-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1
Aruba Networks Security Advisory
Title: TLS Protocol Session Renegotiation Security Vulnerability
Aruba Advisory ID: AID-020810 Revision: 1.0
For Public Release on 02/08/2010
This advisory addresses the renegotiation related vulnerability disclosed recently in Transport Layer Security protocol . This vulnerability may allow a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacker to inject arbitrary data into the beginning of the application protocol stream protected by TLS.
The only ArubaOS component that seems affected by this issue is the HTTPS WebUI administration interface. If a client browser (victim) is configured to authenticate to the WebUI over HTTPS using a client certificate, an attacker can potentially use the victim's credentials temporarily to execute arbitrary HTTP request for each initiation of an HTTPS session from the victim to the WebUI. This would happen without any HTTPS/TLS warnings to the victim. This condition can essentially be exploited by an attacker for command injection in beginning of a HTTPS session between the victim and the ArubaOS WebUI.
ArubaOS itself does not initiate TLS renegotiation at any point and hence is only vulnerable to scenario where a client explicitly requests TLS renegotiation. Captive Portal users do not seem vulnerable to this issue unless somehow client certificates are being used to authenticate captive portal users.
AFFECTED ArubaOS VERSIONS
2.5.6.x, 3.3.2.x, 3.3.3.x, 3.4.0.x, 3.4.1.x, RN 3.1.x, 3.3.2.x-FIPS, 2.4.8.x-FIPS
CHECK IF YOU ARE VULNERABLE
The only ArubaOS component that seems affected by this issue is the HTTPS WebUI administration interface. ArubaOS is vulnerable only if its configuration permits WebUI administration interface clients to connect using either username/password or client certificates. If only one of the two authentication method is allowed, this issue does not seem to apply.
Check if the following line appears in your configuration:
web-server mgmt-auth username/password certificate
If the exact line does not appear in the configuration, this issue does not apply.
An industry wide vulnerability was discovered in TLS protocol's renegotiation feature, which allows a client and server who already have a TLS connection to negotiate new session parameters and generate new key material. Renegotiation is carried out in the existing TLS connection. However there is no cryptographic binding between the renegotiated TLS session and the original TLS session. An attacker who has established MITM between client and server may be able to take advantage of this and inject arbitrary data into the beginning of the application protocol stream protected by TLS. Specifically arbitrary HTTP requests can be injected in a HTTPS session where attacker (MITM) blocks HTTPS session initiation between client and server, establishes HTTPS session with the server itself, injects HTTP data and initiates TLS renegotiation with the server. Then attacker allows the renegotiation to occur between the client and the server. After successful HTTPS session establishment with the server, now the client sends its HTTP request along with its HTTP credentials (cookie) to the server. However due to format of attacker's injected HTTP data, the client's HTTP request is not processed, rather the attacker's HTTP request gets executed with credentials of the client. The attacker is not able to view the results of the injected HTTP request due to the fact that data between the client and the server is encrypted over HTTPS.
ArubaOS itself does not initiate TLS renegotiation at any point.
This vulnerability may allow a MITM attacker to inject arbitrary HTTP request data into the beginning of a HTTPS session between client and server (ArubaOS WebUI). The only ArubaOS component that seems affected by this issue is the HTTPS WebUI administration interface.
Pre-requisites for this attack : 1. The attacker must be able to establish a MITM between the client and the server (ArubaOS WebUI). 2. The attacker must be able to establish a successful HTTPS session with the server (ArubaOS WebUI) 3. ArubaOS must be configured to allow certificate based HTTPS authentication for WebUI clients (client certs).
Captive Portal users do not seem vulnerable to this issue unless somehow client certificates are being used to authenticate captive portal users.
CVSS v2 BASE METRIC SCORE: 6.4 (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:P)
Aruba Networks recommends that all customers apply the appropriate patch(es) as soon as practical. However, in the event that a patch cannot immediately be applied, the following steps will help to mitigate the risk:
Note: This step won't stop command injection from attackers who have valid client certificates but their assigned management role privileges are lower than that of the admin. This attack may allow them to run commands at higher privilege than what is permitted in their role.
Aruba Networks recommends that all customers apply the appropriate patch(es) as soon as practical.
The following patches have the fix (any newer patch will also have the fix):
Please contact Aruba support for obtaining patched FIPS releases.
Please note: We highly recommend that you upgrade your Mobility Controller to the latest available patch on the Aruba support site corresponding to your currently installed release.
OBTAINING FIXED FIRMWARE
Aruba customers can obtain the firmware on the support website: http://www.arubanetworks.com/support.
Aruba Support contacts are as follows:
1-800-WiFiLAN (1-800-943-4526) (toll free from within North America) +1-408-754-1200 (toll call from anywhere in the world) e-mail: support(at)arubanetworks.com
Please, do not contact either "wsirt(at)arubanetworks.com" or "security(at)arubanetworks.com" for software upgrades.
EXPLOITATION AND PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS
This vulnerability will be announced at
Aruba W.S.I.R.T. Advisory: http://www.arubanetworks.com/support/alerts/aid-020810.txt
SecurityFocus Bugtraq http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1
STATUS OF THIS NOTICE: Final
Although Aruba Networks cannot guarantee the accuracy of all statements in this advisory, all of the facts have been checked to the best of our ability. Aruba Networks does not anticipate issuing updated versions of this advisory unless there is some material change in the facts. Should there be a significant change in the facts, Aruba Networks may update this advisory.
A stand-alone copy or paraphrase of the text of this security advisory that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors.
DISTRIBUTION OF THIS ANNOUNCEMENT
This advisory will be posted on Aruba's website at: http://www.arubanetworks.com/support/alerts/aid-020810.txt
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Aruba's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates.
Revision 1.0 / 02-08-2010 / Initial release
ARUBA WSIRT SECURITY PROCEDURES
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Aruba Networks products, obtaining assistance with security incidents is available at http://www.arubanetworks.com/support/wsirt.php
For reporting NEW Aruba Networks security issues, email can be sent to wsirt(at)arubanetworks.com or security(at)arubanetworks.com. For sensitive information we encourage the use of PGP encryption. Our public keys can be found at http://www.arubanetworks.com/support/wsirt.php
(c) Copyright 2010 by Aruba Networks, Inc.
This advisory may be redistributed freely after the release date given at the top of the text, provided that redistributed copies are complete and unmodified, including all date and version information. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.14 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/
iEYEARECAAYFAktwksYACgkQp6KijA4qefXErQCeKJW3YU3Nl7JY4+2Hp2zqM3bN bWAAoJWQT+yeWX2q+02hNEwHWQtGf1YP =CrHf -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----