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I - TITLE Security advisory: Arbitrary file disclosure vulnerability in IP3 NetAccess leads to full system compromise II - SUMMARY Description: Arbitrary file disclosure vulnerability in IP3 NetAccess leads to full system compromise Author: Sebastian Wolfgarten (sebastian at wolfgarten dot com) Date: February 11th, 2007 Severity: High References: http://www.devtarget.org/ip3-advisory-02-2007.txt III - OVERVIEW IP3\'s NetAccess is a device created for high demand environments such as convention centers or hotels. It handles the Internet access and provides for instance firewalling, billing, rate-limiting as well as various authentication mechanisms. The device is administrated via SSH or a web-based GUI. Further information about the product can be found online at http://www.ip3.com/poverview.htm. IV - DETAILS Due to inproper input validation, all NetAccess devices with a firmware version less than 188.8.131.52 are vulnerable to an arbitrary file disclosure vulnerability. This vulnerability allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to abuse the web interface and read any file on the remote system. Due to the fact that important system files are world-readable (see bid #17698), this does include /etc/shadow and thus leads to a full compromise of the device! In addition an attacker is able to gain access to the proprietary code base of the device and potentially identify as well as exploit other (yet unknown) vulnerabilities. V - EXPLOIT CODE The trivial vulnerability can be exploited by accessing the file \"getfile.cgi\" with a relative file path such as http://$target/portalgroups/portalgroups/getfile.cgi?filename=../../../../../../../../etc/shadow As the input to the \"filename\" parameter is not properly validated accessing this URL will disclose the contents of /etc/shadow to a remote attacker. VI - WORKAROUND/FIX To address this problem, the vendor has released a new firmware version (184.108.40.206) which is available at http://www.ip3.com. Hence all users of IP3\'s NetAccess devices are asked to install this version immediately. As a temporary workaround, one may also limit the accessibility of the web interface of the device to authorized personnel only. Nevertheless contacting the vendor and installing the new firmware version is highly recommended! VII - DISCLOSURE TIMELINE 31. December 2006 - Notified vendor 31. December 2006 - Vulnerability confirmed 17. January 2007 - Patch released 11. February 2007 - Public disclosure