Microsoft Windows - gdi32.dll Multiple Issues in the EMF CREATECOLORSPACEW Record Handling (MS16-055

2016-05-17T00:00:00
ID 1337DAY-ID-26013
Type zdt
Reporter Google Security Research
Modified 2016-05-17T00:00:00

Description

Exploit for windows platform in category dos / poc

                                        
                                            Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=722
 
There are multiple programming errors in the implementation of the CREATECOLORSPACEW record in EMF files, as found in the user-mode gdi32.dll system library. The worst of them may lead to reading beyond allocated heap-based buffers, leading to a crash or potential disclosure of the library client's memory (e.g. Internet Explorer's). Another bug may also lead to disclosure of information regarding the existence of arbitrary files in the file system.
 
Each of the discovered bugs is briefly described below. The analysis was based on a 32-bit gdi32.dll file found in the C:\Windows\SysWOW64 directory on a fully patched Windows 7 operating system.
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- Out-of-bounds read of EMR_CREATECOLORSPACEW.cbData in MRCREATECOLORSPACEW::bCheckRecord
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
The MRCREATECOLORSPACEW::bCheckRecord() function starts off by checking if the length of the record is greater or equal than 0x50 (80):
 
--- cut ---
.text:7DB01AEF                 mov     eax, [esi+4]
.text:7DB01AF2                 cmp     eax, 50h
.text:7DB01AF5                 jb      short loc_7DB01B1E
--- cut ---
 
and then immediately proceeds to reading the .cbData field at offset 0x25c (604):
 
--- cut ---
.text:7DB01AF7                 mov     ecx, [esi+25Ch]
--- cut ---
 
Since the record is not guaranteed to be large enough to hold the value at +0x25c, the instruction shown above can read beyond the allocated buffer. The attached oob.emf file illustrates this issue.
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- Integer overflow when checking EMR_CREATECOLORSPACEW.cbData in MRCREATECOLORSPACEW::bCheckRecord
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
Furthermore, the value obtained from offset +0x25c is also used to verify the record length, as part of the (record.length <= ((record->cbData + 0x263) & 0xfffffffc)) expression:
 
--- cut ---
.text:7DB01AF7                 mov     ecx, [esi+25Ch]
.text:7DB01AFD                 add     ecx, 263h
.text:7DB01B03                 and     ecx, 0FFFFFFFCh
.text:7DB01B06                 cmp     eax, ecx
.text:7DB01B08                 ja      short loc_7DB01B1E
--- cut ---
 
Since there is no overflow check in the arithmetic operation, if the cbData field is sufficiently large, it may overflow the 32-bit type. It is not clear, however, why the record length is required to be *smaller* than the structure's field in the first place (intuitively, it should be larger). Whether this is a mistake or not doesn't really seem to matter, as the optional color space data is not used further in the MRCREATECOLORSPACEW::bPlay() function anyway.
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- Out-of-bounds read in CreateColorSpaceW
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
The LOGCOLORSPACEW structure passed to CreateColorSpaceW() by MRCREATECOLORSPACEW::bPlay() is assumed to be at least 0x24c (588) bytes long. However, as we've seen before, the record is only guaranteed to be at least 80 bytes long. As a result, in case of a specially crafted small record, the CreateColorSpaceW() function could operate on data well beyond the record's buffer. The memory from outside the buffer could then be potentially recovered by reading back pixels using the HTML5 canvas API, and deriving the uninitialized values of the LOGCOLORSPACEW structure.
 
The attached oob.emf file also illustrates this issue (in terms of passing OOB heap data to CreateColorSpaceW), provided that the out-of-bounds .cbData check passes successfully in MRCREATECOLORSPACEW::bCheckRecord(), but this is very likely as there are only a few specific values of .cbData which could cause it to fail.
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- File existence information disclosure in CreateColorSpaceW
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
This is perhaps the most interesting bug found in the handling of the CREATECOLORSPACEW / CREATECOLORSPACE EMF records. After being passed a specially crafted LOGCOLORSPACEW structure, the CreateColorSpaceW() function builds a file path based on the LOGCOLORSPACEW.lcsFilename field, using the BuildIcmProfilePath() routine:
 
--- cut ---
.text:7DAEF12E                 push    104h            ; cchDest
.text:7DAEF133                 lea     eax, [ebp+FileName]
.text:7DAEF139                 push    eax             ; pszDest
.text:7DAEF13A                 push    ebx             ; pszSrc
.text:7DAEF13B                 call    [email protected] ; BuildIcmProfilePath(x,x,x)
--- cut ---
 
While paths starting with "\\" are forbidden (limiting access to remote or internal system resources), all other paths, including absolute ones, are allowed. The function then attempts to open the file in order to make sure that it exists, and if this succeeds, the resulting handle is immediately closed:
 
--- cut ---
      hFile = CreateFileW(&FileName, GENERIC_READ, FILE_SHARE_READ, 0, OPEN_EXISTING, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, 0);
      if ( hFile == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE )
      {
        GdiSetLastError(2016);
        return 0;
      }
      CloseHandle(hFile);
--- cut ---
 
Only if the file exists, the code proceeds to invoking the NtGdiCreateColorSpace system call, which creates a Color Space GDI object based on the input structure. This behavior can be used to disclose information regarding the existence of specific (attacker-chosen) files in the file system through applications (GDI client) which enable the propagation of rendered image's pixels back to the attacker, such as the Internet Explorer web browser.
 
The most intuitive way of propagating the result of the CreateFileW() call would be to insert a crafted CREATECOLORSPACEW record in the EMF file, followed by actual drawing primitives. If the color space creation failed (due to a non-existent file), the remainder of the image wouldn't get parsed and displayed, which could then be easily detected in JavaScript. Unfortunately, the idea is blocked in practice by the fact that even if any of the particular EMF record handlers fail, the gdi32!bInternalPlayEMF function only sets a local "status" variable to FALSE, and continues handling subsequent records nevertheless. The status variable is then returned to the caller, but in case of Internet Explorer, it is immediately discarded in the mshtml!CImgTaskEmf::Decode function:
 
--- cut ---
.text:64162B49                 call    ds:[email protected] ; PlayEnhMetaFile(x,x,x)
.text:64162B4F                 or      dword ptr [ebx+7Ch], 0FFFFFFFFh
.text:64162B53                 lea     eax, [esp+4C8h+var_49C]
--- cut ---
 
As a result, the return value of the CreateFileW() call is completely lost and cannot be inferred directly. Instead, a different, indirect approach must be applied, based on the side effects of the CREATECOLORSPACE record handling. When a color space is created, a corresponding GDI handle is created for the process and stored in the EMF handle table. Considering that the default per-process GDI handle quota is set at 10'000, it is feasible to exhaust it by creating an excessive number of objects. The exploit image could be crafted as follows:
 
1. EMR_HEADER
2. EMR_CREATECOLORSPACE (containing the file system path to examine)
3. EMR_CREATECOLORSPACE
.
.
.
10001. EMR_CREATECOLORSPACE
10002. EMR_CREATEBRUSHINDIRECT
10003. EMR_SELECTOBJECT
10004. EMR_POLYGON
10005. EMR_EOF
 
If the file path specified in the 10000 EMR_CREATECOLORSPACE records exists, the GDI handle space will be filled up, causing the brush creation in step #10002 to fail, and thus the polygon drawn in step #10004 to not have any color. On the other hand, if the file doesn't exist, none of the color spaces will be created, allowing the creation of a brush, which will then be used to draw a colored polygon. When such an image is loaded over a HTML5 canvas, JavaScript can then read the pixels back using canvas.getImageData(), which is synonymous to the existence (or lack) of the chosen file.
 
The attached notepad_leak.emf file illustrates the bug. When it is loaded in Internet Explorer in its original form (checking for the existence of C:\Windows\notepad.exe), the edges of the polygon (rectangle) are visible, but there is no fill color. The IE renderer process should have 10'000 GDI handles opened, which can be verified with Task Manager, Process Explorer, or e.g. by trying to use the context menu within the website's window area (it will misbehave due to lack of available GDI handles). When all instances of the "C:\Windows\notepad.exe" string are replaced with a non-existent (but same length, to preserve metadata correctness) path in the POC file, Internet Explorer will correctly display the green polygon fill, and won't hold an excessive number of handles.
 
James Forshaw noted that the check in BuildIcmProfilePath() against the "\\" prefix (or, in fact, against both '\' and '/' in the first two characters) is not effective in preventing access to UNC paths, as there is an equivalent "\??\" prefix (tested on Windows 7+), which can be used for the same purpose. This observation further elevates the severity of the "file existence information disclosure" bug, as it is now possible to reference nearly all resources the CreateFile() API is capable of opening. Some example risks are as follows:
 
1) By referencing a file on an attacker-controlled server, it is possible to track users opening the crafted EMF file (within any application using GDI, not just Internet Explorer).
 
2) Disclosure of the existence of files residing in network shares available to the currently logged in user.
 
3) James suggested it might also facilitate stealing NTLM hashes.
 
Another note is that the gdi32.dll SETICMPROFILEA and SETICMPROFILEW record handlers also reference the BuildIcmProfilePath() function, so it might be worth doing some light variant analysis to check if any of the path-related problems described in this bug affect those records too.
 
 
Proof of Concept:
https://github.com/offensive-security/exploit-database-bin-sploits/raw/master/sploits/39832.zip

#  0day.today [2018-04-13]  #