title: Multiple high risk vulnerabilities (part 2) product: GroundWork Monitor Enterprise
vulnerable version: 6.7.0 fixed version: none - optional technical bulletin released impact: High homepage: http://www.gwos.com found: 2013-02-11 by: Johannes Greil SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab https://www.sec-consult.com =======================================================================
"GroundWork Monitor is the leading open platform for monitoring the availability and performance of enterprise business services, applications and infrastructure. It can live and monitor both on premises and in the cloud. As an open platform, it is easily integrated with common IT service management processes and tools and is competitively and simply priced."
SEC Consult identified multiple vulnerabilities with high risk within the components of the "GroundWork Monitor Enterprise" solution. The scope of the test, where the vulnerabilities have been identified, was a very short evaluation crash-test (~1 PD, part 2) which the software utterly failed. Some components have been spot-checked, others have not been tested at all (e.g. cloud components).
The recommendation of SEC Consult is to immediately switch off existing GroundWork systems until further security measures and thorough follow-up security tests have been implemented and performed.
The following vulnerability description has been categorized into the components where the vulnerabilities have been identified.
1) NeDi component ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ In order to exploit the following vulnerabilities an attacker has to have low privileged "user" access level rights within GroundWork. The NeDi application itself thinks that an admin user has logged in and gives full access rights!
1.1) Access to sensitive files A low-privileged attacker is able to gain access to NeDi configuration files or database dumps or Tomcat status context by just entering a URL.
1.2) Privilege escalation through command execution A low privileged "user" account is able to access the "System File Overview" feature of NeDi which allows editing of files and hence the execution of arbitrary operating system commands.
Affected script: /nedi/html/System-Files.php
1.3) Direct OS command injection A low privileged "user" account is able to execute arbirary OS commands through missing input validation within the "System / NeDi" menu functionality. NeDi allows to scan internal IP addresses which can be exploited by a classic OS command injection payload.
Affected script: /nedi/html/System-NeDi.php
1.4) SQL injection & execution of arbitrary SQL statements A low privileged "user" account can execute arbitrary SQL statements within the current schema (nedi) of the PostgreSQL database and furthermore also exploit SQL injection vulnerabilities.
Affected scripts: /nedi/html/System-Export.php /nedi/html/Devices-List.php
1.5) Open redirection NeDi is affected by an open redirection vulnerability. If an authenticated victim of the attack clicks on a special URL he will be redirected to a website controlled by the attacker.
1.6) Multiple XSS vulnerabilities The NeDi component suffers from multiple XSS vulnerabilities because no input validation is being performed. An attacker is able to steal user accounts/sessions and potentially gain higher privileges within GroundWork.
2) Cacti component ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ In order to exploit the following vulnerabilities an attacker has to have low privileged "user" access level rights within GroundWork. 2.1) Insufficient authorization A low-privileged user is able to access and change all configuration settings within the Cacti component including user accounts and passwords.
2.2) Bundled Cacti version is outdated The Cacti version 0.8.7g that is bundled with GroundWork is already affected by at least two known vulnerabilities (Cross-Site Request-Forgery and SQL injection).
3) Noma component ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The following security flaws can only be exploited with a valid "admin" session, but at least the cross-site request forgery flaw in combination with the permanent XSS flaw can be exploited by outside attackers in order to gain administrative access to GroundWork.
3.1) Cross-site request forgery An attacker can use cross-site request forgery to perform arbitrary web requests with the identity of the victim without being noticed by the victim. Although responses to these requests are not delivered to the attacker, in many cases it is sufficient to be able to compromise the integrity of the victim’s information stored on the site or to perform certain, possibly compromising requests to other sites.
3.2) Multiple reflected and permanent cross-site scripting The Noma component suffers from multiple XSS vulnerabilities because no input validation is being performed. An attacker is able to steal user accounts/sessions and potentially gain higher privileges within GroundWork.
3.3) SQL injection Due to insufficient input validation, the application allows the injection of direct SQL commands. By exploiting the vulnerability, an attacker gains access to all records stored in the database with the privileges of the web application user.
Detailed proof of concept URLs and exploits have been removed from this advisory as the underlying security issues will not be fixed by GroundWork and only be addressed by authentication and authorization changes.
1) NeDi component ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1.1) Access to sensitive files Access config files: [...]
If a legitimate user dumped some database contents through standard NeDi functionality, it will be reachable directly with "user" rights: [...]
Tomcat Status [...]
1.2) Privilege escalation through command execution The following component allows editing of files of a given whitelisted array. At least one of the whitelisted files is a PHP file which can be edited and accessed through the webserver:
Step a) Access start URL [...]
Step b) Go to menu "[...]": [...]
Step c) Edit "[...]" and enter payload: [...]
Step d) Execute arbitrary OS commands: [...]
1.3) Direct OS command injection Affected URL: [...]
Affected parameters, at least: [...] Payload: [...]
1.4) SQL injection & execution of arbitrary SQL statements Execute arbitrary SQL statements with "[...]" parameter: [...]
It has not been investigated whether changes to the NeDi database will affect or propagate to other GroundWork components!
Unfiltered input in at least "[...]" parameter: [...]
1.5) Open redirection [...]
1.6) Multiple XSS vulnerabilities [...]
2) Cacti component ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 2.1) Insufficient authorization A low-privileged user is able to access/change all configuration settings, e.g.: [...]
2.2) Bundled Cacti version is outdated [...]
3) Noma component ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 3.1) Cross-site request forgery Store permanent XSS payload via CSRF attack: [...]
Delete arbitrary entries via CSRF: [...]
3.2) Multiple reflected and permanent cross-site scripting Permanent XSS: [...]
Reflected XSS: [...]
3.3) SQL injection [...]
The vulnerabilities have been tested in the currently latest available version v6.7.0.
SEC Consult tested the pre-installed Ubuntu image 6.7.0-br287-gw157 with a GroundWork Monitor Core test license.
SEC Consult strongly assumes that many further vulnerabilities exist and previous GroundWork versions are affected too.
2013-02-12: Contacting vendor via direct email contact (after trying to establish contact since 14th January, see advisory part 1) 2013-02-13: Vendor, info from engineering: patch for 27th February planned; Patch only addresses few issues (Referer checks) and not critical vulnerabilities SEC Consult: proper fixes needed, not a "workaround patch" 2013-02-26: Vendor: Email reply regarding conference call 2013-02-28: Conference call 2013-03-04: GroundWork provides optional technical bulletin for review 2013-03-05: SEC Consult states that the optional technical bulletin is not enough and does not fix the underlying issues within source code Informing US-CERT about the status and pending release 2013-03-06: Contacting local CERT teams 2013-03-06: GroundWork informs their customers 2013-03-07: Release of optional technical bulletin by GroundWork 2013-03-08: SEC Consult releases coordinated security advisory without proof of concept
GroundWork does not offer patches for the identified security vulnerabilities.
An optional technical bulletin is available by GroundWork that restricts access to GroundWork components by adding a SSO authentication layer for the affected components. Furthermore, configuration changes are suggested by GroundWork that disable "user" privilege access for some applications and require "admin" access rights in the future:
This recommendation by GroundWork is not sufficient and therefore not suggested by SEC Consult. In order to mitigate the risk, the vulnerabilities have to be fixed within the source code.
In secure environments, such as operating centers where this software is for instance used, it is highly undesirable to use insecure applications.
Implement the suggestions of the technical bulletin. Keep in mind that the underlying security issues are not being addressed by the bulletin.
Furthermore, use additional measures to secure the application, e.g. but not limited to strict network segmentation. Only allow administrators to access the server. Secure all accounts with strong passwords & disable standard accounts.
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EOF Johannes Greil / @2013