Osprey Pump Controller 1.0.1 Administrator Backdoor Access

Title: Osprey Pump Controller 1.0.1 Administrator Backdoor Access
Advisory ID: ZSL-2023-5747
Type: Local/Remote
Impact: System Access, Security Bypass, DoS
Risk: (5/5)
Release Date: 27.02.2023

Summary

Providing pumping systems and automated controls for golf courses and turf irrigation, municipal water and sewer, biogas, agricultural, and industrial markets. Osprey: door-mounted, irrigation and landscape pump controller.

Technology hasn’t changed dramatically on pump and electric motors in the last 30 years. Pump station controls are a different story. More than ever before, customers expect the smooth and efficient operation of VFD control. Communications—monitoring, remote control, and interfacing with irrigation computer programs—have become common requirements. Fast and reliable accessibility through cell phones has been a game changer.

ProPump & Controls can handle any of your retrofit needs, from upgrading an older relay logic system to a powerful modern PLC controller, to converting your fixed speed or first generation VFD control system to the latest control platform with communications capabilities.

We use a variety of solutions, from MCI-Flowtronex and Watertronics package panels to sophisticated SCADA systems capable of controlling and monitoring networks of hundreds of pump stations, valves, tanks, deep wells, or remote flow meters.

User friendly system navigation allows quick and easy access to all critical pump station information with no password protection unless requested by the customer. Easy to understand control terminology allows any qualified pump technician the ability to make basic changes without support. Similar control and navigation platform compared to one of the most recognized golf pump station control systems for the last twenty years make it familiar to established golf service groups nationwide. Reliable push button navigation and LCD information screen allows the use of all existing control panel door switches to eliminate the common problems associated with touchscreens.

Global system configuration possibilities allow it to be adapted to virtually any PLC or relay logic controlled pump stations being used in the industrial, municipal, agricultural and golf markets that operate variable or fixed speed. On board Wi-Fi and available cellular modem option allows complete remote access.

Description

The controller has a hidden administrative account ‘admin’ that has the hardcoded password ‘Mirage1234’ that allows full access to the web management interface configuration. The user admin is not visible in Usernames & Passwords menu list (120) of the application and the password cannot be changed through any normal operation of the device. The backdoor lies in the /home/pi/Mirage/Mirage_ValidateSessionCode.x ELF binary.

Vendor

ProPump and Controls, Inc. - <https://www.propumpservice.com> | <https://www.pumpstationparts.com>

Affected Version

Software Build ID 20211018, Production 10/18/2021
Mirage App: MirageAppManager, Release [1.0.1]
Mirage Model 1, RetroBoard II

Tested On

Apache/2.4.25 (Raspbian)
Raspbian GNU/Linux 9 (stretch)
GNU/Linux 4.14.79-v7+ (armv7l)
Python 2.7.13 [GCC 6.3.0 20170516]
GNU gdb (Raspbian 7.12-6) 7.12.0.20161007-git
PHP 7.0.33-0+deb9u1 (Zend Engine v3.0.0 with Zend OPcache v7.0.33)

Vendor Status

[05.01.2023] Vulnerabilities discovered.
[07.01.2023] Vendor contacted.
[09.01.2023] No response from the vendor.
[10.01.2023] Vendor contacted.
[10.01.2023] CISA contacted through CVD.
[10.01.2023] Submitted to VINCE.
[12.01.2023] CISA/VINCE asked for more details.
[13.01.2023] Provided PoCs to CISA.
[13.01.2023] Provided PoCs to VINCE and discovered XSS in VINCE.
[26.01.2023] No response from VINCE.
[26.01.2023] CISA closes incident: INC000010422052. NCISS Score: Baseline - Negligible (White). A Baseline–Negligible priority incident is an incident that is highly unlikely to affect public health or safety, national security, economic security, foreign relations, civil liberties, or public confidence. No further actions required by CISA.
[26.02.2023] No response from the vendor.
[27.02.2023] Public security advisory released.

PoC

osprey_backdoor.txt

Credits

Vulnerability discovered by Gjoko Krstic - <[email protected]>

References

[1] <https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/cisa-national-cyber-incident-scoring-system-nciss&gt;
[2] <https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/171165/&gt;
[3] <https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2023-28654&gt;
[4] <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-28654&gt;
[5] <https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-23-082-06&gt;
[6] <https://fortiguard.fortinet.com/encyclopedia/ips/52704&gt;
[7] <https://fortiguard.fortinet.com/encyclopedia/fct-app/52704&gt;
[8] <https://www.securityweek.com/unpatched-security-flaws-expose-water-pump-controllers-to-remote-hacker-attacks/&gt;
[9] <https://www.hackread.com/cisa-vulnerability-propump-osprey-pump-controller/&gt;
[10] <https://www.isssource.com/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-osprey-pump-controller/&gt;
[11] <https://www.csirtcv.gva.es/sci-multiples-vulnerabilidades-en-controladores-de-bomba-osprey-de-propump/&gt;
[12] <https://nki.gov.hu/it-biztonsag/hirek/vizugyi-rendszereket-erinto-kritikus-serulekenysegekre-figyelmeztet-a-cisa/&gt;
[13] <https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/water-pump-controllers-vulnerable-remote-hacker-due-christian/&gt;

Changelog

[27.02.2023] - Initial release
[23.03.2023] - Added reference [2], [3], [4], [5], [6] and [7]
[30.03.2023] - Added reference [8]
[10.04.2023] - Added reference [9], [10], [11], [12] and [13]

Contact

Zero Science Lab

Web: <https://www.zeroscience.mk>
e-mail: [email protected]