Attacker can cause deposits to be locked in the Solana lockbox

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact An attacker can cause deposits to be locked in the lockbox Proof of Concept In withdraw, if the position has 0 liquidity the execution is reverted function withdrawuint64 amount external address positionAddress =...

tokens can be deposited and immediately withdrawn before the intended lock time by depositing right before expiry

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact tokens can be deposited and immediately withdrawn before the intended lock time by depositing right before expiry. Proof of Concept There is edge cases around the locking and unlocking periods that are not fully considered in the contract. Specifically,...

Griefing attack on liquidity_lockbox withdrawals due to lack of minimum deposit

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The liquiditylockbox contract does not enforce a minimum deposit limit. This allows a user to open many positions with minimum liquidity, forcing other users to close these positions one by one in order to withdraw. This could lead to a griefing attack...

GHSA-4MVM-XH8J-FV27 Duplicate Advisory: govuk_tech_docs vulnerable to unescaped HTML on search results page

Duplicate Advisory This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-x2xw-hw8g-6773. This link is maintained to preserve external references. Original Description versions from 2.0.2 to before 3.3.1 are vulnerable to a cross-site scripting vulnerability. Malicious JavaScript may ...

Ether will get stuck in ERC20TokenEmitter

Lines of code Vulnerability details ERC20TokenEmitter.sol:buyToken distributes the funds sent to purchase the tokens in the following way: 2.5% of the funds are sent to the RevolutionProtocolRewards contract. From the remaining funds, a percentage dependent on the creatorRateBps variable is sent ...

Number withdrawn

Kashipara Job Portal is an online job portal system from Kashipara. This CVE number has been withdrawn...

Number withdrawn

Kashipara Job Portal is an online job portal system from Kashipara. This CVE number has been withdrawn...

borrower can prevent liquidity provider from withdrawing their liquidity

Lines of code Vulnerability details Description When a liquidity provider wants to withdraw their liquidity they can call ParticlePositionManager::reclaimLiquidity. This will prevent any renewals: ParticlePositionManager::addPremium: File: protocol/ParticlePositionManager.sol 508: // check LP...

Number withdrawn

Kashipara Job Portal is an online job portal system from Kashipara. This CVE number has been withdrawn...

In case if wLP will be blacklisted then user will not be able to withdraw it

Lines of code Vulnerability details Proof of Concept When users deposit wLP tokens as collateral, then they are checked to be whitelisted. Later, it's possible that for some reason wLP token will be backlisted by governor. And once it's done, then users, who already used that wLP tokens as...

CVE-2023-27171

DO NOT USE THIS CANDIDATE NUMBER. ConsultIDs: none. Reason: This candidate was withdrawn by its CNA. Further investigation showed that it was not a security issue. Notes: none...

Design/Logic Flaw

Rejected reason: DO NOT USE THIS CANDIDATE NUMBER. ConsultIDs: none. Reason: This candidate was withdrawn by its CNA. Further investigation showed that it was not a security issue. Notes: none...

Funds are lost when Curve pool is killed (paused)

Lines of code Vulnerability details Vulnerability Details If self.iskilled in the curve pool contract becomes true, users will be unable to close their position because removeliquidityonecoinwill revert. Users will be unable to exit their position. if outputToken == zToken uint256 wethBalance =...

Withdraws will be bricked if the curve pool gets killed

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Liquidity will be locked forever since there is no interface to remove it. Proof of Concept Curve pools have a killed parameter that allows an admin to kill the pool, suspend all deposits, swaps, and single token withdrawals, and then only allow for taki...

asD::withdrawCarry assumes wrong number of decimals returned by exchangeRateCurrent which will cause owner to not be able to withdraw revenue

Lines of code Vulnerability details tl;dr asD::withdrawCarry assumes that the exchange rate returned by the cNote contract will be scaled by 1e28, but in reality it will be only scaled by 1e18. It will cause withdrawCarry to always revert with Integer Underflow, which means that owner won't ever ...

The owner of the asD contract (i.e. the creator) can not withdraw the accrued interest

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The asD.withdrawCarry function will always throw an error for all normal totalSupply values due to inappropriate scale factor. So the creator can withdraw the accrued interest only after all users will burn their asD tokens. Proof of Concept The scale...

Max withdrawable calculation is incorrect in asD contract

Lines of code Vulnerability details Summary The implementation of the max withdrawable amount is incorrect as it divides the calculation by the wrong denominator, leading to an incorrect result and a potential denial of service due to an overflow. Impact In the Application Specific Dollar protoco...

Cannot withdraw 1:1

Lines of code Vulnerability details function testX public uint256 mintAmount = 10e18; NOTE.mintalice, mintAmount; vm.startPrankalice; NOTE.approveaddressasdToken, mintAmount; asdToken.mintmintAmount; uint256 newExchangeRate = 1.1e28; cNOTE.setExchangeRatenewExchangeRate; vm.startPrankowner;...

Funds cannot be withdrawn from EigenLayer

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact NodeDelegator contracts handle depositing LSTs into EigenLayer to earn yield. However the contract lacks functions to withdraw those tokens afterwards, meaning they will become trapped in the EigenLayer protocol. This breaks the functionality of the...

Intrinsic arbitrage between assets due to price feed deviation threshold

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Withdrawals have not yet been implemented but I assume it will be implemented in the usual way such that the fraction of total supply of rsETH a user redeems gives him an equal fraction of total assets held, i.e. received = sharesToRedeem totalAssets /...