[OpenPKG-SA-2004.026] OpenPKG Security Advisory (apache)

2004-06-03T00:00:00
ID SECURITYVULNS:DOC:6283
Type securityvulns
Reporter Securityvulns
Modified 2004-06-03T00:00:00

Description

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1


OpenPKG Security Advisory The OpenPKG Project http://www.openpkg.org/security.html http://www.openpkg.org openpkg-security@openpkg.org openpkg@openpkg.org OpenPKG-SA-2004.026 27-May-2004


Package: apache (option "with_mod_ssl" only) Vulnerability: arbitrary code execution OpenPKG Specific: no

Affected Releases: Affected Packages: Corrected Packages: OpenPKG CURRENT <= apache-1.3.31-20040524 >= apache-1.3.31-20040527 OpenPKG 2.0 <= apache-1.3.29-2.0.1 >= apache-1.3.29-2.0.2 OpenPKG 1.3 <= apache-1.3.28-1.3.3 >= apache-1.3.28-1.3.4

Dependent Packages: none

Description: Georgi Guninski discovered [1] a stack-based buffer overflow in the "SSLOptions +FakeBasicAuth" implementation of Apache's SSL/TLS extension module mod_ssl [0]. The overflow can occur if the Subject-DN in the client certificate exceeds 6KB in length and mod_ssl is configured to trust the issuing CA. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project assigned the id CAN-2004-0488 [2] to the problem.

Please check whether you are affected by running "<prefix>/bin/rpm -q apache" and "<prefix>/bin/rpm -qi apache | grep with_mod_ssl". If you have the "apache" package with option "with_mod_ssl" installed and its version is affected (see above), we recommend that you immediately upgrade (see Solution) [3][4].

Solution: Select the updated source RPM appropriate for your OpenPKG release [5][6], fetch it from the OpenPKG FTP service [7][8] or a mirror location, verify its integrity [9], build a corresponding binary RPM from it [3] and update your OpenPKG installation by applying the binary RPM [4]. For the most recent release OpenPKG 2.0, perform the following operations to permanently fix the security problem (for other releases adjust accordingly).

$ ftp ftp.openpkg.org ftp> bin ftp> cd release/2.0/UPD ftp> get apache-1.3.29-2.0.2.src.rpm ftp> bye $ <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm -v --checksig apache-1.3.29-2.0.2.src.rpm $ <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm --rebuild --with mod_ssl apache-1.3.29-2.0.2.src.rpm $ su - # <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm -Fvh <prefix>/RPM/PKG/apache-1.3.29-2.0.2.*.rpm


References: [0] http://www.modssl.org/ [1] http://lists.netsys.com/pipermail/full-disclosure/2004-May/021610.html [2] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-0488 [3] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-source [4] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-binary [5] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.3/UPD/apache-1.3.28-1.3.4.src.rpm [6] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.0/UPD/apache-1.3.29-2.0.2.src.rpm [7] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.3/UPD/ [8] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.0/UPD/ [9] http://www.openpkg.org/security.html#signature


For security reasons, this advisory was digitally signed with the OpenPGP public key "OpenPKG <openpkg@openpkg.org>" (ID 63C4CB9F) of the OpenPKG project which you can retrieve from http://pgp.openpkg.org and hkp://pgp.openpkg.org. Follow the instructions on http://pgp.openpkg.org/ for details on how to verify the integrity of this advisory.


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Comment: OpenPKG <openpkg@openpkg.org>

iD8DBQFAtfL+gHWT4GPEy58RAiHXAJ9sFlOogbuUgnwzcLAam4kLK2jo/ACffjv6 giSMaA/9esxIATuQipW17rg= =agtL -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----