AntennaHouse DMC HTMLFilter AddSst Code Execution Vulnerability(CVE-2017-2799)

2017-09-18T00:00:00
ID SSV:96513
Type seebug
Reporter Root
Modified 2017-09-18T00:00:00

Description

Summary

An exploitable heap corruption vulnerability exists in the AddSst functionality of AntennaHouse DMC HTMLFilter as used by MarkLogioc 8.0-6. A specially crafted XLS file can cause a heap corruption resulting in arbitrary code execution. An attacker can send/provide a malicious XLS file to trigger this vulnerability.

Tested Versions

AntennaHouse DMC HTMLFilter shipped with MarkLogic 8.0-6 fb1a22fa08c986ec3614284f4e912b0a /opt/MarkLogic/Converters/cvtofc/libdhfrdoc.so 15b0acc464fba28335239f722a62037f /opt/MarkLogic/Converters/cvtofc/libdmccomm.so 1eabb31236c675f9856a7d001b339334 /opt/MarkLogic/Converters/cvtofc/libdhfrxls.so 1415cbc784f05db0e9db424636df581a /opt/MarkLogic/Converters/cvtofc/libdhfcomm.so 4ae366fbd4540dd4c750e6679eb63dd4 /opt/MarkLogic/Converters/cvtofc/libdmcconf.so 81db1b55e18a0cb70a78410147f50b9c /opt/MarkLogic/Converters/cvtofc/libdhfhtmlif.so d716dd77c8e9ee88df435e74fad687e6 /opt/MarkLogic/Converters/cvtofc/libdhf_whtml.so e01d37392e2b2cea757a52ddb7873515 /opt/MarkLogic/Converters/cvtofc/convert

Product URLs

https://www.antennahouse.com/antenna1/

CVSSv3 Score

8.3 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Details

This vulnerability is present in the AntennaHouse DMC HTMLFilter which is used, among others, to convert XLS files to (X)HTML form.
This product is mainly used by MarkLogic for office document conversions as part of their web based document search and rendering engine. A specially crafted XLS file can lead to heap corruption and ultimately to remote code execution. Running the XLS to HTML converter under Valgrind we can see the following result: icewall@ubuntu:~/bugs/cvtofc_86$ valgrind ./convert config_xls/ ==18043== Memcheck, a memory error detector ==18043== Copyright (C) 2002-2013, and GNU GPL'd, by Julian Seward et al. ==18043== Using Valgrind-3.10.1 and LibVEX; rerun with -h for copyright info ==18043== Command: ./convert config_xls/ ==18043== input=/home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/config_xls/toconv.xls output=/home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/config_xls/conv.html type=2 info.options='0' Return from GetFileInfo=0 HtmlInfo.GroupName=UTF-8 HtmlInfo.DefLangName=English HtmlInfo.bBigEndian=0 HtmlInfo.options=0 HtmlInfo.SheetId=0 HtmlInfo.SlideId=0 HtmlInfo.lpFunc=(nil) HtmlInfo.szImageFolder= ==18043== Invalid write of size 1 ==18043== at 0x402F04B: memcpy (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-x86-linux.so) ==18043== by 0x40471CE: AddSst (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/libdhf_rxls.so) ==18043== by 0x4052960: GetWorkBookGlobal (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/libdhf_rxls.so) ==18043== by 0x4052B8A: DHF_RGetObject (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/libdhf_rxls.so) ==18043== by 0x403979E: FilterToHtml (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/libdhf_htmlif.so) ==18043== by 0x4038AFB: DHF_GetHtml_V11 (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/libdhf_htmlif.so) ==18043== by 0x8049AF7: main (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/convert) ==18043== Address 0x652306e is 0 bytes after a block of size 53,414 alloc'd ==18043== at 0x402A17C: malloc (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-x86-linux.so) ==18043== by 0x42DCCB1: DMC_malloc (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/libdmc_comm.so) ==18043== by 0x4047054: AddSst (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/libdhf_rxls.so) ==18043== by 0x4052960: GetWorkBookGlobal (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/libdhf_rxls.so) ==18043== by 0x4052B8A: DHF_RGetObject (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/libdhf_rxls.so) ==18043== by 0x403979E: FilterToHtml (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/libdhf_htmlif.so) ==18043== by 0x4038AFB: DHF_GetHtml_V11 (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/libdhf_htmlif.so) ==18043== by 0x8049AF7: main (in /home/icewall/bugs/cvtofc_86/convert) The heap overflow occurs in the AddSst function triggered by the memcpy, where the buffer related with this overflow is allocated in the same function. The pseudo-code of the most important part of this function looks as follows: Line 1 signed int __cdecl AddSst(struct_a1_4 *a1) Line 2 { Line 3 (...) Line 4 v4 = (unsigned __int16)Exc_GetWord((int)a1, &a1->dword128[index]); Line 5 (...) Line 6 a1->fooStruct[a1->i].buff = DMC_malloc(2 * v4); Line 7 if ( !a1->fooStruct[a1->i].buff ) Line 8 return 12; Line 9 memset((void *)a1->fooStruct[a1->i].buff, 0, 2 * v4); Line 10 (...) Line 11 n = 2 * v4; Line 12 v21 = 0; Line 13 while ( !(flag & 1) && index + n / 2 > a1->length || flag & 1 && n + index > a1->length ) Line 14 { Line 15 if ( flag & 1 ) Line 16 { Line 17 v11 = a1->length - index; Line 18 a1->someSize = v11; Line 19 memcpy((void *)(a1->fooStruct[a1->i].buff + v21), &a1->dword128[index], v11); Line 20 v10 = a1->someSize; Line 21 }

At line 4 the value for v4 is read directly from the file and later used for the allocation at line 6. The memcpy which causes the overflow is located at line 19. The problem occurs because the loop condition for the while loop at line 13 is wrong: flag & 1 && n + index > a1->length

This leads to a situation where bigger index is subtracted from a smaller a1->length value at line 17. This results in an integer underflow and the resulting value is then stored in v11 and is used as a size argument in the memcpy at line 19. As a result the memcpy is attempting to copy a huge amount of data: [----------------------------------registers-----------------------------------] EAX: 0x88ca71f --> 0xc0000000 EBX: 0xf7701c24 --> 0x1fb2c ECX: 0xfffffff9 EDX: 0x8958de0 --> 0x0 ESI: 0x8958de0 --> 0x0 EDI: 0x88c9d10 --> 0x0 EBP: 0xffa3b928 --> 0xffa3b958 --> 0xffa3b988 --> 0xffa3b9b8 --> 0xffa3bd98 --> 0xffa4c108 --> 0x0 ESP: 0xffa3b8e0 --> 0x8958de0 --> 0x0 EIP: 0xf76ee1ca --> 0xff7085e8 EFLAGS: 0x292 (carry parity ADJUST zero SIGN trap INTERRUPT direction overflow) [-------------------------------------code-------------------------------------] 0xf76ee1c7: push ecx 0xf76ee1c8: push eax 0xf76ee1c9: push edx => 0xf76ee1ca: call 0xf76e5254 <memcpy@plt> 0xf76ee1cf: mov eax,DWORD PTR [edi+0x134] 0xf76ee1d5: add DWORD PTR [ebp-0x24],eax 0xf76ee1d8: sub DWORD PTR [ebp-0x20],eax 0xf76ee1db: add esp,0x10 Guessed arguments: arg[0]: 0x8958de0 --> 0x0 arg[1]: 0x88ca71f --> 0xc0000000 arg[2]: 0xfffffff9 The values come from the following locations in the file: a1->length - is the Length of an SST record located at 0x948. flag is coming from wrongly interpreted BoundSheet record located at 0x92E. Exactly one byte from the SheetName field which is "Sheet1" and its first letter "e" is interpreted as a flag. v4 is also coming from the aforrmentioned BoundSheet record. Its WORD size value also comes from SheetName string and is equal : 0x6853 ('Sh').

Crash Information

``` Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. [----------------------------------registers-----------------------------------] EAX: 0x80a89bf --> 0x0 EBX: 0xf7f06000 --> 0x1aada8 ECX: 0xfffefcd9 --> 0x0 EDX: 0x8137000 ESI: 0x8126de0 --> 0xc0000000 EDI: 0x8097d10 --> 0x0 EBP: 0xfffec888 --> 0xfffec8b8 --> 0xfffec8e8 --> 0xfffec918 --> 0xfffeccf8 --> 0xffffd068 --> 0x0 ESP: 0xfffec838 --> 0xf7fd1c24 --> 0x1fb2c EIP: 0xf7e8f2f9 (movntdq XMMWORD PTR [edx],xmm0) EFLAGS: 0x10282 (carry parity adjust zero SIGN trap INTERRUPT direction overflow) [-------------------------------------code-------------------------------------] 0xf7e8f2ea: lea eax,[eax+0x80] 0xf7e8f2f0: lfence 0xf7e8f2f3: sub ecx,0x80 => 0xf7e8f2f9: movntdq XMMWORD PTR [edx],xmm0 0xf7e8f2fd: movntdq XMMWORD PTR [edx+0x10],xmm1 0xf7e8f302: movntdq XMMWORD PTR [edx+0x20],xmm2 0xf7e8f307: movntdq XMMWORD PTR [edx+0x30],xmm3 0xf7e8f30c: movntdq XMMWORD PTR [edx+0x40],xmm4 [------------------------------------stack-------------------------------------] 0000| 0xfffec838 --> 0xf7fd1c24 --> 0x1fb2c 0004| 0xfffec83c --> 0xf7fbe1cf (mov eax,DWORD PTR [edi+0x134]) 0008| 0xfffec840 --> 0x8126de0 --> 0xc0000000 0012| 0xfffec844 --> 0x809871f --> 0xc0000000 0016| 0xfffec848 --> 0xfffffff9 0020| 0xfffec84c --> 0xf7fbdeb2 (pop ebx) 0024| 0xfffec850 --> 0x80f62c0 --> 0x8090e08 --> 0x0 0028| 0xfffec854 --> 0x8098710 --> 0x0 [------------------------------------------------------------------------------] Legend: code, data, rodata, value Stopped reason: SIGSEGV __memcpy_ssse3_rep () at ../sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/memcpy-ssse3-rep.S:1294 1294 ../sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/memcpy-ssse3-rep.S: No such file or directory. gdb-peda$ exploitable Description: Access violation on destination operand Short description: DestAv (9/29) Hash: 2e2274428b15c89dbdab51192d9f77fb.49c0f84a1d8f1a6989793e98f9a59358 Exploitability Classification: EXPLOITABLE Explanation: The target crashed on an access violation at an address matching the destination operand of the instruction. This likely indicates a write access violation, which means the attacker may control the write address and/or value. Other tags: AccessViolation (28/29) gdb-peda$ bt

0 __memcpy_ssse3_rep () at ../sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/memcpy-ssse3-rep.S:1294

1 0xf7fbe1cf in AddSst () from ./libdhf_rxls.so

2 0xf7fc9961 in GetWorkBookGlobal () from ./libdhf_rxls.so

3 0xf7fc9b8b in DHF_RGetObject () from ./libdhf_rxls.so

4 0xf7fd479f in FilterToHtml () from ./libdhf_htmlif.so

5 0xf7fd3afc in DHF_GetHtml_V11 () from ./libdhf_htmlif.so

6 0x08049af8 in main ()

7 0xf7d74af3 in libc_start_main (main=0x8049730 <main>, argc=0x2, argv=0xffffd104, init=0x8049f70 <libc_csu_init>, fini=0x8049f60 <__libc_csu_fini>, rtld_fini=0xf7feb160 <_dl_fini>,

stack_end=0xffffd0fc) at libc-start.c:287

8 0x08048ad1 in _start ()

```

Timeline

  • 2017-02-28 - Vendor Disclosure
  • 2017-05-04 - Public Release

CREDIT

  • Discovered by Marcin 'Icewall' Noga of Cisco Talos.