Anyone can withdraw contract funds

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact There is a critical impact that an attacker could drain the entire eth balance of the contract by calling this refundETH function which lacks a modifier. The funds will go always to the caller of the function. Proof of Concept It is not a complex attack ...

Unprotected Ether Withdrawal

Lines of code Vulnerability details Description Due to missing or insufficient access controls, malicious parties can withdraw some or all Ether from the contract account. This bug is sometimes caused by unintentionally exposing initialization functions. By wrongly naming a function intended to b...

Anyone can withdraw all the WETH sent to Payment contract

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Anyone can withdraw all the WETH sent to Payment contract Proof of Concept 1. Someone send WETH to Payment contract 2. Attacker will call unwrapWETH with amountMinimum = WETH balance of Payment contract and recipient = any attacker controlled address 3...

protocolFeeRecipient might take unclaimed reward token after quest ends.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Since there is no code to check whether fee has been drawn, withdrawFee might be called multiple times. This allows protocolFeeRecipient to steal all of the unclaimed reward tokens after quest ended. Proof of Concept Provide direct links to all reference...

PT-2023-13065 · Undefined · Undefined

Name of the Vulnerable Software and Affected Versions: No vulnerable software or affected versions specified. Description: The issue was investigated and found not to be a security issue. It was withdrawn by its CNA. Recommendations: At the moment, there is no information about a newer version th...

RSR will stuck + Withdrawal wont work

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Withdrawals will not work once seizeRSR is called. Also this will cause some RSR to become unusable as shown in POC Proof of Concept 1. Lets say 3 unstakes were made for stakeRSR 20,30,40 using unstake function by User A, B, C 2. This calls the pushDraft...

Proper use of dependecy

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Using safeTransferFrom of solmate. There is no checking the token address is exist Proof of Concept After consulting the dev, the only check for making sure the token exist is a list on the UI/fontend side. A highly motivated attacker can easily disable...

编号撤回

This CVE number has been withdrawn...

编号撤回

This CVE number has been withdrawn...

CVE-2014-125043

Rejected reason: DO NOT USE THIS CANDIDATE NUMBER. ConsultIDs: none. Reason: This candidate was withdrawn by its CNA. Further investigation showed that it was not a security issue. Notes: none...

Design/Logic Flaw

Rejected reason: DO NOT USE THIS CANDIDATE NUMBER. ConsultIDs: none. Reason: This candidate was withdrawn by its CNA. Further investigation showed that it was not a security issue. Notes: none...

PROTOCOL MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO OPERATE DUE TO LACK OF FUNDS

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Redeem/withdraw functionality will fail under certain conditions and users who want to redeem/withdraw their AVAX will not be able to. Proof of Concept Users stake their AVAX and in return get ggAVAX. The AVAX provided by the users is then staked by the...

Malicious user can use previously used nodeID to prevent user(s) from withdrawing minipool funds

Lines of code Vulnerability details In createMinipool, an event is emitted with details of a newly created minipool. This includes relevant information that a subsequent user can utilise to create another minipool.The only condition that prevents a minipool from being created again with the same...

Possible to block withdrawal of staked funds after recordStakingEnd or stakingError

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Node operators can lose their staked AVAX after stakingEnd or stakingError. Funds will be locked in the Staking contract, but impossible to withdraw. A bad actor does need to supply 1000 AVAX which he gets back and has not have real incentive to do it, b...

NODE OPERATORS CAN WITHDRAW ALL THEIR GGP COLLATERAL BEFORE VALIDATION PERIOD ENDS THEREBY AVOIDING SLASHING.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact 1. Node operators can avoid slashing, thus no penalties. 2. Node operators can withdraw their entire GGP collateral before the validation period is over. Proof of Concept The withdrawGGP function in Staking.sol transfers back to node operator excess GGP...

CVE-2020-2068

Rejected reason: DO NOT USE THIS CANDIDATE NUMBER. ConsultIDs: none. Reason: This candidate is unused by its CNA. Notes: none...

Pair.sol has payable functions with no way of withdrawing that ether

Lines of code Vulnerability details Pair.sol has payable functions with no way of withdrawing that ether Summary Value is deposited on the contract using payable functions but later can't be taken out Impact Locked ether Proof of Concept Pair.adduint256,uint256,uint256 Pair.buyuint256,uint256...

User can send a proposal and instantly take back their collateral, keeping the proposal active without risking any Raes amount.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Description In OptimisticListingSeaport.sol, users call propose to set a new proposal. The pendingBalance is updated immediately for the calling proposer: // Sets collateral amount to pending balances for withdrawal pendingBalancesvaultproposedListing.proposer ...

Priority queue min accounting breaks when nodes are split in two

Lines of code Vulnerability details The README states If two users place bids at the same price but with different quantities, the queue will pull from the bid with a higher quantity first, but the data-structure used for implementing this logic, is not used properly and essentially has its data...

Admin can withdraw the NFT before the winner timelock ends

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The admin could set recoverTimelock before drawBufferTime , thus he can withdraw the NFT before the winner Draw buffer time ends. Proof of Concept The drawBufferTime need to be more then an hour and less then a month and the recoverTimelock need to be at...