### Executive summary Most users assume they are safe when surfing the web on a daily basis. But information-stealing malware can operate in the background of infected systems, looking to steal users' passwords, track their habits online and hijack personal information. Cisco Talos has monitored adversaries which are behind a wave of ongoing campaigns dropping well-known information-stealer like Agent Tesla, Loki-bot and others since at least January 2019. The adversaries using custom droppers, which inject the final malware into common processes on the victim machine. Once infected, the malware can steal information from many popular pieces of software, including the Google Chrome, Safari and Firefox web browsers. The injection techniques we're seeing in the wild are well-known and have been used for many years, but with the adversaries customizing them, traditional anti-virus systems are having a hard time detecting the embedded malware. In this post, we'll walk through one of these campaigns in detail and how the different stages of the dropper hide the malware. Any internet user is a potential target of this malware, and if infected, has the potential to completely take away a user's online privacy. ### Technical overview The campaigns we analyzed started with a malicious email similar to the one below: [![](https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-TMvwUeX4qeQ/Xc0Ve28RmsI/AAAAAAAABWo/WUlgoAimdEMhxQlGoCq3HWdWPLtUmQsRwCLcBGAsYHQ/s640/image6.png)]() --- Figure 1 - Phishing email An ARJ archive is attached to this email. ARJ is an early 1990s archive format often used on the pirated software scene to convert files into archives. ARJ can split the archive into multiple smaller files. This made it easier to share these files over dial-up connections. ARJ archives can be unpacked with various tools like 7-Zip or WinRAR. Users can easily find an unpacker by double-clicking on the file and searching in the Windows Store for the appropriate software. We often see that adversaries use old archive formats, hoping to bypass weak email security gateways. In this case, this archive wasn't split into multiple files and it contained only a single executable with the name: "IMP_Arrival Noticedoc.exe". This actor often used filenames with the schema "...<MS Office extension>.exe. In other campaigns by this adversary, we also saw completely different names and different file types like malicious office documents acting as first stage droppers. In this blog post, we will focus on the first ones. ### Dropper Most of the executables are compiled, sometimes UPX packed, AutoIt scripts that can be easily decompiled. Unfortunately, as usual, the content was heavily obfuscated before compilation. Figure 2 shows the decompiled version of the script. [![](https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-gwFiJeCd484/Xc0Vk6R9mgI/AAAAAAAABWs/E3HnTo3z2HYFJXiK7fDg9dwXPJ5RlLtYQCLcBGAsYHQ/s640/image2.png)]() --- Figure 2 - Decompiled version of the AutoIT script The deobfuscated version of the AutoIT script in Figures 3 and 4 shows that it comes with some anti-VM checks in the beginning. These checks are very typical for AgentTesla campaigns for years, you can often find them in one or the other form in the first stage droppers. [![](https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-3AVPYhK-Y_s/Xc0VpUF9foI/AAAAAAAABWw/fkBBI43fsh4mvwZhFYd11qodh1eE4rORgCLcBGAsYHQ/s640/image5.png)]() --- Figure 3 - Start of the deobfuscated AutoIT script [![](https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-Yc843Al4Y50/Xc0VszGCuJI/AAAAAAAABW0/2tNfCwCwcAMpJgMalXFxtPcGujo6rsZiQCLcBGAsYHQ/s640/image11.png)]() --- Figure 4 - VM checks of the deobfuscated AutoIT script If these checks do not find anything, it is decoding and extracting resource font type (8) names from the string in the first parameter ($data) handed over to the DecodeDataFromPEResourceOrString function (Figure 7). In the GetResourcesFromPE function (Figure 6), this parameter is converted into a string and split into the different font resource names. The result is a list of strings in the following order: 1. SystemPropertiesDataExecutionPreventionM 2. Windows.Media.BackgroundPlaybackK 3. windeployL 4. LaunchWinAppX 5. ccaF 6. CellularAPIQ 7. MuiUnattendE 8. RmClientE 9. ucsvcG 10. refsutilV 11. SpeechRuntimeV 12. DPTopologyAppv2_0N These font type resources are then extracted from the PE resources and concatenated to a large binary. [![](https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-mdqkMxgXDbM/Xc0VxsK4aSI/AAAAAAAABW8/ytgPIqZ8HEsW-ip_e-ZwHp6c1XQUUcAlwCLcBGAsYHQ/s640/image7.png)]() --- Figure 5 - Resource Section of IMP_Arrival Noticedoc.exe [![](https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-hDSf-QlEpUA/Xc0V1ZkganI/AAAAAAAABXA/liViriCVmJwgpZlT_DIC6DuddpzwqnoCwCLcBGAsYHQ/s640/image1.png)]() --- Figure 6 - GetResourcesFromPE Function The result is stored again in the $data variable (Line 245 in Figure 7) and the order of the stored bytes is reversed by StringReverse(BinaryToString($data)) in Line 246. This is the final payload malware in an RC4 encrypted form. The variable $sopcode contains the bytes of the RC4 code. After preparing the shellcode and the encrypted payload data, the RC4 function is getting executed in line 262 and decrypts the payload. [![](https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-RE614H8Zmo4/Xc0V6DE4YjI/AAAAAAAABXI/pto_EVAtlbsps1jmBScQu4kZizZ_kkYZQCLcBGAsYHQ/s640/image10.png)]() --- Figure 7 - DecodeDataFromPEResourceOrString RC4 Function The following pictures show the disassembled RC4 shellcode: [![](https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-6BljF3aOMRM/Xc0V-jTDwCI/AAAAAAAABXQ/U8CVg34Z7nIKZXA7r6V3tqrbrh5hI1ZkwCLcBGAsYHQ/s640/image12.png)]() --- Figure 8 - RC4 function ($opcode variable) After the payload is decrypted, the script calls the final InjectPayloadIntoProcess function to inject the payload into another process. It is offering nine different legit process options for this injection. The adversary eventually selects which one will be used by providing the corresponding number to the function. [![](https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-RwwHwGB8dIE/Xc0WCimfskI/AAAAAAAABXY/nFS779K4CzcNSe8rCjx8cSz-CAkW0gBvQCLcBGAsYHQ/s640/image17.png)]() --- Figure 9 - Injection victim process selection In this case, the adversaries picked option one — RegAsm.exe — to hide the payload. The rest of the function is quite similar to what was already described in other blogs. It is preparing the local injection shellcode ($a5_local_shellcode) and executing it in Line 211 in Figure 10. As mentioned before, this code finally hides the payload inside of the selected legit process. The decoded payload is handed over to this injection shellcode as the last parameter ($a4_payload_code). [![](https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-wzwsd3P6LFc/Xc0WGmzsswI/AAAAAAAABXg/SixSUS02o6gPYwETRIIULTo8QSK5qEInACLcBGAsYHQ/s640/image13.png)]() --- Figure 10 - Process Injection code of the AutoIT script The AutoIT script contains several additional functions that are not used in this campaign. For example, functions for the following tasks: * Write a file to the TEMP directory and execute it. * Download a file from the internet and execute it. * Execute a script via the command line. * Privilege escalation. The AutoIT scripts in the different campaigns are always very similar to the one described above. It usually just differs by how they built the payload. Some scripts extract the payload from the resource section as described above, others have the encrypted payload stored in a large string inside the AutoIT script (Figure 11). The decoding function shown in Figure 7 is more or less the same, but the $rt parameter is set to -1, which means the GetResourcesFromPE function (Figure 6) doesn't do anything, except returning the unmodified content of the $data variable, or in other words the content of the $payload variable in Figure 11. [![](https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-DsU8L_qEqOo/Xc0WK0qcGbI/AAAAAAAABXo/CpJsRTuWykMvYocBkriKO32SlFBbAksoQCLcBGAsYHQ/s640/image9.png)]() --- Figure 11 - Long String based AutoIT script start The Injection part of these scripts always work more or less the same, Figure 12 shows an example of another script. [![](https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-x7Ds47TzRdE/Xc0WPvpTZPI/AAAAAAAABXs/lscDI3su0Dw-C3vThX6MUwqv3Xi5ebwHwCLcBGAsYHQ/s640/image3.png)]() --- Figure 12 - Long String based AutoIT script injection part ### Payload The injected payload is in many cases an obfuscated version of AgentTesla. The software is capable of stealing credentials from most browsers, email clients, SSH/SFTP/FTP clients and other software. Please see the IOC section below for additional details. It supports exfiltration via SMTP, FTP and HTTP exfiltration. In this case, it only used SMTP. This version is very similar to the one described by Yoroi in the payload section of their [blog post](), except it is not obfuscated with any obfuscator detected by the latest de4dot. Some functions are also slightly modified or reordered, but most of them are probably done by the obfuscator. We think it is close to the customized Agent Tesla version that's been circulating online since several months. [![](https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-BxVWZwXODB0/Xc0WUFbSXkI/AAAAAAAABX0/9nbw4JhdAdAkg4gdi6PTJNNrtDMNTZcjQCLcBGAsYHQ/s640/image14.png)]() --- Figure 13 - AgentTesla It is resolving configuration settings and suspicious strings at runtime when they are used. The function shown in Figure 10 is implemented in the executables static class constructor (.cctor). It is using the Rijndael algorithm to decrypt certain large arrays. The offset is picked based on the integer which was handed over to the function. On the right side of the screenshot, you can see the length of the array section in purple. [![](https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-FrzL7t99tE4/Xc0WX1ZCf9I/AAAAAAAABX4/MWCZO5Ep4ugbD2yEaMYAH6UdkqYH-_3aQCLcBGAsYHQ/s640/image15.png)]() --- Figure 14 - Agent Tesla decoding routine The next screenshot shows the usage at runtime. For example, decoding certain parameters for email exfiltration. [![](https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-MI-CQ3k3fSg/Xc0Wb_wKCtI/AAAAAAAABYA/trVrzOmRlRAmmh5r-rfnITJ0Dt3hQhlEgCLcBGAsYHQ/s640/image8.png)]() --- Figure 15 - Agent Tesla string obfuscation The fully deobfuscated version of the function looks like this: [![](https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-ghyRrptaVw4/Xc0WfThOYxI/AAAAAAAABYE/RkxVcakXR8oBNe9M6MkYrGsNYDXcMc-AQCLcBGAsYHQ/s640/image16.png)]() --- Figure 16 - Agent Tesla email function (deobfuscated) This is the typical AgentTesla function used for years. It is interesting that it seems to be that the obfuscator is customized for this Agent Tesla version or vice versa. It looks like it is filling in variables at the time it is obfuscating the original code. In functions that are in this sample, but never used and even in a few used ones, some of the hardcoded strings are filled with variables e.g. %filename%. [![](https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-9_Iaq8mx0rc/Xc0WjfHmytI/AAAAAAAABYM/KpFo_HQbqwgtzOCyGNZ0VcSxrXZFHtpnwCLcBGAsYHQ/s640/image18.png)]() --- Figure 17 - Obfuscator variables ## Conclusion This campaign is another example of what modern malware uses to fly under the radar. With the process we've described in this post, the actors can hide the original malware inside the dropper. The malware is only decrypted at runtime and injected into memory — it's never unencrypted on the hard drive. The adversaries use complex droppers that leverage several different obfuscation techniques to make it as hard as possible for antivirus programs to detect the malware. By using these droppers, they can quickly and easily change the final malware for their campaigns. Even known malware is often successfully hidden against anti-virus systems by using these kinds of obfuscation chains. ## Coverage Ways our customers can detect and block this threat are listed below. [![](https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-VPu5V5rp1UA/Xc0WqE4zMZI/AAAAAAAABYY/6DK8BeUstvomdco14gr0FRd3oXbFJ4bdwCLcBGAsYHQ/s1600/image4.png)]() Advanced Malware Protection ([AMP]()) is ideally suited to prevent the execution of the malware detailed in this post. Below is a screenshot showing how AMP can protect customers from this threat. Try AMP for free [here.]() []()Cisco Cloud Web Security ([CWS]()) or Web Security Appliance ([WSA]()) web scanning prevents access to malicious websites and detects malware used in these attacks. [Email Security]() can block malicious emails sent by threat actors as part of their campaign. Network Security appliances such as Next-Generation Firewall ([NGFW]()), Next-Generation Intrusion Prevention System ([NGIPS]()), and [Meraki MX]() can detect malicious activity associated with this threat. [Threat Grid]() helps identify malicious binaries and build protection into all Cisco Security products. [Umbrella](), our secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious domains, IPs, and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network. Additional protections with context to your specific environment and threat data are available from the [Firepower Management Center](). Open Source Snort Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the latest rule pack available for purchase on [Snort.org](). ## IOC **Agent Tesla Stealer capabilities found based on decoded strings:** 1. 7Star Browser 2. Amigo Browser 3. Apple Keychain 4. Becky! Internet Mail 5. Brave Browser 6. Centi Browser 7. Chedot Browser 8. Chrome Browser 9. Chromium Browser 10. Citrio Browser 11. Claws Mail 12. CocCoc Browser 13. Comodo Dragon Browser 14. CoolNovo Browser 15. Coowon Browser 16. CoreFTP 17. Cyberfox Browser 18. DynDNS client 19. Elements Browser 20. Epic Privacy Browser 21. Eudora Mail 22. Firefox Browser 23. FlashFXP FTP client 24. Flock Browser 25. Foxmail 26. FTPCommander 27. FTPGetter 28. FTP Navigator 29. i360 Browser 30. IceCat Browser 31. IceDragon Browser 32. IE/Edge Browser 33. Incredimail 34. Internet Download Manager 35. Iridium Browser 36. JDownloader 37. Keylogger 38. K-Meleon Browser 39. Kometa Browser 40. Liebao Browser 41. Mozilla SeaMonkey 42. Netgate BlackHawk Browser 43. NoIP DNS client 44. Open VPN 45. Opera Browser 46. Opera Mail 47. Orbitum Browser 48. Outlook 49. Pale Moon Browser 50. Paltalk Video Chat 51. PassWd 52. Pidgin 53. PocoMail 54. QIP Surf 55. QQ Browser 56. Safari Browser 57. Screenshots 58. Sleipnir 6 Browser 59. SmartFTP 60. Sputnik Browser 61. SRWare Iron Browser 62. TheBat! Email client 63. Thunderbird 64. Torch Browser 65. Trillian 66. UC Browser 67. uCozMedia Uran 68. Vivaldi Browser 69. WaterFox Browser 70. Wi-Fi Credentials and Profiles 71. Windows Credentials 72. Windows Domain Certificate Credential 73. Windows Domain Password Credential 74. Windows Extended Credential 75. Windows Generic Credential 76. Windows Secure Note 77. Windows Web Password Credential 78. WinSCP 79. WS_FTP Pro FTP client 80. Yandex Browser **Email:** Email: torre@casadavilas[.]com Mailserver: mail[.]casadavilas[.]com **Malware moved to:** C:\Users\Dex Dexter\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpG766.tmp [%TempPath% + "\tmpG" + DateTime.Now.Millisecond + ".tmp"] **Hashes executables:** d076ed9b31172c37a0d6bafae0c18d559f62453f52c17d41dc2e24fd55a91e4a 1c46332d2a0ab693ed1086f8ee78df47798361b4156619e2488cbb6851063373 003ee7d88f3a04cfc1b96744b060170d80da75589c67deaf65adb02d45616bb5 16f9a14d045fa28708710b5a089e1d1a361c8f5702a8574989b1935072c14a1d 4030b864bcff5bd617e3be273387eec3857b019d20b59c8f2f0710f1b1876ede 5246d87a5a69e7d50e7475bda5f9a74c3585188f0c937fcebebdf168043decd7 59880d4c59643d7b268082696931dcbe966780eef072f1150d1ac65dbc95d222 651c520971bc931dc3760b077a8ecd2fd3a7e4535afe2f0fd208168dc2a501e1 694dcad0105052b3b74678a9c0e4ad3c17e8a3e87314863751296d58aa263b23 a758516e200a5afb49ab2082c433fa59a8dbe2cf28973da6691a74759de479e1 b61a6d30e268a406f52aca04cc2a82853968f3516e38d2b5522e9fa5d4c0d3f5 e1954e26d6e82da6906441f30d133ad56b0154777128278d355365da475c4db4 F7303285a2039ab934b696fec43e54fc5c8ab5c6332c62a78891da71f3c2fb82 **ARJ files:** 667519d5fea7b6137de2845dc900cf2813c8fd8c8476b107fe9a281e7aa5248d 198dcc8511236212410e248d66c86236e1f23a79459a4c61aca5c8b913c9539c **Related hashes:** 09dbe016c180e28b748f932805fc35170e348f3201d6939fc2b8368466c69315 10739410391018cedb2bdf6804c4506ea256695935afc34be786894e5cc80602 176d4d6ef5adb9655f63931914fe06688418d6ce62a3bbe6d6f09ccad53cca2f 4059c87e8d39f69e1fb3bc5d094af1dafca73e8b662eb8d6bb850bfb10d1e92e 421a642d23630ee480094dcb51f6ad6dc2430015d54cddbe0dbf299ee26869d4 51aa560a3709127d26dfb9289ec7d9b020558a0ad33b638bbddfaab6b180d7c3 61ee8edf4e9241ac3f5922547577e2c9b6a589b7402845be68c9e4bf377143b4 754fcf3ef2216f15750393c9ee580d1de9bb8b5834532183a7ef09a109b3990f 7a611fac9133845b29b73be71d1e08f2a82ee04a470b11bb0a25692da7c8caed 82ef16248078738591cc548e611a8ce22cb6b30db3ce123bd2900b0ddf644dba 94c3bbcf5af25417b755d9168cf6146b2de52658d8b909e0cdc38efde98df9fc 96bad87dae87cb2c73ce0e2f092dc68adc02a09cc2f549d1a4f390e42c41bf08 a2b174b1679d1a508c70acd2626e297c85aee3da5d50b5a0c7388960b6085c4a a5ddd6719e9ced4f18289103a47bf39ad0e221fcac7ce00ed8e7180865b3c63a aa295b39e3c9fbae2370bfc3bc03528a13fe5ee30d3497fff053fd4ab2ba790f b7d790f4e11364d50c32a0a36fe7c9e159073c905fb4462c8d95e31ea608ede5 be7edfa65d420d6210b5e488b25ffe8a4fc1c37f9f358de97e0915d535766e74 d5cd5875253dbabb6548d96a290e73d196f6db250af8c3ec316d855ef7660f5a da5d248dc77bd464c25fe5ad21ca62e58c69c4cc10cf27a13985432acfa6fd39 ddee0696d2062e1706c368c5066392d56e804c707d6923397cf66d56d2016773 de8fdea527ec9751531f15e727a7221103c5158bf14651faf19e648ec9652a0f e480512a207fc9809035b273dd6c35fcd6caf8829ce5b9d81cc82f2d3b2d5394 e4b55be3eccbac57200e1c5e56d324afa23fdb8b12aba8d5be235b083b5afe0d f05329ffcf221c72570e214a62fb8f04633c8d9e405a4278fd9360e738d9d779 f39c3cea5b1edcc71db1eb140b21f2aa56d9aee87c6d77528b84697aa9b19739 f6f35c3cbf83450d1fecb7101784e6cc89fa13b994ae16199087c2c5119984d3 fc2e81038c1cf19c40b9586889197446b426e8e4ed208931a616d838448fdd23 fc7cf41f41bb94253d946d5db29d65697464772af341e9a2bb20dffb943e716e fe56eb80eb5b119b5c4e56811592029c4d8674061d4fbe89f8174cc4b403cfbf **URLs:** hxxp://premacorceb[.]com/drug/five/fre.php hxxp://www[.]ibsensoftware[.]com/ **IPs:** 194[.]147[.]32[.]237 194[.]58[.]111[.]187 ![](http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/feedburner/Talos/~4/PUK1ri82T6Q)

Custom dropper hide and seek