CommScope Ruckus IoT Controller 1.7.1.0 Hard-Coded System Passwords Vulnerability

CommScope Ruckus IoT Controller 1.7.1.0 Hard-Coded System Passwords Vulnerability

1. Vulnerability Details

     Affected Vendor: CommScope
     Affected Product: Ruckus IoT Controller
     Affected Version: 1.7.1.0 and earlier
     Platform: Linux
     CWE Classification: CWE-259: Use of Hard-coded Password
     CVE ID: CVE-2021-33218


2. Vulnerability Description

     Hard coded, system-level credentials exist on the Ruckus IoT
     Controller OVA image, and are exposed to attackers who mount
     the filesystem.


3. Technical Description

     Ruckus vRIoT server software is available from the software
     library at: https://support.ruckuswireless.com/software/

     Once the OVA is imported into VirtualBox, a VMDK file is
     created. The VMDK file can be mounted and the directory
     structure and its contents can be perused. The virtual appliance
     contains three system accounts with password hashes. The three
     accounts are 'root', 'admin', and 'vriotha'. The 'admin'
     account is documented in vendor documentation, but not the
     other two accounts.

     The password for 'admin' is documented and can be changed
     by the user. The password for the 'vriotha' account is
     'nplus1user'. The password for the 'vriotha' account
     is hardcoded into support scripts. The root hash is still
     undergoing password cracking attempts. The 'admin' and 'vriotha'
     accounts are restricted in terms of their shell, they do
     not drop to typical Unix shell access. The virtual appliance
     does not appear to offer a mechanism for changing the default
     password from the vendor for the 'root' or 'vriotha' accounts.


4. Mitigation and Remediation Recommendation

     The vendor has released an updated firmware (1.8.0.0) which
     remediates the described vulnerability. Firmware and release
     notes are available at:

     https://www.commscope.com/globalassets/digizuite/917216-faq-security-advisory-id-20210525-v1-0.pdf


5. Credit

     This vulnerability was discovered by Jim Becher (@jimbecher)
     of KoreLogic, Inc.


6. Disclosure Timeline

     2021.03.30 - KoreLogic submits vulnerability details to
                  CommScope.
     2021.03.30 - CommScope acknowledges receipt and the intention
                  to investigate.
     2021.04.06 - CommScope notifies KoreLogic that this issue,
                  along with several others reported by KoreLogic,
                  will require more than the standard 45 business
                  day remediation timeline.
     2021.04.06 - KoreLogic agrees to extend disclosure embargo if
                  necessary.
     2021.04.30 - CommScope informs KoreLogic that remediation for
                  this vulnerability will be available inside of the
                  standard 45 business day timeline. Requests
                  KoreLogic acquire CVE number for this
                  vulnerability.
     2021.05.14 - 30 business days have elapsed since the
                  vulnerability was reported to CommScope.
     2021.05.17 - CommScope notifies KoreLogic that the patched
                  version of the firmware will be available the week
                  of 2021.05.24.
     2021.05.19 - KoreLogic requests CVE from MITRE.
     2021.05.19 - MITRE issues CVE-2021-33218.
     2021.05.25 - CommScope releases firmware 1.8.0.0 and associated
                  advisory.
     2021.05.26 - KoreLogic public disclosure.


7. Proof of Concept

     With the VMDK file mounted at the current working directory:
     $ sudo cat etc/shadow
     root:$1$root$.6wlmowMW0KVjst8z6Yqa.:17393:0:99999:7:::
     ...
    
admin:$6$AwyhYDBW$KS5q63LZBuQxPM2RG1N/.TvbaKC5gnoq8ERgMSBGms1EL9IZPrM4SscOvsF/FsoD1fgFjYrJF1as0BSYM0SVa0:17667:0:99999:7:::
    
vriotha:$6$c4jEcmjj$uDjuSxfkzd0QHt/MAGnPJ798izuVhq11MSmkS3iXtDg.iqSumzou4.HauYOrSIYl5JdQlrbZAL7PAkPfrxcxH0:18626:0:99999:7:::

     $ egrep '^root|^admin|^vriotha' etc/passwd
     root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
     admin:x:1001:1001::/home/admin:/VRIOT/ops/scripts/ras
     vriotha:x:1003:1003::/home/vriotha:/usr/bin/rssh

     /VRIOT/ops/scripts/haN1/n1_ha.py:
                 scpstr = "[email protected]"+slave_ip+":/tmp/authkey >/dev/null 2>&1"
                 #call(['sshpass','-p','"nplus1user"','scp','-o','StrictHostKeyChecking=no','/etc/corosync/authkey',scpstr])
                 os.system("
".join(['sshpass','-p','"nplus1user"','scp','-o','StrictHostKeyChecking=no','/etc/corosync/authkey',scpstr]))
     ...
             ### Call slave API to create user #####
             # HOTST_URL = "https://"+replace_ip+"/service/v1/createUser"
             # json_request = {
             #         "username":"vriotha",
             #         "password":"nplus1user"
     ...
             os.system("
".join(['sshpass','-p','"nplus1user"','scp','-o','StrictHostKeyChecking=no','/etc/corosync/authkey',scpstr]))

     /VRIOT/ops/scripts/entrypoint.py:
             userpwd = 'useradd vriotha ; echo vriotha:nplus1user | chpasswd >/dev/null 2>&1'
             os.system(userpwd)
             call(['usermod','-aG','sudo','vriotha'],stdout=devNullFile)
             call(['chsh','-s','/usr/bin/rssh','vriotha'],stdout=devNullFile)

     /VRIOT/ops/scripts/haN1/ha_slave.py:
         scpstr = "[email protected]"+master_ip+":/VRIOT/ha/"
         os.system("
".join(['sshpass','-p','"nplus1user"','scp','-o','StrictHostKeyChecking=no','-r',scpstr,'/VRIOT/'+master_ip+'/']))