praisonai-platform: Issue endpoints accept any issue_id without workspace ownership check, cross-workspace read/update/delete IDOR

SummaryType: Insecure Direct Object Reference. The issue CRUD endpoints GET / PATCH / DELETE /workspaces/workspaceid/issues/issueid gate access on requireworkspacememberworkspaceid only, then resolve issueid through IssueService.getissueid which is a primary-key lookup with no workspace constrain...

PYSEC-2026-2932 praisonai-platform: Project endpoints accept any project_id without workspace ownership check, cross-workspace read/update/delete IDOR

Summary Type: Insecure Direct Object Reference. The project CRUD endpoints GET / PATCH / DELETE /workspaces/workspaceid/projects/projectid and GET .../projectid/stats gate access on requireworkspacememberworkspaceid only, then resolve projectid through ProjectService.getprojectid / updateprojecti...

PYSEC-2026-2933 praisonai-platform: Comment endpoints accept any issue_id without workspace ownership check, cross-workspace comment read and post IDOR

Summary Type: Insecure Direct Object Reference. The comment endpoints POST /workspaces/workspaceid/issues/issueid/comments and GET .../comments gate access on requireworkspacememberworkspaceid only, then call CommentService.createissueid=issueid, ... and CommentService.listforissueissueid without...

praisonai-platform: Any workspace member can rewrite workspace name, description, and settings via PATCH /workspaces/{id}

SummaryType: Authorization bypass enabling workspace metadata + settings tampering. The PATCH /workspaces/workspaceid endpoint is gated only by requireworkspacememberworkspaceid default minrole="member". Any member can rewrite the workspace's name, description, and the settings JSON blob. The...

praisonai-platform: Project endpoints accept any project_id without workspace ownership check, cross-workspace read/update/delete IDOR

SummaryType: Insecure Direct Object Reference. The project CRUD endpoints GET / PATCH / DELETE /workspaces/workspaceid/projects/projectid and GET .../projectid/stats gate access on requireworkspacememberworkspaceid only, then resolve projectid through ProjectService.getprojectid / updateprojectid...

praisonai-platform: Any workspace member can delete the entire workspace via DELETE /workspaces/{id}

SummaryType: Authorization bypass enabling destructive action. The DELETE /workspaces/workspaceid endpoint is gated only by requireworkspacememberworkspaceid default minrole="member". Any member of the workspace can issue a single DELETE to wipe the entire workspace, including every project, issu...

praisonai-platform: Comment endpoints accept any issue_id without workspace ownership check, cross-workspace comment read and post IDOR

SummaryType: Insecure Direct Object Reference. The comment endpoints POST /workspaces/workspaceid/issues/issueid/comments and GET .../comments gate access on requireworkspacememberworkspaceid only, then call CommentService.createissueid=issueid, ... and CommentService.listforissueissueid without...

PYSEC-2026-2934 praisonai-platform: Any workspace member can delete the entire workspace via DELETE /workspaces/{id}

Summary Type: Authorization bypass enabling destructive action. The DELETE /workspaces/workspaceid endpoint is gated only by requireworkspacememberworkspaceid default minrole="member". Any member of the workspace can issue a single DELETE to wipe the entire workspace, including every project,...

praisonai-platform: Label endpoints' unchecked label_id/issue_id enable cross-workspace label IDOR (edit, delete, link)

SummaryType: Insecure Direct Object Reference. Five label endpoints — PATCH /workspaces/workspaceid/labels/labelid, DELETE .../labels/labelid, POST .../issues/issueid/labels/labelid, DELETE .../issues/issueid/labels/labelid, GET .../issues/issueid/labels — gate access on...

PYSEC-2026-2935 PraisonAI has Cross-Workspace IDOR and Privilege Escalation via Platform API

Summary The PraisonAI Platform API has two authorization failures that together break workspace isolation. The service layer for issues and projects performs global primary-key lookups without checking workspace ownership, so any authenticated user can read, modify, and delete resources in any...

PYSEC-2026-2928 praisonai-platform: IDOR in dependency endpoints allows cross-workspace issue linking, reading, and deletion due to missing ownership checks

Summary Type: Insecure Direct Object Reference. The dependency endpoints POST/GET /workspaces/workspaceid/issues/issueid/dependencies and DELETE .../dependencies/depid gate access on requireworkspacememberworkspaceid only, then dispatch to DependencyService calls that take URL/body-supplied issue...

PYSEC-2026-2930 PraisonAI Platform workspace-scoped routes allow cross-workspace object access by global object ID

Summary PraisonAI Platform's workspace-scoped REST routes contain a systemic object-level authorization flaw that allows an authenticated user from one workspace to access, modify, and delete objects belonging to another workspace by supplying the victim object's global UUID. The affected pattern...

PYSEC-2026-2916 PraisonAI has an Arbitrary File Write in Python API

Bug Report: Arbitrary File Write in Python API Summary Hidden metadata in a webpage causes PraisonAI agents to write attacker-controlled content to arbitrary paths. writefile skips path validation when workspace=None always None in production. Affected PraisonAI outputfile: /tmp/flag.txt...

PYSEC-2026-2936 PraisonAI Platform: Missing role checks let any workspace member become owner and control workspace membership

Summary PraisonAI Platform has a broken workspace authorization check that allows any authenticated low-privilege workspace member to escalate their own role to owner. The issue is caused by privileged workspace-management routes using the shared dependency requireworkspacemember... without...

PYSEC-2026-2929 praisonai-platform: Label endpoints' unchecked label_id/issue_id enable cross-workspace label IDOR (edit, delete, link)

Summary Type: Insecure Direct Object Reference. Five label endpoints — PATCH /workspaces/workspaceid/labels/labelid, DELETE .../labels/labelid, POST .../issues/issueid/labels/labelid, DELETE .../issues/issueid/labels/labelid, GET .../issues/issueid/labels — gate access on...

PYSEC-2026-2938 praisonai-platform: Missing authorization on member removal enables full workspace takeover by any user regardless of role

Summary Type: Authorization bypass enabling owner lockout. The DELETE /workspaces/workspaceid/members/userid endpoint is gated only by requireworkspacememberworkspaceid default minrole="member". Any member can remove any other member, including the workspace owner, using a single DELETE. There is...

PYSEC-2026-2927 praisonai-platform: list_issue_activity returns activity log for any issue regardless of workspace ownership

Summary Type: Insecure Direct Object Reference. The GET /workspaces/workspaceid/issues/issueid/activity endpoint is gated by requireworkspacememberworkspaceid and dispatches to ActivityService.listforissueissueid, which executes SELECT FROM activity WHERE issueid = :issueid with no workspace...

PYSEC-2026-2423 compliance-trestle - jinja has an Arbitrary File Write via Path Traversal

Relevant Products/Components: trestle/core/commands/author/jinja.py trestle author jinja --- Detailed Description: The -o/--output argument in trestle author jinja allows writing files outside the intended workspace. The application does not properly validate: ../ ..\ absolute paths This allows...

PYSEC-2026-2749 Open WebUI's Model Import Overwrites Any Model Without Ownership Check

Model Import Overwrites Any Model Without Ownership Check Affected Component Model import endpoint: - backend/openwebui/routers/models.py lines 254-308, importmodels Affected Versions Current main branch commit 6fdd19bf1 and likely all versions with model import functionality. Description The POS...

PYSEC-2026-2894 PPTAgent: Arbitrary File Write via `save_generated_slides`

Summary This vulnerability has been fixed in https://github.com/icip-cas/PPTAgent/commit/418491a9a1c02d9d93194b5973bb58df35cf9d00. The savegeneratedslides MCP tool accepts a pptxpath argument and writes the generated PPTX file to that path without any workspace restriction or path validation:...