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Microsoft Security Bulletin (MS00-070)
Patch Available for Multiple LPC and LPC Ports Vulnerabilities
Originally posted: October 03, 2000
Microsoft has released a patch that eliminates several security vulnerabilities in Microsoft(r) Windows NT(r) 4.0 and Windows(r) 2000. The vulnerabilities could allow a range of effects, from denial of service attacks to, in some cases, privilege elevation.
Frequently asked questions regarding this vulnerability and the patch can be found at http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/fq00-070.asp.
Several vulnerabilities have been identified in the Windows NT 4.0 and Windows 2000 implementations of LPC and LPC ports: - The "Invalid LPC Request" vulnerability, which affects only Windows NT 4.0. By levying an invalid LPC request, it would be possible to make the affected system fail. - The "LPC Memory Exhaustion" vulnerability, which affects both Windows NT 4.0 and Windows 2000. By levying spurious LPC requests, it could be possible to increase the number of queued LPC messages to the point where kernel memory would be depleted. - The "Predictable LPC Message Identifier" vulnerability, which affects both Windows NT 4.0 and Windows 2000. Any process that knows the identifier of an LPC message can access it; however, the identifiers can be predicted. In the simplest case, a malicious user could access other process' LPC ports and feed them random data as a denial of service attack. In the worst case, it could be possible under certain conditions to send bogus requests to a privileged process in order to gain additional local privileges - A new variant of the previously-reported "Spoofed LPC Port Request" vulnerability. (For more information, please see http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms00-003.asp). This vulnerability affects Windows NT 4.0 and Windows 2000, and could, under a very restricted set of conditions, allow a malicious user to create a process that would run under the security context of an already-running process, potentially including System processes.
Because LPC can only be used on the local machine, none of these vulnerabilities could be exploited remotely. Instead, a malicious user could only exploit them on machines that he could log onto interactively. Typically, workstations and terminal servers would be chiefly at risk, because, if normal security practices have been followed, normal users will not be allowed to log onto critical servers interactively. This also means that, even in the worst case, the vulnerability would only confer additional local - not domain - privileges on the malicious user.
Note: The Windows NT 4.0 patch can be installed on systems running Service Pack 6a, and will be included in Service Pack 7. The Windows 2000 patch can be installed on systems with or without Service Pack 1, and will be included in Service Pack 2.
Note: Additional security patches are available at the Microsoft Download Center
Please see the following references for more information related to this issue. - Frequently Asked Questions: Microsoft Security Bulletin MS00-070, http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/fq00-070.asp - Microsoft Knowledge Base article Q266433 discusses this issue and will be available soon. - Microsoft TechNet Security web site, http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/default.asp
This is a fully supported patch. Information on contacting Microsoft Product Support Services is available at http://support.microsoft.com/support/contact/default.asp.
Microsoft thanks BindView's Razor Team (http://razor.bindview.com) for reporting these issues to us and helping us protect our customers. The issues involved in these vulnerabilities required several months of detailed engineering, and BindView worked closely with us throughout the process. We'd like to thank them for their ongoing commitment to responsible reporting practices.
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Last Updated October 03, 2000
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