Broadcom produces Wi-Fi HardMAC SoCs which are used to handle the PHY and MAC layer processing. These chips are present in both mobile devices and Wi-Fi routers, and are capable of handling many Wi-Fi related events without delegating to the host OS. On Android devices, the โbcmdhdโ driver is used in order to communicate with the Wi-Fi SoC (also referred to as โdongleโ).
Along with the regular flow of frames transferred between the host and the dongle, the two communicate with one another via a set of โioctlsโ which can be issued to read or write dongle configuration from the host. This information is exchanged using the SDIO โcontrolโ channel (SDPCM_CONTROL_CHANNEL
) rather than the regular โdataโ and โglomโ channels (which are used to transfer frames).
When the โbcmdhdโ driver performs a network scan, it does so by calling โwl_run_escan
โ. In configurations where P2P scan is enabled (non-legacy configurations), the function first fetches the list of allowed channels in the current regulatory domain. The channels are fetched by issuing the WLC_GET_VALID_CHANNELS
ioctl to the dongle. This ioctlโs results are interpreted as an array of 16-bit values representing channels and a single 32-bit bit value denoting the length of the channel array.
Here is a short snippet from the code handling the P2P scanโs logic:
1. u16* default_chan_list = kzalloc(num_chans * sizeof(*default_chan_list), GFP_KERNEL);
2. u32 n_nodfs = 0
3. ...
4. if (!wl_get_valid_channels(ndev, chan_buf, sizeof(chan_buf))) {
5. list = (wl_uint32_list_t *) chan_buf;
6. n_valid_chan = dtoh32(list->count);
7. for (i = 0; i < num_chans; i++)
8. {
9. _freq = request->channels[i]->center_freq;
10. channel = ieee80211_frequency_to_channel(_freq);
11. ...
12. for (j = 0; j < n_valid_chan; j++) {
13. if (channel == (dtoh32(list->element[j])))
14. default_chan_list[n_nodfs++] = channel;
15. }
16. }
17. }
Where โwl_get_valid_channels
โ is a simple wrapper around the WLC_GET_VALID_CHANNELS
ioctl.
An attacker controlling the dongle can re-write the ioctl handling function (since it is entirely RAM-resident), in order to control the results of the ioctl above. This would allow the attacker to return an arbitrarily large value for โlist->count
โ. Doing so would cause the internal loop (lines 12-15) to iterate many times, and each time a value matching โchannelโ is encountered, line 14 would be executed. Since there is no validation to make sure that โn_nodfs
โ does not exceed the size of โnum_chans
โ, this would cause the loop to overflow the allocated chunk for โdefault_chan_list
โ, corrupting the kernelโs memory.
Iโve been able to statically verify this issue on the โbcmdhd-3.10โ driver, and in the corresponding โbcmdhdโ driver on the Nexus 5 (hammerhead) and Nexus 6Pโs (angler) kernels.