SEC Consult SA-20140710-0 :: Multiple critical vulnerabilities in Shopizer webshop

Type securityvulns
Reporter Securityvulns
Modified 2014-10-16T00:00:00



SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20140710-0 >

          title: Multiple critical vulnerabilities in Shopizer webshop
        product: Shopizer

vulnerable version: 1.1.5 and below fixed version: v2 (new codebase) impact: critical homepage: found: 2012-01-10 by: Johannes Dahse, Johannes Greil SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab =======================================================================

Vendor description:

Shopizer is an open source java shopping cart and e-commerce content management software (CMS). The system is built on Struts 2, Hibernate and Spring. JQuery ui and ajax are heavily used on the ui as well as DWR and Struts2-jQuery plug-in. (

Vulnerability overview/description:

Shopizer is prone to at least the following vulnerabilities, some of them are highly critical:

1.) Remote Command Execution

Shopizer 1.1.5 is using Apache Struts and is thus vulnerable to Remote Command Execution. Shopizer 1.1.3 and below is built on Apache Struts 2.1.6 and is also affected.

Fore more details please refer to: * *

This affects the shop and admin interface (central).

2.) Manipulation of product prices

When buying products in Shopizer the product costs for a single product is calculated by the selected quantity times the price of the product. The total costs of all products is the adding of all product costs. An attacker can specify negative quantities to decrease the total costs.

This affects the shop.

3.) Manipulation of customer data / mass assignment

An attacker can change the contact details of a customer by modifying the customerId in the change request. In example this allows him to modify the shipping address to retrieve products bought by another customer.

Furthermore, a malicious admin user (sm-central) is able to change the passwords of other user accounts by appending a "customer.customerPassword" HTTP parameter when saving user details. This is possible although there is no UI (form field) for this within the admin interface.

This affects the shop and admin interface (central).

4.) Cross-Site Request Forgery

Modifying customer data is also prone to CSRF attacks. Additionally, the attacker can change customer passwords, shop configuration, product details and product prices by sending CSRF requests to the administration interface.

This affects the shop and admin interface (central).

5.) Missing anti brute force protection

No protection against brute force attacks regarding login credentials is implemented. Attackers can guess for weak passwords of users, as the password policy of the shop only allows exactly between 6 and 8 characters. The use of special chars or digits is not being enforced.

This affects the shop and admin interface (central).

6.) Cross-Site Scripting

The Shopizer Admin Interface suffers from multiple reflected XSS vulnerabilities.

Proof of concept:

1.) Remote Command Execution in Struts

a) Via exception

The following URL will trigger an exception for an invalid "productId" data type and Struts will re-evaluate the specified value as OGNL expression. An attacker can successfully bypass security restrictions of Struts and execute arbitrary Java code, leading to Remote Command Execution. /shop/product/reviews.action?product.productId=secconsult'%2b(%23context["xwork.MethodAccessor.denyMethodExecution"]=false,%23_memberAccess["allowStaticMethodAccess"]=true,@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec('calc'))%2b'

Other numeric parameters are affected as well.

b) Via ParameterInterceptor

The following URL will store a OGNL expression in the property "search" of type String. This OGNL expression can then be accessed by a dynamic function call in another parameter leading to Remote Command Execution. /shop/search.action?search=(%23context["xwork.MethodAccessor.denyMethodExecution"]=false,%23_memberAccess["allowStaticMethodAccess"]=true,@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec('calc'))(secconsult)&z[(search)('secconsult')]=true

2.) Manipulation of product prices

Assuming the shop has a product1 (300$) and a product2 (290$) for the total costs of 590$. The following steps can be reproduced by a malicious user to decrease the total costs when buying those products:

a&#41; Add product1 and product2 to the shopping cart
b&#41; Go to the shopping cart and press &quot;recalculate&quot;
c&#41; Intercept the ajax DWR request and modify the number reference of the
   parameter &quot;productQuantity&quot; for product2 to a negative value &#40;-1&#41;:

    c0-e1=Object_Object:{productId:reference:c0-e3, productQuantity:reference:c0-e4}

d&#41; The new costs for product2 now recalculate to: -1 x 290 = -290$
e&#41; the new total costs is: product1 + product2 = 300$ + &#40;-290$&#41; = 10$
f&#41; continue shopping and pay 10$ for products worth 590$.

This is especially critical for shops that only provide digital products.

Furthermore, during the second step of the checkout process it is possible to add a negative quantity of products exploiting a Shopizer's feature called "standalone shopping cart". This results in a negative price. By issuing the following specially crafted request in the separate tab of the web browser, while the first tab contains the second step of the checkout process, the total price will be decreased. Note that the page must be refreshed after the request to reflect the changes.


3.) Manipulation of customer data / mass assignment

It's possible to overwrite user data of an arbitrary user and gain access to his account and personal information when registering a new user. To achieve this, a malicious user has to add the customer.customerId parameter to the HTTP request and specify the value of the parameter to match the target user e.g. 87 when registering a new user. For example, the following request will overwrite the user data including username and password of the user with the ID 87.

POST /shop/profile/register.action HTTP/1.1

In this case no account confirmation is needed. Instant access to the overwritten account and its data is possible using the new username SecTest and the newly specified password! An attacker is able to access sensitive data (order information, personal information etc.).

Additionally, the following request will overwrite the contact data of customer id 10, including the name, shipping address and billing address: /shop/profile/changeAddress.action?formstate=list&customer.customerId=10&customer.customerCompany=secconsult&customer.customerGender=&customer.customerTitel=&customer.customerFirstname=secconsult&customer.customerLastname=secconsult&customer.customerTelephone=00& es=1&customer. customerNick=secconsult

Note that in this specific case the account of the attacker and the victim will not be able to login again after the attack, because the nickname will be overwritten and found twice during login.

Furthermore, the administration interface does not offer a UI to change user passwords. By appending the parameter "customer.customerPassword" an attacker is able to change the password of arbitrary users within the customer details page.

4.) Cross-Site Request Forgery

The following image will alter the product price for the product 30 when rendered by the browser of an logged in webshop administrator:



Furthermore, the parameter "__checkbox_product.productIsFree" can also be set to "true".

Additionally, the administration interface allows to overwrite the password hash of every customer which can also be exploited via CSRF.

The product review form is also vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery attacks. A similar request to the following URL will result in a product review being posted in the context of the currently logged in user. Note that the URL does not contain any parameter that is holding a nonce value.


5.) Missing anti brute force protection

No proof-of-concept is necessary. See source: sm-central/src/com/salesmanager/central/profile/ Line 525 - 530 of shopizer 1.1.5

6.) Cross-Site Scripting


E.g. source code: sm-central/WebContent/orders/orderlist.jsp Line: 118

SEC Consult assumes, that many more XSS vulnerabilities exist within this software as no proper filtering is implemented.

Vulnerable / tested versions:

All vulnerabilities could be reproduced with Shopizer 1.1.5 and 1.1.3

Vendor contact timeline:

2012-01-10: The vulnerabilities have been found during a short blackbox test of a shopizer installation during a customer project 2012-12-20: Customer allows contacting vendor 2013-01-10: Contacting vendor through, fast reply, sending advisory 2013-01-22: Asking for status update, reply: vendor takes a look 2013-02-26: Asking for status update, vendor has some questions regarding version numbers 2013-03-22: Asking for status update again 2013-03-23: Vendor: Release 2 is scheduled for June 2013-06-25: Asking for status update, no answer 2013-07-01: Sending deadline for advisory release 2013-07-07: Vendor: Version 2 of shopizer delayed 2013-07-08: Asking for new release date 2013-07-09: Vendor: moving from Struts to Spring & Spring security 2013-10-03: Asking again for release date 2013-10-06: Vendor: Release shortly 2013-12-10: Asking for update 2013-12-12: Vendor: Release date set for January 2014 2014-06: Vendor releases v2 2014-07-10: SEC Consult releases security advisory


Using the old version branch 1.x is not recommended as there are no security fixes implemented by the vendor.

Version 2 has been released by the vendor, but it has not been tested by SEC Consult and it is unclear whether the issues have been solved.


These workarounds have to be implemented in source: * Update the Apache Struts library to the latest version available. * Disallow negative product quantities. * Identify customers by session and not by customerId parameter.

Furthermore, change the default login (admin:password) for the administration interface.

Advisory URL:

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