CVE-2024-27415

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: bridge: confirm multicast packets before passing them up the
stack conntrack nf_confirm logic cannot handle cloned skbs referencing the
same nf_conn entry, which will happen for multicast (broadcast) frames on
bridges. Example: macvlan0 | br0 / \ ethX ethY ethX (or Y) receives a L2
multicast or broadcast packet containing an IP packet, flow is not yet in
conntrack table. 1. skb passes through bridge and fake-ip
(br_netfilter)Prerouting. -> skb->_nfct now references a unconfirmed entry
2. skb is broad/mcast packet. bridge now passes clones out on each bridge
interface. 3. skb gets passed up the stack. 4. In macvlan case, macvlan
driver retains clone(s) of the mcast skb and schedules a work queue to send
them out on the lower devices. The clone skb->_nfct is not a copy, it is
the same entry as the original skb. The macvlan rx handler then returns
RX_HANDLER_PASS. 5. Normal conntrack hooks (in NF_INET_LOCAL_IN) confirm
the orig skb. The Macvlan broadcast worker and normal confirm path will
race. This race will not happen if step 2 already confirmed a clone. In
that case later steps perform skb_clone() with skb->_nfct already confirmed
(in hash table). This works fine. But such confirmation won’t happen when
eb/ip/nftables rules dropped the packets before they reached the nf_confirm
step in postrouting. Pablo points out that nf_conntrack_bridge doesn’t
allow use of stateful nat, so we can safely discard the nf_conn entry and
let inet call conntrack again. This doesn’t work for bridge netfilter: skb
could have a nat transformation. Also bridge nf prevents re-invocation of
inet prerouting via ‘sabotage_in’ hook. Work around this problem by
explicit confirmation of the entry at LOCAL_IN time, before upper layer has
a chance to clone the unconfirmed entry. The downside is that this disables
NAT and conntrack helpers. Alternative fix would be to add locking to all
code parts that deal with unconfirmed packets, but even if that could be
done in a sane way this opens up other problems, for example: -m physdev
–physdev-out eth0 -j SNAT --snat-to 1.2.3.4 -m physdev --physdev-out eth1
-j SNAT --snat-to 1.2.3.5 For multicast case, only one of such conflicting
mappings will be created, conntrack only handles 1:1 NAT mappings. Users
should set create a setup that explicitly marks such traffic NOTRACK
(conntrack bypass) to avoid this, but we cannot auto-bypass them, ruleset
might have accept rules for untracked traffic already, so user-visible
behaviour would change.