Netfilter Core Team Security Advisory
CVE: CAN-2003-0467
Subject:
Netfilter / NAT Remote DoS
Released:
01 Aug 2003
Effects:
Under limited circumstances, a remote user may be able to crash a
machine doing Network Address Translation (NAT).
Estimated Severity:
Medium.
Systems Affected:
Linux 2.4.20 kernels and recent 2.5 kernels with
CONFIG_IP_NF_NAT_FTP or CONFIG_IP_NF_NAT_IRC enabled, or the
ip_nat_ftp or ip_nat_irc modules loaded, on which ftp and irc users
are not packet filtered out.
Solution:
BEST: Upgrade to Linux kernels 2.4.21 (stable), or apply the patch below.
OR: As a workaround, the modules can be removed, or iptables can
be used to block untrusted users from initiating ftp or irc
connections through the NAT machine.
Details:
This was verified by Rusty Russell on 2.4.20, and verified fixed
with this patch.
Vendor Statement:
Red Hat: All of the 2.4.20-based kernels shipped by Red Hat already
contain the patch and are not vulnerable to this issue.
Others: unknown
Credits:
The problem was found, and the fix implemented by the Netfilter Core Team.
Contact:
[email protected]
diff -urpN --exclude TAGS -X
/home/rusty/devel/kernel/kernel-patches/current-dontdiff --minimal
linux-2.4.21-pre7/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_nat_helper.c
working-2.4.21-pre7-sackadjust/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_nat_helper.c
— linux-2.4.21-pre7/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_nat_helper.c 2003-04-06
15:26:48.000000000 +1000
+++ working-2.4.21-pre7-sackadjust/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_nat_helper.c 2003-04-14
23:18:38.000000000 +1000
@@ -366,54 +365,49 @@ sack_adjust(struct tcphdr *tcph,
}
-/* TCP SACK sequence number adjustment, return 0 if sack found and adjusted /
-static inline int
+/ TCP SACK sequence number adjustment. */
+static inline void
ip_nat_sack_adjust(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct ip_conntrack *ct,
enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo)
struct ip_conntrack *ct,
enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo)
{
struct iphdr *iph;
struct tcphdr *tcph;
unsigned char *ptr;
int length, dir, sack_adjusted = 0;
unsigned char *ptr, *optend;
unsigned int dir;
iph = skb->nh.iph;
tcph = (void *)iph + iph->ihl*4;
length = (tcph->doff*4)-sizeof(struct tcphdr);
tcph = (void *)skb->nh.iph + skb->nh.iph->ihl*4;
optend = (unsigned char *)tcph + tcph->doff*4;
ptr = (unsigned char *)(tcph+1);
dir = CTINFO2DIR(ctinfo);
while (length > 0) {
int opcode = *ptr++;
while (ptr < optend) {
int opcode = ptr[0];
int opsize;
switch (opcode) {
case TCPOPT_EOL:
return !sack_adjusted;
return;
case TCPOPT_NOP:
length--;
ptr++;
continue;
default:
opsize = *ptr++;
if (opsize > length) /* no partial opts */
return !sack_adjusted;
opsize = ptr[1];
/* no partial opts */
if (ptr + opsize > optend || opsize < 2)
return;
if (opcode == TCPOPT_SACK) {
/* found SACK */
if((opsize >= (TCPOLEN_SACK_BASE
+TCPOLEN_SACK_PERBLOCK)) &&
!((opsize - TCPOLEN_SACK_BASE)
% TCPOLEN_SACK_PERBLOCK))
sack_adjust(tcph, ptr-2,
sack_adjust(tcph, ptr,
&ct->nat.info.seq[!dir]);
sack_adjusted = 1;
}
ptr += opsize-2;
length -= opsize;
ptr += opsize;
}
}
return !sack_adjusted;
}
/* TCP sequence number adjustment */
–