n.runs-SA-2010.002 - Alcatel-Lucent - arbitrary code execution on OmniVista 4760

2010-09-20T00:00:00
ID SECURITYVULNS:DOC:24786
Type securityvulns
Reporter Securityvulns
Modified 2010-09-20T00:00:00

Description

n.runs AG http://www.nruns.com/ security(at)nruns.com n.runs-SA-2010.002 20-September-2010


Vendor: Alcatel Affected Products: OmniVista 4760 server: all versions prior to release R5.1.06.03.c_Patch3. Vulnerability: arbitrary code execution Risk: High CVE-Number: CVE-2010-3281


Vendor communication: 2010/02/16 initial information to Alcatel-Lucent from n.runs AG 2010/02/16 initial response from Alcatel-Lucent to investigate responsibility within Alcatel-Lucent group 2010/02/18 request from Alcatel-Lucent about former vendor communication 2010/02/18 response and that n.runs initially found the bug in 2006 during a customer project and the customer has been trying from then until
the beginning of 2010 to get the issue fixed. Customer has
requested from n.runs to take over the handling of vulnerability and to publish it. 2010/02/24 confirmation from Alcatel-Lucent that the vulnerability exists 2010/03/15 n.runs confirms CVSS rating 2010/08/10 Alcatel-Lucent confirms that vulnerability is fixed (fix date: 2010/05/06) 2010/08/23 Alcatel-Lucent proposes September 15th as the publication date and requests a CVE number 2010/09/13 Business Parters of Alcatel-Lucent are informed about the vulnerability
2010/09/15 CVE number received 2010/09/20 n.runs AG releases this advisory


Overview:

Part of the Alcatel Omnivista 4760 administration software of the Alcatel 4400 PBX is an HTTP proxy. It is used to tunnel ssh-connections to the ssh-ports of the PBX within the internal network. This proxy is vulnerable to a remote buffer overflow.

Description:

By sending a long HTTP GET request it is possible to overwrite CPU registers. Due to this vulnerability, an attacker can control the execution path remotely.

Impact:

Arbitray code can be executed on the proxy server from remote. On a normal setup the HTTP proxy is running on the same machine as the 4760 management system. Due to this vulnerability an attacker can gain access to administrative functions of the PBX and to the internal network, possibly a DMZ.

Solution

Mitigation Protect the HTTP proxy function on the 4760 server with the Windows internal

firewall by restricting access to workstations with a known pre-declared IP address: In the windows firewall configuration, for the exception concerning the 4760

Communication Server, modify the extent of allowed systems by removing the authorization for any IP system with the precise list of the specifically allowed IP addresses. Note: include the 4760 server own address in this list to enable the embedded 4760 client as well.

Fixed Software Versions/Patches and how to obtain them OmniVista 4760 version R5.1: install the Patch3 for version 5.1.06.03.c_Patch2 (or the full delivery 5.1.06.03.c_Patch3 when it is available). OmniVista 4760 version R5.0 and prior: upgrade to OmniVista 4760 version R5.1 and installation of patch is recommended.


Credits: Bug found by Axel Rengstorf of Bluebox Security, Dirk Breiden and Florian Walther of n.runs AG.


References: This Advisory and Upcoming Advisories: http://www.nruns.com/security_advisory.php


About n.runs: n.runs AG is a vendor-independent consulting company specialising in the areas of: IT Infrastructure, IT Security and IT Business Consulting.

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