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Advisory CA-2002-20 Multiple Vulnerabilities in CDE ToolTalk

2002-07-1100:00:00
vulners.com
10

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CERT Advisory CA-2002-20 Multiple Vulnerabilities in CDE ToolTalk

Original release date: July 10, 2002
Last revised: –
Source: CERT/CC

A complete revision history can be found at the end of this file.

Systems Affected

 * Systems running CDE ToolTalk

Overview

Two vulnerabilities have been discovered in the Common Desktop
Environment (CDE) ToolTalk RPC database server. The first
vulnerability could be used by a remote attacker to delete arbitrary
files, cause a denial of service, or possibly execute arbitrary code
or commands. The second vulnerability could allow a local attacker to
overwrite arbitrary files with contents of the attacker's choice.

I. Description

The Common Desktop Environment (CDE) is an integrated graphical user
interface that runs on UNIX and Linux operating systems. CDE ToolTalk
is a message brokering system that provides an architecture for
applications to communicate with each other across hosts and
platforms. The ToolTalk RPC database server, rpc.ttdbserverd, manages
communication between ToolTalk applications. For more information
about CDE, see

      http://www.opengroup.org/cde/

      http://www.opengroup.org/desktop/faq/

This advisory addresses two new vulnerabilities in the CDE ToolTalk
RPC database server. These vulnerabilities are summarized below and
are described in further detail in their respective vulnerability
notes. A list previously documented problems in CDE can be found
Appendix B.

VU#975403 - Common Desktop Environment (CDE) ToolTalk RPC database
server (rpc.ttdbserverd) does not adequately validate file descriptor
argument to _TT_ISCLOSE()

      The ToolTalk RPC database server does not validate the range of
      an argument passed to the procedure _TT_ISCLOSE(). As a result,
      certain  locations in memory can be overwritten with zeros. For
      more information, please see VU#975403:

            http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/975403

      This  vulnerability  has  been  assigned  CAN-2002-0677  by the
      Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) group.

VU#299816 - Common Desktop Environment (CDE) ToolTalk RPC database
server (rpc.ttdbserverd) does not adequately validate file operations

      The  ToolTalk  RPC  database  server  does  not ensure that the
      target  of  a  file  write  operation is a valid file and not a
      symbolic link. For more information, please see VU#299816:

            http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/299816

      This  vulnerability  has  been  assigned  CAN-2002-0678  by the
      Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) group.

II. Impact

VU#975403 - Common Desktop Environment (CDE) ToolTalk RPC database
server (rpc.ttdbserverd) does not adequately validate file descriptor
argument to _TT_ISCLOSE()

      By   issuing   a   specially  crafted  call  to  the  procedure
      _TT_ISCLOSE(),   a  remote  attacker  could  overwrite  certain
      locations   in  memory  with  zeros.  Using  a  combination  of
      techniques   that  include  valid  ToolTalk  RPC  requests,  an
      attacker  could  leverage this vulnerability to delete any file
      that  is  accessible by the ToolTalk RPC database server. Since
      the  server  typically runs with root privileges, any file on a
      vulnerable  system  could  be  deleted.  Overwriting  memory or
      deleting  files could cause a denial of service. It may also be
      possible to execute arbitrary code and commands.

VU#299816 - Common Desktop Environment (CDE) ToolTalk RPC database
server (rpc.ttdbserverd) does not adequately validate file operations

      By  referencing  a  specially  crafted symbolic link in certain
      ToolTalk  RPC  requests,  a  local attacker could overwrite any
      file that is accessible by the the ToolTalk RPC database server
      with  contents  of  the  attacker's  choice.  Since  the server
      typically  runs  with root privileges, any file on a vulnerable
      system could be overwritten. Overwriting root-owned files could
      lead  to  lead  to  privilege  escalation  or cause a denial of
      service.

III. Solution

Apply a patch from your vendor

Appendix A contains information provided by vendors for this advisory.
As vendors report new information to the CERT/CC, we will update this
section and note the changes in our revision history. If a particular
vendor is not listed below, we have not received their comments.
Please contact your vendor directly.

Disable vulnerable service

Until patches are available and can be applied, you may wish to
disable the ToolTalk RPC database service. As a best practice, the
CERT/CC recommends disabling all services that are not explicitly
required. On a typical CDE system, it should be possible to disable
rpc.ttdbserverd by commenting out the relevant entries in
/etc/inetd.conf and if necessary, /etc/rpc, and then by restarting the
inetd process.

The program number for the ToolTalk RPC database server is 100083. If
references to 100083 or rpc.ttdbserverd appear in /etc/inetd.conf or
/etc/rpc or in output from the rpcinfo(1M) and ps(1) commands, then
the ToolTalk RPC database server may be running.

The following example was taken from a system running SunOS 5.8
(Solaris 8):

/etc/inetd.conf

Sun ToolTalk Database Server

100083/1 tli rpc/tcp wait root /usr/dt/bin/rpc.ttdbserverd\
rpc.ttdbserverd (line wrapped)

rpcinfo -p

   program vers proto    port  service
   ...
    100083    1   tcp   32773
   ...

ps -ef

    UID   PID  PPID  C    STIME TTY      TIME CMD
   ...
   root   355   164  0 19:31:27 ?        0:00 rpc.ttdbserverd
   ...

Before deciding to disable the ToolTalk RPC database server or the RPC
portmapper service, carefully consider your network configuration and
service requirements.

Block access to vulnerable service

Until patches are available and can be applied, you may wish to block
access to the ToolTalk RPC database server and possibly the RPC
portmapper service from untrusted networks such as the Internet. Use a
firewall or other packet-filtering technology to block the appropriate
network ports. The ToolTalk RPC database server may be configured to
use port 692/tcp or another port as indicated in output from the
rpcinfo(1M) command. In the example above, the ToolTalk RPC database
server is configured to use port 32773/tcp. The RPC portmapper service
typically runs on ports 111/tcp and 111/udp. Keep in mind that
blocking ports at a network perimeter does not protect the vulnerable
service from attacks that originate from the internal network.

Before deciding to block or restrict access to the ToolTalk RPC
database server or the RPC portmapper service, carefully consider your
network configuration and service requirements.

Appendix A. - Vendor Information

This appendix contains information provided by vendors for this
advisory. As vendors report new information to the CERT/CC, we will
update this section and note the changes in our revision history. If a
particular vendor is not listed below, we have not received their
comments.

Caldera, Inc.

      Caldera   Open  UNIX  and  Caldera  UnixWare  provide  the  CDE
      ttdbserverd daemon, and are vulnerable to these issues. We have
      prepared  fixes  for those two operating systems, and will make
      them available as soon as these issues are made public.

      SCO  OpenServer  and  Caldera OpenLinux do not provide CDE, and
      are therefore not vulnerable.

Compaq Computer Corporation

      SOURCE:  Compaq Computer Corporation, a wholly-owned subsidiary
      of  Hewlett-Packard  Company  and  Hewlett-Packard  Company  HP
      Services Software Security Response Team

      CROSS REFERENCE: SSRT2251

      At  this  time  Compaq does have solutions in final testing and
      will  publish  HP  Tru64 UNIX security bulletin (SSRT2251) with
      patch information as soon as testing has completed and kits are
      available from the support ftp web site.

      A  recommended  workaround however is to disable rpc.ttdbserver
      until  solutions  are  available.  This  should  only  create a
      potential  problem  for  public  software packages applications
      that  use  the  RPC-based  ToolTalk  database server. This step
      should be evaluated against the risks identified, your security
      measures  environment,  and  potential impact of other products
      that may use the ToolTalk database server.

      To disable rpc.ttdbserverd:

      + Comment out the following line in /etc/inetd.conf:
        rpc.ttdbserverd stream tcp swait root
        /usr/dt/bin/rpc.ttdbserverd rpc.ttdbserverd  (line wrapped)

      + Force  inetd  to  re-read the configuration file by executing
        the inetd -h command.

      Note:  The  internet  daemon  should kill the currently running
      rpc.ttdbserver.    If   not,   manually   kill   any   existing
      rpc.ttdbserverd process.

Cray, Inc.

      Cray,  Inc. does include ToolTalk within the CrayTools product.
      However,  rpc.ttdbserverd  is not turned on or used by any Cray
      provided  application. Since a site may have turned this on for
      their   own   use,   they   can   always   remove   the  binary
      /opt/ctl/bin/rpc.ttdbserverd if they are concerned.

Fujitsu

      Fujitsu's   UXP/V   operating   system   is   affected  by  the
      vulnerability  reported  in  VU#975403  [or  VU#299816] because
      UXP/V does not support any CDE functionalties.

Hewlett-Packard Company

      HP9000  Series  700/800  running  HP-UX  releases 10.10, 10.20,
      11.00, and 11.11 are vulnerable.

      Until  patches  are  available, install the appropriate file to
      replace rpc.ttdbserver.

      Download  rpc.ttdbserver.tar.gz from the ftp site. This file is
      temporary  and  will be deleted when patches are available from
      the standard HP web sites, including itrc.hp.com.

          System: hprc.external.hp.com (192.170.19.51)
           Login: ttdb1
        Password: ttdb1
      FTP Access: ftp://ttdb1:[email protected]/
                  ftp://ttdb1:[email protected]/
            File: rpc.ttdbserver.tar.gz
             MD5: da1be3aaf70d0e2393bd9a03feaf4b1d

      An HP security bulletin will be released with more information.

IBM Corporation

      The  CDE desktop product shipped with AIX is vulnerable to both
      the  issues  detailed  above  in the advisory. This affects AIX
      releases  4.3.3  and  5.1.0  An  efix package will be available
      shortly  from  the IBM software ftp site. The efix packages can
      be  downloaded  from  ftp.software.ibm.com/aix/efixes/security.
      This  directory  contains  a  README  file  that  gives further
      details on the efix packages.

      The following APARs will be available in the near future:

            AIX 4.3.3: IY32368

            AIX 5.1.0: IY32370

SGI

      SGI  acknowledges the ToolTalk vulnerabilities reported by CERT
      and  is  currently  investigating.  No  further  information is
      available at this time.

      For the protection of all our customers, SGI does not disclose,
      discuss  or  confirm vulnerabilities until a full investigation
      has occurred and any necessary patch(es) or release streams are
      available  for  all  vulnerable  and  supported  IRIX operating
      systems.  Until SGI has more definitive information to provide,
      customers are encouraged to assume all security vulnerabilities
      as  exploitable  and  take appropriate steps according to local
      site security policies and requirements. As further information
      becomes available, additional advisories will be issued via the
      normal  SGI security information distribution methods including
      the wiretap mailing list on
      http://www.sgi.com/support/security/.

Sun Microsystems, Inc.

      The Solaris RPC-based ToolTalk database server, rpc.ttdbserver,
      is  vulnerable to the two vulnerabilities [VU#975403 VU#299816]
      described  in this advisory in all currently supported versions
      of Solaris:

            Solaris 2.5.1, 2.6, 7, 8, and 9

      Patches  are being generated for all of the above releases. Sun
      will  publish  a Sun Security Bulletin and a Sun Alert for this
      issue. The Sun Alert will be available from:

            http://sunsolve.sun.com

      The patches will be available from:

            http://sunsolve.sun.com/securitypatch

      Sun Security Bulletins are available from:

            http://sunsolve.sun.com/security

Xi Graphics

      Xi  Graphics deXtop CDE v2.1 is vulnerable to this attack. When
      announced, the update and accompanying text file will be:

            ftp://ftp.xig.com/pub/updates/dextop/2.1/DEX2100.016.tar.\
            gz  (line wrapped)

            ftp://ftp.xig.com/pub/updates/dextop/2.1/DEX2100.016.txt

      Most  sites  do  not need to use the ToolTalk server daemon. Xi
      Graphics  Security  recommends  that non-essential services are
      never  enabled.  To disable the ToolTalk server on your system,
      edit   /etc/inetd.conf   and   comment   out,  or  remove,  the
      'rpc.ttdbserver'  line.  Then,  either restart inetd, or reboot
      your machine.

Appendix B. - References

 * http://www.opengroup.org/cde/
 * http://www.opengroup.org/desktop/faq/
 * http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2002-01.html
 * http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-31.html
 * http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/172583
 * http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-27.html
 * http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/595507
 * http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/860296
 * http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1999-11.html
 * http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1998-11.html
 * http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1998-02.html

 _________________________________________________________________

The CERT Coordination Center thanks the reporters, IvАn Arce and
Ricardo Quesada of CORE SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES, for their assistance
and cooperation in producing this document.
_________________________________________________________________

Author: Art Manion


This document is available from:
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2002-20.html


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Revision History

July 10, 2002: Initial release

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