Inconsistent balance comparison of nativeToken in executeTrades

Handle kenzo Vulnerability details When toToken == nativeToken, executeTrades compares Executioner's starting nativeToken balance to Executioner's ending wrappedNativeToken balance. Impact Loss of user funds or DOS of executeTrades: if there is extra ETH in Executioner contract, finalOutputAmount...

initialBalance for native token is wrong

Handle WatchPug Vulnerability details function executeTrades address fromToken, address toToken, uint256 fromAmount, TradeFormat calldata trades, uint256 finalAmountMin, address depricated external nonReentrant payable depricated; requirefinalAmountMin 0, "Slingshot: finalAmountMin cannot be zero...

initialBalance and finalBalance calculated in a different way

Handle gpersoon Vulnerability details Impact The function executeTrades of Slingshot.sol calulates the initialBalance and finalBalance in a different way. If toToken == nativeToken then: initialBalance == executioner.balance; finalBalance == wrappedNativeToken.balanceOfaddressexecutioner This cou...