CVE-2024-41003

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix reg_set_min_max corruption of fake_reg
Juan reported that after doing some changes to buzzer [0] and implementing
a new fuzzing strategy guided by coverage, they noticed the following in
one of the probes:
[…]
13: (79) r6 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0) ; R0=map_value(ks=4,vs=8)
R6_w=scalar()
14: (b7) r0 = 0 ; R0_w=0
15: (b4) w0 = -1 ; R0_w=0xffffffff
16: (74) w0 >>= 1 ; R0_w=0x7fffffff
17: (5c) w6 &= w0 ; R0_w=0x7fffffff
R6_w=scalar(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=umax32=0x7fffffff,var_off=(0x0;
0x7fffffff))
18: (44) w6 |= 2 ;
R6_w=scalar(smin=umin=smin32=umin32=2,smax=umax=umax32=0x7fffffff,var_off=(0x2;
0x7ffffffd))
19: (56) if w6 != 0x7ffffffd goto pc+1
REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (true_reg2): range bounds violation
u64=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] s64=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] u32=[0x7fffffff,
0x7ffffffd] s32=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] var_off=(0x7fffffff, 0x0)
REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (false_reg1): range bounds violation
u64=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] s64=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] u32=[0x7fffffff,
0x7ffffffd] s32=[0x7fffffff, 0x7ffffffd] var_off=(0x7fffffff, 0x0)
REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (false_reg2): const tnum out of sync with range
bounds u64=[0x0, 0xffffffffffffffff] s64=[0x8000000000000000,
0x7fffffffffffffff] u32=[0x0, 0xffffffff] s32=[0x80000000, 0x7fffffff]
var_off=(0x7fffffff, 0x0)
19: R6_w=0x7fffffff
20: (95) exit
from 19 to 21: R0=0x7fffffff
R6=scalar(smin=umin=smin32=umin32=2,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=0x7ffffffe,var_off=(0x2;
0x7ffffffd)) R7=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) R9=ctx() R10=fp0
fp-24=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) fp-40=mmmmmmmm
21: R0=0x7fffffff
R6=scalar(smin=umin=smin32=umin32=2,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=0x7ffffffe,var_off=(0x2;
0x7ffffffd)) R7=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) R9=ctx() R10=fp0
fp-24=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) fp-40=mmmmmmmm
21: (14) w6 -= 2147483632 ;
R6_w=scalar(smin=umin=umin32=2,smax=umax=0xffffffff,smin32=0x80000012,smax32=14,var_off=(0x2;
0xfffffffd))
22: (76) if w6 s>= 0xe goto pc+1 ;
R6_w=scalar(smin=umin=umin32=2,smax=umax=0xffffffff,smin32=0x80000012,smax32=13,var_off=(0x2;
0xfffffffd))
23: (95) exit
from 22 to 24: R0=0x7fffffff R6_w=14 R7=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) R9=ctx()
R10=fp0 fp-24=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) fp-40=mmmmmmmm
24: R0=0x7fffffff R6_w=14 R7=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) R9=ctx() R10=fp0
fp-24=map_ptr(ks=4,vs=8) fp-40=mmmmmmmm
24: (14) w6 -= 14 ; R6_w=0
[…]
What can be seen here is a register invariant violation on line 19. After
the binary-or in line 18, the verifier knows that bit 2 is set but knows
nothing about the rest of the content which was loaded from a map value,
meaning, range is [2,0x7fffffff] with var_off=(0x2; 0x7ffffffd). When in
line 19 the verifier analyzes the branch, it splits the register states
in reg_set_min_max() into the registers of the true branch (true_reg1,
true_reg2) and the registers of the false branch (false_reg1, false_reg2).
Since the test is w6 != 0x7ffffffd, the src_reg is a known constant.
Internally, the verifier creates a “fake” register initialized as scalar
to the value of 0x7ffffffd, and then passes it onto reg_set_min_max(). Now,
for line 19, it is mathematically impossible to take the false branch of
this program, yet the verifier analyzes it. It is impossible because the
second bit of r6 will be set due to the prior or operation and the
constant in the condition has that bit unset (hex(fd) == binary(1111 1101).
When the verifier first analyzes the false / fall-through branch, it will
compute an intersection between the var_off of r6 and of the constant. This
is because the verifier creates a “fake” register initialized to the value
of the constant. The intersection result later refines both registers in
regs_refine_cond_op():
[…]
t = tnum_intersect(tnum_subreg(reg1->var_off),
tnum_subreg(reg2->var_off));
reg1->var_o
—truncated—