SEC Consult SA-20130308-0 :: Multiple critical vulnerabilities in GroundWork Monitor Enterprise (part 1)

2013-03-11T00:00:00
ID SECURITYVULNS:DOC:29178
Type securityvulns
Reporter Securityvulns
Modified 2013-03-11T00:00:00

Description

SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20130308-0 >

          title: Multiple critical vulnerabilities &#40;part 1&#41;
        product: GroundWork Monitor Enterprise

vulnerable version: 6.7.0 fixed version: none - optional technical bulletin released impact: Critical homepage: http://www.gwos.com vulnerability note: VU#345260 found: 2013-01-11 by: Johannes Greil SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab https://www.sec-consult.com =======================================================================

Vendor/product description:

"GroundWork Monitor is the leading open platform for monitoring the availability and performance of enterprise business services, applications and infrastructure. It can live and monitor both on premises and in the cloud. As an open platform, it is easily integrated with common IT service management processes and tools and is competitively and simply priced."

URL: http://www.gwos.com/features/


Business recommendation:

SEC Consult identified multiple critical vulnerabilities within the components of the "GroundWork Monitor Enterprise" solution. The scope of the test, where the vulnerabilities have been identified, was a very short evaluation crash-test (~1 PD) which the software utterly failed. Some components have been spot-checked, others have not been tested at all (e.g. cloud components).

The recommendation of SEC Consult is to immediately switch off existing GroundWork systems until further security measures and thorough follow-up security tests have been implemented and performed.


Vulnerability overview/description:

The following vulnerability description has been categorized into the components where the vulnerabilities have been identified.

1) Insufficient authentication in many components: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Many components of GroundWork are only "secured" by Referer header checks. An attacker who uses a specific, known Referer header of the GroundWork Apache configuration file is able to access parts of the administration interface without prior authentication. Only few components are additionally secured by the JOSSO Single-Sign-On system.

2) Foundation webapp admin interface: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 2.1) Referer-check The webapp is only "secured" by a referer check, an unauthenticated attacker is able to access the admin interface. The attacker also has write access and is able to manipulate settings as admin user and he can further exploit other vulnerabilities.

2.2) Unauthenticated file disclosure & file write/modification An unauthenticated attacker is able to read arbitrary files of the operating system with the access rights of the operating system user "nagios" (the only "security protection" is the weak Referer-check from 2.1). He is able to gain sensitive information such as cleartext passwords of monitored systems.

Furthermore, it is possible to alter those files if they are owned and writable by the "nagios" user, which nearly all "GroundWork" files under "/usr/local/groundwork" are.

Affected script: /foundation-webapp/admin/manage-configuration.jsp

2.3) Multiple permanent XSS vulnerabilities An unauthenticated attacker is able to store malicious JavaScript/HTML code in many places within the admin interface and hence further attack / take over admin users of GroundWork! If an administrator e.g. clicks on the "Administration" /"Foundation" menu within GroundWork, the JavaScript code will be executed automatically.

Affected scripts: /foundation-webapp/admin/manage-hostgroups.jsp /foundation-webapp/admin/manage-performanceDataLabel.jsp /foundation-webapp/admin/manage-properties.jsp

3) MONARCH component ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ In order to exploit the following vulnerabilities an attacker has to have low privileged "user" access level rights within GroundWork (+Referer check). He is then able to elevate privileges and get admin rights or completely take over the whole monitoring operating system.

3.1) Direct OS command injection An attacker with a valid cookie (JOSSO SSO) with at least low-privileged "user" access rights is able to execute arbitary operating system commands. He is able to gain access to sensitive configuration files, e.g. passwords of Nagios (and hence of many services within the monitored network) in cleartext.

Affected script: /monarch/monarch_scan.cgi (side note: the script also allows to perform portscans within the network as a feature)

3.2) XML external entity injection & arbitrary XML file (over-)write The Monarch components suffer from XXE attacks where an attacker e.g. is able to read arbitrary files of the operating system (sensitive configuration files, etc.). The vulnerability can be exploited by uploading a malicious XML file within the "Profile Importer" component and then view this uploaded file within the same module.

Furthermore it has to be noted, that an attacker is able to write arbitrary XML files anywhere within the operating system, where the "nagios" operating system user has write access. This allows an attacker to e.g. overwrite configuration files of JBoss or other components.

Affected script: /monarch/monarch.cgi

4) Nagios-App component ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ In order to exploit the following vulnerabilities an attacker has to have low privileged "user" access level rights.

4.1) Access to sensitive files A low privileged user is able to gain access to log files or nagios configuration files (e.g. clear text passwords) just by entering the corresponding URL and including the Referer-header from 1).

5) Performance component ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The context "performance" is only "secured" by Referer checks, see 1) An attacker is able to exploit critical vulnerabilities without any authentication.

5.1) Write files & execute operating system commands An unauthenticated attacker is able to write files (filename & path can be chosen arbitrarily) with pre-given XML content with the access rights of the "nagios" operating system user. The XML content is partially given by the application, but can be modified by the attacker for further injection attacks. In the end it is possible to execute operating system commands, e.g. by using SSI (server-side includes) injection.

One could also alter the pre-given XML file contents and exploit XML parser issues.

Affected script: /performance/cgi-bin/performance/perfchart.cgi


Proof of concept:

Detailed proof of concept URLs and exploits have been removed from this advisory as the underlying security issues will not be fixed by GroundWork and only be addressed by authentication and authorization changes.

1) Insufficient authentication in many components: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The following contexts are "secured" by Referer-header checks:

[...]

E.g. if an attacker sets the Referer-header to: [...] he is able to access the "foundation" administration interface of GroundWork without any prior authentication.

Some parts of those contexts, e.g. "birtviewer", are additionally secured by JOSSO SSO and require "user"-level access rights.

2) Foundation webapp admin interface: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 2.1) Referer check [...] See 1) for Referer

 An attacker is able to access and manipulate the following settings
 without prior authentication:
  Manage Configuration
  Manage Application Types
  Manage Properties
  Manage Host Groups
  Manage Performance Data
  Manage Consolidation Criteria


Unauthenticated access to &amp; manipulation of configuration data, e.g.:
  adapter.properties, cacti.properties, console.properties, db.properties,
  foundation.properties, jndi.properties, nedi.properties,
  network-service.properties, ntop.properties, perfdata.properties,
  register_agent.properties, report-viewer.properties,
  status-feeder.properties, status-viewer.properties, viewer.properties, 
  weathermap.properties, ws_client.properties

2.2) Unauthenticated file disclosure & arbitary file write/modification

[...]
&#40;Referer from 2.1&#41;

An attacker is also able to alter or save the file with new entries. Keep in
mind though that the original file will be modified in a way that it may not
work properly afterwards because &quot;property/value&quot; entries are generated.

2.3) Multiple permanent XSS vulnerabilities Many input fields/parameters are affected, the following list may not be complete:

[...]
&#40;+ Referer from 2.1&#41;

3) MONARCH component ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 3.1) Direct OS command injection [...]

3.2) XML external entity injection & arbitrary XML file (over) write

Module "Profile Importer" Step a) Access URL [...]

Step b) Upload file: secconsult_xxe.xml [...]

The file will be uploaded to path "[...]" by default.

Side note: An attacker can choose arbitrary paths and arbitrary XML contents within the upload request, hence further attacks are possible.

Step c) View uploaded profile: [...]

The uploaded malicious secconsult_xxe.xml file will show up and it shows the executed XXE payload, e.g. the output of the Nagios configuration file "resource.cfg" which includes the plain text passwords of the Nagios configuration (arbitrary other files can be read).

4) Nagios-App component ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 4.1) Access to sensitive files Clear text passwords of Nagios: [...]

Log files: [...]

5) Performance component ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 5.1) Write files & execute operating system commands Step a) Write .shtml file [...]

Step b) Execute command example "ls" from above: [...]

One could also alter the XML file and exploit XML parser issues by retrieving the manipulated XML file again through this request: Write XML file: [...]

XML result/file will look like:
[...]

Read &#40;XML&#41; file again:
[...]

Vulnerable / tested versions:

The vulnerabilities have been tested in the currently latest available version v6.7.0.

SEC Consult tested the pre-installed Ubuntu image 6.7.0-br287-gw157 with a GroundWork Monitor Core test license.

SEC Consult strongly assumes that many further vulnerabilities exist and previous GroundWork versions are affected too.


Vendor contact timeline:

2013-01-14: Contacting vendor via email support@gwos.com, asking for security contact 2013-01-16: No reply from vendor, resending email to support@gwos.com & including info@gwos.com, mentioning deadline according to attached responsible disclosure policy 2013-01-21: Still no reply, resending email support@gwos.com & info@gwos.com, setting deadline for advisory publication to 5th March 2013 2013-01-22: Contacting US-CERT for further coordination, receiving VU#345260, alerting mutual customers 2013-01-29: Asking US-CERT for status update: no security contact at GroundWork yet 2013-02-05: Trying to contact another GroundWork email address of Roger Ruttimann, VP of Engineering 2013-02-06: First answer of GroundWork (Director of Marketing), sending detailed advisory information Informing US-CERT about contact 2013-02-09: Vendor: Detailed info from engineering by next week
2013-02-12: Sending vulnerabilities from a second crash test, requesting conference call for discussion of next steps 2013-02-13: Vendor, info from engineering: patch for 27th February planned; Patch only addresses few issues (Referer checks) and not critical vulnerabilities SEC Consult: proper fixes needed, not a "workaround patch" 2013-02-26: Vendor: Email reply regarding conference call 2013-02-28: Conference call 2013-03-04: GroundWork provides optional technical bulletin for review 2013-03-05: SEC Consult states that the optional technical bulletin is not enough and does not fix the underlying issues within source code Informing US-CERT about the status and pending release 2013-03-06: Contacting local CERT teams 2013-03-06: GroundWork informs their customers 2013-03-07: Release of optional technical bulletin by GroundWork 2013-03-08: SEC Consult releases coordinated security advisory without proof of concept


Solution:

GroundWork does not offer patches for the identified security vulnerabilities.

An optional technical bulletin is available by GroundWork that restricts access to GroundWork components by adding a SSO authentication layer for the affected components. Furthermore, configuration changes are suggested by GroundWork that disable "user" privilege access for some applications and require "admin" access rights in the future:

https://kb.groundworkopensource.com/display/SUPPORT/SA6.7.0-1+Some+web+components+allow+bypass+of+role+access+controls

This recommendation by GroundWork is not sufficient and therefore not suggested by SEC Consult. In order to mitigate the risk, the vulnerabilities have to be fixed within the source code too.

In secure environments, such as operating centers where this software is for instance used, it is highly undesirable to use insecure applications.


Workaround:

Implement the suggestions of the technical bulletin. Keep in mind that the underlying security issues are not being addressed by the bulletin.

Furthermore, use additional measures to secure the application, e.g. but not limited to strict network segmentation. Only allow administrators to access the server. Secure all accounts with strong passwords & disable standard accounts.


Advisory URL:

https://www.sec-consult.com/en/Vulnerability-Lab/Advisories.htm

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SEC Consult Unternehmensberatung GmbH

Office Vienna Mooslackengasse 17 A-1190 Vienna Austria

Tel.: +43 / 1 / 890 30 43 - 0 Fax.: +43 / 1 / 890 30 43 - 25 Mail: research at sec-consult dot com https://www.sec-consult.com http://blog.sec-consult.com

EOF Johannes Greil / @2013