FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-14:06.openssl [REVISED]

2014-04-20T00:00:00
ID SECURITYVULNS:DOC:30481
Type securityvulns
Reporter Securityvulns
Modified 2014-04-20T00:00:00

Description

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512

============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-14:06.openssl Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project

Topic: OpenSSL multiple vulnerabilities

Category: contrib Module: openssl Announced: 2014-04-08 Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD. Corrected: 2014-04-08 18:27:39 UTC (stable/10, 10.0-STABLE) 2014-04-08 18:27:46 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RELEASE-p1) 2014-04-08 23:16:19 UTC (stable/9, 9.2-STABLE) 2014-04-08 23:16:05 UTC (releng/9.2, 9.2-RELEASE-p4) 2014-04-08 23:16:05 UTC (releng/9.1, 9.1-RELEASE-p11) 2014-04-08 23:16:19 UTC (stable/8, 8.4-STABLE) 2014-04-08 23:16:05 UTC (releng/8.4, 8.4-RELEASE-p8) 2014-04-08 23:16:05 UTC (releng/8.3, 8.3-RELEASE-p15) CVE Name: CVE-2014-0076, CVE-2014-0160

For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the following sections, please visit <URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/>.

  1. Revision History

v1.0 2014-04-08 Initial release. v1.1 2014-04-08 Added patch applying step in Solutions section.

I. Background

FreeBSD includes software from the OpenSSL Project. The OpenSSL Project is a collaborative effort to develop a robust, commercial-grade, full-featured Open Source toolkit implementing the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1) protocols as well as a full-strength general purpose cryptography library.

The Heartbeat Extension provides a new protocol for TLS/DTLS allowing the usage of keep-alive functionality without performing a renegotiation and a basis for path MTU (PMTU) discovery for DTLS.

Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is a variant of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) which uses Elliptic Curve Cryptography. OpenSSL uses the Montgomery Ladder Approach to compute scalar multiplication in a fixed amount of time, which does not leak any information through timing or power.

II. Problem Description

The code used to handle the Heartbeat Extension does not do sufficient boundary checks on record length, which allows reading beyond the actual payload. [CVE-2014-0160]. Affects FreeBSD 10.0 only.

A flaw in the implementation of Montgomery Ladder Approach would create a side-channel that leaks sensitive timing information. [CVE-2014-0076]

III. Impact

An attacker who can send a specifically crafted packet to TLS server or client with an established connection can reveal up to 64k of memory of the remote system. Such memory might contain sensitive information, including key material, protected content, etc. which could be directly useful, or might be leveraged to obtain elevated privileges. [CVE-2014-0160]

A local attacker might be able to snoop a signing process and might recover the signing key from it. [CVE-2014-0076]

IV. Workaround

No workaround is available, but systems that do not use OpenSSL to implement the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1) protocols implementation and do not use the ECDSA implementation from OpenSSL are not vulnerable.

V. Solution

Perform one of the following:

1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.

2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:

The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable FreeBSD release branches.

a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.

[FreeBSD 8.x and FreeBSD 9.x]

fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:06/openssl.patch

fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:06/openssl.patch.asc

gpg --verify openssl.patch.asc

[FreeBSD 10.0]

fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:06/openssl-10.patch

fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:06/openssl-10.patch.asc

gpg --verify openssl-10.patch.asc

b) Execute the following commands as root:

cd /usr/src

patch < /path/to/patch

Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as described in <URL:http://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/makeworld.html>.

Restart all deamons using the library, or reboot the system.

3) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:

Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64 platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:

freebsd-update fetch

freebsd-update install

IMPORTANT: the update procedure above does not update OpenSSL from the Ports Collection or from a package, known as security/openssl, which has to be updated separately via ports or package. Users who have installed security/openssl should update to at least version 1.0.1_10.

VI. Correction details

The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each affected branch.

Branch/path Revision


stable/8/ r264285 releng/8.3/ r264284 releng/8.4/ r264284 stable/9/ r264285 releng/9.1/ r264284 releng/9.2/ r264284 stable/10/ r264266 releng/10.0/ r264267


To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a machine with Subversion installed:

svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base

Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:

<URL:http://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>

VII. References

<URL:http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-0076> <URL:http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-0160>

<URL:http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20140407.txt> <URL:http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140.pdf>

The latest revision of this advisory is available at <URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-14:06.openssl.asc> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (FreeBSD)

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