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securityvulnsSecurityvulnsSECURITYVULNS:DOC:4197
HistoryMar 13, 2003 - 12:00 a.m.

R7-0010: Buffer Overflow in Lotus Notes Protocol Authentication

2003-03-1300:00:00
vulners.com
12

0.016 Low

EPSS

Percentile

87.5%

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Hash: SHA1


                 Rapid7, Inc. Security Advisory

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Rapid7 Advisory R7-0010
Buffer Overflow in Lotus Notes Protocol Authentication

Published: March 12, 2003
Revision: 1.0
http://www.rapid7.com/advisories/R7-0010.html

CVE: CAN-2003-0122
Lotus SPR: DBAR5CJJJS
IBM Technote: 1105101
Bugtraq ID: 7037

  1. Affected system(s):

    KNOWN VULNERABLE:
    o Lotus Notes R4
    o Lotus Notes R5 up to and including R5.0.11
    o Lotus Notes R6 betas and pre-releases

    NOT VULNERABLE:
    o Lotus Notes R5.0.12
    o Lotus Notes R6.0 Gold
    o Lotus Notes R6.0.1

    UNKNOWN / NOT TESTED:
    o Lotus Notes R3 and earlier

  2. Summary

    Lotus Notes and Domino servers support a proprietary protocol called
    NotesRPC, commonly known as the Notes protocol. This protocol is
    usually bound to TCP port 1352, but can also use NetBIOS, Netware
    SPX, Banyan Vines, and modem dialup for transport.

    When a Notes client connects to a Notes server, it authenticates with
    the server to establish a session. This authentication consists of a
    series of exchanges in which the client and server present each other
    with challenges to verify each other's identity.

    It is possible for an unauthenticated client to manipulate the data
    during this exchange to trigger a buffer overflow on the Notes
    server. This allows an attacker to overwrite large sections of the
    heap with arbitrary data. While our testing only covered TCP/IP, we
    believe it is possible for this overflow to be triggered via other
    protocols, including dialup. It is theoretically possible for an
    attacker to supply the data in such a way as to compromise the
    Notes server's security.

  3. Vendor status and information

    Lotus
    http://www.lotus.com/
    http://www.ibm.com/

    Lotus was notified and they have fixed this vulnerability. Lotus is
    tracking this issue with SPR #DBAR5CJJJS. [1] IBM has also prepared
    Technote #1105101, which discusses this vulnerability. [2]

    See the References section for more information.

  4. Solution

    This vulnerability is fixed in R5.0.12 and R6.0 Gold. Customers
    running R5.0.11 or earlier (or Notes R6 beta) are advised to upgrade.
    R6.0 Gold is not affected, but due to other vulnerabilities
    discovered in R6.0 Gold, you should consider upgrading to R6.0.1,
    which was released in February 2003.

    Domino incremental installers may be downloaded from the following
    URL (which has been wrapped):

    http://www14.software.ibm.com
    /webapp/download/search.jsp?go=y&rs=ESD-DMNTSRVRi&sb=r

    For more information on partial mitigation strategies for this
    and other Notes vulnerabilities (including best practices for
    Internet-facing Domino servers), please see Rapid7's FAQ for
    these vulnerabilities at:

    http://www.rapid7.com/advisories/R7-0010-info.html

  5. Detailed analysis

    During NotesRPC authentication, the client sends the server its
    distinguished name (DN). The distinguished name is a string that
    looks like "CN=John Smith/O=Acme/C=US". The DN string is prefixed
    by a 16-bit word that specifies its length. The outer packet
    structure contains a header field that refers to the DN field's
    length (which is the length of the prefix plus the length of the
    DN itself).

    If the length specified in the outer header field is less than or
    equal to the length specified in the DN field, an error occurs in
    the data offset arithmetic such that a total of 65534 bytes are
    copied onto the Notes heap (a proprietary structure managed by
    Notes API calls such as OSMemoryAllocate). An attacker can supply
    all of the bytes to be copied by specifying additional data in the
    packet after the DN.

  6. References

    [1] Lotus SPR #DBAR5CJJJS (URL wrapped)
    http://www-10.lotus.com
    /ldd/r5fixlist.nsf/Search?SearchView&Query=DBAR5CJJJS

    [2] IBM Technote #1105101 (URL wrapped)
    http://www-1.ibm.com
    /support/docview.wss?rs=482&q=Domino&uid=swg21105101

  7. Contact Information

    Rapid7 Security Advisories
    Email: [email protected]
    Web: http://www.rapid7.com/
    Phone: +1 (212) 558-8700

  8. Disclaimer and Copyright

    Rapid7, Inc. is not responsible for the misuse of the information
    provided in our security advisories. These advisories are a service
    to the professional security community. There are NO WARRANTIES
    with regard to this information. Any application or distribution of
    this information constitutes acceptance AS IS, at the user's own
    risk. This information is subject to change without notice.

    This advisory Copyright (C) 2003 Rapid7, Inc. Permission is
    hereby granted to redistribute this advisory, providing that no
    changes are made and that the copyright notices and disclaimers
    remain intact.

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0.016 Low

EPSS

Percentile

87.5%

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