fseventsf_ioctl handles ioctls on fsevent fds acquired via FSEVENTS_CLONE_64 on /dev/fsevents
Heres the code for the FSEVENTS_DEVICE_FILTER_64 ioctl: `` case FSEVENTS_DEVICE_FILTER_64: if (! proc_is64bit(vfs_context_proc(ctx))) { ret = EINVAL; break; } devfilt_args = (fsevent_dev_filter_args64 *)data;
handle_dev_filter:
{
int new_num_devices;
dev_t *devices_not_to_watch, *tmp=NULL;
if (devfilt_args->num_devices > 256) {
ret = EINVAL;
break;
}
new_num_devices = devfilt_args->num_devices;
if (new_num_devices == 0) {
tmp = fseh->watcher->devices_not_to_watch; < ------ (a)
lock_watch_table(); <------ (b)
fseh->watcher->devices_not_to_watch = NULL;
fseh->watcher->num_devices = new_num_devices;
unlock_watch_table(); <------ (c)
if (tmp) {
FREE(tmp, M_TEMP); <------ (d)
}
break;
}
``
Thereβs nothing stopping two threads seeing the same value for devices_not_to_watch at (a), assigning that to tmp then freeing it at (d). The lock/unlock at (b) and Β© donβt protect this.
This leads to a double free, which if you also race allocations from the same zone can lead to an exploitable kernel use after free.
/dev/fsevents is: crw-r--r-- 1 root wheel 13, 0 Feb 15 14:00 /dev/fsevents
so this is a privesc from either root or members of the wheel group to the kernel
tested on MacOS 10.12.3 (16D32) on MacbookAir5,2
(build with-O3)
Attachment: fsevents_race. c