Ubiquiti Networks Hardcoded Keys / Remote Management Vulnerabilities

2015-11-05T00:00:00
ID 1337DAY-ID-24507
Type zdt
Reporter Stefan Viehbock
Modified 2015-11-05T00:00:00

Description

Various Ubiquiti Networks products suffer from having hardcoded keys and also having remote management interfaces enabled that can be leveraged by these credentials.

                                        
                                            Ubiquiti Networks Hardcoded Keys / Remote Management

=======================================================================

Vendor description:
-------------------
Ubiquiti Networks develops high-performance networking
technology for service providers and enterprises. Our technology
platforms focus on delivering highly advanced and easily deployable
solutions that appeal to a global customer base in underserved and
underpenetrated markets.

Source: http://ir.ubnt.com/

Vulnerability overview/description:
-----------------------------------
1) Hardcoded cryptographic keys
A certificate including its private key is embedded in the firmware of several
Ubiquiti Networks products. The certificate is used for HTTPS (default server
certificate for web based management).

Impersonation, man-in-the-middle or passive decryption attacks are possible.
These attacks allow an attacker to gain access to sensitive information like
admin credentials and use them in further attacks.

Furthermore searching for the certificate fingerprint in data from internet-wide
scans is a low-cost way of finding the IPs of specific products/product groups and
allows an attacker to exploit vulnerabilities at scale.

2) Remote management enabled by default
The remote management interface is enabled by default. This allows attackers
to exploit vulnerabilities in the device firmware as well as weak credentials
set by the user.

Further information can also be found in our blog post:
http://blog.sec-consult.com/2015/11/the-omnipresence-of-ubiquiti-networks.html

Proof of concept:
-----------------
1) Hardcoded cryptographic keys
OpenSSL text output for the certificate:
Certificate:
    Data:
        Version: 1 (0x0)
        Serial Number: 13408895465235657399 (0xba15f761dbb7b2b7)
    Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
        Issuer: C=US, ST=CA, L=San Jose, O=Ubiquiti Networks Inc.,
OU=Technical Support, CN=UBNT/[email protected]
        Validity
            Not Before: Jun  2 08:35:02 2011 GMT
            Not After : Jan  1 08:35:02 2020 GMT
        Subject: C=US, ST=CA, L=San Jose, O=Ubiquiti Networks Inc.,
OU=Technical Support, CN=UBNT/[email protected]
        Subject Public Key Info:
            Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
                Public-Key: (1024 bit)
                Modulus:
                    00:be:09:9f:14:3a:f7:ee:e5:8a:c9:76:b2:26:17:
                    00:7b:0c:85:1c:94:8e:bd:7f:f5:a1:a5:6d:0a:2c:
                    64:cc:7f:78:bc:11:ee:dc:d9:e6:2a:cb:e1:9e:d8:
                    17:a6:9c:35:aa:da:c5:c1:3a:a5:48:dc:af:bc:99:
                    37:59:7e:88:3c:2c:d3:bb:e7:60:6d:e3:19:f9:4e:
                    18:4c:4c:3a:fd:5e:35:6f:a3:50:b9:50:c0:8e:8b:
                    fa:a0:ee:c4:96:c5:ba:4e:ed:d8:f1:18:05:36:89:
                    54:c2:dc:27:eb:75:74:1c:be:9a:4c:c8:e5:ce:fe:
                    47:44:96:a7:af:10:07:eb:15
                Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
    Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
         00:5a:31:81:3a:15:6d:30:95:8d:03:91:47:aa:23:e2:b4:c0:
         2e:d4:01:cd:d5:21:6b:69:5e:3c:71:27:10:1c:f5:87:d4:28:
         19:17:c2:3d:ec:36:fd:ee:93:07:8f:0b:30:65:0e:28:35:6c:
         25:9e:d8:24:16:85:65:29:da:47:df:30:09:84:33:2c:b4:b4:
         fa:f0:24:40:b9:ee:1e:f0:1c:33:c3:e1:06:70:2e:6b:fe:a0:
         d0:aa:81:6f:cf:1b:70:67:43:01:32:a0:da:bc:8c:a8:91:f3:
         cb:b1:97:30:04:f2:c6:77:e8:89:97:2c:d3:1f:cf:03:f1:fc:
         36:fa

Certificate:
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----

Private Key:
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----

2) Remote management enabled by default
Remote management is available via SSH, HTTP and HTTPS.

Vulnerable / tested versions:
-----------------------------
This vulnerability is not dependent on specific products/versions. We
found the certificate and private key in firmware for at least the
following products:
AF-5X, AF24, AF24HD, AF5, AF5U, AG-HP-2G16, AG-HP-5G23, AG-HP-5G27, AR,
AR-HP, AirGrid M2, AirGrid M5, BM2-Ti, BM2HP, BM5-Ti, BM5HP, Bullet 2,
Bullet 2 HP, Bullet 5, LS2, LS5, LiteStation M5, M2, M3, M365, M5, M900,
MiniStation2, NB-2G18, NB-5G25, NBE-5AC-19, NBE-M5-16, NBE-M5-19, NBM3,
NBM365, NBM9, NS2, NS5, NSM2, NSM3, NSM365, NSM5, NanoStation 2 Loco,
NanoStation 5 Loco, PBE-5AC-500, PBE-5AC-620, PBE-M2-400, PBE-M5-300,
PBE-M5-400, PBM10, PBM3, PBM365, PBM5, PicoStation2, PicoStation2HP,
PicoStation5, Power AP N, PowerStation 2, PowerStation 5, R5AC-Lite,
R5AC-PTMP, R5AC-PTP, RM2-Ti, RM5-Ti, TS-16-CARRIER, TS-5-POE, TS-8-PRO,
WispStation5, airGateway, airGateway PRO, airGateway-LR, locoM2, locoM5,
locoM9

Vendor contact timeline:
------------------------
2015-08-17: Contacting vendor through security[email protected]
2015-08-17: Auto-response: Vulnerability reports are processed via HackerOne.
2015-08-18: Reporting vulnerability via HackerOne (#83038, #83039)
2015-09-22: Vendor responds, enhancement to generate unique certificates will
be added.
2015-10-23: HackerOne ticket closed by ubnt
2015-11-05: No further responses received. Release of the advisory.

Solution:
---------
Not available.

Workaround:
-----------
1) Hardcoded cryptographic keys
Generate and import a device-specific certificate.

2) Remote management enabled by default
Disabled all methods for remote management and use strong passwords.

#  0day.today [2018-01-05]  #