| Reporter | Title | Published | Views | Family All 18 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Microsoft Edge Information Disclosure Vulnerability (CNVD-2017-23791) | 9 Aug 201700:00 | – | cnvd | |
| CVE-2017-8659 | 8 Aug 201721:00 | – | cve | |
| CVE-2017-8659 | 8 Aug 201721:00 | – | cvelist | |
| ChakraCore information disclosure vulnerability | 17 May 202202:13 | – | github | |
| August 8, 2017—KB4034674 (OS Build 15063.540) | 8 Aug 201707:00 | – | mskb | |
| KLA11084 Multiple vulnerabilities in Microsoft Edge and Microsoft Internet Explorer | 8 Aug 201700:00 | – | kaspersky | |
| Scripting Engine Information Disclosure Vulnerability | 8 Aug 201707:00 | – | mscve | |
| CVE-2017-8659 | 8 Aug 201721:29 | – | nvd | |
| Microsoft Windows Multiple Vulnerabilities (KB4034674) | 9 Aug 201700:00 | – | openvas | |
| GHSA-H6M7-JPHX-F9P5 ChakraCore information disclosure vulnerability | 17 May 202202:13 | – | osv |
Microsoft Chakra JIT server out-of-bounds write when processing Js::OpCode::ProfiledLoopStart opcode
CVE-2017-8659
There is an issue in Chakra JIT server that can be potentially exploited to compromise the JIT process from a compromised browser content process. Bugs like this could potentially be used to bypass ACG (Arbitrary Code Guard) in Microsoft Edge.
The issue has been confirmed on a ChakraCore build from source.
Chakra JIT server takes bytecode as an input from the calling process. When processing the Js::OpCode::ProfiledLoopStart opcode in IRBuilder::BuildUnsigned1() function in IRBuilder.cpp there is this line
this->m_saveLoopImplicitCallFlags[num] = saveOpnd;
where num is client-controlled (it's an usigned char following the Js::OpCode::ProfiledLoopStart opcode).
m_saveLoopImplicitCallFlags is allocated in IRBuilder.h as
m_saveLoopImplicitCallFlags = (IR::Opnd**)func->m_alloc->Alloc(sizeof(IR::Opnd*) * loopCount);
where loopCount is also client-controlled (workItemData->jitData->bodyData->loopCount).
Thus if a client sets num larger than loopCount, an out-of-bounds write will occur. There appear to be no bounds checks related to this array, there are some asserts that happen *after* the overrwrite already occurred and they will not be present in the Release builds.
Note that there is also an integer overflow when m_saveLoopImplicitCallFlags is being allocated:
sizeof(IR::Opnd*) * loopCount
that's going to affect 32-bit processes.
Speaking of integer overflows that will affect 32-bit processes, there are also several other similar instances such as
this->tempMap = (SymID*)m_tempAlloc->AllocZero(sizeof(SymID) * tempCount);
in IRBuilder.cpp (as far as I can tell tempCount is going to be controllable by the user) an probably other places.
This bug is subject to a 90 day disclosure deadline. After 90 days elapse
or a patch has been made broadly available, the bug report will become
visible to the public.
Found by: ifratric
# 0day.today [2018-04-03] #Data
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