FortiAuthenticator v300 build 0007 Multiple Vulnerabilities

Fortinet FortiAuthenticator Multiple Vulnerabilities
Affected Versions: Verified on FortiAuthenticator v300 build 0007 

+-------------+
| Description |
+-------------+
This advisory details multiple vulnerabilities found within the Fortinet
FortiAuthenticator virtual appliance. The FortiAuthenticator is a user
identity management appliance, supporting two factor authentication, RADIUS,
LDAP, 802.1x Wireless Authentication, Certificate management and single sign
on.

The FortiAuthenticator appliance was found to contain a subshell bypass
vulnerability, allowing remote administrators to gain root level access via
the command line. Local file and password disclosure vulnerabilities were
discovered, as well as a Reflected Cross Site Scripting vulnerability within
the SCEP system.

+--------------+
| Exploitation |
+--------------+
--[ dbgcore_enable_shell_access Subshell Bypass

By logging into the Fortinet Authenticator and executing the ‘shell’ command,
a malicious user can gain a root /bin/bash shell on the server. However,
unless the /tmp/privexec/dbgcore_enable_shell_access file exists (the contents
of this file are irrelevant), then the command returns ‘shell: No such
command.'  If the file is present, then the command succeeds and a root shell
is given. 
 
The ‘/tmp/privexec/dbgcore_enable_shell_access’ file can be created by using
the ‘load-debug-kit’ command and specifying a network accessible tftp server
with the relevant debug kit. The debug kits were found to be generated by an
internal Fortinet tool called ‘mkprivexec’. The ‘load-debug-kit’ command
expects encrypted binaries which are subsequently executed.

An attacker that can either generate a valid debug kit or create the
appropriate file in /tmp/privexec can therefore get a root shell. This is
likely a workaround for CVE-2013-6990, however an attacker can still obtain
root level command line access with some additional steps.

--[ Local File Disclosure

A malicious user can pass the ‘-f’ flag to the ‘dig’ command and read files
from the filesystem. An example would be executing 'dig -f /etc/passwd' and
observing the dig commands output, retrieving the /etc/passwd files contents.
 
--[ Password Disclosure

A malicious user may use the debug logging functionality within the Fortinet
FortiAuthenticator administrative console to obtain the passwords of the
PostgreSQL database users. The disclosed passwords were found to be weak and
are static across Fortinet FortiAuthenticator appliances. The following
credentials were enumerated:

+-----------------+
|Username:Password|
+-----------------+
|  slony : slony  |
|www-data:www-data|
+-----------------+
 
--[ Reflected Cross Site Scripting

By coercing a legitimate user (usually through a social engineering attack) to
visit a specific FortiAuthenticator URL, an attacker may execute malicious
JavaScript in the context of the user’s browser. This can subsequently be used
to harm the user’s browser or hijack their session. This is due to the
‘operation’ parameter in the SCEP service being reflected to the end user
without sufficient input validation and output scrubbing. The following
URL can be used to replicate the Reflected Cross Site Scripting vulnerability:

https://<FortiAuthenticatorIP>/cert/scep/?operation=<script>alert(1)</script>

+----------+
| Solution |
+----------+
No official solution is currently available for these vulnerabilities. Email
correspondence with Fortinet suggests that the Local File Disclosure and
Password Disclosure vulnerabilities have been resolved in version 3.2. No
official documentation was found to confirm this.

+---------------------+
| Disclosure Timeline |
+---------------------+
08/10/2014 -  Initial email sent to Fortinet PSIRT team.
09/10/2014 -  Advisory documents sent to Fortinet.
15/10/2014 -  Acknowledgement of advisories from Fortinet.
16/10/2014 -  Fortinet advised the Local File and Password disclosure issues would be resolved in the 3.2 release.
31/10/2014 -  Additional information sent to Fortinet RE Reflected XSS
03/11/2014 -  Additional information sent to Fortinet RE Reflected XSS
02/12/2014 -  Update requested from Fortinet.
13/12/2014 -  Update requested from Fortinet.
29/01/2015 -  Advisory Release.

#  0day.today [2018-01-10]  #