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HistoryJun 03, 2004 - 12:00 a.m.

[OpenPKG-SA-2004.026] OpenPKG Security Advisory (apache)

2004-06-0300:00:00
vulners.com
9

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OpenPKG Security Advisory The OpenPKG Project
http://www.openpkg.org/security.html http://www.openpkg.org
[email protected] [email protected]
OpenPKG-SA-2004.026 27-May-2004


Package: apache (option "with_mod_ssl" only)
Vulnerability: arbitrary code execution
OpenPKG Specific: no

Affected Releases: Affected Packages: Corrected Packages:
OpenPKG CURRENT <= apache-1.3.31-20040524 >= apache-1.3.31-20040527
OpenPKG 2.0 <= apache-1.3.29-2.0.1 >= apache-1.3.29-2.0.2
OpenPKG 1.3 <= apache-1.3.28-1.3.3 >= apache-1.3.28-1.3.4

Dependent Packages: none

Description:
Georgi Guninski discovered [1] a stack-based buffer overflow in
the "SSLOptions +FakeBasicAuth" implementation of Apache's SSL/TLS
extension module mod_ssl [0]. The overflow can occur if the Subject-DN
in the client certificate exceeds 6KB in length and mod_ssl is
configured to trust the issuing CA. The Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures (CVE) project assigned the id CAN-2004-0488 [2] to the
problem.

Please check whether you are affected by running "<prefix>/bin/rpm -q
apache" and "<prefix>/bin/rpm -qi apache | grep with_mod_ssl". If you
have the "apache" package with option "with_mod_ssl" installed and its
version is affected (see above), we recommend that you immediately
upgrade (see Solution) [3][4].

Solution:
Select the updated source RPM appropriate for your OpenPKG release
[5][6], fetch it from the OpenPKG FTP service [7][8] or a mirror
location, verify its integrity [9], build a corresponding binary RPM
from it [3] and update your OpenPKG installation by applying the
binary RPM [4]. For the most recent release OpenPKG 2.0, perform the
following operations to permanently fix the security problem (for
other releases adjust accordingly).

$ ftp ftp.openpkg.org
ftp> bin
ftp> cd release/2.0/UPD
ftp> get apache-1.3.29-2.0.2.src.rpm
ftp> bye
$ <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm -v --checksig apache-1.3.29-2.0.2.src.rpm
$ <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm --rebuild --with mod_ssl apache-1.3.29-2.0.2.src.rpm
$ su -

<prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm -Fvh <prefix>/RPM/PKG/apache-1.3.29-2.0.2.*.rpm


References:
[0] http://www.modssl.org/
[1] http://lists.netsys.com/pipermail/full-disclosure/2004-May/021610.html
[2] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-0488
[3] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-source
[4] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-binary
[5] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.3/UPD/apache-1.3.28-1.3.4.src.rpm
[6] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.0/UPD/apache-1.3.29-2.0.2.src.rpm
[7] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.3/UPD/
[8] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.0/UPD/
[9] http://www.openpkg.org/security.html#signature


For security reasons, this advisory was digitally signed with the
OpenPGP public key "OpenPKG <[email protected]>" (ID 63C4CB9F) of the
OpenPKG project which you can retrieve from http://pgp.openpkg.org and
hkp://pgp.openpkg.org. Follow the instructions on http://pgp.openpkg.org/
for details on how to verify the integrity of this advisory.


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